speeches · March 28, 2012
Speech
Ben S. Bernanke · Chair
Lecture 4:
The Aftermath of the Crisis
2
The Fed’s Efforts to
Restore Financial Stability
• A financial panic in fall 2008 threatened the
stability of the global financial system.
• In its lender-of-last-resort role, the Federal
Reserve provided liquidity (short-term
collateralized loans) to help stabilize key financial
institutions and markets.
3
The Fed’s Efforts to
Restore Financial Stability
• The Fed worked closely with the Treasury, other
regulatory agencies (such as the FDIC and SEC).
• Coordination with foreign central banks included
the creation of foreign currency swaps.
– The Fed provided dollars to other central banks in
exchange for foreign currencies.
– The swaps enabled foreign central banks to meet the
dollar funding needs of their own financial
institutions.
4
The Fed’s Continuing Efforts to
Strengthen the Banking System
• The Fed led stress tests of the 19 largest U.S.
banks in the spring of 2009, which helped restore
investor confidence and allowed banks to raise
about $140 billion in private capital.
• Recent stress tests conducted by the Fed showed
substantial further improvements in bank capital
and banks’ resilience to shocks.
5
Evaluation of the Special
Lender-of-Last-Resort Programs
• Results: The programs
– arrested runs on various types of financial
institutions
– restored financial market functioning, restarted
flow of credit, and supported resumption of
economic growth
• Programs were largely phased out by March
2010.
6
Evaluation of the Special
Lender-of-Last-Resort Programs
• Financial risks to the Federal Reserve were
minimal:
– Lending was mostly short-term and backed by
collateral; thousands of loans were made, none
defaulted.
– Although the objective of these programs was
stabilization, not profit, taxpayers came out
ahead.
7
Monetary Policy during the Crisis
• The Fed used lender-of-last-resort policy to help
stabilize the financial system. To stabilize the
economy and promote economic recovery, the
Fed turned to monetary policy.
8
Monetary Policy during the Crisis
• Conventional monetary policy involves
management of a target short-term interest rate
(the federal funds rate). Because longer-term
rates tend to fall when the Fed lowers the shortterm rate, and because lower longer-term rates
tend to encourage purchases of long-lasting
consumer goods, houses, and capital goods,
cutting the federal funds rate helps stimulate the
economy.
9
Monetary Policy during the Crisis
• Monetary policy is conducted by the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC).
• The FOMC meets in Washington, D.C. eight times a
year. During the crisis, it sometimes also held
unscheduled videoconferences.
10
Monetary Policy during the Crisis
• The FOMC consists of 12 members:
– the 7 members of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
– the president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank
– 4 of the remaining 11 Reserve Bank presidents, who
serve one-year terms on a rotating basis
• Other Reserve Bank presidents participate in
deliberations but do not vote.
11
Federal Funds Rate
• To support the
recovery, the Fed
reduced the federal
funds rate from
5¼ percent in
September 2007 to
nearly zero in
December 2008,
where it has
remained since.
12
Large-Scale Asset Purchases
• With the federal funds rate near zero, the scope
for conventional monetary policy was exhausted.
But the economy remained weak and some
worried about the risk of deflation (falling wages
and prices).
13
Large-Scale Asset Purchases
• To influence longer-term rates directly, the Fed
undertook large-scale purchases of Treasury and
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE)
mortgage-related securities.
• Large purchase programs were announced in
March 2009 and November 2010.
• These actions boosted the Fed’s balance sheet by
more than $2 trillion.
14
Large-Scale Asset Purchases
15
Large-Scale Asset Purchases
• With the available supply of Treasury and GSE
securities reduced by Fed purchases, investors
were willing to accept lower yields. Lower
longer-term rates helped stimulate the economy,
just as they do under conventional policies.
• Reduced availability of Treasury and GSE
securities led investors to purchase other assets,
such as corporate bonds, lowering the yields on
those assets as well.
16
Large-Scale Asset Purchases
• These securities purchases were financed by
adding to the reserves held by banks at the Fed;
they did not significantly affect the amount of
money in circulation. The Fed has multiple ways
to unwind the large-scale asset purchases
(LSAPs), including selling the securities back into
the market.
17
Large-Scale Asset Purchases
18
Effects of Large-Scale Asset Purchases
• LSAPs (also known as quantitative easing)
lowered longer-term interest rates.
– 30-year mortgage rates fell below 4 percent.
– Corporate credit became more available, and stock
prices rose.
• Lower longer-term interest rates helped promote
recovery, though the effect on housing was
weaker than hoped.
19
Effects of Large-Scale Asset Purchases
• The Fed’s credibility and long-standing
commitment to price stability has helped anchor
inflation and inflation expectations, which have
remained low.
• At the same time, LSAPs guarded against the risk
of deflation (falling wages and prices).
20
Effects of Large-Scale Asset Purchases
• The Fed’s asset purchases are not government
spending, because the assets the Fed acquired
will ultimately be sold back into the market.
Indeed, the Fed has made money on its
purchases so far, transferring about $200 billion
to the Treasury from 2009 through 2011, money
that benefited taxpayers by reducing the federal
deficit.
21
Monetary Policy Communication
• Clear communication from the central bank can
help make monetary policy more effective by
helping investors better understand policy goals
and better anticipate future policy actions.
22
Monetary Policy Communication
• The Fed has
become more
transparent about
monetary policy.
For example, the
Chairman began
holding news
conferences in
2011.
23
Monetary Policy Communication
• The Fed also has recently provided more
information about its goals and policy approach
(for example, by defining price stability as
inflation of 2 percent in the medium term).
24
Monetary Policy Communication
• The Fed has also begun providing guidance to
investors and the public about how it expects to
adjust the federal funds rate in the future, given
current information about the economic outlook.
• This guidance helps the public better understand
the FOMC’s views and policy.
25
Economic Recovery
• Aided by the effects of monetary and fiscal policy
as well as the economy’s natural recuperative
powers, economic activity began to recover in
mid-2009.
• Since then, real GDP has increased at an average
annual rate of about 2½ percent.
26
Sluggish Economic Recovery
• But the pace of
recovery has been
extremely sluggish
compared with
previous post–
World War II cyclical
recoveries.
Note: On June 21, 2012, the above Real GDP chart was revised
to correct the calculation of GDP during the average of
previous recoveries.
27
Sluggish Economic Recovery
• As a result, job
prospects have
improved only
gradually and the
unemployment rate
remains painfully
high.
28
Slowing the Recovery: Housing
• Why has the recovery
been slower than
hoped?
• A resurgent housing
market normally helps
power economic
recoveries, but not
this time.
29
Slowing the Recovery: Housing
• Factors weighing on
the housing market
include
– a continuing high
foreclosure rate
– an overhang of
unsold homes
– falling house prices
30
Slowing the Recovery: Housing
• Very tight lending
standards on
mortgages have
blunted some of the
effects of low
mortgage rates.
31
Slowing the Recovery: Housing
• Declining house prices
discourage new
construction.
• More generally, sharp
declines in house
prices make
consumers feel poorer,
and thus less willing to
spend.
32
Slowing the Recovery:
Financial and Credit Markets
• The U.S. banking system is significantly stronger
than it was three years ago, and credit is more
available to households and businesses.
33
Slowing the Recovery:
Financial and Credit Markets
• However, difficulties remain for some borrowers:
– For households, mortgages are difficult to obtain
for borrowers with less-than pristine credit scores.
– For small businesses, credit market conditions
remain tight but appear to have begun to
improve.
34
Slowing the Recovery:
Financial and Credit Markets
• Concerns about European fiscal and banking
conditions have also stressed financial markets
and led to more-conservative lending and
diminished confidence.
35
Long-Term Economic Growth
in the United States
• The financial crisis and recession were a major
trauma. Many people who have been
unemployed for a long time have seen their skills
erode. And longer-term problems, like rising
federal deficits, have not gone away.
36
Long-Term Economic Growth
in the United States
• On the upside, however:
– The U.S. economy remains the largest in the
world, with a highly diverse mix of industries.
– Our economy has a robust entrepreneurial
culture, with flexible capital and labor markets.
37
Long-Term Economic Growth
in the United States
• On the upside, however:
– We remain a technological leader, with many of
the world's top research universities and the
highest spending on research and development of
any nation.
– And, in the aftermath of the crisis, we have
strengthened our financial regulatory system.
38
Long-Term Economic Growth
39
Post-crisis Regulatory Changes
• The crisis revealed many important regulatory gaps
and weaknesses.
• Lehman Brothers and AIG endangered the financial
system and highlighted the need for new tools to
address problems at systemically important
financial institutions.
• More oversight of the system as a whole was
needed.
40
Post-crisis Regulatory Changes
• The Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform
and Consumer
Protection Act of
2010 instituted
wide-ranging
reforms of financial
regulation in the
United States.
Rep. Barney Frank
Sen. Christopher Dodd
41
Key Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act:
Supervision and Regulation
• The act expanded the financial stability duties of
financial regulators, including the Fed:
– It created the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) to help regulators coordinate their efforts.
– It gave all regulators the responsibility to track and
respond to possible risks to the financial system as
a whole.
42
Key Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act:
Supervision and Regulation
• It closed gaps in the oversight of the financial
system:
– The FSOC can “designate” systemically important
nonbank institutions to be supervised by the Fed.
– The FSOC can also designate key financial market
utilities (for example, stock exchanges) for
enhanced supervision.
43
Key Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act:
Systemically Important Institutions
• The act subjected systemically important financial
institutions to tougher supervision and
regulation:
– Higher capital requirements were established for
most systemic firms.
– Bank affiliates are prohibited from trading on their
own account (Volcker rule).
44
Key Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act:
Systemically Important Institutions
• The act made systemically important financial
institutions subject to tougher supervision and
regulation:
– Regular “stress tests” are being conducted to
ensure that firms will have adequate capital even
in bad economic scenarios.
45
Key Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act:
Systemically Important Institutions
• It also tackled the problem of “too big to fail”
financial firms:
– New “orderly liquidation authority” allows the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to
close failing systemic firms in a way that causes
less damage to the financial system.
46
Key Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act:
Other Features
• The act took steps to make the financial system
more resilient:
– It required more transparency and standardization
of derivative transactions.
47
Key Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act:
Other Features
• It created a new agency (the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau) with broad powers to protect
consumers in their financial dealings.
• Financial regulators are implementing these and
other provisions, in consultation with foreign
regulators.
48
The Effects of the Crisis on
Central Bank Practice
• In the decades before the crisis, central banks
often viewed financial stability policy as the
junior partner to monetary policy.
• The crisis underscored that maintaining financial
stability is an equally critical responsibility.
49
The Effects of the Crisis on
Central Bank Practice
• Financial crises will always be with us. But as
much as possible, central banks and other
regulators should try to anticipate and defuse
threats to financial stability and mitigate the
effects when a crisis occurs.
50
Conclusion
• We began by noting the two principal tools and
responsibilities of central banks
– serving as lender of last resort to prevent or
mitigate financial crises
– using monetary policy to enhance economic
stability
51
Conclusion
• The Fed and other central banks used both tools
extensively in the crisis and its aftermath. These
tools helped prevent a repeat of the Great
Depression of the 1930s and set the stage for a
slow but continuing economic recovery.
52
Conclusion
• A new regulatory framework will reduce, but not
eliminate, the risk of financial crises in the future.
Greater monitoring of potential systemic risks
should help.
• However, the recent financial crisis shows both
that a crisis can be hard to anticipate and that it
can cause major damage to the economy.
53
Cite this document
APA
Ben S. Bernanke (2012, March 28). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20120329_bernanke
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_20120329_bernanke,
author = {Ben S. Bernanke},
title = {Speech},
year = {2012},
month = {Mar},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20120329_bernanke},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}