speeches · March 14, 2005
Speech
Alan Greenspan · Chair
For release on delivery
10:00 a.m. EST
March 15,2005
Statement of
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Special Committee on Aging
United States Senate
March 15, 2005
Mr. Chairman, Senator Kohl, and members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here
today to discuss the issues of population aging and retirement. In so doing, I would like to
emphasize that the views I will express are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the
Federal Reserve Board.
The economics of retirement are straightforward: Enough resources must be set aside over
a lifetime of work to fund consumption during retirement. At the most rudimentary level, one could
envision households actually storing goods purchased during their working years for use during
retirement. Even better, the resources that would have otherwise gone into producing the stored
goods could be diverted to the production of new capital assets, which would produce an even
greater quantity of goods and services for later use. In the latter case, we would be raising output
per worker hour, our traditional measure of productivity.
The bottom line in the success of all retirement programs is the availability of real resources
at retirement. The financial systems associated with retirement plans facilitate the allocation of
resources that supply retirement consumption of goods and services; they do not produce goods
and services. A useful test of a retirement system for a society is whether it sets up realistic
expectations as to the future availability of real resources and, hence, the capacity to deliver
postwork consumption without overly burdening the standard of living of the working-age
population.
In 2008, the leading edge of what must surely be the largest shift from work to retirement in
our nation's history will become evident as some baby boomers become eligible for
Social Security. According to the intermediate projections of the Social Security trustees, the
population 65 years of age and older will be approximately 26 percent of the adult population in
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2030, compared with 17 percent today. This huge change in the structure of our population will
expose all our financial retirement systems to severe stress and will require adjustments for which
there are no historical precedents. Indeed, retirement, generally, is a relatively new phenomenon in
human history. Average American life expectancy a century ago, for example, was only 47 years.
Relatively few of our citizens were able to enjoy many postwork years.
One consequence of the sizable baby boom cohort moving from the workforce to
retirement is an inevitable slowing in the growth of gross domestic product per capita relative to the
growth of output per worker. As the ratio of workers to population declines, so too must the ratio
of output to population, assuming no change in the growth of productivity. That result is simply a
matter of arithmetic. The important economic implication of that arithmetic is that, with fewer
workers relative to dependents, each worker's output will have to support a greater number of
people. Under the intermediate population projections of the Social Security trustees, for example,
the ratio of workers to total population will shrink about 7 percent by 2030. This shrinkage means
that, by 2030, total output per person will be 7 percent lower than it would be if the current
population structure were to persist. The fact that a greater share of the dependents will be elderly
rather than children will put an additional burden on society's resources, as the elderly consume a
relatively large share of per capita resources, whereas children consume relatively little.
This inevitable drop in the growth rate of per capita GDP relative to the growth of
productivity could be cushioned by an increase in labor force participation, which would boost the
ratio of workers to population. Increasing labor force participation seems a natural response to
population aging, as Americans not only are living longer but are also generally living healthier.
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Rates of disability for the elderly have been declining, reflecting both improvements in health and
changes in technology that accommodate the physical impairments that are associated with aging.
In addition, work is becoming less physically strenuous and more demanding intellectually,
continuing a century-long trend toward a more conceptual and a less physical economic output.
Despite the improving feasibility of work at older ages, Americans have been retiring at
younger and younger ages. For example, in 1940, the median age of retirement for men was 69;
today, the median age is about 62. In recent years, labor force participation among older Americans
has picked up somewhat, but it is far too early to determine the underlying causes of this increase.
Rising pressures on retirement incomes and a growing scarcity of experienced labor could induce
further increases in the labor force participation of the elderly and near-elderly in the future. In
addition, policies that specifically encourage greater labor force participation would also lessen the
necessary adjustments to consumption. Workers nearing retirement have accumulated many years
of valuable experience, so extending labor force participation by just a few years could have a
sizable impact on economic output.
Another way to boost future standards of living is to increase saving.1 We need the
additional saving in the decades ahead if we are to finance the construction of a capital stock that will
produce the additional real resources needed to redeem the retirement claims of the baby boomers
without having to severely raise claims on tomorrow's workers.
1 Additionally, we could borrow from abroad, which would build up the capital stock. In so
doing, however, we would also build up a liability to foreigners that we would have to finance in the
future.
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However, by almost any measure, the required amount of saving that would be necessary is
sufficiently large to raise serious questions about whether we will be able to meet the retirement
commitments already made. Much has been made of shortfalls in our private defined-benefit plans,
but the gross underfunding currently at $450 billion, although significant as a percentage of the
$1.8 trillion in assets of private defined-benefit plans, is modest compared with the underfunding of
our publically administered pensions.
At present, the Social Security trustees estimate the unfunded liability over the indefinite
future to be $10.4 trillion. The shortfall in Medicare is calculated at several multiples of the one in
Social Security. These numbers suggest that either very large tax increases will be required to meet
the shortfalls or benefits will have to be pared back.
Because benefit cuts will almost surely be at least part of the resolution, it is incumbent on
government to convey to future retirees that the real resources currently promised to be available on
retirement will not be fully forthcoming. We owe future retirees as much time as possible to adjust
their plans for work, saving, and retirement spending. They need to ensure that their personal
resources, along with what they expect to receive from government, will be sufficient to meet their
retirement goals.
Conventional advice from personal-finance professionals is that one should aim to
accumulate sufficient resources to provide an overall replacement rate of about 70 percent to
80 percent in retirement. Under current law, Social Security promises a replacement rate of about
42 percent for workers who earn the economywide-average wage each and every year through their
careers and about 56 percent for low-wage workers who earn 45 percent of the
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economywide-average wage.2 Assuming that taxes are capped at the current 12.4 percent of
payroll, revenues will be sufficient to pay only about 70 percent of current-law benefits by the middle
of this century. Thus, for the average worker, a replacement rate of only about 30 percent would be
payable out of contemporaneous revenues, assuming that benefit reductions are applied
proportionately across the board. For a low-wage worker, the payable replacement rate would be
about 40 percent. Assuming that the goal is still to replace 70 percent to 80 percent of
pre-retirement income, average workers by the middle of this century should be aiming to replace
about 45 percent of their pre-retirement income, rather than today's 33 percent, out of some
combination of private employer pension benefits and personal saving.
The required increases in private saving would be less to the extent that Social Security tax
increases are part of the solution. However, to avoid any changes in replacement rates, the
Social Security tax rate would have to be increased from the current 12.4 percent to about
18 percent at the middle of the century.
* * *
Once we have determined the level of benefits that we can reasonably promise, we must
ensure that we will have the real resources in the future to fulfill those promises. When we evaluate
our ability to meet those promises, focusing solely on the solvency of the financial plan is, in my
judgment, a mistake. Focusing on solvency within the Social Security system, without regard to the
broader macroeconomic picture, does not ensure that the real resources to fulfill our commitments
The replacement rate is the ratio of social security benefits to wages in the year preceding retirement.
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will be there. For example, if we build up the assets in the Social Security trust fund, thereby
achieving solvency, but offset those efforts by reducing saving elsewhere, then the real resources
required to meet future benefits will not be forthcoming from our economy. In the end, we will have
accomplished little in preparing the economy to meet future demands. Thus, in addressing Social
Security's imbalances, we need to ensure that measures taken now to finance future benefit
commitments represent real additions to national saving.
We need, in effect, to make the phantom "lock-boxes" around the trust fund real. For a
brief period in the late 1990s, a common commitment emerged to do just that. But, regrettably, that
commitment collapsed when it became apparent that, in light of a less favorable economic
environment, maintaining balance in the budget excluding Social Security would require lower
spending or higher taxes.
Last year, Social Security tax revenues plus interest exceeded benefits by about
$150 billion. If those funds had been removed from the unified budget and "locked up" and
Congress had not made any adjustments in the rest of the budget, the unified budget deficit would
have been $564 billion. A reasonable hypothesis is that the Congress would, in fact, have
responded by taking actions to pare the deficit. In that case, the end result would have been
lowered government dissaving and correspondingly higher national saving. A simple reshuffling from
the unified accounts to the lock-boxes would not have, in itself, added to government savings; but
higher taxes or lower spending would have accomplished that important objective.
The major attraction of personal or private accounts is that they can be constructed to be
truly segregated from the unified budget and, therefore, are more likely to induce the federal
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government to take those actions that would reduce public dissaving and raise national saving. But it
is important to recognize that many varieties of private accounts exist, with significantly different
economic consequences. Some types of accounts are virtually indistinguishable from the current
Social Security system, and the Congress would be unlikely to view them as truly off-budget. Other
types of accounts actually do transfer funds into the private sector as unencumbered private assets.
The Congress is much more likely to view the transfer of funds to these latter types of accounts as
raising the deficit and would then react by taking measures to lower it.
• * *
Failure to address the imbalances between our promises to future retirees and our ability to
meet those promises would have severe consequences for the economy. The most recent
projections by the Office of Management and Budget show that spending on Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid will rise from about 8 percent of GDP today to about 13 percent by
2030.3 Under existing tax rates and reasonable assumptions about other spending, these projections
make clear that the federal budget is on an unsustainable path, in which large deficits result in rising
The projections for Medicare and Medicaid should be viewed as highly uncertain. Health spending has
been growing faster than the economy for many years, the growth fueled, in large part, by significant increases in
technology. How long this trend will continue is extremely difficult to predict. We know very little about how
rapidly medical technology will continue to advance and how those innovations will translate into future spending.
Technological innovations can greatly improve the quality of medical care and can, in some instances, reduce the
costs of existing treatments. But because technology expands the set of treatment possibilities, it also has the
potential to add to overall spending — in some cases, a great deal.
In implementing policy, we need to be cognizant that the uncertainties — especially our inability to identify
the upper bound of future demands for medical care-counsel significant prudence in policymaking. The critical
reason to proceed cautiously is that new programs quickly develop constituencies willing to fiercely resist any
curtailment of spending or tax benefits. As a consequence, our ability to rein in deficit-expanding initiatives, should
they later prove to have been excessive or misguided, is quite limited. Thus, policymakers need to err on the side of
prudence when considering new budget initiatives. Programs can always be expanded in the future should the
resources for them become available, but they cannot be easily curtailed if resources later fall short of commitments.
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interest rates and ever-growing interest payments that augment deficits in future years. But most
important, deficits as a percentage of GDP in these simulations rise without limit. Unless the trend is
reversed, at some point these deficits would cause the economy to stagnate or worse. Closing the
gap solely with rising tax rates would be problematic; higher tax rates rarely achieve a comparable
rise in tax receipts, and the level of required taxation could in itself severely inhibit economic growth.
In light of these sobering projections, I believe that a thorough review of our
commitments—and at least some adjustment in those commitments—is urgently needed. The
necessary adjustments will become ever more difficult and larger the longer we delay. No changes
will be easy. All programs in our budget exist because a majority of the Congress and the President
considered them of value to our society. Adjustments will thus involve making tradeoffs among
valued alternatives. The Congress must choose which alternatives are the most valued in the context
of limited resources. In doing so, you will need to consider not only the distributional effects of
policy changes but also the broader economic effects on labor supply, retirement behavior, and
national saving. The benefits to taking sound, timely action could extend many decades into the
future.
Cite this document
APA
Alan Greenspan (2005, March 14). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20050315_greenspan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_20050315_greenspan,
author = {Alan Greenspan},
title = {Speech},
year = {2005},
month = {Mar},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20050315_greenspan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}