Congressional Testimony

MONETARY POLICY AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY HEARING BEFORETHE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JULY 18, 2012 Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services Serial No. 112–145 ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 76–116 PDF WASHINGTON : 2013 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Vice Chairman BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Ranking PETER T. KING, New York Member EDWARD R. ROYCE, California MAXINE WATERS, California FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York RON PAUL, Texas LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois NYDIA M. VELA´ZQUEZ, New York WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York GARY G. MILLER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas RUBE´N HINOJOSA, Texas PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN CAMPBELL, California CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota JOE BACA, California THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts KEVIN McCARTHY, California BRAD MILLER, North Carolina STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico DAVID SCOTT, Georgia BILL POSEY, Florida AL GREEN, Texas MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin JOE DONNELLY, Indiana NAN A. S. HAYWORTH, New York ANDRE´ CARSON, Indiana JAMES B. RENACCI, Ohio JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut ROBERT HURT, Virginia GARY C. PETERS, Michigan ROBERT J. DOLD, Illinois JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York FRANCISCO ‘‘QUICO’’ CANSECO, Texas STEVE STIVERS, Ohio STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee JAMES H. CLINGER, Staff Director and Chief Counsel (II) VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI C O N T E N T S Page Hearing held on: July 18, 2012 ..................................................................................................... 1 Appendix: July 18, 2012 ..................................................................................................... 51 WITNESSES WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 2012 Bernanke, Hon. Ben S., Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ................................................................................................................... 7 APPENDIX Prepared statements: Paul, Hon. Ron .................................................................................................. 52 Bernanke, Hon. Ben S. ..................................................................................... 54 ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD Schweikert, Hon. David: U.S. Senate letter regarding PCCRAs ............................................................ 62 Bernanke, Hon. Ben S.: Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, dated July 17, 2012 ..................... 66 Written responses to questions submitted by Representative Cleaver ........ 126 Written responses to questions submitted by Representative Hurt ............. 127 Written responses to questions submitted by Representative McCarthy .... 130 Written responses to questions submitted by Representative Paul ............. 132 Written responses to questions submitted by Representative Schweikert .. 134 (III) VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI MONETARY POLICY AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY Wednesday, July 18, 2012 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Spencer Bachus [chair- man of the committee] presiding. Members present: Representatives Bachus, Hensarling, Royce, Lucas, Paul, Manzullo, Jones, Biggert, Miller of California, Garrett, Neugebauer, McHenry, Campbell, Pearce, Posey, Fitzpatrick, West- moreland, Luetkemeyer, Huizenga, Duffy, Hayworth, Renacci, Hurt, Dold, Schweikert, Grimm, Canseco, Fincher; Frank, Waters, Maloney, Watt, Sherman, Capuano, Clay, Lynch, Miller of North Carolina, Scott, Green, Perlmutter, Donnelly, Carson, Himes, and Carney. Chairman BACHUS. This hearing will come to order. We meet today to receive the semi-annual report to Congress by the Chair- man of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on monetary policy and the state of the economy. Pursuant to com- mittee rule 3(f)(2), opening statements are limited to the chair and ranking minority member of the full committee, and the chair and ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Domestic Mone- tary Policy and Technology, for a period of 8 minutes on each side. Without objection, all Members’ written statements will be made a part of the record. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for the purpose of making an opening statement. We are honored to have Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke before us today. Thank you, Chairman Bernanke, for appearing before our committee once again, and for your dedicated service to the country. As we meet this morning, we continue to find our Nation on a path that is fiscally and economically unsustainable. And some in the Senate, Chairman Bernanke, apparently believe that only you can do something about it. Since the economy is bad and unemploy- ment is high, one of those Senators pointedly told you yesterday that you have to get to work. That leads to an important question: Who is ultimately responsible for the state of our economy? We once had a President who had a sign on his desk in the Oval Office that said, ‘‘The buck stops here.’’ I will amend that to say the buck stops with the President of the United States and with Congress, who are the elected leaders of this country. (1) VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 2 The President and Congress are the ones who have created America’s spending-driven debt crisis by hitting the gas when what was needed was someone stomping on the brakes, and more impor- tantly, the need for reform of our entitlements. Some in the Senate may want to duck responsibility, but the truth is the Federal Re- serve cannot rescue Americans from the consequences of failed eco- nomic and regulatory policies passed by Congress and signed by the President. The Chairman of the Fed cannot save the economy when those elected leaders decide they are prepared to send our country over a fiscal cliff, as one of those elected leaders in the Senate declared earlier this week. Chairman Bernanke has warned Congress and the Administra- tion time and time again that without action, growing deficits and the debt will erode our prosperity and leave the next generation of Americans with less opportunity. To avoid this fate, we must start taking action now to tame Washington’s appetite for spending, and more importantly, as Chairman Bernanke has said, tackle the dif- ficult but necessary long-term restructuring of our entitlements. The House, to its credit, has had the courage, in this hyperpartisan attack atmosphere, to begin the long-term process; the Senate has not. So I would like to take this opportunity to tell the Senate that it is time for them to go to work. Our economy is hobbled not only by our deficits and debt, but also by the cumu- lative weight of Washington overregulation. This committee hears constantly from private sector witnesses who tell us the regulatory burdens being placed on them are, as one small town banker wit- ness said, slowly but surely strangling their ability to do business and create jobs. This is not to argue we don’t need regulations. Reasonable regulations provide clear rules of the road for busi- nesses and protect consumers. Businesses need certainty and to know what to expect. They don’t have it under the present regulatory regime. Unfortunately, job creators will tell you that reasonable and clear rules aren’t what they are getting from Washington right now. Instead, they tell us the regulators do not coordinate their actions, and the result is businesses are subjected to confusing and often conflicting rules. While many in Washington attack Wall Street and big corporations when they call for more regulation, the reality is the burden of Federal red tape falls disproportionately on small businesses and the small community-based financial institutions that lend to them. As the Small Business Administration reports, it costs small businesses 36 percent more per employee to comply with Federal rules than large companies. This has driven a consolidation which is evident in our financial services industry. And because small businesses are the engine of job growth in our economy, we can hardly blame the Fed when policies passed by this Congress and signed by the President result in regulatory overkill that makes it harder for small businesses to thrive and hire. Instead of more regulations, Congress and the President need to do more to eliminate the government roadblocks that stand in the way of small business success and job creation. The President re- cently said that entrepreneurs and small businesses aren’t success- ful on their own; they can succeed only with the help of the govern- ment. That is akin to saying that Apple Computer is a success be- VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 3 cause of the person who built Steve Jobs’s garage. Small businesses succeed in this country in spite of the government, not because of it. Chairman Bernanke, I know all of us look forward to your testi- mony and the discussion that we will have today. Again, I thank you for being here, and I yield to the ranking member. Mr. FRANK. I appreciate that. I am always struck by the ability of my Republican colleagues to engage in a kind of duality of the mind with regard to Federal spending. I listened to the chairman talk about the need to rein in spending, and note that we are going to be given a bill today to vote on that will increase military spend- ing beyond what the President has asked for. There is this curious notion that somehow military spending is very different from all other government spending. People who tell us how government spending never creates a job become the most militant Keynesians when it comes to military spending, even though a very large percentage of it is spent overseas. We will be asked today to continue a subsidy to NATO so that the wealthy na- tions of western Europe can continue to spend very little on their military, so that they in turn can have lower retirement ages than we have here in America, and we will then be telling Americans that we have to cut back on their Social Security and their Medi- care. Note when my Republican friends say ‘‘entitlement,’’ they mean Social Security and Medicare. And I am proud of those. While we can make them more efficient, I am not prepared to maintain more and more military spending at their expense. Next, I want to comment on what Chairman Bernanke has told us. And I want to begin by noting that when people look for bipar- tisanship, it is striking the degree of partisan criticism I have heard from Republicans of Chairman Bernanke, who is single- handedly the most bipartisan institution in Washington. He was appointed 3 times to important economic positions by George Bush: first, to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 2002; second, to be Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in 2005; and third, to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve. It does appear that when Mr. Bush had an important economic appointment to make, he said, get me the usual suspect, which was Chairman Bernanke. And I think that is very important, because he is genuinely bipartisan, and therefore, I look at his analysis of the economy. And it has very little do with the very partisan cari- cature we hear. I read the economic report, the Monetary Policy Report; there is a basic statement that our economy has been recovering from the terrible crisis brought about by the complete absence of regulation and consequent, unchecked irresponsibility by some financial insti- tutions, obviously not all, and we are told that it is slowed down by a number of factors. The most important, according to the way it is presented here, is what is going on in Europe. Nothing that we have done is responsible. In fact, the Federal Reserve has tried to be helpful in alleviating the situation in Europe, drawing again partisan criticism from the Republicans for their cooperation with the ECB to ease that situation to our benefit. We are told that there is a problem because there is uncertainty about the tax and VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 4 spending policies. But those are wholly bipartisan. By the way, I voted against the bill that included the sequester. I think we can substantially cut military spending, but sequestering is a stupid way to do it. A better way to do it would be to tell western Europe they are on their own, to stop figuring that we have to win a thermonuclear war with a now nonexistent Soviet Union. But the fact is that the uncertainty that Chairman Bernanke talks about, our bipartisan Republican and Democratic-appointed top economic official, is an uncertainty that is bipartisan and has nothing to do with regula- tion. And I listen to this complaint about regulatory uncertainty. Apparently, maybe there is a part of the Monetary Policy Report I haven’t read. I don’t see a word in here that says that financial reform or other forms of regulation are part of the problem. It does talk about some other things that are part of the problem, for ex- ample, the cutback in hiring and construction by State and local governments. And that is a direct preference of the Republicans. We began in 2009, when we had a President and a Democratic Congress, to provide funding so State and local governments could continue to be economically active in the face of the crisis that had hit them. We were told by our Republican colleagues that was gov- ernment spending; it didn’t create jobs. Apparently, you couldn’t shoot anybody with it. And if you can’t shoot anybody with some- thing, or if you can’t send it to an overseas base, it has no job cre- ation impact, so they only do it for the military. But in fact, if State and local governments had not been forced to cut back, unemploy- ment would now be below 8 percent, even if they had been able to hold even. We have lost about 15 percent of the jobs created in the private sector by cutbacks in the public sector. So again, as I read this, there are discussions of what is causing a recovery slower than we want it to be. None of them have to do with what my Republican colleagues have said. And again, this comes from Chairman Bernanke, who was, as I said, was appointed 3 times to important economic positions by George Bush, a man with whom I sometimes disagree, but whose integrity and intellectual honesty ought to be unquestioned. Unfortunately, in this hyperpartisan atmosphere, to quote the chairman, it sometimes isn’t. Chairman BACHUS. I thank the ranking member. Before recog- nizing Dr. Paul for his statement, I want to note that this may be his last committee meeting with the Chairman of the Federal Re- serve. Throughout his time in office, Dr. Paul has been a consistent and strong advocate for sound monetary policy. And his leadership on the committee, especially during these hearings when we have had the Federal Reserve Chairman up here before us, have cer- tainly made the hearings more interesting and provided several memorable YouTube moments. Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, could I ask unanimous consent just to say that having served for a long time with Ron Paul, with whom I agree on on a number of issues, I am very pleased that I was able to serve one term with him as the chairman, because there were times during our joint service when despite his senior- ity, I thought he would never get to it. So I am glad that he finally achieved that chairmanship that he should have had long ago. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 5 Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. And let me note that my state- ment didn’t talk about Democrats and Republicans. Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, if we are going to debate it, I know you talked about the Administration and Obama, and I think most people know what party he is in. Chairman BACHUS. All right. Thank you. For the record, we do know that. Thank you. Dr. Paul for 3 minutes. Dr. PAUL. Thank you, Chairman Bachus. And welcome, Chair- man Bernanke. I appreciate your comments, Chairman Bernanke and Ranking Member Frank. I am delighted to be here today, but I just want to refresh a few people’s memories. I was first elected to Congress in 1976 in April in a special election. And the biggest bill on the docket at that time was the revamping of the IMF. There was a major crisis going on from the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement, and they had to rewrite the laws. They wanted to conform the laws with what they had been doing for 5 years. And that was a major piece of legislation. But it was only a consequence of what was predicted in 1945, because when 1945 established that Bretton Woods, it was predicted by the free mar- ket economists that it wouldn’t work, that it would fail. This whole idea that they could regulate exchange rates and deal with the balance of payments totally failed. And so, they had to come up with something new. And 1971–1976 is that transition pe- riod. Those same economists at that time said this was an unwork- able system, too, and it would lead to a major crisis of too much debt, too much malinvestment. It would be worldwide. It would be worse than anything because it would be based on the fiat dollar globally, and many of the problems we have domestically would be worldwide. That certainly has been confirmed with the crisis that we are in, and it has not been resolved yet. We are still floundering around, and we still have a long way to go. I have, over the years, obviously been critical of what goes on in monetary policy, but it hasn’t been so much of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, whether it was Paul Volcker or Alan Greenspan or the current Chairman; it has always been the system. I think they have a job that they can’t do because it is an unmanageable job. And it is a fallacy, it is a flawed system, and therefore we shouldn’t expect good results. And generally, we are not getting results. Policies never change. We say the same thing. No matter what the crisis is, we still do more of the same. If spending and debt was the problem, spending more and in greater debt and have the Fed just buy more debt doesn’t seem to help at all. And here we are doing the same thing. We don’t talk about the work ethic and true productions and true savings and why this excessive debt is so bad for us. We talk about solving a worldwide problem of insolvency of nations, including our own, by just printing money, and creating credit. The Fed, in the last 4 years, tripled the monetary base, and it has $1 trillion more money sitting there, and the banks are sitting with trillions of dollars. Just the creation of money doesn’t restore the confidence that is necessary. And until we get to the bottom of this and restore the confidence, I don’t think we are going to see economic growth. This whole idea that you have the job of man- VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 6 aging money, and we can’t even define the dollar—nobody has a definition of the dollar; it is an impossible task. So I have hoped in the past to try to contribute to the discussion on monetary policy and the business cycle and why it benefits the rich over the poor, and so far, my views have not prevailed. But I have appreciated the opportunity, and I appreciate this oppor- tunity to have served on the Financial Services Committee. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Paul. The gen- tleman from Missouri, Mr. Clay, is recognized for 3 minutes. Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me thank Chair- man Bernanke for appearing at today’s hearing. Let me also pub- licly thank our subcommittee chairman, Dr. Paul, for his honorable service in Congress and to his country. As you know, the Hum- phrey-Hawkins Act charges the Federal Reserve with a dual man- date: to maintain stable prices, which I understand we have posi- tive news about; and full employment, which is what I would like to talk about today. Full employment means everyone. Currently, the national average unemployment rate is 8.2 percent. Chairman Bernanke, this has decreased compared with when you were here a year ago, when it was 9.1 percent. Unfortunately, the unemployment rate for African Americans is much higher. For African-American males, it is a too-high 14.2 percent. 12.7 million people in the United States want to work, but cannot find a job. That is down from last year’s 14 million. But too many of those 12.7 million are African Americans. Nonfarm payroll employment is continuing to rise by 80,000, but too few of those who are getting jobs are African Americans. Average hourly earnings for all private nonfarm employees rose to $23.50 over the past 12 months, but not for enough African Americans. Consumer food prices have risen slightly, but consumer price in- flation has decreased overall, and energy prices have decreased too. But if you are out of work, you cannot pay your electric bill even if it is slightly lower than it was last year. The disparity in the un- employment between the national average and African Americans is unacceptable, and we have to do more to solve it. Mr. Chairman, it is important to put everyone back to work in this country. But as we look at policies and strategies that will continue the improve- ment in job numbers, be aware that we as a Nation are only as strong as the weakest link. So let’s make sure we don’t leave behind a large and important part of our communities. And I look forward to your statement and continuing this important and ongoing discussion. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Clay. Before I recognize Chairman Bernanke, let me say that because the Financial Sta- bility Oversight Council on which the Chairman serves is meeting today at 1 p.m., the Chair will excuse Chairman Bernanke at 12:45, so that he can fulfill his important obligation with that Council. The Chair also announces that in order to accommodate questioning of Chairman Bernanke by as many Members as pos- sible, we will strictly enforce the 5-minute rule. Members who wait until the final seconds of their 5 minutes to begin asking their questions to the Chairman should be advised that they will be asked to suspend when the red light comes on so VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 7 that we can allow all Members to be recognized. I have often said that our freshman class and sophomore class are some of our more capable Members, and I want them to have an opportunity to ask questions. Chairman Bernanke, your written statement will be made a part of the record, and you are now recognized for a summary of your testimony. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BEN S. BERNANKE, CHAIR- MAN, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Mr. BERNANKE. Thank you, Chairman Bachus, Ranking Member Frank, and members of the committee. I am pleased to present the Federal Reserve’s semi-annual Monetary Policy report to the Con- gress. Let me begin with a discussion of current economic condi- tions and the outlook, and then I will talk a bit about monetary policy. The U.S. economy has continued to recover, but economic activity appears to have decelerated somewhat during the first half of the year. After rising at an annual rate of 2.5 percent in the sec- ond half of 2011, real GDP increased at a 2 percent pace in the first quarter of this year, and available indicators point to a still smaller gain in the second quarter. Conditions in the labor market improved during the latter part of 2011 and early this year, with the unemployment rate falling about a percentage point over that period. However, after running at nearly 200,000 per month during the fourth and first quarters, the average increase in payroll em- ployment shrank to 75,000 per month during the second quarter. Issues related to seasonal adjustment and the unusually warm weather this past winter can account for a part, but only a part, of this loss of momentum in job creation. At the same time, the job- less rate has recently leveled out at just over 8 percent. Household spending has continued to advance, but recent data indicate a somewhat slower rate of growth in the second quarter. Although declines in energy prices are now providing support to consumers’ purchasing power, households remain concerned about their em- ployment and income prospects and their overall level of confidence remains relatively low. One area where we see modest signs of im- provement is housing. In part, because of historically low mortgage rates, both new and existing home sales have been gradually trending upward since last summer, and some measures of house prices have turned up in recent months as well. Construction has increased, especially in the multi-family sector. Still, a number of factors continue to impede progress in the hous- ing market. On the demand side, many would-be buyers are de- terred by worries about their own finances or about the economy more generally. Other prospective home buyers cannot obtain mort- gages due to tight lending standards, impaired creditworthiness, or because their current mortgages are underwater, that is, they owe more than their homes are worth. On the supply side, the large number of vacant homes, boosted by the ongoing inflow of foreclosed properties, continues to divert demand from new construction. After posting strong gains over the second half of 2011 and into the first quarter of 2012, manufac- turing production has slowed in recent months. Similarly, the rise VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 8 in real business spending on equipment and software appears to have decelerated from the double digit pace seen over the second half of 2011 to a more moderate rate of growth over the first part of this year. Forward-looking indicators of investment demand, such as surveys of business conditions and capital spending plans, suggest further weakness ahead. In part, slowing growth in production and capital investment ap- pears to reflect economic stresses in Europe, which together with some cooling in the economies of other trading partners, is re- straining the demand for U.S. exports. At the time of the June meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee, or FOMC, my col- leagues and I projected that under the assumptions of appropriate monetary policy, economic growth will likely continue at a mod- erate pace over coming quarters and then pick up very gradually. Specifically, our projections for growth in real GDP prepared for the meeting had a central tendency of 1.9 to 2.4 percent for this year, and 2.2 to 2.8 percent for 2013. These forecasts are lower than those we made in January, reflecting the generally dis- appointing tone of the recent incoming data. In addition, financial strains associated with the crisis in Europe have increased since earlier this year, which, as I already noted, are weighing on both global and domestic economic activity. The recovery in the United States continues to be held back by a number of other headwinds, including still tight borrowing condi- tions for some businesses and households and, as I will discuss in more detail shortly, the restraining effects of fiscal policy and fiscal uncertainty. Moreover, although the housing market has shown im- provement, the contribution of this sector to the recovery is less than has been typical of previous recoveries. These headwinds should fade over time, allowing the economy to grow somewhat more rapidly and the unemployment rate to decline toward a more normal level. However, given that growth is projected to be not much above the rate needed to absorb new entrants to the labor force, the re- duction in the unemployment rate seems likely to be frustratingly slow. Indeed, the central tendency of participants’ forecasts now has the unemployment rate at 7 percent or higher at the end of 2014. The committee made comparatively small changes in June to its projections for inflation. Over the first 3 months of 2012, the price index for personal consumption expenditures rose about 3.5 percent at an annual rate, boosted by a large increase in retail en- ergy prices that, in turn, reflected the higher costs of crude oil. However, the sharp drop in crude oil prices in the past few months has brought inflation down. In all, the PCE price index rose at an annual rate of 1.5 percent over the first 5 months of this year, compared with a 2.5 percent rise over 2011 as a whole. The central tendency of the Committee’s projections is that inflation will be 1.2 to 1.7 percent this year, and at or below the 2 percent level that the Committee judges to be consistent with its statutory mandate in 2013 and 2014. Partici- pants at the June FOMC meeting indicated that they see a higher degree of uncertainty about their forecasts than normal, and that the risks to economic growth have increased. I would like to high- light two main sources of risk. The first is the euro-area fiscal and VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 9 banking crisis, and the second is the U.S. fiscal situation. Earlier this year, financial strains in the euro-area moderated in response to a number of constructive steps by the European authorities, in- cluding the provision of 3-year bank financing by the European Central Bank. However, tensions in euro-area financial markets in- tensified again more recently, reflecting political uncertainties in Greece, and news of losses at Spanish banks, which in turn raised questions about Spain’s fiscal position and the resilience of the euro-area banking system more broadly. Euro-area authorities have responded by announcing a number of measures, including funding for the recapitalization of Spain’s troubled banks, greater flexibility in the use of the European financial backstops, and movement toward unified supervision of euro-area banks. Even with these announcements, however, Europe’s financial markets and economy remain under significant stress, with spillover effects on financial and economic conditions in the rest of the world, in- cluding the United States. Moreover, the possibility that the situation in Europe will worsen further remains a significant risk to the outlook. The Federal Re- serve remains in close communication with our European counter- parts. Although the politics are complex, we believe that the Euro- pean authorities have both strong incentives and sufficient re- sources to resolve the crisis. At the same time, we have been focus- ing on improving the resilience of our financial system to severe shocks, including those that might emanate from Europe. The cap- ital and liquidity positions of U.S. banking institutions have im- proved substantially in recent years, and we have been working with U.S. financial firms to ensure that they are taking steps to manage the risks associated with their exposures to Europe. That said, European developments that resulted in a significant disruption in global financial markets would inevitably pose signifi- cant challenges for our financial system and for our economy. The second important risk to our recovery, as I mentioned, is the do- mestic fiscal situation. As is well known, U.S. fiscal policies are on an unsustainable path, and the development of a credible medium- term plan for controlling deficits should be a high priority. At the same time, fiscal decisions should take into account the fragility of the recovery. That recovery could be endangered by the confluence of tax increases and spending reductions that will take effect early next year if no legislative action is taken. The CBO has estimated that if the full range of tax increases and spending cuts were allowed to take effect, a scenario widely referred to as the ‘‘fiscal cliff,’’ a shallow recession, would occur early next year, and about 11⁄ 4 million fewer jobs would be created in 2013. These esti- mates do not incorporate the additional negative effects likely to re- sult from public uncertainty about how these matters will be re- solved. As you recall, market volatility spiked and confidence fell last summer in part as a result of the protracted debate about the nec- essary increase in the debt ceiling. Similar effects could ensue as the debt ceiling and other difficult fiscal issues come into clearer view toward the end of the year. The most effective way that Con- gress could help to support the economy right now would be to work to address the Nation’s fiscal challenges in a way that takes VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 10 into account both the need for long-run sustainability and the fra- gility of the recovery. Doing so earlier rather than later would help reduce uncertainty and boost household and business confidence. Finally, on monetary policy, in view of the weaker economic out- look, subdued projected path for inflation, and the significant downside risk to economic growth, the FOMC decided to ease mon- etary policy at its June meeting by continuing its Maturity Exten- sion Program, or MEP, through the end of this year. The MEP combines sales of short-term Treasury securities with an equiva- lent amount of purchases of longer-term Treasury securities. As a result, it decreases the supply of longer-term Treasury securities available to the public, putting upward pressure on the prices of those securities and downward pressure on their yields, without af- fecting the overall size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. By removing additional longer-term Treasury securities from the mar- ket, the Fed’s asset purchases also induced private investors to ac- quire other longer-term assets such as corporate bonds and mort- gage-backed securities, helping to raise their prices and lower their yields, and thereby making broader financial conditions more ac- commodative. Economic growth is also being supported by the exceptionally low level of the target range for the Federal funds rate from zero to one-fourth percent and the economy’s forward guidance regarding the anticipated path of the funds rate. As I reported in my February testimony, the FOMC extended its forward guidance in January, noting that it expects that economic conditions, including low rates of resource utilization and a sub- dued outlook for inflation over the medium run, are likely to war- rant exceptionally low levels for the Federal funds rate at least through late 2014. The Committee has maintained this conditional forward guidance at its subsequent meetings. Reflecting its con- cerns about the slow pace of progress in reducing unemployment and the downside risk to the economic outlook, the Committee made clear at its June meeting that it is prepared to take further action, as appropriate, to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to an- swer your questions. [The prepared statement of Chairman Bernanke can be found on page 54 of the appendix.] Chairman BACHUS. Thank you, Chairman Bernanke. Next week, the House will be voting on Dr. Paul’s bill to audit the Federal Re- serve. Would you please give us your views on the legislation? Mr. BERNANKE. Yes. Thank you. I absolutely agree with Dr. Paul that the Federal Reserve needs to be transparent and it needs to be accountable. I would argue that at this point, we are quite transparent and accountable. On monetary policy, besides our statement, besides our testimonies, we issue minutes after 3 weeks, we have quarterly projections, I give a press conference 4 times a year. There is quite a bit of information provided to help Congress evaluate monetary policy, as well as the public. Also, very impor- tantly, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, its finances, and its op- erations are thoroughly vetted. We produce an annual financial statement which is audited by an independent external accounting VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 11 firm. We provide quarterly updates and a weekly balance sheet. We have an independent Inspector General (IG.) We have additional scrutiny imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act. And very importantly, and this is, I think, the crux of the matter, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the GAO, has extensive authority, broad authority to audit essentially all aspects of the Federal Reserve. And the Federal Reserve accepts that, and is co- operative with the GAO’s efforts. There is, however, one important exception to what the GAO is allowed to audit under current law, and that specifically is mone- tary policy deliberations and decisions. So what the audit of the Fed bill would do would be to eliminate the exemption for mone- tary policy deliberations and decisions from the GAO audit. So in effect, what it would do is allow Congress, for example, to ask the GAO to audit a decision taken by the Fed about interest rates. That is very concerning because there is a lot of evidence that an independent central bank that makes decisions based strictly on economic considerations, and not based on political pressure, will deliver lower inflation and better economic results in the longer term. So, again, I want to agree with the basic premise that the Fed- eral Reserve should be thoroughly transparent, and thoroughly ac- countable. I will work with everyone here to make sure that is the case. But I do feel it is a mistake to eliminate the exemption for monetary policy and deliberations, which would effectively, at least to some extent, create a political influence or political dampening effect on the Federal Reserve’s policy decisions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. I will note that bill did not come before the Financial Services Committee, which surprised me. Throughout your tenure as Chairman, you have warned this com- mittee and others about the dangers of the U.S. fiscal position, the annual deficit, and the growing national debt. And now, we are fac- ing what you call correctly a fiscal cliff next January. I mentioned in my opening statement the need for long-term re- structuring of our entitlements. And as the ranking member said, I was talking about Medicaid, Medicare, and to a lesser extent, So- cial Security. Would you tell us why you are concerned about the fiscal cliff, what will happen to the economy if we don’t do anything to address it, and what long-term strategies Congress should be thinking about as we address these issues? Mr. BERNANKE. Certainly. Thank you. First, I think there is very little disagreement that the U.S. fiscal situation is not sustainable. Under current law, deficits will continue to grow, interest will con- tinue to accumulate, and ultimately we will simply not be able to pay our bills. So it is very important over the long term to make decisions collectively about tax and spending policies that will bring our fiscal situation into a more sustainable configuration. Now that, I should add, is very much a long-run proposition. Many of the issues that affect our long-term fiscal sustainability are decades rather than months or quarters in the future. And therefore, I think—I would just suggest, if I might, that in looking at these issues, we might want to go beyond the 10-year window VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 12 which is usually the basis for fiscal decisions, and at least consider implications of actions for even longer horizons. So it is very important for fiscal stability, for financial stability, for Congress to provide a credible plan for stabilizing our long-term fiscal situation as soon as possible. That is a long run proposition, however. And the way the current law is set up, we are going to have a very, very sharp contraction in the fiscal situation, in- creased taxes, and cuts in spending, that are very dramatic and that occur almost simultaneously on January 1, 2013. As I discussed in my remarks, and as the CBO has documented in some detail, if that all happens, it will, no doubt, do serious damage to the recovery, and probably will cost a significant num- ber of jobs. It is not essential to do it that way. I think the best way to address this is to attack the long-run fiscal sustainability issue seriously and credibly, but to do it in a more gradual way that doesn’t have such negative effects on the recovery. And I think both of those goals can be met simultaneously, recognizing that it is not politically easy. But I believe that is the correct broad ap- proach for addressing our fiscal situation. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. The ranking member is recog- nized for 5 minutes for questioning. Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, you say on page 6 that we should ad- dress the fiscal challenges in a way that takes into account both the need for long-range sustainability and the fragility of the recov- ery. There are some in the Congress who have been arguing that it is very important in the appropriations we are now voting on for the fiscal year that begins in a couple of months that we substan- tially reduce what we are committed to spend. Is that what you are warning us against when you talk about the fragility of the recov- ery? Is it the timing issue, that we should not be trying to do this in the immediate next fiscal year, but put into place a longer-term situation? Mr. BERNANKE. I am talking about the collective impact of the tax increases and the spending cuts, which together come some- thing close to 5 percent of GDP, which would, if it all hit at the same time, be very negative for growth. It is important to combine a more gradual approach with, of course, a longer-term plan to ad- dress sustainability. Mr. FRANK. Let me ask you, you have been doing a great deal with your colleagues to try to provide an impetus to economic growth, at least an offset to the headwinds I think would be the way to put it. A number of people from the beginning of your ef- forts to do this, quantitative easing and the twist and all the other ways that you have been trying to make more money available, have warned that you were risking inflation, and some have said that this might worsen our fiscal condition because you might be losing money. You are aware of the criticisms. This many, I don’t know, a couple of years into this, what is the record? Were you wrong? Mr. BERNANKE. No, we are not wrong. I have a collection of op- eds and editorials from 2008 and 2009 about immediate hyper- inflation which is right around the corner, collapse of the dollar, those sorts of things. None of that has happened. None of that is VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 13 going to happen. The Federal Reserve is responsibly using mone- tary policy to try to support the recovery. We are very cognizant of our responsibility for price stability, and we have the tools to withdraw the policy stimulus at the ap- propriate time. But markets, for example as reflected in interest rates and inflation-adjusted Treasury securities, suggest that mar- kets are quite confident that inflation will remain low. Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will share with you an insight that I am sure you have already figured out for yourself. But being able to say, ‘‘I told you so’’ is one of the few pleasures that improves with age. And you are certainly entitled to do that with the people who were crying wolf. Part of the problem though, was it was ideologically motivated, some of this criticism. That is there are people, and we have legislation that has been introduced, they are holding it off until after the election because they don’t want to, I think, be seen supporting it too popularly, but people will advance it if they can, which would cut in half your dual man- date. You are mandated by the law under which you appear today to be equally concerned about price stability and employment. And there are some who argue that is inconsistent, and that you have, in fact, been distracted from your focus on price stability by this equal mandate on employment. I believe, by the way, that is part of what people are trying to get at with the audit. Because as you say, we have put into the law already auditing of all your financial transactions, any activity you have with a private company will sometimes be public. I believe this is part of an effort to undermine the dual mandate indirectly. They will try do it directly if they can later. Have you found any inconsistency between the two parts of the mandate? Has the con- cern for employment, which I admire you for showing, interfered with your ability to bring about price stability? Mr. BERNANKE. As you noted, inflation is low. It is in fact a little bit below our 2 percent target, so there has not been an evident in- consistency. And I think the dual mandate has served us well, and we do have the ability to address both sides. That being said, we will do of course whatever Congress tells us to do. Mr. FRANK. But have you found any inconsistency in meeting both aspects of the dual mandate? Mr. BERNANKE. Generally speaking, no. In particular, low infla- tion does contribute to healthy employment in the longer term. So, they are complementary in that respect. Mr. FRANK. And your efforts to help the economy overcome the headwinds have not led to any inflation? Mr. BERNANKE. No. Mr. FRANK. Another argument we have seen is that it is regula- tion that is slowing things down. You talked about the headwinds. I notice you did not mention the committee meeting you are about to go to as one of those headwinds. Having talked to us about the headwinds, in your judgment the financial reform legislation that we passed, is that one of the headwinds? Mr. BERNANKE. I wouldn’t want to rule out regulatory and tax factors as part of the uncertainty. There are a lot of uncertainties in the economy. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 14 Mr. FRANK. I don’t mean in theory; I mean the one that we have adopted. Mr. BERNANKE. It is possible that some of these regulations have some impact on the cost of credit, but there has been a lot of anal- ysis that suggests that the benefits in terms of reducing the risk of a financial crisis are extremely large, and that whatever costs are involved are worthwhile. Mr. FRANK. I thank you. I hope, with that analysis from our bi- partisan appointee here, that some of my colleagues who preach the virtues of benefit cost analysis will not ignore its benefits as you have just mentioned them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Dr. Paul for 5 minutes. Dr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had a question prepared, but I think I better follow up on the question you asked Chairman Bernanke dealing with the audit of the Fed. Because when the Fed talks about independence, what they are really talking about is se- crecy, not transparency. And it is the secrecy that I don’t like and that we have a right to know about. What the GAO cannot audit, and I believe it would be the posi- tion of the Chairman, is it cannot audit monetary policy. And you expressed yourself on monetary policy. It would not be able to look at agreements and operations with foreign central banks and gov- ernments and other banks, or transactions made under the direc- tion of the FOMC, discussions or communications between the Board and the Federal Reserve system related to all those items. It is really not an audit without this. It is still secrecy. And why this is important is because of what happened 4 years ago. It is es- timated that the amount of money that went in and out of the Fed for the bailout overseas was $15 trillion. How did we ever get into this situation where Congress has nothing to say about trillions and trillions of dollars bailing out certain banks and governments through these currency swaps? And the Chairman has publicly announced that he is available, there is a crisis going on in Europe, part of this dollar crisis going on that has been building. It is unique to the history of the world of monetary policy. And we stand ready. Who stands ready? The American taxpayer, because we are just going to print up the money. As long as they take our dollars, we will print the money and we will bail them all out and we are going to destroy the mid- dle class. The middle class is shrinking. The banks get richer, and the middle shrinks, they lose their houses, they lose their mort- gages. The system is biased against the middle class and the poor. So I would say that if we protect this amount of secrecy, it is not good policy and it is not good economics at all, and it is very unfair. But my question is, Mr. Chairman, whose responsibility is it under the Constitution to manage monetary policy? Which branch of govern- ment has the absolute authority to manage monetary policy? Mr. BERNANKE. The Congress has the authority, and it has dele- gated it to the Federal Reserve. That is a policy decision that you have made. Dr. PAUL. Yes, but they can’t transfer authority. You can’t amend the Constitution by just saying we are going to create some secret group of individuals and banks. That is amending the Constitution. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 15 You can’t do that, and all of a sudden allow this to exist in secrecy. Whose responsibility is it for oversight? Which branch of govern- ment has the right of oversight? Mr. BERNANKE. Congress has the right of oversight. And we cer- tainly fully accept that, and we fully accept the need for trans- parency and accountability. But it is a well-established fact that an independent central bank will provide better outcomes. There is no constitutional reason why Congress couldn’t take over monetary policy. If you want to do that, I guess that is your right to do it. But I am advising you that it wouldn’t be very good from an eco- nomic policy point of view. Dr. PAUL. Yes, but if it is allowed to be done in secret, this is the reason why I want to work within the system. What I want to say is Congress ought to get a backbone. They ought to say we de- serve to know, we have a right to know, we have an obligation to know because we have an obligation to defend our currency. It is the destruction of the currency that destroys the middle class. There is a principle in free market banking that says if you destroy the value of currency through inflation, you transfer the wealth from the middle class and it gravitates to the very wealthy. The bankers, the government, the politicians, they all love this. It is a fact that the Federal Reserve is the facilitator. You couldn’t have big government—if everybody loves big government, loves the Fed, because they can finance the wars and all the welfare you want. But it doesn’t work, and it eventually ends up in a crisis. It is a solvency crisis, and it can’t be solved by printing a whole lot of money. So I think the very first step is transparency, and for us to know. We have a right to know. And you may be correct in your assump- tion, at least I am sure you believe this, but maybe I should be talking to the Congress that we should stand up and say, yes, we demand to know. Trillions and trillions of dollars being printed out of thin air, and bailing out their friends. They stand ready to do it. The crisis is just, as far as I am concerned, my opinion is it is in the early stages. It is far from over. We are in deep doldrums, and we never change policy. We never challenge anything. We just keep doing the same thing. Congress keeps spending the money. Welfare expands exponen- tially. Wars never end. And deficits don’t matter. And when it comes to cutting spending, Republicans and Democrats get together and say, oh, no, we can’t really cut. And if we do cut, we just cut proposed increases. Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, regular order. Regular order, Mr. Chairman. Dr. PAUL. And you stand there and facilitate it all. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you, Dr. Paul. Congressman Clay for 5 minutes. Mr. FRANK. Can we get the answer in writing to that question, Mr. Chairman? Mr. BERNANKE. May I just comment, Congressman Paul, your ob- jections are to the structure of the system, as you mentioned. But all of the actions we took during the crisis, the swaps, all of those things are fully disclosed. It is not a question of information. It is a question of whether or not you want to give the Fed those pow- VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 16 ers. If you don’t want to, of course, Congress has the right to take them back. Mr. CLAY. Thank you. Mr. FRANK. Will the gentleman yield me 10 seconds? Mr. CLAY. I yield to the ranking member. Mr. FRANK. Just to mention that, in fact, in the financial reform bill, I think unanimously, while there were some differences, we re- pealed Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which was the sin- gle biggest grant of power to the Federal Reserve to lend any money it wanted if it thought there was a chance to do it. It was the AIG loan. So in fact, this Congress, in 2010, made a substantial reduction in the Federal Reserve’s authority. Mr. CLAY. Chairman Bernanke, the national unemployment rate is 8.2 percent, lower than it was a year ago. And as I said, it is important to put all Americans back to work. But I am troubled by the large disparity between the unemployment rate in the country at large and that of African Americans, which is at 8.2 percent versus 14.2 percent. I think that is a national crisis. Mr. Chairman, to what do you believe this large difference can be attributed? Mr. BERNANKE. It is a tragedy and a problem, of course. It is a long-standing difference. I don’t know how to parse the difference. Some of it is educational and other differences, some of it is dis- crimination. It is hard to say how much. Age and other demo- graphic factors play a role. Unfortunately, this is not something monetary policy can do much about. We can only hope to address the overall state of the labor market and hope that a rising tide will lift all ships, so to speak. But clearly, African Americans re- main disadvantaged in education, in wealth creation, and in oppor- tunity. And those are issues that collectively I hope we can ad- dress. Mr. CLAY. Do you think there is anything that the Federal Re- serve, along with Congress, can do to address it? Mr. BERNANKE. Again, the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies are limited. We have a variety of things that bear on this indi- rectly, such as our Office of Minority and Women Inclusion, which tries to help ensure that in our own employment, we have full di- versity. Financial literacy programs that try to help people in lower- to moderate-income communities achieve a better level of savings and wealth. But more broadly, I think to really address these questions, issues of mobility and education, skills, et cetera, are more a function of congressional and State and local efforts than the Federal Reserve. Mr. CLAY. Thank you for your response. Can the Federal Reserve institute a monetary policy that is strong enough to avoid a double- dip recession? Mr. BERNANKE. At this point, we don’t see a double-dip recession, we see continued moderate growth. But we are very committed to ensuring, or at least doing all we can to ensure that we continue to make progress on the employment side. And we have stated that we are prepared to take action as needed to try to make sure that we see continued progress on employment. Mr. CLAY. In another area of the economy, how will the Federal Reserve expansion of asset rates for stimulating the economy suc- VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 17 ceed when many individuals have liquid assets that may lose value? Mr. BERNANKE. You are talking about various monetary policies of the FOMC? Mr. CLAY. Yes. Mr. BERNANKE. Our monetary policies actually generally increase asset values, broadly speaking. The concern has been raised, and I fully understand it and sympathize with it, that low interest rates penalize people who live off the interest earnings of their in- vestments or their savings. And again, I fully appreciate that con- cern. My response, at least in part, is that if we are going to have good returns on savings and investment overall, we need a healthy economy. And if we raise interest rates prematurely and cause the economy to go into recession, that is not going to be an environ- ment where people can make a good return on their retirement funds or their other investments. Mr. CLAY. If the United States were to announce it was moving to a gold standard, what would you expect to happen to the price of gold? And how difficult would that make it for the country to fix the value of currency in terms of the price of gold? Mr. BERNANKE. That is a very complex question. I think there is an issue about whether, at least at current prices, there would be enough gold to set up a global gold standard. But there are more fundamental issues with the gold standard than that which I have addressed on other occasions. And in particular, a gold standard doesn’t imply stability in the prices of the goods and services that people buy every day. It implies a stability in the price of gold itself. Mr. CLAY. Thank you for your response. I yield back. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Let me advise the Republicans on the committee that Mr. Hensarling and Mr. Jones, because of the questioning lineup, go first, and then under the Greenspan rules, Mr. Manzullo and Mr. Fincher, if they are here. And then, we will resume with Mr. Royce. So at this time, I recognize Mr. Hensarling, the vice chairman. Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Chairman Bernanke. You are clearly here before us because of your dual mandate. And speaking of maximizing employment, clearly the Fed took a number of dramatic actions in 2008, some of which I consider proper, some of which I still question. 2008 was 4 years ago. I think it is an inescapable conclusion that we have seen the greatest monetary and fiscal stimulus thrown at an economy in our history, and what do we see but 41 months of 8 percent-plus unem- ployment, 14.9 percent real unemployment, if we look at those who have left the labor force and those who are seeking full-time em- ployment. We have anemic GDP growth, probably half of what it should be by historic standards. And my interpretation of your tes- timony is you are predicting much of the same. Why shouldn’t the American people come to the inescapable conclusion that we have either had a profound failure of monetary policy or a profound fail- ure of fiscal policy, and which is it? Mr. BERNANKE. I don’t think it is the case that there has been no progress. In the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, we almost had a collapse in the economy, a tremendous in- VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 18 crease in unemployment. The unemployment rate went about 10 percent. Now, it is true that the recovery has been slower than we would have liked. But clearly, we have made progress in unemploy- ment and in job creation. Mr. HENSARLING. Isn’t it true that if you look at the 10 post-war recessions, we are in the midst of the slowest, weakest recovery of all? Mr. BERNANKE. There is some evidence that financial crises lead to recessions that are slower to mend. We also had a housing boom and bust, which is also a major factor. So there have been a num- ber of reasons that are consistent with historical experience why the recovery should be slower than average. Mr. HENSARLING. Okay, let me move on since you don’t agree with the premise of that question. You at least acknowledged in the question from the gentleman from Missouri, I think you used the phrase, there are limits to what monetary policy can achieve. I would like to explore those limits for a moment. Again, when I look at QE1, QE2, I think we are in our second Operation Twist—and, again, I think it is hard to conclude that we have—that, again, we have seen the greatest monetary stimulus in the history of the country. Obviously, you have a rather unique bal- ance sheet today with asset-backed securities. And, yet, your new data reveals that public companies are sitting on $1.7 trillion of ex- cess liquidity, banks have $1.5 trillion in excess reserves. And so I am trying to figure out, what is it that—on the Federal Reserve menu, what would two more Operation Twists and two more QEs, even if you supersized them, achieved that haven’t al- ready been achieved? Mr. BERNANKE. First, I think that the previous efforts did have productive effects. QE1, for example, was followed a few months later by the beginning the recovery in the middle of 2009. And QE2 came at a time when we were seeing increased risk of deflation, which was eliminated by the QE2— Mr. HENSARLING. Then why is all this capital, Mr. Chairman, sit- ting on the sidelines? And you putting in more to excess reserves, how is that improving our economy? Mr. BERNANKE. The excess reserves are not the issue. The issue is the state of financial conditions. And we are still able to lower interest rates, improve, broadly speaking, asset prices, and that provides some incentive. Now, if I might— Mr. HENSARLING. Are we not essentially in a negative real inter- est rate environment already? Mr. BERNANKE. Let me just agree with you on the following, that monetary policy is not a panacea, it is not the ideal tool. Part of the problem is that we hit the zero lower bound, so we can’t use the usual practice of cutting short-term interest rates. So I would like to see other parts of the government— Mr. HENSARLING. In the very limited time I have, Mr. Chairman, I have to tell you, when I am speaking to either Fortune 50 CEOs, world-class investors, small business people in east Texas, here is what I hear: number one, uncertain Federal regulation and cer- tainly harmful Federal regulation is crushing jobs; number two, the threatened single largest tax increase in U.S. history; number VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 19 three, a Nation on the road to bankruptcy; and number four, rhet- oric out of this President that vilifies success in the free enterprise system. And monetary policy is not going to solve that problem. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Mr. Capuano? Mr. CAPUANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Bernanke, first of all, I want to thank you for your steadfast commitment to taking action as you deem appropriate. I am not any different than anybody else; I haven’t agreed with ev- erything you have done. But—and today is another day of it, where everybody gets to criticize everything you have ever done for the last 10 years. And I may take my shot here or there, but I just want to say thank you for not giving up, thank you for not with- ering under this. We still need you and the Fed to be actively in- volved, even if there are things you do with which I disagree. There are so many things I would like to talk about, but in 5 minutes, I can’t do it. So I think I am going to talk a little bit first about the Libor situation. For me—and I am not asking for a decision. I know it is not tech- nically some of the things you are—but one of the things I have heard from the fiscal crisis of 2008 is that so many people walked away scot-free, that the general public thinks that we, the whole government, turned our back on any potential wrongdoing. And in this particular situation, if it turns up that our largest banks in the world repeatedly, intentionally lied in order to manip- ulate the market, do you think it is appropriate for them to be held accountable? Mr. BERNANKE. Of course. Mr. CAPUANO. Either civilly or criminally, whatever might be— and I am not asking you to make a judgment, but— Mr. BERNANKE. Let me just— Mr. CAPUANO. —if others make a determination that is appro- priate, would you think that is an appropriate— Mr. BERNANKE. Currently, there are any number of enforcement agencies, including the Department of Justice, the CFTC, the SEC, and foreign and State regulators looking at this, and I am sure that they will apply the law appropriately. Mr. CAPUANO. Because I would appreciate and I think the Amer- ican people would appreciate it very much if somebody who inten- tionally lied to manipulate a worldwide market on something that affects every one of our daily lives will be held accountable. I want to shift a little bit to the fiscal cliff item. And, again, I am not asking you to tell us what to do. I respect the difference of opinion. But this whole fiscal cliff thing is revolving around, give or take, $450 billion, $500 billion that will be shifted around, give or take, January of next year. That is round numbers, round dates. Five hundred billion dollars—the Fed itself changed the fiscal situ- ation in this country for over a trillion dollars in a matter of less than a year between 2000 and 2008. And to suggest that $500 bil- lion in an economy that is $15 trillion is going to change the dy- namics of the world, I think it is a little concerning to me. But I guess I would like to ask, if it is not going to be $450 bil- lion, $500 billion—and I am not asking you to tell me whether it should be tax cuts or spending cuts—what is a number, do you VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 20 think, a general number—to me, that looks like approximately 3 percent of the economy. I think you said 5 percent. Whatever the number is, what do you think is an acceptable number either in tax cuts or tax increases or spending cuts to shift? Because we are not going to maintain the status quo. We are going to do something. That something may, of course, be the reac- tion of doing nothing. But something will change. And I am just wondering, what is a number that you think will not dramatically throw us off this cliff? Mr. BERNANKE. First, the Federal Reserve’s actions are buying and selling securities, not spending and taxing. They are very dif- ferent. The CBO says that the fiscal cliff is on the order of 4 to 5 percent of GDP, and that big a shift would have a significant effect on real activity in employment. So I am in favor of an aggressive plan over a period of time. The $4 trillion number gets tossed around some- times over the next decade; I am in favor of that. And I can’t give you a specific number for the short term, but I think there ought to be a more gradual approach. I am not saying that you shouldn’t consolidate the budget; I just don’t want it all to happen on 1 day, essentially. Mr. CAPUANO. As I understand this, it may happen in 1 day, but it won’t impact in 1 day, like everything else. Federal spending doesn’t end that day; we have obligations that we have to continue. Sequestration cuts aren’t going to happen like that. Tax increases, I don’t all of a sudden give the Federal Government $3,000 more that day; it is a slow, gradual item over a year. So I think that some of the fiscal cliff thing really needs a dose of reality. I am asking you this because, up until now, I have seen you as a person of reality and a conservative approach toward the real impact of whatever we do. Mr. BERNANKE. The CBO estimates that it would cost 11⁄ 4 million jobs next year, and I don’t think that is an unreasonable estimate. Mr. CAPUANO. Oh, no, I understand. I have read the CBO report. I know exactly what they say. At the same time, the CBO is one source, and you are another. You are not telling me you fully em- brace everything the CBO says in that report? Mr. BERNANKE. I am just saying that order of magnitude, in terms of jobs and GDP, seems reasonable to me. Mr. CAPUANO. I don’t think everybody would like that, but there is a serious question. See, I would argue with the CBO report on other issues, but they are not here today; you are. It is unrealistic to think that nothing is going to happen. Either we are going to do nothing, which will mean tax increases, which will mean massive spending cuts, or we will do something. We probably will not do everything; probably not kick the ball down the road and just extend all of the tax cuts and get rid of seques- tration altogether. We are going to do something in the middle. The question is, what is in the middle that is a reasonable num- ber? Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Mr. CAPUANO. I am not looking to jeopardize the economy, and— Chairman BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Capuano. Mr. CAPUANO. —I guess I am just looking for some guidance. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 21 Mr. BERNANKE. I don’t have a magic number. I just think you should take a smoother approach to obtaining fiscal sustainable. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Mr. Jones? Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And, Chairman Bernanke, thank you for being here. I want to say, two of my worst votes in 18 years were the Iraq war—we didn’t have to go to Iraq—and the repeal of Glass- Steagall. And if I was not going to yield my time, I would ask you about reinstating Glass-Steagall. I think I will write you a letter with that question, sir. But at this time, because he is one of my dearest friends and I supported him for the Republican nomination to be President of the United States, I yield my time to Dr. Ron Paul. Dr. PAUL. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. I wanted to make a very brief statement about our previous dis- cussion about the Audit the Fed bill. That bill has nothing to do with transferring who does monetary policy. It is strictly a trans- parency bill. Monetary policy reform, I believe, will come, but that is another subject. This is just to know more about what the Fed- eral Reserve is doing. Mr. Chairman, one of your key points that you have made through your academic career as well as being at the Fed has been the need to prevent deflation. Would you agree with that? Mr. BERNANKE. Generally, yes, sir. Dr. PAUL. Right. And you argue that the depression was pro- longed by the Federal Reserve not being able to reinflate. So, in that sense, I think you really have achieved—you have had the chance—you were put in a situation that you alone didn’t create. It is, as far as I am concerned, the system created it and other managers helped create this. And there was this, what I see as a natural tendency to deflate and liquidate and clear the market. And under your philosophy, you say we can’t allow this to happen, we have to prevent it. And I would say you have done a pretty good job. The monetary base has been tripled, and in the last 12 months I think M1 has grown about 16 percent, M2 over 9 percent. So it seems to be like the monetary system, the monetary numbers are still growing. But the pricing houses—everybody knows there is a bubble. I like to believe that the free-market economists knew about it and other predicted it; others did not. But the prices soared up, every- body knows there was a bubble, and then they collapsed. When those prices of houses collapse, do you call that deflation? Mr. BERNANKE. No. Deflation is the price of current goods and services. So, inflation doesn’t capture house prices. It includes the house or the rental— Dr. PAUL. Okay. And I think one of the problems even getting a full-fledged discussion out is sometimes the definition of words, about what ‘‘inflation’’ and ‘‘deflation’’ means. Because as far as I am concerned, deflation is when the money supply shrinks, and in- flation is when the money supply expands. But just about every- body in the country, especially the financial markets, and the way I think the conventional use of inflation is the CPI. And I think it is a lousy measurement. Because if it is the money supply increase, VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 22 if prices going down of houses is not deflation, I wonder why it is that inflation is measured by the CPI going up rather than the money supply going up. Our argument is that once you distort interest rates and increase the supply of money, you end up with this gross distortion that is demanding some correction. So I would—I have worked on this for years, and we are not going to solve it today. The definitions would be much better if we—if prices of houses going down is not defla- tion, then CPI going up shouldn’t be inflation. But we have had trouble for 5 years. The monetary system, you say this is not the be-all and end-all. You can’t solve every problem with monetary policy. We have had this for 5 years, and we are still in a mess. Is there ever a time—let’s say we go 5 more years and we have the same problems but much worse—you might say, I have to reas- sess my philosophy on monetary policy, or do you think it will be the same no matter what kind of crisis? Can you foresee any kind of problem that we would have that would cause you to reassess your assumptions? Mr. BERNANKE. I can’t conjecture what specifically, but of course, yes. I am evidence-based; I look and see what happens and try to draw conclusions from that. Certainly. Dr. PAUL. The definitions, obviously, to me are very, very impor- tant. And if we don’t come to this conclusion and we use these terms—inflation demands corrections, and the market wants to cor- rect. So this is why we believe that we are going to have perpetual doldrums and finally have a big one. Do you consider this recession that we are facing today some- thing that is significantly different since 1945? Much worse and different in any way? Mr. BERNANKE. Yes, because of the financial crisis, yes. Mr. FRANK. Regular order. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Paul. That was a double dose you got. So that was pleasantly unexpected, I guess. Mr. Miller? Mr. MILLER OF NORTH CAROLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Bernanke, Mr. Capuano has already asked you about the need for accountability if Libor was, in fact, systematically gamed. But we frequently hear, with respect to whatever the latest scandal is and certainly with respect to the conduct that led up to the financial crisis, that the conduct might have been unethical, it might be objectionable, but it probably wasn’t illegal, it certainly wasn’t criminal, and that the fault was with Congress in not pass- ing tougher laws, for having passed weak laws. And I have no stake in defending the laws passed by Congress before I got here, but I have read the transcript of the telephone conversation between an employee of the New York Fed and the Barclays trader, and I have examined the criminal fraud statutes. Several transcripts show that Barclays admitted they were filing false reports. They were not filing an honest interest rate. But one transcript sort of set out why. They said that the Financial Times had done a chart that showed that Barclays was consistently pay- ing a higher rate. Folks thought that meant that the other banks knew something about Barclays that was not generally known. And VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 23 Barclays’ stock went down, their shares went down. And he said that was why they were not filing an honest rate. They were filing a rate that would be kind of like everybody else’s, so that it wouldn’t call attention to them, like the attention that the Finan- cial Times had called to them, and it wouldn’t affect their shares. The definition of fraud appears to be willful intent—providing false information with the willful intent to deceive. It can be words or acts or the suppression of material facts, again, with intent to deceive. A material fact is one that someone, a shareholder or an investor, would attach importance to in determining whether or not to sell and in determining the price at which to sell those shares. With respect to the Barclays shares, presumably the traders and many Barclays executives held a substantial number of Barclays shares. They probably had options to buy Barclays shares. They probably were paid bonuses in Barclays shares. So it appears that Barclays was providing information they knew to be false. They were providing information that they knew would affect the share price. They provided it with the intent of affecting the share price. And they personally benefited from the effect on the share price of having provided false information. What is missing there? What does Congress need to do? If that does not meet the definition of criminal fraud, how does Congress need to change the law? Mr. BERNANKE. I would recommend—the Federal Reserve is not an enforcement agency. This is currently under the purview of the Department of Justice— Mr. MILLER OF NORTH CAROLINA. Right. Mr. BERNANKE. —and other enforcement agencies. Mr. MILLER OF NORTH CAROLINA. But at the time of those— Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, and Secretary Geithner are now in a dispute over exactly what Secretary Geithner told him. But there doesn’t seem to be any dispute that there was no referral to a U.S. Attorney for criminal prosecution. Why was there not a referral for criminal prosecution? Mr. BERNANKE. As I understood, what the information came across was not quite as explicit as you characterized. It was more, sort of, market chatter about— Mr. MILLER OF NORTH CAROLINA. No. That is directly from the transcript of a conversation between a Barclays employee, a Barclays trader, and an employee of the New York Federal Re- serve. Mr. BERNANKE. The Barclays trader was based in New York and was talking about rumors and things that he had heard. He didn’t have explicit information. But the point, the real point, the relevant point and the impor- tant point is that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York did in- form the appropriate authorities, and it briefed all of the financial regulators, who, in turn, undertook investigations which began about the same time, including especially the CFTC investigation. Mr. MILLER OF NORTH CAROLINA. You said yesterday that you did not know, that no one at the Federal Reserve, the New York Fed knew the reports that Barclays was filing false information to affect the Libor rate because it affected their derivative positions, presumably interest rate swaps. There are many reports that there VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 24 are many banks under investigation. Obviously, that conduct would be much more effective if it was done in concert rather than inde- pendently. But it wouldn’t make sense to act in concert and it wouldn’t really be effective independently if their derivatives posi- tion were all over the place. Is there examination now into whether the derivatives positions, the interest rate swap positions of the various Libor banks, in fact, moved in concert? Mr. BERNANKE. The CFTC is looking at that kind of issue. That is not under our jurisdiction. The investigations from other agen- cies are addressing those questions. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Mr. Manzullo? Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you for coming, Chairman Bernanke. What role does uncertainty in the marketplace have to do with our financial recovery? Mr. BERNANKE. I think uncertainty is—as I have mentioned once or twice in this venue, my Ph.D. thesis was about the effects of un- certainty on investment decisions and suggested that it would im- pede decisions that would be hard to reverse later when informa- tion became available. So I am sure uncertainty is playing some role. I think where there is some disagreement is on the relative weights of different kinds of uncertainty. No doubt, regulatory and tax uncertainty are part of the broad set of issues that are concerning investors and en- trepreneurs. We hear that a lot in our anecdotes. There is also, though, general uncertainty about the recovery itself. Will the re- covery be sustained or not? In order to be confident about hiring people, for example, you like to have greater confidence that, in fact, your sales will be— Mr. MANZULLO. What you are hearing is also what I am hearing. But I am also hearing from a lot of small business people who have around 50 people that they are going to fire people to get below 50 so they are not covered by the President’s health care. I could tell you story after story of small manufacturing facilities that are— they are going to fire people because they are not going to tolerate having to put up with the Affordable Health Care Act. And even one major employer back home in Rockford, Illinois, simply told his employees, ‘‘I am going to offer you no more health care. I will pay the $2,000 fine because I am well over 50.’’ Those businesspeople have money. Large corporations have money. And have you heard about the uncertainty out there with the businesspeople over the President’s Affordable Health Care Act and the impact that that has on the recovery? Mr. BERNANKE. We get lots of anecdotes. The Reserve Bank Presidents from around the country come to the meeting and talk about what they are hearing from their contacts, and contacts fre- quently cite various kinds of uncertainty, including regulatory un- certainty. As I said, though, it is hard to judge whether there is a small factor or a large factor. Mr. MANZULLO. From what I can tell, it is a very large factor. I spend most of my time in this place working on manufacturing issues. And couple that uncertainty with the weak orders coming from the EU, which I think is our second-largest trading partner VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 25 besides Canada, and the Institute for Supply Management is now below 50. It dropped, I think, a dramatic 6 points just in 1 month. If the manufacturing sector isn’t going to lead the recovery, what will? Mr. BERNANKE. I noted in my remarks that manufacturing seems to have slowed somewhat. And part of it is the global economic sit- uation— Mr. MANZULLO. Demand. Mr. BERNANKE. —demand, slowing in European and Asia. And that was part of my earlier point. There are multiple factors in- volved here. One sector which is doing a little better is housing, and over time that will be a contributing factor. But it is true, as Mr. Hensarling pointed out, for example, that growth has been slow, and part of the reason is that following a financial crisis, some of the factors that normally lead to a strong recovery, like a housing recovery or extension of credit, have been affected to some extent by— Mr. MANZULLO. What I have been seeing is that those manufac- turers involved in mining, oil, and gas exploration, anything deal- ing with energy, they are actually expanding because they see the need for that. And banks are lending based upon that. But the massive uncertainty in the manufacturing sector, the fact that com- panies are unwilling to make decisions is, as you said, compounding everything. I met with a bunch of European Union parliamentarians yester- day. They believe—of course, it is in their best interest to say so, but I really believe that they think that things are stabilizing in Europe. Your opinion of that? Mr. BERNANKE. I don’t think they are close to having a long-term solution that will solve the problem. And until they find those long- term solutions, we are going to continue to see periods of financial market volatility, I think. Mr. MANZULLO. Okay. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman BACHUS. Mr. Scott, I guess. No— Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to— Chairman BACHUS. —Mr. Carson. I am sorry. Mr. Carson? Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Bernanke, in previous testimony before this com- mittee, you have mentioned that one of the best ways to strengthen our labor force is to improve the quality of education, especially in disadvantaged areas suffering from persistent unemployment and underemployment. Some encouraging news that I found in the new monetary report is that consumer debt has shrunk. It is not clear to me whether our U.S. savings rate is increasing in proportion to the decrease in consumer debt. But I am very interested in your assessment on the role of financial education, particularly for young people and espe- cially students. The disturbing aspect to me of current consumer debt is the alarming increase of student loan debt. Do you believe, sir, that investments in financial education can help strengthen our economy? And are there any successful models or programs that you see as being effective in this area? VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 26 Mr. BERNANKE. The Federal Reserve is very committed to finan- cial education and economic education more generally. I mentioned yesterday that I am, later this summer, going to meet, on video, with teachers from all over the country who are doing financial education to talk about different approaches and the value of that. It is clearly very important. The crisis showed that many people made bad financial decisions, and that hurt not only them but also hurt the broader economy. So it is extremely important. At the same time, I think on the other side of the ledger it is important that we make sure that financial information, such as credit card statements and the like are understandable, that they are not full of legalese and small print and those kinds of things. So there are really two sides to it. So, yes, that is very important. There is still a lot of work going on about trying to figure out what works in financial education, and I would say that the record is mixed. One of the things that we have learned, I think, is that financial education should be in- troduced in school, in high schools and so on, but it is also impor- tant to have a lifelong opportunity. And many folks don’t pay much attention to these issues until the time comes for them to buy a house or make some other big financial decision, and that is when they are most likely to listen carefully and absorb those lessons. Mr. CARSON. Thank you, sir. I yield back. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Mr. Fincher for 5 minutes. Mr. FINCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Privileges to the lowest-ranking Member, myself: I am close to the action. So thank you for coming in today. To the chairman’s opening question, Chairman Bernanke, about auditing the Fed, none of us are challenging—I am not challenging the transparency that you have given to us in seeing what is hap- pening. But moving forward to the future, not the past, the ranking member’s opening comments about playing politics, most of—I know the freshman class, we are not here to play politics. This is about trying to prevent—or hopefully build a better America than we have now. And auditing the Fed, to most of the American peo- ple, seems like something that is responsible if the political games wouldn’t be played. Can you just kind of comment? Are you that opposed to auditing the Fed? Mr. BERNANKE. Very much so, because I think the term ‘‘audit the Fed’’ is deceptive. The public thinks that auditing means check- ing the books, looking at the financial statements, making sure that you are not doing special deals and that kind of thing. All of those things are completely open. The GAO has complete ability to address all the things we did during the crisis. All of our books are audited by an outside, private—Deloitte & Touche, a private audi- tor. We have an Inspector General. If there is anything that Con- gress wants to know about our financial operations, all they have to do is say so. The one thing which I consider to be absolutely critical, though, about the bill is that it would eliminate the exemption for mone- tary policy in deliberations. And the nightmare scenario I have is VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 27 one in which some future Fed Chairman would decide, say, to raise the Federal funds rates by 25 basis points, and somebody in this room would say, ‘‘I don’t like that decision. I want the GAO to go in and get all the records, get all the transcripts, get all the pre- paratory materials, and give us an independent opinion on whether or not that was the right decision.’’ And I think that would have a chilling effect and would prevent the Fed from operating on the apolitical, independent basis that is so important and which experience shows is much more likely to lead to a low-inflation, healthy-currency kind of economy. Mr. FINCHER. Is there anything that could be done, any kind of compromise, in your opinion, that needs to be done, any more than it is being done now? Mr. BERNANKE. I think everything in the bill is basically fine ex- cept for getting rid of this exemption for monetary policy delibera- tions and operations. I think that is the part that is critical. And it has nothing to do with our books. That is the thing I hope to con- vey. Mr. FINCHER. Okay. The second question: Since the financial crisis of 2008, the Fed- eral Reserve has put into play several measures to help stimulate an economic recovery, like quantitative easing, Operation Twist, et cetera. Do you see these measures as temporary solutions to stimu- lating the economy, or would the Federal Reserve continue these measures on a more permanent basis? Some of us fear that we are just dumping tons of money into the economy, and that sooner or later, with the low interest rates, that things are really going to spin out of control when we do have a recovery. Mr. BERNANKE. They are, of course, temporary. The economy grows in the long run because of all kinds of funda- mental factors: the skills of the workforce, the quality of the infra- structure, how effective the tax system is, research and develop- ment, all of those things. Monetary policy can’t do much about longer-term growth. Mr. FINCHER. Right. Mr. BERNANKE. All we can try to do is try to smooth out periods where the economy is depressed because of lack of demand. And be- cause of the financial crisis, the economy has been slow to reach back to its potential, and we are trying to provide additional sup- port so the recovery can bring the economy back to its potential. But in the medium- and long-term, monetary policy can’t do any- thing to make the economy healthier or grow faster except to keep inflation low, which we are committed to doing. Things like edu- cation, infrastructure, R&D, Tax Code, all those things, obviously, are the private sector and Congress, not the Federal Reserve. Mr. FINCHER. Do you fear—last question—that when the econ- omy starts to turn and move—and it is going to move, hopefully when Washington can add certainty and stability and give con- fidence back to the American people that we are not going to mess things up—there is so much money out there, that this thing is going to really go and inflation is going to be a huge problem? Mr. BERNANKE. No, it will not. We know how to reverse what we did. We know how to take the money out of the system. We know VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 28 how to raise interest rates. So it will be a similar pattern to what we have seen in previous episodes where the Fed cut rates, pro- vided support for the recovery, and then when the economy reached a point of takeoff where it could support itself on its own, then the Fed pulled back, took away the punchbowl. And we can do that and we will do that when the time comes. Mr. FINCHER. Thank you, Chairman Bernanke. Chairman BACHUS. Mr. Himes for 5 minutes. Mr. HIMES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Chairman Bernanke, thank you for being with us, and thank you for your efforts and work over the course of the last sev- eral years to stabilize our economy. Mr. Chairman, I read very closely and listened to your testimony on the things that are holding back our recovery and read that monetary policy report here. And I want to just dwell on them for a minute or 2. I saw financial strains associated with Europe, still- tight borrowing conditions, the restraining effects of fiscal policy and fiscal uncertainty, and the housing market are the four that you highlighted. Presuming that we are not, in the near term, going to do a lot about number one and number four, I want to explore with you still-tight borrowing conditions and whether there is anything that Congress could do to assist in that. I know you are hesitant to sort of make prescriptions to the Congress, and I understand that. But, of course, the Federal Reserve has been pretty clear in their mes- sage that monetary policy alone is not enough, so I am going to ex- plore that a little bit with you. In the report, you say that still-tight borrowing conditions are a result of uncertainty in the economic outlook and high unemploy- ment. You did not mention uncertainty associated with Dodd-Frank and the rule-writing process and the new regulations. Can I as- sume from that omission that you, the Federal Reserve, does not believe that that regulatory uncertainty is, in fact, a material cause of still-tight borrowing conditions? And if it is material, should we be doing something about it? Mr. BERNANKE. There are a lot of reasons for the problem. Part of it is on the demand side, that borrowers are financially impaired from the crisis and they are not as creditworthy or as attractive to lenders as they were earlier. There are other various factors, in- cluding, for example, concerns that banks have about having mort- gages put back to them if they go bad, et cetera. So there is a lot of conservatism in lending right now, as well. I don’t think I would say that there was no effect of financial reg- ulatory policy on any of this. For example, as we try to develop rules for mortgage lending, for mortgage securitization, there is still uncertainty about what the playing field will look like when the private-sector securitization market comes back or if it does come back— Mr. HIMES. No, no, I understand, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry to interrupt, but, again, my question wasn’t was there no effect; it was, was it material? I happen to think that the reforms in Dodd- Frank, many of them are terribly, terribly important, and there are obviously things that we will need to change over time. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 29 I am really, sort of, looking for materiality. Because, frankly, you don’t mention it in the report. If you were to say that, no, it is a material effect on credit availability, I might rethink my position. Mr. BERNANKE. I think it is partly on us, the regulators, more than on Congress, in that some of these things have not been re- solved one way or the other. A number of people have talked about uncertainty. If we can move to provide clarity about how the regu- lations will be written and so on, I think that will be helpful. And I certainly agree that the benefit of financial reform, which is to reduce the threat of another financial crisis, is extremely im- portant to take into consideration. Mr. HIMES. Thank you. The second question: In your second reason for headwinds here, ‘‘the restraining effects of fiscal policy,’’ I wonder if you could elabo- rate on what you mean by ‘‘the restraining effects of fiscal policy.’’ How is that providing a headwind to our economic recovery? Mr. BERNANKE. Broadly speaking, fiscal policy both at the Fed- eral and the State and local level is now contractionary—that is, pulling demand out of the system rather than putting it in. And you can see that most clearly at the State and local level, where tight budgets over the last few years have meant that at the same time that we are trying to increase employment in the country as a whole, that, of course, many people are being laid off by the State and local governments. So I am not making a judgment about that. Obviously, they have fiscal issues they have to deal with. But it is just a fact that fiscal tightening, particularly at the State and local level, has been some- thing of a drag on the recovery in the last few— Mr. HIMES. Can I conclude from all that, though, that your achieving your mandate of full employment, were we to abide by the policies suggested by some in this institution for more severe austerity now, can I conclude that if we pursued that policy, it would actually not be helpful toward full employment? Mr. BERNANKE. Again, what I have been advocating is sort of a two-part policy, one which makes strong and credible steps toward achieving sustainability over the medium term, over the next dec- ade, while avoiding sharp cliffs and sharp contractions in the near term, yes. Mr. HIMES. Last question, drawing on your experience as an economist: There is all sorts of debate around here about the things that we might do—extending safety net programs, unemployment insurance, tax cuts, tax cuts for middle-class families, tax cuts for the wealthy, infrastructure investment. Each of these things, each of these fiscal policies have different multiplier effects, more posi- tive impact on the economy. Chairman BACHUS. Okay— Mr. HIMES. I wonder if you might just relatively rank the multi- plier effects of those four initiatives that I just laid out. Mr. BERNANKE. No, I think that would come too close to advo- cating the different approaches. And each of these things has not only multiplier effects but it has different costs, it has different benefits to the economy, different philosophies about the size of government and so on. So I think, unfortunately, that is a congres- sional prerogative to figure that out. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 30 Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Mr. HIMES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman BACHUS. Mr. Royce for 5 minutes. Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Chairman Bernanke, looking out on the horizon, on the long road ahead of us, there are two studies that seem to indicate the same thing: one recently that came out of the IMF which indicated that a 10-percentage-point fall in the debt-to-GDP ratio typically leads to output rising by 1.4 percent; and a similar conclusion coming from the other direction from Rogoff and Reinhart who say in their paper, ‘‘Growth in a Time of Debt,’’ that debt burdens above 90 per- cent are associated with 1 to 2 percent lower median growth going forward. Our entitlement obligations will consume all of the average post- war projected tax revenue in a few decades, if we just look at the studies that, frankly, you have shared with us. Will we be able to see strong sustainable economic growth without addressing our en- titlement obligations, which you have labeled ‘‘unsustainable’’ in terms of the way they are currently set to compound? Mr. BERNANKE. On current law, healthcare expenditures are ex- pected to rise very substantially, to the extent that they would be crowding out other parts of the government or, alternatively, re- quiring significant tax increases. So if you want to avoid those out- comes, it is important to find ways to reduce expenditure. I hope that it can be done in ways that don’t involve worse health care but just involve a more efficient delivery of health care. Mr. ROYCE. Would you like to make any other observations in terms of the deficits or the size of the debt as you look 10 years out, 15 years out? Mr. BERNANKE. Again, the CBO has done many analyses which show that our fiscal path is unsustainable, even if we avoid some kind of crisis at some point. While I don’t necessarily buy exactly into the 90 percent number and so on, I think it is pretty clear that a high level of debt to GDP, both because of future tax obligations, high interest rates, is going to impede growth, all else equal. Mr. ROYCE. And that will impact employment in the future. Let me go to another question, regarding Basel III. I think it is a step in the right direction, but at the end of the day, capital is the ultimate buffer that stands between the taxpayer and the sys- temically risky institutions, right? So under Basel III, my concern is that it continues to rely on internal risk models at financial in- stitutions when you set the capital levels, the requirements there. I don’t mind those being used internally for purposes, but to use that to set the capital levels—if I may quote your former colleague, Alan Blinder, he says that, prior to the crisis, these models were gained, is the argument he is making, to avoid raising additional capital. And, of course, what that means is that they had excessive leverage. And if you look at the Basel committee study: ‘‘Capital levels in American banks employing the internal ratings approach would ex- perience a capital reduction of 7 to 27 percent. Those adhering to the standardized approach typically used by the smaller banks would experience a 2 percent increase in capital demands.’’ So we VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 31 have a recent study which found 83 percent of institutional inves- tors want to get rid of model discretion. Mr. Chairman, given the history of the gaming of these models in setting capital levels, and given that institutional investors are demanding to move away from model discretion, are you com- fortable with continuing to use these models in setting capital cal- culations? If you just look at the minimum leverage ratio, are you comfortable with that 3 percent level of Tier 1 capital to total as- sets, or a 33-to-1 total leverage there? Mr. BERNANKE. Right. So the overall system has been strength- ened quite a bit with the international leverage ratio—more cap- ital, higher-quality capital, buffers, liquidity rules, and so on. So I think it is a stronger system. Your point is well-taken. For those models to be worthwhile, they need to be validated and they need to be good. The Federal Reserve and the other regulators don’t just let you use whatever model you want; they have to be approved and validated by the regulators. And I believe that is an adequate— Mr. ROYCE. But the argument I am making is that the only way to guarantee that doesn’t happen is to focus on the old-fashioned minimum leverage ratio— Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Mr. ROYCE. —which, under Basel III, is far too low. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you, Mr. Royce. Mr. Carney? Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Bernanke, thank you for coming in today. By the time you get to me, many of my questions that I have have already been addressed. So I would like to just go back to some of the things that were in your statement and in your report, just to confirm my understanding. Since I get it that the Fed is doing everything it can, with re- spect to monetary policy, to address the employment part of your dual mandate—is that correct? Mr. BERNANKE. We can continue to evaluate the situation, evalu- ate the outlook, look at the tools that we have, and we are com- mitted to make sure that we continue to have improvement on em- ployment. But I don’t want to imply that we have done everything we can. We may do more in the future. Mr. CARNEY. So there is more that you might do? Mr. BERNANKE. It is certainly possible that we will take addi- tional action if we conclude that we are not making progress to- ward higher levels of employment. Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. And there seems to be little reason for concern on the price sta- bility side at the moment. Mr. BERNANKE. For now, inflation seems to be well in check. Mr. CARNEY. And you also said that progress has been made in terms of the recovery, but unemployment is still too high, and the recovery has stalled and is not as strong as maybe you had hoped at this point. Mr. BERNANKE. The recovery has decelerated recently. It is sort of a pattern we have seen for the last few years, that things seem to be stronger in the beginning of the year and then the slowdown VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 32 around spring, spring and summer. So we will try to assess wheth- er this is just a temporary slowdown or whether something more fundamental is happening. Again, we are committed to doing what is necessary to make sure the recovery continues and employment continues to grow. Mr. CARNEY. At one point, you said that two big risks to eco- nomic growth were the European situation and the effects of the U.S. fiscal policy, the so-called fiscal cliff. And in part of your re- sponse to that, you said that the most effective thing that Congress could do would be to address the fiscal cliff. And I think you said the sooner we did that, the better. What do you mean by that, the sooner we did that, the better? Mr. BERNANKE. One of the issues—and this is not explicitly ac- counted for in the CBO study—is that, even putting aside the ef- fects on activity of the fiscal cliff, as time passes, as we get closer to the end of the year, we are likely to see increased uncertainty both in financial markets and among people who are making in- vestment and hiring decisions about what programs will be in place, which ones will not, what the tax rates will be, and those kinds of things. Mr. CARNEY. So certainty and confidence are a big part of that, right? Mr. BERNANKE. Absolutely. Mr. CARNEY. And I know—I am going to try not to ask you to suggest things that we should be doing, because I know you won’t answer those questions. But I would like to ask you once to go back to the question that Mr. Capuano left you at, which is really a sense of what ‘‘gradual’’ means. Can you describe that numerically in some kind of way, as opposed to prescriptively in terms of pol- icy? Mr. BERNANKE. I think there is a range that—people would have different views about whether you should be more proactive or just avoid the cliff. Mr. CARNEY. Right, right, right. Mr. BERNANKE. There is a range of views there. Mr. CARNEY. So when you say more proactive, in terms of maybe stimulating? Mr. BERNANKE. Some folks would want to do more fiscal activity. Mr. CARNEY. Right. Mr. BERNANKE. There are different views. What I am taking here is a sort of do-no-harm kind of approach and say that you just want to avoid the impact of the cliff. Mr. CARNEY. Have we learned anything from the European re- sponse? Have they taken through the requirements that the eurozone have imposed on some of the members’ fiscal policies that probably aren’t the best? Mr. BERNANKE. I think we have learned that sharp fiscal con- tractions can slow economic activity. We are seeing that in a num- ber of countries. That is not to say that they have any choice. In the case of Greece, for example, they don’t have many options about cutting back on their fiscal deficits. But we have seen coun- tries that have very sharply contracted their fiscal positions experi- encing recessions at the same time. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 33 Mr. CARNEY. I only have time for one more question. So, two of the big issues that are in our fiscal situation—and you have talked about healthcare spending, that is the biggest part on the spending side, and of course tax policy. Is certainty more important than the underlying policy or as important? The Affordable Care Act was intended and will—projections are it will reduce costs in the long term but will create a lot of uncer- tainty in the short term. Similarly on tax policy. I see my time is running out. Do you have a thought on that? Mr. BERNANKE. Whenever you can have clarity about your policy intentions—and this applies to the Federal Reserve, too—it is going to be better. Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. Mr. LUCAS [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. The Chair now recognizes himself. Mr. Chairman, press reports have indicated—and let’s return to Libor for just a moment—that the New York Fed first learned of possible rigging of Libor in 2008. However, when the CFTC an- nounced the enforcement action and the $200 million fine against Barclays in June, they said the interest rate rigging continued spo- radically well into 2009. Chairman Bernanke, did anyone at the New York Fed inform the Federal Reserve in Washington, D.C., of potential rigging in 2008? Mr. BERNANKE. Let me be clear. There are two types of behaviors that the CFTC has identified. One is manipulation of the rate by derivatives traders for short-term profit. That information has only recently come to light; none of that was known in 2008–2009. What the Federal Reserve heard about in 2008 had to do with banks that were members of the panel, the Libor panel, possibly underreporting their borrowing costs in order to avoid appearing weak in the market. This was information that was about that time becoming generally known. There were media reports in April of 2008, for example, talking about widespread chatter in the mar- kets about that kind of behavior. So that was understood, and it was understood that part of the problem was the structural problems with the Libor system. And so, the New York Fed took two kinds of steps. One was to inform all the relevant regulators what it had learned. But it also took steps to try to make improvements in how Libor is collected and calculated. Mr. LUCAS. And you can understand the perspective of myself and the Agriculture Committee, since literally thousands of those derivative contracts, which fall under the jurisdiction of the com- mittee, were settled potentially using those what now appear to be rigged rates. The impact is very relevant. So can I take your answer to say, therefore, that someone from the Federal Reserve did, indeed, tell the CFTC about this potential issue in 2008? Mr. BERNANKE. Absolutely. As was released in the materials on Friday, the New York Fed made presentations to the President’s Working Group, which includes the CFTC, the SEC, the Fed, and the Treasury. It made separate presentations to the Treasury. And it communicated with British authorities about the issues of how to strengthen Libor and address this underreporting problem. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 34 Mr. LUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, with that, surprisingly enough, I will yield back the balance of my time and recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Wa- ters, for 5 minutes. Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. Thank you for being here, Chairman Bernanke. There is so much all of us would like to discuss. As I recall, in the past year since the passage of Dodd-Frank, we can see that major U.S. banks have managed to make themselves profitable again, but really, the scandals still keep coming, and public trust in the integrity of the financial system, I think is at an end. That is why I have been advocating for the swift implemen- tation of the Wall Street reform law, strong enforcement of existing law, and for adequate funding for our regulators. But as I did last week at another hearing of this committee, I just want to remind us all, in just the last 2 years we have seen the robo-signing of foreclosure documents, the robo-signing of credit card judgments, billions of dollars of put-back lawsuits over mort- gage-backed securities, the failure of two major Futures Commis- sion merchants, municipal bond bid rigging, alleged energy market manipulation, money laundering now for drug cartels, the losses of the ‘‘London Whale,’’ and the bungling of the Facebook initial pub- lic offering. And this is just a partial list. And it is capped off by what might be the most far-reaching scan- dal of all, Libor manipulation. One commentator, Andrew Lo, a pro- fessor at MIT, has noted that this Libor fixing scandal dwarfs by orders of magnitude any financial scam in the history of the mar- kets. I guess in all of this, let me just ask, as it relates to Libor, what are you going to do about primary dealers who we find have been involved in manipulating the information in order to look better? You have that responsibility; you determine, do you not, who the primary dealers are? Mr. BERNANKE. We determine who the primary dealers are. We don’t necessarily regulate them. This particular issue is now under heavy coverage by the CFTC, the DOJ, the SEC, and authorities from other countries as well. And I am sure that they will follow through with every company involved. Ms. WATERS. As I understand it, the New York Fed may not reg- ulate primary dealers, but they do set out business standards and technical requirements for primary dealers, and they can fire a pri- mary dealer at any time. Are any going to be fired, do you know? Mr. BERNANKE. If there are questions raised about the integrity and competence of a primary dealer, yes. It could happen, cer- tainly. Ms. WATERS. Okay. That is good to know. Let me just segue into something that perhaps you had not an- ticipated. Out in California, we have a number of cities that are fil- ing bankruptcy, and a lot of this has to do with the housing crisis and the problems that they have. San Bernardino is one, of course, and Stockton, and some time ago, it was Vallejo. In San Bernardino, they had some interesting discussions about how to use eminent domain in order to keep people in their homes. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 35 From what I can understand, they would access the properties through eminent domain, and then they would pay the fair market value. But the fair market value is different than the mortgage agreement because they are now underwater. They would keep peo- ple in their homes and, of course, try and stabilize the housing. But what do you think about that? Mr. BERNANKE. I think it raises legal issues that I am just not qualified to comment on. It is a very difficult set of problems that they are facing, and I am very sympathetic to their attempts to try to address it, but whether this is a good vehicle or not, I am not qualified to answer the question. Ms. WATERS. Do you believe that these cities are taking action because they are just basically tired of waiting for us to solve the problems of the housing crisis? There is one thing that I think you were involved in with the OCC, and it had to do with the mitiga- tion process for dealing with some of the issues of getting informa- tion out to some of the people who had been harmed and getting them compensated up to $125,000, I do believe, but only 8 percent returns? Former Chairman Frank and I have met with the OCC, and they talked about coming up with new outreach-type programs, et cetera. Have you been in discussion with them about what you could do to do better outreach and get more people involved and responding? Mr. BERNANKE. We have. We have been trying really hard, done a lot of advertising, Web-based, social-media-type communications. We have taken the GAO commentary and tried to incorporate that. But, most recently, I understand, we are trying to make a more community-based approach to reach out to churches and African- American groups and the like and trying to get their assistance as well, as well as home mortgage counselors. Yes, we are trying to address that. Mrs. BIGGERT [presiding]. The gentlelady’s time has expired. I recognize myself for 5 minutes. Chairman Bernanke, could you just talk a little bit about the dif- ferences between insurance and banking, as the Federal Reserve looks at it? Mr. BERNANKE. Sure. For insurance companies that either own a thrift or should one become designated as a nonbank systemically important firm, the Federal Reserve would have consolidated supervision over those in- surance companies’ responsibilities. We recognize there are differences between insurance companies and banks, so a couple of differences in the way we would manage that. One would be, of course, that the insurance companies them- selves, the insurance subs, will continue to be, as I understand it, will continue to be regulated by the State, State authorities, and be subject to the insurance company regulatory and capital require- ments. The Federal Reserve will impose capital requirements at the holding company level to make sure that overall the company is well-capitalized. But even in doing that, we will try to take into account differences between insurance companies and other types of firms. So, for example, there are certain types of assets that in- surance companies have, like not fully guaranteed accounts that VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 36 some of their customers might have, and we are looking to give those different capital treatments. So there will be a lot of similarities, admittedly, at the holding company level, but we recognize insurance companies have both a different composition of assets and a different set of liabilities. And appropriate regulation needs to take that into account. Mrs. BIGGERT. Okay. I think that there have been other Federal regulators that have either signaled or taken action to allow State insurance regulators to continue to do their job, regulating insur- ance. There is concern, I think, with the Fed plan that, how are you going to relate to the companies that maybe have only 1 percent or 2 percent of their assets as part of a thrift or a savings and loan, when 98 to 99 percent of their assets are in insurance? Mr. BERNANKE. As I said, we will try to take into account the dif- ferences. Insurance companies have many of the same assets that banks do and, therefore, share the credit and market risks that banks have. And so, for those kinds of assets, it could be appro- priate to have similar capital requirements for insurance compa- nies and banks. But in those cases where there are distinctive differences, then I think we need to try and accommodate that the best we can, con- sistent with the Collins Amendment and other rules in Dodd- Frank. Mrs. BIGGERT. That brings up—you have the June 7th 800-page proposed capital rules that intend to regulate insurance companies as well as the banks. So do you think there will be a good distinc- tion between those two? And I am also concerned about the fact that it is a 90-day com- ment period. Do you think that will be extended for some of these companies to have to come in and really— Mr. BERNANKE. If the comment period is insufficient to get a full response from the public, we certainly can consider extending it. Mrs. BIGGERT. Okay. And there is a question then of, do you think that the Federal Reserve has the statutory flexibility to rec- ognize the insurance risk-based capital and leverage requirements? There is the Collins Amendment, and then there is Dodd-Frank, which I think goes through with that. But does the Collins Amend- ment then prevent a difference? Mr. BERNANKE. My understanding, and I will be happy to follow up with you on this, is that we have to meet certain requirements at the holding company level. So at the holding company level, there will be a lot of overlap between the regulation of a bank hold- ing company and a thrift holding company. But again, my under- standing is that we will not try to impose bank-style capital re- quirements on individual insurance subs, and that those can still be subject to the State capital requirements. Mrs. BIGGERT. Okay. I thank you. The gentlelady from New York is recognized for 5 minutes. Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, and thank you for your public serv- ice. I would like to note that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued its first enforcement action today, ordering a finan- cial institution to pay a fine for what the agency described as de- ceptive marketing tactics related to credit card products. I wanted VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 37 to publicly thank you for your leadership and this Congress’ leader- ship on credit card reform, and note that it is good to see that con- sumers have an agency speaking up and fighting for their protec- tions and financial products. The Libor problem, really, is readily solvable if we use a different index, one that is objective, public, readily verifiable, and manipu- lation-resistant by any single bank. So I would like to ask you what are your favorite alternatives to Libor? And have you relayed that to Mr. King at the Bank of England? And if so, what was his re- sponse? Mr. BERNANKE. As I discussed yesterday, I think there still are problems with the current Libor system because it doesn’t always reflect an actual market transaction. And the Federal Reserve Bank of New York made some recommendations for reform which have not been fully adopted. So one strategy would be to switch to a market-based indicator. The Federal Reserve has not come out in favor of a specific one. But a number of possibilities include repo rates, the so-called OIS index, and even potentially Treasury bill rates, for example. So there are a number of possible candidates. I have not ad- dressed this issue to Governor King. I have talked to Mark Carney, who is the governor of the Bank of Canada, who is the head of the Financial Stability Board, which is an international body which looks at issues pertaining to regulation and financial stability. And that body is going to be looking at the Libor controversy, implica- tions for financial stability, and possible ways to move forward. So that will be one international effort to look at alternatives. Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. Why is the American economy doing better than Europe’s? The Europeans seem to be more focused on debt, and working towards austerity, and austerity in their public policy instead of stimulating the economy. And what role do you think stimulating the economy with monetary stimulus and fiscal stim- ulus, what role do you think that played in the American recovery, which is better so far than the European one? Mr. BERNANKE. Yes. The U.S. recovery is somewhat dis- appointing, of course, but it has been stronger than some other areas. In Europe, they are facing a number of challenges, mostly related to the structural problems associated with the common cur- rency and with the structure of the eurozone. So a number of fac- tors contributed to the slowdown in the economy. One of them is the fact that a number of countries, which are under a lot of pres- sure from markets, are severely cutting their fiscal positions. And that is contributing to the slowing economic activity. But in addi- tion to that, their banking system is having problems, and credit has become very tight in some countries. Moreover, all of the issues related to the possible default of various countries, or the risks borne by financial institutions have led to a lot of volatility in fi- nancial markets, which has also been a negative factor. So they really are facing a lot of headwinds there, and it is quite a difficult situation. Mrs. MALONEY. I am especially worried about the efforts of some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to limit the Fed’s ability to use monetary stimulus. Long-term unemployment is real- ly high, and I am worried that we don’t have enough tools to com- VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 38 bat it. And don’t you believe that the long-term unemployment would be even higher if the Fed had raised the Federal funds rate and not purchased government securities? Mr. BERNANKE. I am quite confident of that. We haven’t had the recovery we would like, but certainly, monetary policy has contrib- uted to growth and reduction of unemployment in the last 3 years. Mrs. MALONEY. And I would like to hear your comments on posi- tive signs that you see in the latest U.S. economic data. Mrs. BIGGERT. The gentlelady’s time has expired. Mr. BERNANKE. I note housing is one area. Mrs. BIGGERT. The gentleman from California, Mr. Miller, is rec- ognized for 5 minutes. Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Welcome back, Chairman Bernanke. It is good to have you here. In your testimony, you cited low demand and high inventory for houses throughout the country. In California, it is kind of an inter- esting process. We are kind of going the other way. Inventories overall in California are down to about 3.5 months, down from 4.2 months in May, which is a really good trend. In fact, in the Inland Empire, which was hit very, very hard, San Bernardino County, it is actually down to about 40 days. It is nice to go into a real estate office and actually see lists of buyers instead of lists of homes for sale. What do you think we can do to keep this trend going? Because I don’t believe the economy is going to come back until the housing market recovers. Mr. BERNANKE. As you say, there is improvement in the market as a whole, and particularly in some areas. I am not sure that this low inventory situation will persist, because there is a pretty big backlog of houses that are in the foreclosure process that may come onto the market. And that will be an issue. We provided a working paper earlier this year that discussed some of the issues in housing. For example, in order to keep down that inventory, one strategy is to undertake programs that convert REO, real estate owned by banks and other owners, to rental prop- erties. And the GSEs are running a program like that, which has some promise. It is important to do what we can to avoid fore- closure, obviously, where it is possible. Or if that is not possible, to give people a way, through deed-in-lieu or short sales or other mechanisms, to get out of their home and to sell it and to avoid a lengthy process. Access to credit remains a very significant problem. It is hard to point to specific things that can be done. But one thing I think is promising is that the GSEs, as I understand it, are considering changes in their practices that will reduce the concerns that banks have about so-called put-back risk, so that when banks make a mortgage loan and sell the mortgage to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, there is a substantial risk that if the mortgage goes bad, if there is any kind of problem with documentation or anything else, that they will get that mortgage back and be liable to the— Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I like that. Mr. BERNANKE. There are a number of areas where we could hope to see improvement in the housing market, but unfortunately, there is no single solution. And to some extent, just economic recov- ery more generally is going to drive the housing market. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 39 Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. There is a concern about what we are doing. FHFA has developed a pilot program with Freddie and Fannie to sell their REOs on a bulk sale. You saw that program, they are doing a pilot program on it. Mr. BERNANKE. That is right. Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. And the problem I have with that is they are doing it in the Inland Empire, which has a 40-day sup- ply of homes. When they sent the letter out, there was a group of us in our area, 19 of us who represent that region, who wrote a letter objecting to it. And they said, well, these houses have been on the market. When we saw the data, 70 percent of the homes have never even been listed. And my concern is, why would we do that? If we bulk sell them, we are going to sell them for less than market value. If we sold them in the traditional foreclosure proc- ess, you would get more money listing with a REALTOR® and sell- ing them out. But we are actually going to cost the taxpayers money starting a pilot program in a part of the country that has a very low amount of homes listed. Why would we do that? It doesn’t make any sense when we should—I agree there are probably some parts of the country where maybe there is a high inventory level and you need to bulk sale them out. But why would they pick the one area of the country that is starting to recover? Maybe it is because the house prices are so depressed. But you are bulk selling them out, costing taxpayers money. Why would we do that? Mr. BERNANKE. I am not sure it is costing taxpayers money. I hope not. I think one of the reasons they would be doing that is in order to make REO to rental programs work, you want to have a large number of houses close together, foreclosed homes close to- gether so that they can be managed by rental— Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. But if you sell them off in bulk, you are going to sell them for less than market value, the way they are selling them off. Mr. BERNANKE. But more quickly and with less cost. Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. But if you have a 40-day supply of inventory, my argument is that there are probably places where 7 months is considered normal. We have a 40-day supply of inven- tory. And Freddie and Fannie are bulk selling those through FHFA at a reduced price, when those houses could be listed and sold. Mr. BERNANKE. That is a good point. I hadn’t heard that before. And I would urge you to talk to Ed DeMarco about that. Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I did. And the response from Mr. DeMarco was that, ‘‘We are afraid we would lose credibility by not selling them now that we have bid them out.’’ And my response was, ‘‘I am concerned with losing credibility by costing the tax- payers money selling homes in a region that has no inventory and an abundance of buyers.’’ I just think that is something somebody should talk about when you are in meetings. Mr. BERNANKE. Okay. Thank you. Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, sir. Mrs. BIGGERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, and wel- come, Chairman Bernanke. It is good to have you here. I want to VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 40 talk about what I think is the core of our issue now dealing with especially unemployment, and that is a very serious paralysis of partisanship that has basically hijacked this Congress. And I say that because I think that you all have done pretty much what you can do. You have reached in the Fed your point of what you call zero lower bound, where you can’t go any further with your interest rates. And everything that we have done here, we talked about, for ex- ample, the policies that we made, nowhere is the economy more im- pacted than health care. The whole issue was the rising costs of that. We passed a health care bill. And that bill has a direct impact on unemployment and employing people. For example, in there we have the Medicaid expansion, which will bring in another 18 mil- lion individuals. And most importantly, it will have an extraor- dinary impact on job creation, maintaining jobs, and other jobs. Most critical, you find on basically a partisan basis, already those States that have the most to lose, that have the highest rates of uninsured and have the highest rates of unemployed are saying they are going to turn away billions of dollars in Medicaid that will go directly to their largest employers, which are the hospitals. One- third of all the hospitals in this country are facing closure, which means rising unemployment. And so there has to be—what mes- sage can you give the Nation and the Congress here on how we can get our act together and how devastating this partisanship—just we will deny the unemployed, we will deny this in these States strictly because of partisanship. How serious is this to this coun- try? Mr. BERNANKE. Unemployment is an enormous problem. It rep- resents not only wasted resources; it represents hardship. And given the large number of people who have been unemployed for 6 months or more, there are a lot of people who will never really come back to the labor force, or if they do, they will have lost their skills and will not be as employable as they were before. So the costs are very, very high. The Federal Reserve is, as you say, doing our best to try to help the economy recover and put people back to work. But monetary policy isn’t a panacea; it doesn’t have all the tools that could be used. And so, I would urge Congress to work together as much as possible to address this. It is a very serious problem. And it is not just a temporary cyclical problem, the long- run unemployed could affect our labor force for many, many years because of their loss of skills. Mr. SCOTT. Let me get to the other point because I know my time is shrinking, thank you very much. But let’s talk about what we can do in the future. We have sequestration coming up, for exam- ple. How can we formulate our policy dealing with sequestration to shorten and lessen the impact on unemployment? Let’s look at de- fense, for example. We have 50 percent arbitrary we are going to cut. Can we not have some indication of how devastating this is going to be in employment, particularly with many of our defense industries which have huge, huge plants, with huge numbers of employees? And what impact will sequestration have not just in cutting our defense capabilities, but in employment? Can we not have a direc- tion or leadership where we would be very careful as we move for- VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 41 ward with sequestration to make sure we have less of an impact of how that will put people out of work? Mr. BERNANKE. I cited the CBO number of 11⁄ 4 million jobs from the fiscal cliff would be lost, or fewer created than otherwise. So there is a big employment implication. On the other hand, it is very important not just to forget about the long run, we have to make sure we are addressing our long run issues of fiscal sustain- ability. And so, what I have been recommending is a combination of more moderate fiscal retrenchment in the shorter term to respect the fragility of the recovery, but combined with serious and credible actions, to address fiscal unsustainability in the longer term. Mr. SCOTT. And very quickly, the other shoe that we have that will drop is the ending of the Bush tax cuts. What is your advice on which way we should go in that direction as far as having a lessening impact on unemployment? Mr. BERNANKE. I can’t advise on specific tax cuts and spending. But in looking at the package overall— Mrs. BIGGERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. BERNANKE. —I am concerned about the contraction of the en- tire program. Mrs. BIGGERT. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Garrett, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. GARRETT. I thank the chairwoman. So ever since 2009, we have been hearing that the Fed is sort of out of bullets. But we could also argue that you and your colleagues have been pulling the trigger quite a bit since that time, whether it is with 3 rounds of quantitative easing, with 6 years of interest rates being almost 0 percent, balance sheet still stands almost triple its normal size. It is obviously safe to say that we have been, we are, and we con- tinue to be in uncharted territory. Now, through all this, you nor- mally come and you defend yourself on these policy decisions by ar- guing the counterfactual, that is to say, that things could have been a lot worse had we not taken these actions. But before we go down that line of argument, or discussion, you have to think about where things really are. With the recent decline in interest rates where we are in the market today, is that the result of what the Fed is doing or is that the result of the marketplace? The real return out there on a 10- year Treasury is roughly negative 5 percent, right? Is that a func- tion of the Fed’s action keeping the rates down or is that a function of the market in general? And if it is an action in response to the Fed, then the question would be, what is the appropriate rate that we should have in the market? And if the appropriate rate is where the Fed is trying to keep it and where you have said you are going to keep it for the next foreseeable future, the next couple of years, down near zero, isn’t that actually discouraging investment by indi- viduals and businesses at the same time? If I know as a businessman or individual that the interest rates are going to be this low for this year and next year and beyond, maybe I put off those investment decisions to a later date. So some of these decisions may actually have a negative side to them. In other words, maybe there is a counterfactual to your counterfac- tual. Maybe there is a risk inherent in the policies that you have taken. And I will close on this: The Fed involves itself all across VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 42 the economy. You fix the Fed’s fund rate; you manipulate the yield curve via Operation Twist; you essentially monetize our national debt; you manipulate the mortgage market along with every other part of the credit market via quantitative easing; you attempt to manipulate the stock market and the prices there through the port- folio balance channel; you involve yourself in every aspect of the economy. There is not a price in the marketplace that is not subsidized in one sense or another by the Fed. Yesterday at the hearing—I lis- tened to the tape of the hearing—you said you had more bullets that you could pull. You said that there is a range of possibilities, buying Treasuries, MBS, using a discount window, employing addi- tional communication tools, commit to holding rates below even through 2015 or beyond, cutting the rate the Fed pays on excess reserves. So these are all additional bullets that continue to push us into uncharted territory. What I would ask is, is the Fed being as transparent in all these things in going forward on the downside of all these, on the down- side of accommodation? Particularly, what I would say is the failed accommodation. How does QE3 create a single job? Yes, it props up the commodity markets; yes, that is great for those in the com- modity market area. But if I am on the other side of that trade, if I am the individual like an airline that is buying these commod- ities, I may be laying off people. Is there enough transparency in that area to say what the downsides are in the failed portions of your policies? Mr. BERNANKE. Some years ago, we provided research that showed, based on models and analysis, how easing financial condi- tions, lowering interest rates—and by the way, it is minus half a percent I think, not minus 5 percent— Mr. GARRETT. Yes, minus .5 percent. Mr. BERNANKE. —increases spending and investment, increases the incentive for spend and invest, and that provides extra demand and helps the economy recover. It is certainly not a panacea, it is certainly not without costs and risks which I have talked about, and I agree with that. But I think on the whole, there is evidence that it has provided some support for the recovery. It is not the only solution, but it has had a positive effect. Mr. GARRETT. My time is limited. I would ask if you could come back to us and just indicate, have you made any mistakes in any of these areas, where you would have liked to seek other actions that you should have taken? And I will ask maybe if you could give us that in writing. But I will just close in the last 30 seconds on the situation with regard to Libor. I saw your testimony in the Sen- ate hearing yesterday. In essence, you said you knew about it in 2008. You said the entire world and the media knew about it in 2008. You sort of point the finger over at London, and said you made some suggestions over to them what they should be doing on this. Isn’t there some action both the New York Fed and you could have taken? Aren’t there some recommendations that you could have made for Dodd-Frank over the last 4 years when that was coming forward? Isn’t there something that you could have done as far as regulations, perhaps with regard to how banks report their information to Libor, perhaps with regard to the requirements in VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 43 our banks here, perhaps setting up firewalls with regard to the of- fices within there that they—couldn’t you have done something? Mrs. BIGGERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. GARRETT. Can I have an answer to what he could have done? Mr. FRANK. The rule has been that you ask a question. We have people— Mrs. BIGGERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. WATT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And let me do three things quickly. First of all, I want to apologize for not being here for your testimony, Chairman Bernanke. Unfortunately, I had a hearing on intellectual property in the subcommittee on which I am the ranking member, in the Judiciary Committee. So, I couldn’t be here. Second, I want to follow up on Congresswoman Waters’ encour- agement to be more aggressive in the outreach on these real estate settlements. There is money there. It seems to me that there is a built-in disincentive for the lenders to go and find the people be- cause they get to keep the money if they don’t find the people. So somebody needs to be more aggressively reaching out, even to the point of sending people door to door to find these folks who would be eligible to get the relief. So I want to encourage that. And we will do more encouragement offline on that. Third, I want to pick up on Mr. Garrett’s point and take the counter position. I want to express my thanks to you for shooting all of these bullets. Because if I hear what Mr. Garrett is saying, he would prefer that the Fed be as dysfunctional as Congress has been, and that nothing be done, and that the economy just be al- lowed to collapse, which I think would have been the result had not the Fed taken some significant actions. And I think you point that out on the bottom of page 5 and the top of page 6 of your abbre- viated testimony when you say the important risk to our recovery is the domestic fiscal situation. As is well known, U.S. fiscal policies are on an unsustainable path. Development of a credible medium-term plan for controlling deficits should be a high priority. And you paint, unfortunately, kind of a doomsday scenario if Congress does not act because—and you lay out the significant dilemma that we are in, because we need to be spending short term to stimulate the economy, keeping tax rates low short term to stimulate the economy, yet we need to be more fiscally responsible. You can’t both spend and keep taxes low without increasing defi- cits. That is unsustainable. And I guess I am expressing my belief that Congress doesn’t seem to be up to that task. Lay out that sce- nario. I don’t want to get you in the politics of this, but talk to us a little bit more about the delicate balance short term about what we ought to be doing versus long term about what we ought to be doing. And maybe at least edify the public about how difficult these choices are going to be, both short and long term. Mr. BERNANKE. Certainly. They are very difficult choices. If Con- gress only allows the fiscal cliff to happen and doesn’t do anything else, it is actually kind of counterproductive because higher taxes mean that people won’t have income to spend. Less spending by the government means layoffs in the defense industries, for example. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 44 So it will slow the economy and actually mean that tax revenues will be less than expected. And the benefits in terms of deficit re- duction will be smaller than really was anticipated. And we will see a slower economy and less job creation. At the same time, if you simply push everything off without any additional comment, then there is the risk that people will become concerned that Congress has no intention ever of addressing the deficit. And you could see, for example, concerns in the bond mar- ket about that. So it is a difficult balancing act, but it is a recommendation that has been made not just by the Fed and the CBO, but the IMF and pretty much every sort of nonpartisan fiscal authority, which is to mitigate, moderate the extent of the fiscal cliff in the short term, avoid destabilizing the weak recovery, but at the same time, work together to establish a framework and a plan, and a credible plan that will, over time, over the 10-year window, and even beyond that, will bring our fiscal situation into balance. Mrs. BIGGERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Neugebauer, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And Chair- man Bernanke, I want to thank you. Your office was very respon- sive the other day when we sent you a letter in reference to the Libor issue. I think we will be sending you an additional letter today or tomorrow. One of the things that is kind of interesting to me, 16 banks, I think, report in the Libor dollar index, it would be difficult for just one bank to influence that index, wouldn’t it? Mr. BERNANKE. Generally, yes. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So it had to be more than one bank under- reporting or not accurately reporting their borrowing. Would you say that is correct? Mr. BERNANKE. The reason the banks, some of them apparently underreported during the crisis, was not to affect the overall Libor rate necessarily, but rather, because these numbers are reported publicly, they wanted to avoid giving the impression that they were weak and others were strong. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. But if one bank is reporting differently than the other ones, obviously it wouldn’t influence the overall index? Mr. BERNANKE. If they were in the top four or the bottom four, they would be cut out. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. That is right. So when the Fed first learned about this, you had some correspondence with the Bank of Eng- land, but three domestic banks were involved. Did anybody say, I wonder if anybody else is doing this? Or was all of your focus just on Barclays? Mr. BERNANKE. Our focus wasn’t on a specific bank. Barclays is, after all, a British bank, and not supervised by the Federal Re- serve. Our focus was on the general phenomenon. And the New York Fed did two basic things: to inform the relevant regulators here and in the U.K. about this problem so that they could look at it; and to try to address the structural problems in Libor, which were, as you were indicating, incentivizing banks to lowball their rate information. So it was approached as an overall problem. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Are you familiar with the term ‘‘price fixing?’’ Mr. BERNANKE. Of course. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 45 Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So price fixing, if a bunch of us are in the car- pet business and we all get together and we decide that we are going to sell carpet at this price, then that is price fixing, right? Mr. BERNANKE. Yes. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. So if money is a commodity and pricing of money is a function of that, wasn’t this almost price fixing on Libor? Mr. BERNANKE. It may be. But as you pointed out, there are two issues. One is did the individual reporting, misreporting affect the overall Libor? And it may or may not have. And I think that needs to be investigated. The other is that, in some cases, there were no transactions taking place. So during the crisis, there were mostly just overnight transactions, and yet the banks were asked to report what they would have to pay for money a year out. And so a ques- tion is whether or not they were, in fact, misreporting or whether they were simply shading their estimate in some way. So I think there is a question—I think the details need to come out. And we don’t have enough details yet to know whether this was deliberate price fixing or whether there was another interpretation. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. I think the thing that is kind of alarming to some of us is the fact that given how widely used that index is throughout our economy, from just about every area of the finan- cial community, that I felt like the New York Fed’s response was a fairly lukewarm response to if, in fact, somebody was manipu- lating this rate, that could have huge implications. Now, it depends obviously whether you would have benefited from that or if you were penalized from that, whether you were on the buy side or the sell side. But can you explain why you thought—why the Fed thought that wasn’t a big deal? Mr. BERNANKE. I am sure that the Fed thought it was a big deal. The information was widely known. It was reported in the press. And the British Bankers’ Association is not subject in any way to U.S. policy. So it was hard to directly affect the calculation of Libor. But surely, it is a very big deal. It affects lots of different financial contracts. And as I mentioned in my comments yesterday, I think that one of the bad effects of all this is that it is going to further erode confidence in financial markets and in financial in- struments. Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Chairman Bernanke. Mr. BERNANKE. Thank you. Mrs. BIGGERT. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And thank you, Chairman Bernanke, for being here today. I would like to yield most of my time to you, because I have something that I would like for you to respond to. I find that we have some very credible people who make some incredible statements. And one of the statements that causes a good deal of consternation is that we are now doing worse than we were in 2009, that the economy is in worse shape today than it was in 2009. Now, I can give my opinion on it, but I don’t think that it will have the impact that a person of your stature, your standing would have. And I am begging that you, if you would, juxtapose the auto industry with the auto industry today with 2009, financial services, VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 46 lending in general. Just please, if you would, so that we can bring some clarity to what I believe is an incredible statement. Kindly do so. Mr. BERNANKE. Nobody is satisfied with where we are today, of course. But there certainly has been significant improvement since mid-2009, when the recovery began. We have had economic growth now for about 3 years. The unemployment rate has fallen from about 10 percent to about 8 percent. Obviously, not as far as we would like, but still in the right direction. Banks are much stronger and have much more capital than they did a couple of years ago. Manufacturing is much stronger, has improved considerably, par- ticularly in autos, as you mentioned. We have seen important steps in the energy area in terms of U.S. production and conservation. The housing market, which was completely dead in 2009, is still not where we would like it to be, but is moving in the right direc- tion. So clearly, there has been improvement. I recognize that many Americans will still feel that the situation is not satisfactory, but it is going in the right direction. Mr. GREEN. Would you say that it is not worse than it was in 2009, Chairman Bernanke? Mr. BERNANKE. Clearly not. Mr. GREEN. It is not currently? Mr. BERNANKE. Not by all the criteria I just mentioned. Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. And I just want to restate a couple of things. We were about to lose the auto industry. We now have the auto industry, and it is coming back. We were about to lose a good portion of the financial services industry. Larger banks were about to go under. They are now stabilizing. AIG was about to go under. We lost Lehman. And it now is better than it was, obviously not what it was prior to the decline. And it just amazes me that cred- ible people will make such incredible statements. And that adds fuel to this flame of confusion that is engulfing us. People want to have someone with credibility to speak truth about the conditions. And it is just amazing that this line of logic seems to have some degree of credibility in certain circles. Now, if you would respond, just for the record, is the auto industry in bet- ter shape now than it was in 2009? Mr. BERNANKE. It is producing more cars and is more profitable, yes. Mr. GREEN. Is the banking industry in better shape now than it was in 2009? Mr. BERNANKE. Yes, it is more profitable, has more capital, and is making more loans. Mr. GREEN. Is the economy in the main in better shape now than it was in 2009? Mr. BERNANKE. Again, it is not where we would like it to be, but many parts of the economy have improved, yes. Mr. GREEN. All right. Now, my next line of questions will have to do with something that we refer to as structural versus cyclical. You can’t solve structural problems if you use cyclical solutions, generally speaking. And it is difficult to ascertain what amount of what we are dealing with is structural as opposed to cyclical. Do you have some sense of how much of what we are trying to, for VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 47 want of a better term fix, what we are trying to fix is structural as opposed to cyclical? Mr. BERNANKE. That is widely debated, and it is hard to know for certain. But I guess my view, and the view of many economists, is that a good bit of our unemployment problem, for example, re- mains cyclical, which means it can be addressed in principle by monetary and fiscal policies. But structural problems are probably increasing, and in particular, the very long-term unemployed, the problem is, the risk is they will over time become unemployable, and that they will contribute therefore to a structural issue. Mr. GREEN. Thank you. I yield back. Chairman BACHUS. Mr. McHenry for 5 minutes. Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Bernanke, thank you so much for being here today, and thank you for your service to our government and our people. I certainly appreciate that. Now, with quantitative easing, do you think there is a limit to how much quantitative easing that can be used? And do you think we are approaching that limit right now? Mr. BERNANKE. There is certainly a theoretical limit, which is the fact that the Federal Reserve can only buy Treasuries and agencies, and moreover, quantitative easing typically involves buy- ing longer-term Treasuries and agencies, as opposed to bills, for ex- ample. So there are finite amounts of that available. And moreover, beyond a certain point, if the Federal Reserve owned too much, it would greatly hurt market functioning, which would have the effect of reducing the efficacy of the policy. So I wouldn’t say that we are at that point yet, but ultimately, there would be some limit to how much you could do, yes. Mr. MCHENRY. So there is some limit? Mr. BERNANKE. Yes. Mr. MCHENRY. But we are nowhere close to approaching it is what you are saying? Mr. BERNANKE. I don’t have a number for you. But we still have some capacity at this point, yes. Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. Now, there is a separate question. You said that you have a target inflation number, sort of ideal. And what is that? Mr. BERNANKE. Two percent. Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. Now, would the Fed be comfortable with an inflation rate a little higher than that? Maybe 3 percent? Mr. BERNANKE. I don’t know what you mean by ‘‘comfortable.’’ If for whatever reason, for example, in the last few years, we have seen oil price shocks which have driven inflation up to 3 percent or higher, that is not a good situation. And it is our objective in that case to try to move inflation gradually down back to 2 percent. So if you are asking would we target 3 percent, would we seek to get 3 percent, the answer is no. Mr. MCHENRY. Are you more comfortable with 3 percent or 1 percent? A little higher or a little lower? What are you more com- fortable— Mr. BERNANKE. I think both of those are concerns. Both are con- cerns because 3 percent, of course, means that we are moving to- wards a more inflationary situation, but 1 percent is closer to the deflation range, which is also not healthy for the economy. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 48 Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. The reason why I am trying to get at this is because there has been a lot of discussion that with a little high- er inflation rate, a belief—now, I don’t subscribe to this—but a lit- tle higher inflation rate that it, de facto, reduces debt burdens and perhaps could spur spending and the perception, more of the per- ception of less debt and actually the impact of it. And that might spur the economy. It is more consumer spending. Do you think that is desirable or not desirable? Mr. BERNANKE. I recognize that some people would advocate that we set an inflation target, say at 4 percent, and maintain that for a number of years. I don’t think, first, that we could do that with- out losing control of the inflation process. Second, I am very skep- tical that it would increase confidence among businesses and households and increase economic activity. I think it would create a lot of problems in financial markets as well. So I don’t think that is a strategy that has a lot of support on the Federal Open Market Committee. Mr. MCHENRY. So a lower inflation rate, the target inflation rate of around 2 percent, the Fed would have more control than perhaps a higher inflation rate? Mr. BERNANKE. Because we have maintained inflation near 2 percent for a long time, and there is a lot of confidence in the fi- nancial markets that the Fed will keep inflation close to 2 percent. Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. So it is confidence, but also Fed capacity? Mr. BERNANKE. The issue is that we currently have very well-an- chored inflation expectations. People are strongly accustomed to 2 percent inflation. If we were to say 4 percent, first would be the issue of getting there. Could we get there? And could we get there with some accuracy? But beyond that, people would say, if they said 4 percent, why not 6 percent, why not 8 percent? So in the short run at least, it is not at all clear that people would be con- fident that this new target of 4 percent would, in fact, be stable and sustainable. Instead, they would wonder where inflation is going to be in the medium term. Mr. MCHENRY. So right now, in order to—with the Fed contem- plating more easing, and then you also have the question of liquid- ity in the marketplace, making sure that Fed policy enables more liquidity in the marketplace, we also see Europe running counter to that, right? The woes of Europe are making the markets less liq- uid. Does the Volcker Rule—do you have a concern about the tim- ing of the Volcker Rule that would rein in liquidity? Mr. BERNANKE. We are paying close attention to issues related to market liquidity and market making, which are exempt activi- ties under the Volcker Rule. In any case, the Volcker Rule doesn’t come into effect for a couple more years. So I would say that is not a first order issue right now. Mr. MCHENRY. Thank you. Chairman BACHUS. I am now going to recognize Mr. Perlmutter. And let me say this, we have a hard stop at 12:45. So if you want all the time, you can have it. Mr. Pearce would like a minute, if you can work that out. Mr. PERLMUTTER. I will be quick. Chairman Bernanke, thank you for being here, thank you for maintaining a steady hand through all of this, whether it was kind of the collapse on Wall VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 49 Street or some of the clashes that we have here in Congress ideo- logically that don’t give the economy some of the fiscal tools that I think would also help continue to improve our economic situation. And so I want to ask a couple of specific questions and then see where we are. Can we talk a little bit about Basel III for a second, because it came up in a conversation yesterday with a medium- sized bank that we have back in Colorado. In Dodd-Frank, we es- tablished some lower limits as to a lot of the regulations that go in place. And I think either it was a $10 or $15 billion-sized insti- tution, and if you were above it, you had many more things that you had to do, whether it is dealing with derivatives or the like. And as I understand it now, these Basel III regulations, that could potentially become worldwide-type regulations, are going down to a half a billion dollars, $500 million. And it would take into consid- eration lots of smaller banks. And they are fearful that this will really dry up their capital and make it very difficult for them to continue to operate. Can you comment on that? Mr. BERNANKE. Yes. Certain parts of Basel III are being pro- posed to go down to smaller banks, some of the risk weights, for example, some of the basic capital definitions. And the idea here is to try to make sure that small banks as well as large banks are well-capitalized. But I think it is important to note two things. First, many of the aspects of Basel III do not apply to small banks. They simply are—first of all, things like derivatives books and things of that sort just aren’t relevant to small banks. And there are other rules such as the international leverage ratio which ap- plies only to the largest internationally active banks. Mr. PERLMUTTER. But I want to impress on you, if I could, I would like you to take this away, say you are a smaller Colorado bank, you are generally going to have loans on shoppettes and real estate and some home loans and some small business loans. And in my opinion, it wasn’t the smaller banks that led us into the deep recession that we suffered in 2008 and 2009. And I would just ask you, as Chairman of our central bank, to make sure that we don’t penalize—we were pretty tough in some of the Dodd-Frank regula- tions that we passed to make sure that the banking system had some restraints, didn’t just run amok, that there was capital, and there were certain things that had to be watched closely. But I would ask you, sir, to just keep an eye on that, if you would. My last question, and then I will turn it over to Mr. Pearce, is can you describe for us what has happened with the liquidation of the as- sets that were in Maiden Lane one, two, and three? Mr. BERNANKE. They basically have been sold off, and the Fed- eral Reserve and the government and the taxpayer received all their money back with interest and additional profits beyond that. So it has all been sold back into the marketplace. Mr. PERLMUTTER. So we pretty much liquidated it all or do we hold any of it? Mr. BERNANKE. We have a little bit left, but we have paid off the loans. So we are, from now on, whatever we sell is pure profit. Mr. PERLMUTTER. All right. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. And Mr. Pearce for 1 minute. VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 50 Mr. PEARCE. I thank the gentleman for his consideration. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your service. I am looking at page 4, where you talk about the great risks to us financially. And I as- sume that is because of their size and because of the underfunding of them. But when I look at that size, I consider the pension sys- tems. And just yesterday, the California pension system said that they only got a 1 percent rate of return. Their projection, in order to be solvent, is up in the 73⁄ 4 . Maybe just in that one system, the $500 billion shortfall now just on the teachers. And then that is the smaller of the two. Nationwide, maybe a $3 trillion shortfall. I didn’t see that, but I do see Spain talked about, and yet Spain is only $1 trillion exposure. Could you kind of tell us what the risk is associated with the unfunded pensions? Mr. BERNANKE. Low interest rates do put some stress on pension funds and life insurance companies for the reasons that you de- scribed. I think our goal, basically, is to get the economy strong enough that returns will rise and that things will normalize over time. Obviously, pension funds can’t be underfunded forever. But if the economy strengthens and returns go back to a more normal level, then these underfunding problems will not disappear, of course, but they will be mitigated. Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Chairman BACHUS. Thank you. Chairman Bernanke, the com- mittee appreciates your testimony today. And you are dismissed. I am going to ask the audience to remain in your seats until Chairman Bernanke and his staff exit. Mr. Schweikert is recognized for a unanimous consent request. Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous consent to place a letter into the record. It is just some concerns and wanting some additional visibility on the PCCRAs, the premium capture re- serve accounts, and where we are going on that policywise. Chairman BACHUS. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Chair notes that some Members may have additional ques- tions for Chairman Bernanke, which they may wish to submit in writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 30 days for Members to submit written questions to Chairman Bernanke and to place his responses in the record. This hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:49 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI A P P E N D I X July 18, 2012 (51) VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 52 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 100.61167 United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services Hearing on Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy July 18,2012 Congressman Ron Paul Statement for the Record Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this hearing today on monetary policy and the state of the economy. For the past few years the Federal Reserve has received criticism from all sides of the political spectrum, and rightly so, for its unprecedented intervention into the economy and its bailouts oflarge Wall Street banks and foreign central banks. Yet this criticism risks losing sight of the most insidious result of the Fed's actions, which is to enable the growth of government. For nearly the first 40 years of its existence, the Fed operated as an adjunct of the Treasury Department, tasked with purchasing government debt in order to keep the government's borrowing costs low. Even after gaining its vaunted "independence" from Treasury in 1951, the Fed never shrank from enabling the growth of government. The extraordinary monetary policy of the last four years has reaffirmed that the Fed, its protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, is only too willing to enable growing government spending and massive fiscal deficits. For centuries, banks have received special privileges from government in exchange for funding the government's wars. The creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 formalized and centralized this arrangement in the United States. From the very beginning, the Fed was intended to provide a more liquid market for federal government debt, enabling the growth of big government. What we've seen over the last century is nothing less than the remaking of American government, thanks in large part to the Fed. Its loose monetary policy gave rise to: (i) the welfare state, encouraging dependency on government largesse and destroying the work ethic and family life of lower-income Americans; (ii) the warfare state, allowing the U.S. government to involve itself in wars of aggression around the world; and (iii) the regulatory state, the mammoth bureaucracy that relentlessly grinds away at the rights of the American people. Little more than a decade ago, Fed economists were wringing their hands over the prospect that the federal government might pay off the national debt. Nothing could be worse for the Fed, because the Fed's monetary policy operations require the existence of government debt. Treasury debt is purchased from or sold to banks on the open market in order to influence interest rates. Without government debt, the Fed would have no idea how to conduct monetary policy. From a free market perspective this would be wonderful, as it is Fed monetary policy which largely creates the booms and busts of the business cycle. Unfortunately, the federal government has run up the national debt to unprecedented levels over the past decade, and the Federal Reserve has been right there, monetizing that debt to ensure that none of it goes unsold. While the desire of foreign countries and private investors to purchase Treasuries was drying up, the Federal Reserve was only too willing to step in and enable the government to continue its deficit spending. The Fed's balance sheet exploded as it purchased over one trillion dollars in Treasury debt over the past few years. And before it did that, the Fed also purchased over a trillion dollars of overrated mortgage-b\lcked securities from Wall Street banks, giving those banks the cash they needed to purchase Treasury debt of their own. Were it not for the Federal Reserve's actions, the federal government would not have been able to run trillion-dollar deficits for the past several years. In fact, had the Federal Reserve never been created, the federal government never would have been able to run up a $16 trillion debt. No market actor would lend money to such a major debtor at such low interest rates. The only reason that banks are willing to buy Treasury debt at such low interest 53 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 200.61167 rates is because they can easily resell that debt to the Fed. Without the Fed, interest rates would rise to such levels that the federal government would have no choice but to curtail its expenditures and focus only on doing what is truly necessary. With market discipline allowed to prevail, the size of the federal government would be drastically smaller. If Congress were really serious about limiting the size of government, it would eliminate the most important enabler of government profligacy by ending the Fed. 54 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 300.61167 For release on delivery 10:00 a.m. EDT July 18,2012 Statement by Ben S. Bernanke Chairman Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System before the Committee on Financial SerVices U.S. House of Representatives July 18,2012 55 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 400.61167 Chrunnan Bachus, Ranking Member Frank, and other members of the Committee, I am pleased to present the Federal Reserve's semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. will begin with a discussion of current economic conditions and the outlook before turning to monetary policy. The Economic Outlook The U.S. economy has continued to recover, but economic activity appears to have decelerated somewhat during the fIrst half of this year. After rising at an annual rate of 2-112 percent in the second halfof2011, real gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a 2 percent pace in the fIrst quarter of2012, and available indicators point to a still-smaller gain in the second quarter. Conditions in the labor market improved during the latter part of 20 11 and early this year, with the unemployment rate falling about a percentage point over that period. However, after running at nearly 200,000 per month during the fourth and first quarters, the average increase in payroll employment shrank to 75,000 per month during the second quarter.· Issues related to seasonal adjustment and the unusually warm weather this past winter can account for a part, but only a part, of this loss of momentum in job creation. At the same time, the jobless rate has recently leveled out at just over 8 percent. Household spending has continued to advance, but recent data indicate a somewhat slower rate of growth in the second quarter. Although declines in energy prices are now providing some support to consumers' purchasing power, households remain concerned about their employment and income prospects and their overall level of confidence remains relatively low. 56 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 500.61167 -2- We have seen modest signs of improvement in housing. In part because of historically low mortgage rates, both new and existing home sales have been gradually trending upward since last summer, and some measures of house prices have turned up in recent months. Construction has increased, especially in the multifamily sector. Still, a number of factors continue to impede progress in the housing market. On the demand side, many would-be buyers are deterred by worries about their own [mances or about the economy more generally. Other prospective homebuyers cannot obtain mortgages due to tight lending standards, impaired creditworthiness, or because their current mortgages are underwater--that is, they owe more than their homes are worth. On the supply side, the large number of vacant homes, boosted by the ongoing inflow of foreclosed properties, continues to divert demand from new construction. After posting strong gains over the second half of 2011 and into the first quarter of2012, manufacturing production has slowed in recent months. Similarly, the rise in real business spending on equipment and software appears to have decelerated from the double-digit pace seen over the second half of2011 to a more moderate rate of growth over the first part of this year. Forward-looking indicators ofinvestrnent demand--such as surveys of business conditions and capital spending plans--suggest further weakness ahead. In part, slowing growth in production and capital investment appears to reflect economic stresses in Europe, which, together with some cooling in the economies of other trading partners, is restraining the demand for U.S. exports. At the time of the June meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), my colleagues and I projected that, under the assumption of appropriate monetary policy, economic growth will likely continue at a moderate pace over coming quarters and then pick up very gradually. Specifically, our projections for growth in real GDP prepared for the meeting had a 57 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 600.61167 -3 - central tendency of 1.9 to 2.4 percent for this year and 2.2 to 2.8 percent for 2013.l These forecasts are lower than those we made in January, reflecting the generally disappointing tone of the recent incoming data.2 In addition, financial strains associated with the crisis in Europe have increased since earlier in the year, which--as I already noted--are weighing on both global and domestic economic activity. The recovery in the United States continues to be held back by a number of other headwinds, including still-tight borrowing conditions for some businesses and households, and--as I will discuss in more detail shortly--the restraining effects of fiscal policy and fiscal uncertainty. Moreover, although the housing market bas shown improvement, the contribution of this sector to the recovery is less than has been typical of previous recoveries. These headwinds should fade over time, allowing the economy to grow somewhat more rapidly and the unemployment rate to decline toward a more normal level. However, given that growth is projected to be not much above the rate needed to absorb new entrants to the labor force, the reduction in the unemployment rate seems likely to be frustratingly slow. Indeed, the central tendency of participants' forecasts now bas the unemployment rate at 7 percent or higher at the end·of2014. The Committee made comparatively small changes in June to its projections for inflation. Over the first three months of 20 12, the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) rose about 3-1/2 percent at an annual rate, boosted by a large increase in retail energy prices that in turn reflected the higher cost of crude oil. However, the sharp drop in crude oil I See table 1, "Economic Projections of Federal Reserve Board Members and Federal Reserve Bank Presidents, June 2012," of the Summary of Economic Projections, available at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012), "Federal Reserve Board and Federal Open Market Committee Release Economic Projections from the June 19-20 FOMC Meeting," press release, June 20, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetaryI20120620b.htm; table 1 is also available in Part 4 of the July Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. 2 Ben S. Bernanke (2012), "Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress," statement before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, February 29, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/teslimonyibernanke20120229a.htm. 58 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 700.61167 -4- prices in the past few months has brought inflation down. In all, the PCE price index rose at an annual rate of 1-112 percent over the first five months of this year, compared with a 2-1/2 percent rise over 2011 as a whole. The central tendency of the Committee's projections is that inflation will be 1.2 to 1.7 percent this year, and at or below the 2 percent level that the Committee judges to be consistent with its statutory mandate in 2013 and 2014. Risks to the Outlook Participants at the June FOMe meeting indicated that they see a higher degree of uncertainty about their forecasts than normal and that the risks to economic growth have increased. I would like to highlight two main sources of risk: The first is the euro-area fiscal and banking crisis; the second is the U.S. fiscal situation. Earlier this year, financial strains in the euro area moderated in response to a number of constructive steps by the European authorities, including the provision of three-year bank financing by the European Central Bank. However, tensions in euro-area fmancial markets intensified again more recently, reflecting political uncertainties in Greece and news oflosses at Spanish banks, which in turn raised questions about Spain's fiscal position and the resilience of the euro-area banking system more broadly. Euro-area authorities have responded by announcing a number of measures, including funding for the recapitalization of Spain's troubled banks, greater flexibility in the use of the European financial backstops (including, potentially, the flexibility to recapitalize banks directly rather than through loans to sovereigns), and movement toward unified supervision of euro-area banks. Even with these announcements, however, Europe's fmancial markets and economy remain under significant stress, with spillover effects on finaneial and economic conditions in the rest of the world, including the United States. 59 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 800.61167 -5 - Moreover, the possibility that the situation in Europe will worsen further remains a significant risk to the outlook. The Federal Reserve remains in close communication with our European counterparts. Although the politics are complex, we believe that the European authorities have both strong incentives and sufficient resources to resolve the crisis. At the same time, we have been focusing on improving the resilience of our financial system to severe shocks, including those that might emanate from Europe. The capital and liquidity positions of U.S. banking institutions have improved substantially in recent years, and we have been working with U.S. financial firms to ensure they are taking steps to manage the risks associated with their exposures to Europe. That said, European developments that resulted in a significant disruption in global financial markets would inevitably pose significant challenges for our [mancial system and our economy. The second important risk to our recovery, as I mentioned, is the domestic fiscal situation. As is well known, U.S. fiscal policies are on an unsustainable path, and the development of a credible medium-term plan for controlling deficits should be a: high priority. At the same time, fiscal decisions should take into account the fragility of the recovery. That recovery could be endangered by the confluence of tax increases and spending reductions that will take effect early next year if no legislative action is taken. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that, if the full range of tax increases and spending cuts were allowed to take effect--a scenario widely referred to as the fiscal cIiff--a shallow recession would occur early next year and about 1-114 million fewer jobs would be created in 2013.3 These estimates do not 3 Congressional Budget Office (2012), Economic Effects a/RedUCing the Fiscal Restraint That Is Scheduled to Occur in 2013 (Washington: CBO, May), availahle at www.cbo.govfpublicationl43262. The effect of the fiscal cliff on real GDP is shown in table 2 (po 6). The effect of the fiscal cliff on employment, relative to a less restrictive alternative fiscal scenario that assumes that most expiring tax provisions are extended and that the spending sequestration does not take effect, is shown in table 3 (p.7), 60 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 900.61167 -6- incorporate the additional negative effects likely to result from public uncertainty about how these matters will be resolved. As you recall, market volatility spiked and confidence fell last summer, in part as a result of the protracted debate about the necessary increase in the debt ceiling. Similar effects could ensue as the debt ceiling and other difficult fiscal issues come into clearer view toward the end of this year. The most effective way that the Congress could help to support the economy right now would be to work to address the nation's fiscal challenges in a way that takes into account both the need for long-run sustainability and the fragiJity of the recovery. Doing so earlier rather than later would help reduce uncertainty and boost household and business confidence. Monetary Policy In view of the weaker economic outlook, subdued projected path for inflation, and significant downside risks to economic growth, the FOMC decided to ease monetary policy at its June meeting by continuing its maturity extension program (or MEP) through the end of this year. The MEP combines sales of short-term Treasury securities with an equivalent amount of purchases oflonger-term Treasury securities. As a result, it decreases the supply oflonger-term Treasury securities available to the public, putting upward pressure on the prices of those securities and downward pressure on their yields, without affecting the overall size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet By removing additional longer-term Treasury securities from the market, the Fed's asset purchases also induce private investors to acquire other longer-term assl'lts, such as corporate bonds and mortgage backed-securities, helping to raise their prices and lower their yields and thereby making broader financial conditions more accommodative. Economic growth is also being supported by the exceptionally low level of the target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent and the Committee's forward guidance 61 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 010.61167 -7 - regarding the anticipated path of the funds rate. As I reported in my February testimony, the FOMC extended its forward guidance at its January meeting, noting that it expects that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014. The Committee has maintained this conditional forward guidance at its subsequent meetings. Reflecting its concerns about the slow pace of progress in reducing unemployment and the downside risks to the economic outlook, the Committee made clear at its June meeting that it is prepared to take further action as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability. Thank you. I would be pleased to take your questions. 62 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 170.61167 (ftOltgr.ess of tlJ.e lQuit.el't §iuics liIlfasi1ingfnn, il<!t 20515 July 18,2012 Chairman Spencer Bachus House Financial Services Committee 2129 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 Dear Chairman Bachus: I submit the enclosed letter and respectfully request its inclusion in the record for the July 18, 2012 Financial Services Committee hearing entitled, "Monetary Policy and the State ofthe Economy." An area of the Dodd-Frank Act that has been subject to major rulemakmg by regulatory agencies has been section 941, Risk Retention. Included in the risk retention proposed rule is the Premium Capture Cash Reserve Account (PCCRA), which places securitization profits in a first-loss position of a securitization. As proposed, the PCCRA would eliminate the financial incentive for issuing structured securities, including both private-label residential and all commercial mortgage-backed securities. The PCCRA was not part of the Dodd-Frank Act or even contemplated by Congress and was created entirely by the regulators. In separate letters, both House and Senate members have strongly expressed to regulators that the PCCRA was not part of Congressional intent for the Dodd-Frank Act and have urged them to remove it from the final rule. The enclosed is the Senate letter that speaks to this issue, dated June 19,2012, signed by a bipartisan coalition of twelve Senators. I submit the enclosed for inclusion in the record for today's hearing, "Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy." PRINTED ON R!::CYCLED PAPER 63 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 270.61167 WASH!NGTON. D.C. 20510 June 19. 2012 The Honorable Shaun Donovan The Honorable Ben Bernanke Secretary Chairman Department of HUD The Federal Reserve System 451 7th Street. SW 20th Street and Constitution Ave. NW Washington. DC 20551 Washington. DC 20429 The Honorable Mary Schapiro The Honorable Marty Gruenberg Chairman Acting Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 100 F Street, NE 550 17th Street NW Washington, DC 20549 Washington. DC 20429 The Honorable Tom Curry Mr. Edward DeMarco Comptroller Acting Director Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Federal Housing Finance Agency 250 E Street, SW 400 7th Street, SW Washington, DC 20219 Washington, DC 20024 Dear Secretary Donovan, Chairmen Bemanke, Schapiro, Acting Chairman Gruenberg. Comptroller Curry, and Acting Director DeMarco: We are writing to you with concerns regarding the risk retention proposal issued by your agencies pursuant to Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203). Rather than promoting the flow of credit in the commercial real estate and residential mortgage sector, the proposed rule goes in the wrong direction and takes away the flexibility Congress intended by applying a rigid approach and adding extraneous features, such as the Premium Capture Cash Reserve Account and an excessively rigid down-payment requirement in the Qualified Residential Mortgage exclusion. On March 31, 2011, the joint risk retention rule proposal was released for comment. Since then, the six federal financial services regulators have received 13,000 letters in response to the proposal. Congress specifically rejected a one-size fits an risk retention rule for well-underwritten qualified residential mortgages ("QRM") and commercial-mortgage backed securities ("CMBS"). Section 941 recognized that QRM and CMBS, were unique, treated them uniquely under the law, and required that they be distinguished under the proposed rules. The merits of this approach was reinforced by the Federal Reserve's October 2010 study, which recommended "crafting credit risk retention requirements that are tailored to each major class of securitized assets" and "to ensure that the regulations promote the purposes of the Act without unnecessarily reducing the supply of credit." 64 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 370.61167 In the area of CMBS and residential mortgage-backed securities ("RMBS") we are ccncerned that regulators included a requirement for the establishment of Premium Capture Cash Reserve Accounts ("PCCRAsU in the proposed rule that would negatively ) impact capital formation. The PCCRA, which was not envisioned by Congress, would require securitizers to set aside the premium from the sale of securities in separate acccunt for the life of the security. This account would occupy the first loss position and would be in addition to the 5% risk retention requirement. The end result would be that securitizers could not recognize compensation until the security matures many years later and would be forced to bear all downside risk associated with interest rate exposure while waiting years to recognize any potential profit from that risk. The alternatives to creating the PCCRA are not appealing to those investors the rules are deSigned to protect and would require a significant restructuring of CMBS and RMBS deals. This approach fundamentally alters the existing securitization model, conflicting with the Financial Stability OverSight Council's own report on the objectives for risk retention which noted in objective one to, "align incentives without changing the basic structure and objectives of securitization transactions. n We believe that the PCCRA goes well beyond Congressional intent and we urge you to reconsider its inclusion in the risk retention proposal. We have also expressed ccncerns about the rigid QRM definition in the past. The QRM exclusion to risk retention is key to attracting private capital to the mortgage securitization market and restoring confidence to ccnsumers, lenders and investors. The down-payment restriction of the proposed regulation goes beyond the intent and language of the statute and would increase ccnsumer costs and reduce access to affordable credit. Despite Congressional direction on these issues, the proposed rule uses a homogenized approach that takes away the asset-specific flexibility provided by Congress. We are concerned this will cut off or greatly reduce a vital source of capital across all asset classes. Congress crafted a statute that was designed to provide the appropriate balance between strong standards that align the interests of lenders, issuers and investors with the ability of the securitization process to work. The proposed rule does not accomplish this goal. We urge you to modify the proposed risk retention rule to follow Congressional intent by eliminating the PCCRA and the unnecessarily tight down payment restrictions on QRM. Sincerely, 65 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 470.61167 ~ ~~~ - t , ~'i ~ Momo 7 ~~._ ~KJ1 _~~ ~~tL:J- ~ /#-/.#~ 66 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 110.61167 67 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 210.61167 68 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 310.61167 Letter of Transmittal BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Washington, D.C., July 17, 2012 THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES The Board of Governors is pleased to submit its Monetary Policy Report to the Congress pursuant to section 2B of the Federal Reserve Act. 69 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 410.61167 Contents Part 1 Overview: Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook .............................................. 1 Part 2 Recent Economic and Financial Developments ................................................................ 5 DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS .......................................................................................•......... 6 The Household Sector ....................................................................................................... 6 Consumer Spending and Household Finance .............................................................. 6 Housing Activity and Housing Finance ....................................................................... 8 The Business Sector ......................................................................................................... 10 Fixed Investment ........................................................................................................ 10 Inventory Investment .................................................................................................. 11 Corporate Profits and Business Finance .................................................................... 12 The Government Sector .................................................................................................. 14 Federal Government ................................................................................................... 14 State and Local Government ...................................................................................... 16 The External Sector ......................................................................................................... 16 Exports and Imports ................................................................................................... 16 Commodity and Trade Prices .................................................................................... 17 The Current and Financial Accounts ......................................................................... 17 National Saving ................................................................................................................ 18 The Labor Market ........................................................................................................... 19 Employment and Unemployment ............................................................................... 19 Productivity and Labor Compensation ...................................................................... 20 Prices ............................................................................................................................... .21 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS ........•..................................................................................... 22 Monetary Policy Expectations and Treasury Rates ...................................................... 22 Short-Term Funding Markets ........................................................................................ 23 Financial Institutions ...................................................................................................... 25 Corporate Debt and Equity Markets ............................................................................. 27 Monetary Aggregates and the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet .................................. 29 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS .•..................•................................................................ 32 International Financial Markets ..................................................................................... 32 Advanced Foreign Economies ........................................................................................ 35 Emerging Market Economies ......................................................................................... 37 70 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 510.61167 ii Part 3 Monetary Policy: Recent Developments and Outlook ................................................ 39 Monetary Policy over the First Half of 2012 ................................................................ 39 FOMC Communications ............................................................................................... .41 Part 4 Summary of Economic Projections ................................................................................... 43 The Outlook for Economic Activity ............................................................................. .46 The Outlook for Inflation .............................................................................................. .46 Appropriate Monetary Policy ........................................................................................ .49 Uncertainty and Risks .................................................................................................... 53 Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................... 57 List of Boxes The Supply of Mortgage Credit ..................................................................................... 10 The Capital and Liquidity Position of Large U.S. Banks ............................................ 24 Implementing the New Financial Regulatory Regime .................................................. 28 An Update on the European Fiscal and Banking Crisis .............................................. 34 Forecast Uncertainty ....................................................................................................... 55 71 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 610.61167 Part 1 Overview: Monetary Policy and the Economic Outlook The pace of economic recovery appears to have slowed mounting losses at Spanish banks renewed questions during the first half of this year, with real gross domes abont the sustainability of Spain's sovereign debt and tic product (GDP) likely having risen at only a modest the resiliency of the euro-area banking system. As pace. In the labor market, the rate of job gains has yields on the government debt of Spain and other vul diminished recently, and, following a period of nerable European countries rose toward new highs, improvement, the unemployment rate has been little euro-area leaders responded with additional policy changed at an elevated level since January. Meanwhile, measures in late June, including increasing the tlexibil consumer price inflation over the first five months of ity of the region's financial backstops and making 2012 was lower, on net, than in 2011, and longer-term progress toward greater cooperation in the supervision inflation expectations have remained stable. A number and, as necessary, recapitalization of Europe's banks. of factors will likely restrain economic growth in the Many critical details, however, remain to be worked period ahead, including weak economic growth abroad out against a backdrop of continued economic weak and a fiscal environment that looks set to become less ness and political strain. accommodative. Uncertainty about these factors may Financial markets were somewhat volatile over the also restrain household and business spending. In first half of 2012 mostly due to fluctuating views additioll, credit conditions are likely to improve only regarding the crisis in the euro area and the likely pace gradually, as are still-elevated inventories of vacant and of economic growth at home and abroad. As investors' foreclosed homes. Moreover, the possibility of a fur concerns about the situation in Europe eased early in ther material deterioration of conditions in Europe, or the year and with data releases generally coming in to of a particularly severe change in U.S. fiscal conditions, the upside of market expectations, broad equity price poses significant downside risks to the outlook. indexes rose and risk spreads in several markets nar Against this backdrop, the Federal Open Market rowed. Subsequently, however, market participants Committee (FOMC) took steps to provide additional pulled back from riskier assets amid renewed concerns monetary policy accommodation during the first half about the euro area and evidence of slowing global of 2012. In particular, the Committee changed its for economic growth. Retlecting these developments bnt ward guidance regarding the period over which it also owing to the lengthening of the forward rate guid anticipates the federal funds rate to remain at excep ance, continuation of the MEP, and increased expecta tionally low levels and announced a continuation of its tions by market participants of additional balance maturity extension program (MEP) through the end of sheet actions by the Federal Reserve, yields on longer the year. These policies put downward pressure on term Treasury securities and corporate debt as well as longer-term interest rates and made broad financial rates on residential mortgages declined, on net, and conditions more accommodative than they would oth reached historically low levels at times during the first erwise be, thereby supporting the economic recovery. half of the year. On balance since the beginning of the The European fiscal and banking crisis has remained year, broad equity prices rose as corporate earnings a major source of strain on global financial markets. remained fairly resilient through the first quarter. Early in the year, financial stresses within the euro area After rising at an annual rate of 2\1, pereent in the moderated somewhat in light of a number of policy second half of 201l, real GDP increased at a 2 percent actions: The European Central Bank (ECB) provided pace in the first quarter of 2012, and available indica ample liquidity to the region's banks, euro-area leaders tors point to a still smaller gain in the second quarter. agreed to increase the lending capacity of their rescue Private spending continues to be weighed down by a facilities, and a new assistance package for Greece was range of factors, including uncertainty about develop approved following a restructuring of Greek sovereign ments in Europe and the path for U.S. fiscal policy, debt. However, tensions within the euro area increased concerns about the strength and sustainability of the again in the spring as political uncertainties rekindled recovery, the still-anemic state of the housing market, fears of a disorderly Greek exit from the euro area and and the difficulties that many would-be borrowers con- 72 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 710.61167 2 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 tinue to have in obtaining credit. Such considerations In the household sector, credit conditions have gen have made some businesses more cautious about erally remained tight for all but highly rated borrowers; increasing investment or materially expanding their among other factors, this tightness rellects the uncer payrolls and have led households to remain quite pessi tain economic outlook and the high unemployment mistic about their income and employment prospects. rate. Total mortgage debt decreased further as the pace Smoothing through the effects of nnseasonably warm of mortgage applications to purchase a new home was weather this past winter, activity in the housing sector sluggish. Refinancing activity increased over the course appears to have been a little stronger so far this year. of the second quarter but remained below levels However, the level of housing activity remains low and reached in previous refinancing booms despite histori continues to be held down by tight mortgage credit. cally low mortgage interest rates. The increase in refi Meanwhile, the drag on real GDP growth from govern nancing was partially attributable to recent enhance ment purchases is likely to persist, as budgets for state ments made to the Home Affordable Refinance and local governments remain strained and federal Program that appeared to boost refinancing activity fiscal policy is likely to become more restrictive in somewhat for borrowers with underwater mortgages 2013. that is, for those who owed more on their mortgages In the labor market, gains in private payroll employ than their homes were worth. Consumer credit ment averaged 225,000 jobs per month in the first expanded moderately mainly because of growth in fed quarter, up from 165,000 jobs per month in the second eral student loans. half of last year, but fell back in the second quarter to Firms in the nonfinancial corporate sector continued just 90,000 jobs per month. Although the slowing in to raise funds at a generally moderate pace in the first the pace of net job creation may have been exaggerated half of the year. Those with access to capital markets by issues related to swings in the weather and to sea took advantage of low interest rates to refinance exist sonal adjustment difficulties associated with the timing ing debt. As a result, corporate debt issuance was solid of the sharpest job losses during the recession, those over the first part of the year, although issuance of factors do not appear to fully account for the slow speculative-grade corporate bonds weakened notably down. The unemployment rate declined from about in June as investors pulled back from riskier assets. 9 percent last summer to a still-elevated 8Y. percent in Commercial and industrial loans on the books of January, and it has remained close to that level since banks expanded briskly, but borrowing conditions for then. Likewise, long-term joblessness has shown little small businesses have improved more slowly than have net improvement this year, with the share of those those for larger firms. Financing conditions for com unemployed persons who have been jobless for mercial real estate stayed relatively restrictive, and fun six months or longer remaining around 40 percent. damentals in that sector showed few signs of Further meaningful reductions in unemployment are improvement. likely to require some pickup in the pace of economic Market sentiment toward major global banks lIuctu activity. ated in the first half of 2012. In March, the release of Consumer price inflation moved down. on net, dur the results from the Comprehensive Capital Analysis ing the first half of the year. The price index for overall and Review, which investors interpreted as indicating personal consumption expenditures (PCE) rose rapidly continued improvements in the health of domestic in the first three months of the year, reflecting large banks, provided a significant boost to the equity prices increases in oil prices, but inflation turned down in the of U.S. financial institutions. Those gains partially spring when oil prices more than reversed their earlier reversed when market sentiment worsened in May, run-ups. In all, the PCE price index increased at an driven in large part by concerns about Europe and annual rate of about 1V , percent over the first potential spillovers to the United States and its fman five months of the year, compared with a rise of cial institutions. On balance, however, equity prices of 2V, percent during 2011. Excluding food and energy, banks rose significantly from relatively low levels at the consumer prices rose at about a 2 percent rate over the start of the year. An index of credit default swap first five months of the year, close to the pace recorded spreads for the large bank holding companies declined over 2011. In addition to the net decline in crude oil about 60 basis points, but those spreads remained at a prices over the first half of the year, factors contribut high level. Despite the swings in market sentiment ing to low consumer price inflation this year inclnde about global banking organizations, conditions in the deceleration of non-oil import prices in the latter unsecured short-term dollar funding markets were part of 2011, subdued labor costs associated with the fairly stable in the first half of 2012. European finan weak labor market, and stable inflation expectations. cial institutions have reduced their demand for dollar 73 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 810.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 3 funding over recent quarters, and general funding pres in January and April. Committee perticipants' projec sures apparently were alleviated by the ECB's longer tions for the unemployment rate had a central ten term refinancing operations. dency of 8.0 to 8.2 percent in the fourth quarter of this With the Committee anticipating only slow progress year and then deClined to 7.0 to 7.7 percent at the end in bringing unemployment down toward levels that it of 2014; those levels are still generally well above par judges to be consistent with its dual mandate and ticipants' estimates of the longer-run normal rate of strains in global financial markets continuing to pose unemployment. Meanwhile, participants' projections significant downside risks to the economic outlook, the for inflation had a central tendency of 1.2 to 1.7 per FOMC took additional steps to augment the already cent for 2012 and 1.5 to 2.0 percent for both 2013 and highly accommodative stance for monetary policy dur 2014; these projections are lower, particularly in 2012, ing the first half of 2012. In January, the Committee than participants reported in January and April, in modified its forward rate guidance, noting that eco part reflecting the effects of the recent drop in crude oil nomic conditions were likely to warrant exceptionally prices. low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late With the unemployment rate expected to remain 2014. And in June, the FOMC decided to continue the elevated over the projection period and inflation gener MEP until the end of the year rather than completing ally expected to be at or under the Committee's 2 per the program at the end of June as previously cent objective, most participants expected that, nnder scheduled. their individual assessments of appropriate monetary The June Summary of Economic Projections is pre policy, the federal funds rate would remain extraordi sented in Part 4 of this report. At the time of the Com narily low for some time. In particular, II of the mittee's June meeting, FOMC participants (the 19 participants placed the target federal funds rate at 7 members of the Board of Governors and the presi 0.75 percent or lower at the end of 2014; only 4 of dents of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks) saw the them saw the appropriate rate at 2 percent or higher. economy expanding at a moderate pace over coming All participants reported levels for the appropriate tar quarters and then picking up gradually under the get federal funds rate at the end of 2014 that were well assumption of appropriate monetary policy. Most par below their estimates of the level expected to prevail in ticipants marked down their projections for economic the longer run. In addition to projecting only slow growth in 2012 and 2013 relative to what they antici progress in bringing down unemployment, most par pated in January and April largely as a result of the ticipants saw the risks to the outlook as weighted adverse developments in Europe and the associated mainly toward slower growth and higher unemploy effects on financial markets. Moreover, headwinds from ment. In particular, participants noted that strains in the fiscal and financial situation in Europe, from the global financial markets, the prospect of rednced fiscal still-depressed housing market, and from tight credit accommodation in the United States, and a general for some borrowers were cited as likely to hold back slowdown in global economic growth posed significant the pace of economic expansion over the forecast risks to Ibe recovery and to a further improvement in period. labor market conditions. FOMC participants also projected slower progress in reducing unemployment than they had anticipated 74 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 910.61167 Part 2 Recent Economic and Financial Developments Economic activity appears to have expanded at a weather and to seasonal adjustment), and the unem somewhat slower pace over the first half of 2012 than ployment rate hovered around gy. percent after a sig in the second half of 2011. After rising at an annual nificant decrease over the latter months of 20 II and in rate of 2\1, percent in the second half of 2011, real January. Meanwhile, consumer price inflation, in part gross domestic product (GDP) increased at a 2 percent buffeted by sharp swings in the price of gasoline, pace in the first quarter of 2012, and available indica stepped up early in the year but subsequently turned tors point to a still smaller gain in the second quarter down, and longer-term inflation expectations remained (figure I), An important factor influencing economic stable (figure 2). and financial developments this year is the unfolding Financial markets were somewhat volatile over the fiscal and banking crisis in Europe. Indeed, the eco first half of 2012 mostly due to fluctuating views nomic outlook for the second half of 2012 depends regarding the crisis in the euro area and the likely pace crucially on the extent to which current and potential of economic gro~th at home and abroad. Yields on disruptions in Europe directly reduce US. net exports longer-term Treasury securities have declined signifi and indirectly curtail private domestic spending cantly, reflecting greater monetary policy accommoda through adverse spillover effects on US. financial mar tion, the weaker outlook, and safe-haven flows. Broad kets and institutions and on household and business indexes of US. equity prices rose, on net, risk spreads confidence. At the same time, the economy continues on corporate bonds were generally unchanged or to face other headwinds, including restricted access to slightly lower, and unsecured short-term dollar fnnding some types of household and small business credit, a markets were fairly stable. Debt issuance by US. cor still sizable inventory of vacant homes, and less porations was solid, and bank lending to larger firms accommodative fiscal policy. was brisk. In the household sector, consumer credit The labor market remains weak. Private payroll expanded and mortgage refinancing activity increased employment stepped up early in the year but then modestly, reflecting the decline in mortgage rates to slowed in the second quarter (though those moves may historically low levels as well as recent changes to the have been exaggerated by issues related to swings in the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP). I. Change in real gross domestic produc~ 2006-12 2. Change in the chain-type price index for personal consumption expenditures, 2006-12 Percenl, annua! rate -4 - 3 + --------------~~--------------o I I I I I I 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 I I 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 NOTE: Here and in subsequent figures, except as noted, change for a given period is measured to its final quaner from the final quarter of the preceding NOTE: The data are monthly and extend through May 2012; changes are period. from one year earlier. SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 75 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 020.61167 6 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 Domestic Developments 4. Personal saving rate, 1992-2012 The Household Sector ----------------------------!-'=<n. Consumer SJlending and Hou,vehold Finance After rising at an annual rate of about 2 percent in the second half of 2011, real personal consumption expen ditnres (PCE) increased 2V, percent in the first quarter, but available information suggests that real PCE decel - 3 erated some in the second quarter (figure 3). The first quarter increase in spending oceurred across a broad + array of goods and services with the notable exception ----------------------------- 0 of outlays for energy services, which were held down by reduced demand for heating because of the unsea ! ! ! I I I I I ! L....L! I 1 11 I ! ! J I! ! 1992 1996 2000 2004- 2008 2012 sonably warm winter. Spending on energy services appears to have rebounded in the second quarter as the 20 N 12 O : T Q E 2 : T is h t e h e d a a v ta e r a a r g e e q f u o a r r t A er p l r y i l a a n n d d e M xte ay n . d througb 2012:Q2; the reading for temperate winter gave way to a relatively more typical SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. spring. In contrast, the pace of motor vehicle sales edged down in the second quarter, and reports on retail sales suggest that consumer ontlays on a wide Aggregate real disposable personal income (DPI} range of items rose less rapidly than they did in the personal income less personal taxes, adjusted for first quarter. The moderate rise in consumer spending changes in prices-rose more rapidly over the first five over the first half of the year occurred against the months of the year than it did in 2011, in part because backdrop of the considerable economic challenges still of declining energy prices (figure 5). The wage and sal facing many households, including high unemploy ary component of real DP!, which reflects both the ment, sluggish' gliins in employment, tepid growth in number of hours worked and average hourly wages income, still-stressed balanced sheets, tight access to adjusted for inflation, rose at an annual rate of nearly some types of credit, and lingering pessimism about 1 V. percent through May of this year after having job and income prospecta With increases in spending increased at a similar pace in 2011. The increase in real outpacing growth in income so far this year, the per wage and salary income so far in 2012 is largely attrib sonal saving rate continued to decline, on net, though it utable to the modest improvement in employment and remained well above levels that prevailed before the recession (figure 4). 5. Change in real disposable personal income and in real wage and salary disbursements, 2006-12 3. Change in real personal consumption expenditures. 2006-12 Percent, annual mte PcrcclIl,annualrate I • I QI HII IH2 1 --------~--""'--f-.f------=------o + + I 0 Real wage and salary disbursemems I I I I 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 I I I I NOTE: "Through 2011, change is from December to December; for 2012, 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 change is from December to May. The real wage and salary disbursements series is nominal wage and salary disbursements deflated by the personal NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2012:QL consumption expenditures deflator, SOURCE: Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis, SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 76 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 120.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 7 hours worked; real average hourly earnings are little 7. Consumer sentiment indexes. 2002-12 changed thus far this year. The ratio of household net worth to income, in the aggregate, moved up slightly further in the first quarter, 140 reflecting increases in both house prices and equity prices (figure 6). Taking a longer view, this ratio has Conference Board 120 been on a slow upward trend since 2009, and while it 100 remains far below levels seen in the years leading up to the recession, it is about equal to its average over the 80 past 20 years. Household-level data through 20 to indi 60 cate that wealth losses were proportionately larger for 40 the middle portion of the wealth distribution-not a surprising result, given the relative importance of 20 housing among the assets of those households Mean ! ! ! ! I I I while, indicators of consumer sentiment are above 2003 2006 2009 2012 their lows from last summer but have yet to return to NOTE: The Conference Board. data are monthly and extend through lune pre-recession levels (figure 7). 2012; the series is inde,;ed to equal 100 in 1985. The Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan data are monthly and extend through a Household debt-the sum of mortgage and con preliminary estimate for July 2012; the series is indexed to equal 100 in 1966. sumer debt-edged down again in the first quarter of SOURCE: The Conference Board and Thomson ReuterslUniversity of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. 2012 as the continued contraction in mortgage debt was almost offset by solid expansion in consumer credit. With the reduction in household debt, low level dent loans. The rise in nonrevolving credit so far this of most interest rates, and modest growth of income, year was primarily due to the strength in student loans, the debt-service ratio-the aggregate required principal which were almost entirely originated and funded by and interest payments on existing household debt rela the federal government. Meanwhile, auto loans main tive to income-decreased further, and, at the end of tained a steady pace of increase. Revolving consumer the first quarter, it stood at a level last seen in 1994 credit (primarily credit card lending) remained much (figure 8). more subdued in the first five months of the year in Consumer credit expanded at an annual rate of part because nonprime borrowers continued to face about 6\4 percent in the first five months of 2012, tight underwriting standards. Overall, the increase in driven by an increase in nonrevolving credit. This com consumer credit is consistent with recent responses to ponent accounts for about two-thirds of total con the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank sumer credit and primarily consists of auto and stu- Lending Practices (SLOOS) indicating that demand 6. Wl'3lth-to-income ratio, 1992-2012 8. Household debt service, 1984-2012 _________________- -"R.atio Percent of di!lJlOsab!:e income - 7 14 13 12 -4 11 1 ! ! J ! , I I I I I ! I ! ! ! ! I ! ! ! ! I 1 ! ! I!!! j I!!!! III II! I!! II! III!! I 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 1984 1988 1992 19% 2000 2004 2008 2012 NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2012:QL The wealth· NOTE: The data are quarterly and e,;tend through 2012:Q1. Debt service to-income ratio is the ratio of household net worth to disposable personal payments consist of estimated required payments on outstanding mortgage and income. consumer debt. SOURCE: For net worth, Federal Reserve Board. flow of funds data; for SO\lRCE: Federal Reserve Board, "Household Debt Service and Financial income, Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Obligations Ratios," statistical release. 77 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 220.61167 i j 78 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 320.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 9 10. Private housing starts, 2002-12 The same factors that are restraining single-family housing construction also continue to weigh on house MiHionsofllnlts,aIDlualrate prices, including the large inventory of vacant homes, tight mortgage credit conditions, and lacklnster demand. Mortgage rates declined to historically low levels during the first half of 2012 (figure 12). While signifi 1.4 cant, the drop in mortgage rates generally did not keep 1.0 pace with the declines in the yields on Treasury and Single-family mortgage-backed securities (MRS), probably refiecting Multifamily .6 still-elevated risk aversion and some capacity con straints among mortgage originators. Despite the drop .2 in mortgage rates, many potentially creditworthy bor rowers have had difficulty obtaining mortgages or refi nancing because of tight standards and terms (sec the box "The Supply of Credit"). Another fac- tor impeding the ability borrowers to refi- nance, or to sell their home purchase a new one, of the year, new multifamily projects were started at an has been the prevalence of underwater mortgages. average annual rate of about 225,000 units, up from Overall, refinancing activity increased in the second about 200,000 in the second half of 20 11 but still quarter but was still less than might be expected, givcn below the 300,OOO-unit rate that prevailed for much of the level of interest rates, and the pace of mortgage the previous decade. applications for home purchases remained sluggish. House prices, as measured by several national However, refinancing activity attributed to recent indexes, turned up in recent months after edging down changes to the HARP---one of which eliminated caps further, on balance, in 2011 (figure II). For example, on loan-to-value ratios for those who were refinancing the Core Logic repeat-sales index rose 4 percent (not an mortgages already owned by government-sponsored annual rate) over the first five months of the year. This enterprises (GSEs)---has picked up over the first half recent improvement notwithstanding, this measure of of the year. house prices remains 30 percent below its peak in 2006. Indicators of credit quality in the residential mort gage sector continued to reflect strains on homeowners confronting depressed home values and high unem 11. Prices of existing single-family houses, 2001-12 ployment. The fraction of current prime mortgages Index value becoming delinquent remained at a high level but 100 12. Mortgage interest rates. 1995-2012 90 80 70 60 50 S&I?IO,,,-,;hill,,, and FHF A data are monthly and extend through April CoreLogic data are monthly and extend through May 2Q12. Each index has been normalized so that its peak is 100. Both the CoreLogic price index and the FHFA index (formerly calculated by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight) include purchase transactions only. The S&P/Case~Shmer index reflects all ann's~length sales transactions in selected metropolitan areas. SOURCE: For CoreLogic, CoreLogic; for FHF A, Federal Housing Finance Agency~ for S&P/Case-Shiller, Standard & Poor's, 79 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 420.61167 10 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress July 2012 The ,\!uu..-.,:>e,,, Credit Access to mortgage credit is among the important factors that affect the demand for housing and thus the recovery in the housing sector. lending stan dards appear to be considerably tighter than they were even before the housing boom, likely pre venting many households from purchasing homes. According to the Senior loan Officer Opinion higher-rated borrow SUfVeyon Bank lending Practices (SLOOS), from ers in 2008 (figure H). The upward shift in credit mid-200? into 2009, many lenders tightened their scores is also evident for prime borrowers who refi standards for residential mortgages originated to nanced theif mortgages and for Federal Housing borrowers with prime credit scores, and very few Administration mortgages. A. Net percentage of domestic respondents tightening standards for residential mortgage loans, 1990--2012 JOO inched lower, on net, over the first five months of the The Business Sector year, likely reflecting in part stricter underwriting of Fixed Illvestmellt more-recent originations, Additionally, measures of late-stage mortgage delinquency, such as the inventory Real business spending for equipment and software of properties in foreclosure, continued to linger near the peak in the first of 2012 (figure J 3). (E&S) rose at an annual rate of 311, percent in tbe first quarter of 2012 after having risen at a double-digit Gross issuance by GSEs pace, on aveFdge, in the second half of 2011 (figure 14), remained moderate in the first half of 2012, consistent The slowdown in E&S investment growth in the first with the slow pace of mortgage originations. In con quarter was fairly widespread across categories of trast, the securitization market for mortgage loans not equipment and software. This deceleration in E&S guaranteed by a hOUSing-related GSE or the Federal spending along with the recent softening in indicators Housing Administration-an important source of of investment demand, such as surveys of business funding before the crisis for prime-grade mortgages sentiment and capital spending plans, may signal some that exceeded the conforming loan size limit--contin ued to be essentially dosed. 80 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 520.61167 &kJik1i&J IIlIil I 1_1Ii1l Ii i!i¥I"& El:1IU 81 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 620.61167 82 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 720.61167 83 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 820.61167 14 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 19. Net percentage of finns with borrowing needs, 1994--2012 20. Delinquency rates on commercial real estate loans, 1991-2012 Percent _C~o:::m:::m~e~rc:::·ia1:::.:.b.::an~ks=--___________Per cenl 20 IS 10 Multifamily - 5 ! ! I I I! ! I I I t I I ! ! I ! I! ! ! I ! 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 Percent I I ! I ! ! I ! ! ! ! ! ! I ! I ! I I I I I 10 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 8 NOTE: The data are drawn from a survey conducted monthly and are seasonally adjusted; the last observation is from the June 2012 survey. The data represent the proportion of businesses with borrowing needs over the s p a a t s i t s f t i h e r d e . e T I m ti o s n n t u h m s b re e g r a is r d s l e e a s s s o o na f l l w y h a e d t j h u e s r t e t d h . o se needs were satisfied or not + o 2 SOURCE: National Federation of Independent Business. I I I j I I I ! I I I I I I I I ! ! ! I I I I I I - 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 three months earlier and that expected tighter credit NOTE; The data for commercial banks and life insurance companies are conditions over the next three months have both quarterly and extend through 2012:Ql. The data for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) are monthly and extend through declined, but they remained at relatively high levels in June 2012. The delinquency rates for commercial banks and CMBS are the the June survey. In addition, recent readings from the d p e e l r i c n e q n u t e o nc f y J o ra a t n e s fo 3 r 0 li d f a e y i s n s o u r r a m nc o e r e c o p m as p t a n d i u e e s i o s r t h n e o p t e a r c c c e r n u t i n o g f lo in a t n e s r e 6 s 0 t d T a h y e s STBL indicate that the spreads charged by commercial or more past due or not accruing interest. banks on newly originated C&I loans with original SOURCE: For commercial banks, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call amounts less than $1 million remained quite high, even Report); for 1ife insurance companies. American Council of Life Insurers; for on loans with the strongest credit ratings. CMBS. Citigroup. Financial conditions in the commercial real estate (CRE) sector have eased some but stayed relatively five months of 2012, boosted by a solid pace of initial tight amid weak fundamentals. According to the April public offerings (IPOS)4 Data for the first quarter of SLOOS, some domestic banks reported having eased 2012 indicate that share repurchases and cash-financed standards on CRE loans and, on balance, a significant mergers by nonfinancial firms remained robust, and number of domestic banks reported increased demand net equity issuance remained deeply negative (fig- for such loans. While banks' holdings of CRE loans ure 21). However, fewer mergers and new share repur continued to contract in the first half of this year, they chase programs were announced in the second quarter. did so at a slower pace than in the second half of last year. The weakest segment of CRE lending has been the portion supporting construction and land develop ment; some other segments have recently expanded The Government Sector modestly. Issuance of commercial mortgage-backed Federal Goverll1nenf securities (CMBS) has also increased recently from the low levels observed last year. Nonetheless, the delin The deficit in the federal unified budget remains quency rate on loans in CMBS pools continued to set elevated. The Congressional Budget Office projects new highs in June, as some five-year loans issued in that the deficit for fiscal year 2012 will be close to 2007 at the height of the market were unable to refi $1.2 trillion, or about 7Y, percent of nominal GOP. nance at maturity because of their high loan-to-value Such a deficit would be a narrower share of GOP than ratios (figure 20). While delinquency rates for CRE those recorded over the past several years though still loans at commercial banks improved slightly in the first quarter, they remained elevated, especially for con struction and land development loans. 4. Indeed, the second largest lPO on record began trading in mid-May. However, the price performance of those shares in the days In the corporate equity market, gross public equity following that offering was sharply negative on net, and IPO activity issuance by nonfinancial firms was strong in the first subsequently weakened significantly. 84 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 920.61167 85 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 030.61167 16 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 23. Change in real government expenditures receipts--the largest source of tax revenue for these on consumption and investment, 2006--12 governments--were roughly flal in 2011 and early 2012, reflecting the crosscutting effects of the earlier Percent, annual rnte o declines in home prices and increases in property tax Fodernl III State and local 12 rates. Moreover, federal aid to both state and local gov ernments has declined as stimulus-related grants have been almost completely phased out. ~L~_9 One of the ways that state and local governments have addressed their tight budget situations has been through cuts in their employment and construction spending. After shedding jobs at an average pace of 19,000 per month in 2011, these governments reduced their employment over the first half of the year at a - 6 slower pace hy trimming 3,000 jobs per month on aver age. However, real construction expenditures fell sharply in the first quarter after having edged down in SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. the latter half of 2011, and available information on nominal construction spending throngh May points to State and Local GOI'ernment continued declines in recent months. The decreases in employment and construction are evident in the State and local government budgets remain strained, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimate for real but overall fiscal conditions for these governments may state and local purchases, which fell at an annual rate be slowly improving. In particular, state and local tax of 2% percent in the first quarter, about the same pace receipts appeared to increase moderately over the first as in 2011. half of this year. Census Bureau data indicate that Gross issuance of bonds by states and municipalities state revenue collections rose 4 percent in the first picked up in the second quarter of 2012. Credit quality quarter relative to a year earlier, and anecdotal evi in the sector continued to deteriorate over the first half dence suggests that collections during April and May of the year. For instance, credit rating downgrades by were well maintained. Moreover, only a few states Moody's Investors Service substantially outpaced reported budget shortfalls during fiscal 2012 (which upgrades, and credit default swap (CDS) indexes for ended on June 30 in most states). The improvement is municipal bonds rose on net. Yields on long-term gen less evident at the local level, where property tax eral obligation mnnicipal bonds were abont nnchanged over the first half of the year. 24. Federal government debt held by the public, 1960-2012 PeTCI.'hl of nominal GDP The External Sector 70 ExpIJI'ts and Imports 60 Both real exports and imports grew moderately in the first quarter of 2012 (figure 25). Real exports of goods 50 and services rose at an annual rate of 4V4 percent, sup~ 40 ported by relatively strong foreign economic growth. Exports of services, automobiles, compnters, and air 30 craft expanded rapidly, while those of consumer goods 20 declined. The rise in exports was particularly strong to Canada and Mexico. Data for April and May suggest Llw 19 . 6 l 2 . lll III 1 1 9 1 7 ! 2 1 1111111 1 9 j 8 i 2 l l j II i I 1 I 9 I 9 !I 2 I! III I 2 I 0 ! 0 I 2 j ! I!I! I 2 I 0 ! 1 ! 2 that exports continued to rise at a moderate pace in the second quarter. NOTE: The data for debt through 2011 are as of year-end. and the corresponding values for gross domestic product (GDP) are for Q4 at an Real imports of goods and services rose a relatively annual rate. The observation for 2012:Q2 is based on an estimate for debt in modest 2% percent in the first quarter, reflecting slower [hat quarter and GOP iu the frrst quarter. Excludes securities held as investments of federal government accounts.. growth in US. economic activity. Imports of services, SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, flow of funds data. automobiles, and computers rose Significantly, while 86 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 130.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 17 25. Change in real imports and exports of goods 26. Prices of oil and nonfuel commodities, 2007-12 and services, 2007-12 December 2006 '" 100 Dollars pet barre! Percent, annual rate o II I E m xp p o o r r t t s s 160 141) 15 120 141) 10 100 120 80 100 60 80 41) I I I I I I I I 2007 2008 2!lO9 2010 2011 2012 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 NOTE: The data are monthly. The oil price is the spot price of Brent crude SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. oil, and the last observation is the average for July I-B. 2012. The price of nonfuel commodities is an index of 45 primary...commodity prices and extends through June 2012. SOURCE: For oil, the Commodity Research Bureau; for nonfuel commodities, international Monetary Fund. those of petroleum, aircraft, and consumer goods feH. The rise in imports was broadly based across major trading partners, with imports from Japan and Mexico along with a temporary abatement of stresses in showing particularly strong growth. April and May Europe. However, as with oil prices, broader commod data suggest that import growth picked up in the sec ity prices fell in the second quarter, rellecting growing ond quarter. pessimism regarding prospects for the global economy. Altogether, net exports made a small positive contri Prices for non-oil imported goods increased less bution of one-tenth of 1 percentage point to real GDP than Y. percent in the first quarter, with the modest growth in the first quarter. pace of increase likely rellecting the lagged effects of both the appreciation of the dollar and the decline in commodity prices that occurred late last year. Moving Commodity and Trade Prices into the second qnarter, import price inllation appears to have remained subdued, consistent with a further After increasing earlier in the year, oil prices have sub appreciation of the dollar. sequently fallen back (figure 26). Over much of the first quarter, an improved outlook for the global economy and increased geopolitical tensions-most notably with The Current and Financial Accounts Iran-helped spur a run-up in the spot price of oil, with the Brent benchmark averaging $125 per barrel in Largely rellecting the run-up in oil prices early in the March, about $15 above its January average. Since year, the nominal trade deficit widened slightly in the mid-March, however, oil prices have more than first quarter (figure 27). In addition, as the net invest retraced their earlier gains amid an intensification of ment income balance continued to decline, the current the crisis in Europe and increased concerns over the account deficit deteriorated from an annual average of strength of economic growth in China. An easing of $470 billion in 2011 to $550 billion in the first quarter, geopolitical tensions and increased crude oil supply or 3\1, percent of GDp'6 production by Saudi Arabia has been running at near The financial llows that provide the financing of the record high levels-have also likely contributed to the current account deficit reflected the general trends in decline in oil prices. All told, the price of Brent has financial market sentiment and in reserve accumulation plunged $25 a barrel from March to about $100 per barrel in mid-July. 6. In 1999, the BEA-white revisiting its methodology for the Prices of many nonfuel commodities followed a path balance of payments accounts-redefined the current account to similar to that shown by oil prices, albeit with less vola exclude capital transfers, In the process, the capital account was renamed the financial account, and a newly defined capital account tility. Early in 2012, commodity prices rallied, as global was created to include capital transfers as well as the acquisition and economic prospects and financial conditions improved disposal of nonproduced nonfinancial assets. 87 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 230.61167 88 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 330.61167 89 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 430.61167 20 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 33. Civilian unemployment rate. 1982-2012 solid gain in 2010. According to the latest published data, output per hour in the nonfarm business sector _________________- -.:.:Percent rose just Y, percent in 2011 and declined in the first quarter of 2012 (figure 35). Although these data can be 12 volatile from quarter to quarter, the moderation in pro ductivity growth over the past two years suggests that 10 firms have been adding workers not only to meet rising production needs but also to relieve pressures on their - 8 existing workforces, which were cut back sharply dur ing the recession. Increases in hourly compensation continue to be restrained by the very weak condition of the labor - 4 market. The 12-month change in the employment cost I I! IIIII!! I! III! III I!! II!!! II t! II index for private industry workers, which measures 1988 19% 2004 2012 both wages and the cost to employers of providing NOTE: The data are monthly and extend through June 2012. benefits, has been about 2 percent or less since the start SOURCE: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. of 2009 after several years of increases in the neighbor hood of 3 percent (figure 36). Nominal compensation Other labor market indicators were consistent with per hour in the nonfarm business sector-a measure little change in overall labor market conditions during derived from the labor compensation data in the the first half of the year. Initial claims for unemploy NIPA-also decelerated significantly over the past few ment insurance were not much changed, on net, years; this measure rose just I Y. percent over the year although their average level over the first half of the ending in the first quarter of 2012, well below the aver year was lower than in the second half of 20 II. Meas age increase of about 4 percent in the years before the ures of job vacancies edged up, on balance, and house recession. Similarly, average hourly earnings for all holds' labor market expectations largely reversed the employees-the timeliest measure of wage develop steep deterioration from last summer. However, indica ments-rose about 2 percent in nominal terms over the tors of hiring activity remained subdued. 12 months ending in Jnne. According to each of these measures, gains in hourly compensation failed to keep up with increases in consumer prices in 2011 and again Productivity and Lahor Compensation in the first quarter of this year. The change innnit labor costs faced by firms Gains in labor productivity have continued to slow which measures the extent to which nominal hourly recently following an outsized increase in 2009 and a 35. Change in output per hour, 1948-2012 34. Long-term unemployed, 2006-12 _________________~ ~~t Pe:rcent,annual rnle -6 50 40 30 20 10 -1 I I I I 1948- I 1974- I 1996- I 2001- !! 20 ! 06 I 2 008 I I 2 01 I 0 ! 2 012 I 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 73 95 2000 04 NOTE: The data are monthly and extend through June 2012. The series NoTE: Nonfann business sector. Change for each mUltiyear period is shown is the percentage of tOlal unemployed persons who have been measured to the fourth quarter of the final year of the period from the fourth unemployed for 27 weeks Of more. quarter of the year immediately preceding the period. SOURCE: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. SOURCE: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 90 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 530.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 21 36. Measures of change in hourly compensation. 37. Change in the chain-type price index for personal 2002-12 consumption expenditures, 2006-12 Percenl Percent, annual rate o Total • Excluding food and energy - 5 -4 NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2012:QI. For nonfarm NOTE: Through 2011. change is from December to December; for 2012, business compensation, change is over four quarters; for the employment cost change is from December to May. index (Eel), change is over the 12 months ending in the last month of each SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. quarter. The nonfarm business sector excludes farms, government. nonprofit institutions. and households. The sector covered by the Eel used here is the nonfarm business sector plus nonprofit institutions. SOURCE: Depanment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. gasoline at the pump approached $4 per gallon. Since then, crude oil prices have tumbled, and gasoline prices compensation rises in excess of labor productivity have declined roughly in line with crude costs, more remained subdued. Unit labor costs iu the nonfarm than reversing the earlier run-up. Consumer prices for business sector rose 1 percent over the year ending in natural gas plunged over the first five months of the the first quarter of 2012. Over the preceding year, unit year after falling late last year; this drop is attributable, labor costs increased 1Y , percent. at least in part, to the unseasonably warm winter, which reduced demand for natural gas. More recently, spot prices for natural gas have turned up as produc Prices tion has been cut back, but they still remain substan tially lower than they were last summer. Consumer price inflation moved down, on net, during Consumer food price inflation has slowed noticeably the first part of 2012. Overall PCE prices rose rapidly so far this year, as the effect on retail food prices from iu the first three months of the year, reflecting large last year's jump in farm commodity prices appears to increases in oil prices, but inflation turned down in the have largely dissipated. Indeed, PCE prices for food spring as oil prices more than reversed their earlier and beverages only edged up slightly. rising at an run-ups. The overall chain-type PCE price index annual rate of about Y, percent from December to May increased at an annual rate of about 1Y , percent after increasing more than 5 percent in 2011. Although between December 2011 and May 2012, compared farm commodity prices were tempered earlier this year with a rise of 2Y, percent over 2011 (figure 37). Exclud by expectations of a substantial increase in crop output ing food and energy, consumer prices rose at a rate of this growing season. grain prices rose rapidly in late about 2 percent over the first five months of the year, June and early July as a wide swath of the Midwest essentially the same pace as in 2011. In addition to the experienced a bout of hot, dry weather that farm ana net decline in crude oil prices over the first half of the lysts believe cut yield prospects considerably. year, factors contributing to low consumer price infla Survey-based measures of near-term inflation expec tion this year include the deceleration of non-oil tations have changed little, on net, so far this year. import prices in the latter part of 2011, subdued labor Median year-ahead inflation expectations, as reported costs associated with the weak labor market, and stable in the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Sur inflation expectations. veys of Consumers (Michigan survey), rose in March Consumer energy prices surged at an annual rate of when gasoline prices were high but then fell back as over 20 percent in the first three months of 2012, as those prices reversed course (figure 38). Longer-term higher costs for crude oil were passed through to gaso expectations remained more stable. In the Michigan line prices. In April, the national-average price for survey, median expected inflation over the next 5 to 91 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 630.61167 22 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 38. Median inflation expectations, 2001-12 39. Inflation compensation, 2007:-12 Percent __________________________________- 'Pce:r.cent Next 12 months 5 to 10 years ahead - 5 - 3 =~ -4 - 2 \ ! .I I ' -I \ Ai I,j i; 5-year (carry adjusted) + I ---------------------------------- 0 ! I I 1 It! 1 ! I I I j I I ! ! ! ! I ! ! , ! ! ! I I , ,! I j ! ! ! I I t I I 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2007 2008 2009 20!O 20 II 2012 NOTE: The data are monthly and extend through a preliminary estimate for NOTE: The data are weekly averages of daily data and extend through July 2012. July 13, 2012, Inflation compensation is the difference between yields on SOURCE: Thomson ReutersJUniversity of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. nominal Treasury securities and Treasury inflation-protected securities (fIPS) of comparable maturities, based on yield curves fitted by Federal Reserve staff to off4he-run nominal Treasury securities and on- and off-tbe-ruo TIPS, The 5-year measure is adjusted for the effect of indexation 10 years was 2.8 percent in early Jnly, within the nar lags, SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Barclays; Federal Reserve row range of the past 10 years. In the Snrvey of Pro Board staff estimates, fessional Forecasters, condncted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, expectations for the increase in the price index for PCE over the next 10 years remained at 2'/. percent, in the middle of its markets generally remained stable as European finan recent range. cial institutions reduced their demand for dollar fund Measures of medium-and longer-term inllation ing and general funding pressures were alleviated by compensation derived from nominal and inllation the longer-term refinancing operations of the ECB. In protected Treasury securities-which not only rellect the domestic banking sector, the release of the results inflation expectations, but also can be affected by from the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review changes in investor risk aversion and by the different (CCAR) in March provided a significant boost to the liquidity properties of the two types of securities-- . equity prices of US. financial institutions (see the box were little changed, on net, so far this year (figure 39). "The Capital and Liquidity Position of Large US. These measures increased early in the period amid ris Banks"). ing prices for oil and other commodities, but they sub sequently declined as commodity prices feU back and as worries about domestic and global economic growth Monetary Policy Expectations and increased. Treasury Rates In response to the steps taken by the Federal Open Financial Developments Market Committee (FaMe) to provide additional monetary policy accommodation, and amid growing Financial markets were somewhat volatile over the first anxiety about the European crisis and a worsening of half of 2012. Early in the year, broad equity price the economic outlook, investors pushed out further the indexes rose and risk spreads in several markets nar date when they expect the federal funds rate to first rise rowed as investor sentiment regarding short-term above its current target range of 0 to y. percent. In European prospects and the economic outlook addition, they apparently scaled back the pace at which improved. Those gains partially reversed when market they expect the federal funds rate subsequently to be participants became more pessimistic about the Euro increased. Market participants currently anticipate pean situation and global growth prospects in May and that the effective federal funds rate will be about June. Yields on longer-term Treasury securities 50 basis points by the middle of 2015, roughly 55 basis declined, on balance, over the first half of the year. points lower than they expected at the beginning of Conditions in unsecured short-term dollar funding 2012. 92 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 730.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 23 Yields on longer-term nominal Treasury securities year. A few factors seem to have contributed to the declined, on balance, over the first half of 2012 (fig relative stability of those markets. European institu ure 40). Early in the year, longer-term Treasury yields tions apparently reduced their demand for funds in rose, reflecting generally positive U.S. economic data, recent quarters by selling dollar-denominated assets improved market sentiment regarding the crisis in and exiting from business lines requiring heavy dollar Europe, and higher energy prices. More recently, how funding. In additiou, European banks reportedly ever, longer-term yields have more than reversed their switched to secured funding supported by various earlier increases. Investors sought the relative safety types of collateral. Further, the availability of funds and liquidity of Treasury securities as the crisis in from the ECB through its longer-term refinancing Europe intensified again and as weaker-than-expected operations likely helped reduce funding strains and the economic data releases raised concerns about the pace need to access interbank markets more generally. of economic recovery both in the United States and Reflecting these developments, the amount of dollar abroad. In addition, those developments fostered swaps outstanding between the Federal Reserve and expectations that the Federal Reserve would provide the ECB has declined substantially from its peak ear additional accommodation. And the Treasury yield lier this year. curve flattened further following the FOMC's decision Conditions in the CP market were also fairly stable. at its June meeting to continue the maturity extension On uet, 30-day spreads of rates on unsecured A2lP2 program (MEP) through the end of 2012. On balance, CP over comparable-maturity AA-rated nonfinancial yields on 5-, 10-, and 30-year nominal Treasury securi CP declined a bit. The volume outstanding of unse ties declined roughly 20, 40, and 35 basis points, cured financial CP issued in the United States by insti respectively, from their levels at the start of this year. tutions with European parents decreased slightly in the The Open Market Desk's ontright purchases and sales first half of the year. The average maturity of unse of Treasury securities under the MEP did not appear cured financial CP issued by institutions with both U.S. to have any material adverse effect on Treasury market and European parents is about 50 days, a level that is functioning. near the middle of its historical range (figure 41). Signs of stress were also largely absent in secured short-term dollar funding markets. In the market for Short~Term Funding Markets repurchase agreements, bid-asked spreads for most collateral types were little changed. However, short Despite the reemergence of strains in Europe, condi term interest rates continued to edge up from the level tions in unsecured short-term dollar funding markets observed around the turn of the year, likely reflecting have remained fairly stable in the first half of 2012. in part the financing of the increase in dealers' invento Measures of stress in short-term funding markets have ries of shorter-term Treasury securities that resulted eased somewhat, on balance, since the beginning of the 41. Average maturity for unsecured financial commercial paper outstanding in the United States, 2010-12 40. Interest rates on Treasury securities at selected ptaturities. 2004-12 ___________________________________ D." Percent 70 U.S, parent 60 -4 50 40 European parent 30 + ---------------------------------- 0 I! Jan. July Jan. Jan. I! ! I I I ! I I 2010 2011 2012 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 NOTE: The data are weekly and extend through July 11, 2012. NOTE: The data are daily and extend through july 13, 2012, SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board staff calculations based on data from tbe SOURCE: Department of the Treasury. Depository Trust and Gearing Corporation. 93 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 830.61167 24 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 The Capital and liquidity Position of Large U.S. Banks In mid-March, the Federal ReseIVe announced the financial conditions. The stress scenario incorpo results of the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and rated a peak unemployment rate of 13 percent, a Review (CCAR) 2012. This program evaluated the drop in equity prices of more than 50 percent and capital planning processes and capital adequacy of a decline in house prices of 21 percent. The results 19 of the largest banks, a subset of those that will indicated that 15 of the 19 SHCs would continue to be required to undergo annual stress~testing exer~ meet supervisory expectations for several measures cises by the Soard of Governors underthe Dodd of capital adequacy through the end of 2013 Frank WaH Street Reform and Consumer Protection despite large projected losses under this extremely Act of 2010 (Dodd-frank Act).' These 19 bank hold adverse hypothetical scenario, given the firms' pro~ ing companies (SHCs) also participated in the posed capital distribution plans.2 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program and These results reflect the significant steps these the CCAR in 2011. The supervisory stress tests under BHCs have taken to improve their capital positions CCAR 2012 evaluated whether the banks' proposed overthe past three years. In particular, the aggre~ capital distribution plans would allow them to gate Tier 1 common ratio for these 19 firms has maintain sufficient capital to support lending to doubled from about 51/2 percent in the first quarter households and businesses even in the event of an of 2009 to close to 11 percent in the first quarter of extended period of highly adverse economic and 2012 (figure A). Much of the improvement over the intervening period can be attributed to increased retained earnings and issuance of common stock 1. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012), during a period of limited growth in risk-weighted o C n o d m R p e re su h l e ts n f s o iv r e S C tr a e p ss i t S o c l e A n n a a r l i y o s i P s r a o n je d d R io e n vi s e ( w W 20 a 1 sh 2 i : n M gt e o t n h : o B do o l a o r g d y assets. of Governors, March 13), wwwJederalreserve,gov/newsevents The 19 SHCs subject to the CCAR have also /press/bcreglbcreg20120313atpdf. The Dodd-Frank Act reduced their vulnerabilities to disruptions in fund~ requires the Board, in coordination with the appropriate pri~ ing markets. For instance, they have significantly O m f a f r i y c e f . i n to an c c o ia n l d r u eg ct u a la n t n o u ry a l a a g n e a n l c y i s e e s s a o n f d n t o h n e b F an ed k e f r i a n l a I n n c s ia u l r a c n o c m e reduced their reliance on short-term wholesale panies supervised by the Board and bank holding companies liabilities relative to total assets since the height of with total consolidated assets equal to or greater than $50 bir lion to determine whether stich companie... . have the capital necessary to absorb losses that might result from a period of 2. The development of sound models is crucial to the cred~ adverse economic conditions. AI! other financial companies ibility of any type of stress-testing exercise. As a result, the Fed~ that have total consolidated assets of more than $10 billion eral Reserve has developed formal procedures by which and are regulated by a primary federal financial regulatory teams of staff' members from around the federal Reserve agency are required to conduct annual intemal stress tests. System validate the supervisory models used bytne Federal Smaller community banks are not required to undertake stress Reserve during the CCAR process. furthermore, in April20l2, tests, but any bank's primary regulator may subject the bank to the Board announced the formation of the Model Validation a stress test jf conditions warrant. See Board of Governors of Council, composed of outside experts, which will provide the the Federal Reserve System, Division of Banking Supervision Federal Reserve with independent advice on the processes and Regulation (20l2), "'Supervisory Guidance on Stress Test~ used for model assessment. See Board of Governors of the ing for Banking Organizations with More Than $10 Billion in Federal Reserve System (20l2), "Federal Reserve Board Total Consolidated Assets,'" Supervision and Regulation letter Announces the Formation of the Model Validation Coundl/ SR 12-7 (May 14), www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg! press release, April 20, wwwJederalreserve.gov/newsevents! srietters/sr120Zhtm. press/bcregl20120420a.htm. from the ongoing MEP and higher-than-expected bill tively stable since the beginning of the year.' In addi issuance by the Treasury Department earlier in the tion, dealers reported that the use of financial leverage year. In asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) mar among hedge funds had decreased somewhat since the kets, volumes outstanding declined for programs with beginning of 2012. Moreover, respondents to the June European sponsors, and spreads on ABCP with Euro SCOOS noted an increase in the amount of resources pean bank sponsors remained a bit above those on and attention devoted to the management of concen ABCP with U.S. bank sponsors. trated exposures to dealers and other financial interme- Respondents to the Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms (SCOOS) in both March and June indicated that credit terms applicable 7. The SCOOS is available on the Federal Reserve Board's website to important classes of counterparties have been rela- at www:federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releasesiscoos.htm. 94 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 930.61167 Board 0/ Governors 0/ the Federal Reserve System 25 A. Aggregate Tier 1 common ratio of the CCAR B. Reliance on wholesale funding by CCAR institutions. 2008-12 institutions, 2008-12 ----------------------------~~' ___________________________. .::.:Percent CCAR CCAR SCAP 2011 2012 - 12 - 32 10 - 30 - g - 28 - 6 26 I I I! 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 NOTE: The data are quarterly and extend through 2012:Ql. For NoTE.: The data are quarterly and extend through 2012:Q1. the defminon of Tier 1 common capital and the list of the 19 Reliance on wholesale funding is measured as shortAenn wholesale Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) institutions, liabilities to total assets. CCAR is Comprehensive Capital Analysis see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012)., and Review. Short-term wholesale liabilities is defined as the sum ·'Comprehen.~ive Capital Analysis and Review 2012: Methodology of large lime deposits with maturity less than one year, federal funds for Stress Scenario Projections," paper, Mareh 12, WWW. purchased and securities sold under agreements to repurchase. federalreserve.gov/newsevents/presslbcreglbcreg20 1203113 1.pdf. deposits in foreign offices, trading liabilities (excluding revaluation SCAP is the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program. losses on derivatives), and other borrowed money with maturity less SOURCE.: Federal Resetve Board, FR Y -9C. Consolidated than one year. Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies. SOORCE: Federal Reserve Board, FR Y- 9C. Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies. the financial crisis (figure B). In addition, these BHes have experienced significant inflows of rela tively stable core deposits, owing in part to the downturn while meeting the credit needs of availability of unlimited deposit insurance on potential borrowers than they were a few years noninterest~bearing transaction accounts from the ago, having substantially increased their capital Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation until the buffers and improved their liquidity positions over end of 2012, as well as the generally high demand the past several years. That said, a significant dis for safe and liquid assets in the current ruption in global financial markets, such as might environment. occur if the European situation were to worsen Overall, major U.S. financial institutions are markedlYI would still pose considerable challenges much better positioned to weather an economic to the U.S. banking and financial systems. diaries as well as central counterparties and other actions of the European authorities to ease the euro financial utilities (figure 42). In response to a special area crisis and the release of the results from the question in the June SCOOS, dealets reported that CCAR, equity prices for bank holding companies despite the persistently low level of interest rates, only (BHCs) increased and their CDS spreads declined. In moderate fractions of their unlevered institutional cli late spring-as investors reacted to concerns about ents had shown an increased appetite for credit risk or Europe-equity prices reversed some of those gains, duration risk over the past year. and CDS spreads rose for large BHCs, especially those with substantial investment-banking operations. More Financial Institutions recently, Moody's downgraded the long-and short term credit ratings of five of the six largest U.S. banks, Market sentiment toward the banking industry fluctu but none of the banks lost their investment-grade stat ated in the first half of 2012. Early in the year, after the us on long-term debt. The short-term debt ratings of 95 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 040.61167 26 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 42. Net percentage of dealers reporting increased attention 44. Spreads on credit default swaps for selected to management of exposures, 2010-12 U.S. banldng organizations, 2007-12 ___________________________________P ~~m ________________________________.~_ _·_ s points 400 80 350 300 To other dealers 60 250 200 40 150 20 100 50 July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July 2009 2010 2011 2012 NOTE: The data are drawn from a survey coRducted four times per year; NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 13, 2012. Mediar the last observation is from the june 2012 survey. which covers 20l2:Q2. Net spreads for six large bank holding companies and nine other banks. percentage equals the percentage of institutions that reported increasing SOURCE: Markit. attention ("increased considerably" or "increased somewhat") minus the percentage of institutions that reported decreasing attention ("decreased considerably" or "decreased somewhat"), The profitability of BHCs decreased slightly in the SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board. Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms. first quarter of 2012 and remained well below the levels that prevailed before the financial crisis (figure 45). Litigation provisions taken by some large banks in some banks were downgraded to Prime-2, which may connection with the mortgage settlement reached ear affect the ability of some to place significant amounts lier this year accounted for some of the downward of CP with money market funds, but the market effect pressure on bank profitability. The variability in earn appears to have been muted so far, as those banks cur ings due to accounting gains and losses related to rently have limited demand for such funding. On bal changes in the market value of banks' own debt ampli ance, equity prices of banks rose significantly from fied recent swings of bank profits.' Smoothing through relatively low levels at the start of the year (figure 43); an index of CDS spreads for large BHCs declined 8, Under fair value accounting rules, changes in the creditworthi~ about 60 basis points but remained at a high level ness of a BHe generate changes in the value of some of its liabilities. (figure 44). Those changes are then reflected as gains or losses on the income statement 43. Equity price index for banks, 2009-12 45. Profitability of bank holding companies, 1997-2012 January 2. 2009 "" 100 Percen!. annual rate Perccnt.annuairale 120 1.5 Rerum on assets 110 20 100 1.0 90 .5- 10 80 + o ------------------~~~----- + o 70 60 .5 10 50 1.0 40 20 1.5 30 I .I.t ,j ,f. ! ,I,! !! ! ! I I ! ! ! I I I I I ! ! I ! Jan. July Jan. July Jan. Ju1y 2000 2004 2008 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012 Narn: The data are quarterly and extend through 20l2:QL N()TE: The data are daily and extend through July 13.2012. SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, FR Y ~9C, Consolidated Financial SOURCE: Standard & Poor's. Statements for Bank HQlding Companies. 96 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 140.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 27 these special factors, profitability has been about flat in the government guarantee on agency securities, and recent quarters. Net income continued to be supported some large banks may also have been accumulating by the release of loan loss reserves, albeit to a lesser government-backed securities to improve their liquid extent than in the previous year, as charge-off rates ity positions. decreased a bit further across most major asset classes. Still-subdued dividend payouts and share repurchases as well as reductions in risk-weighted assets pushed Corporate Debt and Equity Markets regulatory capital ratios higher in the first quarter of 2012 (see the box "Implementing the New Financial Yields on investment-grade bonds reached record lows Regulatory Regime"). in June, partly reflecting the search by investors for Credit provided by commercial banking organiza relatively safe assets in light of rising concerns about tions in the United States increased in the first half of Europe as well as the weakness in the domestic and 2012 at about the same moderate pace as in the second global economic data releases. However, yields on half of 2011. Core loans-the sum of C&I loans, real speculative-grade corporate debt, which had reached estate loans, and consumer loans-expanded modestly; record-low levels in February, rose somewhat in the as noted earlier, the upturn in lending was particularly second quarter reflecting those same concerns. The noticeable for C&I loans (figure 46). The expansion in spread on investment-grade corporate bonds was C&I lending has been broad based outside of U.S. about unchanged, on net, relative to tbe start of the branches and agencies of European banks and has year. Despite the backup in yields over the second been particularly evident at large domestic banks. This quarter, spreads on speculative-grade corporate bonds pattern is consistent with SLOOS results suggesting decreased some, on balance, over the same period (fig that a portion of the increase in C&I lending observed ure 47). Prices in tbe secondary market for syndicated at large domestic banks reflected decreased competi leveraged loans have changed little, on balance, since tion from European banks and their affiliates and sub the beginning of tbe year; demand from institutional sidiaries for either foreign or domestic customers. investors for these mostly floating-rate loans has Banks' holdings of securities rose moderately, with remained strong despite the reemergence of anxiety purchases concentrated in Treasury securities and about developments in Europe (figure 48). agency-guaranteed MBS. Given the still-depressed Broad equity price indexes were boosted early in the housing market, banks continued to be attracted by year by improved sentiment stemming in part from relatively strong job gains as well as actions taken by major central banks to mitigate the financial strains 46. Change in commercial and industrial loans and core 1oans. 1990-2012 47. Spreads of corporate bond yields over comparable Peroent,anlllJalral:e off-the-run Treasury yields. by securities rating, 1997-2012 30 Percentage points 20 10 +o 10 20 30 I I I ! I I ! ! ! ! I ! ! ! ! !! ! I I J I !! ! I 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 NOTE: The data, which are seasonally adjusted, are quarterly and extend through 2012:Q2. Core loans consist of commercial and industrial loans, real estate loans, and consumer loans. Data have been adjusted for banks' I ! ! ! ! ! ! I ! ! I I ! ! I j ! I I implementation of certain accounting rule changes (including the Financial 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Accounting Standards Board's Statements of Financial Accounting Standards Nos. 166 and 167) and for the effect." of large nonbank institutions converting NOTE: The data are daily and extend through July 13, 2012. The spreads to conunercial banks or merging with a commercial bank. shown are the yields on 10-year bonds less the 10-yearTreasury yield. SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board. Statistical Release H.g, "Assets and SOURCE: Derived from smoothed corporate yield curves using Merrill Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States." Lynch bond data. 97 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 240.61167 28 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 Implementing the New Financial Regulatory Regime The Board of Governors is involved in approxi ber 2011.2 On June 29, 2012, the Board and the mately 250 initiatives-including rulemakings, asso Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation announced ciated guidance, studies of various financial issues, the process they wilt use to review, during the sec and design of internal processes-related to the ond half of 2012, the first set of these plans from Dodd-Frank Wall Street Refonn and Consumer some of the largest internationally active banking Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act). The organizations.3 Board is the lead agency responsible for imple Also, several key notices of proposed rulemak menting a significant number of rulemakings ings (NPRs) implementing the Dodd-Frank Act required under the act and is also; on many of have been issued thus far in 2012. In particuJar, on these initiatives, working in conjunction with other June 7, 2012, the Board issued for comment three federal agencies. For example, as a member of the proposed rules that, taken together, integrate the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the capital provisions of section 171 of the act with Board has contributed to FSOC studies mandated those of Basel III capital standards in order to by the act and has assisted the fSOC with pro enhance financial stability while minimizingthe posed and final rulemakings. burden on affected institutions.4 A number of the rulemakings are directed at enhancing bank supervision and prudential stan dards. In one recent action, the Board and the 2. Board of Govemors of the Federal Reserve System (2011), other federal bank regulatory agencies issued a "Federal Reserve Board Approves Final Rule Implementing the final rule on June 7, 2012, that implements changes Resolution plan Requirement of the Dodd-Frank Act," press to the market risk capital rule. These changes bring release, October 17, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ it into conformance with international standards pre 3 s . s B /b o c a r r e d g o /2 f 0 G 1l o 1 v 0 e 1 rn 7 o a. r n s t o m f . t he Federal Reserve System and and replace agency credit ratings with alternative Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2012), ~Federal standards of creditworthiness in accordance with Reserve Board and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation the requirements of section 939A of the Dodd Announce Process for Receiving and Evaluating Initial Resolu Frank Act.1 In addition, "living wills" were prepared J ti u o n n e P 2 l 9 a , n w s, w A w lso .f e K d n e o r w al n r e a s s e l r i v v e in .g g o W v! iU n s e ,w w j s o e i v n e t n p t r s e / s p s r e re s l s e / a b s c e r , e g! by bank holding companies with assets of $50 bil 20120629b.htm. lion or more based on a final rule issued in Octo- 4. With the encouragement and support of the U.S. bank regulato')' agencies, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi sion has strengthened global capital requirements: raising risk weightings for traded assets, improving the quality of Joss absorbing capital through a new minimum common equity 1. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2012), ratio standard, creating a capital conservation buffer, and uFederal Reserve Board Approves Final Rule to Implement introdUcing an international leverage ratio requirement. See Changes to Market Risk Capital Rute/ press release, June 7, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (20l0), Basel Ill: A www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcregl Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Bonks and 20120607b.htm. Bonking Systems (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International emanating from Europe. However, equity price indexes the bottom end of the range that this indicator has subsequently reversed a portion of their earlier gains occupied since the onset of the financial crisis (fig as concerns about the European banking and fiscal ure 51). crisis intensified again and economic reports suggested In the current environment of very low interest rates, slower growth, On balance, at home and abroad (fig mutual funds that invest in higher-yielding debt instru ure 49). The spread between the 12-month forward ments (inclnding speculative-grade corporate bonds earnings-price ratio for the S&P 500 and a real long and leveraged loans) continued to have significant run Treasury yield-a rough gauge of the equity risk inflows for most of the first half of 2012, while money premium-widened a bit more in the first half of 2012, market funds experienced outflows (fignre 52). Equity and is now closer to the very high levels it reached in mutual funds also recorded modest outflows early in 2008 and again last fall (fignre 50). Implied volatility the year and, as market sentiment deteriorated, both for the S&P 500 index, as calculated from option equity and high-yield mutual funds registered outflows prices, spiked at times this year but is currently toward in May. 98 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 340.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 29 The first NPR would increase the quantity and posed rulemakings. For example, on April 2, 2012, quality of capital by, in part, requiring a new mini the Board published an amendment to a proposed mum common equity Tier 1 ratio of 4,5 percent, rulemaking clarifYing the activities that are deemed instituting a common equity Tier 1 capital conserva to be financial for purposes of title I of the Dodd tion buffer of 2.5 percent, and raising the minimum Frank Act. This rulemaking is designed to provide for the broader Tier 1 capital ratio from 4 percent to clarity regarding firms that may be designated for 6 percentS The NPR does not addressspecific enhanced supelVision by the FSOC? In addition, Basel III liquidity standards, which have not been the Board, along with other regulatory agencies, is finalized by the Basel Committee on Banking reviewing about 19,000 comment letters on the Supervision.6 proposal to implement section 619 of the act, com The second NPR revises certain aspects of the monly known as the Voleker rule. The rule gener risk-based capital requirements in orderto ally prohibits banking entities from engaging in enhance risk sensitivity and address weaknesses in proprietary trading or acquiring an ownership inter the calculation of risk-weighted assets that have est in, sponsoring, or having certain other relation been identified over the past several years. The ships with a hedge fund or private equity fund. On third NPR requires internationally active banks to April 19, the Board issued a clarification regarding improve the risk sensitivity of parts of their current the Volcker rule confonnance period, stating that a advanced approaches to risk-based capital pro banking entity has the full two-year period pro cesses to better address counterparty credit risk vided by statute (that is, until July 21,2014), unless and interconnectedness among financial extended by the Board, to fully conform its activi institutions. ties and investments to the requirements of the Several other actions taken with regard to the Voleker ruleS Dodd-Frank Act provided additional clarity to pro- ~ttlements, December; rev. June 20m, www.bis.orglpublj bcbs189.htm. Z Under title 1o f the Dodd-frank Act,. a company generally 5. The Tied capital ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk can be designated for Board supervision by the FSOC only if weighted assets. Tierl capital consists primarily of common 85 percent or more of the company's revenues or assets are equity (excluding intangible assets such as goodwill and related to activities that are financial in nature under the Bank excluding net unrealized gains on investment account securi Holding Company Act. ties classified as available for sale) and certain perpetual pre B. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, COf'fr ferred stock. modity Futures Trading Commission. Federal Deposit Insur 6. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), Base! III: ance Corporation. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, fnternationalFramework for liqUidity RiskMeasurement, and Securities and Exchange Commission (2012), "Vokker Standards and Monitoring (Basel, Switzerland: Bank for Rule Conformance Period Clarified," joint press release, Intemational Settlements, December), www.bis.org/pubV April 19, WYM.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcregi bcbslB8.htm. 20120419a.htm. Monetary Aggregates and the Federal ever, the levels of M2 and its largest component, liquid Reserve's Balance Sheet deposits, remain elevated relative to what would have been expected based on historical relationships with The growth rate of M2 slowed in the first half of 2012 nominal income and interest rates, likely reflecting to an annual rate of about 7 percent (figure 53)? How- investors' continued preference to hold safe and liquid assets. Currency in circulation increased robustly, reflecting solid demand both at home and abroad. 9. M2 consists of (1) currency outside the US. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks. and the vaults of depository institutions; (2) traveler's Retail money market funds and small time deposits checks of nonbank issuers; (3) demand deposits at commercial banks continued to contract. At the same time as currency in (excluding those amounts held by depository institutions, the u.s. circulation was increasing, reserve balances held at the government, and foreign hanks and official institutions) less cash items in the process of collection and Federal Reserve float; (4) other Federal Reserve were decreasing; as a result, the mon checkable deposits (negotiable order of withdrawal, or NOW, etary base-which is equal to the sum of these two accounts and automatic transfer service accounts at depository insti tutions; credit union share draft accounts; and demand deposits at thrift institutions); (5) savings deposits (induding money market account (IRA) and Keogh balances at depository institutions; and (7) deposit accounts); (6) small-denomination time deposits (time depos~ balances in retail money market mutual funds less IRA and Keogh its issued in amounts of less than $100,000) less individual retirement balances at money market mutual funds. 99 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 440.61167 30 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 48. Secondary-market bid prices for syndicated Joans, 50. Real and 12-month forward 2007-12 S&P 500,1995-2012 --------------------------- Percent 100 12 90 80 70 60 50 items--changed little, on average, over the first half of 6 to 30 years and sold or redeemed $293 billion in the year. Treasury securities with maturities of 3 years or less Total assets of the Federal Reserve decreased to under the MEP.1O Total Federal Reserve holdings of $2,868 billion as of July II, 2012, about $60 billiou less agency MBS increased about $18 billion as the policy than at the end of 2011 (table I). The small decrease of reinvesting principal payments from agency debt since December largely refiects lower usage of foreign and agency MBS into agency MBS continued. central bank liquidity swaps and declines in the net In the first half of 2012, the Federal Reserve contin portfolio holdings of the Maiden Lane LLCs. The ued 10 reduce its exposure to facilities established dur- composition of Treasury security holdings changed over the Course of the first half of this year as a result of the implementation of the MEl'. As of July 13, 10, Between the MEP's announcement in September 2011 and the 2012, the Open Market Desk at the Federal Reserve e T n re d a o su f r t y h a se t c y u e r a i r t , i e t s h e a n D d e h sk a d h a so d l d p u $ r 1 c 3 h 4 a s b e il d l i $ o 1 n 3 i 3 n b s i h l o li r o t n e r i ~ n t l e o r n m g T er r ~ e t a e s rm Bank of New York (FRBNY) had purchased $283 bil ury securities. lion in Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 51. Implied S&P 500 volatility, 1995-2012 49. Stock price index, 1995-2012 -------------'-"""'"' January 3,200500 100 Dow Jones total stock market index 140 120 loo 80 60 40 100 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 540.61167 101 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 640.61167 32 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 in January and February enabled the repayment of the ress in addressing the crisis by the region's leaders con entire remaining outstanding balance of the senior tributed to a temporary easing of financial stresses. loan from the FRBNY to Maiden Laue II LLC in (See the box" An Update on the European Fiscal and March, with interest and a $2.8 billion net gain. In Banking Crisis.") However, amid ongoing political addition, proceeds from the sales of assets from uncertainty in Greece and increased concerns about Maiden Lane LLC and Maiden Lane III LLC in April the health of Spanish banks, financial conditions dete and May enabled the repayment, with interest, of the riorated again in the spring. Foreign economic growth entire remaining outstanding balances of the senior picked up in the first quarter, but this acceleration loans from the FRBNY to Maiden Lane LLC and largely reflected temporary factors, and recent data Maiden Lane III LLC in June. Proceeds from further point to widespread slowing in the second quarter. asset sales from Maiden Lane III in June enabled repayment of the equity position of AIG in July. A net gain on the sale of the remaining assets in Maiden International Financial Markets Lane III LLC is likely during the next few months. Sales of most of the remaining assets in Maiden Lane Foreign financial markets have been volatile. Initially in LLC should be completed by the end of the year, but a the first quarter, encouraging macroeconomic data and few legacy assets may take longer to dispose of. Loans some easing of tensions within the euro area led to an outstanding under the Term Asset-Backed Securities improvement in global financial conditions. This Loan Facility (TALF) were slightly lower, reflecting, in improvement was reversed in the spring as the boost part, the first maturity of a TALF loan with a three from previous policy measures, including the ECB's year initial term. longer-term refinancing operations, faded and political On the liability side of the Federal Reserve's balance and banking stresses in vulnerable European countries sheet, deposits held by depository institutions declined resurfaced. Euro-area leaders responded to the worsen about $42 billion in the first half of 2012, while Federal ing of the crisis by announcing additional measures at Reserve notes in circulation increased roughly $39 bil a summit on June 28-29. The market reaction was lion. As part of its ongoing program to ensure the positive but short-lived. readiness of tools to drain reserves when doing so Increased uncertainty and greater volatility have becomes appropriate, the Federal Reserve conducted a pushed up the foreign exchange value of the dollar series of small-scale reverse repurchase transactions about 4\4 percent on a trade-weighted basis against a involving all eligible collateral types with its expanded broad set of currencies since its low in early February, list of counterparties. In the same vein, the Federal with most of the appreciation occurring in May (fig Reserve also continued to offer small-value term depos ure 54). Typical of periods of flight to safety, the dollar its through the Term Deposit Facility. has appreciated against most currencies but depreci On March 20, the Federal Reserve System released ated against the Japanese yen for most of the period its 2011 combined annual comparative audited finan (fignre 55). The Swiss franc has moved very closely cial statements. The Federal Reserve reported net with the euro as the Swiss National Bank has inter income of about $77 billion for the year ending vened to maintain a ceiling for the franc relative to the December 31, 2011, derived primarily from interest euro. income on securities acquired through open market During the second quarter of this year, flight-to operations (Treasury securities, federal agency and safety flows and the deteriorating global economic out GSE MBS, and GSE debt securities). The Reserve look helped push government bond yields for Canada, Banks transferred about $75 billion of the $77 billion Germany, and the United Kingdom to record lows in comprehensive income to the U.S. Treasury in 2011; (figure 56). Likewise, Japanese yields on IO-year bonds though down slightly from 20 II, the transfer to the fell well below I percent. By contrast, Spanish sover U.S. Treasury remained historically very large. eign spreads over German bnnds rose more than 250 basis points between February and June due to escalating concerns over Spain's public finances (fig International Developments ure 57). Italian sovereign spreads moved up as well over this period. The European fiscal and banking crisis continued to Equity prices abroad declined significantly in the affect international financial markets and foreign eco second quarter, more so than in the United States. nomic activity during the first half of 2012. Early in Indexes tumbled in the nations at the center of the the year, aggressive action by the ECB and some prog- euro-area fiscal and banking crisis, and the fall in value 102 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 740.61167 11\) 103 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 840.61167 34 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 --------------------------- An on the !::UHJU""''' fiscal and Ib.n~"Ir• .,.Crisis months, the crisis in Europe and waned as stresses related to fjnanc~ condition of banking sectors contributed to a marked improvement in financial 58. indexes in selected advanced foreign economies, 59. for emerging m.arket lune 30, 2009 "" 100 ISD SOl..'RCE: Bloomberg. 104 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 940.61167 11M nil h:& ;& II 105 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 050.61167 106 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 150.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 37 Extended Collateral Term Repo facility, offering six one-year lending rate by 25 basis points in June and month funds against a wide set of collateral. In addi 31 basis points in July, the first changes in that rate tion, in July, the BOE increased the size of its asset since an increase in July of last year. Over the first half purchase program from £325 billion to £375 billion, of the year, the renminbi was little changed, on net, and, together with the UK. Treasury, introduced a against the dollar, but it appreciated about II> percent new Funding for Lending Scheme designed to boost on a real trade-weighted basis, as the renminbi fol lending to households and firms. lowed the dollar upward against China's other major trading partners. In India, economic growth has also moderated as Emerging Market Economies slow progress on fiscal and structural reforms and pre vious monetary tightening stalled investment. Noting Following a disappointing performance at the end of rising vulnerabilities from the country's twin fiscal and last year, real GOP growth rebounded in the first quar current account deficits, some credit rating agencies ter in most EMEs. Economic activity expanded espe warned that India's sovereign debt risks losing its cially briskly in emerging Asia, largely reflecting the investment-grade status. reconnection of supply chains damaged by the floods In Mexico, economic activity rebounded briskly in in Thailand. Economic growth, however, continued to the first quarter as the agricultural sector rebounded slow in China and India. Moreover, recent indicators from the fonrth-quarter drought, domestic demand suggest that the pace of economic activity decelerated gained momentnm, and exports to the United States in most EMEs going into the second quarter amid picked up. Economic indicators, however, suggest that headwinds associated with the European crisis and growth moderated somewhat in the second quarter. On relatively subdued growth in China. July I, Enrique Peiia Nieto of the Institutional Revolu In China, real GOP increased at about a 7 percent tionary Party, or PRI, won the Mexican presidential pace in the first half of the year, down from an 81> per election, promising to pursue market-oriented reforms cent pace in the second half of last year. The slowdown to bolster economic growth. reflected weaker demand for Chinese exports as well as In Brazil, real GOP-restrained by flagging invest domestic factors, including moderating consnmer ment and weather-related problems in the agricultural spending and the restraining effects on investment of sector-increased slightly in the first quarter, making it previous govenunent measures to cool activity in the the fourth consecutive quarter of below-trend growth. property sector. Macroeconomic data for May and Industrial production, which has been on a downward June suggest that economic activity was picking up a trend since early 20 II, continued to fall through May, bit toward the end of the second quarter, with growth suggesting that economic activity in Brazil remained of investment, retail sales, and bank lending edging weak in the second quarter. higher. Headline 12-month inflation fell to 2.2 percent Headline inflation generally moderated in the EMEs in June, led by additional moderation in food prices. reflecting lower food price pressures and weaker eco As inflationary pressures eased and concerns about nomic growth. In addition to China, several other cen growth mounted, the People's Bank of China lowered tral banks in the EMEs also loosened monetary policy, banks' reserve requirements by 50 basis points in both including those in Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, the February and May and then reduced the benchmark Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. 107 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 250.61167 j :: 108 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 350.61167 40 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 Nonetheless, participants expected that global financial of economic growth than at the time of the January markets would remain focused on the evolving situa meeting. tion in Europe, and they anticipated that further policy Members viewed the information on U.S. economic efforts would be required to fully address the fiscal and activity as suggesting that the economy would continue financial problems there. to expand moderately. However, despite the easing of With the economy facing continuing headwinds and strains in global financial markets, members continued growth slowing in several U.S. export markets, mem to perceive significant downside risks to economic bers generally expected a modest pace of economic activity. Members generally anticipated that the recent growth over coming quarters, with the unemployment increase in oil and gasoline prices would push up infla rate declining only gradually. At the same time, mem tion temporarily, but that inflation subsequently would bers thought that inflation would run at levels at or run at or below the rate that the Committee judges below those consistent with the Committee's dual most consistent with its mandate. As a result, the mandate. Against this backdrop, members agreed to Committee decided to keep the target range for the keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to federal funds rate at 0 to Y. percent, to reiterate its Y. percent, to continue the program of extending the anticipation that economic conditions were likely to average maturity of the Federal Reserve's holdings of warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds securities as announced in September, and to retain the rate at least through late 2014, to continue the program existing policies regarding the reinvestment of princi of extending the average maturity of the Federal pal payments from Federal Reserve holdings of securi Reserve's holdings of securities that it had adopted in ties. In light of the economic outlook, most members September, and to maintain the existing policies also agreed to indicate that the Committee anticipates regarding the reinvestment of principal payments from that economic conditions are likely to warrant excep Federal Reserve holdings of securities. The Committee tionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least again stated that it is prepared to adjust the size and through late 2014, longer than had been indicated in composition of its securities holdings as appropriate to recent FOMC statements. The Committee also stated promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of that it is prepared to adjust the size and composition of price stability. its securities holdings as appropriate to promote a By the time of the April 24-25 FOMC meeting, the stronger economic recovery in a context of price data again indicated that economic activity was stability. expanding moderately. Payroll employment had con The data in hand at the March 13 FOMC meeting tinued to move up, and the unemployment rate, while indicated that U.S. economic activity had continued to still elevated, had declined a little further. Household expand moderately. Although the unemployment rate spending and business fixed investment had continued remained elevated, it had declined notably in recent to expand. The housing sector showed signs of months and payroll employment had increased. improvement but from a very low level of activity. Household spending and business fixed investment had Mainly reflecting the increase in the prices of crude oil advanced. Signs of improvement or stabilization and gasoline earlier this year. inflation had picked up emerged in some local housing markets, but overall somewhat; however, measures of long.run inflation housing activity continued to be restrained by the sub expectations remained stable. Meeting participants stantial inventory of foreclosed and distressed proper judged that, in general, conditions in domestic credit ties, tight credit conditions for mortgage loans, and markets had improved further, but noted that inves uncertainty about the economic outlook and future tors' concerns about the sovereign debt and banking home prices. Inflation continued to be subdued, situation in the euro area intensified during the inter although prices of crude oil and gasoline had increased meeting period. Many U.S. financial institutions had substantially. Longer-term inflation expectations had been taking steps to bolster their resilience, including remained stable. expanding their capital levels and liquidity buffers and Many participants believed that policy actions in the reducing their European exposures. euro area, notably the Greek debt swap and the ECB's Members expected growth to be moderate over com longer-term refinancing operations, had helped ease ing quarters and then to pick up over time. Strains in strains in financial markets and reduced the downside global financial markets stemming from the sovereign risks to the U.S. and global economic outlook. Against debt and banking situation in Europe as well as uncer that backdrop, equity prices had risen and conditions tainty about U.S. fiscal policy continued to pose sig in credit markets improved, leading many meeting par nificant downside risks to economic activity both here ticipants to see financial conditions as more supportive and abroad. Most members anticipated that the 109 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 450.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 41 increase in inflation would prove temporary and that of ending the program in June as had been planned. In subsequently inflation would run at or below the rate doing so, the Federal Reserve will purchase Treasury that the Committee judges to be most consistent with securities with remaining maturities of 6 years to its mandate. Against this backdrop, the Committee 30 years and sell or redeem an equal par value of members reached the collective judgment that it would Treasury securities with remaining maturities of be appropriate to maintain the existing highly accom approximately 3 years or less. This continuation of the modative stance of monetary policy. In particular, the MEP will proceed at about the same pace as had been Committee agreed to keep the target range for the fed executed through the Iirst phase of the program, eral funds rate at 0 to \4 percent, to continue the pro increasing the Federal Reserve's holdings of longer gram of extending the average maturity of the Federal term Treasury securities by about $267 billion while Reserve's holdings of securities as announced last Sep reducing its holdings of shorter-term Treasury securi tember, and to retain the existing policies regarding the ties by the same amount. For the duration of this pro reinvestment of principal payments from Federal gram, the Committee directed the Open Market Desk Reserve holdings of seenrities. The Committee left the to suspend its current policy of rolling over maturing forward guidance for the target federal funds rate Treasury securities into new issues at auction (and unchanged at this meeting. Members emphasized that instead purchase only additional longer-term securities their forward guidance was conditional on expected with the proceeds of maturing securities). The Com economic developments, but they preferred adjusting mittee expected the continuation of the MEP to put the forward guidance only once they were more confi downward pressure on longer-term interest rates and dent that the medium-term economic outlook or the help make broader financial conditions more accom risks to that outlook had changed Significantly. modative. In addition, the Committee decided to con Data received over the period leading up to the June tinue reinvesting principal payments from its holdings 19-20 FOMC meeting indicated that economic activity of agency debt and agency MBS in agency MBS. The was expanding at a somewhat more modest pace than Committee also decided to keep the target range for earlier in the year. Improvements in labor market con the federal funds rate at 0 to \4 percent and to reaffirm ditions had slowed in recent months, and the unem its anticipation that economic conditions were likely to ployment rate seemed to have flattened out. Household warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds spending appeared to be rising at a somewhat slower rate at least through late 2014. In its statement, the rate, and business investment had continued to Committee noted that it was prepared to take further advance. Despite some ongoing signs of improvement, action as appropriate to promote stronger economic the housing sector remained depressed. Consumer recovery and sustained improvement in labor market price inflation had declined, mainly reflecting lower conditions in a context of price stability. prices of crude oil and gasoline, and longer-term infla tion expectations remained well anchored. Meeting FOMC Communications participants observed that financial markets were vola tile over the intermeeting period and that investor sen Transparency is an essential principle of modern cen timent was strongly influenced by the developments in tral banking because it contributes to the accountabil Europe and evidence of slowing economic growth at ity of central banks to the government and to the pub home and abroad. lic and because it can enhance the effectiveness of In the discussion of monetary policy, most members central banks in achieving their macroeconomic objec agreed that the outlook had deteriorated somewhat tives. To this end, the Federal Reserve provides to the relative to the time of the April meeting, and that sig public a considerable amount of information concern nificant downside risks were present, importantly ing the conduct of monetary policy. Following each including the financial stresses in the euro area and meeting of the FOMC, the Committee inunediately uncertainty about the degree of fiscal restraint in the releases a statement that lays out the rationale for its United States, and its effects on economic activity over policy decision and issues detailed minutes of the the mediunl term. As a result, the Committee decided meeting about three weeks later. Lightly edited tran that providing additional monetary policy accommo scripts of FOMC meetings are released to the public dation would be appropriate to support a stronger eco with a five-year lag.l2 Moreover, beginning in April nomic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, was at a level consistent with the Committee's 12. FOMC statements, minutes, and transcripts, as well as other dual mandate. Specifically, the Committee agreed to related information, are available on the Federal Reserve Board's continue the MEP through the end of the year, instead website at www.federalreserve.gov!monetarypolicylfomc.htm. 110 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 550.61167 42 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 2011, the Chairman has held press conferences on an described the key factors underlying those assessments approximately quarterly basis. At the press confer and provided some qualitative information regarding ences, the Chairman presents the current economic participants' expectations for the Federal Reserve's projections of FOMC participants and provides addi balance sheet. tional context for the Committee's policy decisions. At the March meeting, participants discussed a The Committee continued to consider further range of additional steps that the Committee might improvements in its communications approach in the take to help the public better understand the linkages first half of 2012. At the January meeting, the FOMC between the evolving economic outlook and the Fed released a statement of its longer-ruu goals and policy eral Reserve's monetary policy decisions, and thus the strategy in an effort to enhance the transparency, conditionality in the Committee's forward guidance. accountability, and effectiveness of monetary policy Participants discussed ways in which the Committee and to facilitate well-informed tlecisionmaking by might include, in its postmeeting statements and other households and bnsinesses.!3 The statement did not communications, additional qualitative or quantitative represent a change in the Committee's policy information that could convey a sense of how the approach, but rather was intended to help enhance the Committee might adjust policy in response to changes transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of mon in the economic outlook. However, partiCipants also etary policy. The statement emphasizes the Federal observed that the Committee had introduced several Reserve's firm commitment to pursue its congressional important enhancements to its policy communications mandate to promote maximum employment, stable over the past year or so; these included the Chairman's prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. To postmeeting press conference as well as changes to the clarify its longer-term objectives, the FOMC stated FOMC statement and the SEP. Against this backdrop, that inflation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by some participants noted that additional experience the annual change in the price index for personal con with the changes implemented to date could be helpful sumption expenditures, is most consistent over the long in evaluating potential further enhancements. er run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. At the April meeting, the Committee discussed the While noting that the Committee's assessments of the relationship between the postmeeting statement, which maximum level of employment are necessarily uncer expresses the collective view of the Committee, and the tain and subject to revision, the statement indicated policy projections of individual participants, which are that the central tendency of FOMC participants' cur included in the SEP. The Chairman asked the subcom rent estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unem mittee on communications to consider possible ployment is between 5.2 and 6.0 percent. It stressed enhancements and refinements to the SEP that might that the Federal Reserve's statutory objectives are gen help clarify the link between economic developments erally complementary, but when they are not, the Com and the Committee's view of the appropriate stance of mittee will follow a balanced approach in its efforts to monetary policy. Following up on this issue at the June return both inllation and employment to levels consis meeting, participants discussed several possibilities for tent with its mandate. enhancing the clarity and transparency of the Com In addition, in light of a decision made at the mittee's economic projections as well as the role they December meeting, the Committee provided, starting play in policy decisions and policy communications. in the January Summary of Economic Projections Many participants indicated that if it were possible to (SEPl, information about each participant's assess construct a quantitative economic projection and asso ment of appropriate monetary policy. Specifically, the ciated path of appropriate policy that reflected the col SEP included information about participants' esti lective judgment of the Committee, such a projection mates of the appropriate level of the target federal could potentially be helpful in clarifying how the out funds rate in the fourth quarter of the current year and look and policy decisions are related. However, many the next few calendar years, and over the longer run; participants noted that developing a quantitative fore the SEP also reported participants' current projections cast that rellects the Committee's collective judgment of the likely timing of the appropriate first increase in could be challenging, given the range of their views the target federal funds rate given their assessments of about the economy's structure and dynamics. Partici the economic outlook. The accompanying narrative pants agreed to continue to explore ways to increase clarity and transparency in the Committee's policy communications, but many emphasized that further 13. The FOMe statement of longer-run goals and policy strategy is available on the Federal Reserve Board's website at changes in those communications should be consid www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm. ered carefully. 111 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 650.61167 43 Part 4 Summary of Economic Projections The following material appeared as an addendum to the Overall, the assessments that FOMC participants minutes of the June /9-20, 2012, meeting of the Federal submitted in June indicated that, under appropriate Open Market Committee. monetary policy, the pace of economic expansion over the 2012-14 period would likely continue to be moder In conjunction with the June 19-20,2012, Federal ate and inflation would remain subdued (see table 1 Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, meeting and figure I). Participants judged that the growth rate participants-the 7 members of the Board of Gover of real gross domestic product (GDP) would pick up nors and the 12 presidents of the Federal Reserve gradually and that the unemployment rate would edge Banks, all of whom participate in the deliberations of down very slowly. Participants projected that inflation, the FOMC-submitted their assessments, under each as measured by the annual change in the price index participant's judgment of appropriate monetary for personal consumption expenditures (PCE), would policy, of real output growth, the uuemployment rate, run close to or below the FOMC's longer-run inflation inflation, and the target federal funds mte for each year objective of 2 percent. from 2012 through 2014 and over the longer run. As shown in figure 2, most participants judged that These assessments were based on information available highly accommodative monetary policy was likely to at the time of the meeting and participants' individual be warranted over the forecast period. In particular, assumptions about the factors likely to affect economic 13 participants thought that it would be appropriate outcomes. The longer-run projections represent each for (he first increase in the target federal funds rate to participant's judgment of the mte to which each vari occur during 2014 or later. A majority of participants able would be expected to converge, over time, under judged that appropriate monetary policy would involve appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of fur an extension of the maturity extension program ther shocks to the economy. "Appropriate monetary (MEP) through the end of 2012. policy" is defined as the future path of policy that par Overall, participants judged the uncertainty associ ticipants deem most likely to foster outcomes for eco a(ed with the outlook for real activity and the unem nomic activity and inflation that best satisfy their indi ployment rate to be unusually high relative to historical vidual interpretations of the Federal Reserve's norms, with the risks weighted mainly (oward slower objectives of maximum employment and stable prices. economic growth and a higher unemployment rate. Table 1. Economic projections of l-ooeral Reserve Board members and Federal Reserve Bank presidents, June 2012 Penoen' Central tendencyl Rangc2 Variable I I I I 2012 2013 2014 Longer run 2012 2013 2014 Longer run Cbangeinrea1GDP. 1.9 to 2.4 2.2 to 2.8 3.0to 3.5 2.3102.5 1.6t02.5 2.2103.5 2.8 to 4.0 2.2 to 3.0 April projtx:tion . 2.4 to 2.9 2.7 to 3.1 3,\ to 3,6 2.3 {02.6 2.1 to 3.0 2.4 to 3.8 2.9 to 4.3 22 to 3.0 Unemployment rate . 8.0 to 8.2 7.5 to 8.0 7.0 to 7.7 5.2 to 6.0 7.8 to 8.4 7.0 to 8.1 6.3 to 7.7 4.9 to 6.3 April projection . 7.8 to 8.0 7.3 to 7.7 6.7 to 7.4 5.2 to 6.0 7.8 to 8.2 7.0 to 8.1 6.3 to 7.7 4.9 to 6.0 PCEinfiation .. , . ., .. 1.2 to 1.7 1.5 to 2.0 1.5 to 2.0 2.0 1.2 to 2.0 L5t02.1 1.5 tol.2 2.0 April projection . 1.9 to 2.0 1.6 to 2.0 1,7 to 2.0 ! 2.0 1.8 to 2.3 1.5 to 2.1 1.5 to 2,2 2.0 Co A re p r P il C p E r o in je f c la ti t o io n n 3 ...... ..... 1 1. . 8 7 t t o o 2 2, . 0 0 1 1 . . 6 7 t t o o 2 2 , . 0 0 1 1. . 8 6 t t o o 2 2. . 0 0 1 1 . . 7 7 t t o o 2 2 . .0 0 1 IA .6 t t o o 2 2 . . 1 1 1 L .5 7 t t 0 o 2 2 . . 2 2 1 Note: Projections of change in real gros.. . dome:;tic product (GOP) and projections for both mea.~tlres of inflation are from the fourth quarter of the previOIL<': year to the fourth quarter of th~ year indicated. PCE inJlauon and cure PCE inflation arc the ~rcenl.age rales of change in, respectively. the price index lor personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and tbe price index. for PCE ex.cJuding food and energy. Projections tor the unemployment rate aR for the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year indicated. Each participant's projections arc based on his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy. LongcNun projections represent each participant's assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. The April projections were made in conjunction with the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on April 24-25. 2012. 1. Thecentral tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest projection!> for each variable in each year. 2. The range for a variable in a giv(..'ll year includes all participa.nt.~' projections, from lowest to highcst, for that variable in that year. 3. Lungerarun p!(Jjoctiuns lor .:;ure PCE inllation are not collected. 112 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 750.61167 113 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 850.61167 114 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 950.61167 46 Monetary Policy Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 Many participants also viewed the uncertainty sur prevail under the assumption of appropriate monetary rounding their projections for inflation to be greater policy and in the absence of further shocks to the than normal, but most saw the risks to inflation to be economy was 5.2 to 6.0 percent, unchanged from broadly balanced. April. Most participants projected that the gap between the current unemployment rate and their esti mates of its longer-run normal rate would be closed in The Outlook for Economic Activity five or six years, a couple judged that less time would be needed, and one thought more time would be neces Conditional upon their individual assumptions about sary because of the persistent headwinds impeding the appropriate monetary policy, participants judged that economic expansion. the economy would continue to expand at a moderate Figures 3.A and 3.B provide details on the diversity pace in 2012 and 2013 before picking up in 2014 to a of participants' views regarding the likely outcomes for pace somewhat above what participants view as the real GDP growth and the unemployment rate over the longer-run rate of output growth. The central tendency next three years and over the longer run. The disper of their projections for the change in real GDP in 2012 sion in these projections reflects differences in partici was 1.9 to 2.4 percent, lower than in April. Many par pants' assessments of many factors, including appro ticipants characterized the incoming data~specially priate monetary policy and its effects on the economy, for household spending and the labor market-as hav the underlying momentum in economic activity, the ing been weaker than they had anticipated in April. In spill-over effects of the fiscal and financial situation in addition, most noted that the worsening situation in Europe, the prospective path for U.S. fiscal policy, the Europe was leading to a slowdown in global economic extent of structural dislocations in the labor market, growth and greater volatility in financial markets. and the likely evolution of credit and financial market Compared with their April submissions, most partici conditions. Compared with their April assessments, the pants lowered their medium-run projections of eco range of participants' forecasts for the change in real nomic activity somewhat. The central tendencies of GDP in 2012 and 2013 shifted lower, while the disper participants' projections of real economic growth in sion of individual forecasts for growth in 2014 was 2013 and 2014 were 2.2 to 2.8 percent and 3.0 to about unchanged. Consistent with the downward shift 3.5 percent, respectively. The central tendency for the in the distribution of forecasts for economic growth, longer-run rate of increase of real GDP was 2.3 to the distribution of projections for the unemployment 2.5 percent, little changed from April. Participants rate shifted up in 2012 and 2013 and, to a lesser extent, cited several headwinds that were likely to hold back in 2014. As in April, the dispersion of estimates for the the pace of economic expansion over the forecast longer-run rate of output growth was fairly narrow, period, including the difficult fiscal and financial situa generally in a range of 2.2 to 2.7 percent. In contrast, tion in Europe, a still-depressed housing market, tight participants' views about the level to which the unem credit for some borrowers, and fiscal restraint in the ployment rate would converge in the longer run were U oited States. Consistent with the downward revisions to their pro more diverse, reflecting, among other thing~ different views on the outlook for labor supply and the structure jections for real GDP growth in 2012 and 2013, nearly of the labor market. all participants marked up their assessments for the rate of unemployment. Participants projected the unemployment rate at the end of 2012 to remain at or The Outlook for Inflation slightly below recent levels, with a central tendency of 8.0 to 8.2 percent, somewhat higher than their April Participants' views about the medium-run outlook for submissions. Participants anticipated gradual improve inflation under the assumption of appropriate mon ment in labor market conditions by 2014, but even so, etary policy were little changed from April. However, they generally thought that the unemployment rate at nearly all of them marked down their assessment of the end of that year would still lie well above their indi headline inflation in the near term, pointing to recent vidual estimates of its longer-run normal level. The declines in the prices of crude oil and gasoline that central tendencies of participants' forecasts for the were sharper than previously projected. Almost all par unemployment rate were 7.5 to 8.0 percent at the end ticipants judged that both headline and core inflation of 2013 and 7.0 to 7.7 percent at the end of 2014. The would remain subdued over the 2012-14 period, run central tendency of participants' estimates of the ning at rates at or below the FOMC's longer-run longer-run normal rate of unemployment that would objective of 2 percent. Some participants noted that 115 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 060.61167 -i;' 11 II 116 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 160.61167 1\1 I-j 11 H) 117 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00121 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 260.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 49 inflation expectations had remained stable, and several included additional balance sheet policies, II indicated pointed to resource slack and moderate increases in that their assumptions incorporated an extension labor compensation as sources of restraint on prices. through the end of 2012 of the MEP, and 2 partici Specifically, the central tendency of participants' pro pants conditioned their economic forecasts on a new jections for inflation, as measured by the PCE price program of securities purchases. Two indicated that index, moved down in 2012 to 1.2 to 1.7 percent and they would consider such purchases in the event that was little changed in 2013 and 2014 at 1.5 to 2.0 per the economy did not make satisfactory progress in ccnt. The central tendencies of the forecasts for core improving labor market conditions or in the event of a inflation were broadly the same as those for the head significant deterioration in the economic outlook or a line measure in 2013 and 2014. further increase in downside risks to that outlook. Figures 3.C and 3.D provide information about the Almost all participants assumed that the Committee diversity of participants' views about the outlook for would carry out the normalization of the balance sheet inflation. Relative to the assessments compiled in according to the principles approved at the June 2011 April, the projections for headline inflation shifted FOMC meeting. That is, prior to the first increase in down in 2012, reflecting the declines in energy prices. the federal funds rate, the Committee would likely The distributions of participants' projections for head cease reinvesting some or all principal payments on line and core inflation in 2013 and 2014 were slightly securities in the System Open Market Account lower than those reported in April. (SOMA), and it would likely begin sales of agency securities from the SOMA sometime after the first rate Appropriate Monetary Policy increase, aiming to eliminate the SOMNs holdings of agency securities over a period of three to five years. In As indicated in figure 2, most participants judged that general, participants linked their preferred start dates exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate would for the normalization process to their views for the remain appropriate at least until late 2014. In particu appropriate timing for the first increase in the target lar, seven participants thought that it would be appro federalfunds rate. One participant who thought that priate to commence policy firming in 2014, while the liftoff of the federal funds rate should occur rela another six participants thought that the first increase tively soon indicated that the reinvestment of maturing in the target federal funds rate would not be warranted securities should continue for a time after liftoff. unti12015 (upper panel). Eleven participants indicated The key factors informing participants' individual that the appropriate federal funds rate at the end of assessments of the appropriate setting for monetary 2014 would be 75 basis points or lower (lower panel), policy included their judgments regarding the maxi and those who judged that policy liftoff would not mum level of employment, the extent to which current occur until 2015 thought the federal funds rate would conditions had deviated from mandate-consistent lev be 1 y, percent or lower at the end of that year. As in els, and participants' projections of the likely time April, six participants judged that economic conditions horizon necessary to return employment and inBation would warrant an increase in the target federal funds to such levels. Several participants noted that their rate in either 2012 or 2013 in order to achieve the assessments of appropriate monetary policy reflected Committee's statutory mandate. Those participants the subpar pace of the economic expansion and the judged that the appropriate value for the federal funds persistent shortfall in aggregate demand since the rate would range from I 'Ii to 3 percent at the end of 2007-09 recession, and two commented that the neu 2014. trallevel of the federal funds rate was likely somewhat All participants reported levels for the appropriate below its historical norm. One participant expressed target federal funds rate at the end of 2014 that were concern that a protracted period of very accommoda well below their estimates of the level expected to pre tive monetary policy could lead to a bnildup of risks in vail in the longer run. Estimates of the longer-run tar the financial system. Participants also noted that get federal funds rate ranged from 3 to 4'1i percent, because the appropriate stance of monetary policy reflecting the Committee's inflation objective of 2 per depends importantly on the evolution of real activity cent and participants' judgments about the longer-run and inflation over time, their assessments of the appro equilibrium level of the real federal funds rate. priate future path of the federal funds rate and the bal Participants also provided qualitative information ance sheet could change if economic conditions were on their views regarding the appropriate path of the to evolve in an unexpected manner. Federal Reserve's balance sheet. Of the 12 participants Figure 3.E details the distribution of participants' whose assessments of appropriate monetary policy judgments regarding the appropriate level of the target 118 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 360.61167 1l j~ 11' 119 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00123 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 460.61167 11 -~1U 120 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 560.61167 il 121 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 660.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 53 federal funds rate at the end of each calendar year Table 2. Average historical projection error ranges from 2012 to 2014 and over the longer run. Most par Percentage f!oints ticipants judged that economic conditions would war rant maintaining the current low level of the federal Variable 2012 2013 2014 funds rate through the end of 2013. Views on the Change in real GDpl ±l.O ±J.6 ±L7 appropriate level of the federal funds rate at the end of Unemployment mte1 . ±O.4 ±1.2 ±1.7 2014 were more widely dispersed, with II participants Total consumer priccs2 • ±O.S ±LO ±I.l seeing the appropriate level of the federal funds rate as Note: Error ranges shown are measured as plus or minus the root mean Y. percentage point or lower and 4 of them seeing the squarcderror of projections for 1992 through 2011 that wen: rcleascd in the sum mer by various private and government forecasters. As described in the box "Fore appropriate rate as 2 percent or higher. Those who cast Uncertainty," under certain ass.umptions, there is anout a 70 percent prohabil· judged that a longer period of very accommodative i b t e y i t n h a ra t n a g c e tu s a i l m o p u l l i c e o d m by e s t h Ji e )r a r v e e a r l a G ge O s P iz , e u o n f t: m pr p o k je !y c m tio e n n l e , r a r n or d s c m on a s d u e m in e r t h p e r i p c a e ~ s t . w F ill u r monetary policy would be appropriate generally pro ther information is in David Reifschneider and Peter Tulip (2o(7), "Gauging thc Uncertainty of the Economic Outlook from Historical Forecasting Errors," jected that the unemployment rate would remain fur Finance and Economics Di~ussion Series 2007-60 (Washington: Hoard of Gover ther above its longer-run normal level at the end of nor L s o D f e t f h in e i F ti e o d n e s r o al f R v e a s ri e a r b v l e e s S y a s re te i m n , t h N e o g v e e n m e b ra e l r ) n . ote to table 1. 2014. In contrast, the 6 participants who judged that 2. Measure is the overall consumer price index, the price measure that has been policy firming should begin in 2012 or 2013 indicated c m e o n ) t ;t . . w :ha id n e g l t y !, u f s o e u d r l i b n q g u o a v r e t r e n r m o e f n t t h a e n p d r e p v r i i o v u a s te y e e c a o r n 1 o 0 m th ic e f f o o r u e r c t a h s t q '\ u . a P r r t o e j r e o ct f i o th n t; : i s y e pe a r r ~ that the Committee would need to act soon to keep indicated. inflation near the FOMC's longer-run objective of 2 percent and to prevent a rise in inflation expectations. recession that differed markedly from recent historical experience. Several commented that in the aftermath of the financial crisis, they were more uncertain about the Uncertainty and Risks level of potential output and its trend rate of growth. A majority of participants reported that they saw Nearly all participants jndged that their current level of the risks to their forecasts of real GDP growth as uncertainty about GDP growth and unemployment weighted toward the downside and, accordingly, the was higher than was the norm during the previous risks to their projections of the unemployment rate as 20 years (figure 4).'4 About half of all participants tilted to the upside. The most frequently identified judged the level of uncertainty associated with their sources of risk were the situation in Europe, which inflation forecasts to be higher as well, while another many participants thought had the potential to slow eight participants viewed uncertainty about inflation as global economic activity, particularly over the near broadly similar to historical norms. The main factors term, and the fiscal situation in the United States. cited as underlying the elevated uncertainty about eco Most participants continued to judge the risks to nomic outcomes were the ongoing fiscal and financial their projections for inflation as broadly balanced, with situation in Europe, the outlook for fiscal policy in the several highlighting the recent stability of inflation United States, and a general slowdown in global eco expectations. However, five participants saw the risks nomic growth, including the possibility of a significant to inflation as tilted to the downside, a larger number slowdown in China. As in April, participants noted the than in April; a couple of them noted that slack in difficulties associated with forecasting the path of the resource markets could turn out to be greater or could U.S. economic recovery following a financial crisis and put more downward pressure on inflation tban they were anticipating. Two participants saw the risks to 14. Table 2 provides estimates of the forecast uncertainty for the inflation as weighted to the upside, in light of concerns change in real GDP, the unemployment rate, and total consumer price inflation over the period from 1992 to 201 L At the end of this about U.S. fiscal imbalances, the current highly accom summary, the box "Forecast Uncertainty" discusses the sources and modative stance of monetary policy, or the Commit interpretation of uncertainty in the economic forecasts and explains tee's ability to effectively remove policy accommoda the approach used to assess the uncertainty and risks attending the participants' projections. tion when it becomes appropriate to do so. 122 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00126 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 760.61167 IS Ii 123 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 860.61167 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 55 Forecast Uncertainty The economic projections provided by the mem· in the second year, and 1.3 to 4.7 percent in the bers of the Board of Governors and the presidents third year. The corresponding 70 percent confi~ of the Federal ReselVe Banks inform discussions of dence intervals for overall inflation would be monetary policy among policymakers and can aid 1.2 to 2.8 percent in the current year, 1.0 to 3.0 per public understanding of the basis for policy cent in the second year, and 0.9 to 3.1 percent in actions. Considerable uncertainty attends these the third year. projections, however. The economic and statistical Because current conditions may differ from models and relationships used to help produce those that prevailed, on average, over history, par· economic forecasts are necessarily imperfect ticipants provide judgments as to whether the descriptions of the real world, and the future path uncertainty attached to their prOjections of each of the economy can be affected by myriad unfore~ variable is greater than, smaller than, or broadly seen developments and events. Thus, in setting the similar to typicallevefs of forecast uncertainty in stance of monetary policy, participants consider the past, as shown in table 2. Participants also pro not only what appears to be the most likely. eco vide judgments as to whether the risks to their pro· nomic outcome as embodied in their projections, jections are weighted to the upside, are weighted but also the range of alternative possibilities, the to the downside, or are broadly balanced. That iS t likelihood of their occurring, and the potential participants judge whether each variable is more costs to the economy should they occur. likely to be above or below their projections of the Table 2 summarizes the average historical accu~ most likely outcome. These judgments about the racy of a range of forecasts, including those uncertainty and the risks attending each partici reported in past MonetaI}' Policy Reports and those pant's projections are distinct from the diversity of prepared by the Federal Reserve Board's staffin participants' views about the most likely outcomes. advance of meetings of the Federal Open Market Forecast uncertainty is concerned with the risks Committee. The projection error ranges shown in associated with a particular projection ratherthan the table illustrate the considerable uncertainty with divergences across a number of different associated with economic forecasts. For example, projections. suppose a participant projects that real gross As with real activity and inflation, the outlook domestic product (GOP) and total consumer prices for the future path of the federal funds rate issub will rise steadily at annual rates of/ respectively, ject to considerable uncertainty. This uncertainty 3 percent and 2 percent. If the uncertainty attend~ arises primarily because each participant's assess~ ing those projections is similar to that experienced ment of the appropriate stance of monetary policy in the past and the risks around the projections are depends importantly on the evolution of real activ broadly balanced, the numbers reported in table 2 ity and inflation overtime. If economic conditions would imply a probability of about 70 percent that evolve in an unexpected manner, then assessments actual GDP would expand within a range of 2.0 to of the appropriate setting of the federal funds rate 4.0 percent in the current year, 1.4 to 4.6 percent would change from that pOint forward. 124 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 960.61167 57 Abbreviations ABCP asset-backed commercial paper ABS asset-backed securities AFE advanced foreign economy AIG American International Group, Inc. BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis BHC bank holding company BOE Bank of England BOJ Bank of Japan CCAR Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review CDS credit default swap C&I commercial and industrial CMBS commercial mortgage-backed seeurities CP commercial paper CRE commercial real estate DPI disposable personal income ECB European Central Bank EME emerging market economy E&S equipment and software ESM European Stability Mechanism EU European Union FOMC Federal Open Market Committee; also, the Committee FRBNY Federal Reserve Bank of New York FSOC Financial Stability Oversight Council GDP gross domestic product GSE government-sponsored enterprise HARP Home Affordable Refinance Program IMF International Monetary Fund lPO initial public offering MBS mortgage-backed securities MEP maturity extension program Michigan survey Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers NIPA national income and product accounts NPR notice of proposed rulemaking PCE personal consumption expenditures 125 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 070.61167 58 Monetary Polky Report to the Congress 0 July 2012 PRI Institutional Revolutionary Parly SCOOS Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms SEP Summary of Economic Projections SLOOS Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices SOMA System Open Market Account S&P Standard & Poor's STBL Survey of Terms of Business Lending TALF Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 126 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 570.61167 Question for The Honorable Ben S. Bernanke, Chainnan, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, from Representative Cleaver: 1. The LIBOR by virtue of the manner in which it is calculated seems to be open to distortion. What proposals would you put forward in order to improve the credibility and validity of the rate? A number of efforts are under way to examine the issues surrounding the calculation of LIB OR and to determine the appropriate next steps for refonn of LIB OR and potentially other fmancial market benchmarks. These efforts include work being done by authorities in the United Kingdom, the Bank for Intemational Settlements, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and other international agencies. The Federal Reserve Board has taken part in discussions of possible refonns of LIBOR in international forums including the Economic Consultative Committee, a group of central bank governors, and the Financial Stability Board. Domestically, the Board and other Financial Stability Oversight Council agencies have cooperated in studying the risks surrounding the current LIBOR framework and the alternatives that are being considered. Authorities are still grappling with a number of issues. For example, if the decision is made to fix the current system, then governance of the process, both within rate-submitting banks and within the body that oversees the calculation, must be improved. In addition, changes in the calculation may also be desirable. If, on the other hand, the decision is made to replace LIBOR with an alternative benchmark, there are a host of other issues to address. For example, how to transition to the alternative, whether the alternative will be transaction based or will remain an indicative quote, and how to handle legacy contracts. Finally, an important question is who should oversee the refonn process. Because LIBOR and other similar benchmarks were developed by, and are primarily used by, the private sector, the private sector will likely playa major role in the LIBOR refonn efforts, though UK regulators will also playa key role in ensuring the refonns are adeqnate and in the public interest. The Federal Reserve, like other central banks, has an interest in the outcome of the refonn efforts, given our monetary policy and financial stability responsibilities. We will continue to carefully monitor risks arising from and options to refonn LIBOR and other benchmarks, and we will be prepared to provide support to refonn efforts as necessary and appropriate. 127 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 080.61167 uestions for The Honorable Ben S. Bernank Federal Reserve S stem from Re resentativ 1. While I understand that the Federal Reserve does not have internal mechanisms for measuring the creditworthiness of intellectual property held in general intangible lines, is the Federal Reserve taking any steps for these assets to be included in measuring overall reserve capital by means of impacting risk weighted asset calculations? Of investment grade counterparties were willing to monetize the liquid value of these collateral pools, does the Federal Reserve believe that these knowledge economy assets could be included in assessments of banking capital adequacy? Consistent with the practice of the other federal banking agencies, the Board recognizes only limited forms of collateral in the calculation of a banking organization's risk-weighted assets for risk-based capital purposes. The Board may take other forms of collateral into consideration in evaluating the risks inherent in a banking organization's exposures and assessing its capital adequacy more generally. Revisions to the regulatory capital framework recently proposed by the federal banking agencies would provide for greater recognition of financial collateral. See 77 Federal Register 52888, 52909,52958 (August 30,2012). The proposal would expand the list of eligible forms of collateral under the agencies' risk-based capital rules to include additional liquid and readily marketable instruments, such as certain types of debt securities and publicly-traded equity securities. Banking organizations would be required to meet certain prudential requirements to recognize the collateral, such as having a perfected, first priority interest in the collateral. The expanded definition offmancial collateral under the proposed rules does not include intellectual property held in general intangible liens as a potential form of financial collateral. The Board is in the process of reviewing carefully the comments on the proposal. The Board is not aware that intellectual property rights held in general intangible liens currently take the form ofliquid and readily marketable instruments. We will continue to monitor developments in this market. 2. During your appearance before the House Committee on Financial Services in March 2011, you answered one of my questions by stating that we know from experience that small banks are often the ones that are best situated to provide credit to small businesses so they can expand and create jobs, especially in rnral communities. Based on the Federal Reserve and other regulators recent proposal to extend the Basel III capital requirements to all banks, do you foresee any disproportionate effects on smaller banks and the communities they serve? Has the Federal Reserve or another regulatory authority performed an analysis on how these capital thresholds for smaller institutions will affect access to capital and job creation in rnral communities? Many requirements in the Basel III proposal are focused on larger organizations and would not be applicable to community banking organizations. These requirements include the proposed countercyclical capital buffer, the proposed supplementary leverage ratio, proposed enhanced 128 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00132 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 180.61167 -2- disclosure requirements, proposed enhancements to the advanced approaches risk-based capital framework, stress testing requirements, a systemically important fInancial institution capital surcharge, and market risk capital reforms. These changes, along with other recent regulatory capital enhancements, would require large, systemically important banking organizations to hold signifIcantly higher levels of capital relative to other organizations. In developing the Basel III-based capital requirements, the Board and the other federal banking agencies conducted an impact analysis based on regulatory reporting data to estimate the change in capital that banking organizations would be required to hold to meet the proposed minimum capital requirements. Based on the agencies' analysis, the vast majority of banking organizations currently would meet the fully phased-in minimum capital requirements, and those organizations that would not meet the proposed minimum requirements would have time to adjust their capital levels by the end of the transition period. More specifically with regard to smaller banking organizations, for bank holding companies with less than $10 billion in assets that meet the current minimum regulatory capital requirements, the analysis indicated that more than 90 percent of organizations would meet the new 4.5 percent minimum common equity tier 1 ratio today. In addition, quantitative analysis by the Macroeconomic Assessment Group, a working group of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, found that the stronger Basel III capital requirements would lower the probability of banking crises and their associated economic output losses while having only a modest negative impact on gross domestic product and lending costs, and that the potential negative impact could be mitigated by phasing in the requirements over time. Nonetheless, the Board is concerned about the potential effect of the Basel III proposals on community banks. The Board is still in the process of reviewing the comments it has received on the proposal, including those regarding the likely impact on smaller institutions. The Board will be mindful of these comments when considering potential refinements to the proposal and will work to appropriately balance the benefIts of a revised capital framework against its potential costs, including further tailoring the requirements for smaller institutions as appropriate. 3. Additionally, during your appearance in March 2011, we spoke about what the Federal Reserve has done to curb perceived micromanagement by bank examiners and regulators. Can you provide details on what steps the Federal Reserve has taken over the past two years to tailor its regulatory requirements and examination process based on recommendations and concerns that you have heard from community banks? In recent years, the Board has taken a number of steps to reduce regulatory burden on, and enhance its communication with, community banks. In 2009, the Board established a subcommittee to focus on supervisory approaches to community and regional banks to ensure that their views on the supervisory process are considered. This subcommittee is led by Board Governors Elizabeth Duke and Sarah Bloom Raskin. A primary goal of the subcommittee is to ensure that the development of supervisory guidance is informed by an understanding of the unique characteristics of community and regional banks and consideration of the potential for excessive burden and adverse effects on lending. In addition, in 2010, the Board established the 129 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00133 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 280.61167 -3 - Community Depository Institutions Advisory Council (CDIAC) to provide input on the economy, lending conditions, and other issues of interest to community banks. Members include representatives of banks, thrift institutions, and credit unions serving on local advisory councils at the 12 Federal Reserve Banks. One member of each of the Reserve Bank councils is selected to serve on the CDlAC, which meets twice a year with the Board in Washington, D.C. Feedback from community bankers has consistently pointed to increasing regulatory burden as a concern and threat to the viability of the community bank model. Last year, the Board's subcommittee on community and regional banks asked that a series of initiatives be developed to clarify regulatory expectations, alleviate regulatory burdens where possible, and reduce the potential that regulatory actions could curtail lending. In response, Federal Reserve staff initiated a number of projects to enhance supervision practices for community banks and alleviate some of the burdens that have been of the most immediate concern. Several of these projects aim to revise or clarifY guidance. These have included the development and issuance of guidance to reiterate when supervisory rating upgrades may be considered for community banks recovering from the effects of the recent crisis, to enhance the transparency and consistency of assessments of the adequacy of banks' allowances for loan and lease losses, and to clarify capital planning expectations for community banks. Others projects are intended to improve our examination processes by reviewing exam preparation procedures to ensure that report findings are clearly communicated and fully consistent with infonnation provided to bankers during exit meetings, developing and adopting common teChnology tools across the System to improve efficiency and potentially reduce burden on supervised companies, and evaluating applications-processing procedures to enhance transparency and identify opportunities for streamlining. Overall, these efforts are intended to ensure a rigorous, but balanced, approach to safety and soundness supervision that fosters a stable, sound, and vigorous community bank population. 130 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 380.61167 uestions for The Honorable Ben S. Bernanke Federal Reserve S stem from Re resentative cCarth: 0,, _______ 1. The recent CFTC and DOJ Settlements reached with Barciays regarding their manipulation of the LIDOR index, still leaves outstanding issue of ensuring that such manipulation foes not occur again. Recognizing this is an international issue and will require cooperation from European regulators, • What changes do you feel are necessary to better detect and ultimately avoid future manipulation of the LIDOR index? A number of efforts are under way to examine the issues surrounding the calculation of UBOR and to detennine the appropriate next steps for refonn of LIDOR and potentially other financial market benchmarks. These efforts include work being done by authorities in the United Kingdom, the Bank for International Settlements, the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and other international agencies. The Federal Reserve Board has taken part in discussions of possible reforms of LID OR in intemational forums including the Economic Consultative Committee, a group of central bank governors, and the Financial Stability Board. Domestically, the Board and other Financial Stability Oversight Council agencies have cooperated in studying the risks surrounding the current LIBOR framework and the alternatives that are being considered. Authorities are still grappling with a number of issues. For example, if the decision is made to fix the current system, then governance of the process, both within rate-submitting banks and within the body that oversees the calculation, must be improved. In addition, changes in the calculation may also be desirable. If, on the other hand, the decision is made to replace LIBOR with an altemative benchmark, there are a host of other issues to address. For example, how to transition to the alternative, whether the alternative will be transaction based or will remain an indicative quote, and how to handle legacy contracts. Finally, an important question is who should oversee the refonn process. Because LIDOR and other similar benchmarks were developed by, and are primarily used by, the private sector, the private sector will likely playa major role in the LIBOR refonn efforts, though UK regulators will also playa key role in ensuring the refonns are adequate and in the public interest. The Federal Reserve, like other central banks, has an interest in the outcome of the refonn efforts, given our monetary policy and financial stability responsibilities. We will continue to carefully monitor risks arising from and options to refonn LIBOR and other benchmarks, and we will be prepared to provide support to refonn efforts as necessary and appropriate. 2. In a recent Wall Street Journal article "Fed Wrestles With How Best to Bridge U.S. Credit Divide," June 19, 2012, the point is made that the Federal Reserve's low interest rate policy has not improved access to credit for those who need it most - Americans of modest means and lower credit scores, and has not influenced the credit divide in this country. 131 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 480.61167 -2- • What is the Fed's responsibility in achieving a more equitable spread of the benefits from the policies put in place to spur economic growth? The Federal Reserve has multiple responsibilities in this regard. First, the Federal Reserve has responsibility for pursuing the monetary policy mandates given to it by the Congress, namely price stability and maximum sustainable employment. The experience of the last several years also demonstrates conclusively how critical fmancial stability is to the achievement ofits monetary policy mandate. The Federal Reserve also has important supervisory responsibilities. As important as these policy responsibilities are, they are not a panacea The economy faces multiple important challenges, and all economic policymakers should ensure that they are using every available tool to work toward a more rapid retum of a durable and broadly shared prosperity. • What policy changes can be made to bridge the credit divide, while still preserving safety and soundness? The Federal Reserve has long been oriented toward promoting these objectives. We do that through our microprudential supervision of financial institution; through our development and conduct of macroprudential policy; and through our conduct of monetary policy. As I have said many times, the recovery is proceeding too slowly for anyone's satisfaction, and I can assure you that the Federal Reserve will not stint in its efforts toward the achievement of our various policy objectives. 3. In addition to the liquidity support the Federal Reserve has provided the European Central Bank, what more do you feel could or should the United States do to encourage or support the Eurozone financial crisis response? European leaders have recently taken some important steps toward resolving their crisis, including an agreement on additional aid to Greece and some progress toward banking union. The Europeans will need to build on that progress by working to fulfill their commitments to support growth, financial stability, and fiscal and financial integration in the region. The Federal Reserve and the Treasury are in contact with our counterparts in Europe to remain apprised of the situation there, to consult as appropriate, and to assist in monitoring of potential spillovers to the U.S economy. In the event that financial stresses in Europe were to worsen and threaten the U.S. economic recovery or U.S. financial stability, the Federal Reserve is prepared to use its policy tools as necessary to address strains in financial markets and support the flow of credit to households and firms. The Federal Reserve and several other major central banks have already established swap lines that allow the foreign central banks to provide dollar liquidity to banks in their jurisdictions. These facilities should help reduce pressure on dollar funding markets in the United States, which are important for U.S. households and businesses. In addition to the liquidity support that the Federal Reserve has supplied, we believe that the United States can also contribute to the health of the European economies, and thus support the Eurozone financial crisis response, by bolstering our own economic recovery. 132 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 670.61167 Ouestions for The Honorable Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. from Representative Paul: 1. What items constitute the "Other Federal Reserve assets" line item in Table 1 of the weekly Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve Banks? Please provide as detailed a categorized list as possible? "Other Federal Reserve assets" ("other assets") include assets denominated in foreign currencies; premiums paid on securities bought; accrued interest on other accounts receivable; Reserve Bank premises and operating e~uipment less allowances for depreciation; and, until recently, float related as-of adjustments. Until January 2009, "other assets" also included the currency swaps with other central banks. For reference, the Board of Governors' Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet public website presents a summary of the H.4.1 statistical release with an interactive guide (http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicylbstfedsbalancesheet.htm). 2. The "Other Federal Reserve assets" line item increased from approximately 540 billion in early 2009 to roughly 5100 billion in early 2010, remaining at that level throughout 2010. What were the causes for the increase in the "Other Federal Reserve assets" line items over the 2009-2010 period? You noted that between 2009 and early 20 I 0, "other assets" increased. Indeed, between January 28, 2009, and the present, "other assets" have increased by roughly $150 billion. The increase primarily reflects an increase in unamortized premiums on securities held in the Federal Reserve's System Open Market Account portfolio. The Federal Reserve purchases securities in the open market at market-determined prices. The market price of a security can be expressed as the face value of that security plus a premium or a discount, depending on whether the market price of the security is above or below the face value on the date of purchase. On the H.4.1 statistical release, we report the face value of the securities, and the premium or discount at the time of purchase is separately reported under "other assets." This accounting treatment has been in place for decades. Since early 2009, the Federal Reserve has engaged in large-scale asset purchases in an effort to ease overall financial conditions and to provide support for the economic recovery. Because the market prices of most of the securities that were purchased were greater than the face value of those securities, "other assets" have increased reflecting the accumulation of premiums as our holdings of securities have increased? I As one part of an effort to simplifY the administration of reserve requirements and thereby reduce burden on the banking sector, the Federal Reserve eliminated as-of adjustments on July 12,2012. Additional infonnation about reserves simplifications can be found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/otherI20120405a.htm 2 The Federal Reserve publishes the details ofal! ofits securities holdings on the public website of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (http://www.newyorkfed.orglmarkets/somalsysopen_accholdings.btml). 133 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00137 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 770.61167 -2- 3. The "Other Federal Resenre assets" line item has nearly doubled since early 2011, increasing from roughly $100 billion to almost $200 billion. What is (are) the cause(s) for this increase in the "Other Federal Resenre assets" line item? Please see the response to question 2. 4. Is the increase in the line item "Other Federal Resenre assets" related in any way to the dollar swap lines with foreign central banks or to other assistance to foreign central banks, commercial banks, or governments? The central bank liquidity swaps that the Federal Reserve has with other central banks have been reported separately since January 2009. As a result, the increase in "other assets" since then is not related to those swaps, nor is it related to assistance to foreign institutions. 5. The central bank liquidity swap lines when first drawn upon in 2007 were published in the HA.l release with the "Other Federal Resenre assets" line item before being broken out into a separate line item in early 2009. Are there some specific facilities, asset types, or other categories that could be given their own line item now that the "Other Federal Resenre assets" line items had grown so large? Although the security premiums at the date of purchase are largely a technical accounting item, we are considering whether to report the premiwns on securities separately from other items included in the "other assets" category. 134 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00138 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 870.61167 Ouestions for The Honorable Ben S. Bernanke. Ch~oard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, from Representative Sc~ \ " , 1. In light ofthe current Weighted Average Matuiity-orU.S. sovereign debt, what is your position on encouraging policy makers, particularly those at the Treasury Department, to begin issuing extended durations bonds, such as 50-, 75-, and 99-year bonds? Wouldn't this direction in monetary policy be consistent with the design and intent of Operation Twist, and at the same time reduce U.S. exposure at future refinancing? The Treasury Department makes all decisions regarding the issuance of U.S. Treasury debt. As an independent agency, the Federal Reserve does not offer advice regarding debt issuance matters to the Treasury Department. 2. At a recent hearing held by the Capital Markets Subcommittee I asked the witnesses which issue in the proposed Dodd-Frank rules would most hinder liquidity and a return of the securitization markets. Every one of them raised the same concern: the Premium Capture Cash Reserve Account, or PCCRA, that's part of your proposed risk retention rule. Economist Mark Zandi of Moody's Analytics has written that the PCCRA and the Qualified Mortgage rule, when taken together - have "the potential to significantly restrict the amount of credit available for borrowers without qualified residential mortgages." He estimates the mortgage rate impact to borrowers would be between 1 and 4 percent. Last month a bipartisan group of six Republicans and six Democrat Senators wrote to you, among others, saying that "The PCCRA ... was not envisioned by Congress" and would "negatively impact capital formation." I have submitted the letter for the record. My question to you, Mr. Chairman, is: given that the PCCRA was not a part of Dodd-Frank and was never even contemplated by Congress, don't you think the Fed - which is the only one of the six regulators pushing this proposal-should defer to Congress and drop this harmful idea? On March 31, 2011, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (collectively, the "Agencies") invited public comment on a proposal that would implement the risk retention requirements under section 941 (b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act generally requires the securitizer of asset-backed securities ("ABS") to retain not less than 5 percent of the credit risk of the assets that collateralize those securities. The statute also requires that the risk retention regulations prohibit a securitizer from directly or indirectly hedging or otherwise transferring the credit risk that the securitizer is required to retain with respect to an asset. As the Agencies explained in the joint proposed rulemaking to implement section 941 (the "Proposed Rule"), the securitizer may sell premium income from assets collateralizing ABS that is expected to be generated over the life of a transaction at the inception of a transaction, thereby 135 VerDate Nov 24 2008 18:12 Mar 21, 2013 Jkt 076116 PO 00000 Frm 00139 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 K:\DOCS\76116.TXT TERRI 970.61167 -2- potentially negating or undennining the securitizer's retention of risk pursuant to the requirement. I The Agencies proposed the premium capture cash reserve account ("PCCRA") as a way to address this issue and promote meaningful risk retention by prohibiting sponsors from receiving compensation at the inception of a securitization transaction for premium income that would be generated by the securitized assets over time. As explained in the Proposed Rule, it was expected that the PCCRA would better align the interests of securitizers and investors by disallowing such upfront compensation and thereby potentially promote sound underwriting. It was also expected that the PCCRA would promote simpler and more coherent securitization structures. In the Proposed Rule, the Agencies specifically requested comment on the PCCRA and sought input on alternative methodologies for achieving similar goals.2 The Board and the other Agencies received numerous comments on the PCCRA, as well as suggestions for modification of the PCCRA and alternative methods for ensuring economically meaningful risk retention. In addition, Federal Reserve staffhas met with industry groups and other commenters to better understand their concerns about the PCCRA, along with the other Agencies. The Board is carefully considering all comments and suggestions on the PCCRA in determining how to move forward with the rulemaking. 3. Our committee's chairman, Spencer Bachus, and my subcommittee chairman, Scott Garrett, have repeatedly asked the Fed and the other regulators for an economic analysis ofPCCRA. Is that forthcoming? When can we expect it? The Board has long been committed to considering the costs and benefits of its rulemaking efforts and takes into account all comments and views from the public on the costs and benefits of a proposed rulemaking. Indeed, the Board and the other Agencies specifically invited comment on the costs and benefits of the risk retention proposal and the PCCRA. As it reviews the comments submitted regarding the proposal, including comments on the PCCRA, the Board will carefully weigh the costs and benefits of the PCCRA and other alternatives for implementing risk retention rules that are consistent with the statutory mandate and purpose. 4. Does the Federal Reserve intend to produce any kind ofimpact study on a potential increase in mortgage rates for borrowers if PCCRA is codified into law? As it reviews the comments regarding the proposal, including comments on the PCCRA, the Board is carefully considering the potential effects of the PCCRA, including on mortgage rates for borrowers, in detennining how to move forward with the rulemaking. This is consistent with the Board's rulemaking practice and the Board has incorporated economic impact information into its final rule notices where appropriate. I See 76 FR24113-24114 (April 29, 2011). 2 SeeiQ. o

Ben S. Bernanke (2012, July 17). Congressional Testimony. Testimony, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/testimony_20120718_chair_monetary_policy_and_the_state_of_the

@misc{wtfs_testimony_20120718_chair_monetary_policy_and_the_state_of_the,
  author = {Ben S. Bernanke},
  title = {Congressional Testimony},
  year = {2012},
  month = {Jul},
  howpublished = {Testimony, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/testimony_20120718_chair_monetary_policy_and_the_state_of_the},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}