speeches · June 13, 2005

Speech

William Poole · President

Understanding the Term Structure of Interest Rates MoneyMarketeers NewYork,NewYork June14,2005 PublishedintheFederalReserveBankofSt.LouisReview,September/October2005,87(5),pp.589-95 Atopic much discussed in recent meeting.Ontheotherhand,akeylong-term months is the relationship over the interestrate,theyieldon10-yearU.S.Treasury past year or so between long-term securities,hasshownlittlepersistenttendency and short-term interest rates. Some tochange,eitherupordown,overthesame observershavearguedthatthefailureoflongrates period.Irefertothisdiscrepancyininterestrate to trend up as the Fed has increased its target patternsastherecenttermstructurepuzzle. federalfundsrateisapuzzle.Othershaveargued Theeightincreasesinthetargetfundsrate that Fed policy is ineffective because increasing tookitfrom1percentto3percentasofMay3, the rising short rate is not affecting the long rate. 2005.The10-yearTreasurybondrate,however, I’ll not say much about the policy issue, but I hasexhibitedadifferentpattern.Ifwelookat do want to address the puzzle. monthlyaveragedata,whichI’llusethroughout However,I’mgoingtodefinethepuzzlesome- unlessindicatedotherwise,wecanseethatthe whatnarrowly.I’llnotaddressthecurrentlow ratehasnothadapersistenttrendsincemid-2002, leveloftherealrateofinterestonlong-termbonds. whentheratewasabout41/2percent(aratethat Thatsamepuzzleexistedayearago,althoughit alsoprevailedattheendof2003andagainthis maynothavebeensoobviousatthetime.What spring).Themonthlyaveragelevelofthebond I’lldiscussistheissueofwhythelongratehas rateincreasedbyabout90basispointsfromMarch toJune2004,mostlyinresponsetoevidenceof notincreasedastheFedhasraisedthetarget strongereconomicgrowthandthebeginningof federalfundsrate. Fedtightening.TheJune2004levelof4.73per- IthankmycolleaguesattheFederalReserve centonthebondratewasthehighestsinceJune BankofSt.Louis—especiallyEdNelson—fortheir 2002andhasnotbeenexceededsince. assistanceandcomments. Someobserversliketoemphasizethatthe longratehasdeclinedsincetheFedfirststarted raisingratesinJune2004,butIthinktheright THE RECENT TERM STRUCTURE observation,giventhevariabilityoftherate,is PUZZLE tosaythatthelongratehasfluctuatedaround SinceJune2004,theFederalOpenMarket roughly41/2percentsincemid-2002.June2004 Committee(FOMC)hasincreasedthetargetfederal isnotthebestmonthtobegintheanalysisbecause fundsrateby25basispointseverytimetheyhave theFed’srateincreaseswereforeseensome met,includingtherecentmeetingonMay3. monthsinadvance.BasedontheJuly2004federal Moreover,thefederalfundsfuturesmarketpre- fundsfuturescontract,inlate2003themarket dictedthattheCommitteewouldraisethetarget anticipatedafundsrateof1.25percentorabove, fundsratebyanother25basispointsatitsJune butthentheexpectedrateforJulyfelltonearly1 1 FINANCIALMARKETS percent(i)astheFOMCmaintainedits1percent cientisabitbelow0.2;fortheperiodfromJanuary targetfundsrateatitsJanuaryandMarch2004 1984toMarch2005,thecoefficientisabitabove meetingsand(ii)asaconsequenceofsomewhat 0.3.Usingtheperiodfrom1984,whatthecoeffi- weakeconomicdata.WhentheFOMCintroduced cientmeansisthatonaveragea100-basis-point the“measuredpace”languageatitsmeetingof changeinthefundsratehasbeenassociated May4,2004,themarketpriced-inapolicytarget witha32-basis-pointchangeinthebondratein of1.25percentfortheJune2004FOMCmeeting. thesamedirection.Thus,overthepastyear,as Inanyevent,I’llframethispuzzleasthefailureof thefundsrateroseby200basispoints,weshould long-terminterestratestoincreaseasshort-term haveseenanincreaseofthebondrateofabout interestrateshaverisensincethelatewinterand 65basispoints.Dependingonhowyoueyeball springof2004. yourfavoritechartofthe10-yearbondrate,instead Twophenomenadeservetobedistinguished: ofincreasing,thebondratehasbeenaboutflat, theleveloflong-termratesandthechangeinlong ordownsomewhat,overthepastyear. ratesasshortrateshaverisen.Lowlong-termrates werealreadyinplacebeforetherecenttermstruc- turepuzzle,andsomemajorfactorsbehindlow THE EXPECTATIONS THEORY OF long-termratesdonotnecessarilyhelpinexplain- THE TERM STRUCTURE ingthetermstructurepuzzle,whichconcerns Todecidewhethertherereallyisapuzzle,or changesinrates.Mostnotably,FedGovernor tomakesenseofthepuzzle,we’llneedtocallon BenBernanke(2005)hasconvincinglyargued thatthe“globalsavingglut”hasbeenadepressing economictheory.Accordingtoeconomictheory, factoronU.S.realandnominalinterestratessince akeyreasonwhythecontemporaneousrelation- 2000.Yetthisfactordoesnotsolvethetermstruc- shipbetweenthefundsrateandthebondrateis turepuzzle,fortwoimportantreasons.First,as farfromone-for-oneisthatchangesinthebond noted,thegluthasbeeninforcethroughoutthis rateshouldbecloselylinkednottotoday’schange decade,whereastheterm-structurepuzzlerefers inthefundsratebuttorevisionsinexpectations totheperiodsinceearly2004.Second,theglut ofthefuturepathofthefundsrate.Thetheory isasourceofdownwardpressureonrealinterest willprovideaframeworkforananalysisofthe ratesatallmaturitiessince2001,whereastheterm recenttermstructurepuzzle. structurepuzzleinsteadreferstotherecentflat Theessentialmessageoftheexpectations trendofthelongratedespiteasignificantincrease theoryofthetermstructureisthatmarketforces intheshortrate. shouldmakelonger-terminterestratesaweighted averageoftheshort-terminterestratesexpected toprevailoverthelifeofthebond.Theinvestor AVERAGE HISTORICAL BEHAVIOR shouldbeindifferentbetweenmakingNconsec- utiveinvestmentsin1-periodsecuritiesand Thatthereisapuzzleisaconsequenceof investinginanN-periodbond.Oratleastenough justhowatypicaltherecentbehavioroftheterm investorsshouldbeindifferenttoforcetheN- structureis.Thefundsrateandbondratedotyp- icallymoveinthesamedirection.Alinearregres- periodbondtotradeinthemarketattheweighted sionofthefirstdifferenceofthebondrateonthe averageofthenextN1-periodbonds.Totakea firstdifferenceofthefederalfundsrateprovides simpleexample,lettingtimebequarters,the asimpledescriptionoftheaveragerelationship expectationstheorysaysthatthe2-quarterinterest betweenthebondrateandfundsrate.Theregres- rateshouldbeequaltotheaverageoftoday’s1- sionsindicatethatthecontemporaneousrela- quarterinterestrateandtheexpected1-quarter tionshipbetweenthetwoseriesispositiveand ratenextquarter.Weassumethattoday’sexpec- statisticallysignificant.Fortheentireperiodfrom tationofnextquarter’s1-quarterrateisbased May1954toMarch2005,theregressioncoeffi- rationallyonallinformationavailabletoday. 2 UnderstandingtheTermStructureofInterestRates Theargumentappliestobondratesofany fluctuateinresponsetothechangesinmultiyear maturity.Thesimpleexpectationstheoryimplies budgetdeficitprojections,andsomeofthisfluc- thatthe10-yearbondratereflectstheexpected tuationmayreflectrevisionstoexpectedrealrates. pathoverthenexttenyearsoftheshort-termrate. Itisnothardtoimagineotherinformationthat The10-yearbondrateatthebeginningofJune mightrationallyaffectinvestorexpectationsabout 2004incorporatedthe1-yearrateandthenext distantrealrates.Ultimately,theissueisanempir- nineexpected1-yearrates,thelastofwhichwas icaloneanditdoesappearthattheexpectedreal a1-yearrateonasecuritythatwouldbeissued shortratefluctuatesconsiderablyinpractice. inJune2013andmatureinJune2014. Historically,expectedfuturenominalshort Similarly,the10-yearrateprevailingatthe rateshaveoftenfluctuatedinresponsetochanges beginningofJunethisyearincorporatedthecur- ininflationexpectations.Overthepastyear, rent1-yearrateandthenextnineexpected1-year distantinflationexpectations,asmeasuredby rates,thelastofwhichwasa1-yearrateona thespreadbetweenconventionalandinflation- securitythatwouldbeissuedinJune2014and protectedbonds,havenotchangedmarkedly. matureinJune2015.Aftercomparingthe10-year Thus,wecanproceedbyassumingthatlong-term bondfromayearagowiththeonetoday,wesee expectationsofinflationhaveremainedroughly thatnineoftheten1-yearperiodsarethesame. constantinthepastyearbecauseofconfidence Today’s10-yearbonddoesnotincludethe1-year inFederalReservepoliciesand,intheabsence rateprevailinginJune2004—thatsecurityhas ofinformationtothecontrary,thatthereisnonew matured.Today’s10-yearbonddoesincludethe informationaboutfar-offrealrates.Withthese expected1-yearrateonasecuritymaturingin assumptions,thechangeinthelongrateisdriven June2015.Thus,thedifferenceintheyieldsonthe bynewinformationaboutthemedium-termpath two10-yearbonds—lastJune’sandthisJune’s— ofshort-termrealinterestrates. reflectssubstitutionof(i)theexpected1-year rateforasecuritytobeissuedinJune2014for Forexample,ifnewlypublisheddatasuggest (ii)the1-yearrateinthemarketinJune2004for greaterpressureonaggregatedemandintheyears thesecuritythathasjustmaturedinJune2005, immediatelyahead,agentswillexpectagreater plusrevisionsintheexpected1-yearratestopre- degreeofoffsettingpressurefromtheFederal vaileveryyearfrom2005through2013.Thekey Reserveintheformofhigherrealinterestrates, tounderstandingchangesinthe10-yearrateis andtheexpectationoffuturerealrateswillbe tounderstandrevisionsinthosenineexpected higherthantheexpectationbasedontheprior 1-yearrates. period’sinformationset.Myemphasisinthis Tounderstandtheprocessbywhichexpected discussionisthatnewinformationaboutthestate future1-yearratesarerevised,itisusefultopar- oftheeconomydriveschangesinlong-term titionthe1-yearrateintoarealrateandaninfla- interestrates. tionpremium.Howmightweanticipatefar-off expectedrealshortratestobehave?Thisvariable shouldrespondtonewinformationaboutthereal A DETAILED LOOK AT shockslikelytobefacingtheeconomyseveral JANUARY 2004–MAY 2005 yearsinthefuture.Itwouldbetemptingtothink thatsuchnewinformationarisessoinfrequently Considerthebehaviorofbondratessince thatthedistantshort-termrealratecouldbe thebeginningof2004fromtheperspectiveof treatedasconstant. theexpectationstheoryofthetermstructure.In Thereisconsiderableevidenceagainstthis January2004,the10-yearbondratewas4.15 presumption,however.Forexample,Laubach percent;inJanuary2005,itwas4.22percent.I’ll (2003)findsthatexpectationsofshort-termnomi- concentrateoninformationthathascreatedrevi- nalinterestratesbeyondfiveyearsinthefuture sionstofutureexpectedshortrates. 3 FINANCIALMARKETS Table 1 Selected Changes in the 10-Year Treasury Bond Rate, January 2004–May 2005 Bond-yieldchange, Date basispoints Mainnewsitem Source 1/6/2004 –12 Weaker-than-expectedgrowthinservicessector Reuters 1/9/2004 –16 Weaker-than-expectedpayrolldata DJNW 1/28/2004 +11 FederalReservedrops“foraconsiderableperiod” NYT languagefromFOMCstatement 3/5/2004 –19 Weaker-than-expectedpayrolldata WSJ 4/2/2004 +24 Higherpayrolldata WSJ 4/13/2004 +10 Weaker-than-expectedretailsalesforMarch2004 DJNW 5/7/2004 +16 Better-than-expectedpayrolldata WSJ 6/15/2004 –20 Better-than-expectedMayinflation;reactionto FT GreenspanSenatetestimony 7/16/2004 –12 Better-than-expectedJuneinflation DJNW 7/27/2004 +13 Better-than-expectedJulyconsumerconfidence DJNW 8/6/2004 –19 Lower-than-expectedpayrolldata WSJ 10/8/2004 –11 Weaker-than-expectedpayrolldata DJNW 10/27/2004 +10 Higheroilprices DJNW 11/5/2004 +11 Better-than-expectedpayrolldata WSJ 12/3/2004 –13 Weaker-than-expectedpayrolldata DJNW 12/16/2004 +10 ContinuingreactiontoFOMCstatement DJNW 3/9/2005 +14 Concernaboutspikeinoilprices NYT 4/15/2005 –10 Continuedriseinenergyprices.Disappointingreports Bloomberg fromFordandGM 4/21/2005 +10 Better-than-expectedmanufacturingreportandjobless Bloomberg claimsdata NOTE:DJNW,DowJonesNewsWire;FT,FinancialTimes;NYT,NewYorkTimes;WSJ,WallStreetJournal.Datesrefertothedateof theinterestratechange;sourcesrefertosame-daywirereportsandnext-daynewspaperreportsontheprincipaleconomicnews accompanyingthebondratemovement. Considerrevisionstoexpectedrealshortrates (GDP)growthin2004of4.6percent.Intheevent, inimmediatelycomingyears.Inpasttightenings, U.S.realGDPgrowthin2004was4.4percent.In suchasin1994,policy-inducedincreasesinreal 2004,theeconomyperformedasclosetoexpected ratesledtosharpcontemporaneousincreasesin aswewillfindinthehistoricalrecord.Events bondrates.Thepastyearhasnotrepeatedthis havenotmuchchangedtheoutlookfor2005 phenomenonbecausetheFederalReserveindi- either.InJanuary2004,theBlueChipConsensus cateditstighteningintentionswellinadvance forecastfor2005realgrowthwas3.7percent;the andbecausetheeconomyhasperformedabout asexpected. latest(June10,2005)BlueChipforecastisforreal Anindicationofwhatmarketswereexpect- growthof3.5percent,anextremelysmalldown- ingasofJanuary2004isgivenbytheBlueChip wardrevisionfromtheexpectationprevailingin Consensusforecastforrealgrossdomesticproduct January2004. 4 UnderstandingtheTermStructureofInterestRates Tostudythismattermorecarefully,I’ve droppedfromitspressreleasethephrasethatit examinedlargedailymovementsofthe10-year expectedpolicyaccommodationtoprevail“for bondratesinceJanuary2004.Thesearelistedin aconsiderableperiod.”Oncethisphrasewas Table1.Thecriterionfordetermininga“large” dropped,marketsrevisedtheirexpectationsof movementisachangeof10basispointsormore shortratestoahigherpaththanpreviously,and inthebondrate. bondratesaccordinglywereimmediatelyrevised Seethetablefordetails;Iwillprovidehere upward. theflavorofmajorfinancialnewsthatoccurred Althoughcertaindatareleasesdidsurprise onsomeofthe“largechange”days.Thesluggish themarket,overtheperiodasawholethedata recoveryofemploymentduringthisexpansion cameinaboutasexpected,contributingtothe wasreflectedinweakpayrolldatathatsurprised absenceofatrendinthebondrateovertheperiod themarketonJanuary9,2004,andMarch5,2004, atissue.Likelypolicyresponsestoeconomicdata leadingtodeclinesinthebondrateof16basis werealsoknowninadvance;and,intheabsence pointsand19basispoints,respectively.These ofeconomicsurprises,FOMCdecisionsonthe employmentreportsledtorevisionsofmarket fundsrateweremuchasexpected.Thus,there expectationstowardaslowerexpectedwithdrawal wasnoparticularreasonoverthisperiodforthe bytheFedofitsaccommodativepolicystance, markettoreviseitsexpectationsoffutureinterest and,accordingly,expectationsofrealshortrates ratescontinuouslyinonedirection;thebondrate overthenextfewyearsdeclined. fluctuatedinresponsetoarrivinginformation, Asanotherexample,theoilpricespikeon butendedupaboutwhereitstarted. March9,2005,wasassociatedwithanincrease TheargumentIammakingisnotanewone. inthebondrateof14basispoints.Suchbond Thereisahugeliteratureontheexpectations rateincreasescanbeinterpretedtwoways.One theoryofthetermstructureofinterestrates,and interpretationisthatmarketsdidnotrevise policymakershavelongbeenawareofthebasic upwardtheirexpectationsoffutureinflationbut ideas.Forexample,theRadcliffeCommittee,a didreviseupwardtheirexpectationsoftheFed U.K.inquiryintomonetarypolicyinthelate monetarypolicyrequiredtokeepinflationstable. 1950s,notedthat“Itisgenerallyagreedthatthe Alternatively,thebondrateincreasemayhave moretemporaryariseinshortratesisexpected reflectedexpectationsthattheFedwouldaccom- tobe,thelessitwillcauselongratestorise; modateatemporaryincreaseininflationinthe correspondingly,themoretemporaryadropis wakeoftheoilshock. expectedtobe,thelesswilllongratesfall.”1 Expectationsoffuturemonetarypolicyhave ArthurBurns,thenFederalReserveChairman, affectedthebondratesignificantlyfromtimeto observedin1977that“Long-terminterestrates, time.ArecentstudybyGürkaynak,Sack,and ofcourse,areofmuchlargersignificancetothe Swanson(2005),coveringaperiodearlierthan economythanshort-termrates;butthelong-term thatconsideredhere,findsthatnewsaboutlikely ratesarealsoespeciallysensitivetoinflationary futureFOMCactionsonthefundsratehasan expectations.”2Ina1976paper,Istudiedthe importanteffectonthebondrate,distinctfrom implicationsformonetarypolicyoftheexpecta- FOMCactionsonthecurrentfundsrate.This tionstheoryandconcludedthatthe“implications findingis,ofcourse,inlinewiththeexpectations oftherationalexpectationshypothesisformacro theory.Intheperiodconsideredhere,newsabout modelingareprofound...Thispointisofgreatest futurepolicyincreasedbondratesby11basis importancefortheauctionmarketsinfinancial pointsonJanuary28,2004,whentheFOMC assets”becausetheexpectationstheorytellsus 1 RadcliffeCommittee(1959,paragraph447). 2 Burns(1977,p.724). 5 FINANCIALMARKETS that“long-terminterestratesadjustimmediately expectationsaboutinflation,realgrowth,and andfullyinresponsetonewinformation.”3 Fedpolicy. Theexpectationstheoryofthetermstructure Becausetheroleofchangesininflation hasbeenseverelycriticizedonanumberof expectationshasbeensoimportanthistorically, grounds,butfortheproblemathandIbelieve butnotveryimportantoverthepastdecadeor thatthetheorytellsthebasicstorycorrectly.In so,consideranexamplefromthe1980s.The10- sum,economicsurpriseshavebeenminimalover yearbondratedeclinedsharplyover1984-86, thepastyearandtherehasbeennoreasonfor from11.67percentinJanuary1984to7.11percent significantrevisioninexpectedfutureshort-term inDecember1986.KozickiandTinsley(2005, p.427)suggestthatthisdeclinereflectedcontinued interestrates.Thus,therehasbeennoreasonfor adjustmentof10-year-aheadexpectationsofinfla- asignificanttrendinlong-terminterestrates. tioninthewakeoftheVolckerdisinflation.They arguethatthedeclineinconsumerpriceindex (CPI)inflationtoabout4percentin1983wasnot FULL CIRCLE acceptedasalastingchangeuntilthemid-1980s, Ibeganbydiscussingtheaveragetermstruc- whereuponitbecamemorefullyreflectedin turerelationship,inwhichlongrateschangeby long-termbondyields. about30basispointsforevery100-basis-point Anepisodethatmorecloselyresemblesthe changeinshortrates.NowI’llcirclebacktothat 2004experienceistheperiod1987-89.Herethe topic. FOMCraisedthetargetfederalfundsratesharply, Theaveragerelationshipreflectsaverage butthelongratewasfairlytrendless.Kozickiand businesscycleexperienceinwhichinformation Tinsley(2005,Figure1)showthatthelate1980s surpriseschangeexpectationsaboutfutureshort wasaperiodwhere10-year-aheadexpectations rates.Butacasualglanceatthedatawillshow ofinflationcontinuedtodecline,eventhough howvariabletheseperiodshavebeen.Insome 1-year-aheadexpectationsrose.Therisein1-year- cases,longratesrosebymuchmorethan30basis aheadexpectationsprobablyreflectedinflation pointsforevery100-basis-pointincreaseinshort alreadyinthepipeline.ActualFedpolicyover rates,andinsomecasesmuchless.Forexample, thisperiodwas,bycontrast,disinflationary.It overthe12monthsendingJuly1987,thebond seemsthatthisepisodecorrespondstoonewhere rateroseby115basispointswhilethefederal theFedadjusteddownitslong-runinflationobjec- fundsratewasrisingbyonly2basispoints.In tive.Thelong-termbondmarketunderstoodthis contrast,overthe24monthsendinginJuly1963, changeanddiscountedtheriseinCPIinflation the10-yearbondraterosebyonly10basispoints asnotreflectingthelong-termdirectionofmone- whilethefederalfundsratewasrisingby185 tarypolicy. basispoints.Clearly,I’vepickedoutparticular casestoserveasexamples;butIcanassureyou FINAL THOUGHTS that,ifyoulookatthedatasystematically,you willfindthattheaveragetermstructurerelation- ItshouldbeclearbynowthatIdonotbelieve shipofabout30basispointsonthebondratefor thatthereisatermstructurepuzzlereflectedin every100basispointsonthefundsrateisthe interestratebehavioroverthepastyearorso. averageofverydiverseexperience.IfIwerewrit- Recentexperienceisunusualbutfarfromunprece- ingaPh.D.thesis,Icouldexploreingreatdetail dented.Therealeconomyhasperformedvery theflowofinformationandhowbothshortand closetoexpectationatthebeginningof2004.The longratesrespondedasnewinformationchanged majorsurprisehasbeenthelargeincreasein 3 Poole(1976,pp.471,503). 6 UnderstandingtheTermStructureofInterestRates energyprices.Themarkethasinterpretedthis inthebondrate.Ihopewedonotseesuchan increaseasarelativepricechangeandnotasign outcome,forIbelievethatthecurrentoutlook ofhigherlong-runinflation.Thespreadbetween fortheeconomyisquitefavorable.Ihopethat conventionalandinflation-protectedbondshas currentexpectationsarerealized. increasedoverthenear-termhorizonbutnotover theperiod5to10yearsout. Thefactthatthe10-yearbondhasnotexhib- REFERENCES itedapersistenttrendoverthepast18monthsor Bernanke,BenS.“TheGlobalSavingGlutandthe sowhiletheFedhasbeenincreasingthetarget U.S.CurrentAccountDeficit.”HomerJonesLecture, federalfundsrateby200basispointsisnotevi- FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis,St.Louis, dencethatsomethingisawrywithmonetary Missouri,April14,2005; policy.Thinkoftheissuethisway.Atthebegin- http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ ningofaplanningperiodtheFedhasinminda speeches/2005/20050414/default.htm. probablecoursefortheeconomyandexpectations aboutthepolicyadjustmentsthatwillbeconsis- Burns,ArthurF.StatementbeforetheCommitteeon tentwithlong-runpolicyobjectives.Supposethe Banking,FinanceandUrbanAffairs,U.S.Houseof markethasthesameunderstandingastheFed. 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Kozicki,SharonandTinsley,P.A.“WhatDoYou IamnotclaimingthattheFedhadafirmplan Expect?ImperfectPolicyCredibilityandTestsof inmindinJanuary2004toreachatargetfederal theExpectationsHypothesis.”JournalofMonetary fundsrateof3percentinMay2005,butrather Economics,March2005,52(2),pp.421-47. thateventshavesimplyworkedoutthatway, correspondingrathercloselytothemarket’sbest Laubach,Thomas.“NewEvidenceontheInterest guessastohoweventswouldunfold.Inanyevent, RateEffectsofBudgetDeficitsandDebt.”Finance thefactthateverythinggoesaboutasexpectedis andEconomicsDiscussionSeriesPaperNo.2003-12, certainlynotevidenceofapolicyproblem. FederalReserveBoard,April2003. Iwouldbedelighted,aswouldprofessional forecasters,forthestringofaccurateforecaststo Poole,William.“RationalExpectationsintheMacro continue.Butwewouldbewelladvisednotto Model.”BrookingsPapersonEconomicActivity, forgetthoseforecaststandarderrors.Theyhave April1976,2(76),pp.463-505. notvanished.Withrespecttoforecasterrors,the futureismorelikelytobelikethepastseveral RadcliffeCommittee.Report:Committeeonthe decadesthanlikethepastyear.Ifrealgrowth WorkingoftheMonetarySystem.London:Her and/orinflationdepartsignificantlyfromcurrent Majesty’sStationeryOffice.CommandPaperNo.827, expectations,thenwewillseeapersistenttrend August1959. 7

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APA

William Poole (2005, June 13). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20050614_poole

BibTeX

@misc{wtfs_speech_20050614_poole,
  author = {William Poole},
  title = {Speech},
  year = {2005},
  month = {Jun},
  howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20050614_poole},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}