speeches · November 18, 2004
Speech
Alan Greenspan · Chair
For release on delivery
2:30 p.m. local time (8:30 a.m. EST)
November 19, 2004
Remarks by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the
European Banking Congress 2004
Frankfurt, Germany
November 19, 2004
I am pleased to join my central bank colleagues in appraising an increasingly
important issue — the globalization of trade and finance. I should emphasize that I speak for
myself and not necessarily for the Federal Reserve.
Among the many aspects of the euro addressed in today's discussion, we should
include its role in the ongoing globalization of economic activity. The euro ties together a
sizable share of the world economy with a single currency and, by doing so, lowers
transaction costs associated with trade and finance within the region.
More generally, globalization of trade in goods, services, and assets continues to
move forward at an impressive pace, despite some indications of increased resistance to that
process and the evident difficulties in completing the Doha Round. The volume of trade
relative to world gross domestic product has been rising for decades, largely because of
decreasing transportation costs and lowered trade barriers. The increasing shift of world
GDP toward items with greater conceptual content has further facilitated increased trade
because ideas and services tend to move across borders with greater ease and speed than
goods.
Foreign exchange trading volumes have grown rapidly, and the magnitude of
cross-border claims continues to increase at an impressive rate. Although international trade
in goods, services, and assets rose markedly after World War II, a persistent dispersion of
current account balances across countries did not emerge until recent years. But, as the
U.S. deficit crossed 4 percent of GDP in 2000, financed with the current account surpluses
of other countries, the widening dispersion of current account balances became more
evident. Previous postwar increases in trade relative to world GDP had represented a more
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balanced grossing up of exports and imports without engendering chronic large trade deficits
in the United States, and surpluses among many other countries.
* * *
Home bias~the propensity of residents of a country to invest their savings
disproportionately in domestic assets—prevailed for most of the post-World War II period.
Indeed, Feldstein and Horioka found a remarkably high degree of home bias in their seminal
1980 study1. Through most of the postwar period up to the mid-1990s, the GDP-weighted
correlation coefficient between domestic saving and domestic investment across countries
accounting for four-fifths of world GDP hovered around 0.95.
That bias, however, diminished rather dramatically over the past ten years, arguably
in large measure because of the acceleration in productivity growth in the United States.
The associated elevation of expected real rates of return relative to those available elsewhere
increased investment opportunities in the United States. The correlation coefficient
accordingly fell from 0.95 in 1993 to less than 0.8 by 2002. When one excludes the
United States, the correlation coefficient's decline was even more pronounced. Preliminary
estimates for a smaller sample of countries over the past two years indicate a continued
decline on net.
Basic national income accounting implies that domestic saving less domestic
investment is equal to net foreign investment, a close approximation of a nation's current
account balance. The correlation coefficient between domestic saving and domestic
1Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka (1980), "Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows," The
Economic Journal (June), pp. 314-29.
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investment varies inversely over time with the dispersion of current account balances across
countries. Obviously, if the correlation coefficient is 1.0, meaning that every country
allocates its domestic saving only to domestic investment, then no country has a current
account deficit, and the variance of world current account balances is zero. As the
correlation coefficient falls, as it has over the past decade, one would expect the near
algebraic equivalent—the dispersion of current account balances—to increase. And, of
course, it has. Over the past ten years, a large current account deficit has emerged in the
United States matched by current account surpluses in other countries.
* * *
How far can the decline in home bias and the increase in the variance of current
account balances be expected to proceed, and where will it lead?
Current account imbalances, per se, need not be a problem, but cumulative deficits,
which result in a marked decline of a country's net international investment position—as is
occurring in the United States—raise more complex issues. The U.S. current account deficit
has risen to more than 5 percent of GDP. Because the deficit is essentially the change in net
claims against U.S. residents, the U.S. net international investment position excluding
valuation adjustments must also be declining in dollar terms at an annual pace equivalent to
roughly 5 percent of U.S. GDP.
* * *
The question now confronting us is how large a current account deficit in the
United States can be financed before resistance to acquiring new claims against U.S.
residents leads to adjustment. Even considering heavy purchases by central banks of U.S.
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Treasury and agency issues, we see only limited indications that the large U.S. current
account deficit is meeting financing resistance. Yet, net claims against residents of the
United States cannot continue to increase forever in international portfolios at their recent
pace. Net debt service cost, though currently still modest, would eventually become
burdensome. At some point, diversification considerations will slow and possibly limit the
desire of investors to add dollar claims to their portfolios.
Resistance to financing, however, is likely to emerge well before debt servicing
becomes an issue, or before the economic return on assets invested in the United States or in
dollars more generally starts to erode. Even if returns hold steady, a continued buildup of
dollar assets increases concentration risk.
Net cross-border claims against U.S. residents now amount to about one-fourth of
annual U.S. GDP. A continued financing even of today's current account deficits as a
percentage of GDP doubtless will, at some future point, increase shares of dollar claims in
investor portfolios to levels that imply an unacceptable amount of concentration risk.
This situation suggests that international investors will eventually adjust their
accumulation of dollar assets or, alternatively, seek higher dollar returns to offset
concentration risk, elevating the cost of financing of the U.S. current account deficit and
rendering it increasingly less tenable. If a net importing country finds financing for its net
deficit too expensive, that country will, of necessity, import less.
* * *
It seems persuasive that, given the size of the U.S. current account deficit, a
diminished appetite for adding to dollar balances must occur at some point. But when,
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through what channels, and from what level of the dollar? Regrettably, no answer to those
questions is convincing. This is a reason that forecasting the exchange rate for the dollar and
other major currencies is problematic.
Our analytic difficulty is that the forces driving the current account deficit are more,
perhaps far more, visible than those determining the ex ante financing of the deficit. The
former are captured by reasonably reliable estimates of income- and price-driven trade
imbalances and net interest income; the latter by the considerably more amorphous
assessments of international portfolio choices.
The inability to anticipate changes in supply and demand for a currency is at the root
of the statistically robust finding that forecasting exchange rates has a success rate no better
than that of forecasting the outcome of a coin toss.2
* * *
U.S. policy initiatives can reinforce other factors in the global economy and
marketplace that foster external adjustment. Policy success, of course, requires that
domestic saving must rise relative to domestic investment. Policy initiatives addressing
individual components of domestic saving in years past appear to have had significant
effects on total domestic saving, even though changes in the individual components are not
wholly independent of one another.
2The exceptions to this conclusion are those few cases of successful speculation in which governments
have tried and failed to support a particular exchange rate. Nonetheless, despite extensive efforts on the part of
analysts, to my knowledge, no model projecting directional movements in exchange rates is significantly superior to
tossing a coin. I am aware that, of the thousands who try, some are quite successful. So are winners of coin-tossing
contests. The seeming ability of a number of banking organizations to make consistent profits from foreign
exchange trading likely derives not from their insight into exchange rate determination but from the revenues they
derive from making markets.
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Reducing the federal budget deficit (or preferably moving it to surplus) appears to be
the most effective action that could be taken to augment domestic saving. Significantly
increasing private saving in the United States—more particularly, finding policies that would
elevate the personal saving rate from its current extraordinarily low level—of course would
also be helpful. Corporate saving in the United States has risen to its highest rate in decades
and is unlikely to increase materially. Alternative approaches to reducing our current
account imbalance by reducing domestic investment or inducing recession to suppress
consumption obviously are not constructive long-term solutions.
It is of course possible that U.S. policy initiatives directed at closing the gap between
our domestic investment and domestic saving, and hence narrowing our current account
deficit, may not suffice. But should such initiatives fall short, the marked increase in the
economic flexibility of the American economy that has developed in recent years suggests
that market forces should over time restore, without crises, a sustainable U.S. balance of
payments. At least this is the experience of developed countries, which since 1980, have
managed and eliminated large current account deficits, some in double digits, without major
disruption.3
Flexibility, as history persuasively shows, enables an economic system to better
absorb and rebound from shocks. In the United States, for example, real output contracted
very little during our most recent cyclical episode despite having been subjected to a number
of shocks: the bursting of the technology bubble, the terrorist attack of September 2001, and
3Caroline Freund (2000), "Current Account Adjustment in Industrialized Countries," Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 692, December.
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the corporate governance scandals. Indeed, the U.S. economy has exhibited a degree of
resilience in the face of these adversities not evident in previous decades. Presumably, the
rise in product and labor market flexibility in the United States and in a number of other
countries over the past quarter-century is continuing to pay off. If such flexibility can be
achieved more fully on a global scale, adjustments to the future current account imbalances
of both developed and emerging economies could be rendered significantly less stressful
than in the past.
An admittedly exceptional example of how a flexible system adjusts even with fixed
exchange rates is seen at the state level in the United States. For more than two centuries,
the United States has experienced largely unencumbered interstate free trade. Although we
have scant data on cross-border transactions among the separate states, anecdotal evidence
suggests that over the decades significant apparent imbalances have been resolved without
precipitating interstate balance-of-payments crises. The dispersion of unemployment rates
among the states—one measure of imbalances—has tended to spike up during periods of
economic stress but has then rapidly returned to modest levels, reflecting a high degree of
adjustment flexibility. That flexibility is even more apparent in regional money markets.
Interest rates, which presumably reflect differential imbalances in states' current accounts,
and hence cross-border borrowing requirements, have exhibited very little interstate
dispersion in recent years. This observation suggests either negligible cross-state-border
imbalances, an unlikely occurrence given the pattern of state unemployment dispersion, or
more likely very rapid financial adjustments.
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Although we have examples of the efficacy of flexibility in selected markets and
evidence that, among developed countries, current account deficits, even large ones, have
been defused without significant consequences, we cannot become complacent. History is
not an infallible guide to the future. We in the United States need to continue to increase our
degree of flexibility and resilience. Similar initiatives elsewhere will enhance global
resilience to shocks.
Many steps have been taken in the euro area to facilitate the free flow of labor and
capital across national borders, and considerable progress is being made to enhance
competition in product, labor, and financial markets. But more will need to be done in
Europe as well as in the United States to ensure that our economies are sufficiently resilient
to respond effectively to all the shocks and adjustments that the future will surely bring.
Cite this document
APA
Alan Greenspan (2004, November 18). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20041119_greenspan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_20041119_greenspan,
author = {Alan Greenspan},
title = {Speech},
year = {2004},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20041119_greenspan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}