Congressional Testimony

S. HRG. 108–232 FEDERAL RESERVE’S FIRST MONETARY POLICY REPORT FOR 2003 HEARING BEFORETHE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, ANDURBANAFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON OVERSIGHT ON THE MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSU- ANTTOTHEFULLEMPLOYMENTANDBALANCEDGROWTHACTOF1978 FEBRUARY 11, 2003 Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 90–930 PDF WASHINGTON : 2004 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JACK REED, Rhode Island RICK SANTORUM, Pennsylvania CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York JIM BUNNING, Kentucky EVAN BAYH, Indiana MIKE CRAPO, Idaho ZELL MILLER, Georgia JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey KATHLEEN L. CASEY, Staff Director and Counsel PEGGY R. KUHN, Senior Financial Economist STEVEN B. HARRIS, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel MARTIN J. GRUENBERG, Democratic Senior Counsel JOSEPH R. KOLINSKI, Chief Clerk and Computer Systems Administrator GEORGE E. WHITTLE, Editor (II) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 C O N T E N T S TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2003 Page Opening statement of Chairman Shelby................................................................ 1 Opening statements, comments, or prepared statements of: Senator Dodd .................................................................................................... 2 Senator Allard................................................................................................... 4 Senator Reed ..................................................................................................... 4 Senator Bunning............................................................................................... 5 Senator Schumer .............................................................................................. 6 Senator Sununu ................................................................................................ 6 Senator Bayh .................................................................................................... 7 Senator Dole...................................................................................................... 7 Prepared statement ................................................................................... 44 Senator Miller ................................................................................................... 7 Senator Crapo ................................................................................................... 7 Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 8 Senator Sarbanes.............................................................................................. 9 Prepared statement ................................................................................... 44 Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 11 Prepared statement ................................................................................... 45 Senator Corzine ................................................................................................ 13 Senator Stabenow ............................................................................................. 39 WITNESS Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys- tem, Washington, DC ........................................................................................... 13 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46 Response to written questions of: Senator Shelby........................................................................................... 52 Senator Reed.............................................................................................. 60 Senator Bunning ....................................................................................... 63 Senator Miller ............................................................................................ 64 Senator Crapo ............................................................................................ 65 Senator Sarbanes ...................................................................................... 68 ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOR THE RECORD Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, February 11, 2003 .............................. 70 (III) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 FEDERAL RESERVE’S FIRST MONETARY POLICY REPORT FOR 2003 TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2003 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The Committee met at 10:15 a.m., in room SH–216 of the Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Richard C. Shelby (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RICHARD C. SHELBY Chairman SHELBY. The hearing will come to order. I believe we have a quorum. Since we have a quorum present, I would ask that the Committee favorably report the nomination of William Donaldson, to be a Member of the Securities and Exchange Commission for the remainder of the term expiring June 5, 2007. Can we do a voice vote? Senator DODD. I second the nomination on that, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. The nomination has been seconded by Sen- ator Dodd. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.] Chairman SHELBY. All opposed, no. [No response.] Chairman SHELBY. The ayes have it. The nomination is favorably reported. We will leave the record open so that any Member who is not present will have an oppor- tunity to record their votes, if they care to. I am very pleased this morning to welcome Chairman Greenspan before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, to testify on the Federal Reserve’s Semi-Annual Monetary Policy Re- port to the Congress. Chairman Greenspan, our Nation’s economy appears to be highly resilient. Last year, accounting scandals and corporate misdeeds unnerved investors and weakened trust in financial markets. The war on terrorism and our continuing efforts to enhance homeland security consumed valuable resources, but are necessary to pre- serve long-term security and freedom. Despite these challenges, the economy grew at a 2.8 percent pace in 2002, with inflation remaining low at only 1.3 percent. Produc- tivity growth was more impressive. On an annual average basis, productivity in both the business and nonfarm business sectors rose 4.7 percent in 2002—the fastest pace since 1950, and more than four times the 1.1 percent gain posted in 2001. On the unem- ployment front, the unemployment rate decreased to 5.7 percent in (1) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 2 January, falling three-tenths of a percentage point from December’s 6.0 percent, and hit its lowest level since September 2002. On the economic front, consumers continue to be a source of strength to this economy. Many homeowners have benefited from record low interest rates as they purchase new homes and refi- nance mortgages. Residential investment remains strong, but busi- ness investment continues to be weak. This is certainly a source of concern as we look to businesses to purchase new equipment and hire new workers. I believe that ending the double tax on corporate income and per- manently raising expensing limits for small firms would stimulate more of this needed investment. While it would be very difficult to repeat the productivity gains of this past year, we need to continue to focus on what can be done to further grow the economy, to im- prove productivity, and ultimately the standard of living for all our workers. This requires that we look to our fiscal policy for improvement. I believe the President has put forward a very thoughtful, targeted, and balanced plan that would not only stimulate the economy in the short term, but make very positive long-term policy changes that would sustain strong economic growth. But just as vital to our success in achieving these goals is the underlying credibility and integrity of our capital markets. Earlier this morning, just a few minutes ago, this Committee voted to send forward the nomination of William Donaldson to chair the Securities and Exchange Commission. I believe he has the stature and the experience to provide the strong leadership that will be necessary to help set the tone for the high standards of corporate governance and financial reporting that our markets demand. Mr. Chairman, we are pleased to have you with us this morning, and we look forward to you discussing with us the necessary ac- tions we must take to ensure that our economy grows and prospers in the coming years. I look forward to hearing your remarks. Senator Dodd. STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sarbanes, I am sure, will be along shortly. Let me make a couple of opening comments, and then leave the record open for Senator Sarbanes to add his thoughts as well. First of all, Mr. Chairman, we welcome you once again before this Committee to discuss the Federal Reserve’s Monetary Policy and the state of the economy. It is always a pleasure to have you here before us. Since you last appeared before the Committee, Mr. Chairman, the unemployment rate has lingered near 6 percent and the stock market continues to tumble. Consumer confidence levels remain low and economic growth has been reduced to a near stand-still, at 0.07 percent. All this, in addition to the looming war and rising oil prices, has led some analysts to continue to express concern that we may see a double-dip recession. When President Bush took office, the Nation was in the midst of its fourth consecutive year of budget surpluses. Both the Congres- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 3 sional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget projected surpluses of more than $5.6 trillion over fiscal years 2002 through 2011. At that time, the President submitted his first budget 2 years ago and he promised that the Nation could afford to use projected surpluses to pay for his $1.3 trillion tax cut, and still have enough to meet our spending needs in the Nation. I believe he was wrong. His tax cuts have brought about soaring deficits and instead of try- ing to decrease the deficit, the President continues to add to it. Last week, President Bush submitted his fiscal year 2004 budget proposal to Congress, which substantiates how much the economy has deteriorated during his first 2 years in office. In the Bush Administration’s first budget, it projected a 2004 surplus of $262 billion. In his second budget, a year ago, the Ad- ministration projected a $14 billion deficit for the year 2004. And now the budget for fiscal year 2004 projects a record deficit of $304 billion this year and $307 billion next year. During President Clinton’s last year in office, we were looking at record surpluses of $236 billion. This is the swiftest fiscal deterio- ration our Nation has seen in its history. This is even worse than the record deficit set by President Bush’s father. Even though the numbers show that the President’s previous economic policies hurt the economy, this year’s budget contains much of the same centerpieces as the first budget demonstrated— tax cuts for some of the wealthiest Americans. This year’s proposed tax cuts will cost $1.3 trillion. I see, by the way, my colleague from Maryland has arrived. Just yesterday, more than 10 Nobel Laureates, together with 450 respected economists from universities and institutes from all across the Nation signed a statement expressing caution that the tax cut plan proposed by the President will not only fail to help the economy in the short run, but also will weaken it over the long term by enlarging projected deficits. Any growth package, of course, that Congress passes should go to the people who most feel the ills of the economy. After all, since before President Truman, no President has presided over an econ- omy registering net job loss until now. Since President Bush took office, the economy has lost 2.3 million private-sector jobs, averaging about 75,000 jobs lost a month. In contrast to the previous Administration, we saw the creation of 239,000 jobs gained per month. In 2001, it was projected that we would be debt-free by 2008. The Congressional Budget Office now forecasts that the Nation’s pub- licly held debt will skyrocket to close to $4 trillion. History has shown us that if we ignore fiscal discipline, the debt continues to increase and we will see high long-term interest rates and lower productivity growth. Businesses will be less likely to in- vest and spend. Chairman Greenspan himself has said this throughout the years. Mr. Chairman, these are trying times both home and abroad. But the decisions we make on the economy today will have long-lasting implications for all of us, and generations to come hereafter. We need to understand that circumstances have changed pro- foundly. Our surpluses have turned into deficits. We are seeing a VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 4 record number of job losses. Our economy’s growth rate has been the slowest in 50 years. The Dow and NASDAQ stock markets have lost roughly $5 trillion in market value. It would be foolish for anyone to think that our policies should not change in response to these circumstances. It is unfortunate that thus far the Administration, in my view, has failed to see this. So, Mr. Chairman, we look forward to hearing from you this morning to talk about what can be done to change the direction that we presently seem to be heading in. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Allard. COMMENTS OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I would like to join you in welcoming Chairman Green- span before this Committee again. It is always a delight to hear his comments as we move forward with the next Congressional session. I happen to feel that when the President assumed office, the economy was beginning to head in the wrong direction. It was headed in a negative direction. And I believe now, that the econ- omy is beginning to head back in a positive direction. I want to thank Chairman Greenspan for his efforts to get us on the right track. Yet, the American economy still has some elements of uncer- tainty. But I still believe it is critical that the Congress move to address the long-term solvency of Social Security and Medicare, to put the Government on a plan to pay down the national debt, and to continue to cut taxes. I believe by pursuing policies of low tax- ation, limited Federal regulation, free trade, and monetary policy, the United States will experience great wealth and opportunity. We will create new jobs. I believe that we should follow these policies of limited Govern- ment. And Chairman Greenspan, having shared a few of my thoughts with you, I now look forward to your comments. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Reed. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Chairman Greenspan, for joining us. I would like to associate myself with Senator Dodd’s comments. I thought he was quite eloquent in his discussion of the current economic situation. Like him, I am afraid that the fiscal discipline of the 1990’s is a fading memory and we are headed for a repeat of the fiscal mistakes of the 1980’s. The 1980 tax cuts were a mistake at that time, but similar poli- cies would be an even greater mistake now. At least in the 1980’s, the pressures on the budget from the retirement of the baby-boom generation were off in the relatively distant future and there was time to restore fiscal discipline. This time, however, the biggest tax cuts will be kicking in at just about the same time that the baby boomers start retiring and start claiming the Social Security benefits that they have contributed and the Medicare they expect. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 5 There is a fundamental question that we have to address—is this Government going to break its commitments to the beneficiaries of Social Security who have contributed to the system and to Amer- ican citizens who reasonably expect that their health bills will be paid by Medicare? Also, we have a commitment to fund an ongoing war against ter- rorism and perhaps other military operations, a commitment I do not think anyone around this table, and Chairman Greenspan would say, we will not fulfill totally. With the context of Social Security, Medicare, and expenditures for war, we have to be concerned about the proposed tax cuts, which are I think both unwise and unfair. Indeed, one of the economists today who associated himself with the hundred other economists in the United States, including sev- eral Nobel Prize Winners, indicated that the President’s tax plans are a weapon of mass destruction aimed at the middle class. I think we have to be cognizant of those types of comments and recognize and understand that the policies being advanced today by the President will not help restore our economy, nor will they help us face the responsibilities to fund Social Security, Medicare, and to conduct an international war against terrorists. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Bunning. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM BUNNING Senator BUNNING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you for holding the hearing, and I would like to thank Chairman Greenspan for coming before the Com- mittee today. As we all know, and as has been said before, our Nation’s econ- omy has been sputtering. We had good growth in the first quarter of last year. We had weak growth in the second quarter. We had good growth again in the third quarter. And we had almost no growth at all in the fourth quarter. Seasonally adjusted unemployment was down in January, after a sharp rise in December. The stock market was up and now on the uncertainty of a possible war, it is down. Energy prices are up, but interest rates are still low. As I have pointed out many times, I believe that you waited too long to cut the Federal funds rate when the economy started tanking in 2000. I believe that delay has greatly contributed to the state of our economy right now. Unfortunately, we do not have a time machine to fix past mistakes. You did aggressively cut rates to try to help right the economy, so much so that it is pretty dif- ficult to cut much more. Unfortunately, it was late in the game. Hopefully, you will have some good news for us today. The Amer- ican people still do not have strong confidence in this economy. They may see a light at the end of the tunnel, but they still think it might be a train. Your words matter, Chairman Greenspan, maybe more than they should. But they still matter. You make statements on fiscal policy, which you should not be doing. I understand that sometimes making statements, you be- lieve you are off the record, and your comments about the Presi- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 6 dent’s economic plan may have been taken out of context. But this is Washington. Every microphone is ‘‘wired and hot.’’ You have been in this town for a long time. Some might say too long. You know ‘‘how to play the game’’ and you have played it well. If you are innocent and if the statement you made about the President’s plan were off the record and out of context, you should have known better. If it was neither off the record, nor out of context, then you are once again interjecting yourself into matters where you have no business. Like you, I believe the Federal Reserve should be fiercely independent. No President should try and set monetary policy. That is not his job. But the Fed Chairman should not try to set fiscal policy. That is not your job. It is a two-way street. I understand you are asking questions about fiscal policy. I am sure you will be asked some fis- cal policy questions at this hearing, and you should answer them truthfully. But just as the President should not undermine you on monetary policy, you should not undermine him or Congress on fis- cal policy. Once again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. Thank you, Chairman Greenspan, for running the gauntlet today. I look forward to talking with you further during the ques- tion and answer period. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Schumer. COMMENTS OF SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Chairman Greenspan for being with us because I believe that there is no more respected economist in the world, and we greatly value your time and perspective. Seeing Chairman Greenspan here today makes me think of the classic Yogi Berra line, it is like de´ja` vu all over again. We are all here together again. It is almost 2 years to the day when Chairman Greenspan testified before us, and again, the President has proposed tax cuts that have a profound fiscal impact. Again, we are trying to sort through it all to find the best policy. But one thing is different today. Instead of surpluses, we have ever-widening deficits as far as the eye can see. And I believe we need strong and independent voices to speak out against this ever- increasing fiscal imprudence. I disagree with my good friend from Kentucky. We need your voice. It is our hope that you will be one of those voices that speaks out against this fiscal imprudence because there is no stronger, no more respected, and no more needed voice than yours today. Our hope is that we do not end up in a true fiscal morass down the road. I very much look forward to the Chairman’s comments. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Sununu. COMMENTS OF SENATOR JOHN E. SUNUNU Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Chairman Greenspan. I appreciate your taking the time. I know these hearings are extremely time-consuming and you are faced with Members of Congress, on the House side and on the VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 7 Senate side, that would like to explain to you exactly how we would act if we had your job. So, I appreciate your patience. This is an important time internationally and domestically. I would be very interested in hearing your thoughts today about how the long-term prospects of establishing greater stability overseas, such as in Iraq and North Korea, can promote a better investment climate and can help accelerate whatever benefits—either from tax policy or fiscal policy—here in the United States, I look forward to your testimony. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Bayh. COMMENTS OF SENATOR EVAN BAYH Senator BAYH. Thank you, Chairman Shelby. Chairman Greenspan, thank you for being with us today. We are all here to hear from you and so I am going to save my comments for the question period. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Dole. COMMENTS OF SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE Senator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Greenspan, I certainly appreciate very much the opportunity as a new Member of the Committee to hear your report this morn- ing. And in the interest of time, I am going to submit my formal statement for the record. Chairman SHELBY. Without objection, it will be made part of the record. Senator Miller. COMMENTS OF SENATOR ZELL MILLER Senator MILLER. Thank you, Chairman Shelby, for holding this hearing. I have no opening statement, but we are glad to have you with us again, Chairman Greenspan. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Crapo. COMMENTS OF SENATOR MIKE CRAPO Senator CRAPO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief as well. Chairman Greenspan, I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you again and look forward to your testimony. Obviously, from some of the comments that have already been made, it is very clear that your opinion on economic matters carries a significant amount of weight. I, along with the others that are here, are going to be looking very closely at your evaluation of what is needed in our economy, not only in terms of some of the eco- nomic policy decisions that we will be making here in Congress with regard to the President’s proposal, but also with regard to some of the issues that have been around previously. For example, the derivatives issue still may arise. And I expect that during the question and answer period, to have an opportunity to discuss that with you, to see if your opinion has changed at all on how we should approach those types of issues. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 8 But, again, as some of my collegues have indicated, we are here to listen to you. And I look forward to the opportunity that we have to visit with you today. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Carper. STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMAS R. CARPER Senator CARPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Greenspan, welcome. We are delighted to have you with us today. One of my colleagues said earlier today that the President should not try to fix monetary policy any more than the Chairman of the Federal Reserve should try to fix fiscal policy. I was just thinking—how many Presidents have we seen in my lifetime who tried to fix monetary policy? I am not going to ask you to address that question. But I think most of us here know that there has been some precedent for that. I share with you a conversation we had with some Democratic and Republican centrist Senators not so long ago, conversations I had with some business leaders back in my own State of Delaware, where we talked about what we needed to do to get the economy moving. They talked a whole lot about uncertainty. They spoke of the un- certainty that we have faced with investor confidence, lack of inves- tor confidence over the last year and hopefully, the steps that we have taken here today in moving forward the nomination of Bill Donaldson to chair the Securities and Exchange Commission will help to alleviate some of that uncertainty. As time goes by, the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley legis- lation will hopefully help to boost investor confidence as well. We have uncertainty because of the fear of terrorist attacks. What are we in—orange alert these days, and a whole lot of uncer- tainty that continues to swirl around that. We have faced the uncertainties of the elections. We have sur- vived the elections. We now know who is in the majority and who is not. We still face the uncertainty of a potential war with Iraq, the ef- fect that that war will have on energy prices, on the availability of oil, the prospect of an altercation with North Korea as we deal with them and their problems. We have all kinds of uncertainty that flow out of class action lawsuits where little local courts in places like East St. Louis, Illi- nois and places in Alabama and Texas are making national class action law for our country. We see uncertainty facing companies with little exposure to as- bestos that are actually taking them under and putting them into bankruptcy. We see uncertainty with spiraling health care costs. And we see the uncertainty of a trade deficit, where we have gotten better at exporting jobs. Not just manufacturing jobs, but jobs that are high- paying jobs—software jobs, technology jobs that are going abroad faster than we would like to think. The last thing that I wanted to say is I had an interesting meet- ing with Dan Crippen, our recently departed CBO Chairman. He VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 9 put in context the Administration’s tax cut proposal and talked about its effect on the economy. He looked ahead for the next 10 years and said, GDP for the next 10 years will be about $120, $130, maybe $140 trillion. He also said the size of this tax cut proposal that we are looking at is about $650 billion. An economy of $140 trillion for the next 10 years, about a $650 billion tax cut. And what he said then really helped me put it in context. He said it is a 65-cent change to a $140 economy. Sometimes we delude ourselves, I think, by presuming that a tax cut or a spending policy is going to somehow move the economy, when actually what we do is relatively small compared to the size of the economy itself. I would just say to my colleagues, and certainly to you, and to the Administration, that we need to deal with uncertainty to get the economy moving. You have done a great job on monetary policy. You have done a terrific job and you are to be commended for that. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Sarbanes. STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL S. SARBANES Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to commend our new Chairman for producing an immediate quorum this morning to report Mr. Donaldson out of the Committee, and I would like to join that favorable vote. In fact, Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence and that of my colleagues, I would like to make just a short statement about Mr. Donaldson. In my view, he brings considerable relevant experience to this new assignment as Chairman of the SEC. He founded and man- aged a major investment company, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette. He served as Chairman and CEO of the New York Stock Exchange. He was Chairman and President and CEO of a multibillion dollar public company. And he was the first Dean and Professor at the Yale School of Management. He will face a daunting task as the new Chairman of the SEC. He must join with his fellow Commissioners in appointing the Chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. He must address the challenge of restoring confidence to the capital markets. And I very much hope that he would move immediately to implement pay parity at the SEC. I am pleased in his appearance before the Committee of recog- nizing the importance and immediate challenge of implementing the accounting responsibility and investor protection legislation we passed here in the Congress last year. At his confirmation hearing, he testified that he will vigorously enforce Sarbanes-Oxley and the rules and regulations already put forth by the SEC. He went on to say: ‘‘I will demand accountability from all respon- sible parties. I will aggressively enforce civil penalties and work co- operatively with the State and Federal law enforcement agencies and the President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force to bring those who break the law to justice.’’ VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 10 He went on to pledge to call on corporate America and Wall Street to restore the principles of honesty and integrity to their proper place. He indicated a strong concern for the welfare of the employees of the SEC. He pledged to address issues of morale and union relations at that Agency. I am hopeful that Mr. Donaldson will effectively manage the SEC and effectively enforce the Federal securities laws and that he will bring about a new era of respect for the Agency and confidence in the U.S. securities markets. And I know, Mr. Chairman, you have indicated an intention on the part of this Committee to follow closely with oversight hearings the activities at the SEC. Chairman SHELBY. Absolutely. Senator SARBANES. I am very pleased to join with my colleagues in welcoming Chairman Greenspan before our Committee this morning to testify on the Federal Reserve’s Semi-Annual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. The Federal Reserve was created with an act of Congress. We have the oversight responsibility over the activities of the Federal Reserve. We have tried to formalize those with these semi-annual reports to the Congress, which I think are extremely important. I am pleased that Chairman Greenspan is back before us carrying out this responsibility. I want to make brief reference to the statement that was signed by the economists, including 10 Nobel Prize Winners, that was just released yesterday. They have pointed out the slowdown in the eco- nomic growth, the loss of private-sector jobs, the over-capacity, cor- porate scandals, and uncertainty weigh down the economy. They view with considerable concern—one might say almost alarm—the tax cut plan proposed by the President, as a permanent change in the tax structure rather than directed toward the short- term problem of creating jobs and growth, and note that it would worsen the long-term budget outlook, adding to the Nation’s pro- jected chronic deficits. Some of my colleagues have pointed out, when President Bush came into office in January 2001, that the Federal Government was projecting a 10-year surplus of $5.6 trillion. In fact, Chairman Greenspan came before the Senate at that time supporting a tax cut proposed by President Bush on the grounds that the Govern- ment was paying off its debt too fast. I remember that hearing as though it were yesterday. Chairman Greenspan argued that a tax cut was needed, to ‘‘smooth the glide path,’’ so that the Government debt would not be paid off too quickly and put the Government in the position of acquiring private assets. Well, that was then and this is now. If the President’s program were enacted into law, the program currently being proposed, the budget projections for the same 10- year period would be a $2.1 trillion deficit. In other words, we have gone from projecting a $5.6 trillion surplus to where we would now project a $2.1 billion. Trillion. Excuse me—$2.1 trillion deficit. That is obviously a shift of $7.7 trillion. That projected figure does not include the cost of a possible war with Iraq—probably one should strike the word possible. It also does not include tax changes such VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 11 as the reform of the alternative minimum tax and the extension of tax provisions currently scheduled to sunset, which almost cer- tainly will be extended. We have done that continuously. By any measure, we are in the process of transforming the fiscal position of the United States from one of fiscal surplus to one of large fiscal deficits. Given the scale of the deficits that would be created by the President’s plan, fundamental questions are raised about the impact of deficits on interest rates, investment, growth, and jobs in our economy. Witnesses for the Administration are downplaying the impact of budget deficits. I might note that many of these witnesses not very long ago were in here testifying in favor of the balanced budget amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to require that the Federal Government have a balanced annual budget. In the face of the uncertain demands on public resources imposed by the war on terrorism, by homeland defense, by our difficulties with North Korea, and the march toward war with Iraq, I think the President’s fiscal proposals are reckless and irresponsible. It would deny us the public resources we need to meet current and future challenges. It would put upward pressure on long-term interest rates, which would reduce economic growth and impose greater hardship on middle and working class Americans. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to reviewing these and other issues with Chairman Greenspan this morning. Thank you very much. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Johnson. STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM JOHNSON Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Chairman Shelby, and Ranking Member Sarbanes. And thank you for convening today’s hearing to examine the monetary policy of the United States. We are privi- leged to have before us Chairman Alan Greenspan, and I welcome him here today to the Senate Banking Committee. Today, as we gather to hear about the state of America’s econ- omy, we face a grim picture. It is sobering to note, as Ranking Member Sarbanes has just observed, that just 2 years ago, in this very room, Chairman Greenspan cautioned this Committee about the dangers of paying down the national debt too quickly. Now just a short time later, we face a $304 billion deficit this year alone, and a deficit of more than $2 trillion projected over the next 10 years. That is without counting the costs of war, the AMT fix, or homeland security, the war and homeland security both being par- ticularly unknown and contingent in terms of the nature of the ex- pense that that will entail, other than the obvious observation that it will be extraordinarily costly. I speak in a somewhat unique circumstance among my col- leagues in that in 2001, I voted to support President Bush’s $1.3 trillion tax cut. And while I worked to moderate the cost of that tax cut in its initial proposal, and while I worked to redirect more of those resources toward middle class and working families, I agreed with Chairman Greenspan, who has often warned that Gov- ernment should not accumulate taxpayer dollars. At the time that I voted for that tax relief, this country faced historically high sur- pluses projected at $5.6 trillion for fiscal years 2002 through 2011, VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 12 and I committed myself to assisting to return surplus funds to the taxpayer at that time. I did so, however, on the condition that President Bush himself reiterated during his most recent State of the Union address when he said: ‘‘We will not pass along our prob- lems to other Congresses, other Presidents, and other generations.’’ It is difficult to believe that our circumstances have changed so dramatically since President Bush took office 2 short years ago. It is even more difficult to believe that President Bush appears deter- mined to do exactly the opposite of what he pledged not to do. That is, pass along our actions to the next generation. And frankly, I am appalled at the President’s recklessness in pro- posing a massive tax cut targeted for the rich, while so many of our Nation’s basic needs go unmet and while the prospect of enor- mously deep budget deficits loom before us. I simply cannot under- stand the impulse to plunge our Nation into even more staggering deficits at this time. Now, I believe that any stimulus plan has to meet three simple conditions: One, it should give tax relief to working families who need it and who will spend it. Two, it should give tax relief now, while the economy is weak. And three, it should not saddle our children and grandchildren with additional debt. In 2001, we were faced with record surpluses. Times have changed radically. And as I look, and as my constituents look back at what has gone on over the last several years, we have gone from a time when, frankly, the Democrats were in control in the White House and the Congress and the economy was deep in red ink. And the advice was to balance the budget, and that should come ahead of education and health care and other domestic needs. And that was done. Then, we reached a time when Democrats again were in control in Congress, at the White House, and times were good, and we had budget surpluses. Again, the recommendation was tax cuts should come ahead of education, health care, and other domestic needs. Now, we find ourselves with our Republican friends at the White House and in Congress, and the circumstances again deep in red ink and the advice yet again is tax cuts ahead of education, health care and other domestic needs. My constituents are wondering whether this is economic advice we are receiving or whether it is simply political ideology, whether this has less to do with the economy than it does with bankrupting the Federal Government so that we do not find ourselves in a posi- tion where we can invest in our schools, in our families, in our kids, in the infrastructure that we need to have, in the health care needs of our people. I have to tell you that the observations that I hear from my con- stituents are grim, indeed, about where this country is going and what the prospects are going to be in the future years if we con- tinue to follow down this road of fiscal irresponsibility. I appreciate the opportunity to listen to your words of advice, Mr. Greenspan, here today. I share with you the observations of so many of my constituents and the great fear and concern they have. I look forward to a very constructive hearing today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Corzine. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 13 COMMENTS OF SENATOR JON S. CORZINE Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I am pleased that we are having this hearing and I welcome Chairman Greenspan. It is ironically disturbing to me that I am bouncing back and forth between the Foreign Relations Committee and here today. The two issues on the table are very much interconnected. We have a tragedy of the war on terrorism ongoing, a real element of concern to the American public. We have risks of war, and we are having a hearing on the costs of recon- struction of Iraq in a post-conflict period. And I am hearing from Under Secretary Grossman in that hearing that it will take a long and sustained commitment. Times have changed. The world has changed, whether it is with regard to national security issues. And certainly, anyone’s reading of the budget and economic conditions, which we have heard my colleagues speak of. I look forward to hearing how the Federal Reserve and one of those people most respected in the world believes we should change, given the changing circumstances and environment we face with regard to the economy. These are truly times of challenge for our Nation. And it is very hard for one to understand how we can, in the first time in our his- tory at least that I know of, that we have chosen to have tax cuts in the midst of such great national challenge. I will be anxious to hear what the Chairman has to say about these kinds of issues. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, welcome again to the Com- mittee. Your written statement will be made a part of the record in its entirety. You may proceed as you wish. STATEMENT OF ALAN GREENSPAN, CHAIRMAN BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Chairman GREENSPAN. My written statement, as you know, Mr. Chairman, is rather extended and I do not intend to speak more than 10 to 12 minutes, which would be a significant excerpt out of that long testimony. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, when I testified before this Committee last July, I noted that, while the growth of economic activity over the first half of the year had been spurred importantly by a swing from rapid inventory drawdown to modest inventory accumulation, that source of impetus would surely wind down in subsequent quarters, as it did. We at the Federal Reserve recognized that a strengthening of final sales was an essential ele- ment of putting the expansion on a firm and sustainable track. To support such a strengthening, monetary policy was set to continue its accommodative stance. In the event, final sales continued to grow only modestly, and business outlays remained soft. Concerns about corporate govern- ance, which intensified for a time, were compounded over the late summer and into the fall by growing geopolitical tensions. Equity prices weakened further, the expected volatility of equity prices rose to unusually high levels, spreads on corporate debt and credit default swaps deteriorated, and liquidity in corporate debt markets VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 14 declined. The economic data and the anecdotal information sug- gested that firms were tightly limiting hiring and capital spending and keeping an unusually short leash on inventories. By early November, conditions in financial markets had firmed somewhat. But on November 6, with economic performance remain- ing subpar, the Federal Open Market Committee chose to ease the stance of monetary policy, reducing the Federal funds rate 50 basis points, to 11⁄ 4 percent. We viewed that action as an insurance against the possibility that the still widespread weakness would be- come entrenched. In the weeks that followed, financial market conditions continued to improve, but only haltingly. Mounting concerns about geo- political risks and energy supplies were mirrored by the worrisome surge in oil prices, continued skittishness in financial markets, and substantial uncertainty among businesses about the outlook. Partly as a result, growth of economic activity slowed markedly late in the summer and in the fourth quarter. Much of that decel- eration reflected a falloff in the production of motor vehicles from the near-record level that had been reached in the third quarter when low financing rates and other incentive programs sparked a jump in sales. The slowing in aggregate output also reflected ag- gressive attempts by businesses more generally to ensure that in- ventories remained under control. Thus far, those efforts have proven successful in that business inventories, with only a few ex- ceptions, have stayed lean. Apart from these quarterly fluctuations, the economy has largely extended the broad patterns of performance that were evident at the time of my July testimony. Most notably, output has continued to expand, but only modestly. As previously, overall growth has si- multaneously been supported by relatively strong spending by households and weighed down by weak expenditures by businesses. Importantly, the favorable underlying trends in productivity have continued. One consequence of the combination of sluggish output growth and rapid productivity gains has been that the labor mar- ket has remained quite soft. Another consequence of the strong performance of productivity has been its support of household incomes despite the softness of labor markets. Those gains in income, combined with the very low interest rates and reduced taxes, have permitted relatively robust advances in residential construction and household expenditures. The increases in consumer outlays have been financed partly by the large extraction of built-up equity in homes. While household spending has been reasonably vigorous, we have yet to see convincing signs of a rebound in business outlays. The emergence of a sustained and broad-based pick-up in capital spend- ing will almost surely require the resumption of substantial gains in corporate profits. Of course, the path of capital investment will also depend on the resolution of the uncertainties surrounding the business outlook. The intensification of geopolitical risks makes discerning the economic path ahead especially difficult. If these uncertainties di- minish considerably in the near term, we should be able to tell far better whether we are dealing with a business sector and an econ- omy poised to grow more rapidly—our more probable expectation— VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 15 or one that is still laboring under persisting strains and imbalances that have been misidentified as transitory. If instead, contrary to our expectations, we find that, despite the removal of the Iraq-related uncertainties, constraints to expansion remain, various initiatives for stimulus will doubtless move higher on the policy agenda. But as part of that process, the experience of recent years may be instructive. As I have testified before this Committee in the past, the most significant lesson to be learned from recent American economic history is arguably the importance of structural flexibility and the resilience to economic shocks that it imparts. I do not claim to be able to judge the relative importance of con- ventional stimulus and increased economic flexibility to our ability to weather the shocks of the past few years. But the improved flexi- bility of our economy, no doubt, has played a key role. That in- creased flexibility has been in part the result of the ongoing success in liberalizing global trade, a quarter-century of bipartisan deregu- lation that has significantly reduced rigidities in our markets for energy, transportation, communication, and financial services, and, of course, the dramatic gains in information technology that have markedly enhanced the ability of businesses to address festering economic imbalances before they inflict significant damage. This improved ability has been facilitated further by the increasing will- ingness of our workers to embrace innovation more generally. It is reasonable to surmise that but, not only have such measures contributed significantly to the long-term growth potential of the economy this past decade, but they have also enhanced its short- term resistance to recession. That said, we have too little history to measure the extent to which increasing flexibility has boosted the economy’s potential and helped damp cyclical fluctuations in activity. Even so, the benefits appear sufficiently large that we should be placing special emphasis on searching for policies that will engen- der still greater economic flexibility and dismantling policies that contribute to unnecessary rigidity. The more flexible an economy, the greater its ability to self-correct in response to inevitable, often unanticipated, disturbances, thus reducing the size and the con- sequences of cyclical imbalances. Enhanced flexibility has the ad- vantage of adjustments being automatic and not having to rest on the initiatives of policymakers, which often come too late or are based on highly uncertain forecasts. Policies intended to improve the flexibility of the economy seem to fall outside the sphere of traditional monetary and fiscal policy. But decisions on the structure of the tax system and spending pro- grams surely influence flexibility and thus can have major con- sequences for both the cyclical performance and long-run growth potential of our economy. As we approach the next decade, we need to focus attention on this necessity to make difficult choices from among programs that, on a stand-alone basis, appear very attractive. Because the baby boomers have not yet started to retire in force, and accordingly, the ratio of retirees to workers is still relatively low, we are in the midst of a demographic lull. But short of an out- sized acceleration of productivity to well beyond the average pace VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 16 of the past 7 years or a major expansion of immigration, the aging of the population now in train will end this state of relative budget tranquility in about a decade’s time. It would be wise to address this significant pending adjustment and the associated potential for the emergence of large and possibly unsustainable deficits sooner rather than later. As the President’s just-released budget put it: ‘‘The longer the delay in enacting reforms, the greater the danger, and the more drastic the remedies will have to be.’’ Reestablishing budget balance will require discipline in both rev- enue and spending actions, but restraint on spending may prove the more difficult. Tax cuts are limited by the need for the Federal Government to fund a basic level of services—for example, national defense. No such binding limits constrain spending. If spending growth were to outpace nominal GDP, maintaining budget balance would necessitate progressively higher tax rates that would eventu- ally inhibit the growth in the revenue base on which those rates are imposed. Deficits, possibly ever widening, would be the inevi- table outcome. Faster economic growth, doubtless, would make the deficits far easier to contain. But faster economic growth alone is not likely to be the full solution to currently projected long-term deficits. To be sure, underlying productivity has accelerated considerably in recent years. Nevertheless, to assume that productivity can continue to accelerate to rates well beyond the current underlying pace would be a stretch, even for our very dynamic economy. So short of a major increase in immigration, economic growth cannot be safely counted upon to eliminate deficits and the difficult choices that will be required to restore fiscal discipline. By the same token, in setting budget priorities and policies, at- tention must be paid to the attendant consequences for the real economy. Achieving budget balance, for example, through actions that hinder economic growth is scarcely a measure of success. We need to develop policies that increase the real resources that will be available to meet our longer-term needs. The greater the re- sources available—that is, the greater the output of goods and serv- ices produced by our economy—the easier will be providing real benefits to retirees in coming decades without unduly restraining the consumption of workers. These are challenging times for all policymakers. Considerable uncertainties surround the economic outlook, especially in the pe- riod immediately ahead. But the economy has shown remarkable resilience in the face of a succession of substantial blows. Critical to our Nation’s performance over the past few years has been the flexibility exhibited by our market-driven economy and its ability to generate substantial increases in productivity. Going forward, these same characteristics, in concert with sound economic policies, should help to foster a return to vigorous growth of the U.S. econ- omy to the benefit of all our citizens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. Chairman SHELBY. Thank you. Chairman Greenspan, you are well known for your comments several years ago concerning the irrational exuberance of financial markets. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 17 Over the past year, we have seen a significant decline in finan- cial markets, due in part to not only an economic slowdown, but also because of a decline in investor confidence. In fact, the NASDAQ is below the level it was when you made your comments several years back. In your opinion, have we now moved from irra- tional exuberance to excessive anxiety? Chairman GREENSPAN. Well, it is always difficult to make those judgments, Mr. Chairman, but the fact that there is some anxiety in the markets I think is very evident. Indeed, the general context of my prepared remarks is that, pending full confirmation of the impact of what we call geopolitical risks, we do not know what the underlying strength of this econ- omy is. My suspicion, and I emphasize it is very difficult to know for sure, is that that geopolitical risk is hanging very heavily on economic decisionmaking and hence, economic growth. And its elimination should, in my judgment, make a very considerable difference. Chairman SHELBY. Thank you. Do you believe that sufficient ac- tions have been taken to restore investor confidence or that we need to do more to restore market credibility? Chairman GREENSPAN. I think that the statute which was essen- tially formulated by Senator Sarbanes and Congressman Oxley has gone a very significant way in eliminating a considerable amount of the incredible corporate malfeasance which we saw over the last year or so; or at least was exposed over the last year or so. I do think that the issue of the statute is not wholly related to the short-term. It is mainly, in my judgment, related to the longer term when the next generation, having accrued irrational exu- berance, is apt to go down very similar paths that we have seen the current generation go down. I do think that, as best I can judge, a considerable amount of the malfeasance which I think is so rightly addressed by the Senator’s and the Congressman’s statute, is not a major problem for the im- mediate future. I do not deny that we are likely to find additional examples of rather atrocious accounting, atrocious behavior, and I find that more likely than not. But I would be very surprised if it were initiated beyond mid- 2002 because the decline in the market and the response of the Congress and the political system to some of the actions I think chastised the business community in a way which had the equiva- lent of almost eliminating a high fever which seemed to have gripped people who were otherwise very ethical, very responsive to their shareholders, and responsive to making their companies as best as they could. Virtually all of them, listening to their commentary, have seem- ingly come out of this fever-ridden view toward how to harvest those huge capital gains and restored, in many respects, some of the actions which they did in a more sensible way in years past. Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, homeowners have benefited greatly in recent years from continued low interest rates and rising home values. The outstanding value of revolving home equity loans at commercial banks rose from $155.5 billion in December 2001, to $212.3 billion in December 2002, just 1 year. Homeowners use this money to make other purchases or to pay down some debt. Should VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 18 we have any concerns about consumers being over-extended through these home equity loans? Would there be an adverse im- pact if home prices no longer appreciate or even decline? Chairman GREENSPAN. Senator, we have looked at that in some considerable detail, and the result of our analysis is the following: If you take overall mortgage debt, which would include home eq- uity debt and you compare it to the level of disposable income of homeowners only, the level of the debt is rising relative to income, but not significantly so. However, with the very marked decline in interest rates, the debt service cost as a percent of disposable in- come of owner-occupied households, is actually average or, if any- thing, somewhat less than average. Now, I hasten to add that a goodly part of this is the rather low interest rates that exist in the mortgage market. But unless inter- est rates come back very sharply, which would presumably occur in the context of rapid economic recovery or an acceleration of in- flation, which I do not anticipate, the balance of debt in the mort- gage market generally, even though very large, is not, in our judg- ment, a cause of concern. We would be concerned if the price of homes in general across the country moved down rather considerably. And there was a good deal of concern, as you know, about this housing bubble. But our evaluation of the data and the outlook suggests that, while obvi- ously there are potential problems, they are not serious ones that need to be addressed in any material way as far as we can judge. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Sarbanes. Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Greenspan, The Washington Post this morning has a story headlined: ‘‘Greenspan Likely To Back Dividend Plan,’’ refer- ring to the President’s proposal with respect to the taxation of cor- porate dividends. It points out later that the tax changes that the President is seeking would cost well over a trillion dollars in the next 10 years. Do you back the dividend plan? Chairman GREENSPAN. Let me make two points with respect to this, Senator. The first thing is, I have always supported the elimination of the double taxation of dividends because I think it is a major factor re- straining flexibility in our economy. And as I pointed out in my prepared remarks, moving in the direction of improving flexibility I think has very large, long-term payoffs. However, I also commented in my prepared remarks and, indeed, testified before the House Budget Committee, that PAYGO rules, which expired in September in the House, and will expire here, are very important for the budgetary process. So, I do support the elimination of the double taxation of divi- dends. I would prefer that it be done at the corporate level. But I think the way it is constructed in the President’s program makes a good deal of sense over the long run as well. But in my judgement, any such initiative should be in the con- text of PAYGO rules, which means that the deficit must be main- tained at minimal levels. Senator SARBANES. Just last July, you testified before this Com- mittee, and I am now going to read you a quote and follow up with a couple of questions on the double taxation of dividends. You said: VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 19 The fundamental aspect of this question really gets down to the double taxation of dividends and the issue of the integration of the corporate tax with the individual tax. And I think a lot of economists will tell you that it is an extraordinarily useful and efficient way, if you can do it, to put all of the tax burden on shareholders and not have double taxation of dividends through taxing the corporation and then tax- ing the dividends again. My own impression is that we should have a very large expan- sion of subchapter S corporations which effectively would enable dividends to be paid out and effectively taxed only once. I do not expect that to happen at this particular stage and there are very good reasons why problems of revenue loss are creating a concern. There are issues of equity. But if you are asking as an economist and looking strictly at the question of the optimum allo- cation of capital in the system, eliminating double taxation of divi- dends is a very valuable thing to do. Now it seems to me that the key question is not whether you support ending double taxation of dividends as a matter of abstract tax policy. But whether you think it should be financed by deficit spending or whether it should be paid for. That in turn raises the fundamental issue of whether deficits matter and whether deficits affect long-term interest rates, savings, investment, and growth. You are on the record on that issue as well, but I would like you to respond to two questions. And in the course of asking them, I note that the economists who issued the statement opposing the Bush tax cuts, the 10 Nobel Prize winners and many, many others, said in the course of that statement—the permanent dividend tax cut in particular is not credible as a short-term stimulus. As tax reform, the dividend tax cut is misdirected in that it tar- gets individuals rather than corporations, is overly complex, and could be, but is not, part of a revenue-neutral tax reform effort. Now given that your position has been that you want to address the double taxation, do you think it should be financed out of defi- cits in order to correct that problem? Chairman GREENSPAN. Well, if I support, and I argued very strenuously at the House Budget Committee last September, and indeed, repeated part of that testimony in my prepared remarks, that the process that you go through in constructing the budget has been very effectively enhanced by PAYGO rules and discretionary caps, then the way I would answer the question is, yes, I do think that eliminating the double taxation of dividends in any of the var- ious forms, including subchapter S or taking the tax deduction at the individual level or at the corporate level—and as I said, from a commerce point of view, it is the latter that is the best. But they are all I think quite important and useful. The reason is that they improve the flexibility of the economy. And the one thing I have sensed as the last 2 or 3 years have gone on is how really important that apparently is. Having said that, there is no question that as deficits go up, con- trary to what some have said, it does affect long-term interest rates. It has a negative impact on the economy, unless attended. As I have indicated in my prepared remarks and, indeed, in my oral remarks, I think that there are major problems which must be addressed, which means that we just cannot keep adding programs VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 20 of one form or another to a limited expansion capability in the economy. I would argue that we should be doing both, namely trying to move toward increased flexibility, but being very careful not to allow deficits to get out of hand, especially when we are going to be running into a significant problem starting 2010, 2012, and be- yond with a very significant acceleration in beneficiaries for both Social Security and Medicare. Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, let me just close. Two years ago almost to the day, you said before this Committee, and I want to see whether you still adhere to this statement, and I am now quoting you: ‘‘In recognition of the uncertainties in the economic and budget outlook, it is important that any long-term tax plan or spending initiative . . .’’ let me just emphasize that, long-term tax plan or spending initiative ‘‘. . . for that matter, be phased in. Conceivably, it could include provisions that in some way would limit surplus-reducing actions if specified targets for the budget surplus and Federal debt were not satisfied.’’ Now this is when we are dealing with a surplus question. We are dealing with a deficit question. Even the Administration itself is projecting deficits of $300 billion over the next 2 fiscal years. Then to go on with your quote: ‘‘Now, what I am obviously refer- ring to is the desirability of eliminating the Federal debt, which is still frankly, my first priority because I think that it has had an extraordinarily important impact on the economy, on the financial markets, on long-term interest rates, and on economic growth.’’ Do you still hold to that statement? Chairman GREENSPAN. I do, Senator. Senator SARBANES. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Allard. Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Around September 2002, many of the opponents of the temporary tax cut of 2 years ago, admitted that they felt like it kept the econ- omy from bottoming out at a potentially lower number. In other words, the tax cut did help the economy some. That was even noted in an editorial in The Washington Post in September. What conditions have changed now that would show that we should not advance those tax cuts or make them permanent in order to further help the economy? Chairman GREENSPAN. Senator, as I implied in my remarks, I am one of the few people who still are not as yet convinced that stimulus is a desirable policy at this particular point. It depends very much on how one reads what is effectively going on under the whole structure of geopolitical and other risk. And unless and until we can make a judgment as to whether, in fact, there is underlying deterioration going on, and my own judgment is I suspect not, then stimulus is actually premature. I support the President’s proposal on eliminating the double tax- ation, not as a short-term stimulus measure, but as long-term, good corporate tax policy and something which would add to the long- term flexibility and potential growth of the economy. But unless it turns out that there really is a very weak underlying structure even beneath this degree of uncertainty, which I will grant you will VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 21 then change our view with respect to the desirability of stimulus beyond what has already been put in place by the Federal Reserve in its fairly significant decline in short-term interest rates, we have to be in a position to be able to state that we see that as a very significant problem and one which must be addressed in a manner which would then clearly be necessary. I suspect it is not. But I cannot say with any degree of assurance that I feel comfortable with that conclusion. Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, we are possibly facing the need for Congress to increase the debt limit. The debt limit reflects not only public debt—it is a total debt limit. It reflects obligations, as you know, to the general fund, both from the trusts, as well as the public debt. There is some discussion as to whether, in dealing with the debt limit, we should just concern ourselves with public debt or whether we should concern ourselves just with the total debt limit figure. In other words, instead of putting that limit on total debt, maybe modify it so that it is just on the public debt. I would like to hear your comments on that, sir. Chairman GREENSPAN. Well, I have testified on this previously, Senator, and I will just repeat what I said then, which is, if you are going to do this, then putting it on debt to the public, which is now a number which excludes debt held by investment accounts of the Federal Government, obviously, that is the economic variable you should be adjusting it to. But having said that, you have already, or will have already, con- structed a debt limit by the various votes that you have had with respect to authorizing receipts and outlays. And either that debt limit is redundant, meaning that it is the same number that is im- plicit in the difference between receipts and expenditures, coupled with the debt at the beginning of the period, or it is inconsistent and you are creating contradictory law. So, I conclude, as I did in my prepared remarks, that the debt ceiling is not a useful fiscal tool and, indeed, has never in my judg- ment been successful in doing what it is supposed to have been doing—namely, constrain spending. I would think it would be wise to eliminate it. Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Dodd. Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me pick up, if I can, a bit on what Senator Sarbanes was raising. In your testimony here this morning, you said: As I testified before this Committee in the past, the most significant lesson to be learned from recent American economic history is arguably the importance of struc- tural flexibility and the resilience to economic shocks . . . I want to raise the question of the permanency of the tax cuts that are being sought, the ones that were adopted in the spring of 2001. Obviously, major events have occurred since then that have caused us to have to examine our fiscal policies for all the obvious reasons. I note that you have taken the position, before the Joint Eco- nomic Committee, that the tax cuts are not stimulative. You do not believe them to have any stimulative effect. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 22 But you also argue that because there is a presumption that these tax cuts are already permanent in the economy, that to not make them permanent would be unwise. And I want to raise that particular issue. These are tax cuts that go out 10 years. How do you square agreeing to a permanency of a 10-year tax cut proposal with struc- tural flexibility at a time when we have so many demands that are going to be made on us for all the obvious reasons, both including domestic pressures, as well as anywhere from, according to some economists, $100 billion to in excess of $1 trillion, the cost of the war in Iraq and the after-effects? Chairman GREENSPAN. Well, Senator, my response to that ques- tion at an earlier time was the endeavor to try to recognize that it is just not credible to have a significant tax cut which sunsets 10 years out. Markets do not believe it. It makes no fiscal sense and you are far better off making it permanent, but putting every- thing under PAYGO in a manner which addresses the broad issues of the deficit. The Congress has to make judgments because it is the only vehi- cle which ultimately has the authority to make choices among some very difficult programs. That is, I do not know a single program which has been authorized by the Congress over the years which was not perceived to be beneficial, either as a spending program or a tax cut. The trouble is that when you add them all up, they come to a total larger than the fiscal capacity of the country as measured by our gross domestic product, which means choices must be among things which on a stand-alone basis are very good, desirable, and meet any cost-benefit analysis you can think of. So what we are dealing with is the issue of how to make choices. And the most difficult problem that exists with respect to long-term budget issues is getting them right. But as I have said in previous testimony—indeed, I said it in the current testimony—we almost surely will never get it right. There- fore, we have to consider issues of triggers and sunset legislation in order to make midcourse corrections, not if, but when policies go off the long-term, expected track. And because there has been a very substantial change in budg- etary policy over the last 20, 30, 40 years, in the sense that we have moved from 1-year budgets and essentially two-thirds discre- tionary spending to exactly the reverse, and indeed, we have gone from, as I said, the 1-year, to then 5-year, mandated under the 1979 Act, and by the mid-1990’s, to 10-year horizons, because our programs are projecting out that far, even though we know we can- not estimate them with any great accuracy, we need new devices for long-term fiscal policy. In my judgment, the most significant ones that we need are the ones which we are allowing to basically expire, the PAYGO and discretionary caps, and importantly, over the longer-term, triggers, and to the extent that it is important, sunset legislation. Because the existing tools that we now employ for budgetary policy are not significantly different from what they were 30, 40 years ago. And these are very different budget processes that we are involved in. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 23 Senator DODD. Just a quick follow-up, then. I am somewhat con- fused here. The permanency of these tax cuts over the next 10 years, I do not disagree. In fact, I have supported over the years pay-as-you- go proposals and so forth. I understand the value of that. We are looking, for instance, at budget cuts that are occurring in a number of areas where people anticipated that there would be a Federal commitment in certain areas and seeing the pressures occur at the State and local level as a result of our changing direc- tion here. Just most recently in the COPS program, for instance, in which local departments and States counted on over the years. All of a sudden, that program is going to be eliminated, just to use one example. I am not arguing. Maybe it should be. But the point is that there is an anticipation by local governments and State governments for some time that this would be forthcoming. We are changing that. It seems to me that we need to send some mechanism here. I am hearing you saying that with regard to these tax cuts, that the per- manency of them, that you would like to see something put in place, rather than just the pure permanency of them, some trigger mechanism or some pay-as-you-go proposal that you attach to their permanency. Chairman GREENSPAN. Yes. I do not think that we can have per- manent tax cuts or permanent spending programs in the sense that they exist independently of the tax base or the revenue-raising base of the economy. In a sense, it would be desirable to have permanent, irrevocable fiscal policy. But if it adds up to a claim on resources which ex- ceeds what is available given our economic condition, something has to give. So the notion of permanence cannot rationally be con- sistent with the programs we are involved with. Senator DODD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Bunning. Senator BUNNING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I always start out just to ask one question of you. Do you see any evidence of inflation in the economy presently? Chairman GREENSPAN. I do not, Senator. Senator BUNNING. Thank you. In regards to some of the testi- mony you have given in the past, I would like to just mention a couple things that have happened since that testimony. We had September 11, 2001. We have a war on terrorism. We have had a surplus and now we have a deficit. We had a discussion about the cost of the war, if there is one with Iraq, by OMB Direc- tor Mitch Daniels. He thinks the cost can be under $100 billion. I heard a trillion dollars mentioned here just a minute ago. What I am saying is for 40 years in the Congress that we had some deficit spending. So before the year 1997, when we finally got it right and we turned it around we then had some surplus years. You testified that surpluses are not always good, but can create problems. And sure enough, they have created a problem because we got on a spending spree of about annually 10 to 12 percent in discretionary spending. We cannot sustain that, Mr. Chairman, and expect our surpluses to last very long. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 24 Besides that, we have the cost of the war on terrorism and we have the cost of the war for homeland security. What I am saying to you is a temporary deficit in the amount of $300 billion is bad. I do not like it any more than you do. But if we do not change the policies that we now have, we may have that forever as we go out. And we have to change our fiscal policy to deal with that. Are you saying that we need to do that to stabilize our economy in the out-years, even though you do not think that the tax cuts are stimulus as they are now proposed? Chairman GREENSPAN. I certainly think that it is crucial that we have a budget policy which does not destabilize the economy. What that turns out to be, Senator, amongst a number of different cri- teria, is at least the necessary condition that the level of debt-to- GDP not be rising. Now, you can have in today’s environment a level of debt-to-GDP which is flat, but still have modest, small deficits, indeed, some- where in the area of 1 to 2 percent. That is not inconsistent with stability. But if we get into a position, as I pointed out in my prepared re- marks, where we are finding that the debt-to-GDP ratio begins to accelerate, we have to be very careful because there is no self- equilibrating mechanism when that is occurring because a rise in the debt increases the amount of interest payments, which in turn increases the debt still further and there is an accelerating pattern after you reach a certain point of no return. So it is crucial that we keep in mind the long-term pattern of debt-to-GDP on a unified basis. And I even go on further to discuss in some detail the desirability of moving to an accrued budgetary system as well, which would take into consideration the value of the commitments which the Congress is making over a protracted period and make judgments far better than we can now as to whether those are long-term, sustainable fiscal policies. Senator BUNNING. As you know, the Fed recently announced that they will be eliminating 72 jobs from the Louisville office. I know that your staff has assured my office that the Fed will try to help those workers that are displaced. But I think those workers who may be displaced would feel much better if they had assurance from the Chairman that the Fed will do what they can to assist them in finding new work. Will you give that commitment to the Federal workers in Louisville and throughout the country who are losing their jobs? Chairman GREENSPAN. Most certainly, Senator. We have a pro- gram which endeavors either to find alternate jobs for the people who are displaced in the check-clearing operations, or if that is not feasible, to do whatever we can to find ways in which they can be reemployed as expeditiously as possible. Senator BUNNING. I have some other questions but my time has run out. If I can, I will just submit them to you and you can give me a written response. Chairman GREENSPAN. I would be delighted to. Senator BUNNING. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Reed. Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 25 Chairman Greenspan, let me make one comment and then ask one question. In your testimony, you quite fervently argue for flexibility. But one aspect of flexibility in the American economic and in the polit- ical system is the flexibility of leaders who recognize changed circumstances. In fact, I think the President’s proposal is quite inflexible. It is the same approach that he was advocating before September 11. It is the same approach he was advocating before we saw a surplus turn into a growing deficit. And I would hope that if you are arguing for flexibility before the Congress, you would argue for flexibility of mind with the Administration so that they could adjust their policies. Let me ask just one specific question. Actually, two premises and a conclusion. I will ask you to comment on my premises and the conclusion. The first premise—the American public expects to be paid fully the Social Security benefits which they have contributed. The second premise—by exhausting the Social Security Trust Fund, which is the effect, if not the intent, of the President’s pro- posals, accomplishing that expectation is very, very difficult, if not impossible. The conclusion might be, then, those who support these proposals of the Administration either have no intention of paying fully the benefits of Social Security, and I could add Medicare also, or they are irresponsible in advocating such proposals. Now the first premise. Do you believe that, not that the Amer- ican people expect to have the benefits, we will in fact pay full So- cial Security benefits to everyone who is entitled at this moment? Chairman GREENSPAN. I think, as best I can judge, it has always been my expectation that the payments of benefits under law had very little to do with what the assets in the Social Security Trust Fund were, because I cannot conceive of a political situation in which those benefits run out. And under law, there are curtail- ments in payments. I know that is what the law says. I have no expectation that the Congress would allow that law to stay in place. Senator REED. The second premise is that, by exhausting the So- cial Security Trust Fund, which is the effect of the proposals that we have seen 2 years ago in the tax cuts and the current proposals, making those payments is extraordinarily difficult and will put ex- traordinary pressure on this Congress in terms of other programs and other priorities. Do you agree with that premise, also? Chairman GREENSPAN. Actually, the Social Security benefits are reasonably capable of being estimated well into the future because they have many of the characteristics of a defined benefit pension plan. The really major fiscal problem is not Social Security. It is Medicare. Senator REED. I agree with you. However I was raising an issue that is less complicated in terms of discretionary spending. But as I think you recognize, and we all do, we are talking about, particu- larly after 2017, huge contingent liabilities which we can define right now, as you said, we have reserved some funds for it. But we are going to exhaust those funds by proposed tax cuts. Doesn’t it follow then that we are making life impossible for us? VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 26 Chairman GREENSPAN. Well, I merely fall back to my previous answer. These are the crucial issues of the determination of how one allocates resources available to the Government amongst a se- ries of programs, both tax and spending programs, all of which have very strong supporters and very good re´sume´s, if I may put it that way, as to why these programs are indispensable to the American people. It is the Congress’ very difficult task to make those judgments because we have no other mechanism in this democratic society to effectively try to translate the value system of the American people into how we cut these priorities—I do not mean cutting, I mean by paring—how we lay them out. As you know, I was Chairman of the Social Security Commission back in 1983. It was a fascinating experience to be exposed to a number of what were then your predecessors in a number of the seats around this table, on how they negotiated what ultimately ac- tually turned out to be a remarkably sensible compromise. It pleased nobody. But everyone signed on. Senator REED. I think that is the only thing we can agree on. It won’t please anybody what we do, but we have to do something. Again, let me thank you. I see from your response, which is my intuition also, that we will not step away from Social Security spending, but we are going to make it extraordinarily difficult to fulfill that commitment by these tax cuts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Sununu. Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Greenspan, in your testimony, you talk about the fact that business inventories have stayed pretty lean and then indicate that that is probably a good prognosticator of maybe future manufac- turing activity, and note that purchasing manager information sug- gests the improvement on manufacturing activity has continued into the beginning of this year. Could you elaborate on that a little bit and talk about what signs you see from purchasing managers or other sources that the early trends in the first quarter now are somewhat positive? Chairman GREENSPAN. Yes. First of all, the fact that inventories are low is a very positive sign in the sense that if there is any evi- dence that the economy is picking up, inventory accumulation will begin to move at a fairly pronounced pace. The data for January, which we have, as you know, for pur- chasing managers, says that in their diffusion index, production went up. But more importantly, we have a lot of weekly statistics on production for motor vehicles, steel, electric power, and a set of individual products which account for something in the area of a sixth of the total industrial production index which we publish. Senator SUNUNU. Is that a pretty good proxy? Chairman GREENSPAN. Actually, it is better than a proxy in the sense that we actually have on a weekly basis the industrial pro- duction index for part of the total. Senator SUNUNU. But does the other 84 percent tend to track the weekly numbers? You can get weekly information on 50 percent. But if the other 50 percent is incredibly volatile, it may be of no use. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 27 Chairman GREENSPAN. We have other indicators that tend to proxy for the remainder, mainly, insured unemployment data, which we find has been useful in combination with the weekly data to suggest what patterns are emerging in the manufacturing or, more exactly, in the industrial production area. Senator SUNUNU. I consider myself somewhat an optimist. And so, the parts of your testimony that, at least over the last 2 or 3 years, that I have found most interesting or most encouraging, is your repetition of the degree to which you are impressed with the resilience of our economy, the degree to which technological im- provements have lent themselves to productivity increases and the flexibility you talk about being important. Also, I have been im- pressed with the resilience of the consumer demand, which you note in your testimony has been quite stable through all of this un- certainty. But business investment continues to lag. Could you talk a little bit about the elements of the President’s proposal that do target business investment? There is a provision for small businesses to allow them to expense $75,000 a year in- stead of $25,000 a year. To what degree is that kind of an approach effective, given that it is targeted at small businesses? Are they a big enough part of our business investment economy to make a difference? I am not asking you to write legislation. I know that is not ap- propriate. But other types of approaches that might address the lagging business investment and, as a result, have a good, long- term impact on our economy? Chairman GREENSPAN. Senator, I have not looked at some of the details enough to make an evaluation. But the most important stimulus, if you want to put it that way, in my judgment, is the removal of the uncertainties which overhang the capital investment markets, which, as I have indicated earlier, I believe are quite sig- nificant and that one does not need stimulus, if I may put it that way—— Senator SUNUNU. You are talking about the geopolitical concerns that you outlined in your testimony. Chairman GREENSPAN. Yes. Senator SUNUNU. Beyond that, you have no thoughts to offer about the accelerating depreciation or the reforming depreciation schedules to encourage business investment? Or do you think they just pale in comparison to the geopolitical concerns? Chairman GREENSPAN. The answer is, yes, I do think that it is small in comparison. But I have in the past discussed the various different issues which economists have evaluated with respect to capital investment, namely, there are ways to accelerate capital in- vestment in the short run. But the most fundamental stimulus to capital investment is the prospect for higher earnings on real investment over the longer run. There is no substitute. Senator SUNUNU. I have one final question about the mortgage industry. You talked about the degree to which mortgage rates being at historic lows encourage refinancing and the refinancing activity is at a very high level right now. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 28 In the past, you have been very candid about your concerns re- garding the GSE’s and your thoughts regarding changing some of the current legislation that provides benefits to GSE’s. Let me talk about one particular reform, which I think is topical because of the Sarbanes-Oxley bill, and that is greater oversight or involvement of the SEC in the mortgage market and the secondary mortgage markets in particular. To what extent do you or would you support SEC oversight or involvement in the GSE’s—but to what extent would that affect the costs of mortgages and the liquidity in the mortgage markets? Chairman GREENSPAN. Without stipulating whether I would agree with any particular proposal because without seeing the spe- cific proposal, basically saying that this agency should oversee this part of the economy, I do not think there is enough information. But having said that, the major issue here is the subsidy which is implicit in the GSE debentures, even though they are not legally an obligation of the U.S. Government. They are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. It is the market which presumes that they will be bailed out that effectively enables them to sell mortgages at a number of basis points below what the mar- ket otherwise would be. As a consequence of that, some of that does go through into lower mortgage interest rates. But as best we can judge, it is a very small number. So, I am not at all convinced that many of the proposals really make all that much difference to the secondary mortgage market or to the level of mortgage interest rates to the American public. Senator SUNUNU. I don’t want to let you completely off the hook. On the first part of your response, it is the SEC, the Securities and Exchange Commission, we do task them with oversight of securi- ties markets. We are talking about collateralized obligations. Do you think that they would be an appropriate oversight agency? Or is there something unique to the mortgage markets that would make you say that this has to be treated somewhat differently? Chairman GREENSPAN. No, no. As you know, the SEC is already involved in the question of making judgments as to whether certain types of securities should be registered or not registered. I think these are legally private corporations and should be handled the way private corporations are handled. Senator SUNUNU. With regard to registration and fees. Chairman GREENSPAN. With regard to issues that revolve around the SEC. But going beyond that, I do not know because I do not know what the particular proposals would be. Senator SUNUNU. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Schumer. Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you for your answers. I would like to refer, Mr. Chairman, to an exchange that you and I had just about 2 years ago that still rings fresh in my mind. And it rings fresh in my mind because it was cited in The Washington Post today, evidently. As you may recall, you appeared before our Committee in 2001, as we were considering the President’s first tax cut package and its VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 29 potential impact on dividends. And I am just going to quote a little bit of our exchange: SCHUMER: I take it you, Chairman Greenspan, would say deficit reduction is a reasonable priority. GREENSPAN: I would say, Senator, that we do not wish to go back into unified budget deficits. SCHUMER: Right. Okay. That sounds like me. [Laughter.] SCHUMER: So the question is, given the numbers that you have been talking about, when do we get to a level where it is too high? GREENSPAN: I repeat—when we project our way back into deficit, which I think would be a mistake. That is pretty unequivocal. Now according to the Congressional Budget Office, and validated by the President’s own budget and advisors, we are going to have a unified deficit of $199 billion in 2003, and unified deficits through 2007. If we exclude the Social Security Trust Fund surplus, all of those figures are worse and the budget remains in deficit through 2011. To me, this passes the test of, as you put it, projecting our way back into deficits. So given this new budget outlook, do you main- tain, as you stated a while ago, that a large tax cut that further sends us into deficits, would be a mistake? Chairman GREENSPAN. I support the program to reduce double taxation on dividends and the necessary other actions in the Fed- eral budget to make it revenue-neutral. Senator SCHUMER. Right. Chairman GREENSPAN. I think that that would be a significant value to the American economic system. Senator SCHUMER. Okay. Let me just probe your fertile mind. I generally like cutting the tax on dividends in an abstract world. All things being equal, not thinking of the deficit, it seems to me something that would be a good idea. Although I think I agree with you that it probably would have more bang for the buck in a sense at the corporate level than at the individual level. So be it. I am not President and making that decision. But one way we could make it revenue-neutral, and not get into the age-old fight between the spending side because you and I know that with war coming and with everything else, we are not going to make up for that huge revenue loss that the dividend tax cut would produce on spending. Even the President’s budget goes up 4 percent. It doesn’t go up as much as maybe it might have. And I know the President is try- ing to rein in spending, but it still goes up. It doesn’t do anything to balance the dividend tax cut. What about looking at some corporate tax loopholes. Give some- thing to the corporate side, but take it away. Give it in a general and nonspecific way, which is generally preferred in tax theory. The Cato Institute, not an organization I always agree with, but they said that Federal subsidies to business costs taxpayers an es- timated $87 billion a year. These are the rifle shots aimed at very specific businesses or specific industries. Congressional Research says that corporate tax expenditures are over $100 billion. And most troubling to me, offshore tax havens— VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 30 and I have a proposal which is different. I would like the share- holders to vote before the company goes offshore. If this is supposed to benefit the company, let’s see if the share- holders have that view, which I think is a little bit unpatriotic that we should go overseas to reduce our revenues. But in any case, these offshore tax havens cost an estimated $92 billion in otherwise taxable profits. So those are enormous fig- ures—$3 trillion in lost revenues over 10 years, which would pay, of course, for the dividend reduction, the dividend elimination, eliminating the tax on dividends several times over. It has been a tough issue to address politically. But do you think that combining these two things might be—I am not asking you to comment on any of the specific proposals I mentioned, but general corporate reform, and then come out in a much more revenue neu- tral way, but still do the tax elimination on dividends and given general corporations a break, a good idea? Chairman GREENSPAN. Senator, I have always opposed subsidies to corporations. If you are a private business, you should function as a private business and getting special preferences from the Fed- eral Government has never been something which I have been sup- portive of. Senator SCHUMER. So, you might think that combining the two, in the abstract, would be a good idea. Chairman GREENSPAN. I do not want to comment on the specifics of your proposal. Senator SCHUMER. All right. I tried. I do not know. Is my time up, Mr. Chairman? Chairman SHELBY. Your time is up. Senator SCHUMER. Okay. Well, I have more questions. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Dole. Senator DOLE. Chairman Greenspan, I would like you to focus on the long-term effects of very low-interest rates. With the Federal funds rate at a record low and the high rate of mortgage refi- nancing, do you see a long-term problem with future mortgage- backed securities which will yield historically low returns? Chairman GREENSPAN. There is no necessary problem that mort- gage-backed securities are in difficulty with low-interest rates in the sense, remember that these securities are fully backed by whole mortgages and in many respects, because they are so-called conforming mortgages, they have reasonably good credit ratings. Indeed, it is really interesting to observe that even though the loans are on individual properties, they have something close to an ‘‘A’’ rating individually and in total. So, unless there is something I am missing in your question, Senator, I have not been concerned about the level of interest rates as such. There are questions that are involved in the size of the secondary mortgage market and its efficiency and how it functions. I think the movement of interest rates, and low-interest rates, do cause some problems for some of the GSE’s as a consequence of that. Because there is a one-sided option where a homeowner can refi- nance, but the bank cannot, at its will, refinance, you have difficul- ties in knowing what the maturity of these particular mortgages are which combined into any form of these collateralized vehicles. And I suspect there are some difficulties with them. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 31 So far, that market has worked really quite well. And indeed, I would even go further. I would say the ability to have been able to get the extent of refinancing which has reduced the debt service charges for the American homeowner, but also the very large cash- outs, which is borrowing over and above just refinancing the mort- gage, has been a very important issue in financing consumers in maintaining a fairly robust consumer market, which I think has been a major factor helping us through the last 2 years of very dif- ficult problems with the corporate investment and inventory sec- tors. Senator DOLE. Thank you. Two other questions, please. Wholesale heating oil prices jumped enormously. Yesterday, it was up 30 cents from a week earlier to $1.20 a gallon. Do you have any information on what may happen if indeed there is a conflict with Iraq, whether others in OPEC might step up and fill the shortfall? Chairman GREENSPAN. Senator, this is a very crucial question which we in the Federal Reserve watch very closely and obviously, other members of the Government are doing the same. There are problems in the sense that the sum of the capacity of Iraq and Venezuela is greater than the gap between overall world oil capacity and presumed consumption. And it is that which has been driving up crude oil prices which has spilled over into home heating oil. But it has been very considerably exacerbated by the obviously colder-than-expected winter that we have gone through. We have gone through certain calculations which suggest that in- ventory levels which seem to be quite low at the primary dis- tributor level, have actually moved up quite considerably in both households and in the secondary distribution level, so that there has been a bulge in heating oil inventories which we do not directly measure. This cannot continue on, obviously, because we are gradually moving out of the heating season and into effectively a much lower level of aggregate world demand for oil, which is between the North American heating season and the motoring season, which dominates world markets. In that regard, the outlook, other than the impact of a war, is really obviously quite favorable. The crucial question here is whether, in a war, that the Iraqi oil fields are under stress. So without being able to forecast for both the final outcome of the problems in Venezuela, which has cut pro- duction from about 3 million barrels a day down to now a little over one million barrels a day, and the Iraqi oil production capa- bility, so long as those issues overhang us, they will continue to press prices higher. But the fundamentals are for much lower prices, eventually. Senator DOLE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my mother is 101 years old. America is aging, as we all know. We will have a savings crunch in the next 20 years. I would like to have your thoughts on what we might do to increase savings and what you think of the President’s proposals in this re- gard. Chairman GREENSPAN. About half of productivity growth in the United States is attributable to the actual capital investment input VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 32 which we make year upon year, and that is a prominent force in productivity. It is not 100 percent, but it is a very big chunk. The more savings that we have that are productively used in our economy, the greater the productivity, the greater the growth, the greater the prosperity that we have. Any proposal which augments savings has a positive effect on long-term economic growth. I cannot comment on the specifics of the President’s proposal be- cause it is rather complex and there are pluses and there are minuses, and I probably would be better off if I just stayed with that for the moment. But we should keep looking for policies which, one, enhance sav- ings and enhance flexibility. I think there has been too much in the way of trying to do short-term stimuluses and they work in the short run, but then they fade out. And I think we spend more time than I think is productive in figuring out how to get the economy to move in a certain way in the very short run, rather than focus on the long-term. And if we do that, I suspect the short-term will largely take care of itself. Senator DOLE. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Bayh. Senator BAYH. Thank you to both Chairmen. Mr. Chairman, I have four questions. So, I am going to try to march through these relatively succinctly. The first is about the proposal and the double taxation of divi- dends. I understand the argument in favor of it. It is that it will promote more flexibility in the economy, increase productivity growth, and thereby, better prepare us for the advent of the retire- ment of the baby-boom generation. As you know, there are many things that affect productivity growth. I remember well in my previous capacity as Governor, your giving an address to the Governors Association about the effect of job training and education on productivity growth. There are other things, such as investment in research and development. There are other parts of the tax code that could be altered that would stimu- late productivity gains. Why is this the best proposal of all the possible avenues to pro- mote productivity growth? And is there a comparative analysis that we can rely on in making this policy decision? Chairman GREENSPAN. Senator, I do not know the answer to that question. I do know that eliminating the double taxation of divi- dends is a positive force for just the reasons you gave. I cannot say to you that I know that say using the same amount of resources, if you want to put it that way, it is the best because nobody has come up with a proposal which strikes me as better. I do not deny that one could. Senator BAYH. Unfortunately, that is the choice that we face. My second question is about the effect of tax cuts on revenues. A couple of years ago, the tax cut that was enacted into law was advanced as a way to reduce the burgeoning size of the surplus by reducing the amount of revenue coming into the Federal Treasury. Today, an acceleration of those same tax cuts is being urged upon us. I understand not by you because you have questions about the need for a stimulus at this point. But as a way to stimulate VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 33 the economy, to grow revenue, and thereby deal with the budget surplus. How do you reconcile these arguments coming from the same people? How can the same policy both increase and decrease reve- nues? Chairman GREENSPAN. As you say, you are not addressing that question to me. [Laughter.] Senator BAYH. Well, someone needs to answer it because it is being pressed upon us, and it seems to me to be internally incon- sistent. But I will go on to my third question. You mentioned a combination of weak demand plus continuing productivity gains has led to a soft job market. All of us want the productivity gains to continue. In your opinion, what level of growth is necessary to create jobs in a climate where robust pro- ductivity gains continue? Chairman GREENSPAN. It is a strictly arithmetical calculation be- cause, basically, jobs or, more exactly, hours of input, plus the change in productivity, is what gives you the GDP. What we had for a good part of last year was a largely unex- ploited capability of a manufacturing and distribution system and service system, which basically had not been pressed through the latter part of the 1990’s to be as efficient as it could. Remember, back in the latter part of the 1990’s, the real issue was to try to expand markets, expand sales, and expand profit- ability as a consequence. And little relative effort was employed in making sure that the costs involved in producing those expanding outputs were as efficient as they could be. When we came into the early 2000’s, where sales became very sluggish, American business turned to that unexploited source of potential productivity and created a remarkable run-up in output per hour. So long as that unexploited base is there, then it is possible for business to continuously increase output with very little increase in employment. Now, I do not know where the point turns. At some point, that availability of unexploited short-term capability to increase produc- tivity will have been exhausted, and then to keep up with demand which is coming in, presumably, you have to start reemploying lots of people. And I do not know where that is, but it will happen, and presumably, sooner rather than later. Senator BAYH. And the more that we can do to increase demand and grow GDP, the sooner that day would arrive. Chairman GREENSPAN. Oh, certainly. For every percentage point increase in the GDP growth rate, holding productivity growth un- changed, is the same percentage—— Senator BAYH. I promise, Chairman Shelby, this will be quick, Mr. Chairman. So let me just cut to the bottom line of my fourth question. I have only been around this town for 4 years. But I think a healthy level of skepticism is in order when it comes to the Federal Government’s ability to constrain—take the difficult steps neces- sary to constrain the budget deficit. Ordinarily, the thing grows VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 34 until it can be denied no longer, a crisis is imminent, then some- thing is done. Having said that, I want to ask you about the double taxation again. Assuming for the sake of argument, that these deficits are going to persist for a while, does the benefit of flexibility and pro- ductivity generated by ending the double taxation of dividends out- weigh the exacerbation of the deficit that it may cause? Chairman GREENSPAN. Well, I presume that it will not cause an exacerbation because I would couple my consideration of this with the restoration of the PAYGO rules. So, I look at that as a joint recommendation. Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is one that hopefully we can implement. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Thank you. Senator Miller. Senator MILLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your wisdom and also, as I note the clock, thank you for your patience this morning. My first question is one that I am bringing from Young Harris, Georgia. I was sitting around a coffee table in this rural Georgia restaurant. We were discussing the President’s economic program and his plan, and the fact that it suggests that the deficit is going to rise. And the way that it was put to me was, does the growth in the deficit pose a greater or lesser danger than the prospect of slower economic growth? I told them that I did not know the answer, but that I would ask Chairman Greenspan, which impressed them and let me get out of that restaurant. [Laughter.] Senator SARBANES. Give the Chairman the name of the res- taurant so he can go down there and visit it himself. [Laughter.] Senator MILLER. Mary Anne’s. Chairman SHELBY. Mary Anne’s. [Laughter.] Chairman GREENSPAN. The basic approach to economic analysis and programming that is associated with it is, in my judgment, to try to formulate a budget policy which is stable, meaning that it does not create pressures on private finance which eliminates the underlying growth pattern in the economy. So, I would presume that we can have a fairly rapidly growing economy with a balanced budget or even a surplus, and that the presumption that deficits somehow would increase the GDP—the more deficit, the greater the GDP—is a short-term view which I do not believe continues in the longer run. I think we have to focus on maintaining maximum economic growth, but simultaneously recognize that a necessary condition to do that is that deficits have to be contained or, at the extreme, that the ratio of debt to the public as a percent of the GDP, remains stable. Senator MILLER. Thank you. I will try to paraphrase that next Saturday. [Laughter.] VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 35 This also is a question that comes from personal experience. I am sitting here between two former governors. I do not know about them, but from time to time, I get to thinking that maybe it would be better to be back in the Statehouse. Except right now, it is not too good back in the Statehouse. My question to you is, do you think that Congress should address in any way the budget shortfalls that the States are having? And if so, what would be your approach? Chairman GREENSPAN. This is a difficult question largely be- cause the source of the problem in many of the States, as you know, Senator, has been that with the fairly substantial surge in revenues that the States had in many cases, and it is hard to know how many, permanent programs for expenditures were financed. And to a large extent, because the tax rate on capital gains and options and the like are—or I should say the tax rate on capital gains in the States are pretty much equivalent to the regular in- come tax rate since the adjusted gross income from the Federal re- turns is what is used for the income tax where it is applicable for the States, we saw a very big surge in Federal revenues, but for some States, because the tax rates are relatively high, they saw an even greater surge. So that you have to weigh the fact that some of the States over- expended and should and will and are appropriately pulling back, and others did not. And the question is, how does the Congress or the Federal Government appropriately handle that without essen- tially treating those who were not sufficiently conservative to con- tain their funds from those who are less conservative? In other words, how does one make a program which is fair to everybody? I have no objection obviously to having Federal funds go to the States. We have been doing that for decades. But I must admit that I do have some problems—how would one in all fairness create a program which did not essentially benefit those who are the least conservative in their programs relative to those who were more conservative? If that can be done, then I think that there are obvi- ous arguments in favor of it. Senator MILLER. Thank you, sir. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Carper. Senator CARPER. Mr. Chairman, again thanks for all of your time and insights today. I want to follow up on Governor Miller’s and Governor Bayh’s questions with one that also relates to the States. We have heard from the States repeatedly over the last year or two that, particularly for those whose tax systems piggybacked on the Federal system, that when we make reductions here, then there is an effect on them as well, reducing their revenue base. With the latest proposal from the Administration, and which I think in theory, the double taxation of dividends make sense. It is logical. I, like you, would say, if we are going to do that thing in the con- text of maybe a broader tax reform, that it be deficit-neutral and that we do it on the corporate side rather than on the approach that the Administration seems to be taking. But I am hearing from some of my old governor friends that they are concerned about the cost of issuing tax-exempt debt and how VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 36 that might be affected, if we approach the taxation of dividends as the Administration has proposed. Any thoughts as to how we could minimize the effect of the im- pact on the States by taking a different course? Chairman GREENSPAN. Senator, you are referring to the issue that municipal finance, the interest rates that are involved would be affected by essentially creating a whole new segment of demand for untaxable issues, so to speak. Senator CARPER. Yes, sir. Chairman GREENSPAN. This is a half-full, half-empty glass prob- lem because the double taxation of dividends is a subsidy to the municipalities in the sense that it gives them less competition and, hence, better financing capability. If you look at it that way, then the question is you are elimi- nating a subsidy. If you look at it the other way, you are taking away a subsidy which is deserved. And I do not have a clue how to answer that question. Senator CARPER. All right. Let us try another one. I am going to quote you here in your written testimony, which says: The intensification of geopolitical risks makes discerning the economic path ahead especially difficult. If these uncertainties diminish considerably in the near term, we should be able to tell far better whether we are dealing with the business sector and an economy poised to grow more rapidly—our more probable expectation—or one that is still laboring under persisting strains and imbalances that have been misidentified as transitory. And then, skipping down a couple of lines, you say: If instead, contrary to our expectations, we find that, despite the removal of the Iraq-related uncertainties, constraints to expansion remain, various initiatives for conventional monetary and fiscal stimulus will doubtless move higher on the policy agenda. There is a couple of different ways a person could read this. My own view is that the greatest impediment to economic growth in this country is the uncertainties, a lot of them outside of our country. But I alluded to some of those earlier. Are you saying here that before we use the other arrows in our monetary arrow-holder—— Senator MILLER. Quiver. Senator CARPER. Quiver—out of our monetary quiver, or out of our fiscal quiver, that we should first try to deal with some of these uncertainties. And once we have dealt with those, then let us see what we further need to do on the monetary side or the fiscal side. Is that what you are saying? Chairman GREENSPAN. Yes, Senator. Senator CARPER. On the monetary side, what could that include? Chairman GREENSPAN. The usual monetary policy initiatives. Senator CARPER. Well, you have done a lot. And there are some on this Committee who have been rather critical of your steward- ship on monetary policy. I am certainly not among them. But what further can we do? You have taken the Federal funds rate down. You have loosened up the money supply. What further is there to do? Chairman GREENSPAN. Well, the general position of the Federal Open Market Committee at this particular stage is that we are holding at the 11⁄ 4 percent Federal funds rate and view the outlook VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 37 as the balance of risks essentially balanced on both the upside and the downside. One of the reasons is the large uncertainties with respect to the geopolitical risks. As I said several times this morning, our judge- ment, as best as we can make it, is that there seems to be a fairly significant, almost inexorable, endeavor on the part of the economy to move forward, but it is being held back by these set of forces. And if that is the correct interpretation, and we are viewing it correctly, then we will find that, at least in my judgment, the issue of the discussion of stimulus will probably just go away. Because of the fact we are apt to know the resolution of that within a period which doesn’t stretch out indefinitely into the future, I have con- cluded, as I have indicated previously here, that we are probably more sensible to wait to see what happens before we embark upon a number of programs which may in fact from a stimulus point of view, not be necessary. Remember that I am in support of the President’s program on the elimination of the double taxation of dividends, not for short- term stimulus purposes. I think that it is a very sensible long-term program. Senator CARPER. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Corzine. Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Greenspan, I want to be precise if I can. You said that you support President Bush’s proposal, which I just heard you say, about the dividend exclusion. But I also heard you say, only if it were implemented in a revenue-neutral world. Does that mean, to be clear, would you oppose the Bush tax plan if it were not offset with regard to the dividend exclusion? Chairman GREENSPAN. I would just allow my remarks to stand as I have stated them. Senator CORZINE. You do believe it should be revenue-neutral? Chairman GREENSPAN. I do believe it should be revenue-neutral. Senator CORZINE. I presume that, if we cannot put that together, the conclusion is clear. Let me say, in light of changed conditions that we have talked about, Senator Dodd asked a question about making permanent the 2001 tax cuts. And I thought I heard that in light of changed condi- tions, you believed in triggers, sunsets, and reviews, those policies in light of those changed circumstances. Did I hear that as it re- lated to the 2001, making permanent the 2001 tax cuts? Chairman GREENSPAN. Yes. I went further. I thought I said that I did not believe that there can be in this changed fiscal environ- ment, with so much in the way of commitments to the longer term, which are entitlements, that there can be such a concept as an un- changeable program on either the revenue or the expenditure side. Senator CORZINE. Thank you. Following up on some of the questions that the Governors talked about, is a $70 to $90 billion cumulative budget deficit at the State levels, maybe larger if you include some of the local government levels, a drag on economic activity, regardless of what we do here, if that is what takes place, cutting in expenditures or raising taxes, 181⁄ 2 percent in the city of New York or property taxes? VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 38 Chairman GREENSPAN. Senator, as you know, it relates solely to the general funds of the States and does not affect really the local- ities or other parts of the State budgets that are involved. So those numbers are really quite large. But they are variable. And our abil- ity to forecast them has not been particularly good. But, having said that, to the extent that taxes are raised in order to close those gaps, I would assume that it is restrictive of eco- nomic activity in the locality. Senator CORZINE. Thank you. I just wanted to make sure that I heard you say deficits impact long-term interest rates, in your view, and have an impact then on the investment function over a period of time. Chairman GREENSPAN. You heard me correctly, sir. Senator CORZINE. Okay. Then I would just ask, is there any time—you have a wealth of knowledge on this—in economic history that you know of a period in time when we are at war, where we have serious programmatic demands with regard to homeland secu- rity and protecting the American people and our national security needs, that you have seen a series of tax cuts in the judgment of Congress, is the right way to proceed fiscally? Chairman GREENSPAN. Well, Senator, that is a factual question which it is either true or it is false. And I presume that we can find that out. There is one point in this discussion, however, that I think we should at least put on the table. It is that the ratio of defense ex- penditures to the GDP is still quite low and indeed, as recently as a couple of years ago, it was at the lowest level since before World War II. So, we do have a low base from which we are functioning. And one would presume that there is some give there. Now that does not respond specifically to your question with re- spect to whether tax cuts are appropriate or not appropriate. But it is relevant to the general impact of what the size of potential de- mands, at least for the military, would be relative to the overall economy. Senator CORZINE. I would understand that. But it does have an ultimate budget impact on the bottom line of whether we are run- ning deficits and national savings is being impacted by the fact of the role of Government, whether it is for national security or whether it is for domestic policy. Chairman GREENSPAN. That is certainly the case. But in the con- text of raising it with the issue of being in periods of war or in peri- ods of military stress, those periods, you will find the ratio of defense expenditures-to-GDP was considerably higher than it is today. Senator CORZINE. You talked about flexibility in the economy and then were complimentary of Sarbanes-Oxley. I would presume that there are times when you believe that the role of Government in our society is a positive element. Some peo- ple might call that rigidity and the imposition of rigidities with respect to flexibility. So that there is some minimum level of par- ticipation that I would suspect that you are supportive of with re- gard to the SEC and other elements. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 39 Chairman GREENSPAN. I think that I have a very rigid view to- ward the Constitution of the United States. I do not wish to imply, Senator, that I believe that flexibility goes into our laws or any of the other things which affect business decisionmaking and business activity and corporate governance. Clearly, you cannot run a flexible, capitalist, ‘‘creative destruc- tion’’ type of economy unless you have a rule of law which is clear, unequivocal, and definitive. And in that regard, that is not flexible. In other words, flexible law may very well lead to rigid economics. Senator CORZINE. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Stabenow. COMMENTS OF SENATOR DEBBIE STABENOW Senator STABENOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Chairman Greenspan, welcome back to the Committee. One more follow-up regarding State budget deficits because we know that across the country now, the vast majority of the States are in serious deficits or gaps in their funding. The National Council of State Legislatures says in the coming year, over $68 billion will be there in terms of shortfalls. From a macroeconomic view, can you speak to the effect again in terms of large fiscal shortfalls and the macroeconomic effect to the country? Chairman GREENSPAN. Well, Senator, because, I gather, with the exception of Vermont, every State has a requirement that the budget be balanced within the State, the actions that are going to be taken by the States in order to meet their internal statutes or constitutions are going to be taken well before the Congress can de- cide to move significant funds for the current year. Those adjustments are going to be taken. And one must presume, although I do not know this, that it will effectively restore balance into the States well before any funding could be made available to the States. If that is the case, then you have to be careful in thinking about this issue because unless taxes which are raised which would have a macroeconomic negative effect, are then presumed to be lowered again as Federal funds come in, which strikes me as questionable policy, then I think you have to recognize that because the timing of when the fiscal years end in the States tends to be different than our fiscal year in the Federal Government, you have a very tricky problem, in that if the States have to take actions in order to close their budget deficits in this fiscal year before any Federal funds could conceivably be forthcoming, and in that process, they actually close the gap for all subsequent years, then the issue of making Federal funds available to help the States over this particular prob- lem tends to be moot. And I do not know what the answer to that is. You have to, I suspect, argue that even if they were to impose taxes or cut pro- grams in order to maintain their constitutional required balance, that there are still problems for the current fiscal year which could be assisted by Federal funds. In that event, as I indicated to Senator Miller, you could make the argument that one could go forward with programs, but it is next year’s concerns that should be of interest to you, not the cur- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 40 rent ones, because it is already too late to address those issues in most States, as I understand it. Senator STABENOW. I appreciate that. I know that in Michigan, that is certainly the case, although they are projected for 2004 ad- ditional either spending that will be eliminated from the economy in the State, or some other combinations in terms of—certainly, States are looking at raising taxes, taking spending out of the econ- omy, and so on. I would suspect that this is going to be a few years of a challenge for the States. If you might talk one more time about the deficit. Senator Bayh, Senator Snowe, and I and others have been, since 2001, talking about a trigger and put forward both in committee and on the floor the idea of both addressing an economic trigger that dealt with tax and spending programs so that we would not be going back into debt. Two years ago, we were talking about tremendous surpluses and whether or not we should go back into debt. Now, we are talking about how big the deficit will be, dramatically different just in 2 years. It is astounding the shift that we have seen. But I know you have spoken in support of the idea of some kind of a trigger that relates to the deficit. And also, before the Committee back in February 2001, when we talked about that, you had said: ‘‘If there were a trigger which were built into both tax and spending programs, to the extent that they were phased, it ensures that we achieve what I think should be the first priority—namely, to eliminate the debt.’’ I would ask both if you continue to support the idea of a trigger to bring us into balance, but also, do you still believe that elimi- nating the debt should be our first priority? Chairman GREENSPAN. With the revenues where they are, or more exactly the tax base, where it currently is, that is no longer feasible as a realistic priority. I was raising it in the context of when we were getting signifi- cantly higher individual income tax receipts as a consequence of a very high flow of cash which the Congressional Budget Office was projecting would maintain us in a very high surplus level for quite a while. If we could eliminate the debt in a practical way which was con- ceivable at that point, I would certainly be in favor of it. But hav- ing lost the base and, indeed, largely because of the sharp decline in the stock market, a very substantial amount of revenues have been pulled out of the system, it is not a credible policy which we can embark upon without very substantially altering revenues and spending in a way which I do not think the Congress would even remotely consider. So it was a practical consideration back then. Regrettably, that is gone without it being achieved. Senator STABENOW. It is extremely regrettable. And when we look at the slowing of the economy, the issues of terrorism and the war certainly have to be taken into account. But I would argue that, unfortunately, a majority was self-inflicted by decisions that were made by the Congress. Just one other quick question if I might, Mr. Chairman, that is a totally separate track. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 41 Chairman Greenspan, I know that the Federal Reserve is ex- empted from the appropriations process. I would like to talk about the SEC, just one question. I know that you are allowed to use whatever funds are collected. There are reasons for that in terms of insulating you from political pressure, being able to make long-term decisions, being able to make decisions independently, and so on, all of which makes sense to me. I am wondering if you believe that the SEC, which is one of the only major regulators that goes through the appropriations process, might be better served and if investors and Americans would be better served if in fact the SEC funding process was, as your fund- ing process is, exempt from the annual appropriations process. I wonder if you have any thoughts on that. Chairman GREENSPAN. I have no specific thoughts on that gen- eral proposal, Senator. But I have always argued that it has been our experience that the levels of the salaries in the SEC are prob- ably too low, especially for their lawyers, to attract the quality of people in general which they need to maintain the type of surveil- lance which is required. They have some extraordinary lawyers in the SEC whom I sus- pect could be making double to three times what they are making in the private sector. Senator STABENOW. Don’t tell them that, would you? Chairman GREENSPAN. No, they are smart enough to know that. Senator STABENOW. I agree. Chairman GREENSPAN. But they consider working at the SEC a sufficiently interesting job to consider that the foregone income is more than matched than the job appreciation that one has from doing that work. Senator STABENOW. Thank you. Chairman SHELBY. Chairman Greenspan, I am going to try to be quick. I have a lot of questions for the record, such as the Presi- dent’s budget, projected deficits, tax reform, personal savings— some of these things have been touched on. Dividend proposals have been touched on. Condition of the banking industry, the economy’s resilience, and so forth. But we will do those for the record. I will try to be real fast and try to wind this up. I know you have a place to go and you need to get there. Would you elaborate quickly on the types of decisions regarding our tax structure that would increase economic flexibility as well as the long-run growth potential that the changes would create? Chairman GREENSPAN. Senator, the first thing I would do would be to broaden the question to overall fiscal policy. Chairman SHELBY. Okay. Chairman GREENSPAN. As I indicated earlier, I think we are now involved in the type of process which is really quite different from anything we had in the past. It is essentially the fact that we are dealing with long-term entitlements or taxes which do not go through annual appropriations or annual evaluations by the Con- gress, and as a consequence of that, can very readily add up to a drain on the resources of the economy, which is not the intention of the Congress. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 42 So, I think that the process really needs to be thoroughly re- viewed to make it consonant with the fact of our long-term commit- ments. And that would be involved with accrual accounting, which I discuss at length in my prepared remarks. It has to do with the triggers and various other mechanisms to enable a phase-in of pro- grams which will go off-track inevitably, so that they do not create instabilities in the fiscal system. We must be sure that the Federal Government does not impinge on the private sector’s capability of creating goods and services and expanding the standard of living of the American people, and that requires that it not drain the savings resources of the private sec- tor, which it does when it is running a deficit. Chairman SHELBY. Last, would you comment on the effect of the strengthened Euro versus the dollar on the U.S. economy? What is the future of that? Chairman GREENSPAN. Well, unfortunately, I am not capable of answering that because, as I think I may have said to you pre- viously in hearings, that we have an agreement with the Treasury that the exchange rate is discussed only by the Secretary of the Treasury and by no one else in the Administration. Chairman SHELBY. We will have Secretary Snow up here as soon as Senator Sarbanes and I can. Chairman GREENSPAN. I would suggest that you raise that ques- tion with him and you will get a sensible answer. Chairman SHELBY. Senator Sarbanes. Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I just have one question that I want to ask Chairman Greenspan. Just last year, you testified before the JEC, and I quote you: It is difficult to predict how long global investors will continue to place their funds disproportionately in U.S. assets. The current account is a measure of the increase in net claims, primarily debt claims that foreigners have on our assets. As the stock of such claims grows, an ever larger flow of interest payments must be provided to the foreign suppliers of this capital. Countries that have gone down this path invariably have run into trouble, and so would we. And in your monetary policy report, you point out that we are already borrowing $500 billion a year from a broad, a record 5 per- cent of our GDP. I have been concerned about this issue, as you know from some of our exchanges, for a very long time. This is the net international position of the U.S. as a percent of GDP. A little over 20 years ago, we were positive, 12.9 percent of GDP. Now, we are negative, just shy of 23 percent of GDP. And if we had 5 percent this next year because of the continued borrowing, we would be down to 28 percent of GDP. Is it really realistic to expect that these big increases in our Federal deficit can be offset even more by foreign borrowing? What kind of hole are we digging our- selves into here? Chairman GREENSPAN. Senator, I think I probably said at the JEC testimony, to which you are alluding, and in years previous when this issue came up, that that trend cannot continue. Some- thing will make it change. What is basically causing it is the fact that we have a propensity to import goods and services relative to our GDP which is by far higher than our trading partners’. So in the context of everybody in the world growing at the same rate, we would continually in- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 43 crease our imports faster than anybody else and create a large and increasing trade deficit, which of course is at the root of this par- ticular problem. We know that at some point, the system cannot go on because, as you point out in one of the balance sheets in the way our econ- omy functions is, of necessity, that there are relationships between the Government deficit, domestic investment, and domestic savings which are all tied together. And they cannot go off in different di- rections without affecting each other. I presumed 5 years ago that it would be resolved at some point. I have been presuming the same thing every year for 5 years. For- tunately, we have not had a major problem with respect to this because the productivity in the United States has been very im- pressive and the rates of return on our assets have attracted a con- siderable amount of investment. There are a numbers of ways in which this adjustment could occur. One, which we hope is the case, is a gradual adjustment process which is essentially incremental and we restore balance without economic disruption. There are other scenarios in which there are disruptions. I do not know of any useful way—I know of no way that I find persuasive that enables us to look at this particular process and be able to forecast when the adjustment is going to occur. But far more im- portantly, how it is going to occur. And that it will occur I think is inevitable. Chairman SHELBY. Any other questions? [No response.] Mr. Chairman, picking up on this, on the current account, how much of that is attributable, our deficiency in the current account, to the importation of oil? You can furnish that for the record. Chairman GREENSPAN. It is an issue, but it is not the critical issue. Chairman SHELBY. It is not the only issue, is it? Chairman GREENSPAN. No. We import much more oil per dollar of GDP than others. But in and of itself, even without the oil, that problem still exists. Chairman SHELBY. It would exist, but it wouldn’t be exacerbated. Is that true? Chairman GREENSPAN. Obviously, we are increasing an ever-in- creasing proportion of our domestic consumption of oil, we are im- porting an increasing proportion, and that clearly has no offsets. Chairman SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your appear- ance. Thank you for your patience and your answers. The hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] [Prepared statements, response to written questions, and addi- tional material supplied for the record follow:] VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 44 PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding this hearing, and I join you in welcoming Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan today for his Semi-An- nual Monetary Policy Report. Chairman Greenspan, over the years the economy has benefited greatly from your leadership at the Federal Reserve. In these uncertain times, experience and steadiness at the helm of the central bank are particularly important. We are grateful for your continued service. In recent months, we have witnessed some mixed messages from our economic in- dicators. I was pleased to see that last month unemployment fell three-tenths of a percent from December and that home sales and residential construction remain at high levels. However, at the same time, rising energy costs place a strain on the economy and adverse weather has harmed agricultural production. The Federal Reserves’ January Current Market Conditions Report quoted a Char- lotte, North Carolina, contact which summed up conditions in commercial real es- tate sector as ‘‘slow to partly cloudy.’’ With these issues in mind, my colleagues and I look forward to your thoughts on the current state of the economy and its potential. In addition, I hope we have the benefit of your views regarding the President’s tax package and its ability to stimu- late the economy. I know you agree that tax stimulus is a necessary component of economic recovery, and I look forward to hearing your thoughts on this. While all of us agree that the American economy needs a push in the right direc- tion there is some disagreement among my colleagues on the best way to achieve this goal. I hope in the months ahead we can work together to take the necessary steps in the right direction. Your report today will help us focus on the fundamen- tals as we move forward. Chairman Greenspan, I look forward to working with you and the Federal Reserve in the years to come to achieve sustainable long-term growth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ————— PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL S. SARBANES I am pleased to welcome Chairman Greenspan before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs this morning to testify on the Federal Reserve’s Semi- Annual Monetary Policy Report to Congress. Yesterday, a statement signed by over 450 economists, including 10 Nobel Prize winners, was released. At the outset of today’s hearing I think it would be worth- while to read parts of that statement because it helps to frame the economic issues that will be under discussion this morning: Economic growth, although positive, has not been sufficient to generate jobs and prevent unemployment from rising. In fact, there are now more than two million fewer private sector jobs than at the start of the current recession. Overcapacity, corporate scandals, and uncertainty have and will continue to weigh down the economy. The tax cut plan proposed by President Bush is not the answer to these problems. Regardless of how one views the specifics of the Bush plan, there is wide agreement that its purpose is a permanent change in the tax struc- ture and not the creation of jobs and growth in the near-term. The perma- nent dividend tax cut, in particular, is not credible as a short-term stimulus. As tax reform, the dividend tax cut is misdirected in that it tar- gets individuals rather than corporations, is overly complex, and could be, but is not, part of a revenue-neutral tax reform effort. Passing these tax cuts will worsen the long-term budget outlook, adding to the Nation’s projected chronic deficits. When President Bush came into office in January 2001, the Federal Government had a projected 10-year surplus of $5.6 trillion. In fact, Chairman Greenspan, you testified before the Senate in favor of the tax cut proposed by the President at that time on the grounds that the Government was paying off its debt too fast. You ar- gued that a tax cut was needed to ‘‘smooth the glide path,’’ I believe that was the phrase you used, so that the Government debt would not be paid off too quickly and put the Government in the position of acquiring private assets. That is not the problem we confront today. If the President’s program were en- acted into law, the budget projection for the same 10-year period would be a $2.1 trillion deficit. That is a $7.7 trillion reversal. That does not include the costs of a possible war with Iraq. It also does not include tax changes such as the reform of the alternative minimum tax and the extension of tax provisions currently sched- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 45 uled to sunset which have traditionally been extended. That projection may well be overly optimistic. By any measure, we are in the process of transforming the fiscal position of the United States from one of fiscal surplus to one of large fiscal deficits. Given the scale of the deficits that would be created by the President’s plan, fundamental questions are raised about the impact of deficits on interest rates, investment, growth, and jobs in our economy. The Administration is downplaying the impact of budget deficits, arguing the defi- cits that will result from their program are not that large relative to the economy, and that their size will be reduced by the economic activity that will result from the enactment of its proposed tax cuts. Some people who now support these tax cuts, and discount the significance of the budget deficits they would produce, previously supported an amendment to the Constitution requiring a balanced budget. Particu- larly in the face of the uncertain demands on public resources imposed by the war on terrorism, homeland defense, difficulties with North Korea, and a possible war with Iraq, I believe the President’s proposals are reckless and irresponsible. Giving away our economic strength with the kind of irresponsible tax cuts pro- posed by the President would not only deny us the public resources we will need to meet future challenges, but also it would put upward pressure on long-term inter- est rates that would reduce economic growth and impose greater hardship on middle and working class Americans. I look forward to reviewing these issues with Chairman Greenspan this morning. ————— PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR TIM JOHNSON Chairman Shelby and Ranking Member Sarbanes, thank you for convening to- day’s hearing to examine the monetary policy of the United States. We are privi- leged to have before us Chairman Alan Greenspan, and I welcome him here today to the Senate Banking Committee. Today, as we gather to hear about the state of America’s economy, we face a grim picture. It is sobering to note that, just 2 years ago, Chairman Greenspan cautioned this Committee about the dangers of paying down the national debt too quickly. Now just a short time later, we face a $304 billion deficit this year alone, and a deficit of more than $2 trillion over the next 10 years. In 2001, I voted to support President Bush’s $1.3 trillion tax cut. While I wish that package had been less skewed to the richest Americans, I agree with Chairman Greenspan, who has often warned that the Government should not accumulate taxpayer dollars. At the time I voted for tax relief, this country faced historically high surpluses of $5.6 trillion for fiscal years 2002–2011, and I committed myself to returning surplus funds to the taxpayers. I did so, however, on the condition that President Bush himself reiterated during his State of the Union address: ‘‘We will not pass along our problems to other Congresses, other Presidents, other genera- tions.’’ It is difficult to believe that our circumstances have changed so dramatically since President Bush took office 2 short years ago. And it is even more difficult to believe that President Bush appears determined to do exactly the opposite of what he pledged not to: Pass along our actions to the next generation. Frankly, I am appalled at the President’s recklessness in proposing a massive tax cut targeted for the rich while so many of our Nation’s basic needs go unmet. I sim- ply cannot understand the impulse to plunge our Nation into even more staggering deficits in order to indulge the desire for massive tax relief for the rich. All this, Mr. Chairman, while denying that we leave the next generation to pay for this folly. I believe that any stimulus plan must meet three simple conditions: (1) it should give tax relief to working American families who need it and who will spend it; (2) it should give tax relief now, while the economy is weak; and (3) it should not saddle our children and grandchildren with additional debt. President Bush’s plan does not meet these conditions. Instead, President Bush uses his plan as an excuse not to provide real stimulus, like drought relief that is so desperately needed in States like South Dakota. Chairman Greenspan has long been respected for his wise counsel on the dam- aging impact of deficits. It is now conventional wisdom that deficits cause high in- terest rates, and that, as Mr. Greenspan testified back in 2001, ‘‘a declining level of Federal debt is desirable because it holds down long-term real interest rates, thereby lowering the cost of capital and elevating private investment.’’ We need only look at the incredible appreciation in the Nation’s housing market to see the real benefits that low interest rates have had on our economy. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 46 Back in 2001, when we were faced with record surpluses, I think that we all rec- ognized the value of Chairman Greenspan’s suggestion that the President’s tax cut include so-called ‘‘triggers’’ to revisit the revenue side if the projected budget sur- pluses did not materialize. He recognized that political pressure tends to make hard decisions even harder. Today, it is my hope that Chairman Greenspan can resist the strong pressure to allow politics to color his testimony. We have all read articles decrying the last elec- tion cycle as one of the most vicious in history, with ads attacking our colleagues’ patriotism, their judgment, their motives. For the sake of our Nation and its fiscal health, we must not let that ugliness infect our current deliberations. Chairman Greenspan, your legacy deserves to reflect the brilliance of your career to this point. And so it all comes down to this: Will you be remembered for maintaining your op- position to reckless deficit spending? Or will you abandon that legacy by succumbing to enormous political pressure to justify the President’s tax proposal. I look forward to your testimony. ————— PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN GREENSPAN CHAIRMAN, BOARDOFGOVERNORSOFTHEFEDERALRESERVESYSTEM FEBRUARY11, 2003 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased this morning to present the Federal Reserve’s Semi-Annual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. I will begin by reviewing the state of the U.S. economy and the conduct of monetary policy and then turn to some key issues related to the Federal budget. When I testified before this committee last July, I noted that, while the growth of economic activity over the first half of the year had been spurred importantly by a swing from rapid inventory drawdown to modest inventory accumulation, that source of impetus would surely wind down in subsequent quarters, as it did. We at the Federal Reserve recognized that a strengthening of final sales was an essential element of putting the expansion on a firm and sustainable track. To support such a strengthening, monetary policy was set to continue its accommodative stance. In the event, final sales continued to grow only modestly, and business outlays remained soft. Concerns about corporate governance, which intensified for a time, were compounded over the late summer and into the fall by growing geopolitical tensions. In particular, worries about the situation in Iraq contributed to an appre- ciable increase in oil prices. These uncertainties, coupled with ongoing concerns surrounding macroeconomic prospects, heightened investors’ perception of risk and, perhaps, their aversion to such risk. Equity prices weakened further, the expected volatility of equity prices rose to unusually high levels, spreads on corporate debt and credit default swaps deteriorated, and liquidity in corporate debt markets de- clined. The economic data and the anecdotal information suggested that firms were tightly limiting hiring and capital spending and keeping an unusually short leash on inventories. With capital markets inhospitable and commercial banks firming terms and standards on business loans, corporations relied to an unusual extent on a drawdown of their liquid assets rather than on borrowing to fund their limited expenditures. By early November, conditions in financial markets had firmed somewhat on re- ports of improved corporate profitability. But on November 6, with economic per- formance remaining subpar, the Federal Open Market Committee chose to ease the stance of monetary policy, reducing the Federal funds rate 50 basis points, to 11⁄4 percent. We viewed that action as insurance against the possibility that the still widespread weakness would become entrenched. With inflation expectations well contained, this additional monetary stimulus seemed to offer worthwhile insurance against the threat of persistent economic weakness and unwelcome substantial de- clines in inflation from already low levels. In the weeks that followed, financial market conditions continued to improve, but only haltingly. The additional monetary stimulus and the absence of further revela- tions of major corporate wrongdoing seemed to provide some reassurance to inves- tors. Equity prices rose, volatility declined, risk spreads narrowed, and market liquidity increased, albeit not to levels that might be associated with robust eco- nomic conditions. At the same time, mounting concerns about geopolitical risks and energy supplies, amplified by the turmoil in Venezuela, were mirrored by the worri- some surge in oil prices, continued skittishness in financial markets, and substan- tial uncertainty among businesses about the outlook. Partly as a result, growth of economic activity slowed markedly late in the sum- mer and in the fourth quarter, continuing the choppy pattern that prevailed over VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 47 the past year. According to the advance estimate, real GDP expanded at an annual rate of only 3⁄4 percent last quarter after surging 4 percent in the third quarter. Much of that deceleration reflected a falloff in the production of motor vehicles from the near-record level that had been reached in the third quarter when low financing rates and other incentive programs sparked a jump in sales. The slowing in aggre- gate output also reflected aggressive attempts by businesses more generally to en- sure that inventories remained under control. Thus far, those efforts have proven successful in that business inventories, with only a few exceptions, have stayed lean—a circumstance that should help support production this year. Indeed, after dropping back a bit in the fall, manufacturing activity turned up in December, and reports from purchasing managers suggest that improvement has continued into this year. Excluding both the swings in auto and truck production and the fluctua- tions in nonmotor-vehicle inventories, economic activity has been moving up in a considerably smoother fashion than has overall real GDP: Final sales excluding motor vehicles are estimated to have risen at a 21⁄4 percent annual rate in the fourth quarter after a similar 13⁄4 percent advance in the previous quarter and an average of 2 percent in the first half. Thus, apart from these quarterly fluctuations, the economy has largely extended the broad patterns of performance that were evident at the time of my July testi- mony. Most notably, output has continued to expand, but only modestly. As pre- viously, overall growth has simultaneously been supported by relatively strong spending by households and weighed down by weak expenditures by businesses. Im- portantly, the favorable underlying trends in productivity have continued; despite little change last quarter, output per hour in the nonfarm business sector rose 33⁄4 percent over the four quarters of 2002, an impressive gain for a period of generally lackluster economic performance. One consequence of the combination of sluggish output growth and rapid productivity gains has been that the labor market has re- mained quite soft. Employment turned down in the final months of last year, and the unemployment rate moved up, but the report for January was somewhat more encouraging. Another consequence of the strong performance of productivity has been its sup- port of household incomes despite the softness of labor markets. Those gains in income, combined with very low interest rates and reduced taxes, have permitted relatively robust advances in residential construction and household expenditures. Indeed, residential construction activity has moved up steadily over the year. And despite the large swings in sales, the underlying demand for motor vehicles appears to have been well maintained. Other consumer outlays, financed partly by the large extraction of built-up equity in homes, have continued to trend up. Most equity ex- traction—reflecting the realized capital gains on home sales—usually occurs as a consequence of house turnover. But during the past year, an almost equal amount reflected the debt-financed cash-outs associated with an unprecedented surge in mortgage refinancings. Such refinancing activity is bound to contract at some point, as average interest rates on outstanding home mortgages converge to interest rates on new mortgages. However, fixed mortgage rates remain extraordinarily low, and applications for refinancing are not far off their peaks. Simply processing the back- log of earlier applications will take some time, and this factor alone suggests that refinancing originations and cash-outs will be significant at least through the early part of this year. To be sure, the mortgage debt of homeowners relative to their income is high by historical norms. But as a consequence of low interest rates, the servicing require- ment for the mortgage debt of homeowners relative to the corresponding disposable income of that group is well below the high levels of the early 1990’s. Moreover, owing to continued large gains in residential real estate values, equity in homes has continued to rise despite sizable debt-financed extractions. Adding in the fixed costs associated with other financial obligations, such as rental payments of tenants, con- sumer installment credit, and auto leases, the total servicing costs faced by house- holds relative to their incomes are below previous peaks and do not appear to be a significant cause for concern at this time. While household spending has been reasonably vigorous, we have yet to see con- vincing signs of a rebound in business outlays. After having fallen sharply over the preceding 2 years, new orders for capital equipment stabilized and, for some cat- egories, turned up in nominal terms in 2002. Investment in equipment and software is estimated to have risen at a 5 percent rate in real terms in the fourth quarter and a subpar 3 percent over the four quarters of the year. However, the emergence of a sustained and broad-based pickup in capital spend- ing will almost surely require the resumption of substantial gains in corporate profits. Profit margins apparently did improve a bit last year, aided importantly by the strong growth in labor productivity. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 48 Of course, the path of capital investment will depend not only on market condi- tions and the prospects for profits and cashflow but also on the resolution of the uncertainties surrounding the business outlook. Indeed, the heightening of geo- political tensions has only added to the marked uncertainties that have piled up over the past 3 years, creating formidable barriers to new investment and thus to a resumption of vigorous expansion of overall economic activity. The intensification of geopolitical risks makes discerning the economic path ahead especially difficult. If these uncertainties diminish considerably in the near term, we should be able to tell far better whether we are dealing with a business sector and an economy poised to grow more rapidly—our more probable expectation—or one that is still laboring under persisting strains and imbalances that have been misidentified as transitory. Certainly, financial conditions would not seem to impose a significant hurdle to a turnaround in business spending. Yields on risk-free Treas- ury securities have fallen, risk spreads are narrower on corporate bonds, premiums on credit default swaps have retraced most of their summer spike, and liquidity con- ditions have improved in capital markets. These factors, if maintained, should even- tually facilitate more-vigorous corporate outlays. If instead, contrary to our expectations, we find that, despite the removal of the Iraq-related uncertainties, constraints to expansion remain, various initiatives for conventional monetary and fiscal stimulus will doubtless move higher on the policy agenda. But as part of that process, the experience of recent years may be instruc- tive. As I have testified before this Committee in the past, the most significant les- son to be learned from recent American economic history is arguably the importance of structural flexibility and the resilience to economic shocks that it imparts. I do not claim to be able to judge the relative importance of conventional stimulus and increased economic flexibility to our ability to weather the shocks of the past few years. But the improved flexibility of our economy, no doubt, has played a key role. That increased flexibility has been in part the result of the ongoing success in liberalizing global trade, a quarter-century of bipartisan deregulation that has significantly reduced rigidities in our markets for energy, transportation, commu- nication, and financial services, and, of course, the dramatic gains in information technology that have markedly enhanced the ability of businesses to address fes- tering economic imbalances before they inflict significant damage. This improved ability has been facilitated further by the increasing willingness of our workers to embrace innovation more generally. It is reasonable to surmise that, not only have such measures contributed signifi- cantly to the long-term growth potential of the economy this past decade, they also have enhanced its short-term resistance to recession. That said, we have too little history to measure the extent to which increasing flexibility has boosted the econo- my’s potential and helped damp cyclical fluctuations in activity. Even so, the benefits appear sufficiently large that we should be placing special emphasis on searching for policies that will engender still greater economic flexi- bility and dismantling policies that contribute to unnecessary rigidity. The more flexible an economy, the greater its ability to self-correct in response to inevitable, often unanticipated, disturbances, thus reducing the size and consequences of cycli- cal imbalances. Enhanced flexibility has the advantage of adjustments being auto- matic and not having to rest on the initiatives of policymakers, which often come too late or are based on highly uncertain forecasts. Policies intended to improve the flexibility of the economy seem to fall outside the sphere of traditional monetary and fiscal policy. But decisions on the structure of the tax system and spending programs surely influence flexibility and thus can have major consequences for both the cyclical performance and long-run growth potential of our economy. Accordingly, in view of the major budget issues now confronting the Congress and their potential implications for the economy, I thought it appropriate to devote some of my remarks today to fiscal policy. In that regard, I will not be emphasizing specific spending or revenue programs. Rather, my focus will be on the goals and process determining the budget and on the importance, despite our in- creasing national security requirements, of regaining discipline in that process. These views are my own and are not necessarily shared by my colleagues at the Federal Reserve. * * * One notable feature of the budget landscape over the past half century has been the limited movement in the ratio of unified budget outlays-to-nominal GDP. Over the past 5 years, that ratio has averaged a bit less than 19 percent, about where it was in the 1960’s before it moved up during the 1970’s and 1980’s. But that pat- tern of relative stability over the longer term has masked a pronounced rise in the VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 49 share of spending committed to retirement, medical, and other entitlement pro- grams. Conversely, the share of spending that is subject to the annual appropria- tions process, and thus that comes under regular review by the Congress, has been shrinking. Such so-called discretionary spending has fallen from two-thirds of total outlays in the 1960’s to one-third last year, with defense outlays accounting for al- most all of the decline. The increase in the share of expenditures that is more or less on automatic pilot has complicated the task of making fiscal policy by effectively necessitating an ex- tension of the budget horizon. The Presidents’ budgets through the 1960’s and into the 1970’s mainly provided information for the upcoming fiscal year. The legislation in 1974 that established a new budget process and that created the Congressional Budget Office required that organization to provide 5-year budget projections. And by the mid-1990’s, CBO’s projection horizon had been pushed out to 10 years. These longer time periods and the associated budget projections, even granted their impre- cision, are useful steps toward allowing the Congress to balance budget priorities sensibly in the context of a cash-based accounting system.1 But more can be done to clarify those priorities and thereby enhance the discipline on the fiscal process. A general difficulty concerns the very nature of the unified budget. As a cash ac- counting system, it was adopted in 1968 to provide a comprehensive measure of the funds that move in and out of Federal coffers. With a few modifications, it correctly measures the direct effect of Federal transactions on national saving. But a cash accounting system is not designed to track new commitments and their translation into future spending and borrowing. For budgets that are largely discretionary, changes in forward commitments do not enter significantly into budget delibera- tions, and hence the surplus or deficit in the unified budget is a reasonably accurate indicator of the stance of fiscal policy and its effect on saving. But as longer-term commitments have come to dominate tax and spending decisions, such cash account- ing has been rendered progressively less meaningful as the principal indicator of the state of our fiscal affairs. An accrual-based accounting system geared to the longer horizon could be con- structed with a reasonable amount of additional effort. In fact, many of the inputs on the outlay side are already available. However, estimates of revenue accruals are not well developed. These include deferred taxes on retirement accounts that are taxable on withdrawal, accrued taxes on unrealized capital gains, and corporate tax accruals. An accrual system would allow us to keep better track of the Government’s overall accrued obligations and deferred assets. Future benefit obligations and taxes would be recognized as they are incurred rather than when they are paid out by the Government.2 Currently, accrued outlays very likely are much greater than those calculated under the cash-based approach. Under full accrual accounting, the Social Security program would be showing a substantial deficit this year, rather than the surplus measured under our current cash accounting regimen.3 Indeed, under most reason- able sets of actuarial assumptions, for Social Security benefits alone past accruals cumulate to a liability that amounts to many trillions of dollars. For the Govern- ment as a whole, such liabilities are still growing. Estimating the liabilities implicit in Social Security is relatively straightforward because that program has many of the characteristics of a private defined-benefit retirement program. Projections of Medicare outlays, however, are far more uncer- tain even though the rise in the beneficiary populations is expected to be similar. The likelihood of continued dramatic innovations in medical technology and proce- dures combined with largely inelastic demand and a subsidized third-party payment system engenders virtually open-ended potential Federal outlays unless constrained by law.4 Liabilities for Medicare are probably about the same order of magnitude as those for Social Security, and as is the case for Social Security, the date is rapidly approaching when those liabilities will be converted into cash outlays. Accrual-based accounts would lay out more clearly the true costs and benefits of changes to various taxes and outlay programs and facilitate the development of a 1Unfortunately, they are incomplete steps because even a 10-year horizon ends just as the baby-boom generation is beginning to retire and the huge pressures on Social Security and espe- cially Medicare are about to show through. 2In particular, a full set of accrual accounts would give the Congress, for the first time in usable form, an aggregate tabulation of Federal commitments under current law, with various schedules of the translation of those commitments into receipts and cash payouts. 3However, accrued outlays should exhibit far less deterioration than the unified budget out- lays when the baby boomers retire because the appreciable rise in benefits that is projected to cause spending to balloon after 2010 will have been accrued in earlier years. 4Constraining these outlays by any mechanism other than prices will involve some form of rationing—an approach that in the past has not been popular in the United States. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 50 broad budget strategy. In doing so, these accounts should help shift the national dialogue and consensus toward a more realistic view of the limits of our national resources as we approach the next decade and focus attention on the necessity to make difficult choices from among programs that, on a stand-alone basis, appear very attractive. Because the baby boomers have not yet started to retire in force and accordingly the ratio of retirees to workers is still relatively low, we are in the midst of a demo- graphic lull. But short of an outsized acceleration of productivity to well beyond the average pace of the past 7 years or a major expansion of immigration, the aging of the population now in train will end this state of relative budget tranquility in about a decade’s time. It would be wise to address this significant pending adjust- ment sooner rather than later. As the President’s just-released budget put it, ‘‘The longer the delay in enacting reforms, the greater the danger, and the more drastic the remedies will have to be.’’5 Accrual-based revenue and outlay projections, tied to a credible set of economic assumptions, tax rates, and programmatic spend-out rates, can provide important evidence on the long-term sustainability of the overall budget and economic regimes under alternative scenarios.6 Of course, those projections, useful as they might prove to be, would still be subject to enormous uncertainty. The ability of economists to assess the effects of tax and spending programs is hindered by an incomplete un- derstanding of the forces influencing the economy. It is not surprising, therefore, that much controversy over basic questions sur- rounds the current debate over budget policy. Do budget deficits and debt signifi- cantly affect interest rates and, hence, economic activity? With political constraints on the size of acceptable deficits, do tax cuts ultimately restrain spending increases, and do spending increases limit tax cuts? To what extent do tax increases inhibit investment and economic growth or, by raising national saving, have the opposite effect? And to what extent does Government spending raise the growth of GDP, or is its effect offset by a crowding out of private spending? Substantial efforts are being made to develop analytical tools that, one hopes, will enable us to answer such questions with greater precision than we can now. Much progress has been made in ascertaining the effects of certain policies, but many of the more critical questions remain in dispute. However, there should be little disagreement about the need to reestablish budget discipline. The events of September 11 have placed demands on our budgetary re- sources that were unanticipated a few years ago. In addition, with defense outlays having fallen in recent years to their smallest share of GDP since before World War II, the restraint on overall spending from the downtrend in military outlays has surely run its course—and likely would have done so even without the tragedy of September 11. The CBO and the Office of Management and Budget recently released updated budget projections that are sobering. These projections, in conjunction with the looming demographic pressures, underscore the urgency of extending the budget enforcement rules. To be sure, in the end, it is policy, not process, that counts. But the statutory limits on discretionary spending and the so-called PAYGO rules, which were promulgated in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 and were backed by a sixty-vote point of order in the Senate, served as useful tools for controlling deficits through much of the 1990’s. These rules expired in the House last September and have been partly extended in the Senate only through mid-April. The Budget Enforcement Act was intended to address the problem of huge unified deficits and was enacted in the context of a major effort to bring the budget under control. In 1990, the possibility that surpluses might emerge within the decade seemed remote indeed. When they unexpectedly arrived, the problem that the budget control measures were designed to address seemed to have been solved. Fis- cal discipline became a less pressing priority and was increasingly abandoned. To make the budget process more effective, some have suggested amending the budget rules to increase their robustness against the designation of certain spending items as ‘‘emergency’’ and hence not subject to the caps. Others have proposed mechanisms, such as statutory triggers and sunsets on legislation, that would allow the Congress to make mid-course corrections more easily if budget projections go off- 5Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, fiscal year 2004, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, p.32. 6In general, fiscal systems are presumed stable if the ratio of debt in the hands of the public- to-nominal GDP (a proxy for the revenue base) is itself stable. A rapidly rising ratio of debt- to-GDP, for example, implies an ever-increasing and possibly accelerating ratio of interest pay- ments to the revenue base. Conversely, once debt has fallen to zero, budget surpluses generally require the accumulation of private assets, an undesirable policy in the judgment of many. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 51 track—as they invariably will. These ideas are helpful and they could strengthen the basic structure established a decade ago. But, more important, a budget frame- work along the lines of the one that provided significant and effective discipline in the past needs, in my judgment, to be reinstated without delay. I am concerned that, should the enforcement mechanisms governing the budget process not be restored, the resulting lack of clear direction and constructive goals would allow the inbuilt political bias in favor of growing budget deficits to again become entrenched. We are all too aware that Government spending programs and tax preferences can be easy to initiate or to expand but extraordinarily difficult to trim or to shut down once constituencies develop that have a stake in maintaining the status quo. In Congress’s review of the mechanisms governing the budget process, you may want to reconsider whether the statutory limit on the public debt is a useful device. As a matter of arithmetic, the debt ceiling is either redundant or inconsistent with the paths of revenues and outlays you specify when you legislate a budget. In addition, a technical correction in the procedure used to tie indexed benefits and individual income tax brackets to changes in ‘‘the cost of living’’ as required by law is long overdue. As you may be aware, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has re- cently introduced a new price index—the so-called chained CPI. The new index is based on the same underlying data as is the official CPI, but it combines the indi- vidual prices in a way that better measures changes in the cost of living. In par- ticular, the chained CPI captures more fully than does the official CPI the way that consumers alter the mix of their expenditures in response to changes in relative prices. Because it appears to offer a more accurate measure of the true cost of living—the statutory intent—the chained CPI would be a more suitable series for the indexation of Federal programs. Had such indexing been in place during the past decade, the fiscal 2002 deficit would have been $40 billion smaller, all else being equal. At the present time, there seems to be a large and growing constituency for hold- ing down the deficit, but I sense less appetite to do what is required to achieve that outcome. Reestablishing budget balance will require discipline on both revenue and spending actions, but restraint on spending may prove the more difficult. Tax cuts are limited by the need for the Federal Government to fund a basic level of serv- ices—for example, national defense. No such binding limits constrain spending. If spending growth were to outpace nominal GDP, maintaining budget balance would necessitate progressively higher tax rates that would eventually inhibit the growth in the revenue base on which those rates are imposed. Deficits, possibly ever wid- ening, would be the inevitable outcome. Faster economic growth, doubtless, would make deficits far easier to contain. But faster economic growth alone is not likely to be the full solution to currently pro- jected long-term deficits. To be sure, underlying productivity has accelerated consid- erably in recent years. Nevertheless, to assume that productivity can continue to accelerate to rates well above the current underlying pace would be a stretch, even for our very dynamic economy.7 So, short of a major increase in immigration, eco- nomic growth cannot be safely counted upon to eliminate deficits and the difficult choices that will be required to restore fiscal discipline. By the same token, in setting budget priorities and policies, attention must be paid to the attendant consequences for the real economy. Achieving budget balance, for example, through actions that hinder economic growth is scarcely a measure of success. We need to develop policies that increase the real resources that will be available to meet our longer-run needs. The greater the resources available—that is, the greater the output of goods and services produced by our economy—the easier will be providing real benefits to retirees in coming decades without unduly re- straining the consumption of workers. * * * These are challenging times for all policymakers. Considerable uncertainties sur- round the economic outlook, especially in the period immediately ahead. But the economy has shown remarkable resilience in the face of a succession of substantial blows. Critical to our Nation’s performance over the past few years has been the flexibility exhibited by our market-driven economy and its ability to generate sub- stantial increases in productivity. Going forward, these same characteristics, in con- cert with sound economic policies, should help to foster a return to vigorous growth of the U.S. economy to the benefit of all our citizens. 7In fact, we will need some further acceleration of productivity just to offset the inevitable decline in net labor force, and associated overall economic, growth as the baby boomers retire. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 52 RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR SHELBY FROM ALAN GREENSPAN Q.1. I would like to start off with a very broad question involving our tax structure. I am a strong proponent of a simplified tax struc- ture which would eliminate the inefficiencies of our current system and end the waste of the vast resources currently dedicated to tak- ing advantage of all of the complexities. What three words would you use to describe our current system? What would be the benefits of moving to a more straightforward structure? What aspects of our current tax structure would be in the ‘‘most in need of reform’’ winners? A.1. I believe that our current tax system is overly complex, bur- densome, and inefficient. It creates larger disincentives for work, saving, and investment than need be to raise the revenue required to finance Government operations. Moreover, the complexity leads to a substantial commitment of resources on the part of the private sector for the sole purpose of complying with the tax code. The Na- tion would be well served by moving to a more straightforward structure that would engender greater economic flexibility and effi- ciency and lower the compliance burden. A successful round of tax reform, particularly with regard to the taxation of capital income, could significantly improve the working of our economy. As I stated in my recent appearance before the Committee, I believe any such tax reform should be implemented in a budget-neutral manner. Q.2.a. The President’s budget proposes an end to the double tax- ation of corporate dividends by granting tax relief to individual shareholders. I support this proposal and the President’s proposal to increase expensing for small businesses. What would you antici- pate would be the effect of these proposals on investment and job growth? A.2.a. A full analysis of the macroeconomic impact of the proposals is exceptionally complicated because the relevant conceptual issues touch on unsettled questions at the heart of public finance and cor- porate finance. That said, as I pointed out during my testimony, I support elimination of the double taxation of dividends because it is good long-term policy that reduces distortions and adds to the flexibility of the economy in responding to shocks that otherwise might result in recession. While I do not support elimination of double taxation because of short-term stimulus, it likely would pro- vide some near-term boost to the economy. This is primarily be- cause the plan would likely boost the level of stock prices that, in turn, would generate a positive wealth effect; there also could be some small income effects owing to short-run multiplier effects on aggregate demand. Q.2.b. Won’t this proposal give corporations better incentives as they decide whether to issue debt or equity to run their operations? A.2.b. If enacted as proposed, the President’s plan would eliminate the double tax on corporate dividends and those capital gains de- rived from undistributed after-tax profits (‘‘deemed’’ dividends). This would eliminate shareholder taxes on corporate equity income and thus mitigate the current tax-induced distortion that favors debt financing relative to equity financing. Lower taxes on cor- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 53 porate dividends and capital gains would boost the incentive to issue equity, both to finance new investment and to pay down ex- isting debt, resulting in a decline in corporate debt-equity ratios. As a positive byproduct, the diminution of the reliance on debt would tend to reduce the fragility of the financial system in the face of adverse shocks. Q.2.c. Some have argued that it would be preferable to allow cor- porations to expense dividends akin to the treatment of interest. Does it matter how we do it? And if it does, what incentives/dis- incentives and costs/benefits are created based on the two ap- proaches? A.2.c. I would prefer that the elimination of the double taxation of dividends be done at the corporate level, although in the long run, it probably would not matter greatly which approach is taken. I would note a couple of differences, however, between the two ap- proaches you outline. First, if the plan were implemented on the corporate side, the revenue loss likely would be larger, because about half of dividends are received by tax-exempt equity holders at the personal level. Second, the increase in share prices may be larger: When implemented on the corporate side, the stream of div- idend payments plausibly would rise essentially immediately and, thus, make stocks more attractive even to tax-exempt holders. Q.3.a. The President’s budget projects deficits through 2008. Some have expressed concern about the magnitude of these deficits. How- ever, on a percentage basis, the deficits are a smaller percentage of GDP than those we experienced in the 1980’s. (For example, the projected $308 billion deficit for 2003 represents 2.8 percent of GDP while the 1992 deficit was 4.7 percent of GDP.) Given current economic conditions and uncertainty concerning world affairs, how important is it to maintain fiscal discipline and where is it most important to seek this discipline? A.3.a. Current economic and fiscal circumstances make the mainte- nance of fiscal discipline highly important. The recently updated budget projections from CBO and the Office of Management and Budget show that projections of the budget balance have deterio- rated sharply over the past 2 years reflecting, in part, the demands that our response to the events of September 11 has placed on our budgetary resources, as well as the effects on tax revenues of the cyclical downturn and stock market decline. This return to budget deficits has occurred at a time when lower deficits and declining Federal debt levels would help the country prepare for the fiscal pressures that will accompany the rapidly approaching retirement of the baby-boom generation. My preferred approach to attaining fiscal discipline would be to reinstate budget rules—perhaps a version of the recently expired PAYGO rules and discretionary spending caps. Such an approach would leave the Congress and the Administration free to act on high-priority initiatives and respond to unanticipated demands as long as their effect on the deficit were offset elsewhere in the budg- et. In addition, I have frequently stated that improvement in the budget balance realized through spending restraint would generally be preferable to improvements based on tax increases. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 54 Q.3.b. At what point do you believe we should be concerned about Government deficits ‘‘crowding out’’ private borrowing? A.3.b. The tendency for increases in the deficit to crowd out private borrowing does not begin at a particular point. In general, in- creases in the deficit result in higher long-term interest rates which, in turn, discourage private borrowing. However, if we let deficits become too large there is the additional concern that the fiscal system will become unsustainable; that is, higher-debt serv- ice outlays engendered by growing debt may result in a cycle of ever-higher debt-service outlays and deficits relative to GDP. Such instability would not occur as long as deficits do not result in a ris- ing debt-to-GDP ratio. The path of the debt-to-GDP ratio currently being projected by CBO and the Office of Management and Budget for the next several years is about flat; that is, the deficits do not yet pose a significant instability concern. But as we go beyond the turn of the decade, a very significant acceleration in payments to beneficiaries of both Social Security and Medicare will hit the budget and, in the absence of other budget adjustments, produce deficit-to-GDP ratios that would not be consistent with long-run fis- cal sustainability. Q.4. The threat of war against Iraq leaves consumers and busi- nesses feeling very uncertain about the economic outlook. I want to ask you about an article from last week’s Wall Street Journal. Ac- cording to this article, since WWII, wartime spending has become a smaller part of the economy and produces fewer economic gains. In short, the article makes the case that the United States cannot expect an economic boost from war-related spending since the econ- omy has grown so large relative to the spending. Given that is the case, should we be arguing that the threat of war represents a sig- nificant factor in the cooldown or lag in the economy? What other factors might be at work that are not receiving attention? A.4. It is certainly the case that defense spending represents a smaller share of our GDP than it did in the 1950’s and 1960’s; that is also true for the share of defense output in manufacturing pro- duction. However, I would still expect the incremental increases in defense spending over previously budgeted levels to boost the level of real activity, at least in the short to intermediate term. Part of that effect is likely to occur right away. However, the boost to pro- duction from the replacement of spent munitions and equipment would likely extend over several years. That was the pattern we saw after the 1991 Gulf War. In more recent months, geopolitical concerns have been among a number of factors inhibiting business hiring and capital spending. There is considerable anecdotal evidence that business remain in a wait-and-see mode when it comes to dealing with geopolitical risks. These same concerns likely have weighed on consumer con- fidence in recent months. As I noted in my testimony, if these un- certainties diminish considerably in the near term, we should be able to determine whether we are dealing with an economy poised to grow more rapidly or one that is still laboring to rectify lingering imbalances. Q.5. Economists have long lamented the low savings rate of Ameri- cans. The President’s budget includes sweeping proposals aimed at VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 55 raising the amount of money Americans save. I believe that in- creasing savings is critical yet I am concerned that we may not be able to go as far as the President suggests. If the Congress chose to address this issue, how would you recommend that we provide greater incentives for individual saving? A.5. I agree that raising our Nation’s saving rate should be an im- portant long-term priority. Saving frees up resources from current use and thereby makes those resources available for investment in new plants and equipment. Indeed, about half of the growth in labor productivity in the United States over long periods can be at- tributed to capital investment. The more saving our economy gen- erates, the greater our productivity and prosperity. Raising personal saving—the saving done by households—can be an important element of raising national saving—the saving done by the country as a whole. However, it is only one element. Na- tional saving is the sum of personal saving, saving by businesses (that is, retained earnings), and the saving of governments (that is, budget surpluses less budget deficits). Of the various savings con- cepts, it is national saving that is most important for determining our future national standard of living. Thus, it is critical that any effort to raise personal saving be judged in terms of its efficacy in raising national saving. Q.6. The Fed’s most recent Senior Loan Officer Survey of Bank Lending Practices (January 2003) reported that banks continued to tighten lending standards and terms for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans over the past 3 months in fractions similar to those re- ported in the October survey. In particular, the percentage of do- mestic banks that reported worsening industry-specific problems were a reason for tightening rose substantially from 39 percent in October to 66 percent in January. What is the nature of industry- specific problems? Do you see any particular types of businesses having difficulty getting credit? On the other hand, few banks re- ported that they had tightened any terms on credit card loans or other consumer loans. Should we have any concerns about too much credit in this area? A.6. The survey did not ask respondents to comment on particular industries that were experiencing problems. The few banks that volunteered such information most commonly cited the energy in- dustry, with the telecommunications and airlines industries also being mentioned. The growth of consumer credit slowed sharply last year, to 3.3 percent, down from 6.9 percent in 2001. Part of this slowdown owes to a substantial volume of debt consolidation facilitated by a wave of ‘‘cash out’’ refinancing of mortgage debt in an environment of un- usually low mortgage rates. Indeed, the growth of mortgage debt was sufficiently strong to raise the growth of overall household debt, the sum of consumer credit and residential mortgages, in 2002. Even so, as I mentioned in my testimony, adding in the fixed costs associated with other financial obligations, such as rental payments of tenants, consumer installment credit, and auto leases, the total servicing costs faced by households relative to their in- comes are below previous peaks and do not appear to be a signifi- cant cause for concern at this time. Recent declines in delinquency VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 56 rates on total household debt suggest that this sector remains healthy overall. Q.7. Last week, we saw American Insurance Group (AIG) increase its reserves by $3.5 billion—a result of unexpected costs from cor- porate claims over injury lawsuits, corporate mismanagement, im- proper financial transactions, and medical malpractice. AIG has a significant amount of capital and isn’t in financial danger. Can we expect to see similar increases in reserves for other companies and what does this mean for the insurance industry’s condition as a whole? How much of what we are seeing is due to price competition among insurers versus potential flaws in our tort liability system? A.7. As you know, the Federal Reserve does not have direct super- visory or regulatory responsibility for the insurance industry. In its role as umbrella supervisor of financial holding companies, and for internal purposes, the Federal Reserve tracks broader insurance in- dustry developments, particularly in view of the industry’s role in providing credit to the economy. The Federal Reserve monitors insurance industry developments using publicly available informa- tion. Our response is limited to comments on the property and cas- ualty sector of the insurance industry in view of your reference to adverse reserve developments in that sector. Based on the publicly available sources, it appears that further adverse reserve developments for a number of property and cas- ualty insurance companies may occur. It is our understanding that a large proportion of the recent additional claims reserving for the industry as a whole is associated with business booked in the late 1990’s when pricing was particularly competitive and that addi- tional reserving may be anticipated. The increased reserving appears to be largely related to losses in commercial coverage, including coverage for product liability, workers’ compensation, general liability, financial guarantees, and directors and officers in- surance. We also understand that additional reserving by a number of companies is associated with commercial coverages under gen- eral liability dating back to the 1970’s and before, particularly for asbestos-related claims. (AIG reports that its exposure to asbestos claims is minimal and attributed none of its increased reserves noted above to asbestos exposure.) In addition to continued underwriting losses, other factors may continue to affect the condition of the property and casualty insur- ance industry, including declining interest earned on investment portfolios and write-downs for bond impairments. For many years prior to 2000, property and casualty insurance companies relied on their investment portfolio results to offset underwriting losses. De- clines in corporate credit quality and equity prices in recent years have reversed that trend, which has put significant pressure on in- surance companies to price their products to cover expected losses and recover prior losses. The industry now appears to be benefiting from significantly stronger demand for insurance products and in- creased insurance premium rates across virtually all business lines, and may benefit in the future from the heightened focus on under- writing standards. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 57 On balance, the industry continues to face significant challenges. Despite the adverse effect of recent developments on earnings and capital, capital levels appear strong by historical standards. The Federal Reserve does not have the data to determine the ex- tent to which the reserve developments may have been attributable to adverse judgments by juries. Press reports suggest that the ad- verse reserve developments may be attributed, in large part, to unsustainable, aggressive pricing during the late 1990’s, but we do not have the data to indicate the extent to which the reserving is attributable to competitive pricing. Q.8. Although the banking industry continues to earn record prof- its, credit-quality problems continue to be a concern in commercial and industrial (C&I) loan portfolios at large banks. The industry’s noncurrent rate on C&I loans increased from 2.87 to 3.01 percent during the quarter, the first time since the first quarter of 1993 that it has been above 3 percent. Will we see banks continue to add to loan loss reserves when the fourth quarter data is released? Will credit quality problems continue into 2003 or can we expect to see an improvement? A.8. Bank data for the fourth quarter of 2002 show that both net charge-offs and nonperforming assets declined moderately from the previous quarter, providing some indication that credit quality overall has begun to improve. Broadly speaking, the key contrib- uting factors to the credit quality problems experienced in the past 2 years—a period of recession and weak economic growth, struc- tural problems experienced by certain specific industrial sectors (e.g. telecommunications) and the revelation of improper corporate governance practices at certain firms—appear to have receded in significance. These preliminary indications of improve- ment should be interpreted with caution. Many bankers have ex- pressed considerable uncertainty about the prospects for significant improvement in credit quality before the middle of 2003. Consistent with this general outlook, banks bolstered their re- serves in the fourth quarter by about $1.5 billion, so that reserve coverage of nonaccrual loans improved to 1.63 times, an increase in the multiple of 0.06 from September 2002. For the full year, a net increase in reserves of $3.2 billion was not sufficient to offset more rapid growth in nonaccrual loans, so that reserve coverage of these loans declined by 0.11 times from year-end 2001. The noncurrent ratio for C&I loans cited in the question provides one useful indicator of the severity of credit problems at banks. In the current period, this indicator has been strongly influenced by lower C&I loans outstanding that were attributable to cyclically weak business loan demand, as well as by increases in noncurrent loans. A broader measure of credit quality, the noncurrent rate for all loans, reached only 1.45 percent of loans at year-end 2002, well below the comparable figure of 3.06 percent in 1992. This result is consistent with the broader view that the current credit cycle has been much more manageable for banks than that of a decade ago. The most significant area of difference is in commercial real estate lending. In 1992, the noncurrent rate for all real estate loans was 3.88 percent while the same rate for construction loans reached a remarkable 14.01 percent; these ratios were far lower in 2002, at VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 58 0.89 percent and 0.98 percent, respectively. A number of factors contributed to the unusually large magnitude of the 1992 figures, including the poor lending practices and the significant weakness of commercial real estate as an economic sector at that time. Q.9. When you appeared before the Committee last July, I asked a question about productivity. I would like to revisit that issue again today. Last year, productivity in both the business and non- farm business sectors rose 4.7 percent—the fastest pace since 1950 and more than four times the 1.1 percent gain posted in 2001. What are your views regarding this significant gain? What could be done to attempt to duplicate gains of this magnitude or greater? Do you think that this significant increase provides any indication as to the future direction of the economy? A.9. The impressive performance of productivity recently appears to support the view that the step-up in the pace of structural pro- ductivity growth that occurred in the latter part of the 1990’s has not, as yet, faltered. Indeed, the high growth of productivity during the past year merely extends recent experience. Since the mid- 1990’s, output per hour has been growing at an annual rate of 21⁄ 2 percent, on average, compared with a rate of roughly 11⁄ 2 percent during the preceding two decades. Arguably, the pickup in productivity growth since 1995 reflects largely the ongoing incorporation of innovations in computing and communications technologies into the capital stock and business practices. In addition to the rapid pace of technical progress, de- regulation and other policies to promote the flexibility of the econ- omy have almost surely contributed to the spread and adoption of innovations that have, in turn, boosted the growth of productivity. Furthermore, the more flexible is an economy, the greater is its ability at any given point in time to be producing close to its pro- ductive potential. Looking forward, the transition to the higher permanent level of productivity associated with previous innovations is likely not yet completed. The chances of prolonging the period of rapid innova- tion, doubtless, will be enhanced by maintaining and extending conditions that contribute to flexibility and by dismantling policies that contribute to unnecessary rigidity. However, history does raise some warning flags concerning the length of time that productivity growth remains elevated. Gains in productivity remained quite rapid for years after the innovations that followed the surge in inventions a century ago. But in other episodes, the period of elevated growth of productivity was shorter. Regrettably, examples are too few to generalize. Hence, policy- makers have no substitute for continued close surveillance of the evolution of productivity during this current period of significant innovation. Q.10. I would like to quote from remarks given by Chairman Alan Greenspan at Lancaster House, in London, September 25, 2002: The development of our paradigms of containing risk has emphasized, and will, of necessity, continue to emphasize dispersion of risk to those willing, and presum- ably able, to bear it. If risk is properly dispersed, shocks to the overall economic system will be better absorbed and less likely to create cascading failures that could threaten financial stability. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 59 The broad success of that paradigm seemed to be most evident in the United States over the past 21⁄2 years. Despite the draining impact of a loss of $8 trillion of stock market wealth, a sharp contraction in capital investment and, of course, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, our economy held firm. Importantly, despite significant losses, no major U.S. financial institution was driven to default. Similar observations pertain to much of the rest of the world but to a somewhat lesser extent than to the United States. In light of these circumstances and observations, plus a signifi- cant tax-cutting proposal by our President of an overall estimated $674 billion dollars, and the likelihood of impending war against Iraq, what are your thoughts about the U.S. economy’s resilience for the upcoming year? A.10. The ability of our economy to weather the many shocks in- flicted on it since the spring of 2000 attests to our market system’s remarkable resilience. As I have noted previously, that char- acteristic is far more evident today than two or three decades ago. There may be numerous causes of this increased resilience. Among them, ongoing efforts to liberalize global trade have added flexi- bility to many aspects of our economy over time. Furthermore, a quarter-century of bipartisan deregulation has significantly re- duced inflexibilities in our markets for energy, transportation, com- munication, and financial services. And, of course, the dramatic gains in information technology have markedly improved the abil- ity of businesses to address festering economic imbalances before they inflict significant damage. This improved ability has been fur- ther facilitated by the increasing willingness of our workers to em- brace innovation more generally. Looking forward, the enhanced flexibility should continue to allow the economy to withstand the potentially destabilizing effects of additional negative shocks. Q.11. I share the Chairman’s view regarding the need to keep in place mechanisms that control spending in the budget process. I am particularly intrigued by the ideas relating to limits on the abil- ity to have emergency or supplemental spending. It seems that these types of measures are a significant loophole in the system. Would you recommend that there be some type of automatic offset for these types of bills? Would you suggest that a super-majority (60 votes or more) be required to waive such a rule? A.11. I recommend that Congress reinstate discretionary spending caps and PAYGO rules because those procedures have provided clear direction and constructive goals capable of offsetting in-built political biases in favor of budget deficits. To remain effective over time, a budgetary control mechanism must be stringent enough to exert real budgetary restraint and yet be sufficiently flexible to re- main relevant in the face of ‘‘shocks’’ such as wars, recession, or unforeseen surpluses. Given the recent breakdown of budget con- trols in the face of emerging surpluses, I agree that closing spend- ing loopholes in a way that better balances flexibility and overall restraint would be desirable. That said, how to best accomplish such adjustments must be left with Congress, which has the exper- tise needed to evaluate how possibly subtle changes in the budget process might affect budget decisions. Q.12. Your testimony makes clear that our current cash-based budget may present a misleading picture of actual Federal Govern- ment commitments. I agree with you a better system is needed so VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 60 that we can get a handle on Federal spending. How would we tran- sition to such a system and over what time period? Should we also be looking at a capital budget system for certain types of programs which reflect infrastructure building? A.12. As I stated in my testimony, an accrual-based accounting sys- tem could be constructed with a reasonable amount of effort. More- over, at least a set of rough estimates of an accrual-based budget probably could be developed relatively quickly. Although there ap- pear to be no major conceptual hurdles blocking preparation of more refined estimates, it would not be hard to imagine—given the vast scope and complexity of the Government’s operations—that significant operational questions might arise. All of those questions should be resolvable within a relatively short time-frame. Based on present information, I would recommend that accrual-based budg- etary information be developed as a supplement to—not substitute for—the current, largely cash-based, unified budget. If that same view is adopted by the Congress, the transition to production of accrual-based estimates presumably could proceed on a reasonably expedited basis. The capital-budgeting concept has some merit for the Govern- ment because it can provide useful information about the way the Government’s activities are affecting overall saving and invest- ment. However, such information is already provided in the Analyt- ical Perspectives volume of the budget. Moreover, implementing a separate capital expenditures category within the budget that, pre- sumably, would be subject to different rules than the operating budget would likely be problematic. In particular, I am concerned that the classification of spending as between current expenditures versus capital expenditures could be susceptible to manipulation. I would also note that there is a fundamental difference between the application of capital budgeting in the private and Government sectors. In the private sector, separate accounts for capital expendi- tures can be justified because capital investments are expected to yield financial returns that are applied to interest charges and to liquidate the liability side of the capital accounts as the assets depreciate. Government investments generally are not expected to yield comparable financial returns. RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR REED FROM ALAN GREENSPAN Q.1. Over the past couple of years we have seen an increasing number of credit unions drop their Federal insurance and opt for private insurance. From a safety and soundness perspective, is this something that we should be concerned with at this time? A.1. The banking and thrift industries have had unfortunate expe- rience with alternative deposit insurance systems, most recently during the 1980’s in Ohio and Maryland. Participation in such sys- tems can appear attractive to financial institutions, particularly if that participation is viewed as reducing the scope and cost of Fed- eral regulatory oversight. In the final analysis, these alternative systems did not provide adequate oversight of the participating in- stitutions and proved to be insufficiently funded or diversified to withstand significant failures. The result was mass depositor with- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 61 drawals from, and ultimately the failure of, other similarly-insured institutions. Credit unions have no immunity to these risks, as demonstrated in the collapse of the Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity Corporation in 1991. The NCUA has been vocal in expressing its concern, on a number of occasions, about the potential problems associated with credit unions opting for private deposit insurance, including undue relaxation of their field-of-membership rules and insufficient oversight of the financial condition of these institutions. The history of alternative deposit-insurance systems suggests that such concern is well-founded. Q.2. What impact do you anticipate from regulatory relief legisla- tion that allows interest on business checking accounts to have on monetary policy and on the economy as a whole? How would it spe- cifically impact small businesses? A.2. Permitting interest to be paid on business checking accounts would help to improve the efficiency of our banking industry and provide important benefits for the business customers of banks. A more efficient banking industry would strengthen the overall econ- omy by reducing the level of resources needed to provide a given level of banking services. In addition, interest on business checking could be beneficial for the implementation of monetary policy in the future if it were combined with the authorization of interest on bal- ances held at Federal Reserve Banks. Currently, the prohibitions against interest on demand deposits and on required reserve balances give banks incentives to establish programs to sweep the demand deposits of larger business firms into instruments that can earn interest and that are not subject to reserve requirements. Banks also set up complicated compensating balance programs that pay implicit interest through credits for the use of their services by larger firms. If interest could be paid on demand deposits and on the reserves that must be held against them, there would be no need for such programs, and the resources devoted to them could be redirected to activities that are genuinely productive for the economy as a whole. Sweep programs have the potential to undermine the implemen- tation of monetary policy under current operating procedures. The Federal Open Market Committee determines a target for the Fed- eral funds rate, which the Open Market Desk at the Federal Re- serve Bank of New York tries to achieve by adjusting the aggregate supply of reserves through open market operations. To realize the desired Federal funds rate, the Desk needs to have a predictable demand for reserves so it knows the level of reserves to supply. A predictable demand is provided by balances held at Reserve Banks to meet reserve requirements and contractual clearing require- ments. If these balances were to drop too low, the demand for re- serves would be less predictable and the Desk would find it more difficult to achieve the targeted level of the Federal funds rate. In- terest payments on balances at Reserve Banks, along with interest payments on business checking accounts, would remove incentives for reserve-avoidance activities, thereby helping to ensure that the balances held at Reserve Banks remain at a satisfactory level for the continued effective implementation of monetary policy. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 62 While households have been able to earn interest on their check- ing accounts since the early 1980’s, and larger businesses, at some cost, have earned implicit interest through sweep programs and compensating balance arrangements, small businesses continue to be disadvantaged by the unnecessary prohibition against interest on demand deposits. The checking accounts of small firms are often not sizable enough to justify the complicated compensating balance arrangements or the type of sweep programs mentioned above. Therefore, many small firms earn no interest on the funds they keep in demand deposit accounts. Q.3. What is your position on whether Industrial Loan Companies should be able to offer interest bearing corporate checking ac- counts? Do you believe they should be subject to the same regu- latory treatment with regards to interest on their accounts? A.3. Currently, Federal law prohibits commercial firms from own- ing and operating insured banks and establishes a prudential framework of supervision that protects the safety and soundness of banks controlled by corporate owners and thereby protects the tax- payer. When Congress closed the nonbank bank loophole in 1987, it granted corporate owners of industrial loan companies (ILC’s) chartered in a limited number of States an exception from the rules that apply to all other corporate owners of banks. The exception was subject to the condition that the ILC either refrain from offer- ing demand deposits withdrawable by check or remain below $100 million in assets. At that time, ILC’s were for the most part small local institutions that did not offer checking accounts and con- sequently were distinguishable from full service insured banks. In recent years, the insured deposits in a number of ILC’s have grown into the multiple billions of dollars and ILC’s have been acquired by a number of large corporations. The Board opposes allowing ILC’s that currently cannot offer demand deposits to offer their functional equivalent: Business checking accounts. If this were allowed, ILC’s would become the functional equivalent of full service insured banks. This would turn the limited exception for ILC’s into a significant competitive advan- tage for corporate owners of ILC’s, such as large retail and com- mercial firms, by allowing them to avoid the rules that apply to all other corporate owners of full service insured banks. Unlike bank holding companies, corporate owners of ILC’s would be able to have commercial affiliations and avoid the prudential framework the Congress has deemed essential for the enhancement of financial stability and the protection of the taxpayer. Indeed, in the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act), the Congress rejected efforts to allow commercial entities to acquire insured depository institutions and closed the unitary thrift loophole. This is not a technical matter, nor a simple matter of fairness that affects only a small number of grandfathered companies. There is no restriction that prevents grandfathered States from chartering new ILC’s for corporations seeking banks, as they have continued to do since 1987. Moreover, competitive pressures could encourage existing bank holding companies seeking commercial affiliations or to avoid prudential supervision to relocate their in- sured banks to grandfathered States that charter ILC’s to take ad- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 63 vantage of the ILC loophole. Consequently, taking this step would alter the structure of banking in the United States and be contrary to two important national policies that Congress reaffirmed re- cently in the GLB Act: One prohibiting the mixing of banking and commerce, and the other establishing a Federal prudential frame- work to assure that companies that own insured banks operate in a safe and sound manner. RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR BUNNING FROM ALAN GREENSPAN Q.1. Should the tensions in the Middle East and/or Venezuela con- tinue, are you worried about the effect of long-term high energy prices on our economy? A.1. Because the United States is a major net importer of crude oil, higher crude oil prices exert a restraining influence on the growth of aggregate demand by a reduction in the purchasing power of consumers. In addition, higher crude oil prices raise business costs, and with many companies unable to pass on these cost increases to their customers, the growth of corporate profits slows; this, in turn, restrains business investment. Obviously, the higher crude oil prices go and the longer these high prices persist, the larger the negative economic consequences. Q.2. We all know what the housing boom has done for this econ- omy, especially over the last year. Do you see the housing market being able to sustain this growth? A.2. Last year was truly extraordinary in terms of the construction and sale of residential properties. Near-record-low mortgage rates helped to push up home sales to a record 6.4 million unit pace. However, unless mortgage interest rates fall by the same extent as last year, housing construction is likely to contribute less to eco- nomic growth in the period ahead. Q.3. On Thursday, the Joint Tax Committee will release a report on the Enron mess that I understand may ‘‘name names’’ of those institutions that aided Enron in trying to evade taxes. Will you be taking a look at this report to see if it affects institutions under the Federal Reserve’s regulatory jurisdiction? A.3. Federal Reserve staff are continuing to evaluate financial organizations’ participation in the types of structured finance ac- tivities that have recently raised significant legal and accounting questions. These efforts include analysis of individual transactions, as well as evaluation of the policies and the processes employed by financial organizations to ensure that they are in compliance with all laws and regulations. In addition to the information developed by our own examination efforts, our staff intend to fully consider information developed by other regulatory agencies, law enforce- ment offices, Congressional committees, bankruptcy proceedings, and others. Staff have recently received copies of the Joint Commit- tee’s report and are in the process of reviewing it. Q.4. Last year, I asked you about your views on OTC energy and metals trading, and you responded very favorably to the values that commodity trading brings to the energy industry. Has any- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 64 thing occurred in the last year to change your support for the OTC markets? A.4. I continue to believe that OTC derivatives, including energy derivatives, are important tools for managing price risks. During the last year, there have been a string of revelations and accusa- tions regarding the trading practices of Enron and some other firms during the California energy crisis. However, it is difficult to determine on the basis of publicly available information whether the practices in question constituted fraud or market manipulation or what the scale of any such illegal activity was. What does seem clear is that most of the practices that are being questioned were made possible by a flawed implementation of deregulation of en- ergy markets. Fraud and manipulation undermine the integrity of markets and must be effectively deterred. But, thus far, I have seen no compelling evidence that it cannot be deterred effectively through a combination of market discipline and effective exercise of existing regulatory authority. RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR MILLER FROM ALAN GREENSPAN Q.1. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Chief Economist Richard Berner said on January 10 in The Washington Post, ‘‘Federal budget defi- cits do tend to raise long-term interest rates, making it more ex- pensive for businesses to borrow and invest. But he added as long as economic growth is slow, the private sector’s demand for invest- ment money will stay low. Only when the economy significantly heats up would the competition between the Federal Government and private companies for lenders significantly boost interest rates.’’ What do you see the overall economy doing over the next 6 months and do you agree with Mr. Berner’s statement? A.1. As discussed in the Monetary Policy Report, the members of the Federal Open Market Committee at the time of my testimony believed the most likely outcome for the economy this year was that the economic fundamentals would support a strengthening of economic growth. Of course, considerable uncertainty attends this view owing to geopolitical concerns. There is no question that long- term interest rates are affected by rising deficits, and that this tends to have a negative effect on capital formation. In particular, econometric evidence suggests that when investors see the pro- jected long-run budget outlook worsening, bond rates rise today in anticipation of tighter credit market conditions down the road. Q.2. Mr. Chairman, the housing sector has been one of the strong- est performers in our economy. What impact do you see on the housing sector if deficits increase and interest rates start to rise? Are we threatening one of our strongest performers? A.2. Should mortgage interest rates rise, it is entirely possible that new and existing home sales would decline. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that any sustained increase in rates presumably would occur only in the context of a more vigorous upturn in the pace of business activity, suggesting that the net effect on housing activity might be relatively limited. Q.3. Do you see deflation as a threat in the near term? VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 65 A.3. Central bankers have long believed that price stability is con- ducive to achieving maximum sustainable growth. Historically, de- bilitating risk premiums have tended to rise with both expected inflation and deflation, and they have been minimized during con- ditions of approximate price stability. At present, the United States is nowhere close to sliding into a pernicious deflation. Indeed, both market and survey measures of inflation expectations have re- mained relatively stable over the past year, suggesting that there are no widespread concerns about deflation developing in the pe- riod ahead. But a major objective of the recent heightened scrutiny of the issue is to ensure that any latent deflationary pressures are addressed well before they become a problem. Q.4. Mr. Chairman, last year you and I had the opportunity to dis- cuss OTC energy derivatives. A bill has again been introduced this Congress that would reverse the legal certainty provisions for OTC energy derivatives achieved in the Commodity Futures Moderniza- tion Act in 2000. My concern is that significant regulatory uncer- tainty would be created for these products if the bill passes. Have you seen anything recently that would change your views on the California energy crisis and whether energy derivatives trading contributed either to the California energy crisis or to Enron’s bankruptcy? A.4. I have not seen anything that demonstrates clearly that en- ergy derivatives trading contributed significantly to the California energy crisis. The root cause of the crisis was a flawed implementa- tion of the deregulation of energy markets. To be sure, some trad- ers may have used energy derivatives to profit from the flaws in the regulatory structure. But it remains unclear to what extent these trading strategies added to the strains and the imbalances inherent in the regulatory system. Likewise, although Enron was a leading dealer in energy derivatives, derivatives were not the root cause of its failure. Rather, it failed because its board of directors and its auditors allowed it to publish financial statements that dis- torted its true financial condition and allowed it to become exces- sively leveraged. More intensive regulation of derivatives would not have prevented the California energy crisis or the failure of Enron. Furthermore, as you recognize, some of the proposals for more in- tensive regulation would have the unintended consequence of re- introducing legal uncertainty regarding contract enforceability. RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR CRAPO FROM ALAN GREENSPAN Q.1. During a recent hearing of this Committee, it was suggested that some financial institutions may be illegally tying the avail- ability or price of credit to investment banking services. What are your views concerning the adequacy of existing laws and regulation in this area and are you aware of any convincing evidence that ille- gal tying occurs? What steps is the Federal Reserve taking to en- sure that commercial banking companies do not engage in illegal antitying activities? A.1. Banks are subject to a variety of laws that prohibit them from tying products and services in a manner that harms customers or lessens competition. Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 66 Amendments of 1970, prohibits a bank from extending credit or varying the terms of credit on the condition that a customer pur- chase another product or service from the bank or its affiliates, with certain exceptions. Banks are also subject to the antitying pro- visions of the Federal antitrust laws, which prohibit a company with market power in one product from using that market power to require a customer to purchase a second product. In addition, to the extent that this conduct involves a bank re- ducing the price of credit to benefit an affiliate’s investment bank- ing business, it may violate Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, which requires that transactions involving a bank and its affiliate be on market terms. Finally, in certain circumstances, this practice may, by reducing the bank’s income for the benefit of an affiliate, be an unsafe and unsound banking practice. The Board’s examination procedures and practices include super- visory efforts to ensure compliance with Section 106, other banking statutes and safe and sound banking practices. For example, the Board’s Supervision Manuals governing Bank Holding Company and State Member Bank Examinations provide for compliance re- views of a bank holding company and State member bank that include evaluation by examiners of the institution’s program for compliance with Section 106. The Board and the other Federal banking agencies have also issued guidance directing banks and bank holding companies to implement and maintain appropriate systems and controls to promote compliance with the antitying pro- visions. That guidance addressed the need for specific policies and procedures addressing tying prohibitions, training materials and programs that provide examples of prohibited practices and sen- sitize employees to the concerns raised by tying, compliance sys- tems, and management involvement in reviewing training, audit, and compliance programs related to tying. See, e.g., FRB Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual §3500.0; OCC Insurance Activities Handbook, Federal Prohibitions on Tying (June 2002); OCC Bulletin 95–20 (April 14, 1995). In addition to examining for compliance with this agency guid- ance, the Board investigates allegations of illegal tying and initi- ates appropriate actions to remedy any violations of the antitying provisions that are found. Currently, the Board, in conjunction with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, is conducting a special targeted review of compliance with the antitying provi- sions in light of reports described in the press. This review includes a review of the antitying training and compliance programs, mar- keting programs, training materials and adequacy of internal au- dits for compliance with the bank’s internal policies and procedures at several of the country’s largest banks. These efforts are ongoing, and we have not yet completed our evaluation of the information we have gathered thus far. If the Board finds banks offering credit on an impermissible basis, we will take appropriate supervisory ac- tion to assure compliance with the law and to terminate unsafe and unsound banking practices. To date, the agencies have not found that commercial banks are manipulating the pricing of credit to build investment banking market share. Clearly, banking organizations that have credit rela- tionships with customers hope to sell them the bank’s full range of VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 67 products and services. As you know, banking organizations are per- mitted to package certain services because some tying arrange- ments are permissible under statutory and regulatory exceptions and some customers may request that the bank package services. In both cases, interested customers have the choice of whether to enter into these arrangements. Q.2. Derivatives are complex instruments used by institutional in- vestors. As I understand it, derivatives are actually utilized in our markets to allocate risk better to those areas or those entities that can handle it, and it is a stabilizing force in the markets. Do you agree with that? A.2. Derivatives allow price risks to be transferred to those most willing to assume and manage those risks. Provided that those as- suming the risks manage them effectively, such risk transfers sta- bilize markets and contribute to economic growth. Notwithstanding certain high-profile instances of mismanagement, derivatives have been an important factor supporting growth of the U.S. economy in recent years. Q.3. As you know, last year we had proposals in the Senate that would amend the CFMA (Commodity Futures Modernization Act). Do you see any need to revisit the CFMA at this time? A.3. No. Some may argue that the CFTC needs additional author- ity to deter fraud and manipulation in the trading of OTC energy derivatives. While some apparently were tempted to engage in such market abuses by flaws in the way energy markets were deregu- lated by the States, the scale and significance of such practices remains unclear. Furthermore, it is not clear that such practices cannot be effectively deterred by a combination of market discipline and exercise of existing regulatory authority. We need to be mind- ful of the danger of unintended consequences of new legislation, including the reintroduction of legal uncertainty regarding the en- forceability of contracts. Q.4. What existing reporting and disclosure is made for derivatives transactions? A.4. Firms that file financial statements with the SEC are required to make certain public disclosures related to derivatives trans- actions. Under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in the United States, all derivatives must be measured at fair value and recognized on the balance sheet as either assets or liabilities. Also, a firm must disclose its objectives for entering into deriva- tives transactions, the context needed to understand the objectives, and its strategies for achieving the objectives. In addition, the SEC requires firms to describe their accounting policies for derivatives and to provide the quantitative and qualitative information about market risk exposures, including exposures due to derivatives transactions. Banks are subject to additional public reporting requirements for derivatives transactions. Regulatory reports for banks and bank holding companies require a breakdown of derivatives transactions by risk factor (interest rate, foreign exchange, equity, commodity, credit) by type (futures, forwards, options), and by purpose (trading or nontrading). Moreover, the Federal Reserve has encouraged VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 68 large banks to disclose additional information on market risk expo- sures in the trading account (exposures arising from derivatives and other trading instruments), such as value-at-risk on an aggre- gate basis and value-at-risk by risk factor. RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR SARBANES FROM ALAN GREENSPAN Q.1. Chairman Greenspan, at the hearing you stated that, ‘‘There was a good deal of concern, as you know, about this housing bub- ble. But our evaluation of the data and the outlook suggests that, while obviously, there are potential problems, they are not serious ones that need to be addressed in any material way as far as we can judge.’’ Can you please elaborate on these potential problems and the process that led you to your conclusion that they are not serious enough to be addressed in any material way? A.1. The house price increases over the past 2 years have been de- scribed by some analysts as possibly symptomatic of an emerging housing bubble, not unlike the stock market bubble whose bursting has produced considerable distress in recent years. Existing home prices (as measured by the repeat-sales index) rose by 7 percent during 2002, and by a third during the past 4 years. Such a pace cannot reasonably be expected to be maintained. And recently, price increases have slowed. It is, of course, possible for home prices to fall as they did in a couple of quarters in 1990. But any analogy to stock market pricing behavior and bubbles is a rather large stretch. First, to sell a home, one almost invariably must move out and in the process confront substantial transaction costs in the form of brokerage fees and taxes. These transaction costs greatly discourage the type of buying and selling frenzy that often characterizes bubbles in financial markets. Second, there is no national housing market in the United States. Local conditions dominate, even though mortgage interest rates are similar throughout the country. Home prices in Portland, Maine, do not arbitrage those in Portland, Oregon. Thus, any bub- bles that might emerge would tend to be local, not national, in scope. Third, there is little indication of a supply overhang in newly constructed homes. The level of overall new home construction, in- cluding manufactured homes, appears to be well supported by steady household formation and not dependent on high and vari- able replacement needs or second-home demand. Census Bureau data suggest that one-third to one-half of new household forma- tions in recent years result directly from immigration. After their very substantial run-up in recent years, home prices could recede. A sharp decline, the consequences of a bursting bub- ble, however, seems most unlikely. Nonetheless, even modestly de- clining home prices would reduce the level of unrealized capital gains and presumably dampen the pace of home equity extraction. Home mortgage cash-outs and home equity loan expansion would likely decline in the face of declining home prices. However, the 5- year-old home building and mortgage finance boom is less likely to be defused by declining home prices than by rising mortgage inter- est rates. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 69 Should rates rise, it is entirely possible that new and existing home sales would decline. However, it is worth bearing in mind that any sustained increase in rates presumably would occur only in the context of a more vigorous upturn in the pace of business activity, suggesting that the net effect on housing activity might be relatively limited. Q.2. In the Administration’s proposed budget they have decreased their projections for the cost of bank failures in fiscal year 2004 by 70 percent (from $6.4 billion to $1.9 billion). Do you agree with the Administration’s changed projection? Comparing the economic en- vironment for banking institutions, going forward from this year compared to last year, would you expect the likelihood for aggre- gate bank failures to have increased, decreased, or remained the same? A.2. Bank failures have been relatively few in recent years, and only 10 banks and one thrift failed in 2002. Based upon current conditions, there are no indications that failures should be expected to rise significantly in the near future. Despite recent increases in problem loans and charge-offs, the number and size of problem banks remains small relative to the banking industry. The FDIC reported that at year-end 2002 there were 136 problem institutions (for example, those receiving a CAMEL composite rating of ‘‘4’’ or ‘‘5,’’ made up of 116 banks and 20 thrifts), with combined assets of approximately $39 billion. These figures are significantly higher than just a few years ago, but nonetheless represent a relatively minor share of the industry. Moreover, the industry once again re- ported robust earnings for the year 2002 and remains strongly cap- italized. The prospect of improved economic conditions, together with preliminary indications that problem loans have begun to de- cline, suggest that credit quality pressures on the banking industry may be expected to subside in the coming years. Barring unfore- seen developments, it would be reasonable to expect that the num- ber of bank failures in the next 2 years would remain low, perhaps even lower than were experienced in 2002. Neither figure cited in the question as projected costs of bank failures could readily be located in the Administration’s budget doc- uments, so that it is not possible to comment on them specifically. As a general observation, both figures seem very high. The total costs to the deposit insurance funds from bank failures have been below $1 billion every year since 1992, even if losses to both the Bank Insurance Fund and Savings Association Insurance Fund are included. Estimated losses for 2002 came to roughly $630 million. Given the current number and size of problem banks and the gen- eral state of the banking industry, and barring significant unfore- seen events, it would seem reasonable to expect annual losses to be well below even the $1.9 billion figure in the next 2 years. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 70 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 71 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 72 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 73 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 74 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 75 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 76 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 77 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 78 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 79 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 80 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 81 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 82 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 83 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 84 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 85 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 86 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 87 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 88 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 89 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 90 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 91 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 92 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 93 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 94 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 95 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 96 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 97 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 98 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 99 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 100 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 101 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4 102 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:59 Jan 08, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 90930.TXT SBANK4 PsN: SBANK4

Alan Greenspan (2003, February 10). Congressional Testimony. Testimony, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/testimony_20030211_chair_federal_reserves_first_monetary_policy

@misc{wtfs_testimony_20030211_chair_federal_reserves_first_monetary_policy,
  author = {Alan Greenspan},
  title = {Congressional Testimony},
  year = {2003},
  month = {Feb},
  howpublished = {Testimony, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/testimony_20030211_chair_federal_reserves_first_monetary_policy},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}