speeches · February 23, 2006

Speech

William Poole · President

Fed Communications St.LouisForum St.Louis,Missouri February24,2006 Federal Reserve communications are closingasmuchaspossiblewithoutdamaging much in the news recently, in part theintegrityofpolicydeliberations.Thatintegrity because the Fed’s main policy body, isessentialbothtobesurethatallissuesare the Federal Open Market Committee fullydebatedandtoensurethatinformation (FOMC) has discussed communications issues obtainedunderpledgeofconfidentialityremains on several occasions in recent years. I’ve spoken confidential. several times on various aspects of communica- Butthereisanotheraspecttotransparency tionspolicyandtodaywanttoextendmyviews, thatisincompletelyunderstood.Letmeillustrate which are developing further every time I take byreadingseveralpassagesfromtheFOMC up the subject. transcript.ThetranscriptofFOMCmeetingsis Beforeproceeding,Iwanttoemphasizethat releasedtothepublicwithafive-yearlagandis theviewsIexpressherearemineanddonot availableontheFederalReserveBoardof necessarilyreflectofficialpositionsoftheFederal Governors’website.Allthequotesaremyown— ReserveSystem.Ithankmycolleaguesatthe itwouldnotbefairtopickonothers! FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis—especially “MyoverallassessmentisthatAsiaisprimarily BobRasche,directorofResearchattheSt.Louis arelativedemandshockratherthananaggre- Fed—fortheircomments,butIretainfullrespon- gatedemandshockfortheUnitedStates.” sibilityforerrors. (TranscriptofFOMCmeetingofMarch31, 1998,p.54.) TRANSPARENCY: “Moneygrowth,whetherweuseM2oranar- rowermeasure—IpreferMZMbecauseIthink WHAT DOES IT MEAN? itavoidstheproblemwithsweeps…” Fedcommunicationsissuesareoftendis- (TranscriptofFOMCmeetingofAugust18, cussedunderthegeneralterm“transparency.” 1998,p.50.) What,literally,doestransparencymean?Theidea isthatwecouldthrowopenthecurtainsandallow “Ihaveaquestionabouttheoutlookforinvest- thepublictolookinthroughclearwindows.If ment,whichisdrivenimportantly,asitshould be,byaccelerationconsiderations.” theFedweretothrowopenthecurtains,what (TranscriptofFOMCmeetingofMay18, wouldthepublicobserve? 1999,p.18.) Ofcourse,whatthepublicwouldobserve wouldbedifferentfromwhatnowtakesplace. Whatdoyoumakeofpassagessuchasthe TelevisingFOMCmeetingsonC-SPANwould onesIjustread?Thesepassagesarealltakenout dramaticallychangethenatureofthemeetings. ofcontext,butmyguessisthatthematerialsur- Certainly,whatwemeanbytransparencycannot roundingthesepassageswouldnothelpmuch meanthatallFederalReservedeliberationsare inunderstandingthem,unlessthereaderknows publicinrealtime.Transparencymustmeandis- alotofeconomics.MuchoftheFOMCdelibera- 1 MONETARYPOLICYANDINFLATION tionconsistsoffairlytechnicaldiscussions. thereareanumberofpossiblegoals;Iwillempha- Withoutanadvanceddegreeineconomics,or sizetwo. extensivepolicyexperience,muchofthismate- TheFederalReserve,asanagencycreatedby rialissimplyincomprehensible.Thus,although Congress,clearlyhasaresponsibilitytobepoliti- policyexpertscanunderstandundigestedmate- callyaccountable.TheFedneedstoberesponsive rial,themessagethattheywouldconveytothe toquestionsandconcernsfromtheCongressand, generalpublicwouldlikelynotbetimelyand indeed,fromthepublicatlarge.TheFedneeds mightnotcloselymatch,inemphasisandtone, tobeasclearaspossibleastothegoalsofmone- theconsensusmessagetheFOMCwouldwantto tarypolicyandthestandardstobeappliedto convey. judgethedegreeofsuccessinmeetingthegoals. Moreover,acertainamountofcommunica- TheEmploymentActof1946setsthegoalsin tionduringanFOMCmeetingisnonverbal.For generaltermsasmaximumemploymentandpur- peoplewhohavecometoknoweachotherpretty chasingpower.TheFederalReserve,incongres- welloverthecourseofmanymeetings,someref- sionaltestimony,Feddocumentsandspeeches, erencesinaparticularmeetinghavemeaningonly providesitsinterpretationofthesegoals. inthecontextofdiscussionsinpriormeetingsor Asecond,somewhatdifferent,goalofcom- outsidetheformalFOMCmeeting—duringaca- municationsstrategyistomakemonetarypolicy demicconferencesforexample. moreeffective.Thisisagoalofgreatimportance Thethrustofmyargumentisthattheword forachievingthecongressionalmandateprovided “transparency”ismisleadingwithrespectto totheFederalReserve.Toexplaintheimportance FederalReservecommunicationschallenges. ofclearcommunicationstoeffectivepolicyIneed Instead,theFedneedsaconsciouscommunica- todeveloptheargumentstartingwithatheoreti- tionsstrategyratherthanastrategyofsimply calframework. “openingup.”Thepurposeofaconsciousstrategy isnottohideanythingbutrathertohaveaclear transmissionofinformation.Successfulcommu- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK nicationrequiresthattheFOMCdistillprincipal TheFederalReservereliesheavilyoneco- messagesorthemesfromitsdeliberationsand nomictheorydevelopedoverthespanofmany thevastamountofmaterialconsidered. decades.Thetheoreticalframeworkiscompli- Asanaside,InotethattheFOMCtranscripts catedinitstechnicalformandimplementation arelittlediscussedinthepress.Thegeneral butquitestraightforwardinitsbare-bones assumptionisthattheyaretoooldtobenews- abstractframework.Thekeyelementistheinter- worthy,butIthinktheyalsorequireasubstan- actionbetweentheFed’spolicystanceandthe tialbackgroundineconomicsandthehistoryof responseoftheeconomytochangesinthepolicy monetarypolicytointerpretcorrectly.Thus,even stance. ifthetranscriptwerereleasedpromptlyaftera Ateachofitsmeetings,theFOMCsetsthe meeting—whichwouldn’tbeconstructive intended,ortarget,federalfundsrate.Thefederal becausedoingsowouldchangethenatureofthe fundsrateistheinterestrateoninterbankborrow- Committee’sdeliberations—Idoubtthatthetran- ingandlending.Mostfedfundstransactionsare scriptwouldbeaverysatisfactorycommunica- foroneday—overnightloansinmarketparlance. tionsvehicle. Ifthefederalfundsrateinthemarketistending abovethetargetrate,theOpenMarketDeskat theFederalReserveBankofNewYorksupplies FED COMMUNICATIONS GOALS additionalfundstothemarketthroughpurchases Anystrategyrequiresaclearconceptionof ofTreasurysecurities,ortransactionswithsimilar thegoals.ForFedcommunicationsstrategies effect.Iftherateinthemarketistradingbelow 2 FedCommunications theintendedrate,theDeskabsorbsfundsfrom FULL RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS themarketbysellingTreasurysecuritiesorequiva- MACROECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM lenttransactions.Theseopenmarketoperations adjustthesupplyofbankreservessothatthe TheinteractionbetweentheFederalReserve marketrateremainsclosetotheintendedrate. andthemarketsmaybeconfusingatfirstsight, TheFOMCsetstheintendedratesoasto andindeedwasconfusingtoeconomistsforgen- achieveascloselyaspossiblethegoalsoflow erationsuntilconceptualbreakthroughsinthe andstableinflationandmaximumsustainable 1960sand1970sclarifiedtheissue.Market economicgrowth.TounderstandhowtheFOMC behaviordependsonexpectationsastowhatthe decidesontheappropriatetargetfundsrate,we FederalReserveisgoingtodo,andwhatthe needtofillindetailsabouthowpolicyactions FederalReserveisgoingtododependsonwhat affecttheeconomy. themarketandtheeconomyareanticipatedtodo. Theonlyinterestrateaffecteddirectlyby Thefullrationalexpectationsmacroeconomic Fedopenmarketoperationsisthefederalfunds equilibriumoccurswhenthemarketbehavesas rate.Themarketdetermineslonger-terminterest theFederalReserveexpectsandtheFederal rates,suchasTreasurybondratesofallmaturities, Reservebehavesasthemarketexpects.Inboth andmortgagerates.Theseratesdependcritically casesweassumethattheexpectationsarefully onexpectationsaboutthefuture.Inparticular,the rational,bywhichwemeanthattheexpectations market’sexpectationofaone-weekratedepends arefullyinformedonthebasisofallavailable ontheexpectedovernightfederalfundsrateover information. thenextsevendays.Ingeneral,therateonany Theparadigmofafullrationalexpectations bonddependsonexpectedshortratesoverthe macroeconomicequilibriumsetstheframework horizonofthebond.Thus,theten-yearTreasury forcommunicationsstrategy.FromtheFederal bondratedependsonexpectationsofshort-term Reserve’spointofview,policyeffectivenesswill interestratesovertheten-yearhorizon. beenhancedwhenthemarkethasacompleteand Marketexpectationsaboutfutureinterestrates accurateunderstandingoftheFederalReserve’s dependontheinteractionoftwointerrelated goalsandpolicyprocesses.Thus,toobtaingood sourcesofinfluence.One,obviously,concerns policyoutcomesitisintheFed’sinteresttopro- FederalReservedecisionsontheintendedfederal videascompleteinformationaspossibletothe fundsrate.Alsoimportantareexpectationsasto market. thedemandsforandsuppliesoffundsinthepri- Theabstractionofafullrationalexpectations vatemarket.Forexample,withasimultaneous macroeconomicequilibriumprovidesapower- investmentandhousingboom,creditdemands fulstartingpointforanalysisofcommunications willbehighandinterestrateswilltendtobebid issues.Nevertheless,itisobviousthatinreality up.InpursuingitspolicygoalstheFOMCwill informationisincomplete,inpartbecausethe beadjustingthefederalfundsrateasneededto futureisunknowablewithprecision.Moreover keeptheinflationratelowandstable.Thus,the atanygiventimesomeindividualsinevitably marketformsexpectationsabouttheunderlying havemoreinformationandmoreprocessing stateoftheeconomythatwillbearonFed powerthanothers. decisions. TheFederalReserveisconstantlyevaluating Asymmetric Information thesituationinthemarketsandtryingtoadjust theintendedfederalfundsratetoproduceasat- Afeatureofmanymarketenvironmentsis isfactoryequilibriumintheeconomy.Whenwe thatsomeagentsinthemarkethavemoreinfor- puttheFederalReserve’sandthemarket’sdeci- mationthanothersdo.Inthemonetarypolicy sionsandexpectationstogether,wehavea context,theFederalReservehasthelargestand macroeconomicequilibrium. mostextensiveeconomicinformationgathering 3 MONETARYPOLICYANDINFLATION systemintheworld.TheFednotonlyhasalarge aimstobesystematic—certainlynotrandomand staffbutalsohasaccesstoconsiderableconfi- capricious. dentialinformationfromindividualfirms.To Thedifficultyisthatinthemonetarypolicy someextentthisconfidentialinformationcanbe arenanoonehasyetbeenabletoderiveathorough disclosedinsummaryformwithoutidentifying andcompletestatementofwhatthepolicyrule individualfirms,butneverthelesstheFed’stimely isorshouldbe.1Thereasonforthissituationis accesstothisinformationandknowledgeofthe thatpolicymakersmustrespondtoaflowof firmsinvolveddoesgivetheFedanadvantage informationthatdiffersincertainrespectsfrom overthemarketingeneral.However,theinforma- priorexperience.Inprinciple,inarational tionasymmetryisnottotallyone-sided.Individual expectationsequilibrium,theflowofnewinfor- firmshaveenormousspecializedmarketinfor- mationtriggerspolicyactionsthatarehighly mationthattheFeddoesnothave.Forexample, predictableinthemarketplace.Thatis,asnew largeretailfirmshaveday-by-dayandeven andunpredictedinformationarises,theFed’s hour-by-hourinformationonthescaleofretail andthemarket’sresponsetotheinformation transactionsintheeconomy;largebanksand shouldbehighlypredictable. creditcardcompanieshaveinformationonday- Thisconceptionofmonetarypolicycreatesa by-dayeconomicactivityastheyobserveflows communicationschallengebecausemanymarket oftransactionsontheirownbooks.Therelevant participantsseemnottounderstandtheframe- economy-widereportsconstructedbygovernment workverywell.Whatmarketparticipantswant statisticalagenciescomeoutwithalagmeasured toknowmorethananythingelseiswhattheFed’s inweekstoamonthormore.Theseformalsta- nextpolicyactionisgoingtobe.But,undermost tisticalreportsaretheprimarysourceofFederal circumstancestheFOMCcannotpredictitsnext Reserveinformation,andtheyareavailableto policyactionbecausetheCommitteecannotpre- everyoneinthemarket.Althoughtherecertainly dictthenewinformationthatwilldrivethepolicy isanissueofasymmetricinformation,myown action.Thus,animportantcommunications viewisthatasymmetricinformationisnotamajor challengeisfortheFedtoexplaintheessential issueforFedcommunicationspolicy. differencebetweenpolicyandpolicyactionsand whythisdistinctioniscriticaltotheeffective- Policy Decisions Versus Policy nessofmonetarypolicy. Anextremelyimportantdistinctioninthe policyliteratureisthatbetweenpolicydecisions Fed Disturbances andpolicies.Apolicyisthesystematicbehavior Rationalexpectationsmodelsaredesigned ofthepolicyagencyindeterminingindividual sothattheFedpolicyactionisapredictable policyactions.Thus,howsatisfactoryapolicyis cannotbejudgedfromanysinglepolicyaction. functionofinformationasitarrives.Thesemodels Itisthesequenceofpolicyactionsandtheirrela- donothaveaconstructiveplaceforarandom tiontotheobservableeconomicenvironment componenttoFedpolicy.Thatis,inanabstract thatdefineapolicy.Inprinciple,thereshouldbe modelinwhichtheFedpolicyruleisspecified apolicyresponserule,orregularity,orformula, withprecisionuptoarandomterm,thesmaller orrecipe,orwhateveryouwantcallit,thatguides isthevarianceoftherandomtermthemore ordeterminestheindividualpolicyactions.In effectivethepolicywillbe.Intuitively,itmakes theabsenceofsucharegularity,policyactions sensethatinthemonetarypolicycontextadded wouldberandomandcapricious.Goodpolicy uncertaintyfromunpredictablepolicyshould 1 IdiscussedthisissueatsomelengthinaspeechinOctober2005:“TheFed’sMonetaryPolicyRule,”publishedinTheFederalReserveBank ofSt.LouisReview,January/February2006,88,pp.1-12. 4 FedCommunications notbeexpectedtobeconstructivefortheecon- AttheconclusionofeachFOMCmeetingthe omyasawhole. Committeereleasesabriefpolicystatement. Asanaside,notethattherearepolicyenvi- Policystatementsalsoappearinspeechesand ronmentsinwhicharandomcomponenttoa testimonyofFOMCmembers.Thispublicinfor- policyisanessentialfeatureforpolicysuccess. mationisnotalwaysperfectlyclear.Partofthe Transportationoflargesumsofcashinan difficultyliesintheinherentuncertaintiesinthe armoredtruckisanexample.Thetransportation economyanduncertaintiesfacedbyCommittee scheduleandrouteshouldberandomizedas members.ItisalsonaturalfordifferentCommittee muchaspossibletoreducetheprobabilityof memberstohavesomewhatdifferentviewsand theft.Tomyknowledge,inmodelsofmacroeco- forthoseviewstoevolveovertime.Fromthis nomicpolicynoonehascreatedapositivecase plethoraofinformationitmaybedifficultforthe forrandomness. markettodistillclearmessages.Forthesereasons, Itissometimesarguedthatpolicycommuni- thesummarypolicystatementattheconclusion cationsshouldbevaguetoretainpolicyflexibility. ofeachFOMCmeetingandtheFOMCminutes Myownviewisthatcommunicationsshouldbe ofmeetingsplayacriticallyimportantrole. clearaboutwhatisknownandwhatisnot.Itis Myownviewonthepolicystatement,stated possibletobeperfectlyclearaboutwhyflexibility onanumberofoccasionsinthepast,isthatthe isnecessary—whypolicyactionsordinarilycan- policystatementneedstobeputtogetherfrom notbespecifiedlonginadvance.Thereason,asI relativelyfewstandardelements.ThewayI havealreadyargued,isthatpolicyactionsought haveputthispointisthattheEnglishlanguage toberesponsivetonewinformationthatcannot isincrediblyrich,oftenwithmultiplemeanings itselfbepredicted. foragivenword.Thevariousmeaningscanbe lookedupinagooddictionary.However,thereis nodictionaryinwhichwecanlookupthemean- COMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGES ingofaparagraph.Inthepast,marketparticipants havesometimescometosomewhatdifferent Thediscussionsofarhasleftimplicitanum- interpretationsofFOMCpolicystatements.This berofcommunicationschallenges,whichIwill factindicatestomethattheCommitteehasnot nowtakeupmoreexplicitly. communicatedwithasmuchclarityasdesirable. WheretheFedhasspecializedinformation Idonotpretendthatthegoaliseasytoreachbut thatitcandisclosewithoutcompromisingconfi- believethatprogresswillrequiregreaterstandard- dentiallyortheintegrityofthepolicyprocess, izationovertimeinthestructureofthestatement thereisastrongargumentfortheFedtomake andintheoptionsfromwhichthestatementis suchdisclosure.Infact,formanyyearstheFed puttogether. haspublishedtheBeigeBookseveralweeksbefore Thereisanaturaltendencytotrytowritein eachFOMCmeeting.TheBeigeBookisacom- aninterestingandliteratefashion.Onewayto pendiumofanecdotalreportssummarizeddis- dosoistousesynonymstoavoidrepetition.The trictbydistrictacrossthecountry.Thisanecdotal practicecanbetricky,however.Supposeone informationsupplementstheformalstatistical policystatementdescribestheoutlookas“solid” informationandisanimportantinputtothepolicy andthenextas“robust.”Isrobustashadehigher process.InothercasestheFederalReservemay growththansolid?Howmuchhigher?Rhetorical obtainspecializedinformationthroughitsown flourishesmakeformoreinterestingwritingbut research.ResultsofFederalReserveresearchare donotnecessarilyenhanceclaritywhenitcomes usuallymadeavailablequitepromptlyinthe topolicystatements.Examplesofthissortabound. formofworkingpapersonFederalReserveweb Whatisthedifferencebetween“moderategrowth” sites. and“modestgrowth?” 5 MONETARYPOLICYANDINFLATION Eachpolicystatementisreadnexttothepre- lationaboutthereasonsforsurprisepolicyadjust- cedingone.Themarketlookscloselyatchanges mentswhentheyoccur,andspeculationthatsuch intheadjectivesused,thewordorderandevery asurprisemightoccur.Giventhattherehave otheraspectofastatement.SometimesIthink beenonlyfiveintermeetingpolicyactionssince thataseriesofstatementscouldevolveinsucha 1994,thischangewouldformalizewhatisnow waythatthemeaningwouldberelativelyclear, customarypractice. giventheevolution,eventhoughthemostrecent Anotherexplicitunderstandingcouldbe statementmightbequiteconfusingifconsidered thatallpolicyadjustmentswillbeinincrements onitsown. of25basispoints,unlesscompellingreasons Forthesereasons,andothers,Ibelievethat argueforlargermoves.Thepossibilitythatmar- clarityinFOMCstatementscouldbeimproved ketexpectationsoffutureratechangesmightnot bymakingthemmorestylized.Astylizedstate- matchtheFOMC’sexpectationsisnicelyillus- mentmaybedull,butthemarketwillsearchfor tratedbyexperienceinthespringof2004.At meaningwheneverthestatementchanges.Ifwe thattimethemarketunderstoodthattheFOMC wantchangestohaveclearmeaning,weneedto wouldberaisingthefundsratetargetfromthe1 formthestatementfromstockphrasesthathave percentlevelthathadprevailedsinceJune2003, beenexplainedbefore. andmanyinthemarketwereconcernedthatthe Iearlieremphasizedthat,intherational paceofrateincreasesmightberapid,astheyhad expectationsequilibriumframework,random beenin1994.AfteritsmeetingofMay4,2004, policydisturbancesdonotserveaconstructive theCommitteeissuedapolicystatementthat purpose.Avoidingrandomdisturbancesisnotas referredtoa“measuredpace”ofpolicyactions easyasitmightseem,giventhatcommunication inanattempttobetteralignmarketexpectations isdifficultandmisunderstandingsorincomplete withitsownexpectations.2Thisconcernwould understandingisrelativelyeasy.Thereare,how- nothavebeenpresentiftheFOMChadadopted ever,somespecificthingsthatcouldbedone. apolicyofconfiningadjustmentsto25basis AlthoughI’veemphasizedstatements,itis pointsintheabsenceofacompellingreasonto alsotruethatthemarketsearchesformeaningin actmoreforcefully.Themeasuredpacelanguage thepolicyactionsthemselves.Anincreaseinthe didexactlywhatwasintended,aspresscoverage intendedrateof25basispointsbetweensched- afterthemeetingnoted. uledmeetingshasaverydifferentmeaningthan Confiningpolicyactionsto25basispointsas thesamesizeincreaseatascheduledmeeting. anormalmatterisprettyclosetostandardprac- Toreduceuncertaintyoverthemeaningofinter- tice.Ofthe47policyactionsfrom1994todate, meetingpolicyactions,theFOMCcouldadopt 33havebeen25-basis-pointschanges,13have anexplicitpolicyofmakingallpolicyadjust- been50-basis-pointschangesandonlyonehas mentsonlyatscheduledmeetingsunlessthere beena75-basis-pointschange.Therehavebeen wereacompellingcircumstancetoactbetween nochangeslargerthan75basispoints. meetings.Thecompellingcircumstanceordinar- Iemphasizedearliertheimportanceofthe ilycouldbeeasilyexplained;indeed,theevent distinctionbetweenapolicyandapolicyaction. triggeringapolicyresponsewouldprobablybe Initscommunications,IbelievethattheFOMC highlyvisibleandthepolicyresponseoccasion shouldworkhardertoexplainhowindividual nomarketsurprise.Anexamplewouldbethe policyactionsfitintoacomprehensiveandsys- policyactionfollowingthe9/11attacks.Astan- tematicpolicy.Whenthemarketunderstands dardprocedureofconfiningpolicyactionsto whytheFOMCactsasitdoes,themarketwillbe scheduledmeetingswouldavoidmarketspecu- abletoobservearrivinginformationandjudge 2 Thefullsentenceinthepolicystatementwas:“Atthisjuncture,withinflationlowandresourceuseslack,theCommitteebelievesthatpolicy accommodationcanberemovedatapacethatislikelytobemeasured.” 6 FedCommunications howtheFOMCislikelytorespondtothesame Inmyview,partofthereasontheeconomy information.Appropriatemarketresponsesto hasbeensostable—indeed,increasinglystable— informationwillacceleratetheeconomy’s overthepasttwodecadesorsoisthatmonetary responsetotheinformation,improvingtheeffi- policyhasbecomemuchmorepredictable. ciencyofthoseresponses.And,ofcourse,FOMC GreaterpredictabilityisaconsequenceofFOMC policyactionswillnotbeasurpriseunderthese successinadjustingthestanceofmonetarypolicy circumstances. inamuchmorerule-likewayandtheCommittee’s successinenhancingitscommunicationswith themarketandgeneralpublic.I’vesuggesteda THE BOTTOM LINE: generalframeworkforunderstandingcommuni- cationsissues—thefullrationalexpectations MEASURABLE SUCCESS macroeconomicequilibrium.Perfectingthat WithmycolleagueBobRasche,I’vebeenable equilibriumbymakingpolicyadjustments tostudytheeffectivenessofFOMCcommunica- increasinglyregularandbyreducingaspectsof tions.I’vepresentedtheresultsinsomedetail3; policythatappearrandomtothemarketisa hereI’lljustreportthebottomline.Overthepast worthygoal. decade,themarkethasbeenabletopredictFOMC AsIhaveargued,therearesomefurthersteps policyadjustmentswithconsiderableaccuracy. alongthisroadthattheFOMCmightconsider.I Thatfactindicatesthatpolicyhasbeensystem- wouldwelcomesuggestionsfrommarketpartici- aticenough,andcommunicationseffective pantsandacademicexperts.And,Iwouldwel- enough,thatwe’vemademajorprogresstoward comethoughtsonthissubjectfrommyaudience achievingthegoalofafullrationalexpectations today. macroeconomicequilibrium.Relativetothe progressalreadymade,mysuggestionsareminor refinements.Butthatisthepointwehavereached, andthereiseveryreasontopursuefurthergains. 3 See“HowPredictableisFedPolicy?”FederalReserveBankofSt.LouisReview,November/December2005,87,pp.659-68. 7

Cite this document

APA

William Poole (2006, February 23). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20060224_poole

BibTeX

@misc{wtfs_speech_20060224_poole,
  author = {William Poole},
  title = {Speech},
  year = {2006},
  month = {Feb},
  howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20060224_poole},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}