Congressional Testimony

FEDERAL RESERVE'S SECOND MONETARY POLICY REPORT FOR 1988 HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND UKBAN AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON OVERSIGHT ON THE MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSU- ANT TO THE FULL EMPLOYMENT AND BALANCED GROWTH ACT OF 1978 JULY 12 AND 13, 1988 Printed for the use of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1988 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington. IX: 20402 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS WILLIAM PROXMIRE, Wisconsin, Chairman ALAN CRANSTON, California JAKE GARN, Utah DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan JOHN HEINZ, Pennsylvania PAUL S, SAKBANES, Maryland WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, New York ALAN J. DKON, Illinois CfflC HECHT, Nevada JIM SASSER, Tennessee PHIL GRAMM, Texas TERRY SANTORD, North Carolina CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri RICHARD SHELBY, Alabama JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island BOB GRAHAM, Florida DAVID K. KARNES, Nebraska TIMOTHY E. WIRTH, Colorado KENNETH A. MCLEAN, Staff Director LAMAR SMITH, Republican Staff Director and Economist PATRICK A. MULLOY, General Counsel ROBERT A. JOHNSON, Chief Economist GILLIAN GARCIA, Director of an Economic Analysis Group, GAO (ID Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis CONTENTS TUESDAY, JULY 12, 1988 Page Opening statement of Chairman Proxmire 1 Opening remarks of Senator Riegle 3 Opening statement of Senator Sasser 64 WITNESSES Alan S. Blinder, professor of economics, Princeton University 3 Fed has done an excellent job 3 Fiscal-monetary transition 4 Monetary indicators 5 Prepared statement 7 Rudiger Dornbusch, professor of economics, Massachusetts Institute of Tech- nology 14 Inflation 14 Changes in the world trade structure 15 Prepared statement 17 Ray Fair, professor of economics, Yale University 27 Fed policies and political forces 28 Prepared statement 30 David D. Hale, first vice president and chief economist, Kemper Financial Services, Inc 33 Weakness of the dollar 34 Exchange rate policy 35 Prepared statement 37 Panel discussion: Fed can prevent recessions 61 Influence of international markets 63 Recession 65 External economic events 67 Budget deficit 72 Recommendations about the thrift industry 72 Third World debt 74 WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 1988 Opening statement of Chairman Proxmire 77 Opening statements of: Senator Dixon 79 Senator Chafee '. 79 Senator Sasser 102 WITNESS Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System 80 Economic setting and monetary policy so far in 1988 81 Economic outlook and monetary policy through 1989 81 Persistent U.S. external and fiscal imbalances 83 Appropriate tactics for monetary policy 85 Prepared statement 89 Response to written questions of: Senator Proxmire 124 Senator Riegle 165 tun Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis IV Page Response to written questions of—Continued Senator Sasser 169 Witness discussion: Living beyond our means 100 Rise in interest rates 103 Fiscal readjustment plan 109 Avoiding a recession at all costs 110 Federal Reserve policy and Third World debt Ill Current account deficit and import of foreign capital 113 Exchange rates 116 Discount rate 118 Bailout of S&L's 120 Gasoline tax 121 ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUPPLIED FOE THE RECORD "A Way to Free Small Savers From the 'Casino Society'," by Alan S. Blinder, Economic Watch, Dec. 8, 1986 13 "Risks in the Dollar's Rise," Financial Times, July 2, 1988 176 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FEDERAL RESERVE'S SECOND MONETARY POLICY REPORT FOR 1988 TUESDAY, JULY 12, 1988 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The committee met at 10:15 a.m., in room SD-538, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator William Proxmire (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Proxmire, Riegle, Sasser, Graham, Garn, Hecht, and Bond. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE The CHAIRMAN. This morning we meet to discuss the outlook for the U.S. economy and the appropriate course for monetary policy in the coming months. We have before the committee, a panel of experts on monetary and macroeconomic policy: Dr. Alan Blinder, chairman of the Department of Economics at Princeton University; Dr. Rudiger Dornbusch, professor of economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr. Ray Fair, professor of economics at Yale University; and David Hale, first vice president and chief economist at Kemper Financial Services. Gentlemen, thank you for appearing before us today. We certainly do need expert guidance in these difficult times. The U.S. economy is undergoing a profound transformation from an economy based on consumption-led growth to an export-led growth economy. On the one hand capacity utilization is high and labor markets are increasingly tight. Both of these indicators sug- gest that inflation is beginning to reemerge. Fears of more vigorous inflation and a precipitious decline in the dollar make easing of monetary policy quite risky. On the other side, huge accumulations of debt make our finan- cial system quite fragile. Business debt, Government debt, and con- sumer debt, have all soared in recent years. The debt accumula- tion, the crisis in the Savings and Loan industry, problems of debt service in Latin America, and the agricultural crisis combine to raise the costs associated with a further significant rise in interest rates. In addition, pur Federal debt is now so large that a percentage point increase in the interest rate can add as much as $20 billion to the deficit over 2 years through a rise in debt service alone. (1) Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis All appears calm at the moment. I fear that calm is precisely that—momentary. The dollar is rising despite our continued mas- sive trade deficit. The Federal Reserve has gradually raised rates since March and the last couple of trade statistical announcements have been good news. But what will happen when the next disap- pointing trade number is announced? What will happen as institu- tional investors begin to reallocate their assets later this summer, each trying to beat the market to the draw before the new adminis- tration changes the course of macroeconomic policy? Our Nation's central bank is between a rock and a hard place. The appropriate remedy to our macroeconomic imbalance is Feder- al budget deficit reduction. Hopefully, the Congress and the Presi- dent will find the will to address that problem very early in the next administration. Its resolution is long overdue. What I fear is that the overhang of problems in our economy and the Presidential election, when all 6 members of the Federal Re- serve Board are Republican Reagan appointees, will lead the Fed to be insufficiently strong in fighting inflation. This lack of will to face inflation at the outset will not remedy our structural prob- lems, it will only postpone them. Avoiding the battle against inflation will lead to a rise in prices that will be very costly and painful to wring out of the system just as it was in the early 1980's. The difference is that next time we go through wrenching disin- flation we will do it on the back of all the financial problems that exist today. If the Federal Reserve does not show the resolve to keep inflation down they will make things more comfortable tem- porarily, and in the long run we will all pay the price. An ounce of prevention is, in this case, worth more than a pound of cure. [The complete biography of the panelist follows'.] BIOGRAPHY OF PANELISTS Dr. Alan Blinder is the chairman of the Economics Department at Princeton Uni- versity. He received his B.A. at Princeton, went to London School of Economics on a Marshall scholarship and then returned to complete a Ph.D. at M.I-T. He is an expert in all areas of macroeconomics, public finance, and the economics of income distribution. His most recent book is entitled, "Hard Heads and Soft Hearts". Dr. Rudiger Dornbusch, professor of economics at M.I.T. in Boston. He re- ceived his Ph.D. at University of Chicago. He has pioneered much of the current thinking on international finance and open economy macroeconomics when capital is mobile across borders. He has written the textbook entitled, "Open Economy Mac- roeconomics" that is a staple in every graduate student's diet. Dr. Dornbusch is a consultant to international organizations and governments around the globe. He is almost as internationally mobile as the financial capital that he studies. Dr. Ray Fair, professor of economics at Yale University. He received his Ph.D. from M.I.T. and his undergraduate training at Fresno State. He is well known as the only macroeconomic forecaster who doesn't judgmentally fudge the results of his model. Dr. Fair has been a pioneer in the development of economic modeling meth- ods and is also an expert on the role of macroeconomic policy in influencing the outcome of political elections. David Hale is first vice president at chief economist at Kemper Financial Services in Chicago. He has written prolifically in recent years and his work regularly ap- pears in the magazine, The International Economy, The Wall Street Journal, and the Financial Times. Mr. Hale was educated at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and holds a masters degree in economics from the London School of Economics. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Riegle. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR RIEGLE Senator RIEGLE. Gentlemen, we're delighted to have all of you today and we'll start, Dr. Blinder, with you. STATEMENT OF ALAN S. BLINDER, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY Mr. BLINDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was tempted to start by saying that these are difficult times for conducting monetary policy, but then I concluded that I must have said that every time I have testified on monetary policy. And probably most other wit- nesses have also. I want to try to address some of the questions that were posed in Senator Proxmire's letter to us by making just three main points. The first is something I'm really not accustomed to saying, which is that the Federal Reserve has on the whole done a quite splendid job over the last several years. The second is that the Fed will have to continue doing such a splendid job for several more years because the transition to a policy mix of easier money and smaller fiscal deficits has some way to go yet. And a third is that I think the Government should create a mon- etary indicator that's better than any of those mentioned in Sena- tor Proxmire's letter by issuing indexed bonds. I will take them up in turn, beginning with the recent performance of the Fed. FED HAS DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB With a few exceptions that I won't mention, the Fed has really been doing an excellent job of sustaining a moderately paced, steady economic expansion ever since the post recession rebound ended around the middle of 1984. The civilian unemployment rate, as you know, has been falling smartly since the beginning of last year; and it's now down to the lowest level we've seen since 1974. Furthermore, my guess is that it's also pretty close to where we'd like it to be, that is, to the so-called natural rate of unemployment. While getting the unemployment rate down, the Fed has also managed to hold inflation in check and has done that despite the falling dollar. If you look at the recent numbers on inflation, some of which I put in table 1 which follows page 2 of any printed state- ment, they really show no hint at all of any acceleration of infla- tion. A performance like that deserves kudos and we all hope it will continue. In order for it to continue, at least two potential sources of error must be avoided over the coming months and indeed over the coming years. The first is that the Fed must not be swayed by the inflation hysteria that seems to sweep Wall Street about every week or two. Speculative markets like the stock exchange and the bond markets and the foreign exchange markets react to every- thing, including things that are just imagined by traders; and they almost always overreact to these things. The Fed has to ignore this insanity and, I'm happy to say, seems lately to be doing so. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Second, the Fed must not again get snookered into an agreement to support the dollar at an excessively high level, as it did in 1987. That's obviously not a burning issue right now, with free market forces pushing the dollar up—or let's just say with market forces pushing the dollar up, but I can't imagine that this situation will last very long. The longer term prognosis for the dollar must surely be downward, not upward, a point to which I will return very shortly. FISCAL-MONETARY TRANSITION The second thing I want to say something about is the fiscal- monetary transition, which has to do with the work that's cut out for the Fed in the years coming. We're now in the midst of what seems to be an historic transition from the Reagan-Volcker policy mix of excruciatingly tight money and irresponsibly large budget deficits toward a saner policy of easier money and smaller deficits. This transition has been going on for several years now—with greater progress, I must say, on the monetary front than on the fiscal front. And I think it will almost surely continue through the term of the next President and perhaps beyond that. So far, I think many people would agree that we've managed this transition extremely well, if slowly. I would certainly agree with that. Table 2 which follows page 3 in the printed testimony shows one indicator of the progress we've made to date and the distance that we still have to travel. It does this by comparing the composi- tion of real GNP—all the numbers in this table are percentage shares of GNP—in 1986, when the imbalance was at its worst on an annual basis, and the most recent quarter for which we have data, 1988 first quarter, with 1979, which I take to be a reasonable target of what a sensible composition of GNP for the United States might look like. You can see from these numbers that the combined share of con- sumer and government spending in GNP rose by 4.4 percentage points between 1979 and 1986, while the investment share changed very little. The big offsetting change, offsetting that 4.4 percent rise, came in net exports—which swung from a rough balance to a deficit of about 4 percent of GNP. Now since 1986, we've moved the combined consumption and Government share back down by about 2 percentage points, or roughly halfway back to where we were in 1979; and we've reduced the net export deficit by about a quarter. That last number is cer- tainly tenuous since it's based only a single quarter, the first quar- ter of 1988. And, I think by no coincidence, you can see in the memo item on the right-hand side that the Federal deficit as a share of GNP has come down by about a third from what it was in 1986. So we've so far completed something between a half and a quar- ter of the transition we need to accomplish to get back to a reason- ably balanced GNP. The rest of that job is going to be left to the next President with the help—with considerable help—of Chair- man Greenspan and the Fed. It's obviously critical that we keep this process going. More than likely, a continued shift toward more exports and less consumption Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in GNP is going to require a continued tightening of fiscal policy and a compensating easing of monetary policy. Americans ought to realize that the fiscal-monetary transition that I'm talking about will most likely bring with it not only lower interest rates, which most Americans would welcome, but also a cheaper dollar, which many Americans seem not to like. I don't see how this can be avoided, especially since the foreign indebtedness that we've been accumulating and continue to accumulate ulti- mately will require us to generate a trade surplus in order to pay the interest that we will eventually owe. To shift the pattern of world demand toward U.S. goods and serv- ices, we have to offer foreigners better prices and that's exactly what a cheaper dollar does for us. If the Treasury or the Fed or for that matter any other foreign central bank blocks that adjustment process, it will be very hard for the fiscal-monetary transition to do its necessary work in re- storing the shares of GNP to what they should be. Now let me conclude by taking up the issue of monetary indica- tors that was asked about in the letter. MONETARY INDICATORS By now I think most people would agree that, when it comes to using Ml as a monetary indicator or target of monetary policy, the Fed, to coin a phrase, should just say no. And I think that's exactly what the Fed has been doing over the last several years, which is part of the reason I applaud their performance. I prepared two figures in the printed testimony, figures 2 and 3 which follow page 5, to illustrate this point, that is, to show that it's so and show why this is reason to applaud the Fed's recent per- formance. On figure 2, the growth rate of Ml is plotted horizontally and the growth rate of nominal GNP is plotted vertically. The graph covers the last 15 quarters, which is the period since the rebound from the recession. The vertical and horizontal bars on the graph show the average values of each variable. Now if you look at this graph, two things are clear. One is that monetary growth has been vastly more volatile than GNP growth. The second is that there's absolutely no tendency in the recent data for nominal GNP to grow rapidly when Ml grows rapidly or to grow slowly when Ml grows slowly. The next figure, figure 3, plots velocity growth against Ml growth; and here you do see a very tight and inverse relationship with an almost perfect correlation. The meaning of that tight rela- tionship is that the Fed has managed to offset erratic movements in velocity with timely changes in money growth, thereby stabiliz- ing the growth rate of nominal GNP. That explains both why Ml growth has been so volatile—because it's had to be high when ve- locity is falling and low when velocity is rising—and also why Ml growth bears no relationship whatever to nominal GNP growth over this period. If I had constructed corresponding diagrams using M2 or the monetary base, they would look similar to this, though a bit less dramatic. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 6 In your letter, Mr. Chairman, you inquired about some less con- ventional indicators like commodity prices, the exchange rate, and the term structure of interest rates. I think each of those conveys some useful information, but each is also influenced by a host of extraneous factors not having to do with monetary policy. Commodity prices are sensitive to many market-specific develop- ments. The value of the dollar is influenced by all sorts of things that happen both here and abroad and is also subject to speculative bubbles. The term structure of interest rates is influenced by the term structure of inflationary expectations. As between those three, I personally would place the greatest weight by far on the term structure of interest rates. In theory, monetary policy should move short rates more than it moves long rates, and in practice that seems to be the case. Furthermore, the slope of the term structure is probably influenced by relatively few nonmonetary factors. Finally, and very importantly, econometric evidence shows that the spread between long rates and short rates has considerable pre- dictive power for future inflation and unemployment. Mr. BLINDER. The last point I wanted to make is that we could improve on the term structure of interest rates as a monetary indi- cator if the Congress would do one thing, which is to see to it that some of the Federal debt was issued on an indexed basis. If the Government would issue both bills and bonds on an indexed basis, we could observe the term structure of real interest rates in the financial markets, as the British now do. That is to say, we could observe the term structure purged of the influence of inflationary expectations. If that would be done, I think we would have a better indicator yet. [The complete prepared statement of Mr. Blinder follows:] Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis I. THE RECENT PERFORMANCE OF THE FED Testimony of Alan S. Blinder With a few exceptions, the Fed has been doing an excellent job of Professor of Economics sustaining a moderately-paced economic expansion since the post-recession Princeton University rebound ended In mid 1984. to the The civilian unemployment rate, as you know, has been falling smartly Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs since January 1967 and 1s now down to its lowest level since 1974. My guess United States Senate 1s that it is also pretty close to where we want it to be, though I hold out July 12, 1988 the hope that we might trim off a few tenths of a point more. But, whether the natural rate of unemployment Is 5.2% or 5.8$, it Is clear that we do not want any major movement of the unemployment rate right now. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify here today. 1 was tempted to begin by saying that these are difficult times for While getting the unemployment rate down, the Fed has also managed to hold inflation in check. Figure 1, which comes from the CBOs February conducting monetary policy; but then I realized that I must have said that every time I have testified on monetary policy. So, I Imagine, have your report, shows what they call the stripped CPI ~ all items except food, energy, and used cars. By this measure. Inflation has been stable at around other witnesses. I suppose times are always difficult. 4.5S since 1983. More germane to this hearing. Inflation shows no recent I will try to address a few of the questions you raised In your letter by tendency toward acceleration despite falling unemployment and the falling making Just three main points. The first 1s something I am not accustomed to dollar. Table 1 below shows the last five quarterly inflation rates, measured saying: that the Federal Reserve has, on the whole, done a quite splendid job In two different ways. They, too, show no hint of acceleration. for the past few years. The second 1s that the transition to a policy mix of This performance deserves applause. May It continue. In particular, looser money and tighter federal budgets has some way to go yet; so the Fed will need to continue its stellar performance for several more years. The two potential sources of error must Be avoided. First, the Fed must not be swayed by the Inflation hysteria that seems to sweep Wall Street about every third Is that the government should create a monetary Indicator that is better than any of the ones you mentioned in your letter by Issuing Indexed bonds. two weeks. Speculative markets react to everything, Including things that are Let me take up these three Issues one at a time. just imagined, and they react too vigorously. The Fed must Ignore this insanity. Second, the Fed must not again get Snookered Into an agreement to support the dollar at too high a level. This 1s obviously not a burning Issue right now, with market forces pushing the dollar up; but I cannot Imagine that Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis this situation will last long. The longer-term prognosis for the dollar 1s probably downward — a point to which I will return shortly. Figure 114. Measures of Inflation 2. THE FISCAL/MONETARY TRANSITION We are now 1n the midst of an historic transition from the Reagan/Volcker mix of excruciatingly tight money and Irresponsibly large budget deficits to a saner policy with easier money and smaller deficits. This transition has seen going on for several years now. with greater progress on the monetary than on tha fiscal front. And 1t will continue through the tarn of the next president, ana perhaps beyond. So far, we have managed tills transition extremely well. And. as I just suggested, most of the credit must go to the Fed; fiscal policy has been erratic. Table 2 shows one Indicator of our progress to date and tne distance we still have to go. It compares the composition of real GUP 1n 1986 and tha most recent quarter with that of 1979, which Indicates what a reasonable target for the composition of GNP might be. I take 1986 to represent the peak of the Imbalance and !988:1 tn show where we are now. (One quarter does not establish a trend, but the swing 1n net exports 1s quite recent. Figures for 1987:4 would look similar, except for net exports.) We can see that the combined share of consumer and government spending in GNP rose 4.4 percentage points Detween 1979 and 1966. while the Investment snare changed little. The big offsetting change came 1n net exports, which swurg from approximate balance to a deficit of aBout A% of GNP. Since 1986, we have moved the consumption and government share Oack down by 2 percentage points, or alrrost halfway back to where we were 1n 1979, and reduced the net export deficit by about a quarter. By no coincidence, the combined deficit of all levels of government has also come down ba about a Quarter. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Thus we have so far completed something between a half and a quarter of 3. INDICATORS OF MONETARY POLICY the transition we need to accomplish. The rest of the job will be left to Let me start with the conventional monetary aggregates. By now I think President Dukakis or President Bush — with the help of Chairman Greenspan. most people agree that, when it comes to using Ml as a monetary Indicator or It Is critical that we keep this process going. Most likely, a continued target, the Fed should "just say no" — which is what it has been doing. shift toward more exports and less consumption (as shares of GNP) will require Figures 2 and 3 show dramatically why this 1s so and, by the way, also show a continued tightening of fiscal policy and a continued loosening of monetary why I applaud the Fed's recent performance. policy. Both the Fed and the new administration must realize that they are Figure 2 plots the growth rate of nominal GNP against the growth rate of locked 1n a partnership. With unemployment now roughly where we want It, we Ml over the last 15 quarters. The vertical and horizontal lines Indicate the cannot welcome fiscal tightening without easier money; nor can we afford average values of each variable. Two things are clear. First, monetary greater monetary ease without fiscal tightening. growth has been vastly more volatile than GNP growth. (The ratio of the Americans should realize that the fiscal/monetary transition will most standard deviations Is 3.4:1.) Second, there 1s absolutely no tendency 1n the likely bring with 1t not only lower real Interest rates, wtitch most of us recent data for GNP to grow rapidly when Ml grows rapidly or to grow slowly like, but also a cheaper dollar, which many Americans do not like. I do not when GNP grows slowly. (The simple correlation between the two series 1s see how this can He avoided, especially since our foreign Indebtedness actually -0.35.) ultimately will require us to generate a trade surplus to pay the Interest we Figure 3 plots velocity growth against Ml growth over the same period. will owe. To shift the pattern of world demand toward J.S. goods and Here a tight Inverse relationship 1s apparent. (The simple correlation Is services, we must offer foreigners better prices — which Is just what a -0.97.) This tight relationship shows that the Fed has succeeded 1n cheaper dollar accomplishes. If the Treasury or the Fed — or, for that Offsetting erratic movements in velocity with timely Changes In money growth, matter, some foreign central bank — blocks that adjustment process, it will thereby stabilizing the growth rate of nominal GNP. And that explains both be hard for the fiscal/monetary transition to do Its work. why Ml growth has been so volatile and why It bears no relationship to GNP Nor should the combination of a cheaper dollar and lower Interest rates growth. be viewed as a bad outcome. In addition to helping to rectify the trade The fact that high Ml growth rates have recently signified sharply Imbalance, It should provide a hospitable climate for Investment, ease the negative velocity growth, not rapid GNP growth, would seem to disqualify Ml as debt burdens of farmers and less developed countries, and blunt the S&L a monetary indicator. Corresponding diagrams using M2 or the monetary base crisis. Easier money and tighter fiscal policy 1s not something to fear, but (adjusted for changes In reserve requirements) look similar, though not quite to welcome. so dramatic. Thus, these old standbys do not seem to be working very well either lately. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis -Ife -t* -let- Of, '.. "5 Iff, M f jrc 3 r Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Vour letter enquired about less conventional Indicators such as commodity Let me close by mentioning one thing Congress could do to provide all of prices, the exchange rate, and the term structure of Interest rates. ! think us with a better monetary Indicator. The main problem with interest rate each of these conveys some useful Information about what monetary policy has indicators, Including the term structure, 1s that Interest rates may rise for been or should be doing. But each Is also Influenced By a host of other two quite different reasons. If they rise because of higher expected factors. Commodity prices are sensitive to numerous market-specific inflation, the Fed may want to tighten up. But 1f they rise because of developments; the value of the dollar 1s Influenced by all sorts of things greater demand for money or credit, the Fed may want to ease. In a word, when that happen both here and abroad — and 1s also subject to speculative the nominal rate of interest rises, we cannot tell If 1t 1s the real rate of bubbles; the term structure of Interest rates 1s Influenced By the term Interest or the expected rate of Inflation that has risen. structure of Inflationary expectations. But this lack of knowledge Is self-Imposed, not inherent. We need not Among the three, I personally would place greatest weight on the term remain In the dark. If the federal government would Just Issue Indexed structure. In theory, monetary policy should move short rates more than long bonds, we could observe the real rate of Interest directly in the financial rates and, 1n practice, that seems to be true. Furthermore, the slope of the markets, as the British have been able to do since 1981. Better yet, 1f the term structure 1s probably Influenced by relatively few nonmonetary events. government Issued both indexed bills and Indexed bonds, we could observe the Finally and Importantly, econometric evidence shows that the spread between term structure of real interest rates in the markets. long rates and short rates has considerable predictive power for future There are other good reasons to Issue indexed bonds that have nothing to Inflation and unemployment. do with monetary policy. But since this Is a hearing on monetary policy, 1 But let me hasten to say that looking at any or all of these Indicators will refrain from mentioning them and simply attach an old Business Week Is a far cry from targeting on H. Should the Fed Interpret every column of mine for the record. Let me just add that there Is nothing acceleration of commodity prices as a harbinger of Inflation? Certainly not, difficult or mysterious about Issuing Indexed debt. The state of Maryland Is for to paraphrase an old saw, commodity prices have predicted 12 of the last now deciding whether it will do so. I hope It will. What can be done in five Inflations. Should the Fed tighten up every time the dollar drops? I Annapolis ought to be doable In Washington. have already answered this in the negative; we want the dollar to drop. Should the Fed tighten every time 1t sees the term structure get steeper? No. the term structure probably got steeper because the Fed eased up — hopefully, for good reasons. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 12 TABLE 1 Recent Inflation Rates (quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates) 1987:1 1987:2 1987:3 1987:4 1988:1 Consumer Price 5.4 5.1 3.6 3.9 3.2 Index Fixed-weight 4.5 4.1 3.4 3.6 3.6 GNP deflator TaDle 2 Snares of Real GNP (in percent) Year Corcumptlon Investment Government Net Exports Fed. Def. 1986 66.0 17.6 20.3 -3.9 -4.e 1988:1 64.6 18.8 19.7 -3.0 -3.3 1979 62.8 18.0 19.1 0.1 0.4 Changes: '79-'B6: +3.2 -0.4 +1.2 -4.0 -5.2 '86-'B8: -1.4 +1.2 -0.6 +0.9 +1.5 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 13 I Economic Watch i A WAY TO FREE Two economists writing in the New • Retirees on private pension* now mu»t England Economic Review re- worry that future inflation might erode SMALL SAVERS cently endorsed an idea I have the purchasing power of their pension been promoting to anyone who would benefits. There is no such worry with FROM THE listen for almost 15 years: that the U. S. indexed annuities, such as Social Securi- government should issue indexed bonds. ty. But no private pension fund can com- 'CASINO SOCIETY' Thanks, Alicia Munnell and Joseph Grol- mit itself to indeied payouts unless its nic. Now there are three of us. earnings are afeo indeied. Government BY ALAN S BLINDER You may be wondering what an in- indexed bonds that could be purchased deied bond is. Put simply, it is a securi- by pension funds are the missing ingre- ty whose real (inflation-adjusted) returns dient in the recipe for greater retirement are guaranteed against inflation. This is security. j^Jm^ ^^^^^V done by tying interest and principal pay- • Becaose safer assets generally com- i^H • ments to a price index— hence the name. mand tower rates of return in financial v J ^ J B C r - * ^ ^ r T ^ ^ - B ^ Because of that link,, indexed bonds markets, the government could probably make it possible tc save without betting reduce its average borrowing emu by on inflation. Such bonds are available in offering indexed bonds. ^^iBVj~ ~*>t— J7 several countries— such as Britain — but • An indexed bond market would gr» • ^ ? C " _ * i n fo o r t c e i d n t i h n e to U w . S ha . t S o th i a s l l m A a m ga e z r i i n ca e n s o n a c r e e p in o g li s c y o m n a t k h e e r s re a a c l c u in ra t t e e r e a s n t d r a t t i e m , e a ly n d r e d ad a - t J^f >^v called "the casino society." would enable them to forecast and man- -A^^ /^-« Ordinary U.S. government bonds ap- age the economy more effectively. A* \ .^^B^&L / 1 pear to be completely safe investments. things stand now, economists can only I^^^KPSr V i 1 Default is unthinkable, and the rate of "guesstimate" the real interest rat* by l^ll^ll^ll^llKVg&iJ 1Lj1 r to e tu m rn at u is r it g y u . a B ra u n t t t e h e e d a i p f p t e h a e r a b n o c n e d o i f a s h a e fe ld - s e u d b i t n ra fl c a t t i i n o g n a f ro sh m a k t y h e e s o ti b m se a r t v e e o d f i e n x t p e e n c t t * - IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIKII§IUI *^-_^_^•lll t in y f l i a s t i i o l n ju . so I r n y v e in st o 3 r s w o w rl h d o of b o u u n g p h r t e d 3 i 0 c - t y ab ea le r r n a e t c e e . ss I a n i y B . ri P ta eo in p , l e n o ju s su t c l h o o g k n u e p u v t o h r t k a n » - Some foreign governments g ra o w ve s r n o m f e a n r t o u b n o d n ds 3 ft i n sa 1 w 95 6 u n a e t x p i e n c t t e e r d e l s y t sw N e o r w in c t o h c e o e m s o t r h n e in g h a n rd e w q s u p e a s p ti e o r n !. : If in- issue inflation-adjusted virulent inflation decimate their savings. dexed bond* are so wonderful, why 'indexed' bonds, which B ye y a r c o g n o t v ra e s r t n , m in e v n e t s b t o o n rs d s w i h n o 1 9 b 8 o 1 u g a h t t i f n iv te e r - - ha O sn n ' e t W pos il s l i b S le tr e a e n t i w p e ro r v i i s d e th d a t t h a e m fin * ancial provide a way of separating est rates around 15% enjoyed a bonanza institution cannot safely issue indexed the act of saving w bo h n e d n s b in ee fl n a t i i n o d n e xe t d u , m th b e l e 1 d 9 . 5 6 H b a o d n d t h b o uy se er l a i s ab se il t it s i . e s I u n n d le e s ie s d i t o go n v e in rn ve m st e n in t i b n o d n ex d e s d from the act of gambling. would not have been victimised by infla- would provide those assets. My guet* it Why can't the U.S.? t b i e o e n n , a r n e d w a th rd e e 1 d 9 8 b 1 y b d u is y in e f r l a w ti o o u n l . d .not have t i h ts a t A s is o t o i n n d a e f i t e e d r b th o e n d g s, o v a e n r n o m ut e p n o t u r n in o g w o i f NO-MM mum. These two examples il- private indexed securities would follow. lustrate that indeied bonds and ordinary A second possible answer, of come, bonds differ not so much in the real is that Alicia Mmuwll, Joseph Grotnie. returns investors expect to receive, but and I are the only people who want to rather in the riskiness of those returns. buy indexed bond*. Skeptics point to tb* An indeied bond is a safe investment. In failure of the market for consumer price an inflationary world, an ordinary bond indei futures, where, since June, 1386, is a Crapshoot bondholders who wish to hedge their in- That is the main reason to favor in- flation risks have been able to do so. deied bonds: as a way of separating the Few hare, suggesting to some people act of saving from the act of gambling. that no one cam about such hedgfaic. Gamblers have ample outlets these days. Here • a different interpretation. Fu- from the tables in Las Vegas to the pits tures markets are the home of gam- in Chicago or the trading floors of lower blers, especially big-money gambtn* — Manhattan. Those who want to save not of autious savers. Because tbe in- without gambling should have at least flation rate has been so quiescent since one way to do so. June. 19B5, the en futures market h*s But, you will ask, aren't there already been a poor plats for gamblers to haw good hedges against inflation? Sad to fun. Small investors who prefer the qui- say, the answer is no. For decades the et life shy away from futures markets. stock market was advertised as a hedge which they regard aa gambung den. against inflation, but research showed If my interpretation ia correct, the po- this claim to be emphatically false. In tential market for government indexed fact, stocks do about as badly as bonds bonds, especially if they are iuued in when inflation rises. Even money-market small denominations, is far greater than accounts turn out to be inadequate infla- the CM futures market indicato. Wall tion hedges. Street professionals might not play ALANS E4. NDEBIS THE GCflOCH S HENTSCHLER Government indeied bonds would also much. But Main Street amateurs proba- Of ECONOMICS AT PONCETON IWuEOSlTY confer many important side benefit*: bly would. Let the game begin. ai BUSINESS WEEK'DECEMBERS IMS ECOHCMC (HATCH Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 14 The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Blinder. I want to apologize to the panel and to Senator Garn for so patiently waiting. Unfortu- nately, I had to appear at another hearing this morning and testify myself and I just couldn't get free, but I do apologize. This is an excellent panel. We're in your debt for appearing hear today. Mr. Dornbusch, go ahead, sir. STATEMENT OF RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, PROFESSOR OF ECONOM- ICS, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Mr. DORNBUSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should like to speak about two issues. One, the problem of our policy mix today, too easy fiscal policy and a monetary policy that has to stand by and try to avoid financial pressures; and the second one, a dollar that is rising rather than declining. I see the main issue for monetary policy today to be the wrong fiscal policy and I see a serious threat that a Federal Reserve recession in view of the rising inflation is a very, very realistic outlook for next year unless fiscal policy changes. INFLATION Let me first talk of the inflation issue. I certainly do not believe that today double digit inflation is an issue. That would be posing the wrong question. But I do think that inflation is clearly rising. I show in my testimony in table 1 the comparison between the 1960's and the 1970's on page 3. The point I want to make is that all the talk today is exactly the same as it was in 1968—the talk that in- flation isn't really there, that the economy has still room to go some though nobody knows how much. We do know that in the 1960's in the end the Federal Reserve made a recession and that the 1970's was a period of serious deterioration. I see the outlook, without a change in fiscal policy, to be very much the same in the year ahead. There is of course considerable discussion about whether in fact inflation is there. One set of indicators, the unemployment rate, one doesn't know at what level of unemployment inflation distinct- ly accelerates. Some believed it was 7, some believed it was 6, and now some believe it is 5. But it is clear that employment costs are rising today at sharply higher rates than a year ago and even hourly earnings have increased significantly. Second, we have capacity utilization, another four quarters of the current growth rates would certainly take us to the peak of capac- ity utilization, so there is a second inflationary source. The third, commodity price increases, if there should be further ones. Of course they are very difficult to predict. So I do see us today at the level of 1968 with the critical decision, just as then, to shift the policy mix to have a significant tightening of fiscal policy in order to avoid overheating of the economy; not because of the fiscal crisis but because that is the appropriate way to slow the growth of the economy in a situation where inflation is clearly the big risk. Today the dollar is rising and I consider that a very unfortunate byproduct of the election and the wrong policy mix. The Treasury without doubt is exploiting the markets preference for interest Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 15 earnings, risk-free. They have put a floor under the dollar in the summit process and with that floor under the dollar the interest differential in favor of the United States draws in foreign capital, leads to dollar appreciation. In the short term, that is an attractive policy because it cools down inflation and it looks good. It certainly avoids that Reaganomics gets unwound in the campaign. But from a longer run point of view, there is certainly an issue that the dollar continues to be overvalued and that we want fiscal tightening with a significant expansion in net exports. The 5-per- cent real appreciation of the dollar that we have had in the last 2 months goes exactly in the wrong direction. It creates uncertainties about which way to go. It's the worst kind of mismanagement. Why is the dollar going up? I think it's easy to explain. One is an overreaction to the trade numbers. There was earlier an extraordi- nary pessimism. Nobody wanted to look at professional forecasts when the trade numbers went double digit. Nobody multiplied them by 12 when they were single digit to see that they were still well above $100 billion. The second reason is the agreement not to have the dollar de- cline which means no capital losses, just high interest rates. And the third is the outlook for realistic possibility of a Federal Reserve recession some day if Congress doesn't move on the budget. In the meantime, if we take a longer run view of the U.S. exter- nal balance and the dollar, there is every reason to believe that the dollar continues to be overvalued. Forecasts of the U.S. current account 3 or 4 years out almost uni- formly come out with numbers between $95 billion and $105 bil- lion. There is some variation, but it's centered around $100 billion. That means a third of the deficit will go away, two-thirds will stay. CHANGES IN THE WORLD TRADE STRUCTURE The reason is that we have had since 1980 significant changes in the world trade structure. The first, newly industrialized countries have had a shift in manufacturing of $60 billion in our trade with them. In the 1960's and the 1970's, we equipped them with capital goods and that made for strong trade performance here. Today, those capital goods are at work exporting to us. That's one reason why the dollar certainly will have to decline further. The second is we have a large growth gap between the United States and other industrialized countries. Cumulatively, we've grown 13 percent more than they have. As a result, our imports have grown much more rapidly than our exports, even assuming the same responsiveness to demand. That gap is still there today and it accounts for half of the trade deficit. The third reason is that we haven't had the full devaluation. We only have had half. It has worked extremely well on the export side, but it has worked so far very poorly on the side of imports. Import prices have risen relatively little in response to dollar de- preciation and imports continue to be very competitive, particular- ly in the area of capital goods. I show in my testimony in figure 4 the prices of capital goods in the United States and imported capital goods. The prices of import- ed capital goods today are still at the level of 1980, whereas domes- Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 16 tic goods are 25 percent higher. So we have really had on the import side virtually no depreciation and in capital goods we have massive, massive loss of competitive advantage. Looking ahead, there are two factors that worsen the U.S. trade outlook. One is the dramatic trade integration in Asia between Japan and Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Last year, Japanese trade with those countries doubled as each reinforces the other's competitiveness by trading in components. The other one, Europe in 1992, with the creation of an internal market, certainly amounts to diverting trade from the United States. So I conclude from all these factors on the trade side that we cer- tainly cannot take the view that the dollar should be going up. On the contrary, we should have no dollar targets either for monetary policy nor for the Treasury. I want to conclude my testimony by arguing that there's one very important institutional change which would improve the working of the economy. We have today a predominance of very, very short-sighted asset markets. The upward movement of the dollar is the very best example of speculation that is totally de- tached from fundamentals. A very moderate financial transaction tax, not only on foreign exchange but also on stocks, bonds, all fi- nancial assets—extremely moderate—would discourage the very short horizon speculation which today makes asset markets so vola- tile and so preponderant. One can argue that a tax like that would simply shift business offshore, but it's worth remembering that Switzerland does have such a tax and is still considered the biggest financial center. So I do think one has to start thinking about that in order to get better functioning asset markets and for monetary policy not to become hostage of very short run capital market movements. Thank you. [The complete prepared statement of Mr. Dornbusch follows:] Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis INFLATION AND THE DOLLAR1 Rudieer Dornbusch admi year there Is no excuse for stunting trade improvement by dollar appreciation. The economy la overheating. To avoid a Federal Reserve recession and renewed dollar overvaluation the budget deficit must come down. financial markets rightly project a collision courser rising inflation sooner happens there are significant risks. tightening and a shift in fiscal policy was the inevitable consequHm'.E' . This time around several Important extra difficulties emerge: operate over productive activity. 1. The Situation Today The debate whether inflation is already back, around the corner or only in the horizon makes one point clear: inflation is now the where the Federal Reserve decides Co Hake a stand. Over the next ye taking Til* question today Is when the Federal Reserve will initiate shift toward tighter nonetery policy to slow the growth of the economy and inflation • Khich oust The slowdown In the US economy which is the cure for Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis All these t •Ignlf leant tightening poli addltio high le 2. The 1960s and the _Infl,tton Outlook Today fly the tnd of 1969, 1960s. fly 1968 the economy was precisely it E •Unless action it taken quickly to expand Faderal tevenues. a rapidly. rate of nales age 25 and over. Tva economic position-- by danaglng conEtdetic* ic^ the dallar. arid by loymfnt really at the level where disadvantage. • Financing such deficits vault! increasingly strain financial nsilwts, pushing Interest rates further above present record highs, and threatening another financial squeeze and another 00 Table 1 Creeping inflation (percent per year) on and supply Inflation (CPI) Adj. ftvg. Hourly («1) the year. Investment in capacity expansion, is nat Qutpwing the impact of 19S5 4.4 1.6 3.6 1966 3.4 3.0 4.3 1967 3.7 2.8 5.0 196B 3.5 4.2 fi.l (except when the dollar Is grossly overvalued). But If they should occur they 1969 3.4 5.4 6.7 would Interact with high capacity utilization and lov unenploynent to create a 19«i 7.2 3.5 3.1 198$ 7.0 1.9 2.4 On balance the In the unconfortable 1987 6.2 3.7 2.5 1988* 5.6 4 1 3.1 m^* 5.5 5.0 4.2 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 3. The Dollar and Trade Performance the group of partner countries Included in Che measura encompasses the highly competitive newly Industrialized countries (SICs). By early 1986 Che dollar Has back to Che level of competitiveness of 19BO, or to the average of the 1970s. overvalutd dollar. The recent upturn of the dollar and the sharp Inprovement in rising today and whether this is desirable. Second, what are the Long run prospects for U.S. trad* and ths dollar? 77 H7t 10B1 The Dollar Rally: Trade data are extrenely volatile and hence difficult Co UNOIPIOYUEW (15+) one of the reasons for the present dollar strengthr The long run trade outlook begs the question whether the Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis U.S. REAL EXCHANGE RATE t IBBO-BI-IOO] landlr.5 BCensiio whe In the short run this Scenario is unlikely. On Che contrary, Treasury does not vant Co Ee* a dolla! decline that might unrivel Reagsnomic in the niddle of the campaign. The third is the anticipation of a possible It also would help show (In the shart run) Improving trade results. Our The potsihiUtJ of 8 Federal aeserve tightening in 1989 dollar floor followed by a Federal Reserve recession is a situation nuch lllte the eatly 198QK uhela the dollar «as alloved to appreciate and becone overvalued as an anti-inflation policy. BuC it is also clear that the dollaf appreciation that is Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis THE US CURRENT ACCOUNT (PERCENT or GDP) ourse, the undoing of the appreciation Price Volu Autos Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis CAPITAL GOODS PRICES (HDOt llOttl-lOO) chose not Co pass it through Into higher dollar prices-- differed widely export sectors. by low cost Southeast Asian exporters notably Korea. Singapore, HongKong and The legacy of the overvalued dollar 13 quite apparent in Import penetration Increased in both the capital goods sector and In consumed goods. But the Increase was very moderate compared Co the massive rise since to JAPANESE EXPORT PRICES the U.S. Desand) (MDCt 1(85:2 - 100) 1975 5. It 1980 6.9 14.6 1987 11.6 37.7 Federal Reserve Board Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and 1989 we can expect further export growth at double digit rates. When we done . manufacturing (outside business machines) will be broadly back to the level af 1980. gut that is performance far belo. par in a growing world neuly Industrialized countrlas that ue comment on next. Taiwan Slngapo Table 4. U.S. Manufacturing Trade with the NICS (Billion $ U.S.) Exports 1980 55.6 1986 49.4 Table 6 Adjustment of World Imbalances:1985-f (Annual Average Percentage) Export Volume CNP developing countries have been turned very rapidly into world class exporte Source; OECD Economic Outlook. July 19B Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Europe, but especially Japan, have stepped up their growth THE GROWTH GAP rates of domestic demand. They are now enjoying domestic-led growth rather than [LEHL Of BEAl SPENDING. 1t«0:l -1KJ) growing off the U.S. fiscal expansion. But the differential with U.S. growth (especially in the case of Europe) continues to be far too moderate to Lop ajor recession) makes it app policy ultimately tight alnly failure to adji deficits. >>- Foltev In concluding I would like to comment briefly on the policy to Moreover, without a tightening of fiscal policy (bacause of the overheating of US t NON-US OKD and commodity targets seem very inappropriate Perhaps Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis transactions, in stocks, bonds and foreign exchange alike. The purpose of the Trade improvement and increased InvestmenC would then carry growth, The basic fact of life in asset markets is that the average professional Chinks he or she can liquidate a posIClon before a naj or turn In evidence Co show a stable relationship between commodity prices and general Keynes In Che General Theory (chapter 12) notes Che market's pursuit of "It might have been supposed that competition between expert professionals, possessing judgment and knowledge beyond that of the energies and skill of the professional Investor and speculator are to Of concentrate their resources upon the holding of "liquid" abnormal predominance which financial markets enjoy In todays economy. entlal Co recogni FTT tn f an FTT •^See M.Durand and S.Blondal "Are Commodity Prices Leading Indicators of OECD Prlc investment virtually unaffected. Unpublished manuscript. OECD, February 1988. The najor obje Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 26 Is worth noting chat both Japau and SaiLtMclaftd do tiro Meantime there IB not much cost in moving ahead and designing dechanlsms that Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 27 The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Dornbusch. Dr. Fair. STATEMENT OF RAY FAIR, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, YALE UNIVERSITY Mr. FAIR. Thank you, Senator. In Chart 1 on the first page of my written testimony I give the percentage change in GNP and the percentage change in the GNP deflator by four quarter periods since 1983. There's no question, to echo what others have said, that the economy has really had a re- markable performance in the past few years judged by GNP, infla- tion, as well as unemployment, which is not on this chart. This pattern, of course, masks the changes that have taken place in the trade deficit and the Government deficit and so forth, but if we look simply at GNP, inflation, and unemployment, we really have done a rather remarkable job and I would agree with Profes- sor Blinder that the Fed should get some credit for that. I really don't have much more to say about that, nor do I have much to say about the mix question between monetary and fiscal policy, which has also been touched on by others. Almost everyone agrees that we should have in the future a tighter fiscal policy and an easier monetary policy to offset the negative effects from the contractionary fiscal policy, to get the Government deficit back down. As I said, I have nothing new to say here. I just wanted to add one thing, which is to point out a bonus that you get when you change the mix in this way. This bonus is what I call the interest payments effect on the Government deficit. Because the Govern- ment debt is now so high, if you lower interest rates you get a sub- stantial savings in Government interest payments. I ran an experi- ment with my econometric model where I assumed that the Fed lowered through open market operations short-term interest rates by a percentage point. This gradually lowers long-term rates, which in itself is expansionary—if you lower interest rates you expand the economy. I wanted to focus simply on the interest payments effect, so I took an exogenous component of spending and simply lowered it to the point where I left GNP the same as it was in the base case. The change is thus simply a change in the interest rate, keeping the GNP and the economy roughly the same, to see how much this affected the Government deficit. In the first year, there was a gain in lowering the deficit of $5.6 billion; and in the second year, $13.7 billion. So there's a substan- tial bonus, as I said, that one gets from an easier monetary policy. Given that most people would want the mix to change anyway, this is just simply icing on the cake, and the numbers are now substan- tial. So that any discussion that takes place on how contractionary fiscal policy should be in the future should take this effect into ac- count, assuming the Fed responds to offset the contractionary ef- fects, and I see no reason it wouldn't, aside from perhaps worries about the dollar. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 28 FED POLICIES AND POLITICAL FORCES Now let me turn finally to one of the questions Senator Proxmire addressed in his letter. There's been concern not only by Senator Proxmire but by many others from time to time on whether the Fed is unduly influenced in its policies by political forces. In order to address that question, I really need to answer two questions. The first is, how does the economy—that the Fed has some control over—how does the economy affect voting behavior? We really need to answer that question first. Then, given the answer to that question, you can ask the second question, is it advantageous then for political parties to put pressure on the Fed to manipulate the economy to then help them win the Presidential election? So the first thing I focus on is the question of how does the econ- omy affect voting behavior. Beginning about 1976, I developed an equation that predicts votes for Presidents—the Democratic share of the two-party vote. Not surprising to anyone in this room, the economy does have some effect on votes for President. The econo- metric question that one addresses in this is how does it affect it, which economic variables seem to be most important, and what are the quantitative magnitudes, how much do you get out of this. From the work I've done, the two most important economic vari- ables seem to be the growth rate of GNP, real growth rate per capita, between 6 and 9 months prior to the election; and the infla- tion rate in the 2-year period prior to the election. So the two vari- ables are GNP growth and inflation, and the relevant time periods seem to be for GNP growth between 6 and 9 months before the election and for inflation about 2 years before. On page 3 I give the past history of this equation in terms of pre- dicting the elections, starting with 1916. The equation has a re- markable ability to predict Presidential elections I believe. The av- erage error that this equation makes is about 3 percentage points, and there's only one election where the error was really quite large, which is the Johnson-Goldwater election of 1964, where the Democrats got 61.3 percent of the vote. They were predicted to get 54.2 percent, which is an error of 7.1 percentage points. So there was a rather large error in predicting that election, but there is only one other case in which the error was even as large as 4 per- cent. Three of the elections were predicted incorrectly. Kennedy-Nixon in 1960, Nixon-Humphrey in 1968, and Carter-Ford in 1976. But the errors in these cases, as you can see from page 3, were really very small. The elections were really just too close to call, and the equa- tion predicted them to be that way and just got the sign wrong. The Reagan victories in both 1980 and 1984 were predicted quite well. Again, this is easy to see from the equation. In 1980, the growth rate was minus 5.7 percent over this period and inflation was 9 percent. So Carter was predicted to lose by a substantial amount. And in 1984, the growth rate was 2.7 and inflation was 3.7. Reagan had the incumbency advantage, you get some headstart for that—and he was predicted to win again by a landslide. So you don't really have to appeal to Reagan's personality in order to see why he did so well in the two elections. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 29 Now you can use this equation to predict 1988. In order to do that you need to give me, or give the equation, an estimate of what the inflation rate will be—we pretty much know that because it's the 2-year period before—and what the growth rate will be, per capita growth, 6 to 9 months before the election. I've given you a table on page 4 in which you can simply choose yourself values of what I call "g," the growth rate and "p," the in- flation rate, and see what you predict. If you use a growth rate of 2 percent—remember this is per capita—and an inflation rate of 4 percent, which is roughly what my econometric model predicts, if you look on the table you see the Democrats are predicted to get 48.2 percent of the vote, which means that the Republicans are pre- dicted to win by 1.8 percent. This margin is within 3 percentage points, which is the average error, and so the election is really too close to call. So the basic point of this is that, given what seem to be reasona- ble predictions now of the economy, the election seems too close to call, although the Republicans have a slight headstart. Now to come back to the question of the pressure on the Fed. If what I have just outlined is in fact the way voters behave, you can see there are obviously some advantages for a party to try to push the Fed in one direction or another if it were irresponsible. For example, if the Fed could be induced to increase the growth rate of the economy to 6 percent in this year, leaving the inflation rate at 4 percent for now because most of the inflation conse- quences will take place later, then the Democrats would be predict- ed to get 44.1 percent of the vote, which would be a substantial Re- publican victory, the Republicans could have some confidence that they would win. On the other hand, if the Democrats for some reason put pres- sure on the Fed to induce a recession, minus 6 percent growth or something, then you have a substantial Democratic victory. The re- lationship between growth rate and vote share is about one-for-one. For every percentage point increase in growth, the incumbent party gains about 1 percentage point of the vote. For inflation, for every 1 percent increase in inflation, the incumbent party loses about a third of a percentage point, which is what's reflected in this table. Now to conclude, from my ivory tower at Yale, I have no inside information about what goes on between the administration and the Fed, but the main point is that it's really too late to try to in- fluence the Fed. The effects of monetary policy on the economy, as we all know, takes some time, and unless the Fed did something really extreme between now and October, there really isn't time left for this kind of pressure. So I don't think that Senator Proxmire or anyone else really needs to worry at this time about the effects on the Fed. They maybe should have worried last year, but now it's really too late, and so I don't see this as an important issue. I think Congress and the administration and the Fed should get on with trying to change the mix in the future, in 1989 and 1990, toward an easier monetary policy and a tighter fiscal policy. [The complete prepared statement of Mr. Fair follows:] Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Housing, and Urban Affair July 12, 1988 dovn. If Congress and the Administration could Ray C. Fair Yale University I. The Recent U.S. Performance The performance of the U.S. economy since 1983 has been remarkably I have nothing nevj Co add about the mix question here. Uhat I would Chart 1 Four-Quarter Growth Rates In Real CNF and the CNF Deflate In Real CUP in the GNF Deflator 1983 11 198 1983 V 198 GoO 1984 19B 1984 19B 1984 .1 198 1984 V 19S 1985 194 1985 1 198 1985 II 198 1985 V 198 1 1 1 9 9 9 8 8 8 6 6 6 I 11 1 1 1 9 9 9 8 8 8 III. Th V l o * ti n c g o mm B i e t h t a e vi e o r a n a d n o d t h th e e r erned from tin 1986 V 193 1987 1937 1987 I 19B8 The chart shou apid output growth in 1983, Che all that bad. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis tuo-party vote for the election Also, although che grouch rate in Che following table is tht obtained using the growth rate in Che nine month period before 9f.6 CO .517 .361 .457 412 .591 .625 .550 .538 .524 .446 .422 .52? .352 .415 .446 575 .633 .573 .570 .513 .456 .437 .550 .560 .564 .567 .570 .574 .003 -.009 -.042 036 -.016 .008 .023 .032 -.011 .010 .015 .539 .550 .553 .557 .560 .564 .529 .540 .543 .547 .550 .553 Growth -3 .519 .SJ9 .533 .536 .540 .543 984 2 .509 . 12 .516 . 19 . 71 .526 . in 111 1 .499 . <>y .505 . 09 . 17 .516 . 19 5JT 0 .466 . i-f .495 . )9 . n? .506 . 09 .513 1 .676 . «y .485 . SB . 9; .495 . 90 .502 2 .468 . 71 .475 . 78 . a? .4B5 . HI 49? 3 .456 . 61 .465 . SB . 71 .475 . 78 .482 If. for example, the inflation rate turns out to be 4.0 percent and the rowth rate to be 2.0 percent, which is roughly what my model is predicting. elections In which the win Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 32 Rtpub Infla Administration, and Che Fed should be looking ahead and worrying about the nix in 1989 and 1990. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 33 The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Hale. STATEMENT OF DAVID D. HALE, FIRST VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF ECONOMIST, KEMPER FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC Mr. HALE. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. I have organized my material this morning in terms of four major points. First, I would concur with the previous speakers that the Federal Reserve faces a major challenge in the next couple of years inas- much as we are now in an economic environment somewhat simi- lar to the 1960's. However, I would stress that in many ways the challenge facing the Fed over the next couple of years is even greater than it was in the late 1960's because it is now trying to conduct economic policy and monetary policy against a framework of two major imbalances, not simply domestic overheating. First, as you know from previous discussion here, we currently have a very large imbalance between savings and investment in this country which has produced a current account deficit of $160 billion. That's not simply a record number in dollar terms; it's also a record share of our national income, a sum of money equal to 3.5 percent of our gross national product compared to 1.5 percent back in the 1870's and 1880's when we were a developing country. As a result of this current account deficit and our external bor- rowing, we will also have by 1991-92 probably a trillion dollar ex- ternal debt or foreign investment deficit which in turn will produce a deficit on our investment account of about $60 or $70 billion. So we're talking about a financial environment that is quite different from anything we've known in our modern history. In fact, Chair- man Greenspan is the first American Federal Reserve Chairman to assume the office under conditions of the United States being a large capital-importing nation. Second, in addition to this external financial constraint, we now have a growth rate in our real economy which is increasingly bumping up against real constraints in terms of labor supply and manufacturing capacity. Let me share with you a couple of numbers to put in perspective what these constraints look like. Once our economy achieves full employment—and many econo- mists believe we're almost there—its optimal noninflationary growth rate consists of two factors—labor force growth and produc- tivity growth. Labor force growth in this country is about 1.5 per- cent. Productivity growth is about 1 to 1.2 percent. As a result, our optimal noninflationary growth rate is now around 2.5 percent. Because of the trade deficit, because of our need to move to a trade surplus at some point for debt servicing, we must also allo- cate some share of that 2.5 percent growth to reducing our trade imbalance. I would estimate at least 0.5 and perhaps 1 percent of GNP per annum must go for that purpose. That, in turn, leaves about 1.5 percent for domestic spending. Since we also have to increase the size of our capital stock in order to generate additional capacity for exports, that means that Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 34 our domestic spending for consumption can only grow by about 1.2 or 1.3 percent, which would be about static in per capita terms. That I think is a very significant challenge and my second major point is it would be a serious mistake if we have to rely solely on monetary policy to ration domestic demand, to ration domestic spending in a way that we keep in a noninflationary growth projec- tory over the next few years. I think the previous speakers have spoken aptly on this. Just to restate it very quickly, if we rely on monetary policy to restrain domestic demand, to stay in this nonin- flationary growth path, we will have to have much higher real in- terest rates. Higher interest rates will in turn push up the real ex- change rate. That in turn will jeopardize improvement in our trade account and perhaps set the stage for a new current crisis in the future. A year ago I would have thought that simply complying with the Gramm-Rudman program to gradually balance the budget would be sufficient. In fact, it may be necessary for us to study the eco- nomic policies of countries like Australia and Britain, which to deal with their trade imbalance and to maintain a low inflation rate, felt compelled to actually go to budget surpluses. Our policy alternative by 1991-92 may be to move in that direction more quickly than we would have thought necessary a year ago, especial- ly with unemployment now likely to be at 4.5 percent by the end of 1988. Third, the instruments through which the Fed should pursue this policy protectory must be eclectic. Again, previous speakers have commented quite adequately on the issue of velocity shifts, changes of money demand, and the unreliability of monetary aggregates. I would simply amplify this by encouraging you to also ask questions of Mr. Greenspan about how the changing value of the dollar and possible capital flight from the United States may affect money demand. WEAKNESS OF THE DOLLAR In my conversations with corporations and private investors, I suspect the weakness of the dollar over the last 1 l/z years has fur- ther weakened the relationship between money demand, money growth and nominal GNP, by encouraging our investors and our corporations to put additional money into foreign currency depos- its. In other countries like Britain and Germany, it's easy for the central bank to monitor these changes in currency preferences be- cause it's commonplace for banks in those countries to offer their citizens the option of having their money in foreign currencies in a retail savings account. We don't offer that option. Hence, money here typically goes offshore. But I suspect from looking at move- ments that in capital flows as measured by the B.T.S. data—I cover that in my formal testimony—that we have seen capital flight from the United States in the last year and it is distorting the money numbers and, therefore, is a factor which we must get a better handle on to understand the relationship between money and GNP. I would also concur with Alan Blinder that indexed bonds could be a useful market test of how the market is viewing inflation, mone- tary policy and the risk of future price changes. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 35 EXCHANGE RATE POLICY My final point would be to focus on exchange rate policy. I be- lieve that we need additional guidance from the U.S. Treasury and Mr. Baker in particular on the conduct of exchange rate policy, how our exchange rate target zones are developed, and what impli- cations they have for policy. In the trade bill now before the Congress, we do have an amend- ment or a provision which would require the Treasury to provide regular testimony on the exchange rate. If you do not in the end pass the trade bill, I would encourage you to separate that provi- sion to require additional testimony on exchange rate policy and its implications for our economy. By convention and by custom, the exchange rate is the responsi- bility of the Treasury, not the central bank, but obviously conduct of exchange rate policy has major implications for the Federal Re- serve and the economy in ways which mean we cannot really sepa- rate it from monetary policy. In addition, I believe we also must have greater disclosure in the future of how this exchange rate policy is developed, how the target bands are developed, what kinds of surveillance indicators we use, what do we think are reasonable targets for our trade defi- cit, for capital flows, what do we think is an optimal adjustment path for policy to try to achieve an exchange rate target and a trade deficit adjustment. I think we need this kind of additional information for three rea- sons. First, because simply focusing on the exchange rate would itself draw attention to these other policy imbalances we must con- front. That is, the tension we'll have in the next year between fiscal policy and monetary policy. This is not a new subject or a new theme. It's been debated over the last 4 or 5 years, but absence of an exchange rate policy 7 and 8 years ago helped set the stage for many of our current problems. If we had had more awareness and more sophistication in this area, these imbalances would not have gotten as large, in my opinion. Second, it's very important that we provide clear signals to American businessmen to keep investing very heavily in the trada- ble goods sector, especially manufacturing. We are currently expe- riencing a capital spending boom in manufacturing, but many busi- nessmen still tell me they are concerned about future dollar appre- ciation, that there will be a repeat of what happened in the late 1970's and early 1980's of the dollar cycle which will in fact make the investment they are now undertaking unprofitable at some point. If we had a more clearcut exchange rate policy and disclosure of how things are developed, it would help to reinforce today's current capital spending boom, which itself will lower the risk of future in- flation. Finally, I think we need additional discussion and disclosure about exchange rate policy to lessen the fear of political manipula- tion of exchange rates, to lessen concerns not of our own central bank in fact conducting policy in a way to affect our elections, but in fact of foreign central banks conducting policy in a way which might affect our financial markets or perceptions of the economy Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 36 and therefore how the electoral process here might evolve during a period such as 1988. Now we can put various interpretations on the conduct of mone- tary policy in other countries over the last year. In my testimony I devoted a great deal of time to the issue of exchange rate interven- tion and how we have had exchange rate intervention over the last year to try and stabilize our financial markets, restrain the dollar from going too far, and preventing an upsurge in inflation and in- terest rates that would be destabilizing to our economy in 1988. What concerns me here is not just the reality or what economists might think. It's what the American public might think in 6 or 9 months time if we have a very close election this autumn and it becomes apparent that in fact foreign economic policy was being conducted in ways to influence our election. Here I call your attention to an editorial in last week's Financial Times, which addressed the dollar rally in the last couple of weeks as being in part a political phenomenon. I'll quote it directly: The result of the recent dollar appreciation was the export of inflation to the rest of the world. Both this week and last, Germany has demonstrated resistance. The spotlight now turns to Japan. The policy question in Tokyo: What price, in terms of domestic inflation, is the Japanese Government prepared to pay to help secure the election for Mr. George Bush? That's the opinion of the Financial Times. There's great dissen- sion obviously among financial economists. I think it's essential to our long-term economic and political relationships elsewhere in the world that we have ample description of exchange rate policy so that the American people do not believe that we've had manipula- tion of the exchange rates, such beliefs would be adverse for the maintenance of an effective exchange rate policy and also for our strategic relationship with countries like Japan such relationships will be critical, I would add, not only to our trade adjustment proc- ess but to maintaining world peace and prosperity well into the 1990's. Thank you, [The complete prepared statement of Mr. Hale follows:] Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Mr. Cha Hawking il policy-makers, oiio growth with While there is nothing wrong with inporting foreign capital If ue inveat it wisely, TBSTIHWI OH 0.3. BCOKWC ODTLOOt UK MOHBUBI POLICI oh is: change Testimony for Hearings before the previous high of 1.5* of GNP during the late tgtn csntury when tne U.S. innrm stars SHU™ One Hundredth Congress country on a one hundred year round trip in tsrms CO Second Session Oversight on the Honetary Policy Report to Congress Pursuant tn the Full Enploynent and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 Chicago Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Tha Balaocn of Pumtata idjnatiient Will Bf Gradual the early i°90's, the U.S. will for U.S. output and It la quite likely that the fl-7 experiment^with eigtiange rate management .Hill be running at i* of GNP while foreign finis C oo O 3imply becaua Ano adjua ins imbalances is that America has a large budget deficit while Europe and Japan do not. Nhat la leas well under-stood is that some of today's global payment Imbalances Why have Europe and Japan been so supportive of the dollar? They have nad several ography. gnarj fiscal notlves. Flrat, In gontrast to the U.S. during the period 1982-1981, thay do not population la now falling by 3,000-0,000 per week. Unless there IB a major change In birthrates or immigration, the German population will shrink from 62 million to 50 million by tha rear 2020 and to only «0 million by 2010. In Europe as a whole, candidates favoring prot of American military fo ojn Europe and Asia. Th< Jap ana £« B-aavy dependence upon this country for both markets and military security. In fact, ury. at a recent conference in Nagoya, Japan about how Japan should cope with American While the U.S. population la aging, the oountry has a higher birthrate and therefore at Pa* Britannlca and fifty yeara ot PHI taerlsana, in hi'it notf entered a period Breatep labor fsrt* gr&Jth than Europe or Japan. ExQluaing South fcrrics and Hong International role." w a it l h a r t g h e e t i h m i m rd ig r w a o nt r ld p . op A ul s a a ti o r n e su d l u t r , i n I g t i t s h e fa n r ex m t ore fe u li k d e e ly ca d t e h s a t th th an a U ei . t S h . e w r il E l u a r t o t p r e a c o t r Japan. AS with Hong Kong, the D.S. will probably also experience a great deal of Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Industrial development In areas directly adjacent to Its Border. Hhile population la only one factor of production, large divergences in deaneraphlo behavior can influence the direction of capital flom In a variety of vaya. An aging population will tend to Increase Its savings rate In order to establish retlreneot funds while a society with 4 young population will generate robuat credit denand to finance honebuildlng and eonauaw durable purchases. Cernenjr's residential construction industry, for exaaple, has reulned depressed In the free of falling interest rates for several quarters because of population decline. In previous nerloda of hiatory, countriaa with aging populations would probably have had stagnant eoonceilea and Ion real Intareat rates. But because of the International novetwnt tcwarda financial liberalization, coupled «lth nwt darveloaeMnta la coaputer and coamio (cations technology, we, now have a global financial mrlntplaoe through utlch countries »itti aftlng populations can export capital to eountrlea wita younger populations, One could argue that the O.S. la Importing too ouch capital relative to its lav Investaient rete and that more of It abculd be diverted to countries with even younger populations In the third world. But a variety of structural factors. Including pro-cspltallat eeooonlc pclioles and warlcet openeas, have caused tlxe alloy question facing the world's high savers to concentrate their surplua funds In Jam-lean naaeta durlna the )9BO's. The Foliar Challenge While there are several structural reaaons why the 3.3. can stretch out Ita balance of payments adjustment process and renaln a capital Inporter well into the 1990'a, approaches full employment. the transformation now occurring in the U.S. balance of nayawnfca will atlll pose a a re a t j u o r r n o t h o a ll t e r n a a d e e t s o u rp p l o u l a i cy a t is S k O e M ra p b o o in th t h in e re o r a d n er d o to v e o rs ff e s a e s t . th T e h e gr U ow .S th . o w f il i l n t h e a r v e e s t to ^ar6e budget deficits were onomy had ample underutiliz paynenta and dividends on our internal debt and foreign Infeete»nt Sore. This,In large S t I u o r i n l n a t IB w B i v ll f or r e e q r u e i a a r l e lo c t a h t t a i ng n P .3 4 . - a 5 j J o o n d f a v C e t l M op P .' a f , r f o l n o he d r O re B n e t a , t l a c l* e en o B f Um fi p a ti a o n n l ^ t a o n d ei B p t o on rt e s ta ry and i t o h t e j t r t i e n m g p t a c i 6 n a ? g p . J i i t t P o a ' l t r - s e w t d o u c c k e d n u te ri r n n g a l th d e e f n i i c d i - t I s Q B ha C d ' s b , e w e e n T a g e f c r o a e o h e c o w i t n e o i a o v n r r w s g e l s t ' n s — b a f y u B o l l n t l a l 1 t b o i . e a o 5 a a r o ) p i f l f o p o n f y e o r c r a c n h e e - l 1 a n a t g n n . c r n f o l u h I a w a a t e l l s t l l h e e a n n o n a a g p d n r e t d v i c p i p a r s r r l o e o d a d l n u l i u o k c c n e g t t i - l r i v I o y v n i w i t f t y t l y t h a o t i e g r o x w a r n o p t o a w e a rk r n t y d h l i a . a n g a g r S o W f . w b o t t t y l t h l t - o w t 1 r n S . a 2 s a . % t 7 . e % 0 c . p . O 3 o e n r n . c I s e f I i a » s n o a t w n s o u e r c o a a o , f f s u o a n t r u w t t c h n r e o y e e e ix d uc w i h n i g c h th u e e eficit a jp b p e u i r t a t a , t l i u ng n s f t .i • 5 a a r l n 0 t y t d k u s r u i i . a g n a c n h a t t d e e O l r h y ' m s n i , g a e h c n a d a j s i u u a s c t t i e e i n h d l d a i g z r u a o t a s s o t t c d i r l o o i s l- e . n n 6 s t , r r i a H a l c I l t i t n u e s i s c o t s o l n t u r t r y d h a i i a n t n t u e g o , t l u r a t . c l e d r h h g e e e s s m i p u ± p i o g c e r l g a i i e c c l o s s y e f , t that the n.3. will hne to reduce Its reel trade daTloit by in avcnint eo.u»i to 0.5 - ing in the industrial sector, coupled with the s 1 u .0 rp 1 l u o a f f r o e r a l d G e K b P t p a e e r r v a l n o n l u n a g j o b v y e r th th e e n n id ex -1 t 9 s 9 e 0 v 'a e , r al d o y a e e a a r t s l a i n s p o e r n d d e i r n g t o w a i c ll h ie b v e e a a b le tr ad to e is, will push the total inflation rate into the expand br only 1.5 - Z.ttt per annual. Since the Inveetoent snare of OHP also Mill 5.0 - 5.5J range by early 1989 i hate to expand In arder to reverse ttut daaage done to the D.S. capital stock by the exchange rate policies ef Donald Regan and Beryl Sprlokel during the early 1980'a, aaerlcan oonauagtlon will protablv have to reBain atatle on a per capita oaals for e,n gjteedad period of tine unless the shift In tha aoonony's ffrontn mta tomrds aijport and Investment flv«s a aiyilfloant boo at to productivity Itself. It is eeaenMal that the 11-3. pursue a policy xdx which does not dlacoiirage capital spending and aavlnga egeauHe the overTHluatlen of the dollar between 1981 andll9B6 retarded investaent la~ the aconoig'a tradeabla goods industries.*s the Charts Illustrate,Investnent In oonaerclal real estate and dosestic service InauatriBa steps touarda deficit reduction in the weeks after th rose to record levels as a share cf GKF after 1932 Nftlle ran? aeatora of October st but was inhibited from going further by fears o atanufeaturing Industry suffered fron Invtatnent anorexia.. Indeed, the aairafacturlng triggering capital stoolc of the 0.3. sotually shranlt In 19BZ-B3 for the first tine In the post- Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis testify, though, the major thraat facing tM U.3, anoopf Sue Ing '9 S3 Is not reeeaalon but inflationary overheating. Despite the rt ision myopia of_Wall Street for a reoesalon, which would and monetary j>olicy arc moving In actions retire acceptance of certain traders, and ut moat Wall would hme been a aharp upward spllie In tmeriean Interaj rates during the winte Fed should u 1987-1988 followed by a traditional 3lon notion correct i in equity values. B the past fow Monday affected the tiling of the O.S. adjustnent pr >as, not Its dlreotSoi policy Instr Beagan adninistratlon itself during 1986 will testify, there is _longe aafticientlj arable felationshii. bat^Ben aonM supulv and noalnal OM7 for the Ts6 to oil if tneFede exchange rate, commodity prices r aspects of public polioy which Hashing on capable night directly influence prlc ch a Binlnuo wage law. Ironically, adnlniatration spokeanan of the riat P a ion My have contributed to the n in toerican aonetary growth during the paat year by matting speeches which ary currency balances of Aoerioan residents, data conpiled by the Bank of International Settlenenta showing the distribution of currency balances owned by non-oanka in the offshore financial syateo suggests that there has been capital flight from U.S. pj-oloneed period of volatile staletata in public pollc^T pould ultimately dollar instruoonts since 1985. lit the end of 1987, the ratio of dollar deposits investment and cause the econom to drift into a pertod of g&IC^pep^q owned py non-banks to other Eurocurrency deposits was only 2,1 compared to 6.0 in the financial tiarketa, but 198U. The en vestment, ueak productivity, included In both the Gernv oaitive growth features. In contrast to nd Japan, our population U ipanding. The supply side of the Bust-lean ! onomy la also highly flexible compared and their poasible Impact on o ild the -ation in wages so far this year has been modest. American businessmen retain example, investors believe that U.S. nQMtarv policy is too inflationarj, tMre the nflienc* to invest arjo will eipanil their capital eipendiCures by 10-12J tnls could be a shift of funds out of the U.S., which would depress the growth rate of year. Meanwhile, non-farn siports will probably expand by 201 during '936. In the official monetary aggregates deapite the Fed'a effort to stimulate nioney fact, the sneer size of the trade deficit la itself an argument againat recession if growth. While one can only infer frox the BIS data that there has been capital vt can develop policies wfiieh nalce it poasible W us to attract external aavlngs at flight from the dollar, it is difficult to bellve that Treasury departments In large u re n a d a e o r n « a J b le o f le O v H e P ls o r of tw i i n ce t er th e e s t o r u a tp te u s t . los In t i 1 n 9 8 t 7 h , e t a h v e e r t a r g a e d e p o d s e t- f w ic a i r t r u e a c s e s e s q i u o a n l . toH e j n u c s e t , c to o rp d o o r l a la ti r o n d ) « p a o s il w .tB el l b a B s c a w ua e a a lt o h f y c i o n n d c i e v r i n d u a a b ls o u h t av th e e no v t a l b u a e e n o f m i t n h i e m iz c i u n r g r en th cy e ir d u e r x i p n o g s u t r h e e si»ply elialnatlng Che trade deficit eould add about 10 points to the industrial past eighteen months. Indeed, as chart 1? Illustrates, the aloudoun In 0.3. money uhile reducing the federal deficit. Nh. fine tuning role designed to aehiava 6-7i nominal GMF in which raal output eipanda y~T.11 per annun and fnflation r.Mln in a range" of 3.5 - <..H. In ihe'long-lerm. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis gictumge Bate Target Zo abandoned because of two major defects. First, the trade surplus by 1992-1993. In recent weeks, the dollar has rallied because of foreign hand marksts this year (Oenaark, lustr-sll*, Canada, France, in* the U.S.) greater global convergence in the_ prices of tfadeable gp ets througl: ally any good arguments for establishing adjustment after 19 ould argue that the balance of payments would have be Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis still enact the provision requiring the Treasury to auaMirregular testimony about balances ttia groups. New iaeri exchange rate target zones with the najor components of U.S. scononio policy defin Indus Treasury has been reluctant to provide auah information in the past because it was United ange might rally although every government is entitled to make Its share of mistakes, the deterioration in the conduct of the 0.3, Treasury's international econoolc policy ompe ong ing that inclu i m t courage more efficient resource allocation not only in this country but in the to gu. after 19"I5, the Anerlcan people have often been uncomfortable with managed exchange ratesystems because of fears that they would force this country to import n'real' te^ms'io ustain a ^KriB? Ir'ade" /info It* an" ca conservatives who favored maintaining nonetary links to Britain via the gold gridlock in federal standard and western populists who favored an autonooous domestic monetary system baaed on bl-metallism. In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt torpedoed efforts to stabilize Mehange rates in order to raise domestic prices and zake a clear break with Herbert help to lessen the danger of the imerlcan people believing that a(change rates night ing that olent uphea o.s. U.S. prospects, although no one is yat calling George Bush the Hanehurlan candidate of ty and Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 43 U.S. during (989 if it painful policy choices uhich 118 ahead. > the gold In 1896. but By Mr. Bush's unreported sue in the "G-7 Primary". of autonomy cherished by domestic policy making agencies, such 33 the Tr the Federal Reserve. Management of the exchange fate is by con Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 44 Rill Business Cycle Urwth HitM CoMOund Mnul ntei ov«r ipuiHai ptriadi taring Eipusiooi 1950-88:1 1170-68:1 34;2-37:3 SB:2-W:2 ilsl-WM 70:4-73:4 75il-B»!l 80:1-31:3 B2:4-88:l Bff 3.3 2.7 3.4 4.9 4.1 4.4 4.1 3.1 4.2 Final Sain 1.3 2.7 1.1 4,2 4.2 1.9 3.9 1,3 3.5 DOMltic Final Sites 1.4 2.B 1,1 4.1 4.4 3.7 3.B 2.3 4.2 IIK Ftdffil Sptndinq.... 3.4 3.0 4.1 4,1 4.6 4.7 4.0 2.0 4.4 Consuiptio 3.4 3.0 3.? 4.4 4.4 4.1 .3.7 l.B 3.B Durabln 4.3 5.0 4.2 B.I 7.1 11.4 4.1 5,3 B.I NonduratlK 2.3 1.9 J.8 1.4 3.4 2.1 2.9 0.4 2.3 SiftitM 3.* 3.* 4.0 1.7 4.8 4.0 1.9 1.8 3.7 Businni Fiied Invntidit... 4.0 3.4 1.7 i.l t.i 7.? t.f B.7 6,4 Equipimt 4.8 4.B 4.7 f.b B.4 11.1 7.4 3.4 10.4 Structuris 2.3 0.7 4.1 2.9 4.3 3.0 5.9 H.t -1.5 R»si«ntiil Fiitt Inmtint 2.3 3.2 0.3 10.4 1.1 8.] 7.7 -3.1! 10.1 SingU Faitly 1.4 B.6 -0.2 7.7 7.It -1.1 H.4 IWti-fnill -1.7 7.? 12.2 11.? i.l 4.8 2.B Eiports 3.8 5.7 B.f 9.0 t.2 12.4 B.9 2.0 6.? ten-i^ 3.? 11.3 i.9 -1.9 11.1 Iton-MrchiRiliu i.l 3.i 10.7 3.1 7.0 14.B 12.1 10.4 1.0 Iiportt 1.3 4.1 4.B 4.1 8.T 9.4 7.T 12.7 12.4 Km-iiil 7.3 i.2 9.4 14.1 1S.4 Non-wtbutiu i.3 t.3 7.0 -1.8 1.1 -1.3 B.3 20.1 9.6 Stitf I Local Sort. SotAdiag 3.7 2.1 1.7 t.O 3.0 1.1 1.3 -1.4 3.3 Fidiril Sovt. Spmtfinq 2.8 0.9 -3.0 -0.6 2.8 -4.9 1.3 3.S 2.1 D«4«iM O.f J.I !.3 ttnn-diftnu 2.8 7.1 -7.4 Induitfiil Frttatim *.l S.O b.l 1.7 i.i 7.3 5,9 5.9 5.7 GXP DHlitor 4.4 1.1 3.3 2.2 I.l 4.2 7.3 1.7 3.1 CrnfuNT Pfict Indd 4.3 i.4 1.3 1.1 !.4 3.0 8.3 10.6 3.1 Praductr Prici Indu 3.7 3.1 8.3 8.3 0.9 1. The post-1932 business expansion has been characterized by tha _strongest growth rate of domestic demand in tha post-war period except for the expansion which occurred during the Vietnam War. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 45 It'll i it P»l I lrn>*i tun* IfttHimrr ™" IfW* tn-tu [v«. fralil • lit, i CM it I HT11.14 1.11 11.11 I.M t.1 .It .It t.il .11 I.II 7.11 .11 i.n j toil I •. l-ti)l lull l.ll I.M -l.H .N .11 -l.ll -.71 -9.41 -1.11 - 71 l.ll 1.41 !>•<* I flit twill El»l rut i<Mk rut 1171i 4 IITSil IfMil IIMllItlhlHUH iniit FMtrtl M(*t MIC C I li I t n l il l l l i t i M l l 1 l H l L M H KI H | ! . t l t o o It f l i l i c ci i l iilSC -I.M J . . 1 1 L 1 1 - , l - . - H » l. .» ll "l l . . H ll - -I. l W .ll J .1 L 1 . - - l l . . t t - l I . l . l . l M il - - I 0 i . . M .0 n 3 -l J i . . J l n l L - - I 1 . l . M 1 . 1 ll - -i i i . . .i n n r - -9 M l. .1 ll 1 l il - I j 1 . * I . _ 1 I 9 or 1. 1 i.n 1.11 4.41 l.ll 11.19 I.N P L« r q i- l I i n i t l o . r t t , m f i r o T li i t ll • / l iw it . i l - c t u ll l u i ur l 1 .l . l 1 1 J .11 t 1 l. .2 H 1 1 l. .1 i 0 ! j . B It 1 I. .1 I - l M .ll l t I. . I i T l M I.II l t l. . l n l t l. . H n 41.1.111 1.i7.1a toil lout (oil. toil 1. 1 .11 -t.17 1.11 l.K .1! I.I -l.ll -4.91 -1.11 -Ml 1.71 I.N I.TI 1 H r-hill Ti*H 1. I .15 I.It i.n 1.11 .11 5.3, 7.M 9.79 11.19 1.19 19. « Ml J.It I.N -.M -l.ll -9.4t -I.H -1.71 4. II l.ll 1.11 The above table shows Che level of various economic policy Indicators at the peaks and ttooEha of the U.S. econony's post-war business cycles. Aa the chart illustrates, the U.S. has never entered a recession with such a large government deficit both in nominal terms and on a cyclically adjusted basis. Aa the ratio of long-term government bond yields to T-bill yields utll testify, most post-war recessions also have been preceded by yield curves which were much flatter than those which currently prevail. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 46 6/29/8B Savings I InvBitlent is « I <tf MP 1980 1«1 1982 19B3 lfB4 19B! 19B6 L9B7 19B8 19B? 1990 19?1 1992 16.2 17.1 M.I 116 13.1 13.2 12.6 12.6 11.3 1!.! 13.4 13.6 11.7 17.S IB.O 17.6 11.4 17.9 16.6 16.1 15.0 15.5 15.4 15.3 1S.2 15.: i n 1 7 DcfirKiation 11. 1 11.4 12.1 11.6 11.0 10.9 10.B 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.! 10.2 Bovirmcnt Surplus -1.3 -1.0 -J.I -3.S -2.S -I.J -3.5 -2.4 -2.2 -2.1 -1.9 -1.6 -1.1 Ftdiril -Z.I -I.t -4.i -5.1 -*.5 -4.9 -4.B -5.4 -l.l -S.I -S.4 -1.8 -2.7 14.3 17.2 U.I n.a 1S.2 13 J IZ.t 12.5 13.1 13.3 13.4 13.6 13.7 Brest Priv. DoMst. Invest 16.0 li.9 14.1 H.7 17.6 li.O is. a 16.0 16.1 IS. 9 13.7 15.3 15.B Priv. Dottstic Invest , 16.1 li.l 14.9 13.0 15.8 15.3 15.5 13.0 15.2 15.1 15,0 15.1 1S.1 IDDMS. Fi««d Invest 11. B 12.1 11.6 10.3 11.0 11.0 10.3 9.9 10.2 10.! 10.2 10.2 19.2 Oiinqc in Bui. Inventories -O.I O.B -O.B -fl.2 l.B 9.2 0.4 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 Mrt Fortign InvMtiiBt 0.5 0.3 0.0 -1.0 -2.4 -2.9 -3.4 -1.5 -1.0 -2.6 -2.3 -2.1 -2.1 statistical diicnpucr 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Addendui: Fidinl Surplus -2.2 -2.1 -4.6 -5.2 -4.5 -t.9 -4.B -1.4 -3.2 -3.2 -3,0 -2.B -2.7 Exc. Social Security -J.fl -*.0 -4.1 -4.0 -4.0 -4.0 Sociil Security 0.4 O.B 0.9 1.0 1,2 1.3 3. The peraistance of large federal budget deficits will make it difficult to reduce the nation's external deficit unless personal savings rise sharply or private investment falls. On current policy assumptions, the current account deficit will shrink to 2.1Z of GHP but still exceed J100 billion in 1992. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Real Net Stock of Nonrss I dan 11 a I PMvoU Capital Manufacturing 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 Compound annual rate of growth it. The growth rate of the nation's manufacturing capital stock shrank in 1982- 1983 Tor the first time In the post-war period. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Capacity Utilization Rates By Industry Currant 1979 Averaga 1982 Average Tola! 83.7% 86 2% 72 I % Manufacturing I 83.0 84.6 70.3 Durables B1.1 B4.I 66,8 Stone, clay, glass 82.3 85.0 65-1 Primary metals 84.4 88.6 54.2 Fabricated metals 82.B 85.5 65.4 Non-electrical machinery 79.6 84.2 67.0 Eteclrical machinery 77.6 87.3 70.6 Motor vehicles & parts 80.9 7&2 54.3 Non-aulo trans. 87.fi 82.8 72.1 Instruments 80.3 87.3 81.8 ^ OD Non-durables 85.7 85.3 75.4 Food 80.4 82.7 77.4 Textiles 90.fi 86.7 716 Paper 95.4 89.8 82.6 Chemicals 84.9 81.7 68.5 Pelroleum 88.7 86.4 72.0 Rubber & plastics 88.5 86.0 73.3 5. fca a result of weak manufacturing investment during th« early 1960's, the export boom la creating capacity constraints in some industries. Delivery tinea rose sharply during June. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis New P*E Expenditures by Business - Conraorelol k Other QS a % of GNP n • o i-j Z on "0 • B i- H- (Bl VO 3 1» CO 0! (- O B n 3 - D- fc < O B It • 3.4--T- i , | i i . i i I I I i ' ' ' • ' 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 B8 88-1 4 88*2 based on plannod expenditures published 2 quarter moving average by the BEfl. flcs;uUm»eeQd S(J..33Si aGnf.P- geir-oDn»it:hi iInn i1ist t .A j2.iinud Hq*'t r. . "o•f '<«> Investment in the economy's non-tradeable sectors boomed and is still growing at healthy pace. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 7/i/BB CurrMCir BrtakdoMi of RtpurUni luki' EiUria) Pofitiont m-a-m the Hoi-lak Sit tor SMianiwal (killiMi at U.S.loll art) '» ...p If 77 I17B 1771 HBO I1BI 1)82 11B3 1984 If83 IfU 1187 Liabilities I II I II I II I 11 I II 1 II 11 1 11 1 II 1 11 I II ' Banks in Industrial RtporUai. CauiUntsi A) Foreign Currenciti 43.2 41.8 B1.7 112.3 113.7 153.1 14!.? 144.5 173.0 18?. 8 I14.B 113.3 1?1.3 111.2 214.3 222.5 231.0 244.1 Other 12.3 16.8 22.7 27.? 2S.f 10.1 28.1 11.4 29.8 31.7 33. S 32.4 37.1 4B.O 44.0 81.0 100.4 124.1 Total 57.3 7B.6 112.4 140.4 IS?. 4 IBM 111.3 IfS.f 204. B 221.3 228.3 223.7 232.2 247.2 2B0.3 305.5 331.4 3if.B Ratio 3.7 3.2 4.0 3.8 8> DoMttic Cur rent ill c o n toll an 23.3 43.4 41.2 33. i 41.5 45.0 44.7 48.8 71.4 73.2 if. 3 71.0 Othtr 40.2 40.1 17.3 43.1 41. J 44.1 48.3 43.0 74.0 81. 1 14.3 116.0 Total 45. S 13.7 84.7 f7.1 104.0 10?. 8 115.2 131.8 143.4 154.3 163.6 187.0 Ratio 0.4 C) Total Currnit i« Dollars 17B.4 207.1 224.2 243.4 238.3 261.0 24B.O 283.7 215.7 108.3 113.1 Ottiir 70.3 71.7 (7.3 73. Z 7B.O 77.2 84.4 111.0 140.0 164.3 114.7 240.1 Total 24B.f 27».i 211.3 JIB.* 314.1 113.5 347.4 17f.O 423.7 460.0 303.0 554. B Ratio 2.3 J 1 1.3 1.2 3.3 1.1 1.0 2.4 2.0 1.8 l.i 1.3 ECU'I O.t 0.8 2.1 3.2 l.i 3.2 3.7 4.6 Saurcti Bint for InterMtiwial Settltitflti Plonetary ( Econo*ic Dept. 14. The sharp decline In the dollar share of offshore bank deposits owned by non-bank investors suggests that caplcal flight from the dollar may also have depressed the growth rate of the domestic money aggregates. While the Fed does not collect data on domestic residents' foreign currency balances, the protracted decline in the dollar has probably encouraged a shift out of dollar deposits. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Weighted Ind«x of World H3 Gro«th X chonga year-ago 1982 13B6 Heights' U.S. 40X, U.K. 5X. Germany 231, France 7%. Japan 25X (Thru Mar. '881 15. while u.s. money growth declined during 196? and early 1988, It accelerated in other countries partly because of central bank intervention to stabilize our exchange rate. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis till Itil lit) litl III! IM «il IM Mil Nil Mil Nit If 11 till ItiJ IM Nil Mtl f*tl Hi 4 lltl Ilil till fill Ilil till fill Hi« 1.1. CvtMl fccl. <uu«. ID -III -113 -Ml •!» -IM -111 -IM -IS* -IW -IM -1H -III -IU -IU -114 111 -IB -l» -|U -111 -1*4 -141 -HI -l« -lit -IU -1» -l» Mil IM. It lilHol •ilk H I iilirmtiM 471 ]M 117 Ul 411 Ml Ml H* IM M HI 111 Ml til I,M7 I,HI 1,171 |,IH l,l» l,m 1,1*1 I.1H 1,171 I.M4 1,117 l,l» 1,4*4 1,411 rilh 9* 1 litirmtiH «1 304 117 111 UI 411 4* m H* IN 141 HI I.Mi I,MI 1,111 I.1M I,U1 1,111 1,3" I.HI 1.M1 1.11' I .Ml I,Hi I,7H I,J» 1,1*1 1,U1 •m n i iitifiHiiM vi SH MI ut ui ui Ht m u* nt i,*n i,m i,i» i,m I,M* i,m i.oj i,s» i,Mr i.tn I.IM i,iu i,m i,w i,ui i,i» i,m i,m •itk IM t titHiMttM III SM 5H Ml ill Ul M W* N* t7l I,MI 1,114 1,191 l,W l,4lt I,Mi I,MJ 1,141 1,141 I,t4t l,*ll 1,111 1,111 1,111 I,tU 1,111 1,*1! 1,IU UH Mil Mil Mil I'll I'll I'll III! Nil Mil Mil UK Mil Hil Nil Hi4 Mil Mil Htl Wt< IUI lltl lltl lilt 11)1 11*1 lltl Hit U.I, CvrMl fcct. IHU«. Ill -14.* -14.1 -11.1 -IU -II.' -H.I -II.) -1.7 -1.1 1.1 1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -I.I -1.1 1.1 I.I 1.1 5-1 1.1 1.1 1.) 1.7 M 1.1 T.I 1.1 (•til In. It l*i«w) ritk M I ultrtMtiM II.I 11.1 It.r 11.4 11.1 11.1 «,1 41,1 ll.t IM U.I IV< U.» l».l H.I H.I IS.I tl.t II. 1 11.J 11.1 tl.l tl.t II.1 II.* l*.7 11.3 l*.l •itk HI lit Mint IM ll.l 11.1 ll.r 11.1 11.1 ».l If.l 41.3 H.I ll.t H.I 73.' 11.1 11.) H.1 21.1 M.I M.I 11.1 Il.l IM U.I lit 11.1 It.) M.I 11.7 11.1 •ilk 791 litHiMtm li.l in ».i 11.1 il.f ll.l if.f 11.9 IM M.I 4).i 34.1 n.* n.i it.r n.i 14.1 n.l 11.) n.< 11.1 ».* ii.f ll.l ll.l ll.l li.l ll.l ri» IM i uitrmdH 11.1 11.1 it.r 11.1 11.1 ii.i it.t ii.i ti.i M.I 11.1 u.i 11.1 »-• il.t u.i ii.i n.t IM a.i n.* n.i IM M.* 11.1 11.1 IM 11.1 MMMl rtlt »l ftplttk 16. This table shows the potential growth rate of world foreign exchange reserves IT central banks have to finance 25*, 50K, 75* and 100* of the U.S. current account deficit. It would be possible for central banks to finance a Bodest portion of the current account without losing control of their domestic money supplies, but financing on a scale equal to last year's could lead to a repeat of last October's bond market crisis and stock narket collpaae. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Prices of lnter»«di«t« goods less food and energy hava risen sharply during the past year. Finished goods prices are trending higher but at a gradual pace. Producer Price Indexes 6 month annual rote of chanc Intvn«diate Good* !*ss Food * Energy Finished Goods lagged 6 months (line) less Food * Energy (dot) CC •-•I—h--r —i—t- 197B 1977 1978 1973 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Nonfinanciol Cor-por-ot* Profits *lth IVfl Wholesale ft Retal I ( Mna) ManufacturIng (dot) as a X of Total Nonflnonclol as o X of Total NonfInonclal 54 5E 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 B6 88 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Foreign Direct Investment !n U.S. plus Purchases of U.S. Corporate Equities as a X of GNP 2.0— B I BB B -o rt H » a 3o ^h- 0.0 63 64 65 66 67 68 59 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 63 84 85 86 67 4 qtr. moving average Foreign direct investment and equity purchases rose sharply during the first half of 1987, but they have receded during recent quarters as foreigners scaled back their exposure to the LJ. S. stock market. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Rfter-tax adj. Nonfin. Trade weighted U.S. Profits as I GNP ( line dolIan (dot) > 4.5 -150 4.0 » m i-» 1 rHr - io —130 *H n> - a y > 3B a H- ea s a i n K n a- O » f 1 rr -oBn •< »B 1» y- : _- ft m a n *a M o> 00 V ft » o O 5 " CD (D •* C " 2,0- 1980 1961 1982 1383 1984 4. The dollar rally of the early 1980's co-incided with a 4 qtr. moving average sharp rise in the profit share of GNP resulting from tax policy and paycuts. Now the profit share of GNP is falling, Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 11. -The decline la profits c*u»d by t»x reform ha« probably also weakened the •c.onomj'a tolertnce for high real intireat rat«>. Trade weighted U.S. do I I or (dash ) > 198-1 qtr. moving overage The rise in the profit share of GNP also increased Che economy's Interest rate tolerance and permitted a sharp rise in real yields foe both short and long maturity instruments. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Ml Velocity compound annual rate of growth over 20 qtfs. I dot> w » tr i re Q, a 3- o. o. o M- rs e. n H- 60 62 S4 66 68 70 72 74 7B 78 80 82 84 66 88 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis M2 Velocity compound onnuol rate of growth over 4 qtrs. { IIne) over 20 qtrs. (dot) VI i "1 1 ' I 1 i 60 62 64 66 S3 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 60 The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hale. I want to thank all you gentlemen for excellent presentations. Mr. Fair, as you might expect, I can't resist starting off with you in view of the fact that you're telling us how we can predict elec- tions and we're going to know whether Bush or Dukakis is going to win—I should say the Dukakis-Bentsen combination versus Bush and Kemp or whoever he picks—how they're going to make out. It's awfully disillusioning for those of us in politics that hear anybody, particularly a skilled professional such as you are, can say that you can forget the personalities, you can forget all the issues that we work so hard on and believe so deeply in, forget the deficit, forget everything, as long as you get the combination \Vz years before the election or 2 years before the election of relatively stable inflation or not much change in inflation and a substantial growth, then the election will be determined by those economic forces without reference to either the personality or the campaign or any of the other things that we focus on. And I must say, on page 3, you present us with some remarkable data that shows that in at least 14 of the 18 elections you came very close. I would say that in 1964 it failed. Somehow Goldwater versus Johnson was missed by 7 percent and in 1924 and in 1928 and 1944 the miss exceeded 3 percent, so that you might argue that that wasn't too accurate. But in all the others it was remarkably close. In 1980, for in- stance, you hit it exactly right on the nose and in the others you came within 1 percent or so of predicting how it would turn out. Now you tell us, however—boy, this is something—now you tell us that in 1988, which is what we really are concerned about, you can't tell us. It's too close to call. Is that right? Mr. FAIR. Well, Senator, this is not deterministic. In any equa- tion in economics, there are factors that we don't account for. They are what we call error terms, things that affect, in this case, votes that are not in the equation, that are not in the economic equation. The CHAIRMAN. But this equation did predict 14 out of 18 elec- tions. Mr. FAIR. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. And it predicted 17 out of 18 within a little over 3 percent. Mr. FAIR. Right. On average, it makes an error of about 3 per- cent is what I'm saying. So that politicians should not be dismayed. If the predicted vote is within 3 percentage points, then there's hope because on average this is what the error is. So if I'm predict- ing 48.2 percent for the Republicans, that's a very close election and there are truly other factors that affect the votes other than the economy and that affects about 3 percent of the total. The CHAIRMAN. But you're saying, rightly or wrongly, regardless of how you arrived at it, that if you get the growth and inflation, it may in the long run—the policies may be terrible—I think they are now. They couldn't be worse. We have a terrific national debt. We have a terrific household debt. We have an enormous business debt. I can see nothing but grief for our economy in the future. You're saying the public doesn't care about that. All they care about is what's happened over the last IVa years. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 61 Mr. FAIR. That's what the evidence seems to indicate, yes, that they care about GNP growth and inflation. There's not any evi- dence that they care about the debt, as one can find it. The CHAIRMAN. Now let me say one of the reasons we asked you gentlemen to testify, of course—the principal reason—is because to- morrow we're having the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board testify and we wanted to get the most expert testimony we can so that we could evaluate that testimony we're going to get tomorrow and determine whether it's sound or whether we should criticize it and so forth. Now let me review what you've said very quickly. Mr. Blinder, you have indicated that you think the Federal Reserve Board's monetary policy is about right. Mr. BLINDER. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Dornbusch, you say it's about right maybe but it may be becoming a little too tight, slowing the economy. Is that right? Mr. DORNBUSCH. I'm expressing the fear that next year the Fed- eral Reserve will feel like making a recession unless Congress moves on the budget. All of the problems are next year, not right now. FED CAN PREVENT RECESSIONS The CHAIRMAN. Well, are you telling me that the Federal Re- serve somehow can prevent recessions from occurring? Mr. DORNBUSCH. Certainly. They did last fall. The CHAIRMAN. Well, once in a while, but are you saying that if we have the proper Federal Reserve Board policies we will never have another recession? Mr. DORNBUSCH. I certainly didn't come close to saying that. But they did last fall in a very, very critical situation do an extraordi- nary job avoiding a recession, yes. The CHAIRMAN. But if we're going to have a recession, is it not possible to argue that it's better to take the recession as soon as possible if in taking the recession you reduce spending and increase taxes and reduce the deficit and move the household sector and the business sector into a more sound and stable position? Mr. DORNBUSCH. That is exactly what I'm saying, that we should have fiscal restraint, not recession, and not Federal Reserve reces- sion because a Federal Reserve recession would be extremely The CHAIRMAN. You distinguish between recessions? Mr. DORNBUSCH. Certainly. A Federal Reserve recession tests all the financial fragility in a particularly difficult way. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fair, I don't think you made a judgment as to the Federal Reserve Board's monetary policy. Mr. FAIR. I said somewhere I thought they should be given sub- stantial credit for the past performance of the economy. So basical- ly I would agree with Alan Blinder that the Fed policy has been about right. I would hope, as I said, that for next year that Congress and the administration could lower the deficit some and that the Fed would then perhaps ease up to counter the negative effects of that on the economy. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 62 The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Hale? Mr. HALE. I would concur that the Fed has had a good policy over the last 9 months. It began to tighten last autumn in response to the threat of inflation and after the stock market crash it eased very quickly. I think it pleasantly surprised the market by tighten- ing so aggressively in the face of the resurging economy and grow- ing inflation pressures this spring. But I think over the next year the challenge facing the Fed be- cause of these twin deficits, because of the need to maintain a very modest growth rate, and also to close the very large trade deficit, will overtax the capacity of the Fed unless it has help from fiscal policy. I think a monetary policy recession, as Mr. Dornbusch indicated, would be very destructive. We have large levels of debt. We have a serious crisis in our deposit insurance companies. We already have a large Federal deficit. I think a recession next year is not a viable policy option, but I'm afraid the alternative to that, if we don't get a fiscal policy change, would be an inflation rate heading toward 6 percent and bond yields well above 10 percent. The CHAIRMAN. You say it's not a viable policy option to have a recession next year? Mr. HALE. All policy choices obviously are a question of tradeoffs and I think the tradeoffs of a recession next year would be so de- structive and so destabilizing that it is not an attractive policy choice at all. I would rather live with 5 or 5.5 percent inflation for the next year if we could get significant fiscal policy progress than to try and have the Fed crunch the economy. The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Senator Bond. Senator BOND. Thank you, Mr, Chairman. It probably comes as no surprise that I don't share the chagrin just expressed over the prospects for the parties, given the contin- ued relatively low inflation rate and the strong growth in GNP. I suggest that perhaps we realize that we're limited in our ability in Congress to mess up the economy and if the people of the United States are interested in low rates of inflation and strong growth rates that we perhaps ought to adjust our policies to achieve those and I particularly appreciated the comments that all of you have made about the need for us in Congress to do something about the deficit. I'd like to move to a sort of related area that has interested me. I have seen some knowledgeable economists who are saying that one unintended effect of the increased internationalization of our debt is the fact that the international bondholders, the people who are putting the money into finance our excesses, are controlling inter- est rates and to some degree exercising through the market mecha- nism the role that we traditionally expect the Federal Reserve to exercise in monetary policy. At least one has said that this fine-tuning may prevent monetary policy from bringing about a recession because it makes continuing responsive changes in interest rates and money supply. I'd like to ask if any of you have comments on that, to what extent you think that international markets really are playing an Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 63 increasing role rather than the Federal Reserve in our monetary policy. INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL MARKETS Mr. BLINDER. Well, there's no doubt truth to the idea that bond markets are increasingly internationalized and what goes on not only in the United States, but also in Zurich and lots of other places, affects our interest rates and also Switzerland's interest rates. I think it's easy to exaggerate the effect on monetary policy. The idea that monetary policy is now in the hands of the gnomes of Zurich or the gnomes of somewhere else is easy to exaggerate. To some significant extent, these people are trying to guess what the Federal Reserve, and also the Bank of Japan, and other central banks, are trying to do. So I think it's proper to think that the re- sponsibility for and the authority over monetary policy still rests with the world's central bankers and not with the world's bond traders. Mr. DORNBUSCH. I would add to it that the short-term interest rates are determined by the monetary authorities. The only way world capital markets get into the act is if the monetary authori- ties have exchange rate targets. Then the decline in the dollar would force an increase in interest rates through tighter money. So if we get exchange rate targets, then we would affect monetary policy. Today we are doing exactly the opposite with very strong ex- change rate targets and that's behind the dollar appreciation a sub- stitute for raising interest rates. Mr. FAIR. I have nothing to add. I agree with that. Mr. HALE. I would concur and again just to restate what I said in the very beginning, we've always had some international compo- nents in interest rates but we now have more capital mobility in the world economy than at any time since before 1914. Because of the depression and the two world wars we had restrictions on cap- ital mobility and the financial markets were quite insulated. I think the current financial environment in the United States is highly anolagous to the 1890's when we were importing capital from Britain. In fact, if you look at our external debt in terms of GNP you will see that Ronald Reagan and his successor will have taken us on a 100-year roundtrip. By 1992-93, our external debt or foreign investment here will be about 21 percent of GNP, which is exactly what it was in the days of Grover Cleveland. In that period, changes in foreign capital flows were a major influence on our stock market and interest rates. In fact, all the great bear markets of the late 19th century were grounded on exchange rate uncer- tainty and changes in British capital flows. As with the stock market crash last year, 1 think again we're going to see foreign flows are quite important for some time to come. Senator BOND. Let me follow up on that by starting off with you, Mr. Hale. We have all seen the stock market crash of October 1987 fail to predict the crash in the economy this year. Is there a weak- ening of the linkage between the financial markets, between Wall Street and Main Street? Is this an aberration? Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 64 Mr. HALE. I would say that the crash was very badly interpreted by the New York financial community back in the winter. In my opinion we were heading for very high interest rates in the United States because of the danger of rising inflation. Because of the breakdown in the arbitrage system between the stock market and the futures market, we had a compression of that financial adjust- ment process into a 1-day collapse called Black Monday. I believe it's very hard to have a recession in a country that's had a big cur- rency depreciation unless you have severely restrictive fiscal and monetary policy. We didn't have that. I think the major error made by Wall Street in particular last winter was not to recognize the linkage, that in fact the real concern of the market was not recession but inflation leading to higher interest rates triggering recession at some point combined with the gigantic technological accident. Mr. FAIR. The stock market went up substantially in the first half of 1987 and then crashed later and now has come back up again. The net effect on consumption and spending is not that large, looked at from more than just a 3-month period. From the start of January 1987, the wealth effect has not been that substan- tial. So you wouldn't have expected much of an effect on consump- tion, and we certainly haven't seen it. Mr. DORNBUSCH. I agree. Mr. BLINDER. Let me just add one more thing. You're hearing this with the wisdom of hindsight, to be sure, for a lot of us had some fears in the fall. It wasn't only politicians, but also econo- mists who had some fears about what the stock market crash might do to the economy. With the wisdom of hindsight, however, one thing we can see that made a big difference is that, as the stock market fell, the bond market rose and interest rates fell. Looking now on the investment side of the coin rather than on the consumption side, both markets influenced the average cost of busi- ness capital. The expected effect on investment, given the adverse movement of the stock market and the favorable movement of the bond market, was not that great. That's not something a lot of people were saying on October 19; but, in retrospect you can see that was so. Senator BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sasser. Senator SASSER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have an opening statement which I would like to have printed in the record as if read. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be printed in full in ute record. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM SASSER Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that you are convening the commit- tee for our biannual look at monetary policy and the state of the economy. I think that we are at an important point. The economy appears to be performing at a better than expected level. And naturally we Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 65 are already hearing the calls for a tightening up, lest inflation rear its head. Well I think we need to wait on a tightening up. There is too much fragility in the financial system. Indeed, there is too much danger that a tightening up could eventually cause a recession. A recession would be a disaster. The fiscal situation would be in- tolerable. The savings and loan crisis would reach astronomical proportions. Any increase in rates now I remind the committee will only exacerbate the condition of the thrifts. So I think we need to see some solid evidence of a pick up in in- flation before rates go up. Wage and price increases are moderate. The relatively low unemployment rate does not necessarily mean the economy is heating up. I look forward to today's testimony. It seems to me that given the fragility of the financial system at the present and our fiscal imbalance that we ought to be trying to avoid a recession almost at all costs. Quite frankly, it appears to me that the Federal Reserve is peopled with determined inflation fighters who see inflation where it may not be there and they could very well trip off a recession. We already have a fiscal deficit hovering at around $150 billion annually and I don't see any realistic estimates of any major im- provements in that. We have a thrift crisis which could cost us up- wards of $60 billion to resolve. The commercial banks are carrying large portfolios of nonperforming loans from the less developed countries, energy loans that aren't performing, agricultural loans that aren't performing, and the banks may soon be carrying large portfolios of nonperforming leveraged buyout loans as well, from what I'm reading. Now it appears to me that a recession would greatly magnify these problems. It would certainly make the S&L crisis much, much worse. And I fear, when we got into this recession that Con- gress would have no ability, and the administration would have no ability, to conduct a countercyclical fiscal policy because we just wouldn't have the money. We're broke. Indeed, there probably would be pressure to cut spending and raise revenue ala 1930-31. It appears to me in this scenario that the Federal Reserve has an ab- solutely critical role. I think we need to be encouraging lower in- terest rates right now rather than constantly searching for the slightest signal of an uptick inflation. All we've been hearing in the past week is that the economy is overheating and that interest rates need to be raised. There's spec- ulation the Fed will up the Federal fund rates this week. Now given the danger of recession, why don't we wait for more solid evidence of inflation before we rein in our monetary policy? Am I right or wrong in my assessment here? And I'd like to hear from this distinguished panel what their views are. Why don't we start with you, Dr. Blinder, and see what you have to say about this observation. RECESSION Mr. BLINDER. Well, I very much agree with what you said, as I tried to hint in my testimony. A recession now or next year, espe- Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 66 cially if induced by monetary restrictions, would indeed exacerbate a lot of the problems that you alluded to. And I agree 100 percent that it's pie in the sky to think that we could have a timely fiscal offset given that the hypothetical recession we're talking about would push the Federal budget deficit to $250 or $300 billion. So I don't think we would get stimulus from the budget. Hence, I think this is a scenario to be avoided. I also think there is a tendency— I'm happy to say for a change, for I don't think it has been histori- cally true, but for a change, the tendency to get hysterical over the slightest indication of inflation now seems much stronger on Wall Street than it does at the Fed. That hasn't always been the case. But I think this particular Fed seems to be more recession-averse than previous Boards of Governors, more so, say, than the average over a long period of history. And hence I think we have some reason to think, based also on their past performance, that this group is not likely to be panicked into pushing us into a recession at the slightest hint of inflation. I certainly think that's what they should be doing, and I think maybe that's what they would be doing. Senator SASSER. Does anybody else wish to address this? Mr. DORNBUSCH. I'd like to comment, too. I think the problems for the Federal Reserve is to get a live economy to the next admin- istration so they certainly must do everything to avoid a recession in the second half of this year since that would make fiscal correc- tion entirely impossible. After that, they have done most of the work and the burden will be on Congress to change the fiscal policy and if that does happen the Federal Reserve must assist with an accommodating monetary policy that permits a slowdown but avoids a recession. So two parts—one until Christmas by no means recession, and after Christmas to sit on the next administration hard. I do think we cannot say today that inflation is not the issue. If you go back to the Economic Report of the President of the 1960's and read it year by year, you would think you were in the 1980's. We're exactly in 1968. There's absolutely no question. The uncomfortable part is that inflation is rising so slowly that it isn't dramatic and that one can believe there is no problem. Mr. FAIR. Well, just quickly, we should distinguish between a re- cession and tight money. If it's the case that we have a big export boom because of past falling of the dollar and the economy other- wise remains strong and fiscal policy continues to run very large deficits, it may simply be that we are overheating because fiscal policy is not cooperating. In that case, I would think what we would have to have is a tight monetary policy. That doesn't have to lead to a recession. It's just a change in the mix in the opposite way than most of us want, but it will be a policy to try to keep the economy from booming more than it should. That doesn't have to imply a recession but it may in fact imply tight money. Mr. HALE. I would just add that the Fed's current policy mode is very much one of fine-tuning. We are not looking at a repeat of the policies we had under Arthur Burns in 1974 and Paul Volcker in 1981 as a consequence of high inflation, you can measure that by looking at real short term interest rates which are currently at 2 and 3 percent, which is the lowest level in this decade. I don't sense any support either in this town or in the country as a whole for Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 67 severe monetary crunch because inflation is now under control, but also, as Dr. Dornbusch indicated, the preconditions for inflation are certainly in place and therefore this fine-tuning policy could re- quire further moderate upward adjustments in interest rates but the stress would be on moderate and not a repeat of the sledgeham- mer of 1981-82. Senator SASSER. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Graham. Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There have been some traditional relationships that have been looked at in terms of growth levels of GNP, inflation and unem- ployment which are balanced in order to achieve a stable economy. These tend to infer that we are an island that is unaffected by ex- ternal events, a fact which we know to be wildly inaccurate. To what degree do we need or are we adequately incorporating external economic events in our traditional patterns of domestic monetary policy? EXTERNAL ECONOMIC EVENTS Mr. BLINDER. Well, that's a good question to ask Mr. Greenspan. I think much more than previously everybody is keenly aware— sometimes it seems too aware—of the sensitivity of international capital flows. We have all been speaking about the export boom that's going on in the United States as a very major factor in thinking about what monetary policy should be doing now, and I think there's every reason to think that the Fed is also thinking about that. Should OPEC III occur any time soon—and nobody thinks that it will—the Fed and everybody else would quickly rec- ognize the international implications of that. So I think our eyes are watching the right places. That's not to say that we can predict and anticipate what's going to go on at all perfectly in these dimensions. Senator GRAHAM. One specific issue I heard some discussion that if given our current 5.3 percent rate of unemployment, which is de- fined as almost a full employment economy, that if the gross na- tional product rises above 2.5 or 3 percent that we may be facing the kind of inflationary pressures that I think Senator Sasser was concerned about. My reservation about that analysis is that that assumes that the additional consumption capacity which that GNP level above 2.5 or 3 percent infers is only going to be met with our own domestic economy and if it's at full employment ergo inflation must follow. It seems to me that that doesn't appear to adequately take into ac- count the fact that there is the rest of the world out there which is capable of producing products and services which could absorb that GNP growth. I think my question falls into the same gilt as Senator Sasser's, that we may be searching for phantoms upon which to justify a new surge of inflation and therefore potentially overreacting with some unanticipated negative consequences. Mr. DORNBUSCH. I think the policy you're advocating is exactly what is being done now. Getting the dollar up in order to slow down the growth of exports to have more goods available in the Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis U.S. economy for inflation fighting and we do that by borrowing abroad and we can do that for 1 year or 2 or 3 or 4. If we do it long enough you look like Mexico or Argentina. They have really fought inflation extremely well for 5 years. Then, of course, they had the huge collapse in the exchange rate. I think the risk today is to use a strong dollar for inflation fight- ing at the cost of slowing down the trade adjustment. And that's exactly as you describe it. You use foreign resources to fight infla- tion at home and there's lots out there providing we guarantee the exchange rate. Mr. FAIR. If we are at full employment roughly now, then domes- tic production can only grow at the rate of technical progress and labor force growth, which is about 3 percent, so that we could con- tinue without too much inflationary pressure to grow 2.5 or 3 per- cent domestically, but that's about it. If we want to consume more than that, we have to do what Mr. Dornbusch said. Senator GRAHAM. If Mr. Bush or Mr. Dukakis were to call you and ask you to do some anticipatory planning of what they should focus their attention on during the period from the election until January 20 in order to be prepared to deal with the most urgent economic issues of the new administration, what advice would you give them? Mr. FAIR. I think the fiscal policy needs to be contracted some, as most of us do. So I would argue for a tax and expenditure package that would lower the deficit substantially in the next 3 to 5 years, something that we have been trying to do for years without much success. I would say that's probably one of the top priorities for the new administration. Senator SASSER. Mr. Bush might hang up on you, Dr. Fair, if you talk about taxes. Mr. FAIR. I said tax and expenditure, perhaps I should have said tax on expenditure. Senator GRAHAM. Or in both the conjunctive and the disjunctive? Mr. FAIR. Right. Mr. BLINDER. I'd just like to say that most economists would say something similar and, as you say, most politicians would hang up on them when they say it. Mr. HALE. I'd like to say that we obviously have to address the fiscal problem through a 3 or 4 year program to have credibility in the financial markets. In the absense of that credibility there will be very severe shocks in terms of bond yields and the dollar within weeks after the new President is elected before he even takes office. In addition to that, on a more positive note, I would also want to begin negotiations with our major allies and trading partners on redeveloping the kinds of programs we had in the late 1960's to compensate the United States for its large international military and political role. Before the breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1971, this country pursued a program called the offset program with Ger- many, designed to compensate us for our military presence in Europe. It encompassed, agreement by the bundesbank not to con- vert dollars into gold, which would create downward pressure on the exchange rate. Second, the purchase by the bundesbank of U.S. Treasury bonds bearing below market U.S. interest rates as a quid Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 69 pro quo for our defense effort. Third, additional purchases of U.S. defense equipment by the German armed forces in preference over British or French equipment. Finally, direct subsidies to the U.S. military bases in the Federal Republic. I believe the G-7 process that began under Mr. Baker 2 years ago is now evolving inadvertently into a repeat of that offset program. In fact, you could describe the actions of the Japanese ministry of finance over the last year in terms of its currency intervention and the arm twisting of Japanese life insurance companies to hold onto our bonds even when yields are rising as a kind of informal offset program. As stated in my initial testimony, we have to go beyond this informal ad hoc agreement to something more substantive and comprehensive and I think that is an essential part not only of our adjustment process post election but also of the whole world coming to terms with America's resource constraints and potential overcommitment vis-a-vis its resources. Mr. DORNBUSCH. I would like to argue also for the fiscal issue as the main problem the next President should address and think about early, not because we are in a fiscal crisis—we certainly don't have one—but because the overheating of the economy at the current rates would bring a collision course between the Federal Reserve and the economy unless the budget gets moved. That may be a half a year or 12 months ahead, but when it does happen, just as in 1969, it is going to be extremely expensive because we have vulnerability today. I would add that there is virtually no professional economist that disagrees except people who are advising the candidates. The CHAIRMAN. Do they lose their professionalism because of that? Mr. DORNBUSCH. For them it's untimely to speak. The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Dornbusch, supposing the next President of the United States rolls up his sleeves and says, "Look, I've got 100 days," as Roosevelt had back in 1933, "I'm going to make them count. I'm going to do what I think is right. I m going to, if neces- sary increase taxes. I'm going to cut spending. I'm going to come in with a program that's going to cut this deficit down in a very few years to a balanced budget.' Do you have any confidence that the Federal Reserve Board could then follow a policy that would not result in a recession and a deep one? Mr. DORNBUSCH. I'm certainly totally confident that the Federal Reserve could do it and would do it. In fact, from the time of Volcker it's understood that the quid pro quo of budget balancing is that the Federal Reserve sustains growth in the economy. The CHAIRMAN. You don't have any confidence in McChesney Martin's observation that you can't push a string, referring to mon- etary policy. No matter what you do with interest rates, if you move into a depression caused by fiscal policy or whatever, the Federal Reserve can't make people borrow if the demand isn't there. Mr. DORNBUSCH. I see plenty of room on the net export side where easier monetary policy through a gain in competitiveness stimulates growth. We've had it this year and there's plenty of room left. It will force foreign countries to accommodate by being Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 70 more expansionary and once that is seen, domestic investment will take place. The CHAIRMAN. Now I see Mr. Hale nodding. How about you, Mr. Fair and Mr. Blinder, do you agree? Mr. FAIR. I would agree with that. Remember this is not a crisis. He's got 100 days to make a decision but it's a plan that would be spread out over 3 or more years and that's plenty of time for the Fed to adjust to the changing situation. There are lags and there are some uncertainties and it may be that for a variety of reasons one may have a slowdown, but I think that over that period of time the Fed clearly has the ability and the will to avoid a serious reces- sion. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Blinder. Mr. BUNDER. I agree qualitatively, but I'm not quite as confident in the Fed as Rudi Dornbusch is. He counts on the Fed much more unequivocably than I ever would. The other thing I want to add is that the fiscal contraction we're talking about is not such a cataclysmic event that it's guaranteed to tip off a recession. It's the kind of thing that can and should be done gradually. We're probably talking about something on the order of three quarters of a percent of GNP per year for 4 years, something like that. The CHAIRMAN. But what you're counting on is offsetting spend- ing by the private sector and borrowing by the private sector at a time when the private sector is up to its eyeballs in debt. Mr. BLINDER. Well, some of this will be coming from foreigners buying our goods. It's not mostly replacement by The CHAIRMAN. Let's get into that. Mr. Hale pointed out that the real interest rate is the lowest in this decade. Now at a time when we do have very, very high private debt and very high business debt and very low savings, it would seem to me that a low interest rate policy would tend to aggravate this situation. All you do is you shift the living beyond your means more heavily from the Govern- ment to the private sector, don't you? Mr. BLINDER. No. I think a low interest rate policy—remember, we're talking about compensatory monetary policy—a low interest rate policy is going to ease all of the debt crises while a spike in interest rates is going to exacerbate them greatly. The evidence is that the choice between savings and consumption is very insensi- tive to interest rates. So we wouldn't expect any large change in the consumption behavior of Americans. The CHAIRMAN. That may well be, but certainly home buying, spending on buying a home, spending on buying cars, is very sensi- tive to interest rate changes. If the interest rate is down, people will borrow money and buy homes or borrow money and buy auto- mobiles and so forth and if interest rates go up they tend to reduce that kind of spending and dissaving. Isn't that right? Mr. BLINDER. Yes, that's right. But I think that, given the state of the economy we have now, which is pretty near full employ- ment, a lot of that would be substitution from other types of sav- ings. Prices would adjust to make it so. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Blinder, let me ask you this. Is it interna- tional responsible policy to reduce the value of the dollar so that we can increase our exports and decrease our imports at a time Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 71 when we have 5.3 percent unemployment and in Europe it's 11 per- cent unemployment. They're practically at depression level in Europe. The strongest economy in Europe, Germany, has 9.5 per- cent unemployment. In Ireland, it's 20 percent. In Spain, it's 19 percent. In Italy, it's 14 percent. How responsible is it for us to in effect aggravate that kind of a situation when our unemployment is so low? Mr. BUNDER. Well, I think it's very responsible. I think the situa- tion in Europe is largely the Germans' doing and not our doing. To the extent that a further drop in the dollar, if we have a further drop in the dollar, serves as a swift kick in the pants to the Bundesbank, the entire world will be better off. The CHAIRMAN. I can see how the German policy would have that kind of effect on West Germany, but why should it have that much of an effect on the United Kingdom and on Italy and the other economies of Europe? Mr. BLINDER. Because the EMS is functioning more or less as a way to spread the German monetary policy all over Europe, be- cause the other countries have to more or less keep their curren- cies on par with the mark. The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree with that, Mr. Hale? Mr. HALE. I would say that the bundesbank is one factor but probably far less important than supply side factors such as labor market rigidities in the case of Britain and France, trade union rules, plant closure laws that make it expensive to create new jobs and hire people. There's a whole range of labor market policies in Europe which have been identified and amply documented in a number of studies and books which you can get right here in Wash- ington that explain that Europe's unemployment rate has been rising for over a decade because of these rigidities, and monetary policy has played a role but it's by no means the central part of the process. I would say the German monetary policy has tried to be responsible over the last few years in the face of barriers and prob- lems that are out of the bundesbank's control. Because of that supply side rigidity, I think that if we do, as it were, export more to Europe, we in fact will create circumstances that might lead to some policy changes that would lower unem- ployment. In fact, in the past year or two, the British economy has begun to improve quite dramatically not only in terms of growth but also unemployment because of changes in policy designed to correct these rigidities so that their unemployment now is ap- proaching that of the Eastern United States. Let me just amplify your previous question. The reason we need fiscal restraint is that we are resource constrained. None of us here are recommending a recession. What we're recommending is a long period of moderate growth reflecting full employment, which I think is the ideal outcome. The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Senator Sasser. Senator SASSER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Two comments. One, Mr. Hale was indicating that we ought to get back into an offset program with our allies around the world where they help offset some of our military expenditures. I think that certainly is happening, if I may comment on that—it's certain- ly happening with a vengeance. You have only to follow Secretary Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 72 Carlucci's travels to Japan and Assistant Secretary Taft's travels to Europe to see the stipulations that have been put on the appropria- tions bills here in the Senate requiring increased burden sharing on the part of our allies. So I think we're making a strong effort to move down that road for better or worse. BUDGET DEFICIT One quick question. Dr. Dornbusch indicated one of his com- ments that he said we certainly don't have any fiscal crisis in this country. You didn't mean to infer by that I'm sure that nonconcern about the budget deficit and are we overly concerned here in the Congress about budget deficits? Mr. DORNBUSCH. Well, the Congress is certainly not sufficiently concerned. Senator SASSER. We say the administration is not sufficiently concerned. Mr. DORNBUSCH. We do not have the problem that tomorrow morning bond buyers will not absorb what the Treasury issues in debt. The debt income ratio is rising very, very moderately. In that sense, there is no fiscal crisis and nothing will happen. There is a fiscal crisis because the economy is overheating and the right policy mix is low interest rates and a tight budget. With that policy mix, you can have another 5 years of growth. Without that policy mix, you will have problems and big problems from the financial side. Senator SASSER. Do we all agree that we would be better off with expansive monetary policy and a tight fiscal policy. Mr. DORNBUSCH. Yes. Mr. BLINDER. Certainly. Senator SASSER. While we've got all this brainpower here, Mr. Chairman, why don't we get them to do some of our work for us. We've got a problem here with the thrift industry. The General Ac- counting Office told us that their estimate of the deficit in the FSLIC is $30 to $40 billion, when they testified here a couple weeks ago. Now they're saying it's up an additional $10 billion. Some ex- perts are telling us that the liability of the FSLIC could be as much as $65 billion, whereas the best estimates of income over the next few years is about $20 billion. So we have a little shortfall there of somewhere in the neighborhood of $40 billion. RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT THE THRIFT INDUSTRY What would these distinguished economists—what recommenda- tions would they have to make to us or the incoming administra- tion about what to do with regard to the thrift industry? Who's going to pay this deficit? How should we handle it? Mr. DORNBUSCH. If this was LDC debt, you would say the Japa- nese. [Laughter.] Mr. BLINDER. I think in all likelihood, the taxpayer. The actions Congress will take will make the taxpayer pay for a lot of it. As you look toward the longer term, however, some reform of deposit insurance is probably—not probably, definitely—called for. There has been a well-documented tendency for teetering thrifts to lay off the risks on the taxpayer by going for broke; something needs to be Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 73 done about that. But that in no way is going to get us out of the current crisis. Another way to make the point you were making is to note that many of these thrifts would have negative net worth if they marked their portfolios to market today. That's the legacy of the past. That bill is, either gradually or quickly, landing in the tax- payers' lap. Senator SASSER. Well, you know we're fresh out of cash around here. Mr. BLINDER. You can print it, unlike the thrifts. Mr. HALE. I think there's no alternative but to have government relief paid for by the taxpayers in the short term, given the magni- tude of the problem. But I think this problem reflects a breakdown in our regulatory process. There's a lot said in this town today about financial deregulation and how it works its way through our business sector. Senator SASSER. I couldn't agree more. Mr. HALE. We're going to have to create a self-funding financial regulatory process financed by taxation on the financial sector which employs highly sophisticated, very highly paid, elite people who can stay on top of financial innovation or in this case the thrift industry financial fraud, and make sure it doesn't happen again in the 1990's. I cannot believe that over the course of the 1980's we actually reduced our Comptroller of the Currency's field examination staff by 10 percent. The conduct of financial regula- tion in this country in the 1980's has been a scandal. We need insti- tutional changes that are self-financing through industry taxation, like we do in other industries. Senator SASSER. One final question. My time has expired. But in our rush to deregulate the savings and loan industry and airlines and other matters, we've reaped a bitter harvest to a certain extent. Are we making the same mistake in moving down the line of deregulation of the banking industry? Does anybody on this panel want to express an opinion on that thorny question? Mr. HALE. There has to be deregulation because technology is changing, the world financial marketplace is changing, and there's no way that our banks can remain static because of the reduced cost of trading through computerization and the movement toward securitization globally as a consequence of these new capital asset ratios. We cannot stay in the past. What we need, though, as I indicated, is a new method of regula- tion funded in a more adequate way by taxation of the industry, but I would add with regulatory agencies staffed by very high qual- ity people. We can no longer have the kind of turnover, lack of pro- fessionals, that we've had in the 1980's continue into the 1990's be- cause the scope of the problem will get larger rather than smaller as we integrate our investment banks and our commercial banks and as they play not only a domestic role but also a global role. Senator SASSER. What do the academicians say about that? Mr. FAIR. I don't have much to add. The problem with the thrifts is that the regulation was the wrong kind; we were encouraging risk-taking on their part. That doesn't argue necessarily that we should stop deregulation. It just means that we want to make sure Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 74 whatever we do we don't impose these kind of regulations that en- courage this excessive risk-taking at the expense of the taxpayers. I would think that we should continue the deregulation at this point. Mr. DORNBUSCH. I would go in the same direction that you can't stop deregulation, but at the same time you have to add an enor- mous amount of new regulation that takes account of the activities that are being pursued now and much higher capital requirements in order to discourage the speculation on the taxpayers. Mr. BLINDER. I agree. The technology and world competition, which are interrelated, are driving us inexorably in this direction. I think the important thing for Congress to think of in writing new laws is the principle—and this is a principle, not a legislative pro- posal—that what needs to be done is to build a wall between the depositors and whatever kinds of equity involvement banks are going to have. Then whatever goes on on one side of the ledger does not jeopardize the safety of the deposits and, at the same time, doesn't just lay off these risks on the taxpayer. That would mean some pricing of deposit insurance to reflect the risks that are taken, or something like that, The CHAIRMAN. Senator Graham, Senator GRAHAM. Going back to my question of what you would put on the agenda for the next President during the period be- tween the election and inauguration, what would you recommend the new President commence planning for as it relates to the man- agement of Third World debt? THIRD WORLD DEBT I noticed Hobart Rowan in the Post on Sunday had a column which sort of did some second guessing of the recent Toronto Summit and was more critical than the initial stories, saying effec- tively the summit had brushed off the difficult issues and felt that the next summit of the new president was going to have an espe- cially challenging time with Third World debt being the most seri- ous and the most overlooked and unexamined and undealt with residue of the Toronto Summit. Mr. DORNBUSCH. I would say that certainly Third World debt is the major issue for our financial industry and politically for the United States. I think the trick is to find a solution that is not squarely on the taxpayer. The taxpayer is already in, but you do want to minimize that. My own view is that the best way to do it—and Mexico is prob- ably a good example—is to encourage the reinvestment of interest payments in the debtor countries forcing them in their budgets to actually make the payments but not to take them out in trade sur- pluses, but rather to reinvest them. In that way we make those economies financially viable again and draw in repatriation of their own capital. Then later—5, 6, 7 years, whatever—we can start taking the money out. If we fail to do that, then the taxpayer is in in a major way be- cause if Mexico today, after doing everything right—except the vote counting—does not have growth, then of course, there's a major political issue on our border. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 75 So recycling of interest payments, I think, is the most conserva- tive way and the best economic way of handling it. Bringing in the taxpayer is very hard to imagine given the size of the problem. I would add, if I may, that there is today enormous diversity be- tween countries. Brazil is messed up by poor domestic policy with the debt problem a minor issue in their high inflation, and Mexico by contrast all adjustments have been done. So I would not see that there's any room for a uniform, across-the-board solution, at least not a sensible one. Senator GRAHAM. Any other comments? Mr. HALE. Rudy's comments are correct. We cannot expect much in a large country like Mexico in the face of what they just experi- enced in their election and also the economic challenge that will lie ahead. Also, I would add that the stock market itself has made a major adjustment for these loans. The academic work suggests that the stock market is already effectively valuing them at half their ap- parent book value and therefore in a sense we've already had a major hit on bank shareholders. If we would divide up this discount or this loss among the various parties, we could perhaps get a benign outcome if we can get, as Rudy suggested, policies in the beneficiaries which are encouraging growth and to developing fi- nancial markets so as to get capital transfers not just in debt but through equity in the 1990s. Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, gentlemen, very much for an excellent lesson on what we should do in the next 4 years. We ap- preciate your testimony. [Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FEDERAL RESERVE'S SECOND MONETARY POLICY REPORT FOR 1988 WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 1988 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The committee met at 10:10 a.m. in room SD-538, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator William Proxmire (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Proxmire, Riegle, Dixon, Sasser, Shelby, Wirth, Graham, Garn, Heinz, D'Amato, Hecht, Gramm, Bond, and Chafee. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Chairman Greenspan, I apologize for my tardiness and the fact that other members will be late. There's a vote going on on the floor and members will come in later than they usually do. We're looking forward eagerly to this hearing this morning. It's a very, very important hearing for our committee and for the Con- gress. There are few things more critical with respect to our econo- my in the future than monetary policy and the policies adopted by the Federal Reserve. This morning Chairman Greenspan is before the committee to discuss the outlook for the economy and monetary policy. Chair- man Greenspan, the task of setting monetary policy in this high speed world of international capital mobility is a high wire act worthy of the great Walinda, and so far you seem to be a good rival for Walinda. The U.S. economy is undergoing a profound transformation from an economy based on consumption-led growth to an export-led growth economy. On the one hand, capacity utilization is high and labor markets are increasingly tight. Both of these indicators sug- gest that inflation is beginning to reemerge. Fears of more vigorous inflation and a precipitous decline in the dollar make easing of monetary policy quite risky. On the other side, huge accumulations of debt make our finan- cial system quite fragile. Business debt, Government debt, con- sumer debt of all sort in recent years and by almost any measure are very, very high. The debt accumulation, the crisis in the Sav- ings and Loan industry, problems of debt service in Latin America and the agricultural crisis combine to raise the costs associated with a further significant rise in interest rates. (77) Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 78 All appears calm at the moment. I fear that calm is precisely that—momentary. The dollar is rising despite our continued mas- sive trade deficits. The Federal Reserve has gradually raised rates since March and the last couple of trade statistical announcements have been good news. What will happen when the next disappointing trade number is announced? What will happen as institutional investors begin to reallocate their assets later this summer, each trying to beat the market to the draw before the new administration can change the course of macroeconomic policy? What I fear is that the overhang of problems on our economy and the Presidential election, when all six members of the Federal Reserve Board are Republican Reagan appointees, will lead the Fed to be insufficiently strong in fighting inflation. This lack of will to face inflation at the outset will not remedy our structural prob- lems; it will only postpone them. Having said that, let me say that yesterday we had four eminent economists and experts. We chose them because we thought they were among the most prestigious and highly respected economists in the country and experts in monetary policy and, in general, they gave you high marks. There were no criticisms of the conduct of the Federal Reserve to date. They also indicated that the book is pretty much in on monetary policy, that there's not much you can do now that's going to have much effect because of the lag before the election anyway. Avoiding a battle against an overheating economy will lead to a rise in inflation that will be very costly and painful to wring out of the system just as it was in the early 1980's. The difference is that next time we go through wrenching disinflation, we will do it on the back of all the financial problems that exist today. If the Federal Reserve does not show the resolve to keep infla- tion down, it will make things more comfortable temporarily, but in the long run we will all pay the price. An ounce of prevention is, in this case, worth a pound of cure. The Nation's economic vitality depends upon a coherent and stable monetary policy. To facilitate congressional oversight of the process and to provide greater information to the public on the for- mation of monetary policy I encourage the Federal Reserve to narrow the target ranges on its monetary policy projections. The law explicitly does not require the Federal Reserve to adhere to the publicized targets, so there's no cost to providing more precise esti- mates of your intentions. At the same time, precise targets give us better information on the Federal Reserve's intentions and a better way to measure the performance of the central bank after the fact. Market participants can make their plans with less uncertainty. Furthermore, at future hearings you can come back and explain any deviations from your projected path for monetary growth so we can all better under- stand this complicated process of monetary policy making. Senator Garn. Senator GARN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no opening statement. I'm pleased to have Chairman Greenspan here today and look forward to his testimony. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dixon. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 79 Senator DIXON. I'll place my statement in the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Dixon. I also have a state- ment from Senator Chafee to be inserted in the record. STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON Senator DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here this morning as the Banking Committee continues its oversight of mon- etary policy and other economic issues of crucial importance to our economic future. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the dis- tinguished Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Green- span. At the moment, we seem to have a sort of "good news, bad news" kind of economy. Unemployment is down to the lowest point in at least 14 years, our trade deficit is finally starting to go down, and economic growth is strong. However, persistent fears about a resur- gence of inflation seemingly cannot be put to rest. Our financial markets seem to fear every bit of economic good news; they find the black cloud behind every silver lining. There are those who claim that these fears are irrational, and that strong, noninflationary, GNP growth can continue indefinitely. I would like to believe that, but I cannot. We have serious structural problems that we must deal with if we are to ensure a sound eco- nomic future for our economy. We must bring Federal budget defi- cits under control and we must address the international balance of payments problems that have made the United States the world's largest debtor nation. Monetary policy cannot accomplish these tasks alone. If we con- tinue the kind of contradictory economic policies that have charac- terized our recent past, then it is only a question of time before in- terest rates begin to rise, inflation reoccurs, and economic growth evaporates. We have a strong, resilient economy that is capable of tolerating substantial abuse. But the economy's capacity to absorb the punish- ment caused by unwise economic policies is not limitless. The Fed- eral Reserve cannot reverse the damage caused by past economic mistakes by itself. The executive branch and the Congress must co- ordinate their efforts with those of the Fed if we are to prevent the economic day of reckoning that we will otherwise surely face. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN H. CHAFEE Senator CHAFEE. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to welcome Chairman Greenspan back to this committee. His decisions and ac- tions have been a helpful factor in keeping this country on an even keel. I salute him for that. Today's hearing, with Chairman Greenspan's commentary on U.S. monetary policy, is very timely. For monetary policy has become increasingly important for two reasons. First, fiscal policy threatens to become stuck as an effective oper- ational level of broad financial policy. If so, the hoped for benefits achievable from significant reductions in the Federal budget deficit Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 80 would be minimized. This is especially true when the effect of the Social Security surplus is noted. Second, the growth of the international sector will constrain the Federal Reserve's ability to focus exclusively on U.S. inflation and interest rates. The value of the U.S. dollar and its effect on U.S. exports and foreign imports, U.S. dollar-denominated Third World debt, and increasing foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury securities, will all have to be factored in. For example, higher U.S. interest rates to counteract expected higher U.S. inflation will cause the dollar to rise, making it more difficult for U.S. companies to export and increasing the interest owed by developing countries on their debt, thereby reducing their ability to import U.S. products. What then becomes the chief priority of the Federal Reserve, es- pecially given the probable inflexibility of fiscal policy? And what are the Federal Reserve's obligations to foreign countries which do not seem to be shouldering their respective obligations to keep world trade flowing? Fortunately, the Federal Reserve currently has some room for maneuver, operating in an reasonably enviable environment by recent historical standards. The United States is in the 61st month of continuous growth, and the bouyancy of the economy is con- founding even the most ardent naysayers. The unemployment rate has fallen to 5.3%, the lowest since 1974. Inflation hovers below 4%, and the recovering U.S. dollar and low energy prices will help keep that in check. Nevertheless, $200 billion Federal budget defi- cits financed abroad, $150 billion trade deficits, the potential effects of the drought on prices—all point out that much work still re- mains to be done. I look forward to the testimony of Chairman Greenspan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator D'Amato. Senator D'AMATO. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take the opportunity to raise and touch on another matter with the chairman and with the committee as it relates to another issue. I think you know what that issue is. The CHAIRMAN. I sure do. Senator D'AMATO. It's a matter of a hearing that was supposed to be held tomorrow and was canceled, and I find it rather difficult to understand when 14 cosponsors of a bill and this Senator having received a promise and a commitment for that hearing, not even being notified personally about it, and I was wondering if the chair- man would reconsider. So I say I'd like to discuss that matter after we hear the Chairman's testimony. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator D'Amato. Mr. Chairman, go right ahead, sir. STATEMENT OF ALAN GREENSPAN, CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Mr. GREENSPAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to review with you recent and prospective monetary policy. I will excerpt from my prepared remarks, but request that the full text be included in the record. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 81 The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be printed in full in the record. ECONOMIC SETTING AND MONETARY POLICY SO FAR IN 1988 Mr. GREENSPAN. The macroeconomic setting for monetary policy has changed in some notable respects since I testified last Febru- ary. At that time, the full after-effects of the stock market plunge on spending and financial markets were still unclear. While most Federal Open Market Committee members were forecasting moder- ate growth, in view of rapid inventory building and some signs of a weakening of labor demand, the possibility of a decline in economic activity could not be ruled out. To guard against this outcome, in the context of a firmer dollar on exchange markets, the Federal Reserve undertook a further modest easing of reserve pressures in late January, which augmented the more substantial easing follow- ing October 19. Short-term interest rates came down another notch, and with a delay helped to push the monetary aggregates higher within their targeted annual ranges. In the event, the economy proved remarkably resilient to the loss of stock market wealth. Economic growth remained vigorous through the first half of the year. As the risks of a faltering economic expansion and further finan- cial market disruptions diminished, the dangers of intensified infla- tionary pressures reemerged. Utilization of labor and capital reached the highest levels in many years, and hints of acceleration began to crop up in wage and price data. Strong gains in payroll employment that continued through the spring combined with slower growth in the labor force to lower the unemployment rate by about 1/4 percentage point, even before the strong labor market report for June; the industrial capacity utilization rate moved up as well. In these circumstances, the Federal Reserve was well aware that it should not fall behind in establishing enough monetary restraint to effectively resist these inflationary tendencies. The System took a succession of restraining steps from late March through late June. The shortest-term interest rates gradually rose to levels now around highs reached last fall. Responding as well to the unwind- ing of a tax-related buildup in liquid balances, M2 and M3 growth slowed noticeably after April. In contrast to the shortest-maturity interest rates, long-term bond and mortgage rates, though also above February lows, still remain well below last fall's peaks. The timely tightening of mone- tary policy this spring, along with perceptions of better prospects for the dollar in foreign exchange markets in light of the narrow- ing in our trade deficit, seemed to improve market confidence that inflationary excesses would be avoided. Both bond prices and the dollar rallied in June despite increases in interest rates in several major foreign countries and jumps in some agricultural prices re- sulting from the drought in important growing areas. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND MONETARY POLICY THROUGH 1989 The monetary actions of the first half of the year were undertak- en so that economic expansion could be maintained, recognizing Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis that to do so, additional price pressures could not be permitted to build and progress toward external balance had to be sustained. The projections of FOMC members and nonvoting presidents indi- cate that they do expect economic growth to continue, and inflation to be contained. The 2% to 3 percent central tendency of FOMC members' expec- tations for real GNP growth over the four quarters of this year im- plies a deceleration over the rest of the year to a pace more in line with their expected 2 to 2Vz percent real growth over 1989 and with the long-run potential of the economy. Although the month-to-month pattern in our trade deficit can be expected to be erratic, the improvement in the external sector on balance over time is expected to replace much of the reduced ex- pansion in domestic final demands from our consumer, business, and government sectors. Employment growth is anticipated to be substantial, though some updrift in the unemployment rate may occur over the next year and a half. Capacity utilization could well top out soon, as growth in demands for manufactured goods slows to match that of capacity. Considering the already limited slack in available labor and cap- ital resources, a leveling of the unemployment and capacity utiliza- tion rates is essential if more intense inflationary pressures are to be avoided in the period ahead. Otherwise, aggregate demand would continue growing at an unsustainable pace and would soon begin to create a destabilizing inflationary climate. Supply condi- tions for materials and labor would tighten further and costs would start to rise more rapidly; businesses would attempt to recoup profit margins with further price hikes on final goods and services. These faster price rises would, in turn, foster an inflationary psy- chology, cut into workers' real purchasing power, and prompt an attempted further catchup of wages, setting in motion a dynamic process in which neither workers nor businesses would benefit. The hard-won gains in our international competitiveness would be eroded, with feedback effects depressing the exchange value of the dollar. Excessive domestic demands and inflation pressures in this country, with its sizable external deficit, would be disruptive to the ongoing international adjustment of trade and payments imbal- ances. Not only the reduced slack in the economy but also several pro- spective adjustments in relative prices have accentuated inflation dangers. One is the upward movement of import prices relative to domestic prices, which is a necessary part of the process of adjust- ment to large imbalances in international trade and payments. An- other is the recent drought-related increases in grain and soybean prices. It is essential that we keep these processes confined to a one-time adjustment in the level of prices and not let them spill over to a sustained higher rate of increase in wages and prices. The costs to our economy and society of allowing a more intense inflationary process to become entrenched are serious. As the expe- rience in the past two decades has clearly shown, accelerating wages and prices would have to be countered later by quite restric- tive policies, with unavoidably adverse implications for production and employment. The financial health of many individual and busi- Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 83 ness debtors, as well as of some of their creditors, would then be threatened. The long-run costs of a return to higher inflation and the risks of this occurring under current circumstances are suffi- ciently great that Federal Reserve policy at this juncture might be well advised to err more on the side of restrictiveness rather than of stimulus. We believe that monetary policy actions to date, together with fiscal restraint embodied in last fall's agreement between the Con- gress and the administration, have set the stage for containing in- flation through next year. The central tendency of FOMC mem- bers' expectations for inflation in the GNP deflator ranges from 3 to 3% percent over this year and 3 to 4Vz percent next year. The FOMC believes that efforts to contain inflation pressures and sustain the economic expansion would be fostered by growth of the monetary aggregates over 1988 well within their reaffirmed 4 to 8 percent annual ranges, followed by some slowing in money growth over the course of next year. The debt of nonfinancial sectors, which so far this year has been near the midpoint of its reaffirmed 7 to 11 percent monitoring range, is anticipated to post similar growth through year-end. For 1989, the FOMC has underscored its intention to encourage progress toward price stability over time by lowering its tentative ranges for money and debt. We have preliminarily reduced the growth range for M2 by 1 full percentage point to 3 to 7 percent. We have adjusted the tentative 1989 range from M3 downward by J/2 a percentage point to a 3 l/z to 7 Vz percent range. This configura- tion is consistent with the observed tendency for M3 velocity over time to fall relative to the velocity of M2; over the last decade, the Federal Reserve's ranges frequently allowed for faster growth of M3 than of M2. The monitoring range for domestic nonfinancial debt for 1989 also has been lowered Vz percentage point to a tenta- tive 6V2 to 10 Vz percent range. The specific ranges chosen for 1989 are, as usual, provisional, and the FOMC will review them carefully next February in light of intervening developments. Anticipating today how the outlook for the economy in 1989 will appear next February is difficult, and a major reassessment of that outlook would have implications for ap- propriate money growth ranges for that year. As the aggregates have become more responsive to interest rate changes in the 1980s, judgments about possible ranges for the next year necessarily have become even more tentative and subject to revision. PERSISTENT U.S. EXTERNAL AND FISCAL IMBALANCES Despite the changes in the economic setting over the last 6 months, other features of the macroeconomic landscape remain much the same. Most notable are the continuing massive deficits in our external payments and internal fiscal accounts. As a nation, we still are living well beyond our means. We consume much more of the world's goods and services each year than we produce. Our current account deficit indicates how much more deeply in debt to the rest of the world we are sliding each year. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 84 The consequence of this external imbalance will be a steady ex- pansion in our external debt burden in the years ahead. No house- hold or business can expect to have an inexhaustible credit line with borrowing terms that stay the same as its debt mounts rela- tive to its wealth and income. Nor can we as a nation expect our foreign indebtedness to grow indefinitely relative to our servicing capacity without additional inducements to foreigners to acquire dollar assets—either higher real interest returns, or a cheaper real foreign exchange value for dollar assets, or both. To be sure, such changes in market incentives would have self-correcting effects over time in reducing the imbalance between our domestic spend- ing and income. Higher real interest rates would curtail domestic investment and other spending. A lower real value of the dollar would make U.S. goods and services relatively less expensive to both United States and foreign residents, damping our spending on imports out of U.S. income and boosting our exports. But simply sitting back and allowing such a self-correction to take place is not a workable policy alternative. Trying to follow such a course could have severe drawbacks now that our economy is operating close to effective capacity and potential inflationary pressures are on the horizon. The time is hardly propitious to dis- courage investment in needed plant and equipment, to add further impulses for import price hikes on top of the upward tendencies al- ready in the making, or to push our export industries as well as import-competing industries to their capacity limits. Fortunately, we have a better choice for righting the imbalance between domestic spending and income—one over which we have direct control. That is to resume reducing substantially the still massive Federal budget deficit, which remains the most important source of dissaving in our economy. The fall in the dollar we have already experienced over the last few years, even allowing for the dollar's appreciation from the lows reached at the end of last year, has set in motion forces that should.continue to narrow our trade and current account deficits in the years ahead. The associated loss of foreign-funded domestic investment is likely to adversely affect overall investment unless it can be replaced by greater domestic in- vestment financed by domestic saving. A sharp contraction in the Federal deficit appears to be the only assured source of augmented domestic net saving. Such a fiscal cutback should help counter future tendencies for further increases in U.S. interest rates and declines in the dollar, partly by instilling confidence on the part of international investors in the resolve of the United States to ad- dress its economic problems. In terms of Federal deficit reduction, the schedule under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law is a good baseline for a multiyear strategy, and I trust the Congress will stick with it. But we should go further. Ideally, we should be aiming ultimately at a Federal budget surplus so that Government saving could supplement pri- vate domestic saving in financing additional domestic investment. The strategy for monetary policy needs to be centered on making further progress toward and ultimately reaching stable prices. Price stability is a prerequisite for achieving the maximum eco- nomic expansion consistent with a sustainable external balance and high employment. Price stability reduces uncertainty and risks Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 85 in a critical area of economic decision making by households and businesses. By price stability, I mean a situation in which households and businesses in making their saving and investment decisions can safely ignore the possibility of sustained, generalized price in- creases or decreases. Prices of individual goods and services, of course, would still vary to equilibrate the various markets in our complex national and world economy, and particular price indexes could still show transitory movements. Essentially, the average of all prices would exhibit no trend over time. In the process of fostering price stability, monetary policy also would have to bear much of the burden for countering any pro- nounced cyclical instability in the economy, especially if fiscal policy is following a program for multiyear reductions in the Feder- al budget deficit. While recognizing the self-correcting nature of some macroeconomic disturbances, monetary policy does have a role to play over time in guiding aggregate demand into line with the economy's potential to produce. This may involve providing a counterweight to major, sustained cyclical tendencies in private spending, though we cannot be overconfident in our ability to iden- tify such tendencies and to determine exactly the appropriate policy response. In this regard, it seems worthwhile for me to offer some thoughts on the approach the Federal Reserve should take in implementing this longer-term strategy for monetary policy. APPROPRIATE TACTICS FOR MONETARY POLICY For better or worse, our economy is enormously complex, the re- lationships among macroeconomic variables are imperfectly under- stood, and as a consequence economic forecasting is an uncertain endeavor. Nonetheless, the forecasting exercise can aid policymak- ing by helping to refine the boundaries of the likely economic con- sequences of our policy stance. But forecasts will often go astray to a greater or lesser degree and monetary policy has to remain flexi- ble to respond to unexpected developments. A perfectly flexible monetary policy, however, without any guide- posts to steer by. can risk losing sight of the ultimate goal of price stability. In this connection, the requirement under the Humphrey- Hawkins Act for the Federal Reserve to announce its objectives and plans for growth of money and credit aggregates is a very useful device for calibrating prospective monetary policy. The an- nouncement of ranges for the monetary aggregates represents a way for the Federal Reserve to communicate its policy intentions to the Congress and the public. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I apologize. This is an excellent statement, but it's so rare that this committee or any committee for that matter has a quorum present that I'm going to take advan- tage of it. We have a number of nominees that we would like to act on. It's very important that we act promptly, including one who will join you on the Federal Reserve Board, John La Ware. We also have Timothy Coyle, of California, to be an Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; Jack Stokvis, of New York, to be an Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban De- velopment; and James Werson, of California, to be a Member of the Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 86 Board of Directors of the National Corporation for Housing Part- nerships. Because of the urgency of this matter and because we have to move it along as soon as we possibly can—we have had an exten- sive hearing, of course, on Mr. La Ware and, in my judgment, he was very impressive and I hope that the committee can act on that nomination now. Senator GARN. Mr. Chairman, I would move that we act on all of the nominees en bloc. The CHAIRMAN. Any discussion? Any objection? [No response.] The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the committee will act on the nominees en bloc. All in favor signify by saying "Aye." [A chorus of "Ayes."] The CHAIRMAN. Opposed? [No response.] The CHAIRMAN. The nominees will be reported to the floor of the Senate. Senator GRAMM. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gramm. Senator GRAMM. Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make note of the fact that I don't think any committee chairman in the U.S. Senate has done more than you have done to move appointments forward, and I just want to congratulate you for it and thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Gramm. There's nobody who's support I'd rather have than yours, or whose opposition I would less like to have than yours. [Laughter.] Senator GRAMM. Then you agree with me and I appreciate it. Senator WIRTH. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wirth. Senator WIRTH. Just let me very briefly associate myself with Senator Gramm's remarks and also commend you on moving on Mr. LaWare's appointment. It's a long appointment I know and I think it's the right thing for us to do and I appreciate your step- ping into that as well. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Wirth. Senator HECHT. Mr. Chairman, I just have a short statement on Mr. Coyle which I'll put into the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be printed in full in the record. Senator HECHT. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to commend Mr. Coyle on the fine job he has done to this date and would also like to voice my strong support for his nomination to the position of Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. I be- lieve he is amply qualified to fill this spot and would be an asset to both HUD and the Nation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Greenspan, I apologize. Go right ahead, sir. Mr. GREENSPAN. Let me just say, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I very much appreciate your expediting the nomi- nation of our new Board member. I'm really sure he will serve the country well. I think he's a first-rate appointment and hope he Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 87 moves through the Senate as expeditiously as he has done this morning. If I may continue, I just have a few more remarks to make for the record. The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead. Mr. GREENSPAN. The undisputed long-run relation between money growth and inflation means that trend growth rates in the monetary aggregates provide useful checks on the thrust of mone- tary policy over time. It is clear to all observers that the monetary ranges will have to be brought down further in the future if price stability is to be achieved and then maintained. But, in a shorter-run countercyclical context, monetary aggre- gates have drawbacks as rigid guides to monetary policy implemen- tation. As I discussed in some detail in my February testimony, fi- nancial innovation and deregulation in the 1980's have altered the structure of deposits, lessened the predictability of the demands for the aggregates, and made the velocities of Ml and probably M2 over periods of a year or so more sensitive to movements in market interest rates. Nonetheless, the demonstrated long-run connection of money and prices overshadows the problems of interpreting shorter-run swings in money growth. I certainly don't want to leave the impression that the aggregates have little utility in implementing monetary policy. They have an important role, and it is quite possible that their importance will grow in the years ahead. Currently, the FOMC keeps M2 and M3 under careful scrutiny, and judges their actual movements relative to assessments of their appropriate growth at any particular time. In this context, these aggregates are among the indicators influencing adjustments to the stance of policy. At times in recent years, we have intensively examined the properties of several alternative measures. An analysis of the monetary base appears as an appendix to the Board's Humphrey-Hawkins report. Although the monetary base has exhibited some useful proper- ties over the last three decades as a whole, the FOMC's view is that its behavior has not consistently added to the information provided by the broader aggregates, M2 and M3. The committee accordingly has decided not to establish a range for this aggregate, although it has requested staff to intensify research into the ability of various monetary measures to indicate long-run price trends. Because the Federal Reserve cannot reliably take its cue for shorter-run operations solely from the signals being given by any or all of the monetary aggregates, we have little alternative but to interpret the behavior of a variety of economic and financial indi- cators. They can suggest the likely future course of the economy given the current stance of monetary policy. Judgments about the balance of various risks to the economic outlook need to adapt over time to the shifting weight of incoming evidence; this point is well exemplified so far this year, as noted earlier. The Federal Reserve must be willing to adjust its instru- ments fairly flexibly as these judgments evolve; we must not hesi- tate to reverse course occasionally if warranted by new develop- ments. To be sure, we should not overreact to every bit of new in- formation because the frequent observations for a variety of eco- Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis nomic statistics are subject to considerable transitory "noise." But we need to be willing to respond to indications of changing under- lying economic trends, without losing sight of the ultimate policy objectives. To the extent that the underlying economic trends are judged to be deviating from a path consistent with reaching the ultimate ob- jectives, the Federal Reserve would need to make "midcourse" policy corrections. Such deviations from the appropriate direction for the economy will be inevitable, given the delayed and imper- fectly predictable nature of the effects of previous policy actions. Numerous unforeseen forces not related to monetary policy will continue to buffet the economy. The limits of monetary policy in short-run stabilization need to be borne in mind. The business cycle cannot be repealed, but I believe it can be significantly dampened by appropriate policy action. Price stability cannot be dictated by fiat, but governmental decision-makers can establish the conditions needed to approach this goal over the next several years. [The complete prepared statement of Mr. Greenspan follows:] Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, I appreci- ate this opportunity to review with you recent and prospective monetary policy and the economic outlook. I would also like to provide a broader perspective by discussing in some detail our nation'a longer-term economic objectives, the overall strategy for fiscal and monetary policies needed to reach those objec- tives, and the appropriate tactics for implementing monetary Statement by policy within that strategic framework. The economic setting and monetary policy so far in 19SB. Alan Greenspan The macroeconomic aetting for monetary policy has Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System changed in some notable respects since I testified last February. At that time, the full after-effects of the stock OO before the (£5 market plunge on spending and financial markets were still Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs unclear. While most Federal Open Market Committee members were forecasting moderate growth, in view of rapid inventory building of the and some signs of a weakening of labor demand, the possibility tJ.S. Senate of a decline in economic activity could not be ruled out. To guard against this outcome, in the contest of a firmer dollar on exchange markets, the Federal Reserve undertook a further July 13, 1988 modest easing of reserve pressures in late January, which augmented the more substantial easing following October 19. Short-term interest rates came down another notch, and with a delay helped to push the monetary aggregates higher within their targeted annual ranges. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis -2- In the event, the economy proved remarkably resilient the unemployment rate by about 1/4 percentage point, even before to the loss of stock market wealth. Economic growth remained vigorous through the first half of the year. Continuing brisk utilization rate moved up as well. In part reflecting the advances in exports, together with moderating growth in imports, payroll tax increase, broad measures of hourly compensation supported expansion in output, especially in manufacturing. picked up somewhat in the first quarter. Prices for a wide Some strengthening alao was evident in business outlays for range of domestic and imported industrial materials and aupplie equipment, especially computers, and consumer purchases of rose even more steeply than last year. Finished goods price durables, including autos. inflation has not: reflected this step-up in price increases for intermediate goods, in part as productivity gains kept unit tioning. Although trading volumes did not regain pre-crash labor coats under control. Even so, continued increases in levels in many markets, price volatility diminished somewhat and materials prices at the recent pace were seen as pointing to a quality differentials stayed considerably narrower than in the potential intensification in inflation more generally, ainco immediate aftermath of the stock market plunge. In response, baaed on historical experience, such increases have tended to the Federal Reserve gradually was able to restore its standard show through to finished good prices. procedure of gearing open market operations to the intended In these circumstances, the Federal Reserve waa well pressure on reserve positions of depository institutions. We aware that it should not fall behind in establishing enough thereby discontinued the procedure of reacting primarily to day- monetary restraint to effectively resist these inflationary to-day variations in money market interest rates that had been tendencies. The System took a succession of restraining steps adopted right after the stock market break. from late March through late June. The shortest -term interest As the risks of faltering economic expansion and rates gradually rose to levels now around highs reached last further financial market disruptions diminished, the dangers of fall. Responding aa well to the unwinding of a tax-related intensified inflationary pressures raemerged. Utilization of buildup in liquid balances, M2 and M3 growth slowed noticeably labor and capital reached the highest levels in many years, and after April. hints of acceleration began to crop up in wage and price data. In contrast to the shortest -maturity interest rates, Strong gains in payroll employment that continued through the long-term bond and mortgage rates, though alao above February spring combined with slower growth in the labor force to lower lows, atill remain well below last fall's peaks. Th« tinaly Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis -4- tightening of monetary policy this spring, along with percep- reflecting the lagged effects of the decline in the exchange tions of better prospects for the dollar in foreign exchange value of the dollar through the end of last year. Although the markets in light of the narrowing in our trade deficit, seemed month-to-month pattern in our trade deficit can be expected to to improve market confidence that inflationary excesses would be be erratic, the improvement in the external sector on balance avoided. Both bond prices and the dollar rallied in June over time is expected to replace much of the reduced expansion despite increases in interest rates in several major foreign in domestic final demands from our consumer, business, and countries and jumps in some agricultural prices resulting from government sectors. the drought in important growing areas. Employment growth is anticipated to be substantial, The economic outlook, and monetary policy through 1989. though some updrlft in the unemployment rate may occur over the next year and a half. Capacity utilization could well top out undertaken so that economic expansion could bo maintained, soon, as growth in demands for manufactured goods alows to match recognizing that to do so, additional price pressures could that of capacity- not be permitted to build and progress toward external balance Considering the already limited slack in available <£> had to be sustained. The projections of FQMC members and labor and capital resources, a leveling of the unemployment and nonvoting presidents indicate that they do expect economic capacity utilization rates is essential if more intense infla- growth to continue, and inflation to be contained. tionary pressures are to be avoided in the period ahead. Other- The 2-3/4 to 3 percent central tendency of FOMC mem- wise, aggregate demand would continue growing at an unsustain- bers' expectations for real GNP growth over the four quarters of able pace and would soon begin to create a destabilizing this year implies a deceleration over the rest of the year to a inflationary climate. Supply conditions for materials and labor pace more in line with their expected 2 to 2-1/2 percent real would tighten further and costs would start to rise more growth over 1989 and with the long-run potential of the economy. rapidly; businesses would attempt to recoup profit margins with The drought will reduce farm output for a time, and it is further price hikes on final goods and services. These faster important that nonfarm inventory accumulation slow before long, price rises would, in turn, foster an inflationary psychology, if we are to avoid a troublesome imbalance. Still, further cut into workers' real purchasing power, and prompt an attempted gains in our international trade position should continue to further catchup of wages, setting in motion a dynamic process in provide a major stimulus to real GNP growth through next year, Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis -6- which neither workers nor businesses would benefit. The hard- The costs to our economy and society of allowing a more won gains in our international competitiveness would be eroded, intense inflationary process to become entrenched are serioua. with feedback effects depressing the exchange value of the As the experience in the past two decades has clearly shown, dollar. Excessive domestic demands and inflation pressures in accelerating wages and prices would have to be countered later this country, with its sizable external deficit, would be by qiiite restrictive policies, with unavoidably adverse impli- disruptive to the ongoing international adjustment of trade and cations for production and employment. The financial health of payments imbalances. many individual and business debtors, as well as of some of Not only the reduced slack in the economy but also their creditors, then would be threatened. The long-run costs several prospective adjustments in relative prices have of a return to higher inflation and the risks of this occurring accentuated inflation dangers. One is the upward movement of under current circumstances are sufficiently great, that Federal import prices relative to domestic prices, which is a necessary Reserve policy at this juncture might be well advised to err part of the process of adjustment to large imbalances in inter- more on the side of restrictiveness rather than of stimulus. national trade and payments. Another is the recent drought- related increases in grain and soybean prices. It is essential gether with the fiscal restraint embodied in last fall's agree- that we keep these processes confined to a one-time adjustment ment between the Congress and the administration, have set the in the level of prices and not let them spill over to a sus- stage for containing inflation through next year. The central tained higher rata of increase in wages and prices. Elevated tendency of FOMC members' expectations for inflation in the GNP import and farm prices must be prevented from engendering deflator ranges from 3 to 3-3/4 percent over this year and 3 to expectations of higher general inflation, with feedback effects 4-1/2 percent next year. But in one sense the GNP deflator on labor costs. A more serious long-run threat to price understates this year's rate of inflation, and the comparison stability could come from government actions that introduced with next year overstates the pick-up. The deflator represents structural rigidities and increased costs of production. the average price of final goods and services produced in the Protectionist legislation, inordinate hikes in the minimum wage, United States, or equivalently domestic value added, using and other mandated programs that would impose costs on U.S. current quantity weights. This measure was artificially held producers would adversely affect their efficiency and down in the first tjuarter by a shift in the composition of international competitiveness. output, especially by the surge in sales of computers whose Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis -9- prices have dropped sharply since the 19S2 base year used for For 1989, the FOMC has underscored its intention to constructing the deflator. Indeed, if the deflator were indexed encourage progress toward price stability over time by lowering with a 1987 base year, it would have risen appreciably faster in its tentative ranges for money and debt. We have preliminarily the first quarter. reduced the growth range for HZ by 1 full percentage point, to Another understatement of inflation in the deflator 3 to 1 percent; last February, the FOMC also had reduced the this year arises from its exclusion of imported goods, which ara midpoint of the 1988 range for M2 by 1 percentage point from not directly encompassed because they are produced abroad. In that for 1987. He have adjusted the tentative 1989 range for M3 part because import prices have continued to rise significantly downward by 1/2 percentage point, to 3-1/2 to 7-1/2 percent. faster than prices of domestically produced goods, consumer This configuration is consistent with the observed tendency for price indexes have increased more than the GUP deflator. M3 velocity over time to fall relative to the velocity of M2; The FOMC believes that efforts to contain inflation over the last decade, the Federal Reserve's ranges frequently pressures and sustain the economic expansion would be fostered allowed for faster growth of M3 than of M2. The monitoring by growth of the monetary aggregates over 1988 well within their range for domestic nonfinancial debt for 1989 also has been CD CO reaffirmed 4 to 8 percent annual ranges, followed by some slow- lowered 1/2 percentage point to a tentative 6-1/2 to 10-1/2 ing in money growth over the course of next year. M2 should percent. move close to the midpoint of its range by late 1988, if The specific ranges chosen for 1989 are, as uaual, pro- depositors react as expected to the greater attractiveness of visional, and the FOMC will review them carefully next February, market instruments compared with liquid money balances that was in light of intervening developments. Anticipating today how brought about by recent increases in short-term market rates the outlook for the economy in 1989 will appear ne»t February is relative to deposit rates. M3 could end the year somewhat above difficult, and a major reassessment of that outlooK would have its midpoint, though comfortably within its range, if depository implications for appropriate money growth ranges for that year. institutions retain their recent share of overall credit expan- Unexpectedly strong or weak economic expansion or inflation sion. The dsbt of nonfinancial sectors, which so far this year pressures over the next six months also could have implications has been near the midpoint of its reaffirmed 7 to 11 percent for the behavior of interest rates and their prospects for 1989. monitoring range, is anticipated to post similar growth through The sensitivity of the monetary aggregates to movements in mar- year-end. ket interest rates means that the appropriate growth next year Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis -11- in M2, M3, and debt could seem different next February than nov, incentives would have self-correcting effects over time in necessitating a revision in the annual growth ranges. As the reducing the imbalance between our domestic spending and income. aggregates have become more responsive to interest rate changes Higher real interest rates would curtail domeatic investment and in the 1980s, judgments about possible ranges for the next year other spending. A lower real value of the dollar would make necessarily hive become even more tentative and subject to U.S. goods and services relatively less expensive to both U.S. revision. and foreign residents, damping our spending on imports out of Tha persistent U.S. external and fiscal imbalances. U.S. income and boosting our exports. Despite the changes in the economic setting over the But simply sitting back and allowing such a self- last six months, other features of the macroeconomic landscape correction to take place ia not a workable policy alternative. remain much the same. Most notable are the continuing massive Trying to follow auch a course could have severe drawbacks now deficits in our external payments and internal fiscal accounts. that our economy is operating close to effective capacity and As a nation, vo at ill are living well beyond our means; va potential inflationary pressures are on the horizon. The time consume much more of the norla'a goods and services each year is hardly propitious to discourage investment in needed plant to than He produce. Our current account deficit indicates how much and equipment, to add further impulses for import price hikes on more deeply in debt to the rest of the world tie are sliding each top of the upward tendencies already in the making, or to push year. our export industries as well as import-competing industries to The consequence of this external imbalance will be a tfcair capacity limits. steady expansion in our external debt burden in the years ahead. Fortunately, we have a better choice for righting the No household or business can expect to have an inexhaustible imbalance between domestic spending and income—ana over which credit line Kith borrowing terms that stay the same as ita debt we have direct control. That is to resume reducing substan- mounts relative to its wealth and income. Nor can we as a tially the still massive federal budget deficit, which remains nation expect our foreign indebtedness to gro» indefinitely the most important source of dissaving in our economy. The fall relative to our servicing capacity without additional induce- in the dollar we have already experienced over the last few ments to foreigners to acquire dollar assets--either higher rsal years, even allowing for the dollar's appreciation from the lows interest returns, or a cheaper real foreign exchange value for reached at the end of last year, has set in motion forcea that dollar assets, or both. To be aure, such changes in market should continue to narrow our trade and currant account deficits Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis -12- -13- in the years ahead. The associated loss of foreign-funded multi-year strategy, and I trust the Congress will stick wir.h domestic investment is likely to adversely affect overall it. But we should go further. Ideally, we should be aiming investment unless it can be replaced by greater domestic ultimately at a federal budget surplus, so that government investment financed by domestic saving. A sharp contraction in saving could supplement private domestic saving in financing the federal deficit appears to be the only assured source of additional domestic investment. Historically, the United States augmented domestic net saving. Such a fiscal cutback should was not a low saving, low investing economy. From the post- help counter future tendencies for further increases in U.S. Civil War period through the 1920s, the United States consis- interest rates and declines in the dollar, partly by instilling tently saved more as a fraction of GNP than Japan and Germany, confidence on the part of international investors in the resolve and we saved much more as a share of GHP then than we have since of the United States to address its economic problems. the end of World rtar II. A turnaround in our current domestic saving performance is essential to a smooth reduction in our making room for the needed diversion of more of our productive dependence on foreign saving, and the federal government should resources to meeting demands from abroad. Domestic demands Hill taka the lead. have to continue growing more slowly than our productive capac- It is also apparent that redressing our external im- ity, as seems to have been the case so far this year, if net balances must encompass cooperative policies with our trading exports are to expand further without resulting in an inflation- partners. These include both the established industrial powers, ary overheating of the economy. Absent thia fiscal restraint, the newly industrialized economies, and the developing coun- higher interest rates would become the only channel for damping tries, whose debt problems must be worked through as part of the domestic demands if they were becoming excessive. If a renewed international adjustment process. decline in the dollar were adding further inflationary stimulus This is the strategy that U.S. fiscal policy as well as at the same time, upward pressures on interest rates would be economic policies abroad should follow in most effectively pro- even more likely. The restrictive impact would be felt most by moting our shared economic objectives. The strategic role of the interest-sensitive sectors--homebuilding, business fixed U.S. monetary policy is implied by a clear statement of what investment, and consumer durables. those ultimate objectives are. We should not be satisfied In terms of federal deficit reduction, the schedule unless the U.S. economy is operating at high employment with a under the Gramra-Rudnian-Hollinga law is a good baseline for a sustainable external position and above all stable prices. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis High employment is consistent with steadily rising that have become relatively cheap. But essentially the average nominal wages and real wages growing in line with productivity of all prices would exhibit no trend over time. Price movements gains. Some frictional unemployment will exist in a dynamic in these circumstances would reflect relative scarcities of labor market, reflecting the process of matching available goods, and private decision-makers could focus their concerns on workers with available jobs. But every effort should be made adjusting production and consumption patterns appropriately to to minimize both impediments that contribute to structural changing individual prices, without being misled by generalized unemployment and deviations of real economic growth from the inflationary or deflationary price movements. economy's potential that cause cyclical unemployment. The strategy for monetary policy needs to be centered By a sustainable external position, I am referring to a on making further progress toward and ultimately reaching situation in which our foreign indebtedness is not persistently stable prices. Price stability is a prerequisite for achieving growing faster than our capacity to service it out of national the maximum economic expansion consistent with a sustainable income. Our international payments need not be in exact balance external balance at high employment. Price stability reduces from one year to the next, and the exchange value of the dollar uncertainty and risk in a critical area of economic decision- need not be perfectly stable, but wide swings in the dollar, and making by households and businesses. In the process of foster- boom and bust cycles in our export and import-competing indus- ing price stability, monetary policy also would have to bear tries, should be avoided. much of the burden for countering any pronounced cyclical By price stability, I mean a situation in which house- instability in tBe economy, especially if fiscal policy is holds and businesses in malting their saving and investment following a program for multi-year reductions in the federal decisions can safely ignore the possibility of sustained, gener- budget deficit. While recognizing the self-correcting nature of alized price increases or decreases. Prices of individual goods some macroeconoaic disturbances, monetary policy does have a and services, of course, would still vary to equilibrate the role to play over time in guiding aggregate demand into line various markets in our complex national and world economy, and with the economy's potential to produce. This may involve particular price indexes could still show transitory movements. providing a counterweight to major, sustained cyclical A small persistent rise in some of the indexes would be toler- tendencies in private spending, though we can not be over- able, given the inadequate adjustment for trends in quality confident in our ability to identify such tendencies and to improvement and the tendency for spending to shift toward goods determine exactly the appropriate policy response. In this Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis -16- regard, it aeems worthwhile for me to offer some thoughts on the the monetary ranges will have to be brought down further in the approach the Federal Reserve should take in implementing this future if price staiLlity is to be achieved and then maintained. longer-term strategy for monetary policy. But, in a shorter-run countercyclical context, monetary The appropriate tactics for monetary^poliCY. aggregates have drawbacks as rigid guides to monetary policy For better or worse, our economy is enormously complex, implementation. As I discussed in some detail in my February the relationships among macroeconomic variables ate imperfectly testimony, financial innovation and decegMlation in the 1980s understood, and aa a consequence economic forecasting is an have altered the structure of deposits, lessened the predict- uncertain endeavor. Nonetheless, the forecasting exercise can ability of the demands for the aggregates, and made the veloci- aid policymaking by helping to refine the boundaries of the ties of Ml and probably M2 over periods of a year or so more likely economic consequences of our policy stance. But fore- sensitive to movements in market interest rates. Movements in casts will often go astray to a greater or- lesser degree and short-term market rates relative to sluggishly adjusting deposit monetary policy has to remain flexible to respond to unexpected rates can result in large percentage changes in the opportunity developments. costa of holding liquid monetary assets. Depositor responses A perfectly flexible monetary policy, however, without can induce divergent growth between money and no.mir.al Gtip for a any guideposta to steer by, can risk losing sight of the ulti- time. I might add that it was partly these considerations that mate goal of price stability. In this connection, the require- led the FOMC to retain the wider four percentage point ranges ment under the Humphrey-Hawkins Act for the Federal Reserve to for money and credit growth for this ysar and next. announce its Objectives «nd plans for growth of money and credit Nonetheless, the demonstrated long-tun connection of aggregates is a very useful device for calibrating prospective money and prices overshadows the problems of interpreting monetary policy. The announcement of ranges for the monetary shorter-run swings in money growth. 1 certainly don't want to aggregatos represents a way for the Federal Reserve to leave the impression that the aggregates have little utility in communicate its policy intentions to the Congress and the implementing monetary policy, they have an important role, and public. And the undisputed long-run relation between money it is quite possible that their importance will grow in the growth and inflation means that trend growth rates in the years ahead. Currently, the FOMC keeps M2 and M3 under careful monetary aggregates provide useful checks on the thrust of scrutiny, and judges their actual movements relative to monetary policy over time- It is clear to all observers that assessments of their appropriate growth at any particular, time. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis -18- -19- In this context, these aggregates are among the indicators noticeably faster than would have been expected from its influencing adjustments to the stance of policy, both at regular historical relationships with U.S. spending and interest ratea. FOMC meetings and between meetings, as the FOMC's directive to although the monetary base has exhibited some useful the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Trading Desk indicates. properties over the last three decades as a whole, the FOMC1s The FOMC also regularly monitors a variety of other monetary vie« is that its behavior has not consistently added to the aggregates. At times in recent years, we have intensively information provided by the broader aggregates, M2 and M3. The examined the properties of several alternative measures, and Committee accordingly has decided not to establish a range for reported the results to the Congress. These measures have this aggregate, although it haa requested staff to intensify included Ml, Ml-A (Ml less NOW accounts), monetary indexes, and research into the ability of various monetary measures to moat recently the monetary base. indicate long-run price trends. An analysis of the monetary base appears as an appendix Because the Federal Reserve cannot reliably take its to the Board's Humphrey-Hawkins report. This aggregate, essen- cue for shorter-run operations solely from the signals being tially the sum of currency and reserves, did not escape the given by any or all of th« monetary aggregates, we have little 0 SO 0 sharp velocity declines of other money measures earlier in the alternative but to interpret the behavior of a variety of 1980s. Its velocity behavior stemmed from relatively strong economic and financial indicators. They can suggest the likely growth in transactions deposits compared with GNP, which was future course of the economy given the current stance of mone- mirrored in the reserve component of the baas. In this sense, tary policy. some of the problems plaguing Ml also have, ahown through to the Judgments about the balance of various risks to the base, though in somewhat muted form. Moreover, the three- economic outlook nnad to adapt over time to the shifting weight quarters share of currency in the base raises some question of incoming evidence; this point La fell exemplified so far this about the reliability of its link to, spending. The high level year, as noted earlier. The Federal Reserve must be willing to of currency holdings—5825 per nan, woman and child living in adjust its instruments fairly flexibly as these judgments the United States—suggests that vast, indeterminate amounts of evolve; we must not hesitate to reverse course occasionally if U.S. currency circulate or are hoarded beyond our borders. warranted by new developments. TO be sure, we should not Indeed, over the last year and one half, currency has grown overreact to every bit of new information, because the frequent observations for a. variety of economic statistics are subject to Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 99 -20- considerable transitory "noiae". But we need to be willing to respond to indications of changing underlying economic trends, without losing sight of the ultimate policy objectives. To the extent that the underlying economic trends are judged to be deviating from a path consistent with reaching the ultimate objectives, the Federal Reserve would need to make "mid-course" policy corrections. Such deviations from the appropriate direction for the economy will be inevitable, given the delayed and imperfectly predictable nature of the effects of previous policy actions. Nunerous unforeseen forces not related to monetary policy will continue to buffet the economy. The limits of monetary policy in short-run stabilization need to be borne in mind. The business cycle cannot be repealed, but I believe it can be significantly damped by appropriate policy action. Price stability cannot be dictated by fiat, but govern- mental decision-makers can establish the conditions needed to approach this goal over the next several years. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 100 The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Greenspan. Let me ask you first, is it true that because of the lags involved the changes in monetary policy that would affect the economy, affect interest rates, stock prices and so forth—those changes are probably already done. They were changes that occurred in the past and that between now and the election, that any changes in monetary policy would not have an effect on the economy? I ask that because Dr. Fair, a distinguished professor from Yale University, testified that in his judgment that was the case and the other experts yesterday seemed to agree with that judgment. Mr. GREENSPAN. I think it is substantially true, Mr. Chairman, that most of the effects of economic policies, specifically with re- spect to monetary policy, occur only with a lag. Nonetheless, I think that there are effects which are continuing and which could be altered should policy change in any significant way. But those effects could be described as relatively small, com- pared with the effects already in place currently embodied in the structure of policy. The CHAIRMAN. I thought your statement was an excellent state- ment and you talked about something I think we have to be con- cerned about—living beyond our means. LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS The unique thing about your statement is you didn't confine living beyond our means to the Federal Government. We are living beyond our means obviously. We all know that. We've talked about it and debated it. But yours is one of the first statements from a top official that I've heard that includes American households and businesses. And I think that it's a very, very important point. Not only is the Federal Government living beyond its means, but our households are deeply in debt. Our businesses are enormously in debt. The figures I've seen from the Federal Reserve on house- hold debt is that it's over $3 trillion. On business debt, if you in- clude not only corporate debt but nonincorporated business, includ- ing farms and so forth, that it's over $4 trillion. And that this is occurring at a time when savings are low. The reason I bring that up is that any compensatory action on the part of the Federal Reserve to allow for the fact that we're shrinking the Federal deficit—people have talked about how, yes, we can encourage with lower interest rates housing and borrowing for automobiles and so forth. It seems to me either way you do it, you're living beyond your means and we're simply shifting the in- debtedness and the obligations from the Federal Government to the private sector. Mr. GREENSPAN. I would, of course, generally agree with the overall thrust of your remarks with one addition, which I think is an important one. We would not have particular problems if the difference between consumption and income in our system were being financed with equity, and if we had very effective ratios of capital to debt because in those instances we could absorb a considerable amount of eco- nomic shock. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 101 When evaluating debt, it is incomplete merely to look at the ag- gregate levels. It's always important to view debt relative to equity in balance sheets. And here, even though it is certainly the case that we have very large debts in the household sector, we also, of course, have very substantial assets. The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt in that situation, however. Isn't it true that there's been an enormous increase in borrowing by cor- porations compared to raising equity, particularly in view of the merger mania, the takeovers and so forth which have been fi- nanced largely by debt and there are certainly at least many dra- matic cases of corporations that had a strong equity-debt ratio and now have a much weaker, thinner capital-debt ratio? Mr. GREENSPAN. Yes. In fact, that has been concerning me, as you know, for a number of years. Long-term interest rates have come down a great deal since their peaks in the early 1980's. But the ratio of interest payments of the nonfinancial corporate sector to gross cash flow has not come down, and that is another indica- tion of the fact that instead of getting debt relief from the decline in interest rates which occurred from the early 1980's to the most recent period, we have essentially offset that relief by increasing debt. The interest payments, the servicing costs, so to speak, remain undiminished and, in my judgment, higher than I would like to see them. The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Senator Garn. Senator GARN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Greenspan, increasing internationalization of world markets—world capital markets in particular—was an important part of passage of S. 1886, the Proxmire bill which passed the Senate 94 to 2. Do you still favor that legislation? It's been some 3 months now since it passed the Senate. Mr. GREENSPAN. Yes, I do, and the Federal Reserve Board still does. Senator GARN. And my next question would be, then, have you had an opportunity to look at the St Germain draft bill? Mr. GREENSPAN. Only cursorily, Senator. Senator GARN. And what is your cursory opinion of the St Ger- main bill? Mr. GREENSPAN. My cursory opinion is that it could probably accept some amendments from the Senate. [Laughter.] Senator GARN. Well, you're much more charitable with it than I am, I feel very strongly that if we go to conference and we do not have a bill that looks very much like the Senate bill, that we would probably be better off with no bill at all. I would expect that if this happened that people would say, well, there's been another deregu- lation bill passed and it's good for another 6 or 7 years. So I'm hopeful that there will be more than just some amend- ments by the Senate. I hope, we can come up with a bill that is much closer to the Senate bill so that we can pass one that is sig- nificant and does not pacify certain elements for a number of years into the future. Would you go so far as to say that you feel that it should look very close to what the Senate bill looks like? Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 102 Mr. GREENSPAN. Until I've gone beyond a cursory look, which is really inadequate for any form of analysis, I wouldn't want to give you any extended position. But nonetheless, I do think that at this particular stage, speaking for my colleagues, that the Senate bill as it stands is the type of model we would like to see evolving as this particular piece of legislation moves forward. Senator GARN. I would hope that when you've had an opportuni- ty to look at it more carefully that we could have a more detailed analysis of the bill from you and, hopefully, an expression of the Board in general as to how they feel about the bill. Mr. GREENSPAN. I would think we would be obliged first to com- municate detailed discussions with your counterparts in the House after we evaluate it, but after that point I'm sure we would be more than willing to go public. Senator GARN. News travels fast. We have no problem with that. In your statement, you say: A more serious long-run threat to price stability could come from government ac- tions that introduced structural rigidities and increased costs of production. Protec- tionist legislation, inordinate hikes in the minimum wage, and other mandated pro- grams that would impose costs on U.S. producers would adversely affect their effi- ciency and international competitiveness. I think that's a very important statement. Would you expand and elaborate on that particular comment? Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, I think that what we have observed over the years is that one can create inflationary environments by means other than adverse monetary or fiscal policies. There are a number of actions that can be taken which can load costs onto the economy indirectly which have very much the same effects as infla- tionary monetary policies. One thing that does concern me is that as we move toward a period when budget restraint is going to become of necessity the highest priority so far as economic policy is concerned, I'm con- cerned that we will tend to try to create a number of different eco- nomic policies through regulation or indirectly through various dif- ferent types of actions which in effect move resources, increase costs, in a way which is presumed to be hidden. Protectionist legislation, in my judgment, is the most dangerous form of cost increase because it gives a sense of tranquility too often to companies which should be competing very fiercely and will have to at some point. So I would basically argue that we must be careful not to substitute various different forms of cost-increas- ing legislation merely because the vehicle which exists or has exist- ed in the past through the Federal budget is no longer available. Senator GARN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sasser. Senator SASSER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement which I would like to have in- cluded in the record as if read. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM SASSER Mr. Chairman, the committee is honored today by the presence of the distinguished Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. I am Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 103 pleased that Dr. Greenspan will give us his view of where the econ- omy is headed. I think Dr. Greenspan deserves great credit for his stewardship of the Federal Reserve over the past year. Indeed, the Fed per- formed extraordinarily well in responding to the October stock market crash. The Fed stepped in quickly, and reassured the mar- ketplace by providing the liquidity needed to get us through those seemingly desperate days. Mr. Chairman, I am concerned, however, about the conduct of monetary policy in the months ahead. I am afraid that some on wall street may be a little too concerned about inflation, and too quick to advocate a rise in interest rates. Right now the last thing we need is a restrictive monetary policy. The risks the economy would incur if we were to move into a recession are far too great. We already are running an unacceptable fiscal deficit. A rise in interest rates, and particularly a contraction in the economy, would only exacerbate that deficit. I note that Professor Blinder testified yesterday that the deficit could easily go to $300 billion were there to be a recession. And as we all know, we are facing a crisis in the savings and loan industry. Given the situation, a recession could easily under- mine the safety and soundness of the banking system. To put it mildly, I think the Fed will play a critical role in the coming months. I look forward to Dr. Greenspan's testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Greenspan, I want to welcome you before the committee this morning and yesterday we had the good fortune to have a panel of very distinguished and eminent economists appear before the com- mittee to give their views on monetary policy and generally their views on the state of the economy. One of those was Professor Alan Blinder, a distinguished econo- mist from Princeton University. Dr. Blinder spoke of the specula- tion that the Fed might increase interest rates in the wake of the recently announced lower unemployment rate and over concern that the economy might be overheating. He also indicated that the Fed should not be swayed by what he characterized as "the hysteria that seems to sweep Wall Street about every 2 weeks." He went on to say the speculative markets react to everything, including things that are just imagined and they react too vigorously and he concluded by saying, "the Fed must ignore this insanity." What about this speculation on a rise in interest rates and what about Professor Blinder's comment? How significant an increase in rates is the Fed looking at at this juncture? RISE IN INTEREST RATES Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, Senator, I agree with Dr. Blinder in the sense that there is a great deal of street chatter, as we call it, which of necessity fills up the newspapers, largely because people discuss with each other why they are investing, why they are not investing, sometimes based on evidence, sometimes not, sometimes based on hunch. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 104 A lot of that is actually quite useful in that we monitor it to a very considerable degree because it tells us a good deal about what the attitudes of the investing public and the professional investors are. However, that's just merely a piece of evidence so far as Federal Reserve policy is concerned. It is an important piece of evidence be- cause it tells us something about their expectations which one must presume are embodied in levels of interest rates, stock prices, exchange rates, and a variety of other things. But I should certainly hope that we take it as that and are not unduly swayed as though much of that is the same thing as hard evidence about what the economy is doing at any particular time. Our monetary policy will continue, I hope, to focus on the hard facts of what the economy is doing and the particular positions that the FOMC will take. Consequently, attitudes toward the vari- ous different financial variables will depend on how the Committee views the ongoing evolution of economic developments over the next year or year and a half. Senator SASSER. Well, Mr. Chairman, given the fragility of the fi- nancial system at this juncture and the fiscal imbalance that we find ourselves in, I would come down on the side of avoiding a re- cession almost at all costs, and I do hope that the Fed will not be hyperreactive to any signs, real or imagined, of impending infla- tion. If we fall off into recession, we've got the problem of the Fed- eral deficit. We were told yesterday that in a recessionary economy it could run up to as high as $300 billion annually. We're saddled here in this committee with the problem of the ailing S&L's and we are told that the FSLIC might have liability up to $60 billion with regard to these thrifts. If we get into a recessionary economy the Congress and the new administration are not going to have the ability to conduct a countercyclical fiscal policy as we've done in times past because we simply are not going to have the wherewith- al to do it, given the large budget deficit. So that's why I'm concerned this morning, Mr. Chairman, about the whole question of the Fed tightening monetary policy or rais- ing rates in anticipation of some inflationary pressures. I would urge that we not overreact to that. I noted a day or two ago that Wall Street had reacted to the un- employment rate that is now is 5.3 percent, the lowest we have had in 14 years. Usually that is a sign and a signal that there might be some inflationary pressure mounting because of bidding for labor services—there is a shortage of labor. But when you get inside those figures, according to the Wall Street Journal, what we find is that, unlike in the 1970's, a large proportion of these unemployed are mature workers, as opposed to the 1974 figures, for example, of this 5.3 figure being composed very largely of teenage workers. Because of demographic changes, the unemployed now are largely made up of mature workers which would indicate that there's not the labor shortage out there that these low unemployment figures would indicate. That and a number of other factors lead me to at least weigh in, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the Fed's monetary policy of not being overreactive to signs of inflationary pressure. That's my speech this morning. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 105 The CHAIRMAN. Senator D'Amato. Senator D'AMATO. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can quote Senator Chafee while he's here. Mr. Chairman, I want to tell you I'd like to associate myself with some of the statements of my colleague, Senator Sasser. We've got problems with FSLIC. We've got a ticking time bomb with FDIC. Nobody wants to say that. I think we do a great mistake by the way if this committee and staffers on this committee run around and say, well, FSLIC has a hole of $60, $70, $80 billion. If you really wanted to look at the international debt situation and the commercial loan situation and add it up just like GAO went ahead and did with FSLIC, you'd find maybe the situation will be even more distressing. It's the faith and confidence in the system that. we will provide the mechanism by which to work our way out that in the fullness of time will be the only solution, not just screaming and yelling from the highest bell tower about the problems. I also think that Senator Sasser said something that bears repeti- tion. I would hate to think that we're going to try to cool inflation- ary pressures by just simply the monetary policy of raising interest rates. We've seen some of that in the past and I think it's been rather disastrous. It is a very important component in that infla- tion factor. When you raise interest rates to the business communi- ty, to the home owner, to the user of products, it exacerbates prob- lems as it relates to a recessionary cycle. So it's a very careful bal- ancing act and I would hope that our Chairman—I have every con- fidence in him—that he is able to manage that in such a way that we don't tilt it too much toward that high interest rate phenomena that we saw in the past, a good deal of it which came from your predecessor. Everybody gives him great grades. I think that he kept that spigot on the credit closed just a little too long and brought about a little too much pain and brought about a little too much recession that was unnecessary. Yet we're not supposed to say those things because we're supposed to be in the world where we say everything is wonderful and we all do wonderful and good jobs. As it relates to the work of this committee, let me suggest to you that we have an opportunity to open up the spigot to about $1V2 billion to the thrift industry that is sadly, sadly and deeply in need, simply by lifting a restriction on the trading of Freddie Mac, simply by taking that ban off and allowing it to proceed. Now for whatever reason it seems to me that staff has made up their mind—and I'll be very candid—the staff director who has worked his way to attempt to encourage members to put in various amendments on that legislation that has brought then concern to other members of this committee so we can't even proceed, not- withstanding that 14 members of this committee have indicated support for that legislative initiative. I think it's a rather sad com- mentary. Now are we talking political gamesmanship or are we talking about what we're going to do to benefit this ailing industry? Are we talking about doing the right thing or are we talking about some kind of obsequiousness that we have to pay in tribute to the staff director? That's a heck of a thing for me to have to say, but I'm sick and tired of that kind of nonsense and it's nonsense. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 106 We were promised—I was promised, particularly on the floor, a markup for tomorrow. Now that's what was made. You said, "Sena- tor, if you don't go forward with this legislation"—then another group of Senators are promised that they can introduce amend- ments and use that markup as a vehicle by which to introduce their amendments. You want to talk about the dog in the manger, that's exactly what that is. That's the dog in the manger and the cow is not going to come in there to eat, and so everybody is prom- ised something but we have the dog in the manger. I don t enjoy it. Mr. Chairman, you may say, well, why don't we try to discuss these things privately. Well, no one has ever made the opportunity or the attempt. I would think that I would be owed at least that, so I didn't have to make this public. But it seems to me that's the only way we have to do it. So now when this Senator looks upon other vehicles by which to put this legislative initiative, I don't want people to be surprised. I think that a promise that was made and accepted in good faith has not been kept. It's unfortunate and it's wrong and it's certainly not helping to address the problems. Let's take it on the merits. If the legislation isn't any good, kill it, vote it down. But when you don't have the votes, it doesn't seem to me that that's the appropriate thing to do to exercise the kind of discretion that is placed in the chairman and just deny that markup that was promised for tomor- row. So I share those thoughts with you. I think some of my col- leagues may agree. Some may not want to—by the way, I expressed it in a lot less emotion than I'm generally given in regards to mat- ters of this kind, particularly when I feel rather aggrieved. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. May I respond to the distinguished Senator from New York? I want to thank you for your kind and gentle remarks, kinder and gentler than they sometimes are, but I do think that in fairness to the staff, the decision was not made by the staff. Senator D'AMATO. He just set all the conditions, Mr. Chairman, by which it was brought about. The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say that I've been insulted in a lot of ways, but I think the worst insult would be to tell me that I don't know what the dickens I'm doing and that the staff runs the committee, which is what the distinguished Senator from New York is certainly implying and that certainly isn't the case. Let me say why we postponed this matter. During the hearings on the Freddie Mac bill I asked Mr. Brendsel, who is the head of Freddie Mac, the President of Freddie Mac, for legislation on how FSLIC could share in the profits. That language has been prepared and it's been sent to the Chairman of the Bank Board. We haven't gotten an answer from him. The staff made at my direction repeat- ed inquiries of the Bank Board as to its position on the bill and on the FSLIC recapture issue. No answer has been forthcoming. Last Monday, I asked the Bank Board in writing for its views on the FSLIC recapture issue not later than Tuesday. We still have not heard from the Board. If it's feasible and desirable to recapture part of the profits for FSLIC, it's an opportunity this committee shouldn't let slip away. FSLIC is in terrible trouble. They need that money desperately. If they could have only several hundred million Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 107 dollars it would help greatly. As you know, it's either a bailout or it raising money from the industry itself, and this is one way of providing a little more money for FSLIC. So in view of all that, it seemed to me that it wouldn't be respon- sible for the committee to proceed in the markup on Freddie Mac without the formal views of the Bank Board. Now this is not a cancellation. The Senator earlier— not in these remarks, but earlier indicated that we had canceled that meeting. We didn't cancel the meeting. We postponed the meeting. We intend definitely to have the meeting. You said that 14 members of the committee support your bill. That's true and I'm one of the 14, as you know. I've said I support it. Senator D'AMATO. That would be 15, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Well, all right, then it's 15 members who support it. I think it's a good provision. Senator GRAMM. Let's vote. The CHAIRMAN. But I did state on the record that I supported the bill, but I think we ought to know what we're doing and we ought to consider whether or not we can provide several hundred million dollars for FSLIC as well as most of the money, three-quarters of the money perhaps, for the S&L's. That was the reason why I post- poned that, but I definitely did not cancel it. I have every intention of having a markup on that bill, but I think we ought to do it with the fullest knowledge we can get. Senator GARN. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Garn. Senator GARN. If I could also respond—and the Senator from New York is well aware of this—we have had two or three private conversations on this issue over the last day or two and so I wish to make my statements to him public. As ranking Republican on this committee, I was part of the decision and agreed to the postpone- ment of the markup. I think the Senator is well aware why I felt that way, because when we had the hearing he and I had a rather heated discussion. It was not over the substance. I don't know whether, Al, I'm counted in your 14 or 15, but I did state in that hearing that I was also in favor of the legislation. So is that 16 or am I part of the 15? Senator D'AMATO. Sixteen. Senator GRAMM. We'd better vote fast. [Laughter.] Senator GARN. You didn't count very carefully then, because if you remember, I started out our heated discussion by saying I was in favor of your bill; but I was not in favor of rushing into it until we had the answers to some questions. I asked all of the witnesses very pointedly, "Will one of you answer my question?" None of them had the answer to those questions. So that is my position. We should move forward. The Freddie Mac stock should be freed up and my attitude is that we ought to have the markup the week after we come back from recess. As far as I'm concerned—and I can only speak for myself—if at that time the Bank Board and Freddie Mac, have not answered our questions, then we go ahead and mark it up. We give them another 2 weeks and if they have not answered us by then, we will go ahead and mark up the bill and 16 of us, or however many, will vote for it. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 108 The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator from Utah would yield, I agree with that and I intend to do exactly that. Senator D'AMATO. So I understand that the Chair is indicating that the week we come back that we will then take this up? The CHAIRMAN. That's correct. Senator D'AMATO. Well, fine. Senator GARN. I would further suggest, Mr. Chairman, the 27th, I believe, is clear on the schedule. That's 2 weeks from today; and if we've not had the official opinion of the Board, we will move ahead without them. The CHAIRMAN. The 27th is fine with me. Senator D'AMATO. I thank the chairman and I thank the ranking member. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Riegle. Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You had a ringside seat for that at no extra charge. [Laughter.] It sounds to me in terms of what you said in going through your statement that interest rates are probably headed up. That's what I draw from what you presented here. On page 7, you say explicitly that Federal Reserve policy at this juncture might be well advised to err more on the side of restric- tiveness rather than stimulus, and I think the general pattern of events, in addition to other things you've said today, would suggest upward pressure. When we watch what's happening to interest rates in Great Britain, that's the sense I get. Now if you dispute that, I think you should respond one way or the other. Mr. GREENSPAN. As you know, Senator, we are not in the busi- ness of forecasting rates. What we are in the business of doing is evaluating the balance of risks. To state, as we do, that the risks are more on the inflation upside than on the recession downside is not to say that of necessity it will come out that way. What we will do and what we have done is to continuously and concurrently evaluate economic events and financial pressures as they emerge and take actions as is appropriate to it. We do not forecast interest rates and, in fact, we do not have im- plicit in our policies something which says that we will be moving in a direction which will either move rates up or move rates down over some protracted period. That's not the way the system func- tions nor do I think it should. Senator RIEGLE. Well, let me ask you this. If interest rates tend to be rising around the world and it seems to me they are—I think we see pressure in that direction—we're the largest debtor nation, so we've got more borrowing to do, unfortunately, than anybody else. We've already had some rise in the value of the dollar and there's a whole question as to whether it can hold that rise or goes back down. That creates an interest rate risk to somebody that's going to invest by lending to the United States from abroad—a cur- rency risk, if you will, if there's reversal in the dollar value. Why doesn t that necessarily have to push our rates up? How can we keep our rates down if rates are rising generally? Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, Senator, there are many more things in- volved in the determination of pressures which move rates one way Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 109 or the other than either international considerations or even the domestic economic structure. There are so many elements involved. Senator RIEGLE. I don't dispute that. I agree with that, but I guess what I'm saying is, given the fact that you have this whole mix of elements with the ones that I've just stressed, why doesn't that upward pressure on rates inevitably cause us to have to re- spond in kind? Mr. GREENSPAN. Basically, it's the word "inevitably" that I'm re- sponding to. I don't think it is inevitable. Obviously, it is a pressure in that direction, but there can be innumerable other things work- ing in the other direction of greater force which would negate that. Senator RIEGLE. What's the most hopeful one you see on the ho- rizon that would help us keep rates down in the face of upward pressures elsewhere? Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, I would say, first of all, I'm not necessari- ly subscribing to the presumption that rates internationally are going up. It is certainly the case that they have gone up recently. It doesn't necessarily follow that they will continue to do so. I know of no actions contemplated by any of my counterparts in the international arena which necessitates that. I don't deny it is possi- ble, it's certainly one of the innumerable credible forecasts out there that could occur, but it may not. And it may not basically because inflationary pressures which still are held in check may continue to be held in check or they may begin to ease for reasons that are not obvious at the moment. All we can do is to try, as best we can, to monitor what's going on on a continuous and real-time basis and try to evaluate where the risks of mistakes are in policy. What few people realize is that policy is perhaps more focused on what the cost is of going in direc- tion "a" if you're wrong? We consider that all the time and that's a major issue involved in the current period. Senator RIEGLE. Well, let me ask you to crank one other thing into your forward planning. I had a top official in the Government come to see me yesterday who's in a position to be very knowledge- able, who conveyed an estimate of the size of the savings and loan exposure of the losses that are going to have to be covered some- where between $50 and $70 billion. FISCAL READJUSTMENT PLAN Your strategy here is to have a fiscal readjustment plan some- where along the line, presumably in the next administration be- cause there's no sign of it coming in the rest of this year. I'd like to know how we're going to square those two things, have a fiscal re- adjustment plan that brings down Federal deficits, and at the same time brings this savings and loan deficiency up into the light of day, stops the hemorrhaging, solves it in the range of a $50 billion problem or higher, and make all that fit together. I'd like to hear some sense as to how you think those two things can be cross-con- nected here. Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, first, Senator, I've seen those numbers— and I've evaluated a lot of different numbers and what I am aware Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 110 of is the fact that we have very great analytical problems with trying to make judgments about the scope of this hole in FSLIC. The reason we have the problem is that even though we are deal- ing with financial instruments—mortgages on the asset side of the balance sheet of the S&L's largely—they are essentially at the end of the line a nonrecourse loan against a property whose value is deficient. I say nonrecourse in the sense that as a practical matter it often works out that way. The tricky problem is not in evaluating the state of those loans. It's trying to make a judgment about the market value of all of those properties on which those loans rest. And while there are a lot of people who are appraisers and they look at this, until you've got a hard evaluation over the long run, you really don't know ex- actly what the size of that hole is. I think it's substantial. I don't frankly know what the specific number is. But whatever the number, it is not a situation which, in the event of a congressional approach to this problem, would re- quire up front the types of numbers that you're talking about even remotely. It is a problem which is extended over a period of time. It is, nonetheless, an issue which I think does exacerbate the fiscal problem and it is something which the next Congress is going to have to confront. It's just that I'm a little bit reluctant to absorb some of the numbers which I've seen because I know how difficult those estimates really are. I think the ranges are much wider. Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gramm. Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. AVOIDING A RECESSION AT ALL COSTS Dr. Greenspan, I'm sort of obsessed with this idea of avoiding a recession at any cost and I'd like to ask you a question, going back to your comments on page 6. As you know, we have pending before the Congress now a series of labor provisions that range from sub- stantial increase in the minimum wage to mandated benefits to worker notification of plant closings and layoffs. I've seen estimates that all of this package, if put together and adopted, would raise the cost of job creation in the country maybe by as much as one- quarter. If your objective were to avoid a recession at all costs, to create more jobs, more growth, more opportunity in America, would you see the adoption of that general type of legislation as being a posi- tive or a negative? Mr. GREENSPAN. Negative. Senator GRAMM. And you would say that, other things being the same, that the adoption of that package would mean fewer jobs, less growth, less opportunity? Mr. GREENSPAN. Over the longer run, I would subscribe to that statement. Senator GRAMM. Let me talk a little bit about this whole debt issue. It seems to me that the real question we've got to face, whether we're talking about public debt or private debt or domestic debt or international debt, is what was the money used for? If the money was used to create wealth, to build new plants and equip- Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Ill ment thats one thing. It's no secret that we borrowed our way into being a world power, since the United States was a debtor nation from the time the first pilgrim stepped on Plymouth Rock until about 1920. If on the other hand the borrowing is going basically to nonpro- ductive uses—that is, it's not creating a wealth flow that will in turn pay off the debt and generate wealth in the process—then debt becomes a negative factor. So it seems to me, if you agree with that approach, that the real question we've got to answer is, what is the private debt going to do and what is the public debt going to do? And the thing that bothers me about our international debt is that a lot more of it now than ever before is going to finance the public debt, which is primarily being generated by deficit spending and which I don't think anybody could argue is wealth-creating. Certainly it's not creating assets that would pay off those loans. Do you share that concern? Mr. GREENSPAN. It's very difficult to try to determine precisely which item on the asset side of the balance sheet is financed by which item on the liability side. But it is certainly the case that our aggregate amount of external borrowing that is measured by the current account deficit in the most recent past has been excep- tionally high, as indeed our Federal deficit has been. And when one is balancing the various different accounts one can clearly say that there is an increasing proportion of external finance which goes di- rectly and indirectly to finance the Federal deficit. It's not strictly the question of how much direct Federal securities is purchased by foreigners. That's not what I'm talking about. But leaving that particular concept aside, I would certainly agree that the issue of debt is crucially related to the question of whether the employment of that debt was used to produce an asset which will create the resources to pay both interest and principle on the debt and more. Senator GRAMM. Would you agree, Dr. Greenspan, that public debt in general does not do that? Mr. GREENSPAN. I would agree with that. Senator GRAMM. Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say I don't want to get back into this debate about Freddie Mac. I think I agreed with our colleague from New York. I think, however, that we ought not to miss an opportunity to liberate the capital of institutions that are capital starved. If there are legitimate concerns about it, then we ought to move quickly to resolve them. We ought to ask the questions and we ought to get the information, and then we ought to move ahead if in fact there is a general consensus that this is a good idea. We do have a very severe capital shortage in the savings and loan industry. If we can liberate over $1 billion of capital, I think we ought to do it. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Graham. Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY AND THIRD WORLD DEBT I would like to ask some questions relative to the Federal Re- serve policy and Third World debt. Some commentators on the re- Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 112 cently concluded Toronto summit have suggested that the failure to come more fully to grips with that issue was the major deficien- cy of the summit and that it would therefore be the first priority of the next economic summit. If you were preparing to advise the next Secretary of the Treas- ury and the next President in preparation for the economic summit as to an evaluation of the way in which the United States has dealt with the Third World debt to date and any changes that might be appropriate beginning with the new administration, what advice would you give? Mr. GREENSPAN. Senator, when I came into office almost a year ago, I had a number of differing notions as to how to resolve what was clearly an extraordinarily difficult problem, and it is really quite interesting that when you get, as I have, into the day-by-day details and the whole financing process and the whole issue of rela- tionships between creditors and debtors and banks and financial in- stitutions, you begin of necessity to see where the real crucial issues are. The one thing that has struck me as upfront in all of this is how important the resolution of this debt question is in general and how necessary the solution to the problem is. The crucial initial focus of where one starts in resolving this problem is the economic policy actions of the debtor nations. It's fairly obvious that if economic policies are adequate to re- solve the difficulties that a lot of these debtor nations have, both they and the international financial system will come out of this probably strengthened, having learned basically how to deal with this extraordinarily difficult problem. If there are inadequate economic policies, there is no solution, of which I am aware, that's credible over the longer run to resolve this debt problem. I think that the most recent action in history of, for example, Brazil, is really quite illustrative. As you know, a year or so ago, Brazil introduced a unilateral moratorium on payments and, in retrospect, upon relooking at what was gained from all of that, the new finance minister, Mailson Nobrega, concluded it was negative to Brazil's interest and immediately reversed it and en- deavored to restore far more sensible policy approach. He has moved back into very detailed discussions and very fruitful discus- sions with the commercial banking system. I think that what we are learning from this process is that when the finance ministers and various other members of the economic team of the debtor nations look in detail at this issue, they recog- nize that step No. 1 is what they do. And I think that we—that is, the United States and the next administration—should do what- ever we can do to see to it that their actions are implemented in a most productive way and in a manner which induces their credi- tors, who obviously want them to succeed, to be as helpful as possi- ble. That's essentially the process which currently is the policy of this country. I must say to you that I think it has the highest prob- ability of achieving more than all of the various different alterna- tives which I've been exposed to. Most of the alternatives require some very large bailouts with taxpayer money, which I think would turn out actually to be counterproductive. At the moment, I Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 113 would recommend that we endeavor to enhance the process which is currently in place. Senator GRAHAM. So, in summary, your recommendation to the next administration would be a continuation of the current policy? Mr. GREENSPAN. Yes. It's the policy which endeavors on a case- by-case basis to recognize that the only way to get individual coun- tries back on a basis which gives them access to the international financial markets on a voluntary basis is to go in the direction we're going. My major concern is that if we fail in doing that, these debtor nations will be out of the private markets for a generation, as they were the last time they ran into difficulties in the 1920's. That, I might add, would be a tragedy not only for them but for the whole international financial system. Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Before I recognize Senator Heinz, I ask unani- mous consent that a statement by Senator Chafee appear at the be- ginning of the hearing before the chairman was recognized. Senator Heinz. Senator HEINZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you. CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT AND IMPORT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL Chairman Greenspan, earlier you referred to our current account deficit and this country's imports of foreign capital. You observed that the United States is living beyond its means. We have accu- mulated a $400 billion debt to other countries and there are some estimates that our debt could reach $1 trillion by the early 1990's. Some people say that the United States is importing a lot of cap- ital to pay for current consumption and that we cannot continue to follow that policy. However others say those imports of capital are really an indication of strength in the United States' economy and that this country is an attractive place to put your money. Which of those two views is correct? Mr. GREENSPAN. At various different times, both of them are cor- rect. Senator HEINZ. What about the present? Mr. GREENSPAN. The trouble with my answering is that the bottom line in any short-term period is the direction of the ex- change rate, and that's a topic which I think I'm probably wise to stay away from. Senator HEINZ. But that's the precise area I wanted you to ad- dress. Mr. GREENSPAN. I'm delighted I fended you off in advance. [Laughter.] Senator HEINZ. Would you agree that today the single most im- portant determinant of international exchange rates is the level of interest rates in our country? Mr. GREENSPAN. It's certainly one of the elements. I think the more general notion I would put forth is that the exchange rate is being determined, to a very substantial extent, by the willingness of foreigners to hold dollar-denominated assets relative to assets de- nominated in other currencies. And while obviously differential in- Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 114 terest rates are a crucial element in that determination, it is by no means the only element. Senator HEINZ. In your view, what are the other key elements? Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, I think it's interesting that when you try, for example, to examine why the American dollar rose so sharply from 1983 through 1985, in most of that period the real interest rates on dollar-denominated securities were not increasing relative to interest rates denominated in other securities. Senator HEINZ, Were they relatively higher? Mr. GREENSPAN. They were higher, but remember, the spread be- tween real interest rates will determine the spread between cur- rencies or the exchange rate, not whether it's going up or going down. Senator HEINZ. What you're saying then is that confidence in an economy is another key factor. Mr. GREENSPAN. Yes, and I think it's crucially so. Senator HEINZ. I think there would be very few people who would disagree with that. There are some people who say that the United States is in dire straits, and that we are in an irreversible economic decline. In sup- port of that view, they cite statistics that show that real disposable income per capita has been stagnant for 15 years or so. They also cite our relatively poor productivity and the huge trade deficit. In contrast there are other people who say that the economic policies that we are following are totally sound, that these policies are responsible for nearly 6 years of economic growth, and that we should continue to follow those policies that have worked so well because they will continue to work well in the future. The former is a pessimistic view of this country. The latter is an optimistic view of this country. Clearly, the view that foreigners take, whether it's one or the other or someplace in between, is quite material to where the dollar lies in international currency values. Which of those views comes closest to your own? Mr. GREENSPAN. I must say I'm impressed with the improvement in productivity which has occurred in recent years, especially in manufacturing. The irony of that is it probably it was at least partly the result of competitive pressures coming from abroad as a consequence of a rise in the dollar, which in turn induced an awful lot of endeavors on the part of manufacturing companies to pare down in many instances what clearly in retrospect was a loaded cost structure. Whatever one may say about the United States in the 1970's and the difficult periods we had in the late 1970's, the most recent period has been really quite impressive and in one respect surpris- ing. I don't think any of us who were in the forecasting business, as I was as a private citizen, would, IVa years ago, have essentially projected the developments that have emerged over the previous times. Senator HEINZ. Aren't there times though, when being a private citizen felt good? Mr. GREENSPAN. Many times. Senator HEINZ. If you were persuaded that one view was right and the other was wrong, would it not make a difference in the Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 115 way the Fed conducted its policy? If you adopted the pessimistic view, would the Fed's policy be different than if it adopted the opti- mistic view that I described a moment ago? Mr. GREENSPAN. I don't think that the two views are in suffi- ciently constructed detail for me to then apply monetary policy to that because I don't think Senator HEINZ. Let me suggest a hypothesis. You may disagree with it. I'll try and be brief because my time has expired and Sena- tor Bond deserves his time. If indeed the pessimistic view is correct, would it be reasonable for the Fed to follow a policy that would allow the dollar to drift lower in order to make our exports more competitive and imports more expensive? Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, merely allowing the dollar to drift lower doesn't automatically create that phenomenon, because if in the process a falling dollar engendered an acceleration of inflationary forces in the United States, the cost competitiveness of American exporters would not be improving vis-a-vis those of our foreign competitors and could very well in the end turn out to be counter- productive. History is strewn with experiences of individual compa- nies trying to improve their competitive position through devalu- ations and failed. Senator HEINZ. Mr. Chairman, Chairman Greenspan has been very responsive to my question. Just as a concluding comment I would observe that it's quite remarkable that the dollar has fallen as much as it has over the last 2 years without any resurgence of inflation. Therefore, I'm not sure I totally understand the rationale for Chairman Greenspan's last comment. However, I am sure that there will be other occasions when we can pursue this matter fur- ther. I do want to draw specifically to the Fed's attention a very signif- icant report. This is the first part of what will be a much longer study by the Office of Technology Assessment. It's a study that many of us requested about 2 years ago. It was called "Paying the Bill: Manufacturing and America's Trade Deficit." The reason it struck me as relevant is that Chairman Greenspan indicated that he was impressed with the improvements in Ameri- ca's manufacturing productivity in recent years. This report suggests that our improvements in the manufactur- ing sector, while significant when compared to the 1970's are not enough when compared with what other developed countries are doing today. At best, we are not falling behind. At worst, there are many areas where we are continuing to lose our competitive advan- tage and lead, in terms of both productivity and technological ad- vancement. I ask that the Fed please study this report carefully. Perhaps it's worth further discussion and even a hearing to get Chairman Greenspan's views and that of other experts on this report. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bond. Senator BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm always happy to accommodate my friend from Pennsylvania in order that we can hear the discussion that Chairman Greenspan has had with us. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 116 I want to follow up on the exchange rate question because it came up yesterday in testimony by a distinguished private econo- mist before this committee, who said that really he thought the Fed and particularly the Treasury Department ought to be placing more emphasis on maintaining the exchange rate within a narrow range. Not fixing it, but keeping it in a narrow range because of the importance of that exchange rate for fiscal and monetary policy, the interdependence of our economy with the world econo- my. He suggested that some of the problems we have seen and may see are more likely to come because of exchange rate fluctuations. I would appreciate your views and discussion on that issue. EXCHANGE RATES Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, Senator, I think that we certainly agree that exchange rate stability is a desirable goal. It's clearly some- thing that not only we in the United States believe but it is the general view of the international financial community—very spe- cifically the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors who are largely in charge of implementing, on a day-by-day basis, ex- change rate policy for the major trading nations of the world. There is no question that instability in the exchange rates would create risk premium, create instabilities in other economic varia- bles, and clearly is not something which would enhance economic growth either for the United States or for our trading partners. Senator BOND. I was most interested again to hear your discus- sions about the problem of the burden of debt going beyond the Federal debt in our system. What would be your suggestions with respect to tax policies to either encourage savings or to discourage borrowing? And what could be done to encourage an increase in personal and corporate savings in this country, in addition to the need to balance our Fed- eral budget? Mr. GREENSPAN. Senator, we have over the years endeavored to use the tax system in order to enhance savings, to basically en- hance the proportion of equity to debt in the system and to largely counter the problems which excessive debt and excessive borrowing clearly create. It's a slow process. I don't think we've been anywhere near as successful as I would like to see us be. The types of things we have to do in the tax area to significantly increase savings and discour- age debt, I suspect, are very politically difficult to do. I've concluded, as a consequence, that it is probably far easier and, for the moment, perhaps just as productive to recognize that if we bring the Federal deficit not only down to zero but allow it to move into surplus, we will in fact be creating many of the very positive things which we need to offset the excessive debt creation that one has seen over the most recent period. If I were to recommend a specific focus of policy which has got the largest economic impact on this problem, it's clearly moving toward a Federal surplus over the years as fast as we can. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 117 Senator BOND. Finally, with respect to that budget deficit, you played the lead in the very important work of the commission to fix the Social Security System. What's the proper place for Social Security in the Federal budget? Should it be off budget or should we be using the surplus to pay off our other government obligations? Mr. GREENSPAN. Senator, in a technical sense, it should be on budget in the sense that we look at the total economic impact of the Federal Government's activities. If one chooses to take it off- budget and focus on the non-Social Security trust fund budget and if one endeavors to take that budget deficit—which will obviously be larger than the current one in the unified budget deficit—down to zero or balance, we will automatically create the type of surplus- es which we will need in the aggregate unified budget system. So whatever the Congress ultimately decides to do—and at the moment, of course, it is scheduled to go off-budget—one should per- ceive of the necessity to create a surplus in the unified total budget including Social Security funds for the type of increase in domestic savings which I think this Nation needs. Senator BOND. Chairman Greenspan, my sincere thanks for your most informative testimony. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence and patience in al- lowing me to ask questions. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Well, I'd be delighted to have you go on. I'll tell you, our problem is that the Democratic Caucus is meeting right now at 11:45 with President Dukakis and Vice President Bentsen and, for that reason, as you can imagine, they're almost as big an attraction as you are, but I'm going to stay here because I've got some questions for you that I'm sure you will answer with at least as much information as the next President and Vice President will. Senator BOND. Mr. Chairman, would you be so kind as to ask that pair who's defense and international policies they're going to follow, the Governor's or the Senator's? It would be most interest- ing to learn. I'd be delighted to hear that discussion. The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think they will follow the very wise poli- cies that will come from a blending of the exchange of information and intelligence on both sides which is very high. [Laughter.] Chairman Greenspan, it's a delight not to have to run again for public office, I'll tell you, because when you don't have to run again for public office you don't have to take the position that all Members of Congress and administrations take that we avoid a re- cession at all costs. We've heard that from Senator Sasser and Sen- ator D'Amato today, two fine Senators, but I think that can get us into a lot of trouble. I notice you didn't indicate that. You indicated we wanted to mitigate recessions and wanted to do all we can to make the reces- sion as painless as possible, but that's the price you pay for a free economy, in my view, and we're going to have to face that. One of the things you do to get on top of the problem of excessive debt and deficient savings it seems to me is to let interest rates rise. That is the way it would seem to me that you penalize debt, isn't it? We know that borrowing to buy homes, borrowing tc buy cars is enormously sensitive to the level of interest rates. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 118 Mr. GREENSPAN. I think it is certainly true that mortgage inter- est rates do impact to a significant extent the desire on the part of individuals to buy homes and therefore their willingness to take out mortgage debt. It's not clear that that's true in consumer credit in general or, as we have observed in recent years, credit cards. But in general, it is certainly the case that in the consumer area that the mortgage interest rate is a crucial variable. The CHAIRMAN. Now how about the effect of the level of interest rates on savings? The testimony by and large has been that savings is quite inelastic and that even if interest rates rise sharply people are not inclined to save more. Is that correct? Mr. GREENSPAN. I think that's correct in a general sense. Obvi- ously, If a specific depository institution raises its interest rate, it will gain savings. But the total is very insensitive and very inelas- tic to changes in interest rates. The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you about the discount rate. In recent weeks, the Federal funds rate has been averaging near 75/s percent. Yet the discount rate is only 6 percent. Ordinarily, the dis- count rate would be set at a level that is much closer to the short- term money market rates. Some are beginning to suggest that the Fed is reluctant to raise the discount rate for fear of the impact of a rate rise on the Presi- dential election. Others claim that it would only send the dollar higher. Why has the Fed been reluctant to make an adjustment in the discount rate that seems justified given the level of current short- term interest rates and the implication in your testimony that they may have to rise some more? DISCOUNT RATE Mr. GREENSPAN. Senator, the relationship between the Federal funds rate and the discount rate has varied quite considerably over the years. Spreads have been both significantly higher and signifi- cantly lower in past periods. We have a number of instruments that can be employed to ad- dress specific problems of monetary policy and the Federal Open Market Committee, in conjunction with the Federal Reserve Board, makes choices about what the best mix is at any particular time. It's been the judgment to date of the FOMC and the Federal Re- serve Board that the current relationships are satisfactory. The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday, the panel of experts who appeared agreed with you that fiscal tightening could produce an expansion when accompanied by monetary ease. The panelists suggested that a substantial reason for this was that the change in the policy mix would cause the dollar to fall and we would then experience fur- ther improvement in our trade balance and export-related invest- ments. Your analysis in February suggests that we would see an expan- sion if the deficit is reduced substantially. Today, you say that fiscal contraction will increase confidence in U.S. policy and may cause the dollar to rise. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 119 If the dollar rises and the deficit is reduced, how will an expan- sion result? Mr. GREENSPAN. I'm sorry, if what? The CHAIRMAN. If the dollar rises and the deficit is reduced, how will that cause an economic expansion? Mr. GREENSPAN. We're talking now about the Federal deficit? The CHAIRMAN. That's right. Mr. GREENSPAN. If the Federal deficit comes down, real domestic dollar denominated interest rates are likely to fall significantly. There is unquestionably a very substantial backlog of capital in- vestment mainly for modernization projects that would be forth- coming in this country if real long-term interest rates declined. And all of the various other suppressing elements in the econo- my would be clearly offset by that. What we don't have enough of is net capital investment. Gross investment is quite high, but it's relatively short-lived assets with high depreciation rates and the trend of net capital investment to net national product has been going down for quite a number of years. It is that which would turn around and that which would support the economy. The CHAIRMAN. But wouldn't that have an adverse effect on demand? As the deficit goes down, there's less stimulus from the Government spending. Mr. GREENSPAN. Certainly. The CHAIRMAN. And the relationship between taxing and spend- ing is adverse as far as the economy is concerned and as the dollar rises, of course, we sell less abroad and buy more from abroad. Wouldn't that tend to overcome the modification in interest rates? Mr. GREENSPAN. I don't necessarily think so. I think that using the hypothetical example which we're using, the missing element in there is precisely the reaction of domestic capital investment. One can reduce purchasing power or effective demand from the de- cline in the Federal deficit and one can reduce the export demand one could get if one hypothesizes that we lose some of that, but that could be fully offset and more by domestic capital investment if the combination of both of those elements brings real interest rates down. I'd say the conclusion of where you come out in the example is really indeterminate without being far more specific about the var- ious relationships that exist amongst those elements in the econo- my. The CHAIRMAN. My time is up, but I get the feeling that you seem to feel that maybe we can avoid a recession. If that hap- pens—of course, these are the elements—reducing the deficit and having the dollar rise it seems to me are two factors that I think in the long run would be helpful to our economy, but I would think we would have to go through a recession at the same time. That's one of the things that brings interest rates down. Mr. GREENSPAN. I would say, Mr. Chairman, that there is not enough information, so to speak, in that hypothetical forecast to tell me whether or not there's a recession without knowing what domestic capital investment is, and the lower interest rates could be a significant event in today's environment should those events occur. I'm obviously not subscribing to that as a forecast because that's not the way we look at things. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 120 The CHAIRMAN. You're disagreeing with William McChesney Martin and arguing that you can push a string? Mr. GREENSPAN. I'm not aware that this is string pushing. I'm just aware of the fact that the type of scenario that is out there, the type of international adjustment process, can in fact be imple- mented over the longer run without a recession. That it can be done is certain. That it will necessarily happen, obviously I can't comment on. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Bond. Senator BOND. I don't have as distinguished a luncheon as you do to go to, so go ahead. The CHAIRMAN. Some producers of export goods have claimed that they would not invest in new capacity despite the rise in utili- zation rates because they did not feel confident that the dollar would stay at its current level. Is the rise in the dollar over the last couple of weeks going to fuel these doubts and cause export firms to cut back on capital for- mation plans? Mr. GREENSPAN. I haven't seen any evidence of that, Senator. On the contrary, at the moment, orders for export goods are really quite impressive. The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday in testimony before the committee David Hale of Kemper Financial Services suggested that the ex- change rate targets be made explicit by disclosing them to the public. Do you support that idea? Mr. GREENSPAN. No, I do not. The CHAIRMAN. What are the costs of making public the target zones for exchange rates? Mr. GREENSPAN. I think that what would happen very quickly is that we would engender a tremendous amount of speculation around the targets and ultimately make the policy of implementing them exceptionally difficult. The net result, as I would see it, would be counterproductive. BAILOUT OF S&I-'S The CHAIRMAN. Now members of this committee, including the distinguished Senator from Texas who's one of the brightest men in the Senate, have argued that we must not under any circum- stances bail out the S&L's. But I don't see that we have much choice if things worsen because we have a promise to, of course, pay insurance on all deposits under $100,000 which is most of the deposits. Some have suggested that the resolution of the S&L crisis will entail using funds from the interest earnings of the Federal Re- serve on its open market portfolio to recapitalize the savings and loan insurance fund. In 1987, the Fed returned to the Treasury over $17 billion. Do you favor using these funds to recapitalize the S&L industry? Mr. GREENSPAN. Let me just say that what we are talking about is precisely the same as appropriations and expenditures from the budget because to the extent that you divert funds that we earn and return to the Treasury, receipts are lower in the total Federal Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 121 budget. It makes no difference so far as the Federal budget deficit is concerned whether you do it that way—that is, take money off the earnings of the Federal Reserve—or you expend money on the outlay side. The CHAIRMAN. There's a critical difference. Members of Con- gress don't have to vote for that appropriation. [Laughter.] Mr. GREENSPAN. I quite agree. The CHAIRMAN. And the President can say I can't handle these fellows in the Federal Reserve, they're appointed and they're inde- pendent and they should be and if they want to do it that way, then God bless them. Mr. GREENSPAN. Without commenting on the very last remark, I'm not certain it's good precedent or good policy. The CHAIRMAN. Now in public statements you've supported an increase in the gasoline tax. Mr. GREENSPAN. That's correct. The CHAIRMAN. I doubt that Vice President Bentsen will support that recommendation. Wouldn't a gas tax depress the price of energy and exacerbate the regional depression in the oil-producing regions and wouldn't it also make the S&L crisis worse in view of the problems in Texas and California? GASOLINE TAX Mr. GREENSPAN. No, I don't think so, Mr. Chairman, because I believe that the world price of gasoline is determined not in the United States but in the world, and it's essentially derived from the price of crude oil. So in the sense of the tax depressing the price of gasoline, there's no evidence that that would happen. It presumably would depress the demand for domestic gasoline in the United States and in that regard, over the long run, I consider that a plus, not a negative. Since gasoline consumption in the United States in and of itself is a remarkably large proportion of aggregate world oil consumption, I would assume that to the extent that the tax lowers domestic gasoline consumption, as it would, one can argue that, on the margin, it lowers long-term crude oil prices and has some feedback effects here. But my suspicion is that those numbers are really quite marginal and will have very little effect on the oil-producing economy of the United States. The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Greenspan, one of the statistics I'm sure you look at in considering inflation is capacity utilization and obviously if we move toward a higher level of capacity utilization there's more inflationary pressures. Dr. Cooper, of Harvard, has recommended broadening our view there. In your testimony, you suggest that capacity utilization is high and that this will contribute to a rise in prices in the years ahead. At our last hearing, Dr. Cooper suggested that as long as there were no import barriers in a sector that full capacity utiliza- tion would lead to greater imports rather than a rise in prices. Dr. Cooper suggested that one focus on the state of global capacity uti- lization in the industry in question rather than on national rates of capacity utilization. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 122 Do you agree with Dr. Cooper's emphasis on global capacity utili- zation? Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, only in a general way. Remember, that to the extent you pick up imports to supply shortages in the United States, you basically have to pay for them and one would presume at the extreme that that would cause the dollar's exchange rate to fall which would increase the domestic price of the imports over time which in turn would create the same inflationary problems that we are concerned about. The CHAIRMAN. Of course, time is an important element here, isn't it? Mr. GREENSPAN. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. How long would that time be? Would it be sever- al years? Mr. GREENSPAN. I don't know. Yes, it could conceivably be. How- ever, I do think there is a different question and there is a sense in which I would agree with Dr. Cooper. What we really are con- cerned about is deliverability of products by our manufacturing producers and the way we measure that best is their ability to supply products quickly to their customers. At the moment we have nonaccelerating delivery lead times on materials—meaning when customers come to the salesman for delivery they are not being quoted excessively increasing lead times with the exception of steel and aluminum and a few other things. But in general not. What that is saying is that we still have adequate deliverability capabilities in American manufacturing. Our concern is that we will get squeezed and that will all of a sudden cause huge stret- chouts in delivery lead times which is where the inflation comes from. The reason that we have adequate deliverability capabilities at the moment is that, at least in part, we do have access to imports and to products and materials from abroad. So in a certain sense, what Dr. Cooper is arguing for already exists. My concern about the way he put it in a generalized sense is that in the longer run it probably doesn't work. The CHAIRMAN. One final question. Do you favor paying interest to banks on their required reserves? Mr. GREENSPAN. That's a subject which gets to the whole ques- tion of interest on demand deposits and a variety of other issues. I do think that, as I have thought over the years, we should look at the whole question of paying interest on demand deposits. That would bring forth the whole question of paying interest on reserve balances. That, however, would be such a major change in the way the Federal Reserve System functions that I think we have to give it very considerable thought. The CHAIRMAN. Would that have an adverse effect on the budget deficit? Mr. GREENSPAN. Perhaps. The CHAIRMAN. Why not? It's money that would otherwise go into the Treasury, wouldn't it? Mr. GREENSPAN. In net, it could. It would depend on a number of other things. The CHAIRMAN. Why wouldn't it? I would think it would inevita- bly have that effect. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 123 Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, there's no question obviously that in the immediate short run it obviously reduces the amount of moneys that are paid to the Treasury, but to the extent that that creates profits in the commercial banking system, part of it gets absorbed by the corporate income tax. The CHAIRMAN. Well, as you know, I love the banks, but the taxes they pay to the Federal Government are not overwhelming. They have all kinds of ways of diminishing those taxes. Some people tell me the tax they pay is a matter of their public relations rather than any real requirement. Mr. GREENSPAN. I'm not going to comment on that. The CHAIRMAN. OK. Senator Bond. Senator BOND. Mr. Chairman, just one last question. One of our colleagues asked if I would inquire what impact Chairman Green- span thinks the drought may have on the banking system. We have had banks in trouble in our part of the country in the heartland as a result of agricultural and commodity loans. Do you see any in- creased stress on agricultural lending banks that may have been put in a precarious position from the drought? Mr. GREENSPAN. Well, as you know, Senator, prior to the drought, the agricultural banks were coming back quite rapidly and doing rather well. I think this probably will stall some of the improvement in some of the cases, but I don't see it as something which will throw us back into the types of difficulties that we had previously. Senator BOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have been superb and I can't thank you enough for your fine testimony. The committee will stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] [Response to written questions and additional material supplied for the record follow:] Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 124 Chairman Greenspan subsequently submitted the following in response to written questions from Chairman Proxmire in connection with the hearing held on July 13, 1988 : (Question 1; It is often suggested that cutting the federal budget"deficit will be least painful if it is offset by economic stimulus in some other sector of the economy. Since early 1985 the decline in the exchange value of the dollar has provided stimulus to export and import-competing industries. o According to the Federal Reserve's analysis, if the exchange rate remains at current levels, how long will it be before the adjustment to the decline of the dollar since early 1985 completes propagating through the economic system and ceases to provide substantial stimulus to the economy? o According to the Federal Reserve's analysis, given current exchange rates, at what point in time will the current account balance begin to deteriorate because the increment in external debt service caused by the current account deficit begins to exceed the improvement in the merchandise trade deficit? Answer; The large net decline in the dollar's value since early 1985 has set in motion forces that should continue, for some time to come, the improvement in our external position that we have been experiencing. Conventional models of the U.S. current account, including some of those used by the Federal Reserve Board staff as well as other prominent models, suggest that most of the shifts in demand for exports and imports resulting from an exchange rate change are realized within about two to three years. Thus, if exchange rates were to remain unchanged, these models suggest that the U.S. current account might begin to deteriorate after 1990 or so, both because of rising debt service and because the level of imports would still exceed the level of exports, implying larger absolute increases in imports under reasonable assumptions about other factors. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 125 However, there is a wide range of uncertainty surrounding these model results, especially given the unpre- cedented size of exchange rate movements. Moreover, these models do not even purport to capture all aspects of the process of external adjustment. For example, the improvement in the competitive position of U.S. firms might well induce an increase in productive capacity that would impact favorably on our ex- ternal position. Actions to reduce our federal budget deficit would work In the same direction. In short, we simply do not know enough to predict when, if ever, the ongoing improvement in our current account will be reversed, even at current exchange rates. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 126 -3- Question 2: On Monday, July 19th, the New York Times reported the results of three studies on the dynamic adjustment of the trade balance and current account balance in the United States in the absence of further dollar depreciation. The study by Data Resources cited in the article suggests that the trade deficit will stop declining in 1989 and begin to rise there- after. The WEFA Group's study shows a similar result with both the trade deficit and the current account deficit beginning to widen again in the early 1990s. The third study, by the Institute for International Economics, suggests that even with- out the recent appreciation of the dollar the trade deficit will not dip below $100 billion before it begins to grow again. This last study may be the most discouraging because it does not even account for the recent appreciation of the dollar. o If one assumes that the dollar does not depreciate further does the Federal Reserve's model predict a result that differs markedly from the results described in the New York Times article? o Absent a further decline in the dollar and a recession, how will the United States achieve a balanced current account in the next several years? Answer: Some of the models used by staff at the Federal Reserve Board show results not unlike those of the studies cited. That reflects the fact that the same basic structure underlies all of these models. Less conventional models that take into account a wider range of factors, in- cluding supply responses of producers, yield somewhat more optimistic results. Moreover, no model can take account of all factors bearing on external adjustment. The United States has achieved an enormous recovery in competitiveness as a consequence of the exchange rate adjust- ments of the past several years coupled with continued increases in manufacturing productivity and restrained increases in wages and prices. To ensure that this is sustained and results in a Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 127 continuing improvement in our external balances, we must act to avoid excessive pressure on our productive capacity. Actions to reduce the federal budget deficit are certainly desirable in this context. A monetary policy like the current one, designed to preclude additional inflationary pressures, will help also to improve our external position. One cannot be certain that those policies would be sufficient to restore our external accounts to a more sustainable configuration within the next several years, but they could at least ensure that we continue to move in the right direction. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 128 -5- Question 3: In a panel discussion at the February hearings, Professor Richard Cooper of Harvard University said the following: "... there is a serious anomaly in the present U.S. arrangements and that is that the Federal Reserve is formally in charge of domestic monetary policy but the Treasury is formally in charge of exchange rate policy. That was an arrangement that worked perfectly well under the Bretton Woods system in which the U.S. was the passive player and we didn't intervene actively in exchange markets. That is an anomalous arrangement in a world of flexible exchange rates and it is one of the sources of the tensions that exist between the Treasury and the Fed today." o Do you agree with this statement? o The Federal Reserve was criticized by the Administration in late 1987 and early 1988 for the slow growth rate of money last year. Do you not find that difficult to accept in light of the fact that a significant reason for the monetary slowdown was that the Federal Reserve was defending the dol- lar to live up to an exchange rate agreement made in conjunction with the Administration in February of 1987? Answer: In the Federal Reserve's conduct of monetary policy, the value of the dollar on foreign exchange markets is an important consideration. The exchange rate is a central price variable in the economy, with implications both for U.S. inflation and output and for resource shifts across sectors. We cannot be indifferent toward it nor can we ignore the informa- tion it may provide. Indeed, conditions in exchange markets at times have been accorded very high priority in our policy decisions. We also work closely with the Treasury in the formulation and implementation of U.S. exchange rate policy. Senior Treasury officials consult extensively with Federal Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 129 Reserve officials in a cooperative effort to ensure financial stability, better balance in the nation's international ac- counts, and improved prospects for sustainable economic growth over the long run. During 1987, the exchange rate was given a great deal of weight in monetary policy deliberations, but was not the exclusive, or even the major, factor behind the rise in interest rates and the slowing of money growth. Instead, the major factor was concern about a resurgence of inflation more gen- erally. At times during the year, soaring commodity prices and sharp declines in the dollar and bond prices signaled the possibility of greater inflationary dangers. With real GNP growing well above its long-run potential and levels of resource utilization climbing at an unsustainable pace, the Federal Reserve had to be especially alert to these and other indica- tions of potential inflation pressures. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 130 -7- Question 4; In a recent book entitled, "Managing the Dollar", by Yoichi Funabashi, the author discusses an episode where the exchange rate between the yen and the dollar was managed to promote the reelection of Mr. Nakasone in Japan. Secretary Baker of the Treasury allegedly made comments on the exchange rate to stop the yen from appreciating against the dollar just before the Japanese elections. There is also an insinuation that the Japanese provided a similar courtesy to the Administration before the 1986 Congressional elections. Mr. Hale, in a panel hearing on July 12, mentioned this in his testimony. He also cited a Financial Times editorial on July 2nd which espoused this view. An article in the New York Times on the same day suggested that the dollar was being manipulated to help George Bush. Since that time the Washington Post and Jeffrey Garten, a New York investment banker writing in the Hew York Times, have also expressed concern on this ques- tion. o Why would the Japanese or other foreign powers prefer George Bush to Michael Dukakis? o Do you know of an agreement between the Japanese and the Treasury in 1988 that is similar to the one Mr. Funabashi described in his book? Are the Japanese and other foreign powers capable of acting to stabilize markets to help a Bush Administration get elected as Mr. Hale and the press have suggested? Answer: It would be inappropriate for Federal Reserve officials to speculate about the political preferences of indi- viduals in other countries or about their political strategies. I know of no agreement between the Japanese and the Treasury that is similar to the one described in Mr. Funabashi's book. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 131 Ques t ion 5; In recent months Governor Johnson has stated that tTiree indicators are helpful when assessing the suitability of monetary policy. The behavior of an index of commodity prices, the term structure of interest rates, and the foreign exchange value of the dollar. o The December 1987 and the June 1988 issues of the OECD Economic Outlook suggest that foreign purchases of long-term bonds, particularly by Japanese insti- tutional investors, occurred in 1985 and 1986. If foreign holders sell long-term securities will not the dollar decline at the same time that long-term interest rates rise? What has been Che correlation between the steepening of the term structure and the change in the yen-dollar exchange rate in since the end of 1986? o At the panel hearing on July 12, Dr. Rudiger Dornbusch suggested that the level of commodity prices is affected by the dollar exchange rate. That is presumably because most commodities are priced IB dollars and when the dollar depreciates the demand for commodities is stimulated in the industrial countries whose currencies have appre- ciated. Dr. Dornbusch claims that, "Using commodity price-oriented monetary policy may simply amount to a disguised exchange rate target." What is the correlation between exchange rate changes and changes in commodities prices? o Are not movements in commodity price indices, the term structure of interest rates, and the foreign exchange rate highly correlated? Does each convey much information that is independent of the others? o In recent weeks many commodity prices have fallen, the dollar has risen, and the term structure of interest rates has flattened. Is that an indication that monetary policy is becoming too tight1? Answer: A desired shift out of long-term U.S. securities into foreign currency-denominated assets in response to, say, worse-than-expected U.S. trade figures would tend to cause U.S. long-term interest rates to rise and the dollar to depreciate. On the other hand, a desired shift out of long-term Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 132 U.S. securities into short-term dollar assets in response to, say, an anticipated Federal Reserve tightening, would tend to be associated with rising U.S. long-term rates and an appreciation of the dollar. Thus, depending on the nature of the new information, changes in U.S. long-term rates can be associated with either increases or decreases in the dollar's exchange value. The simple correlation coefficient between weekly changes in the U.S. term structure (30-year bond minus 3-month bills) and percentage changes in the yen-dollar exchange rate since the end of 1986 is -.03. The correlation of the levels is -.33. Changes in the dollar prices of internationally traded commodities should, indeed, be negatively related to changes in the dollar's exchange value since it is world (not just U.S.) demand and supply which determines these prices. The correla- tion coefficient between monthly percentage changes in the Economist commodity price index (in dollars) and monthly per- centage changes in the dollar's weighted average exchange value in terms of other G-10 currencies since 1982 is -.20. The correlation coefficient between monthly levels of commodity prices and the dollar's weighted average exchange value from end-1982 is -.50; between commodity prices and the term structure of interest rates (measured by the difference between the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds and 3-month Treasury Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 133 -ID- bills) is .08; between the term structure and the weighted average dollar, .20. Since none of these correlations is par- ticularly high, it would be reasonable to conclude that each of the three variables conveys some information not conveyed by the others. (Also see attached chart.) Interpretations of the movements in any of these indicators require a knowledge of the surrounding circumstances and judgments of what factors lie behind the shifts in supply and demand. Even if these three indicators, along with others, were all moving in a consistent direction and all were reflecting the recent tightening of monetary policy, that information alone could not answer the question whether monetary policy was becoming too tight. The answer to that question would depend on the extent of the move- ment of these indicators and the strength of their relationships to subsequent developments in the overall economy, in particu- lar, the general price level. Given the present risks of inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy, we do not consider monetary policy to be excessively tight in present circum- stances. Attachment Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis SELECTED INDICATORS "Monthly WEIGHTED AVERAGE DOLLAR EXCHANGE VALUE (March 1973 -100) CO Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 135 -ii- Question 6: It is often suggested that raising interest rates is necessary to arrest the formation of a wage price inflationary spiral. At the same time, interest rates, like wages, represent a cost to a business which must borrow for working capital and fixed investment. o In the short run does a rise in interest rates create "cost push" inflation just as a rise in wages would? o Is it possible to generate an interest rate-price spiral which is analogous to a vage-price spiral whereby a rise in interest rates leads to an increase in prices followed by an investor reaction demanding an inflation premium in interest rates which raises costs and prices again? o Would you please provide to the Committee data which shows how wages, business profits and net interest shares of national income have evolved in the post world war period? Answer: There appears to be no compelling evidence at the macro level of the interest rate-price effect you suggest. Although interest costs may be an expense that businesses will seek to cover in their pricing, the net effect of a tightening of credit conditions that is reflected in higher interest rates (especially higher "real" rates) appears to be a damping of aggregate demand and of inflationary pressures. The data you requested are attached. Attachment Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 136 Question 16 SHARES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR NONRNANCIAL CORPORATIONS ( in percent) EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION r~ \ v , — 65 60 NET INTEREST — B PROFITS [26 y\ /- , SO ' \i V \< 1946 19S3 i960 1967 1974 1901 19B8 Data description notes are included on a separate page. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 137 Notes on Gross, Domestic Product of Honfinancial Corporations Shares of Gross Domestic Product for nonfinancial corporations are expressed in percentage terms. Gross domestic product of nonfinancial. corporations represents the value added of these business operations. It has accounted for more than 90 percent of total gross domestic corporate product and more than 55 percent of the U.S. gross national product in recent years. Employe* compensation includes wages and salaries plus fringe benefits paid by nonfinancial corporations. Net interest is the total interest paid less interest received by nonfinancial corporations. Domestic operations of nonfinancial firms provide for more than three-fourths of total U.S. corporate profits. Profits before taxes are operating profits for nonfinancial corporations, with adjustments to value inventories and capital at current replacement costs, but before corporate income taxes. Profits after taxes differ from profits before taxes by the amount of profits taxes (including federal, state and local income taxes levied on corporate profits). The remaining component shares of GDP that are not depicted in the charts (primarily, depreciation and indirect business taxes) averaged around 20 percent of GDP in recent years. data source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 138 -12-13- Question 7: It is often suggested that, given the rate of population growth and the rate of technical progress, the U.S. economy may overheat because demand growth will exceed the growth of capacity. Those offering this prediction suggest that U.S. real economic growth cannot proceed at much more than 2-2.5 percent in the years ahead. Some also suggest that in the absence of federal budget deficit reduction interest rates will have to be relied upon to modulate demand. o Are the expansion of capacity and the pace of modernization of our capital stock independent of the way in which aggregate demand is restrained? Do not increases in interest rates retard capital formation and slow down the growth of future poten- tial output and increases in future productivity? o What does the Federal Reserve analysis show the impact of a one percentage point increase in interest rates to be on plant and equipment investment? Answej:: It is my view that the mix of policies in the economy does have significant implications for the rate of capi- tal formation and thus for the level of potential output in the economy. It is for this reason that I have suggested that we should be seeking to move the federal budget toward surplus, thereby easing financial market pressures and freeing up savings for investment. One cannot quantify with precision the effects of interest rates on investment; different econometric models, employed at the Board and elsewhere, yield different results, and the outcome would vary depending on the circumstances. It is fair to say that most analysts are of the view that the short-run response of business capital spending to changes in interest rates is rather small, but that, over a period of a few years, the influence of the cost of capital on such investment is substantial. Residential investment, of course, has a more notable short-run interest-sensitivity. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 139 -14- Question 8; At the February hearing you alluded to the difficulties that the British had after the second world war because of their external imbalance. Some say that the U.S. debtor status gives foreign investors influence over the setting of monetary policy. o Do foreign creditors influence monetary policy any differently than domestic creditors do? o Is it the debtor status or just that capital is increasingly mobile internationally that makes the monetary management sensitive to international considerations? o Does that fact that foreign investors, particularly Japanese institutional investors, have chosen to invest in long-term instruments complicate the prob- lem of monetary management, as the December OECD Economic Outlook suggests? The Federal Reserve's instruments of monetary policy management primarily affect short-term interest rates don't they? How closely linked are short-term and long-term interest rates? Answer: The key factor making monetary management sensitive to international considerations is the high degree of international financial market integration rather than the net debtor status, per se, of the United States. Capital is ex- tremely mobile internationally, and there are large gross asset and liability positions in foreign currencies by U.S. residents as well as large positions in dollars by foreign residents. Gross flows into and out of currencies other than "home cur- rencies", by both U.S. and foreign residents, are a great multiple of net flows, and desired net positions can be very volatile. Both U.S. and foreign residents will likely seek to alter their net foreign exchange exposures in response to news Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 140 -15- that occasions a revision in exchange rate expectations, and these responses will affect actual exchange rates and, to some extent, asset prices. Whether U.S. or foreign residents, on the Whole, react differently to such news is a moot point. Long-term interest rates are influenced by a wide variety of factors, of which the portfolio preferences of a single group of investors is only one. Other factors, such as anticipation of short-term rates, inflation expectations, the perceived risk of interest rate fluctuations, real returns to capital, and the time preferences of savers probably dominate the setting of long-term interest rates. Monetary policy, which affects most directly current short-term interest rates but also expected short-term rates and expected inflation, is a key, but not determining, influence on long-term rates. Short-term and long-term rates tend to move together over time, but, given the importance of expectations among other factors not directly tied to current short-term rate levels, the linkage can be fairly loose. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 141 -16- Question 9; In recent months we have seen a continued rise in U.S. imports despite the decline of the dollar and the rise in price of imports. Recent data show that the most sur- prising strength in imports comes from capital goods imports. It appears that the rise in U.S. investment associated with improvements in the export sector is leading to an increased demand for imports. o Why are capital goods increasingly imported rather than purchased from U.S. producers? o Since these imports are being used to provide for improvements in the U.S. productive base presumably they will make the economy more competitive in the future. Should we worry about the size of our imports if they are largely used to expand domestic production possibilities for the future? o What foreign countries are producing the capital goods that we import? Answer: Imports as a share of expenditures by domestic producers of durable equipment (in constant dollars and exclud- ing motor vehicles) edged down during the first half of this year after having moved up throughout 1986 and 1987. Purchases of capital goods from domestic producers are rising very rapidly. In the first half of 1988, half of the increase in value and all of the increase in the volume of imported capital goods (1987-Q4 to 1988-Q2) can be accounted for by rising imports of aircraft, of computers, peripherals and parts, and of semiconductors. Imported capital goods do not now appear to be a problem for the U.S. capital goods industry, which is now doing very well (after a long lean period) because of expanding mar- kets both at home and abroad. So long as U.S. firms in general continue to expand their productive base, from whatever source Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 142 possible, the problem of servicing the debt associated with the imports of capital goods should not be a concern either. About three-fourths of U.S. imports of capital goods come from industrial countries. Western European countries supply about 30 percent of imported capital goods, with most of the items supplied not those showing notable increases in the first half of 1988; the one exception was imports of aircraft where France substantially increased its shipments of Airbuses to the United States. Japan supplies about 33 percent of capital goods imports (about half of which were computers, peripherals and parts, semiconductors, and electric generating machinery). Canada supplies less than 10 percent of the value of capital goods imports. Among developing countries, most of the imports come from Asia. Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan together account for nearly 20 percent of U.S. capital goods imports (half of which are computers and parts or semi- conductors). Other countries in Asia, especially Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, are particularly important in the production of semiconductors. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 143 -18- Question 10: Some analysts have suggested that there are public policy problems associated with running a social security trust fund surplus and a general budget deficit. o What are the dangers of this situation for citizens counting on future social security benefits? o What policy changes would you recommend to manage the situation? Answer: I believe that, for the purposes of macroeconomic analysis, it is appropriate to look at the federal budget including the social security surplus/deficit. This provides a better picture of the government's overall contribu- tion to the flow of savings in the economy. There is no particular danger in running a social security surplus and a "general budget" deficit, so long as the two net out acceptably—which I believe to be on the surplus side, in light of our deficient level of national saving. How- ever, it is important to recognize that the prospective trust fund surpluses are needed to fund social security benefits in future years, and when the trust fund balances are later run down, the negative effects on the government's overall fiscal position will magnify any deficits in the remainder of the budget. Consequently, I think it is crucial that we keep a close watch on the trends in both components of the budget. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 144 -19- Question 11: In his testimony at the panel hearing on July 12, David Hale referred to the fact that President Roosevelt went off of gold in 1933 to reflate the economy. Many commentators are busy citing similarities between 1929 and 1933. o Is it not true that one significant difference between the two cases derives from the fact that the depreciation of the dollar began in 1985, two years before the crash, and the 1933 devaluation came 3.5 years after the crash of 1929? o Does that not account for a large part of the difference in post crash performance of the real economy in the two periods? o What other major structural differences exist in today's economy that would lead one to believe that the performance of the economy in the aftermath of the 1987 crash will differ from the experience after the 1929 stock market crash? Answer; There are a great many differences between the economic world today and that back in 1929-33. Certainly, the decline in the value of the dollar that has occurred since 1985 is having some highly favorable effects at present, especially in sectors such as manufacturing that had not enjoyed as great a measure of prosperity earlier in the current economic expansion and that are now contributing importantly to the improvement in our trade balance. In terms of the basic structure of the economy, one would have to identify in particular the differences in the financial system safeguards that exist today as compared with those in the earlier period. Federal deposit insurance provides significant protection against the kind of loss of confidence that might cause a negative development in one segment of the Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 145 -20- financial markets to create problems on a broader front; like- wise, the Federal Reserve is better prepared to deal with any liquidity shocks today, and, indeed, I believe that there is fairly general agreement that the steps the Federal Reserve took last fall were an important element in sustaining the strong uptrend in economic activity in the aftermath of the stock market break. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 146 -21- Question 12: In his testimony on July 12th David Hale presented testimony on data provided by the Bank for Inter- national Settlements regarding the currency denomination of offshore bank deposits owned by nonbanks which shows that the proportion of total deposits in the offshore financial system denominated in dollars has fallen quite markedly in recent years. Mr. Hale believes that this phenomena would help to explain the lower than normal monetary growth in the United States and the higher than normal monetary growth abroad in recent years. o Do you agree with Mr. Kale's analysis? o How does this show up in the U.S. monetary aggregates? o Mr. Hale also suggested that retail customers in the United States cannot be offered deposit accounts denominated in foreign currencies. Is this true? o Has the Federal Reserve Board ever considered allowing domestic banks to offer foreign currency denominated accounts? Do U.S. banks lose business to foreign banks because of their inability to offer these accounts? What are the pros and cons of per- mitting U.S. banks to offer such accounts? Answer; Mr. Kale's interpretation of the data appears to be flawed on several counts. First, the marked decline in the share of dollar-denominated offshore bank deposits primarily reflects valuation effects, rather than a true shift in currency composition. The sharp depreciation of the dollar on balance between the end of 1984 and late 1987 automatically would have raised the dollar value of foreign currency deposits, even if nonbank holders had kept the composition of their portfolios otherwise unchanged. After adjusting for exchange rate changes, it appears that only about one-quarter of the recorded decline in the dollar-denominated share of offshore deposits probably reflected any shifting of funds. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 147 -22- While the dollar-denominated share (however measured) declined, the level of dollar cross-border deposits continued to rise during this period. It increased at nearly a 7 percent annual rate, about the same pace as overall M3. Moreover, another data series produced by the BIS, but not cited by Mr. Hale, shows that dollar-denominated deposits held by non-U.S. residents in banks in their own countries grew at almost an 18 percent annual rate over the three years in question. The BIS data on cross-border holdings of deposits include those owned both by U.S. and by foreign residents, and thus represent a broader concept than that in our monetary aggregates. Narrowing it down to just those components included in M3, cross-border bank liabilities composed perhaps 5 percent of the broad money measure at the end of last year. Clearly, it would have taken an enormous shift in this small portion to have an appreciable effect on growth of the overall monetary aggre- gate. To be sure, there are other avenues through which the aggregates could have been affected. For example, U.S. residents might have shifted out of domestically held deposits into foreign-currency deposits held abroad. But for those wishing to adjust currency exposures, the use of options, futures, and forward contracts is probably much less costly than actually shifting the currency denomination and location of Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 148 -23- deposits, many of which are held overseas for particular purposes. Finally, there is little need to resort to currency substitution explanations for the pattern of growth in the broader monetary aggregates over the past several years either in the United States or elsewhere; domestic policies and macro- economic developments can largely account for it. It is true that the Federal Reserve has said that U.S. offices of depository institutions should not issue deposits denominated in foreign currencies (except at IBFs). This policy was first articulated in 1973 in a letter from Chairman Burns to the Bank of America, because it was felt that providing "greater scope for movements out of dollars into foreign currency assets could at times pose an increased threat to the international stability of the dollar." It was felt also that it would be inconsistent with the programs of restraint on capital outflows that were in force at that time. The policy has been reiterated subsequently. Financial markets have become increasingly integrated internationally Over the years. It has become relatively easy for U.S. residents to acquire any foreign currency exposure they desire. This means that issuance of foreign currency deposits in the United States would be likely to have a smaller and less destabilizing impact on the dollar's value than it would have Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 149 -24- earlier, but the added benefits to the U.S. Investor would be smaller, as well. The competitive position of U.S. banks is not significantly affected by this policy. Neither foreign nor U.S, banks can issue foreign currency deposits in the United States. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 150 -25- Question 13; In response to a question from Senator Heinz, you stated that, "the spread between real interest rates will determine the spread between currencies or the exchange rate, not whether it's going up or down." o Is this position borne out empirically? Is the level of the dollar related to the real interest rate differential? What about the so-called in- terest parity conditions which relate the expected rate of change of the exchange rate to the interest rate differential between the two currencies? Has this relationship been reliable empirically? o Are changes in the real interest rate differential correlated with changes in the exchange rate? Answer: There is a fairly good, broad correlation between the level of the long-term real interest rate dif- ferential and the level of the real spot exchange value of the dollar over the floating rate period—see attached chart. (The relationship between contemporaneous changes in this differen- tial and changes in the exchange rate is not so close.) How- ever, both the interest differential and the exchange rate are determined simultaneously in a general equilibrium system, and both variables would typically react to any exogenous shock, such as a change in monetary policy or a change in market expectations about the long-run equilibrium exchange value of the dollar. An unanticipated tightening of monetary policy, for example, would normally tend to cause both the interest dif- ferential and the exchange rate to rise. An upward revision of the long-run expected equilibrium exchange rate would tend to raise the current spot value of the dollar but leave the interest differential unchanged or even lower it. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 151 -26- The uncovered interest parity hypothesis links the interest differential, which by arbitrage is equal to the for- ward exchange premium or discount, to the expected change in the future spot exchange rate. The forward premium has not, in general, been a good predictor of exchange rate movements—most of the movement in exchange rates appears to be unanticipated. Nor has the forward rate been an unbiased predictor over ex- tended periods of time. The latter observations suggest that the hypothesis of uncovered interest parity does not strictly hold. Attachment Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 152 Exchange Value of the Dollar and interest Rate Differential fuaio MM!*, uwoh 1873 .100 teo 1*0 Prto*-ao>»t»d •xchvtgt vakw 140 ofttodoUv 130 120 110 100 Long-term TM! intarvst rats (fifterantial (U.S. minus foreign) I I I _] II I I I I IBM NOTE; Th« «ieliing« v*lu« of ttn UA dOllv <• Hi wMgntld •v*r»g« tictiviB* vilut •gUnM ttM CunnclM <X oVwr O-IO eeufltrtM ui'ng tB7»7t MUJ mM vAtgfH* **/uil*J frf 4U»*« con*um«r pifcM- Tti» ai«»r»nti«t I* llw mi on Ion0-Wm U.I, go*«mm»nt bond* mlnui IM r«t« on eompvul* foreign betn U|u%iM tor upociM intluien by A Ifrmofltn c«nWM rnoMng rrwagt of •dual CW inliuton or «Mr* n lOQi a. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 153 -27- Question 14: In your testimony you state that "we have over the years endeavored to use the tax system in order to enhance savings to basically enhance the proportion of equity to debt in the system..." o What particular tax incentives have been offered to encourage equity issuance relative to debt issuance? o What further tax incentives do you believe should be created to promote equity issuance? Answer.- There have been a few changes in the tax code in recent years that, if not encouraging equity issuance, at least have reduced the incentives for debt finance. Perhaps the most obvious is the phasing out of consumer interest deductions. In many respects, however, the laws still provide substantial incentive to leverage, and the continuing massive increases in household and corporate indebtedness suggest that we should be looking for ways to bring greater balance to the financial decisionmaking process. I do not have a specific legislative agenda, and I recognize that any steps to address this problem must be taken in the broader context of the effort to achieve equity and efficiency in the tax code. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 154 -28- Question 15: In your testimony you suggested that the spread between the discount rate was within a range that has been covered by past historical experience. o For each year in the period from 1975 to the present would you please provide the Committee with the annual mean spread between the federal funds rate and the discount rate and the maximum spread between the monthly average federal funds rate and the monthly average discount rate within each year. Answer: •Sear Mean Spread Maximum (absolute) Spread 1975 -.43 -.90 1976 -.45 -.92 1977 .07 -.64 1978 .48 .70 1979 .91 1.99 1980 1.59 6.03 1981 2.96 6.08 1982 1.24 2.94 1983 .59 1.06 1984 1.43 2.64 1985 .41 .77 1986 .48 1.41 1987 .99 1.35 1988 (Jan. -Aug.) 1.11 1.75 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 155 -29- (juejtion 16; Several economists including Rudiger Dornbusch, Lawrence Summers, and James Tobin have suggested that this country should adopt a transfer tax on securities trans- actions . o Which of the other industrial countries currently have such a tax? How large is the tax in each of these countries? How are the securities markets in each country affected? What happened to securities markets in each of these countries at the time that the tax was imposed? Have any countries discon- tinued the tax after trying it for a time? o Does the Federal Reserve favor adopting a securities transfer tax in this country? Answer; You have raised a complex set of questions for which I do not have the answers at present. It may be that other bodies that deal regularly with the subject of taxation would be able to provide the information that you are seeking with regard to the experience with transfer taxes in other countries. The Federal Reserve does not have a position on the policy issue. It is clear that theoreticians in the finance field have differing views on the merits of the transfer tax proposal, some believing that it would diminish short-run volatility, others believing that it would reduce liquidity and possibly enhance volatility and reduce equity values. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 156 -30- Question 17: In your testimony you suggest that currency holdings are $825 per man, woman and child living in the United States. o Has the Federal Reserve undertaken a study to ascertain the whereabouts of our currency? How much currency do you estimate is held overseas as a per- cent of the total? Is currency concentrated in any one of the Federal Reserve Districts to a greater extent than in the others? Answer; No large-scale study is under way to determine where U.S. currency is being held; however, new approaches to obtaining better estimates of currency holdings are explored from time to time. A comprehensive study of currency hold- ings—even for amounts held in the United States—would be costly, and it is unlikely that hoarders of currency and those engaged in illegal activities would give accurate responses. Instead, judgments regarding the amounts of currency held domestically must be formed on the basis of infrequent surveys of consumer holdings of U.S. currency coupled with plausible assumptions regarding the amount of currency lost or stolen, business needs for currency, and the requirements of individuals engaged in illegal transactions. Unless these surveys and assumptions substantially understate the amounts of currency held by consumers, this approach suggests that in excess of half the total volume of currency outside of depository institutions may be held abroad. Weekly data — from the Federal Reserve's H.4.1 statistical release—are available on the amount of Federal Reserve notes issued by each Federal Reserve district and still Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 157 -31- outstanding. As might be expected, these data display con- siderable variation by district: New York leads with about one-third of the total volume of notes outstanding, while Minneapolis accounts for only about two percent. Some caution is appropriate in using these data to make judgments about the concentration of currency holdings, however, because currency issued in one district may routinely be carried or shipped across district lines or even across national boundaries. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 158 -32- Cjuestion 18: In your testimony you said that "high employment is consistent with steadily rising nominal wages and real wages growing in line with productivity gains." o Would you please provide the Committee with data on the growth of real wages and the growth of pro- ductivity on an annual basis since 1975? Have real wages exceeded, kept pace with, or lagged behind productivity growth in recent years? Answer; The data you requested are exhibited in the attached table. The relation between increases in real compensation and productivity is highly variable in the short run. Apart from basic statistical noise associated with the difficulty in measuring these quantities, there can be significant variation in their relative movement because of cyclical and other short-run economic factors. Early in the current business expansion, for example, real compensation gains fell short of the percent increases in labor productivity because of a com- bination of labor market slack and the usual acceleration in productivity that occurs in the initial recovery phase of an upturn. More recently, productivity growth has somewhat out- stripped gains in real compensation partly because of the effects of the depreciation of the dollar, which have shown through in larger increases in the expenditure-price measure conventionally used to deflate compensation than in the output-price measure used to deflate production. Attachment Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 159 CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY AND REAL HOURLY COMPENSATION NONFARM BUSINESS SECTOR (four-quarter percent change) Year Productivity Real Compensation 1975 3..4 ,9 19T6 1,.8 3,,3 1977 1,.5 1.,0 1978 1..1 ,0 1979 -2,,7 -2,.6 1980 1.,0 -1.,5 1981 -,.6 -1..2 1982 1,,0 2..7 1983 3..6 .0 1984 1,.5 .1 1985 1.,5 .9 1986 1..2 2.9 1987 1,.9 -,.4 Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 160 -33- Questlon 19: Some analysts have suggested that the United States should seek external financing through the issuance of bonds denominated in foreign currencies — so-called Reagan bonds. o The United States has issued foreign currency bonds in the 1960s, so-called Roosa bonds, and again in the 1970s, so-called Carter bonds. What was the purpose of each of these bond issues? In retrospect did each of these bond issuance initiatives prove to be beneficial to the United States? o What are the advantages and disadvantages of issuing debt denominated in a foreign currency? Do you favor the U.S. government issuing foreign currency denominated bonds in the present context? Answer; The Roosa bonds of the 1960s were sold to foreign central banks. Though denominated in foreign currency, the U.S. Treasury received the proceeds in dollars. The purpose of the bonds was to redeem dollar holdings which certain foreign central banks deemed "excessive" so as to forestall the conver- sion of these dollars into gold, which the United States freely provided under the rules of the Bretton Woods system. By reducing the exchange risk of the foreign central banks' asset portfolios, the notion was that these central banks would be more willing to undertake exchange market intervention to support the dollar. By transferring the exchange risk from foreign central banks to the United States the Roosa bonds were, in essence, a substitute for U.S. exchange market intervention, which was undertaken only minimally at that time. Whether or not the Roosa bonds were beneficial depends upon the counter- factual assumption. Certainly they proved more expensive than dollar bonds, since U.S. interest rates were lower than foreign Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 161 interest rates and some of the bonds were repaid only after the dollar devaluations of 1971 and 1973. But, to the extent that they substituted for U.S. gold sales, the market value of gold "saved" jumped to a great multiple of its value at the official gold price. The Carter bonds were issued in 1978-80 to private market participants in Germany and Switzerland, with the proceeds received in marks and Swiss francs. Their purpose was to bolster the U.S. stock of foreign currencies available to support the dollar through U.S. exchange market intervention. Some of the proceeds were so used, some were not required. Those operations were, broadly speaking, profitable for the United States as the dollar subsequently appreciated. Generally speaking, the only purpose of issuing foreign currency-denominated U.S. government bonds would be to finance intervention purchases of dollars. Unless the foreign currency proceeds were so used, the issuance of such bonds would have no effect on exchange markets or on the financing of the government deficit. But there are many alternative sources of financing U.S. exchange market intervention—including existing balances of foreign currencies, swap drawings, and sales of SDKs to foreign monetary authorities. To the extent that the proceeds of such bond issues were not, in the event, needed for inter- vention, we would end up borrowing long-term and investing short-term. Unless short-term foreign interest rates rose sufficiently during the holding period, we would lose money on the spread. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 162 -36- Questlon 20: In recent years real interest rates have been very high relative to historical averages. There have been many explanations for this including the federal budget deficit, financial deregulation, and fears of the prospect of another bout with inflation after the experience of the late 1970s. o Would you please provide for the Committee data on the decade average ex-post real interest rate of one year maturity for each decade since the 1920s in- cluding an average for the period from 1980-1987? o Presumably in a world of high international capital mobility the worldwide savings-investment balance would determine the real interest rate. In the 1980s have the reductions in foreign government dis-saving offset the dis-savings in the United States associated with the rise in our federal budget deficit as Olivier Bianchard and Lawrence Summers suggested in a paper presented to the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity in 1984? If so, why have real interest rates risen in worldwide in the 1980s? Does the key currency status of the dollar compromise the usefulness of analyses that utilize the global savings-investment balance framework? Answer: Real Nominal Interest Rates Interest Rates Inflation 1920s 3.5^ 3.5 -.02 1930s .35 .33 -.02 1940s -5.13 .47 5.6 1950s .11 2.21 2.1 1960s 1.74 4.54 2.8 1970s -.80 7.00 7.8 1980-87 4.42 9.02 4.6 All figures are decade averages in percent per annum. Interest rate quotes used are as follows: 3- to 6-month Treasury notes and certificates in the 1920s: 3-month Treasury bills in the 1930s-1950s; and 1-year Treasury bill rates in the 1960s-1980s. Inflation is the year-to-year change in the CPI. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 163 -37- Making a crude comparison of the experience of the 1970s with that so far in the 1980s shows that the general government financial deficit in the OECD countries expanded from an average of 1.4 percent of aggregate GNP in the 1970s to 3.3 percent in 1980-87. Widening fiscal imbalances in both the United States and the group of other nations contributed about proportionately to the overall deterioration. While these figures cover a longer span of time than does the Blanchard and Summers paper and have not been similarly adjusted for cyclical and inflation influences, they nonetheless are suggestive of increased government dissaving in the 17 member countries on which the OECD provides data. Certainly in the United States, the wider fiscal gap during the 1980s has produced a macroeconomic policy mix con- ducive to higher real interest rates. Ex-post real rates, while down from earlier in the decade, remain high, perhaps in part reflecting market participants' skepticism about the likelihood of a significant further reduction in U.S. government dissaving. Additional, substantial cuts in our federal deficit would un- doubtedly prove constructive in paving the way for lower real interest rates. It should be noted that measurement of real interest rates is problematical. The relevant real rates for analysis would be based on expected rates of inflation, not realized Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 164 -38- movements in the price level. In this regard, expected infla- tion may have exceeded actual inflation through much of the 1980s, given the experience of the late 1970s, so that real rates were somewhat lower on an gx-ante than on an gx-post basis. In any case, relatively high ex-post real rates did not foreclose a sustained and vigorous economic expansion in recent years. Analyses that utilize the global savings-investment balance framework can help to identify factors that are putting upward (or downward) pressures on interest rates in general and so can inform and guide policymakers in their efforts to support balanced, noninflationary growth, particularly as part of the policy coordination effort by the major industrial countries. In this process, the dollar's status as a key currency has at most a secondary role. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 165 Chairman Greenspan subsequently submitted the following in response to written questions from Senator Riegle in connec- tion with the hearing held on July 13, 1988: Question 1; There are reports that international bankers are worried that the new capital rules announced by the Bank for International Settlements earlier this week will fur- ther hinder their competitiveness against other financial insti- tutions, particularly investment banks and insurers. What is your reaction to this concern and how will the new capital rules affect our largest money center banks? Ansyer: An important objective of the international risk-based capital standard, which the Board has now adopted, is to achieve greater convergence in the measurement and assessment of bank capital adequacy by government supervisors in major industrial countries. Thus, the new standard will help to promote competitive equality between U.S. banking organizations and those in other countries. As for the impact of the new standard on the competitive position of banking organizations vis-a-vis other financial institutions, it is generally the case that such institutions maintain capital positions in line with or exceeding tho&e specified by the risk-based standards. Even if that were not the case, however, it would not be advisable to adjust the capital standards for banks down to the lowest common denominator. It should be stressed that it was the consensus view of major industrial countries that are parties to the international agreement that the standards are needed to help strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 166 -2- Queatipn_2: OPEC'a surging oil production has resulted in lower energy prices and of course energy prices are an im- portant indicator of inflation. What is your projection for energy prices throughout the remainder of this year and into the early 1990s? Answer; OPEC has produced more crude oil during the past three months than roost oil market analysts expected. Consequently, oil prices have declined further below OPEC's target of $18 per barrel for a select basket of crude oils. Because of the large increase in non-OPEC oil production during the past decade, OPEC has a large surplus of crude oil production capacity. Consequently, some members of OPEC desire to produce more oil than is demanded by consumers at current prices. If this happens, oil prices would tend to rise more slowly than the general price level during the next few years. On the other hand, other OPEC members prefer that oil producers act cooperatively to restrict output in order to maintain somewhat higher oil prices. The resolution of these differing views depends essentially on political considerations. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 167 -3- Question 3; We will have to make serious decisions concerning the problems currently facing the S&L industry. Some of the proposals for providing funding to clean up the mess involve the Federal Reserve. For example, the Fed might pay interest on bank reserves, but pay it, for the first few years, to the FSL1C to enhance its resources. Alternatively, the Federal Reserve might be required to accept the notes currently being issued by the FSL1C as collateral for loans. What is your reaction to these two proposals? What role do you see the Fed playing in the S&L crisis? Answer: Clearly, the FSLIC will need additional resources. The amount of these additional funds will become clearer as the FSLIC proceeds to address the problems facing it. Congress had indicated that it intends to address this question early in the new year. As for whether the Federal Reserve should be called upon to provide funding to resolve thrift industry problems, I would point out that funding from the Federal Reserve would add to the federal budget deficit essentially in the same way as a budget expenditure. Moreover, in considering such an autho- rization one should take carefully into account that it would mark a sharp departure from the view traditionally held in our nation that the resources of the Federal Reserve (of the central bank with its monetary policy responsibilities) should not be used for special purposes and would set a dangerous precedent for the future. Aside from the question whether the Federal Reserve should provide direct funding assistance to help resolve the thrift crisis, it can play a constructive role in other ways. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 168 In the event the Federal Home Loan Banks are unable to meet the liquidity needs of troubled thrift institutions, the Federal Reserve Banks, in their capacity as lenders of last resort, stand ready to provide such institutions assistance at their discount windows. In addition, the Federal Reserve is prepared to work with the FSLIC and the Congress in evaluating possible ways in which additional resources might be marshalled to deal with the problems in the thrift industry, in considering arrangements that might be established to promote the long-run health of the thrift industry, and in promoting harmony between the supervisory framework to which thrift institutions and commercial banks are subject. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 169 Chairman Greenspan subsequently submitted the following in response to written questions from Senator Sasser in connec- tion with the hearing held on July 13, 1988: Question 1: At the panel hearing on July 12, Dr. Ray Fair suggested that one percentage point change in 3-month Treasury bill interest rates, holding GNP growth constant, would change the federal budget deficit by $5.6 billion in the first year and $13.7 billion in the second year. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a one percentage point increase in the interest rate beginning in January 1988, for all maturities, would produce an increase in the deficit of $3 billion in fiscal 1988 CFY88), $11 billion in FY89, $16 billion in FY90, $21 bil- lion in FY91, $26 billion in FY92, and $30 billion in FY93. None of these estimates add in the effects of higher interest rates depressing economic growth and thereby reducing revenues and increasing automatic outlays. In addition, cost of living adjustments in budget items may increase if they are based on the consumer price index because a rise in interest costs pushes up that index. o What does the Federal Reserve's analysis estimate the dollar impact of a permanent one percentage point increase in interest rates of all maturities to be on each of the following over a six year period: A. Debt service on the national debt B. Economic growth C. Tax revenues D. Federal government spending E. The consumer price index F. The federal budget deficit Answer; It is understandable that the OMB and CBO prefer to give the "partial" estimates of interest rate effects, because it really is not practical to do multi-year "general equilibrium" simulations of the sort you are seeking without specifying in very particular ways a great many assumptions about policy and other variables that would significantly influence the results. Moreover, six years is a rather long span of time, and the econometric models constructed by the staff of the Board are not well designed to capture the "supply-side" and other effects that could become important over such an extended period. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 170 -3- Question 2: Japanese Bank Lending to Soviets. I have had occasion to explore as a part of "my work on t^ie Defense Appropriations Subcommittee the issue of burden sharing, par- ticularly with regard to the Japanese. In this Committee, we have the omnipresent concern about the Third World debt crisis, and its impact on our major financial institutions, and the issue of export policy. We need to open markets overseas. It seems to me that the issues are increasingly related and alarmingly so. We have the Latin American countries scraping the bottom of the barrel to find the foreign exchange to service their debt. The last thing they can afford to do is to buy our exports, so our industries and workers here suffer to some extent. We had hoped that the Japanese would step in and increase assistance to the Latin American countries to get their economies moving again. Obviously, we would like to see an increase in lending that would relieve the pressure on our banks and open up some opportunities for our exporters. Well, the Japanese have increased their assistance in Latin America to some degree. But what we see are loans tied directly to purchases of Japanese exports. Obviously this is no help to us. Most alarmingly, at the same time, the Japanese banks have dramatically increased their lending to the Soviet Bloc and these loans are untied. They're a line of credit to be spent on whatever the Soviets want. It sounds to me like a mockery of the concept of burden sharing, I have to admit that I am surprised at how little information is available about Japanese bank lending to the Soviets. But I strongly feel that it's an issue that this Committee and the Fed should examine closely soon. Do you have any information on this lending? Answer; Data reported by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) on total international bank lending to the Soviet Bloc show a $14 billion decline in gross claims for the 1980-1984 period, followed by a $37 billion increase over the subsequent three years. This pattern of bank lending to the Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 171 Soviet Bloc reflects in part the effect of the decline in the dollar on the dollar value of loans denominated in other cur- rencies, which constitute a significant part of bank lending to the Soviet Bloc. After adjusting for exchange rate changes, there appears to have been only a modest increase in bank lend- ing to the Soviet Bloc in the late 1980s and, conversely, no abrupt decline in such lending in the early 1980s. Furthermore, data for U.S. banks indicate that their involvement in lending to the Soviet Bloc has fallen throughout the 1980s both in terms of dollar amounts and as a proportion of total reported bank lending. Unfortunately, country-by-country creditor data for most other BIS reporting countries' banks, including those of Japan, are not available. Overall, the Soviet Union's continued ability to borrow from banks appears to be accounted for by its pursuit of conservative external finan- cial policies. Generally speaking. Soviet Bloc borrowing from banks has apparently been largely untied, although anecdotal reports suggest that recently the proportion of tied bank credits ap- pears to have increased. We do not have data on Japanese bank loans to the Soviet Bloc that would enable us to say how much is untied or whether Japanese loans have been more or less tied than those of banks from other creditor countries. On the other hand, we do know there has been a strong increase in Japanese Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 172 official lending to Latin America. This lending, usually con- ducted in support of concerted lending by the international financial institutions and the commercial banks, has been untied. We cannot make a comparison of Japanese bank lending terms to Soviet Bloc and Latin American borrowers. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 173 -6- Question 3. S&L Crisis. As you probably know, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board is now reporting that the cost of resolving all of the problems of the insolvent thrifts is $10 billion more than they told us just last month. That puts their estimate up to around $30 or $40 billion. However, some experts are saying the cost could be around $65 billion. And I think the best estimates of income to the FSLIC over the next few years it; around $20 billion. So we will have a shortfall. We now have talk of a taxpayer bailout and a merger of the FD1C and FSLIC funds. Neither of these are solutions--nor are they acceptable. Indeed, they are in effect the same thing. Outlays by the FDIC are counted as expenditures in the budget process, so merging the funds would only worsen the deficit, and increase pressure for revenues from taxpayers. What are your recommendations as to how we should proceed? How do we pay for this mess? What's a realistic expectation for a contribution from the thrift industry towards reconciling the problem of the insolvent savings and loans? With the special assessment that they're paying now, are they already paying too much? Answer: It is important to emphasize the great uncertainty that surrounds estimates of the potential losses facing the FSLIC. The extent of such losses will depend in large part upon the market value of the real estate properties that secure the mortgage loans of troubled institutions. And, given the huge amount of property involved, relatively small changes in market value can have a major impact on the magnitude of thrift industry losses. Taking that point into account and that real estate markets are highly unsettled in areas where troubled institutions have made the bulk of their loans, it should be obvious that judgments as to potential losses must be subject to considerable error. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 174 But, while there is reason to be cautious in viewing estimates of potential loss, it is clear that the FSLIC is fac- ing large problems which are going to be with us for some time to come. The Congress has indicated that it will be addressing the important questions that you have raised concerning the extent to which healthy thrift institutions should be required to bear the brunt of the industry's losses early in the new session. The Federal Reserve will, of course, be happy to provide whatever expertise it can when the Congress takes up this issue. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 175 Question 4; LBO Debt_as a Future Problem for Ijanks. As you well know, b anks ^have ~dramatically in c r e a s e cT ^h eIr" 1 end- ing for so-called leveraged buyouts over the past few years. Exchanging debt for equity has become the rage. Some $400 billion in new debt has been added in the last two years. This has helped push debt-to-equity ratios of corporations to unprecedented levels, raising a good deal of concern that this level of debt could cause big problems for companies when the next recession hits. Obviously if companies are going to have problems servicing this debt, the banks that hold it are going to be in trouble too. Indeed, the magazine, The ^cgnomist, has called LBO debt the next Third World debt crTsis~for banks. What do you think about this trend? Should the Fed be monitoring this more closely? What steps would you recommend? Answer •. The Federal Reserve has been monitoring the LBO and corporate leveraging trends for some time now, and both I and my predecessor as Chairman have noted our concerns about the risks that these developments might carry for lenders and the economy more broadly. The Federal Reserve, in its super- visory capacity, has looked closely at the lending activities of individual banking institutions and has cautioned banks more generally that they should make certain that they examine the prospects for LBO loans under a range of economic and financial circumstances. The issue of increasing leverage is one that should be viewed from a broader perspective than its possible implications for credit quality in the banking sector. We do not yet fully understand why there has been such a large increase in the use of debt finance in the current decade, but I think it is widely recognized that the cax system provides some incentives toward leverage, and it would be appropriate tor the Congress to con- tinue looking at that problem. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 176 FINANCIAL TIMES BFWCKEN HOUSE, CANNON STREET LONDON EC4 P4BY fete^ams; Finantimo, London PS4. T&PSK: 8954871 Saturday July 2 1988 Risks in the , . ' . A. ,:.".' tV, . dollar' THE MOTTO of tbc R*ann Changed rditlvelr utue in <0*f> US iconomy. "~ imln laailaflM thin niiiirnd t a y d e n ar iU t i e iM em M s ii l o a n b i e n o l p it re i U n tt a a h il k l m the an m y id o d r t e J o a f p a J n u , n a e l . ™ lea .* n * b *• t - t -- n loo pn t r d I e n c * fd r e w rf t l T o f l t e he u w i o t r t k n c th ti l r o t f . i B ak t n « u U dy i 4 m g u D ch . f -T re h a e l er h u * d )i* a n c i g M en e t r o - d d d c th u o l e e l n l u u t b t , g m t t R b t . o h u e m a a t T g t e h a w t n e h n t h r e a e w w t a f i o h l t I u e l a s l r s d m m h a a a b p p k t e r h p e o e e o n v n I f e t i p n li d K n g t t t f d t l f i D e l - t - E t p r b t o m i e W k n r n p i e i t t n e d h la r t c l a i h e n e i p t l n a o t B i r o f g h t a h n e o v e r r o t o u i d f t n r e o t U r l o e m l t r a f O e , r t e s . h m t e A d o r o n a U r w e t a e S y o n a d h m d t w o t a f e d - t t d i e a r n a x n n t t d h r a d t i r r e o n c v m e o e l b m e y n e s t m t r t G i e i c o p r e d t r d i c m t t h u y g a a r r n p r n o e y r w i n c a c t e p n h i s e e t t r I s w c f n , o l f n l J r ) W a i n U t r i l u l n l d K h g i . a i l t t a n l r r l o r u c y g t a » , e - l m y « b h f u a l b i t s i e e t t c h b b d a e e e m . e a n e T c a u h m o i r e m f e r i a p U n b n r c o S a t r v e i t i a n a n n H c g d o e d . e t n I o O b t b B n a a W V t i n . t man difficult than eipecud. Mr amount of central bank interwn- tor of mQtfkn is mtvitj&a. a service. In the first quarter of JUH Biker, Ihe US TnuorT don, almost entirely in Enropt, tftr eiacerbated by the low* MM Otf OS eamm occoma •» S t o p t f e i u p c u t e h r l e e i t t n h a U e e ry r S t e , o e s I x g e s t e e e t e a r n n a th o a e t u l o g a U h c h S c a o a v th d u e j r n u o d t s u e t i g c m n i h d e t e b n t d o t t h U a S al o al o le ll d o t o o f c re vers . e the" ttdc, •< m c A o o p u n n p e t r r t e i a e c r s y i . a : t i c o o . n . n . d ' itions In both i f i 1 n r n 9 o W m d t e , h f d J e ic 3 e i 4 s t b b p a t n i o l t a e I n t n b * c e e t t b s t b e u o n n n l e u u m o n t p f e q r r I c a u t h * f a t a * r o n m u d . r l e B u o n p f e t t i t n i h n f e l t a e t e i d o le n c . 1 ti 0 o n t . h e T h s e a p p p r r io e r tt i i t t y g h a u t y a c b e e T o n n v t h p e e a n b I d d t o s o v n l l e l o o a w r i l t e s i a s s t g s r a n o t i o u h n w g a s n h t s th a o 1 g m e 5 a e p D i n e - 1 s r M 0 t c i t p r h e k e n e r , t o D t n n In > t , M t t h M h o e u * B g u h n b n I d K n e i i b s tr o i a u d * d it o i t i o o n n g t a l « t M n t o l d a - o rl f f T k ( h b i e n e ' U t b h S l e a a a m u te t e h d o f i o u ri r m ti e t t s h e e r c m a t r . a r I y e n n c m i t u u ta c ie h l ' The result it the export of which is now where tt was baton realtoluit following the market. of their unwillingness ffl carry Inflation to the rest of the world., October 19 1887. The dollar') Th» UK ham been only too gM ta out ictive intervention against Both Mi week and last. On- nominal effective exchange rate l«d the upward charge. Tin t^ tbc doDu. Tbe danger hu, bow- many has demonstrated ml* tout have, bowever, nunigiil •> ever, been Inherent In the pres- luce. Th* ipoilijiit Don turn* to Industrial countries has appmti.' avoid ann upward movement in ent Informal Approach to Japan. What price in term! of aled Qve per cent in under three tbort term Entereat rates, it Im) eicbinge rate management, ff • l s I W g e d n t G w t y t i e n n h t o t x r e o e a a m e o f e K e p T s a m b r h U l o r a e e a t r h h r i e r a t c t i K l , U e i g e e l i e g i i d t t s o p s e e , r S d h o t t m i n o h d i n v r e B s t c p r . e o a e g o e a i e e a a u g b d b r u A c i c r t n s i o d l i n u t t a o n u o u h m h h u s o s f t d n o n m h ? l o t o e t m a o o a e n k e t r f n t m t j h e i d t i i h k t r e a t n t o s b e o i e y h e a r e s t a p n e s l m l e l s e u n i g r t l a I b e h y e l l i t , n r i c e t u x n . p h a . . . i t t u c - c n w h t a n a , e B M i t r o . i r d t r e , u t ™ r i n e h n e a h g n e n , g d i m i c e e n e o b g n t f e r " a e t t f g M o e n r n n n o J c c t e n f i a o ^ b r t a t i n U p - w B p l a m d t l a t o a " t t I a e V t k n K f a » y f e i t t \ - t m p l l u e a p r n t t t l p i e e o h e i d n o i e a o o k v r o m e c o F v r l y n l m m e e i n h i e o t k m a l h c l t s r y c a . r l i e h y i s o n n g e e n l . s e M f y d i n h t t n g q l o h e e t a t e e a a u t s e r t r n f a n h d i f i b d n t f e m d e a r o r e a U e c w x p t t f a i p l t t c r n o S o t h e r l t e h t o a d y w s o o i h t h a l n i w l a e n v e e t i t n l u s i e , t H i g o t i t t c g s h i g e a h n t h y i t h n t h h e a h l p e h e o a l r e t n t p a a a f n r d t b o r u n p r t i c g h h . m e s a t e v l r o e i a e . l e c e I w e o a m i v n - o i s r i n s n c a o e M n I n b c m e r t t r l i t f t e a i y s n t a h a a o n t a s e h b c a r I r r i g h n o n e y t 4 e - t t i e , f y A , ! t i • d • t • i n ? & d t h h o p o » c t a l e t e t t e u d ^ p I - q a ^ . n t W T l n ^ t n n n t « r e n n f w H a o I - . t c e a m h , n v r S t f l a S e i h l i l I v s t t t t r i s - n h i i i h t i t e ^ n t ; o J t i a e u e - r . t t u l n d t r y h n e i a U I u a « a w f l e r n u w l r r « w n S y o f n i m y o d n l ; t r a w f a o l u g u i • i l t d r f l v n i U n l t c o t a o a o w e J f h t d r a r n l a e - u v e l n , e i a n E s t - l a n f l . d l h r , u i : n a i ! d e y h c n e a - W . d M o i - v g n t r m l t r u i [ l o m d e e n t f a o • I s o m . m u n e r a r , " k w k r t t t l a N a h e k t t * b M i d h i h c « m M d i n f a c t * r t t l * r t a w t d p r n g t r t i a h b h t m a t u o r a r a r i e e i e t o e t o m l t t e p l r y i y t e h d a n « e s c l e l t e u u a y e d t s m t w c c h r o t s , l f b e t i o e a o t e a s i e c t e g u v t r e n r t u e l o e r e e t p r d n I d v i g v e i c o n n w c e a a o e l l s t b t h e u a s e v r s e i t e a o a n r l n s b r i e r l c r y n n b e m d e i v r a h n s s s g l n r e v e t t , e e g u d e m e n m o n t e l m t t t r i e d e h o l t d i o a n u s s o i n i e e r t s g n p t n t e s w d e f c e d s e r o e , . o r e i s . e r w e t i p p d s U h x c e t d i n i e a i i m c r n f n e o a n n r e b f h f i p a h n t m t o a i a r r a b . l a t n r e t e i f t h t t p n l n n g o t d u e I * r e d s - e e f r - r - - ; . an upward drift -in ihort item •n&infe rate will pul dDnmnt -. To* woriJi taden an Hkib dollar intcmt ralea. MunwUle. in mi in on inflitton, otherwtot i 10 wit. aptn am art* a mo abort term rate* of interest coosUermblt riii In the booytnt Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Alan Greenspan (1988, July 12). Congressional Testimony. Testimony, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/testimony_19880713_chair_federal_reserves_second_monetary_policy

@misc{wtfs_testimony_19880713_chair_federal_reserves_second_monetary_policy,
  author = {Alan Greenspan},
  title = {Congressional Testimony},
  year = {1988},
  month = {Jul},
  howpublished = {Testimony, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/testimony_19880713_chair_federal_reserves_second_monetary_policy},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}