Congressional Testimony

S. HRG. 114–397 FEDERAL RESERVE’S SECOND MONETARY POLICY REPORT FOR 2016 HEARING BEFORETHE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, ANDURBANAFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON OVERSIGHT ON THE MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSU- ANTTOTHEFULLEMPLOYMENTANDBALANCEDGROWTHACTOF1978 JUNE 21, 2016 Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs ( Available at: http://www.fdsys.gov/ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 22–224 PDF WASHINGTON : 2016 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman MIKE CRAPO, Idaho SHERROD BROWN, Ohio BOB CORKER, Tennessee JACK REED, Rhode Island DAVID VITTER, Louisiana CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey MARK KIRK, Illinois JON TESTER, Montana DEAN HELLER, Nevada MARK R. WARNER, Virginia TIM SCOTT, South Carolina JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon BEN SASSE, Nebraska ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts TOM COTTON, Arkansas HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota JOE DONNELLY, Indiana JERRY MORAN, Kansas WILLIAM D. DUHNKE III, Staff Director and Counsel MARK POWDEN, Democratic Staff Director DANA WADE, Deputy Staff Director JELENA MCWILLIAMS, Chief Counsel THOMAS HOGAN, Chief Economist SHELBY BEGANY, Professional Staff Member LAURA SWANSON, Democratic Deputy Staff Director GRAHAM STEELE, Democratic Chief Counsel DAWN RATLIFF, Chief Clerk TROY CORNELL, Hearing Clerk SHELVIN SIMMONS, IT Director JIM CROWELL, Editor (II) VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON C O N T E N T S TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 2016 Page Opening statement of Chairman Shelby ................................................................ 1 Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of: Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 2 WITNESS Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ...... 4 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 Responses to written questions of: Chairman Shelby ....................................................................................... 44 Senator Crapo ............................................................................................ 47 Senator Toomey ......................................................................................... 49 Senator Kirk .............................................................................................. 51 Senator Heller ........................................................................................... 53 Senator Sasse ............................................................................................ 57 Senator Rounds ......................................................................................... 63 Senator Menendez ..................................................................................... 64 Senator Merkley ........................................................................................ 71 Senator Heitkamp ..................................................................................... 74 ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOR THE RECORD Monetary Policy Report to the Congress dated June 21, 2016 ............................ 79 (III) VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON FEDERAL RESERVE’S SECOND MONETARY POLICY REPORT FOR 2016 TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 2016 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The Committee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD–538, Dirksen Sen- ate Office Building, Hon. Richard C. Shelby, Chairman of the Com- mittee, presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RICHARD C. SHELBY Chairman SHELBY. The Committee will come to order. Today we will receive testimony from Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen regarding the Fed’s semiannual report on monetary policy. And while Humphrey-Hawkins testimony is a key part of Congress’ oversight of our Nation’s central bank, it is not sufficient to provide Congress and the American public with a full picture of Fed policymaking. I have often remarked during these hearings about the impor- tance of striking the right balance between transparency and inde- pendence. One of the Fed’s stated reasons for maintaining its inde- pendence is to avoid politicizing its decisions. I agree that politics have no place at the Federal Reserve. And while the line between politics and policy can be quite fine, it should, nonetheless, be clear and unambiguous. The Fed should act, I believe, in a manner consistent with its statutory mandate in the interest of the stability of the U.S. econ- omy whether or not such policies align with the goals of Congress or the Administration. Our central bank is independent and should remain so. The de- sire to preserve the Fed’s independence should not preclude consid- eration of additional measures to increase the transparency of the Board’s actions. In fact, some have argued that better disclosure of monetary policy strategy could actually bolster independence. Earlier this year, a prominent group of economists, including three Nobel Prize winners, agreed in a statement that, and I will quote, ‘‘ . . . publicly reporting a strategy helps prevent policy- makers from bending under pressure and sacrificing independ- ence.’’ The Fed continues to resist calls by Congress to disclose mone- tary rules, even though it claims to use such rules regularly. In its public communications, the Fed has veered further away from data-driven analysis toward the exercise of even more discretion. (1) VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 2 For example, rather than adhering precisely to its stated goals for inflation and employment, the Federal Open Market Committee appears to base certain decisions on factors such as ‘‘financial and international developments’’ that cannot be derived from quan- titative analysis. Similarly, the Fed’s regulatory conduct has become increasingly opaque and complicated. This is demonstrated by the inherent com- plexity and overlap in its capital and liquidity rules, stress testing, and resolution and recovery planning. Two weeks ago, a panel of experts testified before this Committee that complex regulations might actually increase rather than de- crease risk in the banking system. They also criticized the lack of analysis and transparency in the rulemaking process. This is espe- cially true of Basel rules established by an international committee and imposed by domestic regulators on our institutions, without adequate tailoring. The Fed did not even do its own quantitative study for Basel III, as it did, Madam Chair, for Basel I and II. It instead relied on the Basel Committee’s analysis, which included data from only 13— only 13—U.S. banks out of the 249 banks that were studied. Such an approach is concerning. The Fed should perform, I be- lieve, rigorous analysis, not only for each rule but also on the cu- mulative impact of capital and liquidity regulations. If our banking regulators are unable or unwilling to conduct such analysis, then we should consider mandating it. Even the European Commission analyzes these factors in its reg- ulatory framework. In a recent Call for Evidence, it solicited feed- back from the public to ‘‘ . . . evaluate the interaction between fi- nancial regulations and assess their cumulative impact.’’ We should expect no less from our own regulators. Chair Yellen, I look forward to your testimony today and your thoughts on these important issues. I think it is a very important hearing. Senator Brown. STATEMENT OF SENATOR SHERROD BROWN Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Madam Chair, welcome back to the Committee. We are so glad you are here. Since your last appearance, the economy has made only modest gains. Inflation remains low. Job creation seems to have slowed. The economies of our trading partners struggle. Uncertainty, most notably with the possibility of Britain’s exit from the European, re- mains high. In the face of these headwinds, you would think that politicians here at home would do everything we could to promote our econ- omy. Instead, many of them seem intent on doing just the opposite. My colleagues on the other side of the aisle are failing to invest in infrastructure, in public works, in research and development, in education, in training—the very building blocks of our economic success. If that were not enough, they are trying their level best to undermine the safeguards that dampened the economic crisis and were erected to prevent the next one. They would like to repeal Dodd-Frank and return our country to the casino capitalism that caused so much ruin for families and communities across our coun- VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 3 try. And they are trying to politicize and undermine the Federal Reserve, despite the key actions that it has taken to help the recov- ery. Congress rated its reserves and reduced dividend payments in order to pay for a transportation bill. Many of my colleagues are trying to insert Congress into monetary policy decisions. This Com- mittee has yet to even hold a hearing on the two nominees to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and bad legislative ideas continue to multiply. The presumptive nominee of the Republican Party is a factory of bad ideas. Moody’s Analytics recently released a report that states that, if adopted, his economic proposals would leave our economy ‘‘significantly weaker.’’ He suggests that he would replace the cur- rent Fed Chair based on imagined partisan political considerations. That is a bad idea. You might argue that someone is failing to pur- sue the right course on monetary and regulatory policy, but par- tisan labels should never be part of that discourse. The presumptive nominee has suggested he would simply renego- tiate or renege on our debt, comfortable in the belief that the United States can never default ‘‘because you print the money.’’ In his opinion, he understands debt ‘‘better than probably anybody.’’ His words. He also thinks, along with the runner-up for the Repub- lican nomination, that this country should return to the gold stand- ard. When Ron Paul was promoting this idea a few years ago, the Wall Street Journal reported on a poll of a panel of economists and whether a return to the gold standard would improve price sta- bility and unemployment. The response was split between those who disagreed and those who strongly disagreed. Not one person thought it would help. So we do not know if it is just a bad idea or a really, really bad idea. But as one University of Chicago professor put it, ‘‘Love of the gold standard implies macroeconomic illiteracy.’’ If your own very good brain is your top consultant, I suppose the unanimous opinion of a diverse group of economists does not count for much. But for those of us in the evidence-based world, the prospect of this nominee trading imagined for real authority gives added sig- nificance to what we do in the Banking Committee and what we do in Congress. That is true in general. It is particularly true with maintaining the independence of the Federal Reserve and the other regulators of the financial services industry. Madam Chair, I think you have shown your commitment to an independent, data-driven Federal Reserve. I commend you for that. We are grateful for that. I hope we can work together to maintain it. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Madam Chair, your written testimony in its entirety will be made part of the hearing record. We welcome you here today again. You are no stranger to this Committee, and you proceed as you wish. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 4 STATEMENT OF JANET L. YELLEN, CHAIR, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Ms. YELLEN. Thank you. Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member Brown, and other Members of the Committee, I am pleased to present the Federal Reserve’s semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. In my remarks today, I will briefly discuss the current economic situation and outlook before turning to monetary policy. Since my last appearance before this Committee in February, the economy has made further progress toward the Federal Reserve’s objective of maximum employment. And while inflation has contin- ued to run below our 2-percent objective, the Federal Open Market Committee expects inflation to rise to that level over the medium term. However, the pace of improvement in the labor market ap- pears to have slowed more recently, suggesting that our cautious approach to adjusting monetary policy remains appropriate. In the labor market, the cumulative increase in jobs since its trough in early 2010 has now topped 14 million, while the unem- ployment rate has fallen more than 5 percentage points from its peak. In addition, as we detail in the Monetary Policy Report, job- less rates have declined for all major demographic groups, includ- ing for African Americans and Hispanics. Despite these declines, however, it is troubling that unemployment rates for these minor- ity groups remain higher than for the Nation overall, and that the annual income of the median African American household is still well below the median income of other U.S. households. During the first quarter of this year, job gains averaged 200,000 per month, just a bit slower than last year’s pace. And while the unemployment rate held steady at 5 percent over this period, the labor force participation rate moved up noticeably. In April and May, however, the average pace of job gains slowed to only 80,000 per month or about 100,000 per month after adjustment for the ef- fects of a strike. The unemployment rate fell to 4.7 percent in May, but that decline mainly occurred because fewer people reported that they were actively seeking work. A broader measure of labor market slack that includes workers marginally attached to the workforce and those working part-time who would prefer full-time work was unchanged in May and remains above its level prior to the recession. Of course, it is important not to overreact to one or two reports, and several other timely indicators of labor market conditions still look favorable. One notable development is that there are some tentative signs that wage growth may finally be picking up. That said, we will be watching the job market carefully to see whether the recent slowing in employment growth is transitory, as we be- lieve it is. Economic growth has been uneven over recent quarters. U.S. in- flation-adjusted gross domestic product is currently estimated to have increased at an annual rate of only 3⁄ 4 percent in the first quarter of this year. Subdued foreign growth and the appreciation of the dollar weighed on exports, while the energy sector was hard hit by the steep drop in oil prices since mid-2014; in addition, busi- ness investment outside of the energy sector was surprisingly weak. However, the available indicators point to a noticeable step- VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 5 up in GDP growth in the second quarter. In particular, consumer spending has picked up smartly in recent months, supported by solid growth in real disposable income and the ongoing effects of the increases in household wealth. And housing has continued to recover gradually, aided by income gains and the very low level of mortgage rates. The recent pickup in household spending, together with under- lying conditions that are favorable for growth, lead me to be opti- mistic that we will see further improvements in the labor market and the economy more broadly over the next few years. Monetary policy remains accommodative; low oil prices and ongoing job gains should continue to support the growth of incomes and, therefore, consumer spending; fiscal policy is now a small positive for growth; and global economic growth should pick up over time, supported by accommodative monetary policies abroad. As a result, the FOMC expects that with gradual increases in the Federal funds rate, eco- nomic activity will continue to expand at a moderate pace and labor market indicators will strengthen further. Turning to inflation, overall consumer prices, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, increased just 1 percent over the 12 months ending in April, up noticeably from its pace through much of last year but still well short of the Com- mittee’s 2-percent objective. Much of this shortfall continues to re- flect earlier declines in energy prices and lower prices for imports. Core inflation, which excludes energy and food prices, has been running close to 11⁄ 2 percent. As the transitory influences holding down inflation fade and the labor market strengthens further, the Committee expects inflation to rise to 2 percent over the medium term. Nonetheless, in considering future policy decisions, we will continue to carefully monitor actual and expected progress toward our inflation goal. Of course, considerable uncertainty about the economic outlook remains. The latest readings on the labor market and the weak pace of investment illustrate one downside risk—that domestic de- mand might falter. In addition, although I am optimistic about the longer-run prospects for the U.S. economy, we cannot rule out the possibility expressed by some prominent economists that the slow productivity growth seen in recent years will continue into the fu- ture. Vulnerabilities in the global economy also remain. Although concerns about slowing growth in China and falling commodity prices appear to have eased from earlier this year, China continues to face considerable challenges as it rebalances its economy toward domestic demand and consumption and away from export-led growth. More generally, in the current environment of sluggish growth, low inflation, and already very accommodative monetary policy in many advanced economies, investor perceptions of and ap- petite for risk can change abruptly. One development that could shift investor sentiment is the upcoming referendum in the United Kingdom. A U.K. vote to exit the European Union could have sig- nificant economic repercussions. For all of these reasons, the Com- mittee is closely monitoring global economic and financial develop- ments and their implications for domestic economic activity, labor markets, and inflation. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 6 I will turn next to monetary policy. The FOMC seeks to promote maximum employment and price stability, as mandated by Con- gress. Given the economic situation I just described, monetary pol- icy has remained accommodative over the first half of this year to support further improvements in the labor market and a return of inflation to our 2-percent objective. Specifically, the FOMC has maintained the target range for the Federal funds rate at 1⁄ 4 to 1⁄ 2 percent and has kept the Federal Reserve’s holdings of longer-term securities at an elevated level. The Committee’s actions reflect a careful assessment of the ap- propriate setting for monetary policy, taking into account con- tinuing below-target inflation and the mixed readings on the labor market and economic growth seen this year. Proceeding cautiously in raising the Federal funds rate will allow us to keep the mone- tary support to economic growth in place while we assess whether growth is returning to a moderate pace, whether the labor market will strengthen further, and whether inflation will continue to make progress toward our 2-percent objective. Another factor that supports taking a cautious approach in rais- ing the Federal funds rate is that the Federal funds rate is still near its effective lower bound. If inflation were to remain persist- ently low or the labor market were to weaken, the Committee would have only limited room to reduce the target range for the Federal funds rate. However, if the economy were to overheat and inflation seemed likely to move significantly or persistently above 2 percent, the FOMC could readily increase the target range for the Federal funds rate. The FOMC continues to anticipate that economic conditions will improve further and that the economy will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual increases in the Federal funds rate. In addition, the Committee expects that the Federal funds rate is like- ly to remain, for some time, below the levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run because headwinds—which include re- straint on U.S. economic activity from economic and financial de- velopments abroad, subdued household formation, and meager pro- ductivity growth—mean that the interest rate needed to keep the economy operating near its potential is low by historical standards. If these headwinds slowly fade over time, as the Committee ex- pects, then gradual increases in the Federal funds rate are likely to be needed. In line with that view, most FOMC participants, based on their projections prepared for the June meeting, antici- pate that values for the Federal funds rate of less than 1 percent at the end of this year and less than 2 percent at the end of next year will be consistent with their assessment of appropriate mone- tary policy. Of course, the economic outlook is uncertain, so monetary policy is by no means on a preset course and FOMC participants’ projec- tions for the Federal funds rate are not a predetermined plan for future policy. The actual path of the Federal funds rate will depend on economic and financial developments and their implications for the outlook and associated risks. Stronger growth or a more rapid increase in inflation than the Committee currently anticipates would likely make it appropriate to raise the Federal funds rate more quickly. Conversely, if the economy were to disappoint, a VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 7 lower path of the Federal funds rate would be appropriate. We are committed to our dual objectives, and we will adjust policy as ap- propriate to foster financial conditions consistent with their attain- ment over time. The Committee is continuing its policy of reinvesting proceeds from maturing Treasury securities and principal payments from agency debt and mortgage-backed securities. As highlighted in the statement released after the June FOMC meeting, we anticipate continuing this policy until normalization of the level of the Fed- eral funds rate is well under way. Maintaining our sizable holdings of longer-term securities should help maintain accommodative fi- nancial conditions and should reduce the risk that we might have to lower the Federal funds rate to the effective lower bound in the event of a future large adverse shock. Thank you. I would be pleased to take your questions. Chairman SHELBY. Madam Chair, in recent years the Fed has in- creasingly used forward guidance to shape market expectations. However, the Fed’s frequently incorrect predictions of interest rate increases have caused it to lose some credibility among some quar- ters. How would you rate the utility of your forward guidance over the past several months? Ms. YELLEN. So in the past several months, we have used for- ward guidance less than we did in the aftermath of the financial crisis when we named calendar dates or gave explicit economic con- ditions that we would not need to see prevailing in the economy be- fore considering an increase in the Federal funds rate. We used that forward guidance in the aftermath of the crisis in order to help market participants understand how serious the crisis was and how long we thought we would need to maintain the Federal funds rate as its—— Chairman SHELBY. Are you saying you are not using forward guidance now or are you not relying on it as much as you were? Ms. YELLEN. We are not relying very much on forward guidance. We do publish every 3 months participants’ projections for the paths of the Federal funds rate that they believe will be appro- priate in light of their expectations about the performance of the economy. And sometimes those paths which participants discuss in their remarks are thought to constitute forward guidance about policy. I do believe those projections are helpful to the public in un- derstanding the path of the economy that participants think is like- ly and how, if those conditions prevail, they would see monetary policy as evolving. But as I always emphasize on every occasion, including in my prepared remarks, those paths, while I think they are helpful, are not a preset plan and not in any way a commitment. We are con- stantly trying to evaluate in light of incoming information the out- look and risks, and you see those paths change over time as we up- date our evaluation of the economic outlook. And I think that is a critical part of monetary policy. Chairman SHELBY. Has the slowing of the economy in certain areas caused you to kind of hold back a little bit at times informa- tion that you see there? VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 8 Ms. YELLEN. So for quite some time now, we have seen mixed de- velopments in the economy—some sectors slowing because of the decline in energy prices, strong dollar foreign growth; others pro- viding an offset. Throughout, until the last couple of months progress in the labor market has held up extremely well. Now, for the last few months, as I mentioned, job gains averaged 100,000 on a strike-adjusted basis, which is a substantial slowdown from the first quarter and from last year. And it is important for us to see ongoing progress in the labor market, so that is some- thing we want to carefully evaluate and is a focus of our attention. But economic growth has picked up from a weak pace, and if that slowdown is a reflection of weak growth earlier in the year, I am hopeful that we will see stronger job gains going forward. And while it is an important report, I would also emphasize that it is important never to overblow the significance of a single report or a small amount of data. Other information about the labor market suggests it continues to perform well. Chairman SHELBY. Do you see a clear path ahead as far as your trajectory going forward on the economy picking up? Or are you not sure yet? Ms. YELLEN. That is what you see in all of the projections that were provided in connection last week with our June FOMC meet- ing. But, of course, there is uncertainty about that, and given that inflation remains low, we have the ability to watch economic devel- opments and try to make sure the economy is on a favorable path before raising rates. Chairman SHELBY. Madam Chair, the FOMC’s target for the Fed funds rate has been at one-half percent or lower since December 2008. A report last year from the Bank of International Settle- ments found that the prolonged period of low interest rates may be damaging the U.S. economy, resulting in, and I will quote, ‘‘too much debt and too little growth.’’ In addition, the report states that low rates may in part have contributed to costly financial booms and busts. Do you agree that persistently low interest rates can have nega- tive long-term effects on the U.S. economy? And could you explain? Ms. YELLEN. Well, I believe that the persistent low interest rates we have had have been essential to—— Chairman SHELBY. Can have—— Ms. YELLEN. ——achieving the progress. But, of course, low rates can induce households or banks or firms to reach for yield and can stoke financial instability. And we are very attentive to that possi- bility, and I would not at this time say that the threats from low rates to financial stability are elevated. I do not think they are ele- vated at this time. But it is, of course, something that we need to watch because it can have that impact. You mentioned debt. I do not think that we are seeing an undue buildup of debt throughout the economy. Leverage remains at moderate levels, well below where it was prior to the crisis. We are looking at credit growth which has picked up but is not at worrisome levels. So we are mon- itoring for potential impacts of low rates on financial stability, which I think is appropriate. Chairman SHELBY. Madam Chair, in an interview earlier this month, Governor Tarullo stated that the Fed is reviewing the ap- VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 9 plication of stress tests to regional banks, and he uses the word ‘‘probably’’ will exempt regional banks from the qualitative portion of CCAR. Last December, the Fed announced it was tailoring CCAR, but the tailoring turned out to be just a restatement of existing policy. What assurances can you give that this current review is a meaningful effort to tailor CCAR in a way that recognizes the dif- ferent risk profiles of banks? And if so, when do you expect to pub- lish such changes for comment? Ms. YELLEN. So we are engaging in a 5-year very serious review that has been informed by consultation with both financial sector participants and outside economists, and I do think that you will see meaningful changes. The suggestion that Governor Tarullo made that banks between $50 and $250 billion that are subject to the stress test and CCAR might be left out of the qualitative por- tions of CCAR, still the stress test would be applied, but the whole qualitative part of CCAR that relates to capital planning, that they might be exempted from that, I think that is very likely. We will look at other changes as well that, as you said, are designed to ap- propriately tailor it so that its impact is most significant for the largest and most systemic firms. It will be a very meaningful re- view, and I believe we will be proceeding on it shortly. Chairman SHELBY. Well, my last observation has to do with you alluded to the fact that, come Thursday, there is a big referendum in the United Kingdom as to whether to stay in the European Union or start leaving. What is the real implication, or can you tell at this point, if the British were to leave the Common Market on us? There could be implications for the Common Market and for Britain. Ms. YELLEN. Well, it is a very important relationship. It would be significant for the United Kingdom and for Europe as a whole. I think it would usher in a period of uncertainty, and it is very hard to predict, but there could be a period of financial market vol- atility that would negatively affect financial conditions and the U.S. economic outlook that is by no means certain. But it is some- thing that we will be carefully monitoring. Chairman SHELBY. Thank you. Senator Brown. Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Chair, first, thank you for your work on the recent insur- ance rules. I am pleased that the Fed has put out an Advance No- tice of Proposed Rulemaking to implement capital standards for the two large insurance companies, the two SIFIs, and the 12 insur- ance companies that are savings and loan holding companies. I ap- preciate how quickly you have moved on this and your constructive dialog with stakeholders. I think that your response to our efforts here made a huge difference in doing this right. This week, the Banking Committee will have a second hearing on capital and liquidity rules. Please discuss for us the Fed’s ap- proach to capital and liquidity rules for the Nation’s largest banks. Specifically, have these new rules made our financial system stronger? Ms. YELLEN. So I do believe that the enhancements that we have put in place to capital and liquidity requirements that are tailored VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 10 by firms’ size and systemic importance have made an enormous dif- ference to the safety and soundness of the U.S. financial system. The quantity of capital at the largest banking organizations has es- sentially doubled from before the crisis, and the quality of that cap- ital is very much higher. In addition to imposing higher static risk-based capital and lever- age requirements, our stress testing and capital planning exercises are very detailed, forward-looking exercises that are working to en- sure that the largest firms in extremely stressful conditions would be able to go on supporting the credit needs of the U.S. economy, of households and businesses. And I think this has been a very sig- nificant exercise and has resulted in a far superior understanding by the firms themselves of the risks they face and improved man- agement of those risks. Capital is not sufficient to assure financial stability. Often liquid- ity is what disappears in a financial crisis, and we have put in place, especially for the largest banking organizations, enhance- ments to liquidity through the liquidity coverage ratio and our pro- posed net stable funding ratio. And so I think this also works to enhance financial stability. So I think we have a much safer and sounder, less crisis prone system because of the enhancements that we have put in place. Senator BROWN. Thank you. We have talked in the past about how the current labor market data do not reflect what has hap- pened to minorities whose rates of unemployment are still much higher than the average. In your testimony today, for the first time—and thank you for that—you talked about minority unem- ployment rates and have included a new section in the semiannual Monetary Policy Report with this data and a discussion of whether the gains of the economic expansion have been widely enough shared. Discuss why the Fed made this addition to the report. Ms. YELLEN. Well, the Federal Reserve’s job is to try to achieve maximum employment and broad gains in the labor market that are as widely distributed as possible. And I believe it is very impor- tant for us to monitor how different groups in the labor market are doing to see if what we perceive as broad-based labor market im- provement is being widely shared. And there are very significant differences in success in the labor market across demographic groups, and I think it is important for us to be aware of those dif- ferences and to focus on them as we think about monetary policy and the broader work that the Federal Reserve does in the area of community development and trying to make sure that financial services are widely available to those that need it, including low- and moderate-income—— Senator BROWN. Well, that brings to mind a meeting I had just a few minutes ago with three people from my home town of Cleve- land, three community leaders, about the lack of diversity in terms of gender and ethnicity and race and the lack of diversity in terms of ideas that are the Class C Directors in many of your Federal Re- serves, your 12 Federal Reserves around the country, including in Cleveland. I would like to see and I think many of us on this panel would like to see a more diverse Federal Reserve System, including the VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 11 Governors, the reserve bank Presidents in the 12 regions, the Boards of Directors, the advisory committees, and employees. Discuss what you have done as Chair of the Fed, what more you can do to better address the financial needs of all Americans as you reach into the community better. And I know you have had a goal of doing that. You said that at maybe our first hearing, certainly one of our first meetings, particularly serving those unserved and underserved by the financial system. Ms. YELLEN. So I am personally committed and the Federal Re- serve as an organization is committed to achieving diversity within our workforce and within our leadership at absolutely all levels. I believe we have made progress. I am committed to seeing us make further progress, and in order to make sure that we are taking all of the steps that we possibly can to promote a diversity in economic inclusion, I have launched an interdisciplinary effort within the Federal Reserve to focus on all of our diversity initiatives, both in terms of our own hiring, hiring throughout the Federal Reserve System, our work in community development to promote access to credit, our work in the payment system to foster better and faster payments that can promote financial inclusion. I do believe we are making some progress, but I want us to make greater progress. At the Board, minorities currently represent 18 percent and women represent 37 percent of senior leadership. That is relatively common. Throughout the Federal Reserve System you would see similar numbers. And we have worked very hard to in- crease diversity among the reserve bank Directors, and Directors on the branch Boards have made quite a lot of progress. At this point minority representation stands at about 24 percent of reserve bank and branch Board Directors. About 30 percent are women. It is a matter that the Board focuses on annually in its oversight of the reserve banks that we regularly track our progress in increas- ing diversity in the Boards of Directors, and it is something we will continue to focus on. Diversity is an extremely important goal, and I will do everything I can to further advance it. Senator BROWN. Thank you. And I want to—my last question, but I want you to share with us in a continual way the progress you are making there, especially in the Class C Directors that they more represent the community, not just in diversity of look and background but diversity of ideas and all that. Last question. There currently are a record number of job open- ings, almost 6 million, but the May jobs data show that workers are not being hired for these jobs. What do we do to get Americans who want to work into these available jobs? What do we need to do better? Ms. YELLEN. So there are an enormous number of job openings, and there is a certain degree of mismatch of workers who are look- ing for work with the job openings that are available within the Federal Reserve, and I personally have been looking at workforce development programs, job training programs, some of which I think are doing a very good job of trying to build the skills and that are needed to fill available jobs and work to match workers with jobs. I was recently in Philadelphia and visited a very impressive pro- gram that is placing workers who have had trouble in the job mar- VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 12 ket into real jobs that can lead to upward mobility and a career in some of the Philadelphia hospitals. I have seen such programs around the country that I think have been effective, but obviously, our job at the Fed is to make sure we have a strong job market, that there are enough jobs that are being created. But helping that matching process, looking at training programs and educational op- portunities, I think that is a piece of the puzzle as well. Senator BROWN. As you have from time to time mentioned—‘‘ex- horted’’ is maybe too strong a word—that Congress needs to do a better job in terms of investment in public works and infrastruc- ture, also you have made comments from time to time about job training. Can you give us more instruction—in my last minute or so, could you give us more instruction on what we should do here? Ms. YELLEN. Well, I am not going to give you detailed instruc- tion. I think this is up to Congress to decide. But when one looks at either inclusion or inequality or more broadly the fact we are suffering as a country from very low productivity growth, dis- appointingly low productivity growth, and we think about what the factors are that over time influence productivity growth, the things that have long been identified as important are investments, both private and public, private investment really since the financial cri- sis has been very weak, but private and public investments, edu- cation and workforce development, and the pace of technological progress, which is influenced by the environment that contributes to innovation, the startup of new firms, and research and develop- ment and other basic support. So I think all of those areas should be on Congress’ list to focus on. Senator BROWN. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Corker. Senator CORKER. Madam Chairman, we thank you for being here. Thank you for your service. I had numbers of conversations in this setting and others with your predecessor about QE2 and QE3, and I know the Fed announced in 2014 the normalization process. And both your predecessor and this normalization process that was announced in 2014 stated that the securities that we had built up on the balance sheet would be held to maturity, and then they would run off the balance sheet. You have basically announced today that we are embarking on QE4 by reinvesting the proceeds, have you not, in new securities, which is a major policy change, is it not, from where the Fed has been in allowing these securities to run off and allowing—maybe I am misunderstanding what you are saying, but I thought I heard you say that the Fed is now, when we reach maturity on these se- curities, going to reinvest them, which is a pretty big policy change, is it not? Ms. YELLEN. It is not a policy change. That has long been our policy ever since when QE3 ended, we made clear that we would continue to reinvest maturing proceeds. We have been doing that ever since. We did say that as the economy recovers and the Fed funds rate rises to a somewhat higher level than it is at present, that a day would come when, based on economic and financial con- ditions, the Committee would begin the process you just described of gradually allowing securities to run off our balance sheet so that we reduce our holdings to a more normal level. And we fully intend VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 13 to do that, but I cannot give you a precise timetable for when that policy will begin. It is going to depend on how the economy evolves. But a long time ago, we put out a set of normalization principles where we made clear that that was how we would proceed, namely, continue reinvestment until after we had begun the process of rais- ing the Federal funds rate and achieved sufficient progress there. That remains our intention. Senator CORKER. Well, thank you for clearing that up. I appre- ciate that. I know last time you were here, you alluded, we alluded to negative rates, and I know that is what has happened in Japan and the EU. And you were looking into the legality of whether— your staff was looking into whether you felt that you had the legal basis to pursue negative rates. Have you come to a conclusion rel- ative to that? Ms. YELLEN. I believe we do have the legal basis to pursue nega- tive rates, but I want to emphasize it is not something that we are considering. This is not a matter that we are actively looking at, considering. When we have looked at it or looked at that in the past, we have identified significant shortcomings of that type of ap- proach. I do not think we are going to have to provide accommoda- tion, and if we do, that is not something that is on our list. But I do think we have the legal authority. Senator CORKER. Very good, and I really appreciate you clearing that up. Obviously, Japan and the EU have not had good benefit from that, or at least it is not benefit that we can see has been good for them. So I appreciate you clearing that up. That is very good. We look at the Taylor rule from time to time, and I know that the Fed has not adopted the Taylor rule. But if you look at it, Bloomberg has a chart that tracks it, and basically, you know, Fed rates and the Taylor rule have been within a range. Recently, there is the biggest dichotomy that we have seen in years and years between the Fed funds rate and what they would be if the Taylor rule was being employed. Today it is at 25 to 50 basis points. Under the Taylor rule, we would be at 3.7 percent. That would be a target Fed rate today. A big range difference. Is that because of the headwinds that you have been alluding to and just what you are generally seeing in the market? Ms. YELLEN. Yes, I believe it is because of the headwinds. One of the numbers in the Taylor rule reflects Professor Taylor’s esti- mate of what we sometimes refer to as the neutral level of the Fed funds rate. It is a level of the Fed funds rate that is consistent with the economy operating at full employment. And that is something that by our estimate has been very depressed in the aftermath of the financial crisis. And discussions about secular stagnation are very much about what is the level of interest rates that is con- sistent with the economy operating at full employment. I am hopeful that rate will rise over time, although I am uncer- tain, but at the moment most of the divergence between our set- tings and what would be the higher levels that would be called for really reflect the headwinds that have been facing the economy since the financial crisis. Senator CORKER. The labor—I have only got a little bit of time, but the employment rate really is misleading, is it not, relative to VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 14 where we are in the labor market today, meaning that there is still a lot of excess capacity, and I know Ranking Member Brown was alluding to that anew. So that equation is a little bit off. Just be- cause you are not really feeling the employment levels, even though the rates that we show are there, the involvement by the labor market is not what we would like for it to be. Let me just ask one last thing briefly on living wills. I know that under Section 165 of Dodd-Frank the larger institutions are sup- posed to present living wills, and you all are supposed to ensure that they can be resolved in bankruptcy. And I know we are going through hopefully the final iteration in the next several months. But I was confused in that Governor Powell recently mentioned that if the Fed just keeps raising capital levels, these institutions will on their own downsize or become less complex. And I am just confused by that. Is the Federal Reserve, if these institutions cannot be resolved in bankruptcy, going to do what Section 165 of Dodd-Frank tells them to do? Or are you going to rely on raising capital to cause the banks to do it themselves? Ms. YELLEN. Well, we are insisting that the firms address in some cases deficiencies and in other cases shortcomings that we have found enumerated in the living wills in the last submission, and there is a timetable for doing that. If the firms fail to address the deficiencies or if later on by the summer of 2017 they fail to address the shortcomings we have identified and then we find them deficient, Dodd-Frank does say that the FDIC and the Fed can im- pose higher capital requirements, liquidity requirements, or ulti- mately structural changes. Do not expect to have to go there, but we are insisting that the firms address the deficiencies and short- comings that we have carefully identified. Senator CORKER. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Mr. Chair- man. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Reed. Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Madam Chair. It strikes me that over the last several years you have had a very difficult challenge, we all have, but we have been operating in some respects with one hand tied behind our back, which is that you have been pursuing a very expansionary policy to stimulate the economy, cutting rates and reluctant to raise rates, while we have not had a complementary fiscal policy that invests in infrastructure and other things and allows you the room to raise rates if nec- essary or to complement your activity with what we are doing. And the point you just made in response to Senator Brown is that this productivity gap, which is very troubling, some of that is just re- lated to decrepit infrastructure. If it takes 2 hours to get some- place, that is 2 lost hours for someone delivering a package. If it takes 10 minutes on a superhighway, that is a productivity in- crease. So you are in a position, I think, that you are doing all you can, but it is not enough, and we have to step up. Is that something that you tend to sympathize with? Ms. YELLEN. Well, I think in the United States and in many other advanced Nations where interest rates are at very low levels, VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 15 it is common to say that it is monetary policy, central banks that have been carrying the load. In many parts of the world, fiscal pol- icy has, because of concern about large debt or deficits, not played a supportive role. I think we have achieved a lot in the United States. We have cre- ated over 14 million jobs. The unemployment rate has come down to 4.7 percent. Inflation is still under 2 percent, but I believe mov- ing up. So I think we are making good progress, but if there were to be a negative shock to the economy—and I mentioned this in my testimony—starting with very low levels of interest rates, we do not have a lot of room using our traditional tried and true method to respond. If fiscal policy were more expansionary, this neutral level of interest rates that is one of the factors, the stance of policy, that affects what level of interest rates is neutral for the economy, keeps it on an even keel, and the level would be higher with a dif- ferent stance of fiscal policy. Senator REED. We have made progress, I agree, but I think the sense is that not only could we have made more progress, but we are at a point now where you have exhausted most of your leverage in a nonfinancial sense, and if there was a shock, then you have very little to respond with. Ms. YELLEN. Well, we have the same tools that we used earlier, namely, asset purchases, forward guidance, the maturity distribu- tion, duration of our portfolios, and those are the tools we would rely on. Senator REED. And just very quickly, the other part of this di- lemma is the sense in some places that because interest rates have been so low, there is the possibility of creating a bubble, for exam- ple, driving people into equities because there is no return, and the price is driven up not because of the underlying quality of the eq- uity but simply because that is where they can get some money fast. Are you concerned about that? Ms. YELLEN. Well, yes, as I said earlier, I do not see signs of ex- treme threats to financial stability at this time. This is something we monitor very closely. But it is something that can happen in a low interest rate environment, so I do not think that I see any broad-based evidence of those financial stability concerns, but it is something that is possible. Senator REED. And I have less than a minute, but let me just add—with respect to cybersecurity—that we had a discussion last time you were here. It is an increasing problem—in fact, at the Federal Reserve. Public reports say you have been breached in some respects. But just getting to the point, do you have the au- thority to require your regulated companies to put people on their boards that have cybersecurity expertise, and also to publicly dis- close what their cybersecurity general parameters are, or some- thing to indicate to the public that they are taking this seriously? Ms. YELLEN. Well, it is a focus of our supervision. We do have standards that we expect financial institutions to meet, and just what is expected depends on the complexity and importance of the firm. So we do regard this as a very significant threat. On your question about Boards of Directors, I do not know that we have looked at that. I would need to get back to you on that. Senator REED. Thank you. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 16 Ms. YELLEN. But we are certainly supervising financial institu- tions’ ability to address cyberthreats. Senator REED. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Vitter. Senator VITTER. Thank you, Madam Chair, for being here and for your service. Ms. YELLEN. Thank you. Senator VITTER. Madam Chair, in April, the Fed finally released the results of the 2015 resolution plans of eight systemically impor- tant domestic banking institutions, and five of the Nation’s largest banks failed that exercise, including JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America. I have three questions related to that. First, the New York Times in April described this Fed release as stating, ‘‘That suggests that if there were another crisis today, the Government would need to prop up the largest banks if it wanted to avoid financial chaos.’’ So Question 1 is: Do you agree with that? Question 2 is: What do these five banks need to do by October 1st to fully remediate their deficiencies? And Question 3 is: If they do not by October 1st, will the Fed take more systemic action like raising capital levels? Ms. YELLEN. So those banks have, over the span of the last sev- eral years in which they have been preparing living wills, greatly increased their ability to be resolved in the event of trouble by bankruptcy or, alternatively, Title II is available. I could not guar- antee at this point. It depends just what the circumstances are in which a bank fails that bankruptcy would work at this point as a means to resolve one of these firms. We have identified for five of the firms deficiencies. We have been extremely careful in spelling out in detail what those deficiencies are that we want to see rem- edied by October 1st. And, in addition, we have listed, jointly with the FDIC, a large number of specific shortcomings that the firms have until the summer of 2017 to remedy. And we will be moni- toring very carefully and evaluating whether that is done. And as I said, if the deficiencies are not remedied or, later, if the short- comings are not remedied, they could turn into deficiencies that would lead us to impose higher capital standards or other remedies on these firms if that is not done. But I think we have learned a lot in the course of the years we have been evaluating these living wills about what it takes to actu- ally resolve a firm in bankruptcy. The firms have learned in this process, and I do think we have made substantial advances in terms of being able to do—— Senator VITTER. Let me go back to my question—three questions. First, in terms of the New York Times quote, needing to prop up the largest banks, you would not categorically refute that possi- bility? Ms. YELLEN. Well, I would not say at this point that all of them are prepared for resolution under bankruptcy. Senator VITTER. And, again, if they do not get there for October 1st, would you very soon thereafter consider something more sys- temic like higher capital requirements or not? Ms. YELLEN. Yes. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 17 Senator VITTER. OK. And, Madam Chair, my second and last question is about the Puerto Rican crisis. You have said you do not think the Fed should be involved, and I appreciate that and agree with that. However, my concern is the Fed has authority to be in- volved. Do you think the Fed has authority to issue as a last resort emergency loans to Puerto Rican institutions or not? Ms. YELLEN. I think our authority is extremely limited, and it would not be appropriate for us to give loans to Puerto Rico. We have very limited authority to buy municipal debt, and the author- ity we have, if we were to buy eligible debt, I do not think it would be helpful to Puerto Rico. And beyond that, we have no ability to make emergency loans. We could not use 13(3) or emergency pow- ers of that type to extend a loan to Puerto Rico. This is inherently a matter for Congress and is not something that is appropriate for the Federal Reserve. Senator VITTER. OK. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Menendez. Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam Chair, for your service and your insights. I always appre- ciate it. Recently, in the national public discourse, there are those who propose reducing the national debt by persuading creditors to take a haircut on their investments. And in my opinion, policies like that would drive our economy off a cliff and endanger working fam- ilies in our country. And I really do not know of anyone more quali- fied to answer this question than you. In your opinion, what would be the consequences if the President of the United States were to propose that holders of U.S. Treasury bonds accept less than the face value of their investments? Ms. YELLEN. So this is a topic that I have spoken on many times when Congress says we have faced debt ceiling-type situations. I feel the consequences for the United States and the global economy of defaulting on Treasury debt would be very severe. U.S. Treasury securities are the safest and most liquid benchmark security in the global financial system. They play a critical role in financial mar- kets, and the consequences of such a default, while they are uncer- tain, I think there can be no doubt that it would be long-run harm- ful to U.S. interests and at a minimum result in much higher bor- rowing costs for American households and businesses. Senator MENENDEZ. And saying that you should take a haircut, does it actually mean—it means a default because you are not pay- ing the full amount that you are obligated to on the security. And just for clarification purposes, am I right, my understanding that U.S. citizens and American entities, such as State and local govern- ments, pension funds, mutual funds, and the Federal Reserve, own the vast majority of U.S. debt estimated at approximately 67.5 per- cent? Ms. YELLEN. U.S. entities and foreign entities. Senator MENENDEZ. U.S. entities and foreign entities. OK. My understanding is—and I would like to get it for the record. My un- derstanding is that just U.S. citizens and American entities, State and local governments, pension funds, mutual funds, 401(k)s, Fed- eral Reserve, own the majority of U.S. debt, and that would be VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 18 about 67.5 percent. But for the record, if you could submit that, I would appreciate it. Ms. YELLEN. Certainly. Senator MENENDEZ. Which means the overwhelming majority would be taking a haircut that, as proposed by Mr. Trump, would ultimately mean U.S. citizens, State and local governments, and that is pretty outrageous. Let me ask you this: In the nearly 8 years since the start of the financial crisis, our economy has indeed shown signs of growth and progress, yet many data points indicate that we are far from a full recovery in the labor market. In the past, you have advocated for the Federal Reserve’s use of a metric called the ‘‘Labor Market Conditions Index.’’ That index, which pulls data from 19 different labor market sources, including labor force participation, workers that are classified as part-time for economic reasons, hires, quits, and so forth, has fallen nearly 15 points over the last 5 months. In fact, the index has fallen to its lowest level since 2010. My understanding is that every other time the index has turned negative for 5 months or longer over the last 25 years, the Fed has moved to ease monetary policy, not tighten it. So I am concerned that given the path the Fed has laid out for potential rate increases later this year and next, the Fed will neither have the ability nor the will to temper the impacts of this slowdown in the labor mar- ket. Shouldn’t the Fed wait to consider additional rate hikes until we see indications of growth in the labor market? Ms. YELLEN. So the numbers that are released on the Labor Mar- ket Conditions Index do not refer to the level of the index but, rath- er, the change. And the move that you have mentioned in that index suggests not that the labor market is not operating—the labor market is operating at a good level according to the level of that index, which we do not publish, but there is a loss of momen- tum. That is what those negative numbers show, and we see the same thing in recent job reports that I referred to in my testimony. So without a doubt, for the last several months, a number of dif- ferent metrics suggest a loss of momentum, not a deterioration in the labor market but a loss of momentum in terms of the pace of improvement. And that is an important consideration, as I men- tioned. We believe that will turn around, expect it to turn around, but we are taking a cautious approach and watching very carefully to make sure that that expectation is borne out before we proceed to raise interest rates further. Senator MENENDEZ. Madam Chair, one final point, not even a question. I want to echo what Senator Brown has said, and in the letter that I, Senator Warner, Senator Merkley, and 124 Members of Congress sent to you with reference to improving the representa- tion at regional banks, 83 percent of Federal Reserve Board mem- bers are white; 92 percent of regional bank Presidents are white. There is not a single President who is either African American or someone like me, Latino. That is fundamentally wrong, and I would hope that you would chair some diversity effort, because leadership on this issue always comes from the top, regardless of the institution. And with your own experiences as a woman—and in that regard, we seem to be doing a lot better in the system, but VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 19 we are not doing that much better with people of color. And I hope that you will seriously consider such an effort. Ms. YELLEN. I agree with you that it is extremely important, and I will do everything I can to see that our performance improves on that dimension. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Toomey. Senator TOOMEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Chair Yellen. Chair Yellen, your predecessor, Chairman Bernanke, both before this Committee and in columns that he has written, discussed some of the limits of monetary policy, what monetary policy is ca- pable of and what it is not capable of. And one of the things that he said—I am paraphrasing, but I think he has said this on numer- ous occasions—that accommodative monetary policy has the limit of being only stimulative in the sense that it brings economic activ- ity forward in time. It does not create new wealth, goods, or serv- ices, but it shifts the timing of economic activity. Do you agree with Chairman Bernanke in that respect? Ms. YELLEN. Well, it sometimes does shift the timing of economic activity, brings forward a decision that might have been made later. But I think the stance of policy also has repercussions that have a more longer lasting impact on the state of demand. It is not only a matter of shifting purchases early by having more accom- modative financial conditions. There are repercussions that can be longer lasting than that. Senator TOOMEY. You may disagree. My sense of the academic consensus is that the main effect of accommodative monetary policy is to induce economic activity that was going to occur later at an earlier time, and that that is the principal activity, or the prin- cipal—but you are acknowledging there is some of that phe- nomenon. Ms. YELLEN. There is some of that phenomenon. It is not the only thing. Senator TOOMEY. So to what extent is this unprecedented accom- modative monetary policy for these many years now part of the reason that we have had relatively anemic growth today? Isn’t it very likely the case that some of the economic activity that would be occurring today was dragged forward in years gone by and it has already occurred in the past? Ms. YELLEN. So it is very hard to know how large that effect is, but I continue to think that our accommodative stance of policy— for example, low mortgage rates—is continuing to boost activity in the housing sector. It has not only pulled activity forward to sup- press it now. I believe it has—— Senator TOOMEY. The housing sector has still not recovered its previous highs. Ms. YELLEN. Well, it has undergone very substantial shocks. Senator TOOMEY. Have you attempted to quantify how much of the economic growth that would be occurring in 2017 and 2018 and 2019 is happening now because of this ongoing activity of having these extremely low, unnaturally low interest rates? Ms. YELLEN. We have not tried to determine that. We have in the past looked at whether or not low rates have had less impact on spurring economic activity than in the past, namely, whether or VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 20 not there might be some attenuation in the impact of policy. But in the past, our analysis suggested that it is not only a matter of shifting the timing of economic activity, but also stimulating in- vestment and spending decisions on a longer lasting basis. Senator TOOMEY. Even if that is so, my guess is that the prin- cipal effect is shifting the timing, and you may disagree with that. I got the impression from your predecessor that his view was that the principal effect was shifting the timing. It is certainly an effect, and I would think it is something that the Fed ought to be looking at, because to the extent that that is a significant effect, what you are doing today is damaging economic growth going forward, to some extent. Let me touch on another concern. It seems from what you and others have said there has been a great focus on the demand side of the effect of monetary policy and not so much on the supply side. One of the concerns that I have is the danger that, first of all, you have been missing the estimates on the supply side as well as eco- nomic growth overall, right? I mean, we are now, I think, 12 con- secutive years in which the Fed has systematically overestimated economic growth. It has been overly optimistic about the supply side phenomena, such as workers returning to the workforce, im- proving productivity level, that have not been happening to the ex- tent that the Fed has hoped. One of my concerns is that the inducement to expand capacity, the unnatural excess capacity that comes from unnaturally low in- terest rates, could get the Fed into a kind of vicious cycle where all that excess capacity creates excess commodities, downward pressure on prices, makes it that much harder to hit your 2-percent inflation goal, and creates this dilemma that is hard to get out of. Is there a danger that the ultra-low interest rates are contributing to that? Ms. YELLEN. Well, I think investment has been running at a very slow pace. We have really not had the creation of a lot of excess capacity. One of the reasons—— Senator TOOMEY. Globally, we have. Ms. YELLEN. ——that productivity growth has been so slow, and it has been disappointingly slow, is that we have had very weak investment in the aftermath of the crisis, and more recently in re- cent months, it has turned negative and is extremely low even out- side of energy where we have a substantial cutback in drilling ac- tivity. So I do not think an impact of low interest rates has been to stimulate an investment boom or a boom in capacity—— Senator TOOMEY. No, there is—I think that is largely true in the United States, but globally, where this experiment has been going on since everybody is in this business of ultra-low interest rates, it seems, certainly if you talk to people in the steel industry, they would suggest that there is massive overcapacity in not just steel but in other commodities as well. And I do worry that we have en- couraged companies to take on massive amounts of debt to create this overcapacity, and it is just one of the many distortions. But I thank you for your time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Tester. Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 21 Chair Yellen, thank you for being here. I have got a couple ques- tions that I have asked before and, quite frankly, will do it again. Senator Crapo and myself sent a letter on the EGRPRA process and how that is moving forward. I am continually concerned about community banks and the level regulation to match the risk that they pose to the economy and to their depositors and borrowers. We are seeing consolidation in Montana. We are probably seeing consolidation across the country with small banks. And that is not good for capitalism, and I do not think it is good for rural America as we see small banks combining with bigger banks combining with bigger banks. So my question is: Do you see any problem with the process right now of regulation on our small banks? And if so, what are we doing about it? Ms. YELLEN. We are very heavily focused on trying to find ways to relieve community banks of undue burden, and tailoring our reg- ulatory system and supervision system to suit the risks that an en- tity entails is a core principle for us of proper supervision. So we have made very meaningful efforts to reduce the burdens of our ex- aminations on community banks, to reduce the complexity of the capital requirements that they face. The EGRPRA process we are taking very seriously, and I believe we will come out with meaning- ful proposals for relief. And we are looking at something that might be a significant simplification of the capital regime for those com- munity banks. Senator TESTER. I think simplification is important. Are you happy where the Fed is right now as it regards the community banks? Ms. YELLEN. I think we have made progress, but we will con- tinue to focus on it. Senator TESTER. OK. Do you believe that consolidation in the banking industry, in particular as it applies to—well, across the board, does not matter—is not a good thing? And do you think that the regulatory issues have contributed to the consolidation? Ms. YELLEN. I think there have been a number of factors that have contributed to it. This is a challenging environment for banks, a low interest rate environment, and profitability has been impor- tant. Senator TESTER. Right. And in some cases, some of these small banks are putting out literally millions—and these are small banks—millions of dollars to meet the regulatory issues that are brought up. I just want to get your commitment you are going to continue to work—— Ms. YELLEN. Absolutely. Senator TESTER. The consolidation piece is something that really bothers me big time, especially as it applies to States like Montana, because that forces us to the big buys, and I do not necessarily think that is good for the consumer coming down the line. I think it should be their choice if they want to go that direction. On international insurance rules, the Fed has proposed rules for two nonbank SIFIs, AIG and Prudential, and I am pleased the Fed is moving forward with the international insurance rules. Could you give me an idea when you think these might be complete? VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 22 Ms. YELLEN. Well, I think there are some ways to go in terms of the international work that is ongoing. We put out a few weeks ago an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the framework that we intend to take here in the United States. You know, we are in discussions internationally in advancing these ideas, but I think we are ahead of that process here in the United States. Senator TESTER. OK. So I will take one more run at it because I may not have worded it correctly. Do you have any idea when they will be done? Ms. YELLEN. No. Senator TESTER. Will it be done in this Administration? Ms. YELLEN. I will have to get back to you. I do not know what the timetable is. You are talking about the international efforts? Senator TESTER. Yes, right, and how those are going to impact, for instance, GE, for example, who is a nonbank SIFI. I am just curious to figure out how that is going to come down the pipe. Ms. YELLEN. Well, so GE, we already published—— Senator TESTER. It is a SIFI, right? Ms. YELLEN. ——a rule. Senator TESTER. Right. Ms. YELLEN. It is not insurance. Senator TESTER. It is not an insurance company. What happens to those guys? Does this insurance rule have no impact on them? What happens to those guys moving forward? Ms. YELLEN. Well, they are not an insurance company. Senator TESTER. No, I know, but they are SIFI, and they have divested their financial—their banking part of their business. So what happens to them moving forward? Ms. YELLEN. That will be something that the FSOC—— Senator TESTER. Will take up. Ms. YELLEN. Will take up. Senator TESTER. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Kirk. Senator KIRK. Madam Chair, I want to take you what you were just talking about, the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the insurance industry. I am speaking on behalf of large Illinois employers like State Farm and Allstate. I would say that Senator Collins and I have been working very hard to make sure the Fed recognizes the great difference between the business of banking and insurance, and I would say the ANPRM, the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, heads in the right direction there. I would ask you that, as we look forward to this, as I look at the essence of the ANPRM, it seemed like the key stress test was a 90-day win- dow of liquidity that, if I look at the details, I would say a 90-day— if you look at someone like State Farm that affects 80 million American families, you would say the stress would be given the 2008 drop in various sales of various products, do you have enough money over 90 days to sustain the enterprise? I wanted to explore this with you, a commonsense way of letting people know, because this is the way we should go. I would urge you to follow in the di- rection of Senator Collins and me, making sure the normal Fed cul- ture of bank regulation does not impinge on the insurance indus- try. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 23 Ms. YELLEN. Well, we have tried to do that very much in devel- oping this proposal. We have put forward some conceptual frame- works and are going to be looking very carefully at comments be- fore we proceed with more detailed rules, and the Collins fix was very helpful to us in having the flexibility to design something that is appropriate for insurance and not bank centric. Senator KIRK. Thank you, because I think we have got 60 days to comment now coming up. Ms. YELLEN. Yes. Senator KIRK. And I will be approaching Members of this Com- mittee to also provide their comments on that. I want to make sure that we have a robust and strong insurance sector. Ms. YELLEN. Yes, and we will look at those very carefully. We are trying to proceed in a very thoughtful and careful way based on a great deal of consultation with other regulators, State regu- lators, the NAIC, the industry. We have taken a lot of comment and look forward to more. Senator KIRK. From what we have heard, the ANPRM has been pretty well received, reflecting the Collins fix nicely. Ms. YELLEN. Great. Senator KIRK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Warner. Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Chair Yellen, it is great to see you. I am going to try to get three questions in and respect the 5-minute rule, which has not been respected this morning, to make sure that all our colleagues get a chance to ask questions. I want to go back to Senator Reed’s point about cyber. Senator Gardner and I have started the Cyber Caucus. I think this is in- creasingly going to be a challenge for every institution. Senator Reed raised the question about whether under prudential regula- tions we can make sure that bank boards and others have cyberexpertise. I would hope you would move forward with that. I want to move slightly on my question to the issue around what happened at the New York Fed with the Bangladeshi incursion that was through the SWIFT system. Obviously, the SWIFT sys- tem, as evidenced by this cyberattack, has some challenges, enor- mously important to international banking regimes. Does the New York Fed or the overall Fed, do you feel like you have enough abil- ity to work with SWIFT to increase their cyberprotections? Ms. YELLEN. We are part of an oversight group for SWIFT. It is led by the National Bank of Belgium, and many supervisors from different countries participate in that group. And we also partici- pated in that group. SWIFT and the New York Fed are working with the Bank of Bangladesh to try to understand what happened. Senator WARNER. I would just urge you that this is going to be an area that is going to exponentially grow in importance, both in terms of the Fed’s internal expertise and ensuring that we are working more closely with the overall banking industry to up their game, I think is critically important. Ms. YELLEN. We certainly agree with that. Senator WARNER. Let me make sure I get to the others. A num- ber of us have talked about how we can generate additional job growth. One of the concerns that I have is that, particularly inside VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 24 the public markets, we have seen an enormous rush over the last decade plus starting in the 1990s, but really over the last decade and the last few years even more particularly, toward short- termism in terms of views versus long-term value creation, and that in many ways this is undermining basic tenets of American capitalism as more and more people choose and more and more in- stitutions, financial institutions, choose to invest in financial in- struments rather than investing in lending to business institutions. As a matter of fact, I have seen some data that says as low as 15 percent of financial institutions’ activities are actually geared to- ward supporting businesses making investments in communities. We have clearly seen amongst public companies a shift from 80 percent in the 1980s, where 50 percent of profits were reinvested back into plant and equipment and employees and R&D; now we are seeing 95 percent of corporate profits used for stock buybacks and dividends. We have seen some of America’s largest iconic tech firms with huge balance sheets still go into the markets, borrow billions of dollars to use not for R&D but to use share buybacks. I think there is an increasing consensus among CEOs and I think even some more sophisticated investors that this is long-term destructive to real value creation in business and, consequently, to job growth. Has the Fed and do you individually have any views on this challenge about short-termism? Is it a challenge? And some of this movement, particularly amongst public companies, away from investing back in their businesses, back toward stock buyback and dividends prognosis here? Ms. YELLEN. Well, we have looked very closely at investment spending and tried to understand why it has been so very de- pressed in the aftermath of the crisis. You know, I think one rea- son for it is simply that the economy has been growing slowly. Sales growth has been slow, and many firms have found they actu- ally do not need to invest very much in order to satisfy the demand growth that they are seeing. The workforce has been expanding less quickly than it had been. When you have a rapidly expanding workforce, firms need—they are hiring those people, and they need to invest to equip new en- trants with the tools to be productive that others already in the workforce have. A slowing workforce has also played a role. But be- yond that, I would agree with you that there has been—— Senator WARNER. I would simply add that there has been some level of activist investors who come in and say the first thing you shut down are your worker training programs, your investment in infrastructure, and I believe that is a negative long term. I will ad- here to my—— Ms. YELLEN. I would agree with—— Senator WARNER. ——5-minute request, although I would ask for the public record that you come back—I am concerned on Section 165 and the living wills. We have got to move this process along. I am concerned about the level of disagreement between the Fed and the FDIC, but I will take that for the record so that other members can get their questions in. Chairman SHELBY. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Heller. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 25 Senator HELLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, Madam Chair- woman, thank you for being here today, and thanks for taking time out. I find this to be very informative. I want to go back to Brexit for just a minute. The Chairman brought Brexit up, and you also mentioned it in your opening com- ments. You said that a U.K. vote to exit the European would have significant economic repercussions. Can you go more into detail of what that means and perhaps what the plan of attack by the Feds are if, in fact, it were to pass 2 days from now? Ms. YELLEN. So I said it could. I do not know that it would, but I think it could have significant economic consequences by launch- ing a period of uncertainty, both for the United Kingdom and pos- sibly the future of European economic integration. Most analyses suggest it would have negative economic consequences for the U.K. and spillovers to Europe more broadly speaking. I think the financial market reaction to the uncertainties that would be unleashed by that decision could result in a kind of risk/ risk off sentiment that we would see impacts on financial markets that we might see flight to safety flows that could push up the dol- lar or other so-called safe haven currencies. And I do not want to overblow the likely impacts, but we are aware of them. We will watch them and consider those impacts as we make future deci- sions on monetary policy. Senator HELLER. Is there any reason to believe that if Brexit were to pass, it would have an effect on the U.S. economy to the point that we would go back into a recession? Ms. YELLEN. I do not think that is the most likely case, but we just do not really know what will happen, and we will have to watch very carefully. Senator HELLER. What is the chance of the U.S. economy being in a recession by the end of the year? Ms. YELLEN. I think it is quite low. I think the U.S. economy is doing well, and although I have indicated that we are watching this recent slowdown in the job market carefully, my expectation is that the U.S. economy will continue to grow. We have seen a pickup, a strong pickup in consumer spending and growth in the economy. If the weakness in the labor market for the last couple of months was a reaction to an earlier slowdown in growth, that looks to be reversing. I remain quite optimistic in the kinds of con- ditions that have been associated in the past with U.S. recession. Often that occurs when inflation is—when an economy is over- heated, inflation has been quite high, the Fed has had to tighten monetary policy. We do not have any such conditions in play now. Households are in much improved shape, and while there are nega- tive influences in the economy, particularly on manufacturing, stemming from slow growth abroad, the strong dollar, lower com- modity prices, very seriously depressing hiring, causing job loss in the energy sector, and slowing investment in drilling and mining. Still, overall the U.S. economy has been progressing even with those negatives, and I think the odds of a recession are low. It is certainly not what I expect. Senator HELLER. Chairman, thanks for your answer. A week ago Friday, I think the 10-year yield on Japanese bonds and also German bonds were negative. What impact does that have VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 26 on our Treasury yields with these investors obviously looking for any kind of return coming in, buying up our Treasury bonds, what kind of impact is that going to have on our yields? Ms. YELLEN. So it does tend to induce capital inflows into the United States, which pushed down our Treasury yields, so ours are considerably higher. But in absolute terms, they are really quite low. And differentials in the stance of monetary policy also put im- pacts on the value of the dollar. The dollar has gone up around 20 percent against a broad basket of currencies since mid-2014, and that has had a negative effect on our trade with the rest of the world and put downward pressure on corporate profits and hiring in manufacturing. Senator HELLER. Are you concerned that if Feds raise rates, bond traders will ignore that, in fact, reversing exactly what you are try- ing to achieve by raising rates? Ms. YELLEN. Well, I think one of the factors that does influence bond pricing, if this is what you are referring to, is the anticipated path of rates. And there are some further increases built into mar- ket expectations, and often the response of bond markets to what we do depends on how our actual actions compare with those ex- pectations. Senator HELLER. Chairwoman, thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Warren. Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you again, Chair Yellen. I want to follow up on questions raised by Senator Corker and Senator Vitter. As you know, Dodd-Frank requires giant financial institutions to submit living wills, documents that describe how these giants could be liquidated in an orderly and rapid way in bankruptcy without either bringing down the economy or requiring a taxpayer bailout. Now, a few months ago, the Fed and the FDIC jointly deter- mined that the living wills submitted by five of the biggest banks in the country were not credible, and those banks must resolve the problems identified in their living wills by October 1st. That is 14 weeks from now. If the banks fail to do that, the Fed and the FDIC have the power to reduce the risks posed by these giant banks by, for example, raising higher capital standards or stricter leverage ratios. These changes are critically important to avoiding another 2008 crisis, but the banks are unlikely to make them unless they believe that the Fed and the FDIC are serious about enforcing Dodd- Frank. Now, I know by law you must consider increasing capital and higher leverage ratios. What I want today is to ask: Can you com- mit that if any of these giant banks fail to resolve the problems in their living wills by October 1st that the Fed will use the tools that Congress gave you to reduce the risks posed by these too-big-to-fail banks? Ms. YELLEN. We have been very serious in this review of the liv- ing wills, and we have clearly stated a set of well-identified changes that we want to see—— Senator WARREN. I appreciate that. Ms. YELLEN. ——by October 1st. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 27 Now, the decision about what we do if those deadlines are not met, those are decisions that my colleagues and I will need to look at very carefully, what is the appropriate sanction for doing that. But, clearly, we are very serious about wanting to see these defi- ciencies remedied and well aware that we have at our disposal the tools that you listed. So I cannot precommit today to tell you precisely what our re- sponse will be, and we will work closely with the FDIC, as we have been all along. But we are extremely serious about wanting to see progress and certainly will consider using those tools. Senator WARREN. Well, like I said, you are required by law to consider them. What I am asking for is a commitment here, and I have to say I do not fully understand why you would not make that commitment. These banks have known this is coming since Dodd-Frank was passed in 2010. That is 6 years ago. And they have been submitting living wills since 2013. There is no provision in the law for all of the extensions that you have given them so far. If any of these banks fail the credibility test on their fifth try, they need to face some real consequences. Otherwise, why would they ever make changes if there are no consequences? Ms. YELLEN. Well, there will be consequences. Senator WARREN. Well, I very much hope so. You know, when you found that these five banks had submitted living wills that were not credible, you were saying quite explicitly that each of these banks remains too big to fail, and that if any one of them crashed, they would risk taking down the whole econ- omy unless they got a Government bailout. The entire goal of the living wills process is to push the biggest banks to fix this funda- mental problem, and I am glad that the Fed finally—finally—deter- mined that some of these living wills were not credible. But it is not going to mean anything if you are not willing to use the tools that Congress gave you to force these banks to reduce the risks that they are pushing off onto the taxpayers. I have a second issue that I just want to cover here if I can brief- ly, and that is, I want to follow up on Senator Brown’s and Senator Menendez’s questions about diversity. I think diversity is very im- portant. There is a growing body of research showing, for example, that gender diversity and leadership makes for stronger institu- tions. Perhaps it is not a coincidence, then, that there is a stunning lack of diversity at our biggest financial institutions. Not a single one is led by a woman. And while the Fed’s leadership is somewhat more diverse, it is not a whole lot better. Of the 12 regional Fed Presidents, 10 are men. Now, as you know, Congressman Conyers and I, along with 120 of our colleagues, sent you a letter a few weeks ago about the lack of diversity among the Fed’s leadership, and I appreciate the re- sponse that you sent us last week in which you acknowledged that greater diversity can help improve the Fed’s decision making and that there is still work to be done to improve diversity among the Fed’s leadership. So let me just start by asking, does the lack of diversity among the regional Fed Presidents concern you? Ms. YELLEN. Yes. I believe it is important to have a diverse group of policymakers who can bring different perspectives to bear. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 28 I think, as you know, it is the responsibility of the regional banks’ Class B and C Directors to conduct a search and to identify can- didates. The Board reviews those candidates, and we insist that this search be national and that every attempt be made to identify a diverse pool of candidates. And we monitor those searches while they are ongoing to make sure that has been done. It is unfortu- nate—— Senator WARREN. But then let me just ask you about the out- come here, because just as you say, under the law, when a new re- gional Fed President is selected by the regional Fed Board, that person must be approved by you and the others on the Board of Governors before taking office. The Fed Board recently reappointed each and every one of these Presidents without any public debate or any public discussion about it. So the question I have is: If you are concerned about this diver- sity issue, why didn’t you use either of these opportunities to say, ‘‘Enough is enough. Let us go back and see if we can find qualified regional Presidents who also contribute to the overall diversity of the Fed’s leadership’’? Ms. YELLEN. Well, we did undertake a thorough review of the re- appointments of the performance of the Presidents. The Board of Governors has oversight of the reserve banks. There are annual meetings between the Board’s Bank Affairs Committee and the leadership of those banks to review the performance of the Presi- dents. And there were thorough reviews of the performance—— Senator WARREN. But you are telling me diversity is important, and yet you just signed off on all these folks without any public dis- cussion about it. You know, I appreciate your commitment to diversity, and I have no doubt about it. I do not question it. It just shows me that the selection process for regional Fed Presidents is broken, because the current process has not allowed you and the rest of the Board to address the persistent lack of diversity among the regional Fed Presidents. I think that Congress should take a hard look at reforming the regional Fed selection process so that we can all benefit from a Fed leadership that reflects a broader array of both backgrounds and interests. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Scott. Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chair Yellen, thank you for being here today, and I thank you for your hard work on behalf of all of America. Ms. YELLEN. Thank you. Senator SCOTT. Frankly, you have a difficult task and one that will not get any easier before the year is out, from my perspective. I did find it quite interesting, the opening comments of my good friend, the Ranking Member, Senator Brown from Ohio, as he seemed to suggest that perhaps the failure of the economy some- how rests on the shoulders of my party. I thought to myself that the American people are not really looking to assign blame for why the economy is so anemic and the so-called recovery has not truly reached into those folks living paycheck to paycheck. But it would be easy for them to remember that at the beginning of the so-called VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 29 recovery, the Democrats, my good friends to the left, controlled the White House, the Senate, and the House until early January 2011. And what did they do with that trifecta? Actually, they created the most onerous regulatory State in the history of our country, and it continued until even last year when the Administration proposed 80,000-plus pages of new regulations, according to the Competitive Enterprise Institute, with an economic impact or cost to the econ- omy of $1.85 trillion. Said differently, that this anemic recovery perhaps is anemic because of the regulatory burden created during those first couple of years. And I would suggest to you that people in my home State of South Carolina who are working paycheck to paycheck do not be- lieve that we are actually having a strong recovery, and the num- bers seem to bear that out. First-time home buyers, down for the third consecutive year, and that disproportionately impacts African Americans who have homeownership of around 45 percent. So the challenge seems to continue. Our economy grew the first quarter by 1.1 percent. We saw real incomes since 2007 decline by 6.5 percent. Americans eligible for food stamps is up 40 percent. Americans using food stamps are up over 20 percent. Last month, we saw 38,000 jobs created, and our labor force par- ticipation rate: in 2007, 66.4 percent; 2010—bless you—64.8 per- cent. I have got to stop and bless a woman for sneezing. [Laughter.] Senator SCOTT. Is that OK with you, sir? Thank you, sir. And in 2014—we are having fun up here because this is not a fun topic. In 2014, it was 62.9 percent. In May of this year, 62.6 percent. I would suggest that the numbers themselves bear out the fact that perhaps the anemic recovery is not a recovery for those folks working paycheck to paycheck. I do not know who is to blame, but I can tell you that the American people want solutions more than blame. My question to you is: As you look for the rest of this year, do you anticipate more months where the job creation number is 38,000 and in the same months where we see job creation at 38,000, we celebrate a 4.7-percent unemployment rate only because 458,000 people stopped looking for work? So when you take a real unemployment number, based on the 2007 labor force participation rate, would it be at 9 percent? Ms. YELLEN. So we do expect further improvement in the coming year. The unemployment rate fell substantially over the last year, and there were jobs created in 2015 at about 225,000 or 230,000 a month. Perhaps we will not see job creation now that the econ- omy is getting closer to estimates of normal longer-run rate of un- employment. But I expect continued improvement bringing down broader measures of unemployment, which, as you noted, are much higher. Some include involuntary part-time employment. I expect further improvement if the labor market continues to strengthen. Now, the last jobs report and the last couple of months of labor market performance were quite disappointing. My hope and expec- tation is that that is something that is temporary, and we will see that turn around in the coming months. Clearly, it is something we VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 30 will be watching very carefully. My expectation is that we will see improvement, but we will watch it very carefully. Senator SCOTT. My last question, as my time is running out, has to do with full employment and how to reach that wonderful goal of full employment. When I look at the numbers that are coming out of the need for skilled workers as well as STEM workers, it ap- pears that by 2020 we could have a shortfall of 3 million or 4 mil- lion folks in the skilled labor force and about 5 million in the STEM labor force. My solution has a lot to do with the German model of apprenticeship programs. I would love to hear if you have any solutions that you are going to be recommending as we look at the labor force participation rate, the number of skilled jobs that will be available, and the need to get our workforce trained in that direction. Ms. YELLEN. So going back probably to the mid-1980s, we have seen a persistent shift in employment patterns from unskilled and people with middle skills but doing jobs that can be offshored, outsourced, to demand for skilled labor. Senator SCOTT. Yes, ma’am. Ms. YELLEN. And the consequence of that has been rising in- equality, a high return to education, and downward pressure on the wages of those who are less skilled and middle income. And I completely agree with you that education and training, perhaps ap- prenticeships of the type that are used in some European and other countries, these are ideas that really have to be considered if we are going to address what comes out of that, which is that even when you have enough jobs, you have downward pressure on the wages and incomes of people in the middle and the bottom of the skill distribution. Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Chair Yellen. Mr. Chairman, I would just suggest that at some point we are going to have to have a national conversation about the quality of education in our country and the necessity of a dual track. Back in my days, we had shop, which was an important part of our edu- cation apparatus, and perhaps we need to have that conversation again. Thank you, Chair Yellen. Ms. YELLEN. I agree with you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Donnelly. Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Chair Yellen. When you were here in February, we talked about corporate offshoring and the devastating impact it has had on families in my home State of Indiana and the manufacturing towns across the country. The frustration remains. The decline in manufacturing employment is one of the factors that has led to a shrinking middle class. We have two economies in this country. The overall economy might be doing well enough, and the wealthier are richer than ever. But middle- and working- class families are not feeling the recovery. Wages have been stag- nant for years. A recent Pew report said that since 1971, each dec- ade has ended with a smaller share of adults living in middle-in- come households than at the beginning of the decade. What is the state of the economy for working families? VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 31 Ms. YELLEN. Well, I would agree with you that for decades now, as we were just discussing there has been downward pressure on the incomes of less skilled individuals, and the kinds of jobs that once upon a time were pretty readily available, say, for a high school-educated man in manufacturing have gradually diminished. There has been a long-term trend. Part of it is due to just the tech- nological change that has consistently raised the demands for skilled workers and reduced the demands for less skilled workers. And I think globalization has also played some role. More recently, slow growth in foreign economies, the strength of the dollar, which really is reflective of the U.S. doing better on bal- ance than other countries, and—— Senator DONNELLY. I understand all these reasons, but, I mean, these are real people, as you well know. Ms. YELLEN. I know. Senator DONNELLY. There was an article not too long ago in the paper here about a fellow who was making about $17 an hour at the plant. He got fired because they shipped his job to Mexico for $3 an hour. But the ongoing ripple of that was that his daughter, who had applied to Indiana University, IU, got accepted. She found out that her dad was going to lose his job, and she said, ‘‘I do not think the family can afford for me to go to college like this.’’ That is devastating. That is the future of America. That is what the real impact of all of this stuff is, just in the past few months, and these are not because the companies are not doing well. They are doing really well. But, you know, in the town next to my home town, Elkhart, 200 jobs, shipped overseas; 700 jobs, Huntington, Indiana, not the biggest county in the, shipped to Mexico for $3- an-hour wages; 1,400 out of Indianapolis. Very profitable compa- nies. And these folks are making, you know, $13, $14, $17 an hour. So as long as we have the mousetrap like this, how do we ever try to get the middle class up if even $13 an hour is too much in these companies’ minds? Ms. YELLEN. So these are very sad situations for workers—— Senator DONNELLY. They are wrong situations, is what they are. Ms. YELLEN. The kind of thing you are describing imposes ter- rible burdens on all too many American families. Senator DONNELLY. So how do we make America work for them? Ms. YELLEN. Part of it is trying to make jobs. We cannot stop all shifts occurring across sectors of the economy. I think we have to make sure that there are opportunities—— Senator DONNELLY. But let me ask you this: Do you consider that a shift when a company is doing really well and somebody is mak- ing 13 bucks an hour, not much above minimum wage, but lose their job because our laws allow them to ship them to Mexico for $3 an hour? Is that a shift? That is not really a shift in technology or anything. That is just a cold-blooded decision that Americans do not count as much as their profits. Ms. YELLEN. Well, those forces have been in play for quite some time, and, for our part at the Fed, we are trying to create a job market where there are enough vacancies and opportunities that people who lose jobs in one sector are able to find them in the sec- tors of our economy that are expanding. And sometimes to make that transition is difficult and may require retraining or other VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 32 forms of help to connect with available job opportunities. And sometimes we know that kind of job loss does cost long-lasting im- pact on wages. Senator DONNELLY. I will just leave it with this: It seems like gaming the system to want to make your product somewhere else in the hope that you can sell them back to here, to the United States, because you are hoping that other people will be happy to pay the $13-an-hour, $14-an-hour wages so you will have enough customers, you are just going to game it so that you can pay the 3 bucks and then get your products back in here. And it is like you get it on one end, and you get it on the other end. And that just seems incredibly responsible to me. Thank you, Madam Chair. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Rounds. Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Chair, welcome. As I listened to your Monetary Policy Report, it strikes me that the—as the Ranking Member had indi- cated earlier, we talk about productivity growth and the need for both public and private investment. That requires that the dollars come from some place. And I would like your thoughts on this just in terms of—on the basis of what the Joint Economic Committee had reported earlier this year. And they laid it out in some pretty stark terms. They indicated that 99—well, let me put it this way: Ten years from now, in the year 2026—which, by the way, is the 250th birth- day of our country—we can look forward to, under current condi- tions, 99 percent of all the revenue coming into the Federal Gov- ernment—highway taxes, corporate taxes, personal taxes, personal income taxes—99 percent of it is going to go back out in two cat- egories: interest on the Federal debt and mandatory payments on entitlements. That does not leave a lot for public investment and clearly it does not drive private investment. You are working on short-term activity right now and you are monitoring very closely—you are actually, on a day-to-day basis, following an economy right now, which, as you have suggested, is doing very well. And yet I think a lot of us would disagree, that three-quarters of 1 percent growth in a quarter hardly seems ap- propriate. And I know that you are optimistic about the second being better, but even if it is double or even triple, we are not going to grow our way out of this crisis which is coming upon us. I would like your thoughts, because right now we are looking at areas in which, if we want those jobs to come back and if we want individuals or wages to rise, we are going to have to be in a posi- tion to where we actually grow this economy once again—tax pol- icy, regulatory reform, actually managing our entitlements, all of which seem critical and yet today we have not talked about that at all. We do not seem to really have a place where we can. Can you, as an impartial individual in this process who watches our economy grow or falter on a daily basis, can you talk to us about the need to do something now to avoid the crisis in 10 years? Ms. YELLEN. Well, I think we all know, and we have known for a long time, that with an aging population and with health care costs that have, by and large, risen more rapidly than inflation, that we faced a situation where we would have an unsustainable VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 33 debt path and that this would require reforms. As you say, Medi- care, Medicaid, Social Security, those three programs will, under the current rules—— Senator ROUNDS. So you are talking—just to begin with, you are saying the Affordable Care Act needs to be reformed—— Ms. YELLEN. Well, I did not—— Senator ROUNDS. ——as part one. Ms. YELLEN. Well, I did not say anything about the Affordable Care Act. Senator ROUNDS. OK. Ms. YELLEN. I am saying that the entitlement programs need to be considered how to put those on a sustainable basis. Senator ROUNDS. Would it be fair to say they need to be man- aged? Ms. YELLEN. Well, they need to have Congress look at both reve- nues and the structure of expenditures to ensure that those pro- grams remain sustainable in the overall Federal budget and debt associated with that remain on a sustainable course, because as you go out further with an aging population, as you said, the debt- to-GDP ratio is rising simply unsustainably, and that does require changes. Senator ROUNDS. Is it fair to say that right now, if—over the long-term basis, every time the interest rate that we have to pay at the Federal level goes up by a quarter point, it is estimated that approximately a $50 billion a year additional increase in our costs being paid out. It looks to me like simply addressing and beginning the process of slowing down the increasing Federal debt and recog- nizing that we cannot just simply say, over a 1-day period of time or a 2-day period of time, that we have got all the answers, but most certainly we are going to have to grow our way out of this as well as reducing some of the ongoing expenditures. Fair to say? Ms. YELLEN. It certainly would be desirable if the U.S. economy were growing at a faster rate. You cited a very depressed number for first-quarter growth. Over the last four quarters the average growth has been about 2 percent, and over eight quarters it has been about 2.5 percent. So sort of smoothing through the ups and downs, we have been experiencing growth of 2 or 2.5 percent. Senator ROUNDS. And we are not going to grow our way out based upon that number, are we? Ms. YELLEN. We would certainly have to do better than that, and that is a matter of productivity growth essentially being quite de- pressed relative, for example, to the levels that we enjoyed in the second half of the ’90s. So it is not certain what is responsible for that but, you know, many factors come into play. We have had depressed levels of in- vestment. We seem to have a depressed rate of business formation. Technological change, as it shows up in output gains, seems to have fallen relative to those better times. And there were a range of policies we could consider to address it, but—— Senator ROUNDS. Madam Chair, my time is up, but it looks to me like what you are giving us is a wake up call about a crisis that is not 10 years from now; it is right now. Ms. YELLEN. Well, it is a very serious matter that productivity growth is so slow, yes. I want to highlight that. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 34 Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Merkley. Senator MERKLEY. Chair Yellen, thank you. Senator Donnelly was raising concern about manufacturing jobs in America. And indeed, our trade policy has given full access to our market to goods manufactured by companies in countries that do not have to abide by the same labor laws, the same wage rules, the same environmental rules, or the same enforcement. This is a very unlevel playing field for American manufacturers and has a devastating impact. The loss is extensive. And is that really fair to the American worker to have American companies having to compete against companies that are allowed a completely different set of standards that lower their costs dramatically? Ms. YELLEN. Well, I guess I would just say that, in the view of most economists, more open trade creates net benefits, but that does not mean benefits for everyone. And there are gainers but there are also losers, and that is certainly part of it—— Senator MERKLEY. The losers are the manufacturing workers. Again, is that fair to the manufacturing workers? Ms. YELLEN. Well, it is important to have policies that address the losses. Senator MERKLEY. Since the mid-1970s, 1975 through now, we have had four decades in which virtually zero—well, let me put it different—virtually 100 percent of the new income has gone to the top 10 percent of Americans, leaving basically 9 out of 10 Ameri- cans in our economy out in the cold. This is substantially a reflec- tion of the shift to manufacturing overseas. We have had a series of geostrategic decisions. We wanted to nurture the recovery of Japan. We wanted to pull China out of the Sino–Soviet bloc. Now we want to pull the rest of Asia away from China. Is there an understanding within the Fed how—the costs of these geostrategic decisions upon the welfare of American families and through living-wage jobs—the loss of living-wage jobs? Ms. YELLEN. Well, we have certainly looked at this question of wage inequality, income inequality. We collect data. Our Survey of Consumer Finances is one of the key datasets that gives us insight into what is happening. Academic work on this topic, while it has focused to some extent on trade more broadly, also looks at the importance of a phe- nomenon called skill-biased technical change, that the nature of technological change in recent decades has continually shifted de- mand away—— Senator MERKLEY. So let’s take—— Ms. YELLEN. ——from less-skilled workers toward more skilled—— Senator MERKLEY. So let’s take that as an additional factor. Technological change has occurred. However, a lot of the shift over- seas has been due to lower wages, not to technological change. In fact, they have been rooting up our factory machines and shipping them overseas. So it is the same factories producing the same goods in a place that pays less. That is not technological change. That is an issue of trade policy. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 35 Technological change does have an impact. So in a situation where, as you point out, there is more higher-skilled demand, de- mand for higher-skilled jobs, education becomes very important. Ms. YELLEN. That is right. Senator MERKLEY. But as compared to other developed econo- mies, higher education—be it higher skill training or college—is far more expensive. It is the single factor, more than health care, that has gone up faster than inflation in our economy, and such that not only is it daunting to our students who, in blue-collar communities like the one I live in, are getting the message that there is not an affordable path to fulfill their goals in life—and statistically we see our students who do pursue that education burdened with debt that is having a profound impact both on delaying marriage and on delaying home ownership, which is the major—has been a major engine of wealth for the middle class. So we see this high cost of college, and that seems to me like the type of structural concern in our economy that the Fed should be using its economic expertise to highlight the long-term devastating impacts of failing to provide the opportunity for the skills needed for the economy of the future, but I do not hear the Fed talking about that. Ms. YELLEN. Well, we are looking at trends in student debt, and I believe we will be hosting a conference this fall on student debt and looking particularly at what it means for low- and moderate- income households. Senator MERKLEY. You know, I cannot—over these last few years I have asked so many questions in which the response is always: That is something we are looking at. It would be nice to have a muscular representation of the big challenges to our economy be- cause the Fed has the expertise to put its hands around that and be able to project that into the policy debate. And I will just close, since my time is expiring, by saying one of those issues that I have raised multiple times is the Fed’s power of the conflict of interest in commodities, the ability of large finan- cial institutions to own pipelines, to own ships full of oil, to own energy-generation stations, to own warehouses of aluminum. And each time I hear ‘‘we are looking at that,’’ are we still looking at that or are we actually going to do something about that? Ms. YELLEN. We will come out with a proposal on that, but some of it reflects decisions that Congress made and not Fed policy. Senator MERKLEY. That is true, there are some restrictions, but there is still considerable power resting with the Fed. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Moran. Senator MORAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for joining us this morning. I would tell you that, in my conversations with Kansans, very few— I do not know if I have had a conversation with a Kansan who sees their economic future brighter. They see it—they are more disillu- sioned. No one feels more secure in their job. No one feels like their chil- dren are going to have a brighter future. Parents are concerned about their children’s opportunities when they graduate from school—the ability to pay back student loans—worried about sav- VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 36 ing for their own retirement. People are worried about having enough income and savings to pay for health care emergencies. So the sense of an economic recovery is far from being felt universally with Kansans that I visit with across our State. I wanted to just raise two questions. One, in part that cir- cumstance is related to significantly lower agricultural commodity prices, significantly lower prices in oil production, natural gas pro- duction. And part of that is a consequence of, I assume, the value of our dollar in comparison to other currencies and our ability to promote exports, both of those—certainly of agriculture commod- ities, although the law now allows for the export of oil as well. But where are we in the value of our dollar? What is the inter- mediate expectations for us to be able to jumpstart the sale of wheat, cattle, corn and other products, airplanes that are manufac- tured in our State that seemingly are not able to access those mar- kets, in part because of the value of our currency? Ms. YELLEN. So the value of the dollar has increased signifi- cantly since, say, mid-2014. Partly that reflects the fact that the U.S. has enjoyed a stronger recovery than many other advanced Nations. And that has created an expectation that in the U.S., in- terest rates will rise at a more rapid pace than in other parts of the world, and that has induced inflows into our assets that have pushed up the dollar. But more broadly, the trends you have seen in commodity prices I think reflect a larger set of global forces. In some cases we have seen significant increases in the supply of commodities. In the case of oil, the rapid growth of U.S. ability to supply oil markets has been a factor. And then there has been a slowdown in global growth, and particularly in China, which has been an important consumer of so many commodities. China is on a path—and it is understood this will continue—a path of slowing growth. And—you have seen for many commodity prices plummet just because of basic supply-and-demand considerations. The dollar makes some difference to that as well. Senator MORAN. We often talk about, when we talk about ex- ports, trade agreements. Has the Fed weighed in, or have you ex- pressed an opinion previously about other countries and their abil- ity to manipulate currencies to our disadvantage of exports? Ms. YELLEN. The responsibility for currency policy rests with—— Senator MORAN. With the Treasury Department. Ms. YELLEN. ——the Secretary of the Treasury, and we do not weigh in on that. Senator MORAN. Madam Chairwoman, let me ask you about something in your testimony. You indicate that business invest- ment outside the energy sector was surprisingly weak. Would you indicate to me—elaborate on the factors that lead you to that state- ment? And when you exclude the energy sector, is that just because of definition or is something happening in the energy sector that indicates investment? Ms. YELLEN. Well, drilling activity has been very important and it is counted as part of investment activities. So with the huge plunge in oil prices, even though there has been some recovery, we have seen the number of rigs in operation just plummet. And that is part of why aggregate investment spending has been so weak. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 37 And we understand that and expect it because it reflects the de- cline in oil prices. But even when we go outside the energy sector or other sectors that are directly related to energy and supplying inputs to it, in- vestment spending recently—and this is just a report on the data; I do not have a story to offer you on why this has happened—it has been surprisingly weak over the last several months. It has not been very strong investment spending generally—we talked about this earlier—during the recovery, but it has been— and we think we understand some reasons why it has generally been weak, namely slow growth and less rapid increase in the labor force. But it has been surprisingly weak in recent months and it is something we are watching, and I cannot tell you just what that is due to. Senator MORAN. I would not expect you to say this but, in my view, in part that lack of investment or that reduction in invest- ment is related to a wide array of circumstances. One of them would be the debt and deficit, the uncertainty of our economy, lack of economic growth generally. The economic indicators are down- trending, not up-trending a sufficient number of times to instill a sense of confidence. The next regulation that may come their way as a businessperson, just decisions to make investments, people are deciding it is more risky to invest than to not. Ms. YELLEN. Well, those things are certainly mentioned by businesspeople. In recent quarters, corporate earnings have also been under downward pressure for a variety of reasons. Senator MORAN. Well, I would conclude my remarks by indi- cating that one of the places we ought to focus our attention is on innovation, startup businesses, new entrepreneurs, and the uncer- tainty that they face is even more of a dramatic—has more dra- matic consequence than a larger business that can better inter- nalize and handle that uncertainty. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you, Chairwoman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Cotton. Senator COTTON. Thank you. And thank you, Chair, for being a force again. I know these are always two highlights of every year for you. I want to return to some of the earlier discussion of the so-called Brexit, the referendum that will occur in the United Kingdom on Thursday, on whether Great Britain should remain or leave the EU. Your testimony on page 4 says, ‘‘One development that could shift investor sentiment is the upcoming referendum in the United Kingdom. A U.K. vote to exit the European Union could have sig- nificant economic repercussions’’—‘‘could,’’ which you stressed to Senator Heller in his comments. That sounds to me like the usual prudence and caution you use in all of your public statements. You also stated to Senator Heller, ‘‘I don’t want to overblow the likely impacts.’’ That reminds me of Yogi Berra’s old sage advice that predictions are hard, especially about the future. Ms. YELLEN. That is absolutely true. I could not agree with that more. [Laughter.] VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 38 Senator COTTON. Yet, in the last few minutes, here is how the Guardian of London reports your testimony to the Committee: ‘‘Yellen warns on Brexit.’’ Not exactly what you said, is it? Ms. YELLEN. I said that we were monitoring it and that it could have consequences with the United States. Senator COTTON. You would not characterize your testimony as a warning on the Brexit? Ms. YELLEN. If that means that I am warning U.K. residents, I am not attempting to take a stand. They are going to go to the polls. They have had an active debate on the issues and I am not providing advice in that sense. Senator COTTON. Good. Thank you. I sympathize when headlines do not exactly capture the exact meaning of what one says. And to be fair to the Guardian, they are not the only outlet that has re- ported your testimony along those lines. The BBC, Reuters, CNBC, and Fortune have, as well. So to be crystal clear, you take no position on whether U.K. citi- zens should vote to remain or leave the EU, and the Federal Re- serve takes no position. Ms. YELLEN. That is correct. It is for them to decide. I am simply saying the decision could have economic consequences that would be relevant to the U.S. economic outlook that we need to monitor carefully. Senator COTTON. Thank you for that, because I certainly think that we all in America, and particularly in positions of leadership in our Government, should respect the British people’s sovereign right to govern their own affairs. One point you made in your earlier comments about Brexit, about the potential source of these economic repercussions, is ‘‘a pe- riod of uncertainty.’’ That is something I hear frequently in com- mentary about the Brexit. Is there any time when the global econ- omy or the U.S. economy does not operate in a condition of uncer- tainty? Ms. YELLEN. Well, there is uncertainty, but this is a unique event that has no close parallel. It is hard to know what the con- sequences would be. Of course there is always uncertainty domesti- cally and globally. We operate in an uncertain environment. Senator COTTON. Many of your counterparts in the Continent, many of my elected counterparts in the Continent, have not treated the matter so even-handedly. They have opined on what British citizens should do. They have also been responsible for other things that have caused uncertainties in recent years, like the Greek debt crisis or other debt crises in Europe, or the suspension of the Schengen zone privileges because of the flow of migrants into Eu- rope, and terrorists now infiltrating that flow and launching at- tacks in Paris and just a few blocks away from the heart of the Eu- ropean Union. Those would also potentially cause periods of uncertainty in the European and the global economy, wouldn’t they? Ms. YELLEN. Absolutely. Senator COTTON. Is there a risk that some of the dire predictions about Brexit could become—or the reaction to the Brexit could be- come a self-fulfilling prophecy in the economy? Some British politi- cians have promised—or perhaps I should say threatened—imme- VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 39 diate tax increases or budget cuts if the U.K. citizens vote to leave. Some continental leaders have threatened punitive and retaliatory action if the U.K. votes to leave. Our own President has said that the United Kingdom would have to go to ‘‘the back of the queue’’ for any new trade agreement. Do these statements have the potential to create a self-fulfilling prophecy that would lead to increased uncertainty, whatever the outcome on Thursday? Ms. YELLEN. You know, I do not want to comment on what var- ious participants in this debate have said or the advice they have given the British people. There is an active debate. It is not inap- propriate, with a decision of this sort, for many parties to weigh in about the consequences. As I said, I am not trying to offer advice myself to the U.K. residents about to go to the polls. Senator COTTON. Thank you; nor am I. One final point. Your counterpart at the ECB has said that the ECB is ‘‘ready for all contingencies following the U.K.’s EU ref- erendum.’’ Can you say the same thing about the Federal Reserve? You are ready for all contingencies following the vote on Thursday? Ms. YELLEN. Well, in the sense that we will closely monitor what the economic consequences would be and are prepared to act in light of that assessment. Senator COTTON. And should the U.K. vote to leave the EU, the United States Government as a whole, and the Federal Reserve in particular, will handle that contingency in the spirit of magna- nimity, generosity, and friendship among Nations? Ms. YELLEN. Well, it would certainly be my inclination to do so. Senator COTTON. Thank you for that. Chairman SHELBY. Thank you. Madam Chair, I want to shift the conversation a little bit to cus- tody banks, which are very important. I think that would be banks like State Street and New York Mellon and, I am sure, others. It has been reported that custody banks have turned away depos- its or are charging fees on deposits because of the Enhanced Sup- plementary Leverage Ratio. You received public comments stating that the rule could limit the ability of custody banks to accept de- posits, particularly during periods of stress. Is the Fed currently examining how this rule is impacting cus- tody banks’ ability to accept deposits, one? Two, could this rule in- crease systemic risk during times of stress? And three, just for the audience—they probably know—what is a custody bank as opposed to the ordinary retail bank, for example? Ms. YELLEN. So a custody bank is one that handles transactions for other customers, like asset managers. Chairman SHELBY. Very important, isn’t it? A custody bank is important to the banking system, is it not? Ms. YELLEN. Yes, they are. Chairman SHELBY. OK. Ms. YELLEN. And we certainly are aware that they are concerned about the Supplementary Leverage Ratio impacting their profit- ability. Leverage ratios are normally intended to be a backup form of capital regulation. They are not oriented toward the risk of par- ticular assets in the balance sheet but impose a minimum amount of capital that applies to the entire balance sheet, all assets. And VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 40 so, for safe assets in banks that hold large quantities of safe assets, it can be a burden. And it is something that we will monitor, but this is the way leverage ratios have always been imposed against all of the assets of the overall size of the organization. Chairman SHELBY. Thank you. Senator Brown, do you have anything else? Senator BROWN. Nope, that is it. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Madam Chair, thank you for your participa- tion. I know it has been long, but I thank you for appearing before the Committee again. Ms. YELLEN. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. The Committee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] [Prepared statements, responses to written questions, and addi- tional material supplied for the record follow:] VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 41 PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANET L. YELLEN CHAIR, BOARDOFGOVERNORSOFTHEFEDERALRESERVESYSTEM JUNE21, 2016 Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member Brown, and other Members of the Committee, I am pleased to present the Federal Reserve’s semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. In my remarks today, I will briefly discuss the current economic situation and outlook before turning to monetary policy. Current Economic Situation and Outlook Since my last appearance before this Committee in February, the economy has made further progress toward the Federal Reserve’s objective of maximum employ- ment. And while inflation has continued to run below our 2-percent objective, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) expects inflation to rise to that level over the medium term. However, the pace of improvement in the labor market appears to have slowed more recently, suggesting that our cautious approach to adjusting monetary policy remains appropriate. In the labor market, the cumulative increase in jobs since its trough in early 2010 has now topped 14 million, while the unemployment rate has fallen more than 5 percentage points from its peak. In addition, as we detail in the Monetary Policy Report, jobless rates have declined for all major demographic groups, including for African Americans and Hispanics. Despite these declines, however, it is troubling that unemployment rates for these minority groups remain higher than for the Na- tion overall, and that the annual income of the median African American household is still well below the median income of other U.S. households. During the first quarter of this year, job gains averaged 200,000 per month, just a bit slower than last year’s pace. And while the unemployment rate held steady at 5 percent over this period, the labor force participation rate moved up noticeably. In April and May, however, the average pace of job gains slowed to only 80,000 per month or about 100,000 per month after adjustment for the effects of a strike. The unemployment rate fell to 4.7 percent in May, but that decline mainly occurred be- cause fewer people reported that they were actively seeking work. A broader meas- ure of labor market slack that includes workers marginally attached to the work- force and those working part-time who would prefer full-time work was unchanged in May and remains above its level prior to the recession. Of course, it is important not to overreact to one or two reports, and several other timely indicators of labor market conditions still look favorable. One notable development is that there are some tentative signs that wage growth may finally be picking up. That said, we will be watching the job market carefully to see whether the recent slowing in employ- ment growth is transitory, as we believe it is. Economic growth has been uneven over recent quarters. U.S. inflation-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) is currently estimated to have increased at an annual rate of only 3⁄4percent in the first quarter of this year. Subdued foreign growth and the appreciation of the dollar weighed on exports, while the energy sector was hard hit by the steep drop in oil prices since mid-2014; in addition, business investment outside of the energy sector was surprisingly weak. However, the available indica- tors point to a noticeable step-up in GDP growth in the second quarter. In par- ticular, consumer spending has picked up smartly in recent months, supported by solid growth in real disposable income and the ongoing effects of the increases in household wealth. And housing has continued to recover gradually, aided by income gains and the very low level of mortgage rates. The recent pickup in household spending, together with underlying conditions that are favorable for growth, lead me to be optimistic that we will see further im- provements in the labor market and the economy more broadly over the next few years. Monetary policy remains accommodative; low oil prices and ongoing job gains should continue to support the growth of incomes and therefore consumer spending; fiscal policy is now a small positive for growth; and global economic growth should pick up over time, supported by accommodative monetary policies abroad. As a re- sult, the FOMC expects that with gradual increases in the Federal funds rate, eco- nomic activity will continue to expand at a moderate pace and labor market indica- tors will strengthen further. Turning to inflation, overall consumer prices, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, increased just 1 percent over the 12 months ending in April, up noticeably from its pace through much of last year but still well short of the Committee’s 2-percent objective. Much of this shortfall continues to re- flect earlier declines in energy prices and lower prices for imports. Core inflation, which excludes energy and food prices, has been running close to 11⁄2 percent. As the transitory influences holding down inflation fade and the labor market strength- VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 42 ens further, the Committee expects inflation to rise to 2 percent over the medium term. Nonetheless, in considering future policy decisions, we will continue to care- fully monitor actual and expected progress toward our inflation goal. Of course, considerable uncertainty about the economic outlook remains. The lat- est readings on the labor market and the weak pace of investment illustrate one downside risk—that domestic demand might falter. In addition, although I am opti- mistic about the longer-run prospects for the U.S. economy, we cannot rule out the possibility expressed by some prominent economists that the slow productivity growth seen in recent years will continue into the future. Vulnerabilities in the glob- al economy also remain. Although concerns about slowing growth in China and fall- ing commodity prices appear to have eased from earlier this year, China continues to face considerable challenges as it rebalances its economy toward domestic de- mand and consumption and away from export-led growth. More generally, in the current environment of sluggish growth, low inflation, and already very accommoda- tive monetary policy in many advanced economies, investor perceptions of and appe- tite for risk can change abruptly. One development that could shift investor senti- ment is the upcoming referendum in the United Kingdom. A U.K. vote to exit the European Union could have significant economic repercussions. For all of these rea- sons, the Committee is closely monitoring global economic and financial develop- ments and their implications for domestic economic activity, labor markets, and in- flation. Monetary Policy I will turn next to monetary policy. The FOMC seeks to promote maximum em- ployment and price stability, as mandated by the Congress. Given the economic situ- ation I just described, monetary policy has remained accommodative over the first half of this year to support further improvement in the labor market and a return of inflation to our 2-percent objective. Specifically, the FOMC has maintained the target range for the Federal funds rate at 1⁄4to 1⁄2percent and has kept the Federal Reserve’s holdings of longer-term securities at an elevated level. The Committee’s actions reflect a careful assessment of the appropriate setting for monetary policy, taking into account continuing below-target inflation and the mixed readings on the labor market and economic growth seen this year. Proceeding cautiously in raising the Federal funds rate will allow us to keep the monetary sup- port to economic growth in place while we assess whether growth is returning to a moderate pace, whether the labor market will strengthen further, and whether in- flation will continue to make progress toward our 2-percent objective. Another factor that supports taking a cautious approach in raising the Federal funds rate is that the Federal funds rate is still near its effective lower bound. If inflation were to re- main persistently low or the labor market were to weaken, the Committee would have only limited room to reduce the target range for the Federal funds rate. How- ever, if the economy were to overheat and inflation seemed likely to move signifi- cantly or persistently above 2 percent, the FOMC could readily increase the target range for the Federal funds rate. The FOMC continues to anticipate that economic conditions will improve further and that the economy will evolve in a manner that will warrant only gradual in- creases in the Federal funds rate. In addition, the Committee expects that the Fed- eral funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below the levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run because headwinds—which include restraint on U.S. economic activity from economic and financial developments abroad, subdued house- hold formation, and meager productivity growth—mean that the interest rate need- ed to keep the economy operating near its potential is low by historical standards. If these headwinds slowly fade over time, as the Committee expects, then gradual increases in the Federal funds rate are likely to be needed. In line with that view, most FOMC participants, based on their projections prepared for the June meeting, anticipate that values for the Federal funds rate of less than 1 percent at the end of this year and less than 2 percent at the end of next year will be consistent with their assessment of appropriate monetary policy. Of course, the economic outlook is uncertain, so monetary policy is by no means on a preset course and FOMC participants’ projections for the Federal funds rate are not a predetermined plan for future policy. The actual path of the Federal funds rate will depend on economic and financial developments and their implications for the outlook and associated risks. Stronger growth or a more rapid increase in infla- tion than the Committee currently anticipates would likely make it appropriate to raise the Federal funds rate more quickly. Conversely, if the economy were to dis- appoint, a lower path of the Federal funds rate would be appropriate. We are com- mitted to our dual objectives, and we will adjust policy as appropriate to foster fi- nancial conditions consistent with their attainment over time. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 43 The Committee is continuing its policy of reinvesting proceeds from maturing Treasury securities and principal payments from agency debt and mortgage-backed securities. As highlighted in the statement released after the June FOMC meeting, we anticipate continuing this policy until normalization of the level of the Federal funds rate is well under way. Maintaining our sizable holdings of longer-term secu- rities should help maintain accommodative financial conditions and should reduce the risk that we might have to lower the Federal funds rate to the effective lower bound in the event of a future large adverse shock. Thank you. I would be pleased to take your questions. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6621 Sfmt 6621 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 44 RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF CHAIRMAN SHELBY FROM JANET L. YELLEN Q.1. In connection with the release of the proposed rule on single- counterparty credit limits, the Board released a white paper with a quantitative credit risk model and calibrated that model to deter- mine the appropriate credit limits. Will you commit to using simi- lar quantitative analyses on all future capital and liquidity rulemakings, and will you make such analyses public? A.1. The Federal Reserve Board (Board) carefully considers the cost and benefits of all regulations that it proposes. The nature and scope of the analysis depends in large part on the nature of the rule, the underlying statutory framework for the rule, and the ex- tent to which the potential costs and benefits of the rule lend them- selves to rigorous quantification. The Board typically publishes its assessment of the costs, bene- fits, and impact of a rule as part of the rule itself, but has occasion- ally issued such an assessment in a separate white paper. In each case, the Board chooses a publication format for its assessment that is best suited for the public communication of the particular analysis and results. The Board has chosen to publish white papers on occasions where the level of detail needed to communicate its assessment has been greater than what would typically appear in the preamble to a proposed or final rule. It is important to point out that the calibration of a rule can rarely be fully reduced to the output of a single mathematical for- mula with a set of parameters that are known with certainty. Therefore, the Board is careful not to ascribe a false level of preci- sion to its analyses. Typically, the Board’s goal in publishing an analysis such as the Calibrating the Single-Counterparty Credit Limit between Systemically Important Financial Institutions white paper is not to derive an exact calibration for a regulatory thresh- old, but rather to demonstrate that under a range of plausible as- sumptions and parameter values, the calibration of the regulatory threshold in question is defensible. In the case of proposed rulemakings, the publication of the analysis may also point out where further data from the industry could be helpful, and may en- courage the industry to provide such data during the comment pe- riod. In the future, the Board will continue to perform appropriate quantitative analyses for proposed and final rules, and will strive to publish such analyses in the most suitable form to solicit public input on, and enhance public understanding of, our rules. Q.2. Is it possible that the [Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio] rule could increase systemic risk due to its impact on the ability of custody banks to accept deposits during times of stress? What type of analysis has the Board performed to examine this issue? A.2. The Federal Reserve Board (Board) and the other Federal banking agencies (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) adopted enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) standards for the largest, glob- al systemically important bank holding companies and their in- sured depository subsidiaries, effective January 1, 2018 (5 percent VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 45 and 6 percent SLR, respectively).1 The enhanced SLR is one part of the enhanced prudential standards adopted by the Board that, taken together, improve the resiliency of individual companies and strengthen financial stability. For example, companies subject to the enhanced SLR standards are also subject to risk-based capital surcharges that are scaled to their systemic risk profiles, liquidity risk management and risk measurement requirements, supervisory- and company-run stress testing and capital planning requirements, and resolution planning standards. Depending on a banking organization’s business structure and mix of assets, banking organizations will be affected by the SLR differently. Custody banks, which engage in a variety of activities may experience increases in assets based on economic events, par- ticularly during periods of financial market stress. The SLR does not impose any specific restrictions on any particular asset profile, including the asset profile of custody banks. Rather, the SLR re- quires that banking organizations hold a certain amount of capital to support their total assets. In this regard, the SLR final rule re- quires banks to use daily average balance-sheet assets to calculate the amount of their assets each quarter. This approach helps to mitigate the impact of spikes in deposits that banking organiza- tions, such as custody banks, may experience. The agencies also have reserved authority under their respective capital rules to re- quire a banking organization to use a different asset amount for an exposure included in the SLR to address extraordinary situations.2 As part of several rulemakings that are applicable to global sys- temically important banking organizations, which includes the largest U.S. custodial banking organizations, the Board estimated the impact that such rulemakings would have on these firms’ regu- latory capital ratios, including on the leverage ratio. Prior to final- izing the enhanced SLR standards, the staff of the Federal banking agencies, including Board, analyzed regulatory and confidential su- pervisory data to determine the quantitative impact of these rules on subject firms. According to their public disclosures, global sys- temically important bank holding companies and their insured de- pository institutions have made significant progress in complying with the enhanced SLR standards that take effect January 1, 2018. Board staff continuously evaluates the capital planning processes and capital adequacy of the largest U.S.-based bank holding compa- nies through its Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR), which will incorporate the SLR requirements under stressed conditions beginning with the 2017 exercise. Q.3. One of the stated goals of the Federal Reserve’s Quantitative Easing (QE) programs was to put downward pressure on long-term interest rates and thereby ‘‘reduce the cost and increase the avail- ability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved conditions in finan- cial markets more generally.’’3 Nonetheless, studies by Soebel and 1See 79 FR 24528 (May 1, 2014). 2See 12 CFR 3.1(d)(4) (OCC); 12 CFR 217.1(d)(4) (Federal Reserve); 12 CFR 324.1(d)(4) (FDIC). 3See: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125b.htm. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 46 Taylor (2012)4 and Belke, Gros, and Osowski (2016),5 among oth- ers, have found that QE was not effective at reducing long-term rates. To what degree can currently low long-term interest rates be attributed to a decades-long trend of decline versus the effects of QE? A.3. The Federal Reserve and many other central banks have used purchases of longer-term assets as a tool to provide additional pol- icy accommodation once the level of short-term interest rates reached the effective lower bound. The effectiveness of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) as a tool for providing additional policy accommodation—at both conceptual and empirical levels—has been a topic of active discussion and research among economists and others. On balance, the results of recent research support the view that LSAPs are an important and effective tool that central banks can use to put downward pressure on longer-term rates and make overall financial conditions more accommodative. These changes in financial conditions, in turn, help to support the level of economic activity and guard against disinflationary pressures. Regarding the conceptual framework for the effects of LSAPs, many authors have pointed to a range of channels through which large scale asset purchases may affect financial markets and the economy. A particularly important channel for the influence of LSAPs operates through basic supply and demand factors. By pur- chasing large volumes of longer-term Treasury and agency securi- ties in its large scale asset purchase programs, the Federal Reserve reduced the quantity of those assets held by private investors. Given strong private sector demand for those longer-term Treasury and agency securities, the reduction in the available private supply of those assets tended to push up their prices and push down their yields. Investors holding lower-yielding Treasury and agency secu- rities then tend to bid up the prices and push down the yields on other assets that are reasonably close substitutes such as corporate bonds and many other fixed-income investments. Lower levels of private yields generally boost the prices for a range of assets in- cluding equities, home values, and many other types of invest- ments. These changes in financial conditions, on net, contribute to lower borrowing costs for households and businesses and generally more accommodative financial conditions. Regarding the empirical basis for the effectiveness of LSAPs, while the studies that you cite conclude that LSAPs have not been effective, many other studies to date find that these programs have been successful in providing additional policy accommodation. In- deed, some studies suggest that yields on longer-term Treasury se- curities could be 50 to 100 basis points lower at present than would otherwise be the case in the absence of the Federal Reserve’s asset purchases. Moreover, these estimates typically focus on only the di- rect effects of LSAPs on yields operating through basic supply ef- fects and thus may understate the effects of asset purchases that 4Stroebel, Johannes, and John B. Taylor (2012), ‘‘Estimated Impact of the Federal Reserve’s Mortgage-Backed Securities Purchase Program’’, International Journal of Central Banking 8(2):1–42. 5Belke, Ansgar, Daniel Gros, and Thomas Osowski (2016), ‘‘Did Quantitative Easing Affect Interest Rates Outside the U.S.? New Evidence Based on Interest Rate Differentials’’, CEPS Working Paper No. 416. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 47 can stem from other channels. For example, large scale asset pur- chase programs may help to reinforce central bank communications about the future path of the Federal funds rate—the so-called sig- naling channel. In addition, large scale asset purchases may have significant effects in financial markets at times when markets are under severe stress by enhancing market liquidity and bolstering market confidence. By boosting asset prices and lowering borrowing costs, these changes in asset prices provide support for spending and guard against downward pressures on inflation. See Vayanos and Vila (2009)6 and Li and Wei (2013 )7 for a dis- cussion of the effects of LSAPs on interest rates in a modern mod- els of the term structure of interest rates. See Li and Wei (2013), Hamilton and Wu (2011)8, and D’Amico, English, Lopez-Salido, and Nelson (2012)9 for a discussion of empirical estimates of the effects of LSAPs; see Chung, Laforte, Reifschneider, and Williams (2012)10 and Engen, Laubach, and Reifschneider (2015)11 for a dis- cussion of the effects of LSAPs in providing macroeconomic stim- ulus. RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR CRAPO FROM JANET L. YELLEN Q.1. In previous hearings I have encouraged our banking regu- lators to make the 10-year regulatory review meaningful and pro- vide specific ways to reduce the regulatory burden on financial in- stitutions while at the same time ensuring the safety and sound- ness of the financial system. Last week Senator Tester and I sent you a letter highlighting feedback from the EGRPRA outreach meetings questioning the need for four capital minimum require- ments, a capital conservation buffer, and the complexity in the defi- nition of tier 1 capital for community banks. Do you agree that our banking regulators should simplify and tailor the capital framework for community banks? A.1. Federal Reserve Board (Board) staff are currently exploring ways to simplify and tailor the regulatory capital requirements for community banking organizations in a manner that will be con- sistent with the safety and soundness aims of prudential regulation and with statutory requirements. As part of these efforts, Board staff are considering simplifications to certain aspects of the cur- rent capital framework, including those suggested in your letter, and associated reporting forms and instructions. 6Vayanos, Dmitri, and Jean-Luc Vila (2009), ‘‘A Preferred Habitat Model of the Term Struc- ture of Interest Rates’’, NBER Working Paper, 15487. 7Li, Canlin, and Min Wei (2013), ‘‘Term Structure Modelling With Supply Factors and the Federal Reserve’s Large Scale Asset Purchase Programs’’, International Journal of Central Banking, 9(1), pp.3–39. 8Hamilton, James, and Cynthia Wu (2011), ‘‘The Effectiveness of Alternative Monetary Policy Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment’’, NBER Working Paper 16956. 9D’Amico, Stefania, William English, David Lopez-Salido, and Edward Nelson (2012), ‘‘The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programs: Rationale and Effects’’, FEDS Working Paper series, 2012-85. 10Chung, Hess, Jean-Philippe Laforte, David Reifschneider, and John Williams (2012), ‘‘Have We Underestimated the Likelihood and Severity of Zero Lower Bound Events?’’ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 44(S1), 47–82. 11Engen, Eric M., Thomas Laubach, and David Reifschnieder (2015), ‘‘The Macroeconomic Ef- fects of the Federal Reserve’s Unconventional Policies’’, FEDS Working Paper, 2015-005. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 48 Q.2. On June 9th, the European Commission announced that it would delay its start date from September 1 to mid-2017 on the im- plementation of the margin requirements. I assume this announce- ment surprised you and your fellow regulators since for the last 3 years all the international regulators have been working to ensure global consistency in application of margin requirements in various jurisdictions around the world and established a phased-in sched- ule. What steps can the U.S. regulators take to address this timing issue and avoid fragmentation and competitive disadvantages and achieve global consistency? A.2. On June 9, 2016, U.S. regulators were informed by staff of the European Commission that the Basel Committee on Banking Su- pervision–International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (BCBS–IOSCO) margin framework for over-the-counter derivatives would not be enacted in the European Union in time for the up- coming September 2016 implementation deadline. Under the BCBS–IOSCO framework, large swap market partici- pants with over $3 trillion in noncleared swaps exposures are to begin complying with margin requirements on September 1, 2016, for their noncleared swaps with other large market participants. This agreed-upon implementation schedule is reflected in the final swap margin rules adopted in October 2015 and November 2015 by the U.S. prudential regulators and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), respectively. Minimum margin requirements for noncleared swaps are among the most important postfinancial crisis reforms to reduce uncer- tainty around possible exposures arising from noncleared swaps by requiring firms to have financial resources commensurate with the risks of the swaps into which they have entered. Sections 731 and 764 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec- tion Act (Dodd-Frank Act) mandate that the U.S. regulators write rules for initial margin and variation margin for noncleared swaps. We intend to move forward with implementation of the pruden- tial regulator final swap margin rule on September 1, 2016, as agreed to under the BCBS–IOSCO framework and as required by the Dodd-Frank Act. We have consulted with colleagues at the CFTC, and we understand they also plan to move forward with im- plementation on September 1, 2016. We are in close communication with our European Union coun- terparts and are urging them to move forward with implementation as soon as possible to avoid fragmentation and competitive dis- advantages and achieve global consistency. Q.3. I have heard concerns from clearinghouses and end users of the derivatives markets related to the treatment of customer mar- gin under the Basel leverage ratio. The posting of margin is re- quired for end user customers who use the futures market to man- age their business risks. As was widely espoused during develop- ment of the Dodd-Frank Act, margin posted to a clearing member bank both protects the customer from counterparty risk and offsets the clearing member bank’s exposure to the clearinghouse. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 49 Why then does the leverage ratio not recognize this offset rather than penalize bank affiliated clearing members who accept cus- tomer margin? A.3. The Board and the other Federal banking agencies (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insur- ance Corporation) adopted a supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) rule that applies to internationally active banking organizations.1 As designed, the SLR rule requires a banking organization to hold a minimum amount of capital against on-balance sheet assets and off-balance exposures, regardless of the riskiness of the individual exposure. This leverage ratio requirement is designed to recognize that the risk a banking organization poses to the financial system is a factor of its size as well as the composition of its assets. The denominator of the SLR, total leverage exposure, generally includes all on-balance sheet assets as determined by United States gen- erally accepted accounting principles, as well as certain off balance sheet items. If a banking organization records clients’ cash initial margin on its balance sheet, such margin is included in the bank- ing organization’s total leverage exposure. Whether cash initial margin is recorded on the balance sheet depends on the details of each specific margin agreement. RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR TOOMEY FROM JANET L. YELLEN Q.1. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), of which the Federal Re- serve is a member, has designated several American companies as global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs). The U.S., however, has its own designation process for nonbank systemically important financial institution (SIFI) managed by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). Though the FSB and FSOC share some members, not all American G-SIIs are currently SIFIs. This dis- parity in designations appears to undermine the credibility of both regulatory bodies. Should the U.S. representatives to the FSB sup- port the rescission of the G-SII designation for American companies that are not U.S. designated SIFIs? A.1. Since the financial crisis, U.S. authorities and foreign regu- lators have been working to identify institutions whose failure or distress may pose a threat to financial stability, including nonbank financial companies like insurance firms. The leaders of the Group of 20 Nations, including the United States, charged the Financial Stability Board (FSB) with identifying firms whose distress would threaten the global economy. The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) undertakes a process for designating nonbank firms as systemically important that assesses the potential harm that a firm’s distress or failure could cause to the economy of the United States. The fact that both groups have examined the same firms, at times in close proximity, is to be expected given the lim- ited number of firms that would reasonably be large and inter- connected enough to be considered systemically important. However, the specific designation frameworks and standards at the FSB and FSOC are distinctive. The FSB’s process for identi- 179 FR 57725, 57728, and 57735, September 26, 2014. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 50 fying global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs) is completely independent from the FSOCs designation process. Indeed, a des- ignation by the FSB that an insurer is systemically important would not logically require a similar finding by the FSOC, even if the FSB and the FSOC agreed on the underlying facts. The meth- odology for identifying G-SIIs is developed by the International As- sociation of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and has been updated this year. The FSOC’s analysis is based on a broad range of quan- titative and qualitative information available to the FSOC through existing public and regulatory sources and as submitted to the FSOC by the firms under consideration. The analysis is tailored, as appropriate, to address company-specific risk factors, including, but not limited to, the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, inter- connectedness, and mix of the activities of the firms. In addition, any standards adopted by the FSB, including any designation of an entity as a G-SII, are not binding on the Federal Reserve, the FSOC, or any other agency of the U.S. Government, or any U.S. companies. Thus, FSB designation of an entity as a G-SII does not result in the Federal Reserve becoming the entity’ s prudential reg- ulator. Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), the FSOC is responsible for decid- ing whether a nonbank financial company should be regulated and supervised by the Federal Reserve Board, based on the FSOC’s as- sessment of the extent to which the failure, material distress, or ongoing activities of that entity could pose a risk to the U.S. finan- cial system. As a member of the FSB, the Federal Reserve, together with other U.S. agencies, participates in the FSB’s work, including G-SII designations, and provides input that considers implications for U.S. domiciled firms that the Federal Reserve supervises as well as global financial stability. A decision to rescind the designation of any G-SII requires a careful evaluation of the firm and its global systemic footprint in accordance with the methodology developed by the IAIS. The Federal Reserve, the U.S. Securities and Ex- change Commission, and the U.S. Department of Treasury are all members of the FSB and engage in the FSB’s global financial sta- bility work. Moreover, the Federal Reserve is participating as a member of the IAIS alongside the Federal Insurance Office (FIO), the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), and State insurance regulators in the development of international in- surance standards that best meet the needs of the U.S. insurance market and consumers. The Federal Reserve, along with other members of the U.S. delegation at the FIO and NAIC, actively en- gage U.S. interested parties on issues being considered by the IAIS. Q.2. Will the FSB review its list of G-SIIs in 2016, and will that review include the possibility for the rescission of current G-SII designations? What analysis will the Fed review or develop to sup- port its positions on 2016 G-SII designations? A.2. As noted by the FSB in its 2015 update of the list of G-SIIs, ‘‘the group of G-SIIs would be updated annually based on new data published by the FSB each November,’’ where changes to the list may ‘‘reflect changes in the level and/or type of activity undertaken by the relevant institutions, combined with supervisory judg- VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 51 ment.’’1 The 2016 review will cover the presently identified G-SIIs, which may result in changes to the institutions included in the list, and will use the G-SII assessment methodology as updated by the IAIS on June 16, 2016, among other things. Federal Reserve staff will review documents associated with the development of the methodology and will continue to confer with other U.S. members of the FSB and IAIS. Q.3. The systemically important designation, by both international and American regulators, has proven to have a profound impact on designated American companies, their employees, and their cus- tomers. Nevertheless, transparency in these designation processes remains lacking. As a participant at the FSB, what steps will you take to increase transparency into activities at the FSB? A.3. The Federal Reserve strongly supports transparency in the methods and processes that the IAIS and FSB use to identify G- SIIs. On November 25, 2015, the IAIS issued a public consultation document on the methodology used to identify and analyze poten- tial G-SIIs. The Federal Reserve participated in the review of com- ments received from stakeholders in the U.S. and around the world. The revised methodology was released as a public paper on June 16, 2016, and has been implemented. The revisions to the G- SII identification process increased the involvement of the insur- ance companies and their relevant supervisors in the process through its five phases: (1) the collection of data, (2) quality control on the data, initial scoring of the company, and grouping relative to a quantitative threshold for the score, (3) additional information collection and methodical assessment of companies that cross the quantitative threshold, (4) information exchange between the com- pany, relevant authorities, and the IAIS, and (5) recommendation by the IAIS to the FSB, which then deliberates on a confidential basis to protect the confidentiality of company data. The updated assessment methodology contemplates transparency that was not part of the prior assessment methodology, including transparency with companies that are subject to phases 1 through 4 and other transparent engagement with companies subject to only phases 1 and 2, as well as certain public disclosure of aggregate and method- ology information after the G-SII identification process is complete. Moreover, the JAIS has committed to further developing public dis- closure. It is important to note that neither the FSB, nor the IAIS, has the ability to impose requirements in any national jurisdiction. The FSOC makes its own independent decisions on designating nonbank financial companies, using the statutory standards set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act. RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR KIRK FROM JANET L. YELLEN Q.1. As you know, the financial regulators, including the Federal Reserve Board, recently put forward a joint proposed rule on execu- 1FSB, 2015 Update of List of Global Systemically Important Insurers (G-SIIs) dated Nov. 3, 2015, available at http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-communication-G-SIIs-Final- version.pdf. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 52 tive compensation pursuant to section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The rules, which are intended to reduce systemic risk, would rep- resent a sweeping change to executive compensation arrangements for many financial institutions, and would apply to a subset of in- surance companies—those that own thrifts. There is concern that the rules are very bank-centric and not in any way tailored to in- surance companies subject to the rule. As the Fed noted in its re- lease of proposed capital rules for insurers, thrift insurers do not pose systemic risk, and generally have a very distinct business model from the banks that are the central target of the Fed’s pro- posed executive compensation rule. The one-size-fits-all approach by the Fed in the executive compensation rule is counter to the agency’s own statements on thrift insurers, and counter to the Fed’s insurance-specific approach for capital rules for thrift insur- ers. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve’s analysis underlying the rule, including the horizontal review, was focused solely on banks. Are you willing to conduct an analysis of insurance executive compensation practices and insurance risks before finalizing the rule for thrift insurers, and will you treat insurers distinctly from banks in the final rule, consistent with the treatment of thrift in- surers for capital purposes? A.1. Pursuant to section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), the Agencies1 joint notice of proposed rulemaking2 covers all depository institu- tion holding companies, including all savings and loan holding com- panies.3 As described in the preamble, the proposed rule does not establish a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach. Rather, the Agencies have tailored the requirements of the proposed rule to the size and complexity of covered institutions. In addition, the proposed rule would allow firms to tailor the incentive based compensation ar- rangements to the nature of a particular institution’s business and the risks, as long as those incentive-based compensation arrange- ments appropriately balance risk and reward. The methods by which such balance is achieved would be permitted to differ by in- stitution and across business lines and operating units. The pre- amble invited comment on the impact of the proposed rule on all covered institutions. The Agencies have included numerous ques- tions, touching all aspects of the proposed rule, including the tai- loring of institutions by asset size and the definitions of significant risk takers. We will consider your comments and all comments we receive in the final rulemaking process. 1Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Federal Housing Finance Agen- cy (FHFA); National Credit Union Administration (NCUA); and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 281 FR 37670 (July 10, 2016). 3Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act defines ‘‘covered financial institution’’ to include any of the following types of institutions that have $1 billion or more in assets: (A) a depository institu- tion or depository institution holding company, as such terms are defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) (12 U.S.C. 1813); (B) a broker-dealer registered under sec- tion 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 780); (C) a credit union, as described in section 19(b)(1)(A)(iv) of the Federal Reserve Act; (D) an investment adviser, as such term is defined in section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11)); (E) the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae); (F) the Federal Home Loan Mort- gage Corporation (Freddie Mac); and (G) any other financial institution that the appropriate Federal regulators, jointly, by rule, determine should be treated as a covered financial institu- tion for these purposes. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 53 RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR HELLER FROM JANET L. YELLEN Q.1. What are the precise criteria and metrics that Financial Sta- bility Oversight Council (FSOC) uses to determine whether to des- ignate an intuition as a Systemically Important Financial Institu- tion? A.1. The Financial Stability Oversight Council (Council) may deter- mine that a nonbank financial company should be supervised by the Federal Reserve Board (Board) and be subject to prudential standards ‘‘if the Council determines that material financial dis- tress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activi- ties of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.’’1 In considering whether a nonbank financial company should be supervised by the Board and subject to prudential standards, the Council considers the following statutory factors:2 1. The extent of the leverage of the company; 2. the extent and nature of the off-balance-sheet exposures of the company; 3. the extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the company with other significant nonbank financial compa- nies and significant bank holding companies; 4. the importance of the company as a source of credit for house- holds, businesses, and State and local governments and as a source of liquidity for the United States financial system; 5. the importance of the company as a source of credit for low- income, minority, or underserved communities, and the im- pact that the failure of such company would have on the avail- ability of credit in such communities; 6. the extent to which assets are managed rather than owned by the company, and the extent to which ownership of assets under management is diffuse; 7. the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnected- ness, and mix of the activities of the company; 8. the degree to which the company is already regulated by one or more primary financial regulatory agencies; 9. the amount and nature of the financial assets of the company; and 10. the amount and types of the liabilities of the company, in- cluding the degree of reliance on short-term funding. In 2012, the Council adopted a rule and interpretive guidance that describe the manner in which the Council applies the statu- tory standards and considerations, and the processes and proce- dures that the Council follows, in making determinations under section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 1Dodd-Frank Act section 113(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1). 2The Council may also consider any other risk-related factors that it deems appropriate. Dodd-Frank Act section 113(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. §5323(a)(2). VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 54 Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).3 In 2015, the Council revised cer- tain of its practices related to evaluation of nonbank financial com- panies and adopted supplemental procedures to bolster engagement with companies during evaluations for potential determinations and annual reevaluations, as well as transparency to the public.4 The Council’s assessment of whether a nonbank financial com- pany meets the statutory standard is based on an evaluation of each of the statutory factors, taking into account facts and cir- cumstances relevant to the company. Quantitative metrics, to- gether with qualitative analysis, informs the judgment of the Coun- cil when it is evaluating whether a nonbank financial company should be supervised by the Board and be subject to prudential standards. Because the impact of a firm’s material distress or ac- tivities on financial stability is firm-specific, the Council conducts its analysis on a company-by-company basis in order to take into account the potential risks and mitigating factors that are unique to each company. Q.2. Do you think there is room for improvement in the FSOC’s an- nual review and derisking process, and what would you suggest? A.2. At the time the Council determines that a nonbank financial company should be supervised by the Board and subject to pruden- tial standards, the nonbank financial company is given a detailed basis for the determination. A company can use that information, as well as the factors the Council is required to consider under the Dodd-Frank Act, to guide its effort to reduce its systemic footprint. The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Council to reevaluate the deter- minations at least annually. The Council’s reevaluation process considers whether the nonbank financial company continues to meet the standards under the Dodd-Frank Act. As explained in its final rule and interpretive guidance, the Council may also consider a request from a nonbank financial company for a reevaluation be- fore the next required annual reevaluation in the case of an ex- traordinary change that materially decreases the threat a nonbank financial company could pose to U.S. financial stability. As part of the annual reevaluation process, each company is pro- vided an opportunity to meet with Council staff to discuss the scope and process for the review and to present information regarding any change that may be relevant to the threat the company could pose to U.S. financial stability, including a company restructuring, regulatory developments, market changes, or other factors. lf a company requests that the Council rescind the determination, the Council has noted that it intends to vote on whether to rescind the determination and provide the company, its primary financial regu- latory agency, and the primary financial regulatory agency of its significant subsidiaries with a notice explaining the primary basis for any decision not to rescind the designation. The notice will ad- dress the material factors raised by the company during the annual reevaluation. In addition, the FSOC will provide each designated nonbank financial company an opportunity for an oral hearing be- fore the Council once every 5 years. 312 CFR part 1310, app. A. 4See ‘‘Supplemental Procedures Relating to Nonbank Financial Company Determinations’’, Feb. 4, 2015. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 55 As discussed below, using the foregoing process, the Council has recently voted to rescind its determination concerning GE Capital. Q.3. Would you consider making a clear exit or off-ramp for des- ignated firms? A.3. Because the impact of a firm’s material distress or activities on financial stability is firm specific, the Council conducts its anal- ysis on a company-by-company basis in order to take into account the potential risks and mitigating factors that are unique to each company. At the time the Council determines that a nonbank fi- nancial company should be supervised by the Board and subject to prudential standards, the nonbank financial company is given a de- tailed basis for the determination. A company can use that infor- mation, as well as other information relating to the factors the Council is required to consider under the Dodd-Frank Act, to guide its efforts to reduce its systemic footprint. As you may be aware, on June 28, 2016, the Council voted to re- scind the determination that GE Capital should be subject to su- pervision by the Board and prudential standards. The Council de- termined that GE Capital had fundamentally changed its business and become a much less significant participant in financial mar- kets and the U.S. economy through a series of divestitures, a trans- formation of its funding model, and a corporate reorganization. GE Capital had decreased its total assets by over 50 percent, shifted away from short-term funding, and reduced its interconnectedness with large financial institutions. The Council’s decision to rescind its final determination was based on extensive quantitative and qualitative analyses regarding GE Capital. Upon review of the stat- utory factors and all the facts of record, the Council determined that GE Capital no longer met the standards for determination under section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act and rescinded its deter- mination that GE Capital should be supervised by the Board and subject to prudential standards. Q.4. The Federal Reserve plays a major role on the Financial Sta- bility Board and chairs the supervisory and regulatory cooperation committee. The Federal Reserve is uniquely involved in setting international regulatory and supervisory policies that ultimately must be implemented by U.S. regulators. Would you support having transcripts made at international groups the Federal Reserve is a member of so the American public knows what is being advocated for and discussed? A.4. The Federal Reserve is committed to transparency in the international groups of which it is a part. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) monitors and assesses vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system and recommends actions needed to address them. In addition, it monitors and advises on market and systemic developments, and their implications for regulatory policy. Before the FSB recommends a particular policy action, the FSB typically goes through a public notice-and-comment process similar to that which would accompany rulemaking in the United States. In addi- tion, it is important to note that none of the policy actions rec- ommended by the FSB would take effect in the U.S. without being adopted by U.S. authorities through a notice and comment process. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 56 With respect to the possibility of public transcripts of meetings of international groups, there are competing factors that must be considered. The benefits of increased transparency must be weighed against concerns about exposing confidential or sensitive information about firms and markets and concerns about the im- pact on discussion within the international group, which could make the group less effective at achieving its stated goals. Q.5. Would you be willing to brief Members of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee on what is happening in international discussions prior to any new international rules being proposed? A.5. My staff and I are always available to brief Members of the Committee on the status of international regulatory policy discus- sions. Q.6. Does the Financial Stability Board influence the decisions that the Federal Stability Oversight Council makes regarding System- ically Important Financial Institution designations? A.6. The U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) deter- mines whether to designate nonbank financial firms as system- ically important based on the factors identified in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), as interpreted by the FSOC through rulemaking. Whether an entity has been designated by the FSB is not a consideration. Q.7. Recently the living wills submitted by several banks were re- jected by the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The Federal Reserve and the FDIC came to different conclusions regarding two firms. How is the criteria used by the Federal Reserve when evaluating living wills different than the FDIC’s criteria which is creating these split decisions? Do you believe providing more clear criteria of what you expect to see or fix in living wills would help prevent split decisions be- tween the Federal Reserve and FDIC? A.7. In April 2016, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit In- surance Corporation (together, the Agencies) published a joint as- sessment framework and an explanation of the determinations they had made on the firms’ 2015 resolution plans.5 Specifically, the Agencies evaluated the preferred strategy presented by each firm, the executability of the firm’s resolution plan, and whether the firm had made demonstrable progress to improve its resolvability. In as- sessing each of the 2015 resolution plans, the Agencies focused on seven key elements: capital, liquidity, governance mechanisms, operational capabilities, legal entity rationalization, derivatives and trading activities, and responsiveness. The Agencies also issued joint guidance for the next full resolution plans that are due in July 2017.6 Under Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Agencies are re- quired to make independent findings. Nonetheless, the Agencies closely coordinate to ensure consistency of treatment in the review process and reconcile factual findings and identified issues. The 5See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20160413a2.pdf. 6See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20160413a1.pdf. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 57 Agencies reached consensus and agreement repeatedly throughout the process, including on the weaknesses identified at particular firms and guidance being issued for the next resolution plans. In the instances where the agencies differed, they have found agree- ment on facts and remediations. Q.8. Do you believe that the Federal Reserve should study the costs and benefits of existing and recent financial regulations be- fore layering on new regulations? Do you have concerns about the cumulative impact that all these regulations are having on average Americans access to credit or main street businesses? A.8. The Federal Reserve conducts a variety of economic analyses and assessments to support the rulemaking process, and regularly publishes these analyses either as part of the proposed or final rule itself or as a separate white paper accompanying the rule. In such cases, the impact analyses naturally focus on the impact of the spe- cific regulation in question, but the Federal Reserve also gives careful consideration to the potential positive and negative inter- actions among rules. More broadly, the Federal Reserve engages in a regular quan- titative impact assessment and monitoring program that is coordi- nated with other global regulators through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). This program, the results of which are made public, is designed to assess the overall impact of the new postcrisis bank capital and liquidity requirements on the global banking system. The Federal Reserve has been participating in this impact assessment program since 2012, and it continues to inform the Federal Reserve’s understanding of the cost and benefits of bank capital and liquidity regulation. The Federal Reserve has also participated in several other global efforts to assess the costs and benefits of postcrisis financial regu- latory reforms through its participation in the FSB and the BCBS. The BCBS published a study in 2010 that demonstrated the sub- stantial net economic benefits of stronger bank capital and liquidity requirements. The FSB published an updated study in 2015 that demonstrated the substantial additional net economic benefits of imposing total loss absorbing capacity requirements on the most systemic global banks. The Federal Reserve carefully considers the overall costs and benefits of all of the regulations it promulgates. The overarching goal of the Federal Reserve’s regulatory program is to enhance bank safety and soundness and financial stability at the least cost to economic growth and credit availability. The Federal Reserve is committed to conducting an ongoing review to understand how postcrisis reform is influencing financial stability and the economy. RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR SASSE FROM JANET L. YELLEN Q.1. I’d like to continue our discussion of the concentration of job creation and economic growth in higher-skilled fields. You said in recent correspondence that unemployment rates for ‘‘lower skilled workers and workers in goods producing industries’’ are around VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 58 twice as high as those for highly skilled workers such as managers and professions. As I said in our correspondence, this disparity is important be- cause our economy faces a crisis in the nature of work. If we think about the history of economics, we had the ‘‘old economy,’’ which evolved from hunter gatherers, to settled farmers and big tool man- ufacturing economies. Now we’re entering into a ‘‘new economy,’’ which exists within a global economy and a fast, technology-based, information age. Could you elaborate on the causes of this uneven growth? In our correspondence, you briefly mentioned the ‘‘business cycle and tran- sitory-specific factors,’’ including the housing market collapse and the decline in oil prices. A.1. In addition to the cyclical and transitory factors, it is the case that these disparities in unemployment rates and the shift in em- ployment shares that I cited in my letter of May 25, 2016, are re- lated to longer term developments transforming our economy such as globalization and technical change, which I mentioned in my February 11, 2016, testimony and which you describe as being re- lated to our economy’s transition from an ‘‘old economy’’ based on manufacturing to a new economy. Q.2. As I understand it, we have moved from having the average duration at a firm for a worker being 26 years in the late 70s, to being around 3.8 years now, and dropping. How is this turnover af- fecting our economy? For example, how many workers must now change fields altogether in order to find a new job? A.2. Based on data from U.S. Census Bureau and work by Farber, it appears that firm tenure has actually not changed much because an increase in the age of the population (older people have longer tenure) and greater attachment to the labor market among women has offset a decline in tenure among men. But tenure has gone down for men, especially those over 50.1 I have not seen statistics on how many workers must change fields in order to find a new job and whether that has changed over time. The U.S. labor mar- ket is very fluid, and a regular feature is that individuals change occupations and industries fairly frequently—some studies have es- timated that about 20 percent of workers change industry or occu- pation each year.2 However, it seems likely that many of these transitions are voluntary. Q.3. Is this increasing job turnover behind some of the disparity in job creation between highly skilled workers and lower skilled work- ers? A.3. It is the case that lower skilled workers experience higher turnover and have higher unemployment rates than highly skilled workers. In part this may reflect the fact that lower skilled workers gain fewer firm-specific skills on the job, or the skills they gain are easily taught, and thus it is less costly for firms to replace them. 1Farber, Henry S. ‘‘Employment Security: The Decline in Worker-Firm Attachment in the United States’’, CEPS Working Paper No. 172, January 2008. 2Whether this share has been rising is not clear. See, for example, Moscarini, Giuseppe, and Kaj Thomsson, ‘‘Occupational and Job Mobility in the U.S.’’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 109(4), 807–836, 2007; and Kambourov, Gueorgui, and Iourii Manovskii, ‘‘Rising Occupational and Industry Mobility in the United States: 1968–1997’’, International Economic Review 49(1), 41–79, 2008. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 59 Q.4. What portion of currently unemployed, underemployed, and discouraged workers will have to retool their skillset to enter a new sector of the economy to become fully employed? A.4. It is very difficult to say what proportion of the unemployed are structurally unemployed, in the sense that they lack the skills to perform the available jobs, and I have not seen the specific esti- mates you are asking for. One could estimate an upper bound limit of about 8 million workers who are either unemployed or discour- aged.3 If we assume that all discouraged workers and all long-term unemployed workers (unemployed more than 27 weeks) are struc- turally unemployed, then the portion of unemployed and discour- aged workers who are structurally unemployed and therefore at risk of having to retool would be closer to 30 percent. However, this latter number is certainly an overstatement. Some discouraged workers stop searching due to what they perceive as overall weak demand or other factors, not lack of skills, and not all workers who are unemployed more than 27 weeks must retool to find jobs. Of course this number does not include workers who choose to reskill after only a short period of unemployment or who improve or change their skillset while working, because they see more oppor- tunity in another field. Q.5. Will this percentage of unemployed, underemployed, and dis- couraged workers that must enter a new sector increase in the fu- ture? A.5. It is difficult to say with certainty. The answer to this question depends on many factors including whether future technical change and globalization are more or less disruptive to labor markets as have been the changes we have undergone in recent decades. Q.6. What is the average age of an unemployed or underemployed worker that decides to leave the workforce altogether instead of seeking to retool their skillset and enter a new sector? A.6. Consider again the data on discouraged workers. In 2015, about half of discouraged workers were in the 25 to 54 age group, although as noted previously, not all discouraged workers leave the labor force because they think they do not have the right skills.4 Another way to answer this question is to look at data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on displaced workers.5 Of all workers who were displaced from a job in 2014, those who were 65 and older were the most likely to leave the labor force—over half did. About one-fifth of workers ages 55 to 64 left the labor force as did 12 percent of workers ages 25 to 54. However, because most dis- placed workers fall into this latter age category, about half of the workers who left the labor force after a displacement were between the ages of 24 and 54. 3Discouraged workers, as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, are workers who sepa- rated from a job in the past year and did some job search but stopped searching because they think there is no work available for them. 4Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Data, Annual Averages, Table 35. http:// www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat35.pdf. 5Displaced workers are defined as ‘‘persons 20 years of age and older who lost or left jobs because their plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do, or their position or shift was abolished.’’ ‘‘Worker Displacement: 2011–2013’’, News Release, USDL-14-1605, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, August 26, 2014. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 60 Q.7. What risk, if any, does the increasing automation of routine work tasks pose to the economy over the long-term? A.7. Typically automation has boosted productivity growth. More- over, history suggests that while automation does reduce employ- ment in the affected occupations, demand and workers shift to new occupations, some of which may not even exist today. However, such processes can take a long time to play out, and there is some debate today among economists and others who think about the role of automation in the workplace as to whether the technical change underway now may upend this historical pattern, resulting in greater displacement of workers from the labor market than has historically been the case. Beyond that, automation could affect the distribution of income and wealth in the economy, which could have spillovers to other parts of the economy. Q.8. How long will it take for these risks to come to significant fru- ition? A.8. It is unclear how automation will evolve and its impact on the economy going forward is highly unclear. As such, we cannot specu- late as to the timing of any particular outcomes. Q.9. What sectors of the economy will benefit the most from auto- mation? A.9. The jobs that are most susceptible to automation are those that involve routine tasks, either physical or cognitive. The sectors where automation has proceeded the furthest include manufac- turing, and where automation substitutes for routine physical labor and some services, where automation can substitute for routine cognitive skills (such as banking—for example, ATMs). To the ex- tent that automation makes it less expensive to perform these tasks, end users of those products (whether they be businesses that use them as inputs or consumers) will benefit. Q.10. What sectors of the economy will benefit the least from auto- mation? A.10. With our current technology, tasks that require nonroutine skills, either physical or cognitive, are the least susceptible to auto- mation. This includes a wide range of occupations that include both lower skilled work, such as laborers and personal care providers, to higher skilled work such as software developers and managers. Sectors of the economy and consumers that rely on these types of work are less likely to see cost savings. However, as technology changes, it may be that more and more occupations are susceptible in part to automation. Already we have seen that technology has improved productivity in these occupations even if the jobs them- selves are not automated (for instance, improved information tech- nology does not completely substitute for doctors, but it can provide them access to better information, which improves outcomes). Q.11. I’d like to ask about the recent Brexit. What economic and political factors are the Federal Reserve con- sulting in evaluating the national and international economic risk associated with the Brexit? How would the economically worst-case Brexit scenario unfold? How would the economically best-case Brexit scenario unfold? VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 61 Will the value of the dollar will significantly appreciate over the long-term, including as compared to the pound sterling, due to the Brexit? If so, what will the impact of such appreciation be on U.S. ex- ports? What are the most economically significant legal questions that the U.K. and the EU must resolve, in order to fully evaluate the practical economic consequences of the Brexit? A.11. The United Kingdom (U.K.) vote to leave the European Union (EU) has increased uncertainty about the future trading re- lationship between the U.K. and the EU. That increased uncer- tainty appears to be weighing on U.K. investment and hiring deci- sions, and early indicators following the June 23 referendum point to a slowdown in U.K. economic growth. The broader effect on the global economy, however, is likely to be limited, as many postvote declines in global asset prices have since been reversed. For in- stance, U.S. stock price indexes are now higher than before the ref- erendum. The economic impact of the referendum result on the U.K., the rest of Europe, and the global economy is likely to depend on how uncertainty is resolved over time, which in turn will depend on the progress of negotiations between U.K. and EU authorities over their future trading relationship. Given the importance of London as a global financial center, some of the most important legal ques- tions involve the trading of financial services between the U.K. and the EU. Since the June 23 referendum, the dollar has appreciated signifi- cantly against the British pound, but the dollar is only modestly stronger on net against a broad basket of foreign currencies, and thus the impact on the demand for U.S. exports is likely to be mod- est. Q.12. I’d like to ask about the Federal Reserve Board’s joint pro- posed rule on executive compensation under section 956 of Dodd- Frank. As you know, these rules would apply to those insurance compa- nies that own thrifts. Does the Federal Reserve plan on treating in- surance companies different than banks in the application of this rule, as it has with capital standards? What has the Federal Reserve done or will do to ensure that these rules are not bankcentric and are instead tailored to the in- surance industry? A.12. Pursuant to section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re- form and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), the Agen- cies’6 joint notice of proposed rulemaking7 covers all depository in- stitution holding companies, including all savings and loan holding companies.8 As described in the preamble, the proposed rule does 6Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA); National Credit Union Administration (NCUA); and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 781 FR 37670 (July 10, 2016). 8Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act defines ‘‘covered financial institution’’ to include any of the following types of institutions that have $1 billion or more in assets: (A) a depository institu- tion or depository institution holding company, as such terms are defined in section 3 of the Continued VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 62 not establish a rigid, one-size-fits-all approach. Rather, the Agen- cies have tailored the requirements of the proposed rule to the size and complexity of covered institutions. In addition, the proposed rule would allow firms to tailor the incentive based compensation arrangements to the nature of a particular institution’s business and the risks, as long as those incentive-based compensation ar- rangements appropriately balance risk and reward. The methods by which such balance is achieved would be permitted to differ by institution and across business lines and operating units. The pre- amble invited comment on the impact of the proposed rule on all covered institutions. The Agencies have included numerous ques- tions, touching all aspects of the proposed rule, including the tai- loring of institutions by asset size and the definitions of significant risk-takers. We will consider your comments and all comments we receive in the final rulemaking process. Q.13. Has or will the Federal Reserve conduct specific analysis of insurance executive compensation practices and risks and how the rule will impact insurance companies? If so, please provide a copy of the analysis. A.13. The Federal Reserve Board has not conducted specific anal- ysis of insurance executive compensation practice. However, the Agencies have encouraged institutions to provide feedback on the potential impact of the proposed rule on covered institutions throughout the comment period process, and through this notice and comment process help us analyze specifically insurance com- pensation practice.9 In addition, the preamble solicits input on the impact of the rule on all covered financial institutions through a number of questions posed in this area. For instance, question 2.8 seeks commenters’ views on situations where it might be appro- priate and why to modify the requirements of the proposed rule where there are multiple covered institution subsidiaries within a single parent organization based upon the relative size, complexity, risk profile, or business model, and use of incentive-based com- pensation of the covered institution subsidiaries within the consoli- dated organization. In a similar vein, question 2.12 asks whether the determination of average total consolidated assets should be further tailored for certain types of investment advisers, such as charitable advisers, non-U.S.-domiciled advisers, or insurance com- panies and, if so, why and in what manner. Q.14. As you know, the rule provides that a firm’s ‘‘significant risk- takers’’ are subject to the compensation rule. Some have expressed concern that determining whether an employee is a ‘‘significant risk-taker’’—specifically calculating whether an employee is among the top 5 percent of compensated employees—could be costly to im- plement, given technical difficulties in accurately discerning salary Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) (12 U.S.C. 1813); (B) a broker-dealer registered under sec- tion 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 780); (C) a credit union, as described in section 19(b)(1)(A)(iv) of the Federal Reserve Act; (D) an investment adviser, as such term is defined in section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11)); (E) the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae); (F) the Federal Home Loan Mort- gage Corporation (Freddie Mac); and (G) any other financial institution that the appropriate Federal regulators, jointly, by rule, determine should be treated as a covered financial institu- tion for these purposes. 9See http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doclid=R-1536& doclver1. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 63 levels across a firm. Could there be merit in implementing a salary threshold test instead, which would instead define (in part) ‘‘signifi- cant risk-takers’’ as any employee earning more than a particular salary threshold? A.14. While drafting the proposal, the Agencies were conscious of potential burden on covered institutions and have attempted to ap- propriately reduce burden throughout the proposal. We are evalu- ating the merit of a proposal such as salary thresholds. To that end, the Agencies have posed specific questions10 on the alter- native of using a dollar threshold test under which the designation of significant risk-takers would be based in part on whether a cov- ered person receives annual base salary and incentive-based com- pensation in excess of a specific dollar threshold. RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR ROUNDS FROM JANET L. YELLEN Q.1. The Federal Reserve (along with the Department of the Treas- ury and the Security and Exchange Commission) participates at the Financial Stability Board (FSB), but there is little to no trans- parency into the Fed’s actions at the FSB. What steps can the Fed take to increase transparency into its activities at the FSB? A.1. Like the U.S. Treasury Department and the Securities and Ex- change Commission, the Federal Reserve is a member of the Finan- cial Stability Board (FSB). The FSB monitors and assesses vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system and rec- ommends actions needed to address them. In addition, it monitors and advises on market and systemic developments, and their impli- cations for regulatory policy. Before the FSB recommends a par- ticular policy action, the FSB typically goes through a public notice and comment process similar to that which would accompany rule- making in the United States. In addition, it is important to note that none of the policy actions recommended by the FSB would take effect in the U.S. without being adopted by U.S. authorities through a public notice and comment process. Thus, the Federal Reserve would not implement any FSB standards in the U.S. with- out going through the same process as we do for our other rulemakings. Q.2. As you know, the FSB is an international body charged with designating global systemically important nonbank financial com- panies. To date, the three American insurers that the FSB des- ignated have all been designated by the Financial Stability Over- sight Council (FSOC). Given that the FSB is not subject to the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and several members of FSOC serve on the FSB and have been in- volved in the separate designation process for global systemically important financial institutions (SIFI), how much does FSOC rely on or consider the FSB’s designations in conducting its own assess- ment of SIFI prospects? 10See questions 2.30, 2.31, and 2.32. 81 FR 37670 at 37699. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 64 A.2. The U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) deter- mines whether to designate nonbank financial firms as system- ically important based on the factors identified in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, as interpreted by the FSOC through rulemaking. Whether an entity has been des- ignated by the FSB is not a consideration. RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR MENENDEZ FROM JANET L. YELLEN Q.1. After years of rapid and consistent economic growth due to large-scale market reforms beginning in the late 1970s, the Chi- nese economy has slowed significantly in recent years. The slow- down has led the Chinese government to fall back on fiscal and monetary stimulus measures to buoy its faltering economy. And while these efforts have had varying levels of success, further inter- vention has served to raise core concerns about the Chinese govern- ment’s ability and willingness to open up its economy to greater competition and its financial system to cross-border capital flows— elements most economists agree are necessary to facilitate sus- tained economic health in China. Taking into account China’s surging debt levels resulting from an aggressive lending campaign by financial institutions and banks, imbalanced and slowing economic growth, and an unpredictable re- gime, can you speak to what impact China’s continuing economic decline will have on the U.S. economy? A.1. Chinese economic growth has been on a general downward trend over the past several years, but we would not characterize the Chinese economy as being in decline. It is still growing at a siz- able pace and, to some degree, the slowing that has occurred is a result of several structural factors—slower labor force growth, re- duced investment as the economy rebalances toward consumption, and a moderation in growth typical of maturing economies. Even with growth declining it should be noted that China’s contribution to global growth remains strong. This contribution depends on both China’s growth rate and its weight in the world economy—since China still grows faster than many other economies, its share in the global economy has been rising. Also, if China manages to re- balance its economy successfully, its economic growth will be more sustainable even if it is lower, and it will increasingly import more consumption-type goods, thus becoming more of an independent en- gine of global growth as it draws more imports from the rest of the world, including from the United States (U.S.). But you are right to note that there is a risk that Chinese growth could slow more sharply given the run-up in corporate debt, adjustments going on in industries with excess capacity, and some uncertainty about the economic policies being followed. We do not view this to be the most likely scenario, as the authorities still have room to provide more policy stimulus were the economy to slow sharply and also have ample resources to stave off a crisis if necessary. But unexpected developments can occur, and, should the Chinese economy slow much more abruptly and severely, there would clearly be an adverse impact on the global economy, includ- ing in the U.S. The U.S. economy would be hit from its direct trade VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 65 links to China (China accounted for nearly 8 percent of U.S. goods exports in 2015), its indirect links to China through trade with other countries affected by China’s slowing, and possibly by rever- berations to global financial markets. Q.2. To what extent has this been a factor in monetary policy deci- sions? A.2. Our monetary policy is motivated by the dual mandate set for us by the U.S. Congress, which calls for achieving stable prices and maximum sustainable employment. In this globally interconnected world, economic and financial developments in the U.S. have a sig- nificant impact on the rest of the world and, by the same token, developments in the rest of the world have significant effects on our own economy. We, therefore, closely monitor developments abroad, including importantly those in China, for their implications for the outlook and risks to the U.S. economy and adjust our poli- cies accordingly in order to achieve our dual mandate. Q.3. From 2010 to 2015, labor productivity rose just 0.6 percent per year on average, in comparison to an average of nearly 2 percent growth in the previous 6 years. And perhaps just as concerning, productivity fell at a 0.6 percent annual rate in the first quarter of this year. However you slice it, all signs point to the fact that U.S. worker productivity is no longer on the same trajectory that it had been on in the past. In your speech on June 6, you said that productivity growth has been ‘‘unusually weak in recent years.’’ This has undoubtedly ham- pered wage growth and limited economic expansion. As many have acknowledged, business investment, research and development, and business creation have all been slow to recover from the reces- sion. In your opinion, what are the major factors accounting for this slowdown? A.3. Part of the weakness in labor productivity growth seen in re- cent years likely reflects the enduring effects of the Great Reces- sion. For example, there is some evidence that the recession led to a long-lasting reduction in business investment, research, and de- velopment spending, and new business formation, and that these factors have lowered productivity growth.1 That said, productivity growth began to slow even before the Great Recession, and some research has suggested that the earlier deceleration was the result of the economic effects of the 1990s IT revolution having largely run their course by the mid-2000s.2 3 Q.4. Earlier this month, you also said that you are cautiously opti- mistic about productivity growth. What indications do you have that we will begin to see an upswing in productivity? 1Reifschneider, Dave, William Wascher, and David Wilcox (2015), ‘‘Aggregate Supply in the United States: Recent Developments and Implications for the Conduct of Monetary Policy’’, IMF Economic Review, vol. 63, no. 1, pp.71–109. 2Fernald, John G. (2014), ‘‘Productivity and Potential Output Before, During, and After the Great Recession’’, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 29(1), pp.1–51. 3It has also been argued that mismeasurement of real output could have contributed to the weakness in measured productivity growth. However, recent research by Byrne, Fernald, and Reinsdorf (2016) casts doubt on the ability of this hypothesis to explain the recent slowdown. Byrne, David M., J. Fernald, and Marshall Reinsdorf (2016), ‘‘Does the United States Have a Productivity Slowdown or a Measurement Problem?’’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 66 A.4. Up to this point, we have not yet seen clear indications of a pickup in productivity growth in the economic data. However, some of the factors that have dragged down productivity growth in recent years—especially factors related to the last recession—are likely to diminish going forward. For example, we expect that continued gains in economic activity will lead to a faster pace of investment growth and more spending on research and development, contrib- uting to a stronger pace of productivity growth in coming years. Moreover, we see no obvious slowdown in the pace, or the potential benefits, of innovation in America—for example, stunning gains continue to be made in computing power, data storage, robotics, 3D printing, and cloud computing, to name just a few areas of techno- logical progress. Such innovations may bear fruit more readily in a stronger economy. Q.5. There is widespread agreement that we face a considerable shortfall of public investment in transportation, education, broadband, and research and development. With interest rates still low, and gains to be made in the labor market, isn’t now the time to make sustained public investments that would lead to job cre- ation, productivity gains, and broad-based economic growth? A.5. I agree with the view that the American people would be well served by investments—both public and private—that support longer-run growth in productivity. Well-designed investments in the areas you mention—transportation, education, broadband, and research and development—have the potential to lead to stronger productivity gains in the future. Furthermore, I would add that any such investments are more likely to be effective if they are ac- companied by Government policies that encourage entrepreneur- ship and innovation, and that foster the flexible allocation of labor and capital to their most productive uses. Q.6. Chair Yellen, in your recent speech on June 6, you laid out the grim reality that many African Americans and Latinos face in our job market. Although conditions have improved, we still see that compared to the overall unemployment rate, minorities still face a much tougher job market. In January, the unemployment rate for African American’s with Associate’s Degrees finally fell equal to the unemployment rate for white adults who did not complete high school. If we’re nearing full employment, shouldn’t we expect the unem- ployment rates of African Americans with Associate’s Degrees to be much closer to the unemployment rate of whites with Associate’s Degrees and not those who’ve dropped out of high school? A.6. Unemployment rates have long been persistently higher for both African Americans and Hispanics, on average, than for whites. And, those differentials are not purely the result of whites having more education. Unemployment rates are lower for those with more education, but for any given level of educational attainment, Afri- can Americans in particular tend to experience higher unemploy- ment than whites. One illustration of this fact, as you note, is that the unemployment rate for African Americans who have an asso- ciate degree is comparable to the unemployment rate for whites who have not completed high school. These patterns have been evi- dent since at least the early 1990s. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 67 Despite overall improvements in the U.S. economy in recent years, there are still significant disparities in labor market out- comes and a continuation in the trend toward widening wealth and income inequality. These trends are troubling. In carrying out its mandate, the Federal Reserve pays close attention to issues of eco- nomic inclusion. We follow unemployment rates by race and eth- nicity and examine whether particular groups are discouraged from participating in the labor force. More broadly, through our data col- lection efforts, such as the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Survey of Household Economics and Decision Making, the Federal Reserve has gathered and disseminated information that is critical for understanding the economic situation of disadvantaged groups. Q.7. Former Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota said earlier this year, ‘‘there is one key source of economic dif- ference in American life that is likely underemphasized in FOMC deliberations: race.’’ After a search of transcripts of FOMC meet- ings from 2010, when African American unemployment stood at 15.5 percent or higher, to the most recent meetings, Kocherlakota found that there was not a single reference in the meetings to labor market conditions among African Americans. It is absolutely critical that the leadership of the Federal Reserve reflect the composition of our diverse Nation. Monetary policy is in- extricably linked with the experiences of hardworking families, white, African American, Latino, and Asian, across the Nation, and leadership positions at the Federal Reserve should be held by those that reflect the interests of all of our communities. Recently, I along with Sens. Warren and Merkley, and many other members of Congress sent letter urging you to improve rep- resentation at the regional Banks’ boards of directors. The Federal Reserve Act requires that the presidents and Boards of Directors at the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks ‘‘represent the public.’’ Yet 83 percent of Federal Reserve Board members are white, and 92 percent of regional Bank presidents are white, and not a single president is either African American or Latino. When you were here in February, you testified that the Board of Governors was constantly attentive to the issue of diversity on the boards, and that 45 percent of directors are either women or minorities. Do you believe that this is sufficient? Does the Board of Governors have a plan for increasing the representation of diverse candidates? A.7. As I have stated previously, I am personally committed and the Federal Reserve as an organization is committed to achieving diversity within our workforce and within our leadership at all lev- els. We have made progress, but there is more work to be done. Di- versity is an extremely important goal and I will do everything I can to further it. It is important to have a diversified group of policy makers who can bring different perspectives. The Federal Reserve recognizes the value of sustaining a diverse workforce at all levels of the orga- nization. An interdisciplinary effort that I discussed at my June 21 hearing before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee is focusing on all of our diversity initiatives, both in terms of our own hiring al the Federal Reserve Board (Board) and VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 68 throughout the Federal Reserve System, as well as our efforts to promote diversity in economic inclusion. Our efforts to achieve our objectives for more diversified leader- ship include both shorter-term and longer-term goals. In the short- term, we are committed to broad, open, transparent, and proactive search processes. We are actively soliciting and then considering input from a wide range of sources in our efforts to identify quali- fied candidates who expand on one or more dimensions of the di- versity of our senior leadership. We have, for example, benefited from input with respect to Reserve Bank directors from several community groups. We have also incorporated into our search proc- ess for our most senior executives outreach via social media, in- tended to both better explain the nature of the positions to a broad- er audience and invite suggestions regarding suitable candidates. Building on those efforts, we have also initiated a longer-term program of seeking to identify and foster promising candidates from a variety of backgrounds and with a variety of experiences for a range of roles while at a stage in their careers when they may not yet fully be prepared to assume the responsibilities of our most senior leadership. We intend to leverage the full range of the Sys- tem’s existing outreach programs, including in the areas of eco- nomic education, community outreach, and academic partnership. Q.8. Along with other financial agencies, the Federal Reserve is mandated to assess and increase its contracting and procurement with minority-owned and women-owned businesses. This practice, known as supplier diversity, is a powerful form of economic devel- opment. Contracts create economic ripples throughout communities and create quality jobs, something desperately needed in commu- nities of color. In 2015, the Board of Governors spent $214 million on goods and services, but less than 9 percent of that money went to minority-owned businesses. That’s less than half of what the av- erage financial agency spends. What are the Fed’s plan to rectify this disparity? A.8. As reported in the Board’s Report to the Congress on the Of- fice of Minority and Women Inclusion for calendar-year 2015, the Board awarded contracts for goods and services (including con- tracts for the Board’s Office of Inspector General as well as the Board’s currency program) in the amount of $214,867,580, of which 11.23 percent went to minority-owned businesses. This represents the total obligated amount of the contracts rather than the ‘‘spend’’ or actual amounts paid to contractors. The amount of funds that the Board paid out to contractors for goods and services during 2015 was $154,264,257, of which 8.32 percent went to minority- owned businesses. Both the amounts contracted and the amounts paid represented a significant increase from the prior year. The Board has an active supplier diversity program that com- bines outreach and training for vendors with internal programs aimed at educating our staff about the importance of diversity and how to increase diverse vendor participation in the Board’s procure- ment activities. To enhance its supplier diversity program, Board Procurement staff plans to review its Acquisition Policies and Procedures to identify any unintentional barriers to minority participation and to VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 69 build additional strategies to increase contracts awarded to minor- ity vendors. To help these companies compete, the Board will con- sider changes in the design of its solicitations that may facilitate or encourage participation by these companies. For example, lengthening delivery schedules or the time period for the submis- sion of offers or bids or dividing proposed acquisitions to permit of- fers in quantities Jess than the total requirement could create greater opportunities for minority-owned business to compete. In looking for opportunities to further increase its spend with small and disadvantaged businesses, the Procurement staff is re- viewing its approach to setting aside an acquisition or a class of ac- quisitions for covered companies. A ‘‘set-aside’’ is a preference where the procurement is limited to participation by small and dis- advantaged businesses only. An award will be made only if the pro- posal is fair and reasonable. We will continue to look for additional opportunities to use this program. In 2017, the Board plans to host a ‘‘vendor outreach fair.’’ The event is an opportunity for us to share upcoming procurement op- portunities with a wide range of potential suppliers, including mi- nority-owned firms. Because staff from across the organization par- ticipate, vendors have an opportunity to get to know the individ- uals overseeing contractual work, and staff have an opportunity to learn about vendors’ products and capabilities. The outreach fair will also include training sessions designed to better position pro- spective vendors to compete for procurement opportunities. Our previous outreach event held in June 2015 attracted over 400 indi- viduals representing 300 companies. The Board will continue to utilize national and local organiza- tions advocating for minority companies as a method to connect di- rectly with qualified minority-owned companies. Memberships in these types of organizations will provide direct access to these sup- pliers who demonstrate the ability to provide high-quality goods and services. Among these organizations are the National Minority Supplier Development Council, U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Com- merce, Greater Washington Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, and the National Black Chamber of Commerce. The outreach events hosted by these organizations provide a platform for the Board’s staff to discuss the procurement process with potential vendors while also providing information on future procurement opportuni- ties to potential vendors. The Board is aware of the many chal- lenges facing minority firms, and continued collaboration with ad- vocacy groups representing these firms will help the Board better understand the challenges these businesses face and help the firms better navigate the Board’s acquisition process. Lastly, to increase Board staffs awareness and understanding of the requirements of section 342 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re- form and Consumer Protection Act, the Board’s Procurement office will continue to host a series of training sessions and forums to educate staff—agency wide—on the importance of supplier diver- sity. The Procurement office has also established a reporting tool to monitor the success of the supplier diversity program. The tool, which is available to all Board divisions, provides dashboards, product data, and supplier classification information, allowing divi- VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 70 sions to track and monitor their diversity spend and to make im- provements to help achieve desired results. Q.9. Over the years, the Federal Reserve has struggled to increase the diversity of its senior leadership. Multiple entities, including the Government Accountability Office, have repeatedly cited leader- ship commitment as a driver to change. Agency heads and top offi- cials at the CFPB, FDIC, SEC, and NCUA actively participate in Diversity Councils. With your unique insights as a woman, how are you specifically working to drive diversity at the Fed? Will the Federal Reserve commit to forming a Diversity Council led by a Governor? A.9. I am personally committed and the Federal Reserve as an or- ganization is committed to achieving diversity within our workforce and within our leadership. The Federal Reserve recognizes the value of sustaining a diverse workforce at all levels of the organiza- tion. When I joined the Board staff, I was one of relatively few women economists. Since then, there have been significant gains in diversity at the Board and throughout the Federal Reserve System (System). Currently, minorities represent 18 percent and women 37 percent of senior leadership at the Board. Throughout the System, minorities make up 18 percent of officer-level staff, which is an in- crease of 22 percent over the past 4 years. Furthermore, among di- rectors on Reserve Bank and Branch boards, minority representa- tion stands at about 24 percent, and representation of women is ap- proximately 30 percent. I recognize there is still work to be done and workforce diversity remains a strategic priority for the Federal Reserve. The selection and reappointment of Federal Reserve Bank presi- dents is a process set forth by the Federal Reserve Act, including the specific responsibilities of the Reserve Bank’s board of directors and the Board of Governors. Within this statutory framework, the System has operationalized the process to be expansive and proactive in the identification of candidates, including persons who may not routinely have contact with the Federal Reserve, the eco- nomics profession, or the financial services sector. I am committed to seeing us make further progress and to mak- ing sure that we are taking all of the steps that we possibly can to promote diversity and economic inclusion. To further support this commitment, as mentioned previously, I recently launched and lead an interdisciplinary effort within the Federal Reserve that is focused on all of our diversity initiatives, both in terms of hiring at the Board and throughout the Federal Reserve System, and our efforts to promote diversity and economic inclusion. My colleagues and I meet quarterly with this group to discuss initiatives and progress. The Federal Reserve is committed to achieving further progress, and to better understanding the challenges to improving diversity, as well as promoting diversity of ideas and backgrounds. I believe that diversity makes the Federal Reserve more effective in carrying out its mission. Q.10. I appreciate the Federal Reserve’s willingness to engage and recognize that this issue doesn’t exist at the agency alone—it’s per- vasive throughout the entire financial sector. The Federal Reserve VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 71 should use its leadership to promote this same transparency among its regulated entities. Your Office of Minority and Women Inclusion made the submission of diversity data voluntary. How will you use your position to increase diversity in the pri- vate sector? A.10. The Federal Reserve, in conjunction with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, issued a joint press release on August 2, 2016, providing information on how regulated institutions may begin to submit self- assessments of their diversity policies and practices to their pri- mary Federal financial regulator per the approval granted by the Office of Management and Budget on July 13, 2016, to collect vol- untary self-assessment information. The notice also strongly en- couraged the regulated entities to post their diversity policies and practices, as well as information related to their self-assessments on their public Web sites. The Office of Minority and Women Inclusion Directors of the banking agencies worked to establish uniform standards applicable to all regulated entities and in view of the particular statutory lan- guage of section 342 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the banking agencies determined to make compliance with the standards voluntary. RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR MERKLEY FROM JANET L. YELLEN Q.1. It’s been 3 years since the Volcker Rule was finalized and a little over a year since it went into effect. As of last year, banks can no longer engage in some of the risky trading behavior that nearly wrecked on our economy. Both the public and Congress need to understand and deserve to know how the Volcker Rule is being enforced by regulators and if banks are complying with it. If we learned anything from 2008, it’s that Congress must shine a spotlight on how regulators are imple- menting the Nation’s laws. The final version of the Volcker Rule included a standard for reg- ulators to measure whether banks went beyond market-making and into the now prohibited proprietary trading. But, this standard did not include specific metrics for how the Volcker Rule should be enforced or how to measure its success. There’s a lack of clear guidance on what metrics regulators are using, the thresholds determining if proprietary trading is hap- pening, or even what regulators are supposed to do if a financial institution is found to be in violation. In the absence of clearer guidance, how can the American people and Congress be sure that the regulators are doing their job and ensuring that the Volcker Rule is being properly implemented by regulators? Does the Federal Reserve have a plan to ensure that Congress and the public is more informed and understand how the Fed is working with other regulators on enforcement and compliance of the Volcker Rule? A.1. I appreciate your desire to understand how the Federal Re- serve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 72 and U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the Agencies) are implementing and enforcing compliance with section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the statutory provision known as the Volcker rule).1 As you know, the Agencies have jointly issued public rules that detail and implement the statutory requirements mandated by the Volcker rule. The im- plementing rules also require each firm engaged in activities cov- ered by the Volcker rule to have in place a compliance program that is consistent in detail and breadth with the size, type, and complexity of the banking entity and the activities the entity con- ducts that are subject to the Volcker rule. The implementing rules establish minimum requirements for those compliance programs with increased requirements and detail for the largest banking en- tities engaged in activities covered by the Volcker rule. Among these requirements is a provision requiring the chief executive offi- cer of each banking entity engaged in activities covered by the Volcker rule, on an annual basis, to attest that the entity has in place processes to establish, maintain, enforce, review, test, and modify the compliance program in a manner reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the Volcker rule. In addition, the Federal Reserve conducts examinations of the compliance programs and activities subject to the Volcker rule of banking entities for which the Federal Reserve is the appropriate supervisor under the Volcker rule. To aid designing and conducting these supervisory efforts, the implementing rules of the Agencies require banking entities with significant trading activities subject to the Volcker rule to report a variety of metrics regarding these activities. These metrics include risk and position limits and usage, risk factor sensitivities, value-at-risk (VaR) and stress VaR, com- prehensive profit and loss attribution, inventory turnover, inven- tory aging, and customer facing trade ratio. As described in the preamble to the final rule, the Federal Re- serve uses these metrics as a tool to help identify instances that may warrant further investigation to determine whether a viola- tion has occurred or whether the activity is within a permitted ex- ception, such as market making or hedging. This additional review typically includes review of other metrics and information collected from the firm and information about events that have occurred in the market. As indicated in the preamble to the final rule, the Fed- eral Reserve and the other Agencies are evaluating the data col- lected through September 30, 2015, and may revise the metric defi- nitions and collection requirement, as appropriate, based on their review of the data. Implementation of the Volcker rule is coordinated among the Agencies as part of an ongoing effort to facilitate consistent appli- cation of its requirements. Staffs of the Agencies regularly meet to address key implementation and supervisory issues as they arise. The Agencies collaborate, for example, to jointly issue to the public responses to frequently asked questions and other forms of external guidance as appropriate. Public responses to frequently asked ques- tions published to date have clarified particular provisions of the final rule, including the submission of metrics, expectations during 112 U.S.C. §1851. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 73 the conformance period, the application of certain covered funds re- strictions and clarification regarding the annual chief executive of- ficer attestation.2 Staffs of the Agencies expect to continue to co- ordinate responding to matters that are of common interest in pub- lic statements, including through public responses to frequently asked questions and in public guidance. Q.2. Currently, some type of marijuana use is legal in 27 jurisdic- tions in the United States, or more than half the country. But a conflict between State and Federal law remains. This conflict is making it very difficult for marijuana-related businesses in these States to access to the banking system forcing them to operate in all cash. Financial institutions that provide banking services to legitimate marijuana-related businesses are currently vulnerable to criminal prosecution under Federal law. As you’re probably aware, few banks and credit unions are will- ing to risk providing services to marijuana-related businesses, leav- ing many of these legal businesses cut off by financial institutions. That means even marijuana-related businesses like landlords and security companies have lost their accounts at banks and credit unions. These businesses can no longer accept credit cards, or de- posit revenues, or write checks to meet their payroll or pay their taxes. In Oregon alone, it is estimated that the marijuana market could bring in close to half a billion dollars during its first 14 months of legal sales. Just last month, I accompanied an Oregon businessman who runs a marijuana dispensary to Salem to pay his taxes. He had to stuff $70,000 dollars in cash into a backpack in order to pay the State what he owed in taxes and drive it over an hour away in his car. Businessmen and women, who are operating legally under Or- egon State law and elsewhere, are forced to shuttle around gym bags full of cash and it is just an invitation to crime and malfea- sance. The Federal Government is effectively forcing legal mari- juana businesses to carry gym bags full of cash to pay their taxes, employees and bills. This is an invitation to robberies, money laundering, and orga- nized crime. Earlier this month, a 24-year-old U.S. Marine who was working as a security guard at a Colorado dispensary was shot and killed in an attempted robbery. The death of a husband and father of a three children under 4 is tragic. Sadly, it is not sur- prising given the dangers faced by businesses operating all-cash. What is the Federal Reserve’s position on ensuring that mari- juana-related businesses operating legally at the State level have access to banking and other financial services? A.2. The decision to open, close, or decline a particular account or customer relationship is made by a depository institution without involvement by its Federal banking regulator. This decision may be based on the bank’s particular business objectives, its evaluation of the risks associated with particular products, services, or customers as well as the institution’s capacity and systems to effectively man- age those risks. Among the factors a banking firm will typically consider in establishing a business relationship with a customer is 2See http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/volcker-rule/faq.htm. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 74 whether the activity of the customer is being conducted in accord- ance with Federal and State law. Federal law and State law are in conflict concerning certain types of use and distribution of mari- juana. Federal law makes it a Federal crime to possess, grow, or distribute marijuana and prohibits knowingly engaging in mone- tary transactions with proceeds from an unlawful activity. Because of this conflict, marijuana-related businesses in those States that have legalized certain types of marijuana use and distribution under State law have had difficulty obtaining financial services. The Department of Justice and the Financial Crimes Enforce- ment Network (FinCEN) have both issued guidance that recognize that the use and distribution of marijuana in general continues to be illegal under Federal law and describe the resources and pri- ority those agencies expect to place on enforcement of those Federal laws governing marijuana. As a Federal agency, the Federal Re- serve incorporates guidance issued by FinCEN concerning the Bank Secrecy Act into our supervisory process, including references to FinCEN’s marijuana guidance. Nonetheless, the conflict between Federal law and State law creates risk and uncertainty for banking institutions. Only Congress can determine whether it is appro- priate to amend Federal law in this area. Q.3. Do you believe the Federal Reserve has the authority to act and give banks the certainty they need to offer services to legal marijuana related businesses or does Congress need to act? A.3. The Federal Reserve does not have the authority to change laws and regulations regarding the legality of possession, sale, or distribution of marijuana. Only Congress has the authority to act to determine whether it is appropriate to amend Federal law gov- erning marijuana possession, sales, and distribution. RESPONSES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR HEITKAMP FROM JANET L. YELLEN Q.1. Many American workers face significant economic uncertainty as they approach retirement. According to a 2015 Government Ac- countability Office (GAO) report, about half of households age 55 and older have no retirement savings (such as in a 401(k) plan or an IRA). After reviewing several independent studies, the GAO also concluded that generally about one-third to two-thirds of workers are at risk of falling short of maintaining their preretirement standard of living in retirement. How is the Federal Reserve monitoring this issue? What metrics does the Federal Reserve use to quantify retire- ment needs? Does it view the lack of retirement savings in the U.S. as a sys- temic risk? Are there any steps the Fed has considered taking that would help address the retirement savings gap? A.1. Through its Survey of Consumer Finances, the Federal Re- serve Board collects some of the key data that provide the founda- tion on which researchers form judgments about retirement income adequacy. However, important as it is, retirement income adequacy does not directly implicate the stability of the financial system. If VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 75 households enter retirement without adequate financial prepara- tion, their spending power will suffer, with potentially serious im- plications for their own well being over their remaining lifetime, but the stability of the financial system is not likely to be threat- ened. As part of our effort to calibrate the stance of monetary policy so as to promote the dual mandate given to us by the Congress— price stability and maximum sustainable employment—we attempt to gauge the strength of aggregate demand over the next few years. The issue of retirement income security is of greater relevance over a considerably longer time horizon: Are today’s working genera- tions adequately preparing themselves for retirement a decade or more into the future? That question is surely important, even it ex- tends well beyond the reach of monetary policy. The one main contribution that the Federal Reserve can and does make to the attainment of a financially secure retirement is to pur- sue our core monetary policy and financial stability responsibilities. By pursuing the dual mandate, we aim to establish the best pos- sible backdrop for individuals seeking to provide for their retire- ment security by having a better chance at steady employment, and knowing that their retirement savings will not be eroded by a bout of unanticipated inflation. By helping to build a financial sys- tem that is robust, households will have a greater assurance that their retirement-oriented savings will be there, as planned. Thus, the Federal Reserve agrees that retirement income ade- quacy is an important issue; we provide key information that can be used to form judgments about it; and we recognize that the ac- tions we take under our monetary policy and financial stability re- sponsibilities have indirect implications for the ability of house- holds to attain financial security in retirement. Q.2. In the past, you have remarked that regulators should work to help ease unnecessary regulatory burdens on our community banks. In North Dakota, and rural America more generally, com- munity banks are many times the only access to capital families and businesses have. Yet more than ever they are faced with layers of regulatory and accounting rules that I worry are stifling new bank charters, banking innovation, and customer access to impor- tant credit and deposit relationships and products. Given your concerns about the regulatory pressures on commu- nity banks, what is the Fed actively doing to address this issue? A.2. A major goal of the Federal Reserve is to eliminate unneces- sary regulatory burden on all banks, especially community banks. In that vein, the Federal Reserve has been carefully considering the comments received as part of the 2014 review conducted pursu- ant to the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA). This decennial review, which is a joint ef- fort between the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora- tion (FDIC) (collectively, the Agencies), generated nearly 270 public comments submitted in response to four issued Federal Register no- tices. Additional comments were also received from bankers as well as consumer and community groups through the six outreach meet- VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 76 ings held in 2014 and 2015 with over 1,030 participants in Los An- geles, Dallas, Boston, Kansas City, Chicago, and Washington, DC. Although the Federal Reserve is still evaluating these comments, we have already taken action on certain issues. For example, the Federal Reserve immediately raised the threshold from $500 mil- lion to $1 billion for banks that qualified for an 18 month versus a 12 month examination cycle when the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act became effective on December 4, 2015. An in- terim final rule later followed in February 2016.1 In April 2016, the Federal Reserve published a final rule to expand the applica- bility of its Small Bank Holding Company Policy Statement by raising the asset threshold of the policy statement from $500 mil- lion to $1 billion in total consolidated assets. The policy statement was also expanded to apply to certain savings and loan holding companies. As a result of this action, 89 percent of all bank holding companies and 81 percent of all savings and loan holding compa- nies are excluded from certain consolidated regulatory capital re- quirements. In addition to reducing capital burden, the action sig- nificantly reduced the reporting burden associated with capital re- quirements. In addition, raising the asset threshold allowed more bank holding companies to take advantage of expedited applica- tions processing procedures.2 Under the auspices of the Federal Financial Institutions Exam- ination Council (FFIEC), the Agencies issued a public notice on September 8, 2015, to establish a multistep process for stream- lining Call Report requirements.3 The notice announced an acceler- ated start of a required review of the Call Report and included pro- posals to eliminate or revise several Call Report data items. It also included a proposed assessment of the feasibility of creating a streamlined community bank Call Report. The Agencies also reached out to the banking industry to better understand signifi- cant sources of Call Report burden. On March 4, 2016, the Agen- cies also issued an ‘‘Interagency Advisory on Use of Evaluations in Real Estate-Related Financial Transactions.’’4 This advisory de- scribes existing supervisory expectations, guidance, and industry practice for using evaluations instead of appraisals when esti- mating the market value of real property securing real estate-re- lated financial transactions, and directly responds to issues raised by EGRPRA commenters regarding the use of evaluations.5 In June of 2016, the Agencies also issued supervisory views on the new accounting standard for credit losses issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board indicating that the new standard will be scaled to the size of the institution, that allowances for credit losses may be determined using various methods and that smaller and less complex institutions are not expected to implement com- plex modeling techniques.6 Outside of the EGRPRA review, the Federal Reserve has also taken a number of steps to ease the burden associated with com- 181 FR 10063 (February 29, 2016). 2See: http://wwww.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-15/pdf/2015-08513.pdf. 380 FR 56539 (September 18, 2015). 4See: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20160304a.htm. 5OCC Bulletin 2016-8; FRB SR letter 16-5; FDIC FIL-16-2016. 6SR Letter 16-12. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 77 munity bank examinations, including improving examination effi- ciency by: • Using existing bank financial data to identify high-risk activi- ties, which would allow us to focus our supervisory efforts and reduce regulatory burden on banking organizations with less risk; • leveraging technology to conduct more examination work off- site;7 • simplifying and tailoring preexamination requests for docu- mentation; • helping community bankers easily identify new regulations or proposals that are applicable to their organizations; and • conducting extensive training for examiners and performing in- ternal reviews and studies to ensure that rules and guidance are properly interpreted and applied appropriately to commu- nity banks. Further, in order to reduce the burden of on-site examinations the Federal Reserve continues to coordinate with other regulators on the majority of on-site examination work. For example, since 1981, the Federal Reserve and the State regulators have examined community banks that are free of problems on an alternative schedule, with the Federal Reserve examining one year and the State the next. The Federal Reserve and the State regulators also conduct joint examinations or participate in each other’s examina- tions. Q.3. How has the Fed coordinated with other regulatory agencies to appropriately tailor rules for community banks? Do you see areas for improvement in this regard? A.3. The Federal Reserve collaborates with the other regulatory agencies in most major aspects of bank supervision such as the de- velopment of supervisory rules and guidance and on-site examina- tions. For example, a large portion of the guidance issued that im- pacts community banks are developed on an interagency basis through the FFIEC. Through the FFIEC, the Federal Reserve has and continues to work with other regulators to help ensure that our rules are properly tailored so that smaller institutions are not subject to the same set of requirements as larger institutions. When permitted by law, the Federal Reserve and the other regu- latory agencies work together to tailor supervisory rules and guid- ance based on the bank’s risk, size, and complexity so that the most stringent requirements are applicable to the largest, most complex banking organizations that pose the greatest risk to the U.S. financial system. For example, the enhanced prudential stand- ards and expectations implemented through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act set forth a number of requirements that do not apply to community banks such as capital plans, stress testing, and liquidity and risk management require- ments. Many of the requirements of the capital rule that were issued in 2013 such as the countercyclical capital buffer, supple- mentary leverage ratio, and capital requirements for credit valu- 7SR Letter 16-8. VerDate Nov 24 2008 09:50 Dec 21, 2016 Jkt 046629 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6602 Sfmt 6602 L:\HEARINGS 2016\06-21 THE SEMIANNUAL MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CON 78 ation also do not apply to community banks. Also, to assist commu- nity banks in understanding how new complex rules could possibly affect their business operations, the Federal banking agencies have issued supplemental guides that focus on rule requirements that are most applicable to community banks. For example, the Federal banking agencies issued supplemental guides for the 2013 capital rule, as well as the Volcker rule issued in December 2013. As to the identification of areas for improvement, the Federal Re- serve and the other Federal banking agencies are currently in the midst of completing the EGRPRA review. The Federal Reserve views this review as a timely opportunity to step back and look for ways to reduce regulatory burden, particularly for smaller or less complex banks that pose less risk to the U.S. financial system. By the end of this year, the Federal banking agencies will submit a report to Congress summarizing any significant issues raised by the commenters and the relative merits of such issues, as well as recommendations and actions taken by the Federal banking agen- cies to reduce regulatory burden. 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Janet L. Yellen (2016, June 20). Congressional Testimony. Testimony, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/testimony_20160621_chair_federal_reserves_second_monetary_policy

@misc{wtfs_testimony_20160621_chair_federal_reserves_second_monetary_policy,
  author = {Janet L. Yellen},
  title = {Congressional Testimony},
  year = {2016},
  month = {Jun},
  howpublished = {Testimony, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/testimony_20160621_chair_federal_reserves_second_monetary_policy},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}