speeches · October 13, 2003
Speech
William Poole · President
Economic Growth and the Real Rate of Interest
BryantCollege
Providence,RhodeIsland
October14,2003
My wife, Gerie, and I are absolutely tratethismorningonrealinterestrates,forthat
delighted to be back in Rhode iswherethereallyinterestingstoryliestoday.
Island, here at Bryant College. As Realinterestratesareinterestratesadjustedfor
much as I love St. Louis, Little expectedinflation.
Rhody,whereIlivedforalmostaquartercentury, Mostoftheexplanationofwhynominal
sure feels like home. interestratesaresomuchbelowtheirlevelof20
IcametoRhodeIsland,toBrownUniversity, yearsagoisthatinflationandexpectedinflation
in1974.Theeconomywasinthemiddleofa aremuchlowertodaythanovermostoftheperiod
nastyrecession.Interestratesbeganfallinginmid- since,say,1970.However,althoughinflationand
1974—temporarilyasitturnedout—butatthat expectedinflationhavedrifteddownslightly
timeratesaslowastoday’sseemedimpossible. overthelastfewyears,thebigstoryisthatreal
TheratesinthemarketasIspeakareatlowsnot rateshavedeclineddramaticallysince1999.
seensincethe1950sintheUnitedStates.Theone- Whatdeterminesrealinterestrates?Howare
yearconstant-maturityTreasuryrate,forinstance, theseratesrelatedtothepaceofeconomicgrowth?
averaged1.22percentduringthethirdquarterof Andwhatdoestrendproductivitycontributeto
thisyear.Aloweryieldwaslastseenin1954,49 therealrateofinterest?Theseareseveralofthe
issuesI’lldiscussthismorning.
yearsago.
Beforeproceeding,Iwanttoemphasizethat
Inmostmarketdiscussion,andinsome
theviewsIexpressherearemineanddonot
FederalReservecommentaryaswell,thecurrent
necessarilyreflectofficialpositionsoftheFederal
lowinterestratesareascribedtoeasymonetary
ReserveSystem.Ithankmycolleaguesatthe
policy.Theargumentusuallygoessomethinglike
FederalReserveBankofSt.Louisfortheircom-
this:TheFederalOpenMarketCommittee(FOMC)
ments.JamesB.Bullard,vicepresidentinthe
lowereditstargetshort-termnominalinterestrate,
Researchdivision,providedespeciallyvaluable
thefederalfundsrate,toalowlevel,andallother
assistance.However,Iretainfullresponsibility
market-determinedinterestratesfollowed.While
forerrors.
thisdescriptioniscertainlyaccurateononelevel,
itisoverlysimplisticandmasksanumberof
importantissues.Inparticular,whatisitabout
REAL INTEREST RATES
theeconomytodaythatpermitstheFedtosetthe
intendedfederalfundsrateatsuchalowlevel? IrvingFisherofYaleUniversitywasperhaps
Noonedoubtsthatsettingthefundsrateat1 themostfamousAmericaneconomistinthefirst
percentin1999wouldhaveproducedanexplo- halfofthetwentiethcentury.Oneofhismany
siveinflation. contributionstoeconomicsciencewashis
TheinterestratesI’vementionedarenominal analysisdecomposingthenominalinterestrate
interestrates.Anominalratecontainsacompo- intoarealcomponentandaninflationcomponent.
nentmeanttocompensateinvestorsforexpected Thisdecompositionwassopowerfulanidea
inflationovertheholdingperiod.Iwillconcen- thatitremainswithustodayasafundamental
1
ECONOMICGROWTH
principleforeconomistsanalyzinginterestrate inflationofabout2percentandarealyieldabit
determination. above2percent.Fouryearsago,theexpectedreal
Thedecompositionisnothardtounderstand. yieldonTreasurysecuritieswasintheneighbor-
Considera1-yearTreasurysecuritywithayieldof hoodof4percent.Apparently,investorsdonot
1.22percent,theaverageinthethirdquarter. seegoodopportunitiestoearnasubstantialreal
Supposethatoneyearfromnowthe12-month yieldtoday.Whathashappened?
inflationrateturnsouttobe1.0percent.Then,
thatinvestmentwillrealizeapaltry0.22percent
realyield,orinflation-adjustedyield.Shouldthe THE REAL COMPONENT AND
inflationratebe2.0percent,thentherealyield
ECONOMIC GROWTH
willbe–0.78percent.
Nowconsideraninvestorwhoiscontemplat- I’vebeendiscussingtherealyieldonTreasury
ingbuyingaTreasurysecuritywithamaturityof securities.Treasurieshavezerodefaultrisk,or
oneyear.Theinvestorwantstobecompensated atleastasclosetozeroaswe’llfind.However,
foranydeclineinthepurchasingpowerofmoney becauseofarbitrage,other,generallyriskier,instru-
overthetermoftheinvestment,butcan’tknow mentswillbepricedtoyieldasuitableamount
therateofinflationinadvance.Thustheinvestor abovethisrisk-freerate.Inparticular,investments
formsanexpectationastotherateofinflation.If inproductivecapitalshouldhavearealyield
theexpectedrateofinflationishighrelativeto abovetherisk-freeyield,butthetwoyieldsshould
thenominalyieldonthebond,theinvestorwill fluctuatetogetherovertimebecauseinvestors
probablylookforsomeotherinvestment.This canchoosewhatinvestmentstomake.Whatdeter-
phenomenonappearedinspadesinthelate1970s; minestherealyieldonproductivecapital?There
fearinginflation,manyinvestorsshunnedbonds issomewell-establishedtheorythathelpsto
andbidupthepricesofland,fineart,gold,and answerthisquestion.However,thetheoryI’m
othergoodsexpectedtoretainvalue. abouttodiscussabstractsfromimportantcom-
Thereislittlequestionthatexpectationsplay plicationsraisedbyuncertaintyandconnections
acriticalroleindetermininginterestrates.Since amongcountriesthroughinternationalcapital
inflationiscontrolledoverthemedium-tolong- flows.Growththeoryhelpsusunderstandfunda-
termbytheFederalReserve,expectationsof mentaleconomicforcesbutshouldnotbeinter-
futuremonetarypolicyareakeycomponentof pretedasprovidingprecisequantitativeguidance.
observednominalinterestrates.Today,andquite Manypeoplethinkaboutwealthinfinancial
consistentlyinrecentyears,investorshavebeen terms,butforsomepurposesthatviewcanbe
confidentthattheFederalReservewillmaintain misleading.Everyfinancialassetissomeone’s
lowandstableinflation.Forthatreason,inflation financialliability.Fortheworldeconomyasa
expectationshavebeenquitelow.Basedonmarket whole,then,financialwealthnetsouttozero.
readingsfromtheTreasury’sinflation-indexed Beyondfinancialwealth,Americanhouseholds
securities,longer-terminflationexpectations ownthenation’scapitalstock,eitherdirectlyor
todayareapproximately2percentbasedona throughownershipoffinancialclaimsonbusi-
10-yearmaturity. nesses.(Ofcourse,someoftheU.S.capitalstock
Althoughinvestorswanttorealizeashigha isownedbyinvestorsabroad,butI’llneglectthis
realyieldaspossible,giventheriskassumed, factasitisnotimportantfortheissueathand.)
theymaynotinsomecircumstancesbeableto Thiscollectionofrealassets—buildings,machines,
expectevenapositiverealyield.Today,theone- land,transportationequipment,highways,intan-
yearnominalinterestrateisabout1¼percent giblecapital,andsoon—istheproductivecapital
whileexpectedinflation,accordingtoseveral that,combinedwithlabor,producesnational
measures,overthenextyearisabout1½percent. output.Thestatisticalmeasureofthatoutputis
Overa10-yearhorizon,investorstodayexpect grossdomesticproduct(GDP).Calculationsvary,
2
EconomicGrowthandtheRealRateofInterest
butestimatesoftheratioofthevalueofthecapital centinrecentyears.Estimatesofthelong-runrate
stocktooneyear’sGDPareintheneighborhood oflaborforcegrowtharearound1percent.There-
of3.So,withU.S.GDPincurrentdollarsrunning fore,avalueof3½percentisagood,back-of-the-
atanannualrateofjustunder$11trillion,the envelopecalculationconcerningthelong-run
U.S.capitalstockisworthsomethingapproaching risk-freerealrateofreturnintheU.S.rightnow.
$33trillionrightnow. Inastandardmodel,thiswouldalsobethelong-
Economistsanalyzetherelationshipbetween runrateofoutputgrowth.
inputsandoutputusingtheconceptofaproduc- Letmetrytoprovidesomeinsight,atleast
tionfunction.Theproductionfunctionshows qualitatively,intothisresult.First,fromahouse-
howinputsofcapitalandlaborarecombinedto hold’spointofview,interestiscompensationfor
produceoutput.Oneofthefeaturesofthemodern delayingconsumption.Ata4percentrateofinter-
industrializedworldisproductivityimprove- est,forexample,delayingonedollar’sworthof
ment—thatis,usingthesameinputstoproduce consumptionforoneyear,andsavinginstead,per-
higheroutputofgoodsandservices.Technology mitsconsumptionof$1.04attheendoftheyear.
isimprovingovertime.Thisfactisnomystery Nowconsidertheroleofpopulationgrowth.
toanyonewhohaslivedinagrowingeconomy Agrowingpopulationneedsagrowingcapital
formorethanafewyears.Weseetechnological stock—factorybuildings,machines,houses,
improvementsallaroundus.Pricesofgoodslike schools,aircraft,highways,andsoforth.Ifthe
TVsandcomputerscandeclinebecauseproducers capitalstockdoesnotgrow,thentheamountof
areconstantlyfindingwaystocreatemoreoutput capitalpercapitadeclinesaspopulationgrows.
frominputsoflaborandcapital. Toprovidethegrowingcapitalstock,peopleand
Totaloutputgrowsfromlargerquantitiesof businessesmustsave—mustforegocurrentcon-
inputsandfromhigheroutputperunitofinput. sumptionoutofcurrentproduction.Thehigher
Becausethestandardoflivingismeasuredby istherateofpopulationgrowth,thehighermust
consumptionpercapita,itisusefultomeasure betherateofsavingandinvestmenttoequipthe
totaloutputperhouroflaborinput.Outputper growingpopulationwithcapital.Ahigherreal
houroflaborinput,orlaborproductivity,rises interestratepersuadespeopletosavemoreto
asmorecapitalisemployedrelativetolaborand providecapitalforthegrowingpopulation.
astechnologicalchangeraisesoutputforany Theroleofproductivitygrowthcanbeana-
givenamountoflaborandcapital. lyzedinsimilarfashion.Assume,aseconomists
Iftherewerenoshockstotheeconomy,a usuallydo,thataworkerispaidhismarginalprod-
constantpaceofproductivityimprovementcom- uct,atleastinequilibrium.Supposetheworker’s
binedwithaconstantrateoflaborforcegrowth outputisworth$20perhourtodayand,because
woulddetermineabalancedgrowthpathforthe ofproductivitygrowth,$21perhourinoneyear.
economy.Alongthebalancedgrowthpath,all Wouldyouprefertoworkanhourwhenyourpay
marketsintheeconomyareinequilibriumand is$20or$21,whichis5percenthigher?The
expectationsofthefutureareconsistentwith answerisobvious.Butnotallworkcanbedelayed
actualoutcomes.Andalsoalongthisbalanced tonextyear.Ahigherrealinterestratecanper-
growthpath,householdsholdingthecapitalstock, suadepeopletoprovidelabornow.Workingan
eitherdirectlyorthroughownershipofbusinesses, hournow,savingandinvestingthehourlyearn-
wouldreceivearealreturn.Whatwouldthelevel ingsof$20at5percentinterestyields$21dollars
ofthatrealreturnbe? inoneyear,thesameamountthatwouldbereal-
Instandardmodelsofeconomicgrowth,this izedfromdelayingworkforoneyear.
realreturnturnsouttobetherateofproductivity Inshort,thehigherispopulationgrowthand
improvementplustherateoflaborforcegrowth. thehigherisproductivitygrowth,thehigherwill
FortheUnitedStates,business-sectorproductivity betheequilibriumrealrateofinterest.Theresult
hasimprovedatanannualrateofabout2½per- thattherealrateofinterestispreciselyequalto
3
ECONOMICGROWTH
thesumofpopulationandproductivitygrowth thesefundamentalrealeconomicforces.We
ratesdependsonthedetailsofthemodel,butthe ignorethesefundamentalsatourperil.
generalqualitativeresultmakesalotofintuitive
sense.
TherealratecalculationIhavejustcompleted TREND BREAKS IN
isforabalancedgrowthpathinaworldofno
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
uncertainty.Itisonlyabenchmarksince,of
course,actualeconomiesmustadapttoshocks Giventhegrowththeoryresult,thatthereal
allthetime.Unusualweatheraffectingagriculture, rateofinterestwillequaltherateofproductivity
theriseandfallofindustries,changinggovern- growthplustherateofpopulationgrowth,itis
mentpoliciesand,yes,warsallhaveimportant clearthatanalysisofchangesinproductivity
impactsontheeconomy.Thustheeconomyisin growthisimportantforunderstandingchanges
aconstantstateofadjustment,andprobablyonly inrealinterestrates.Butrecentbehaviorofinter-
rarelyactuallyonabalancedgrowthpath.The estratesandproductivitygrowthonlydeepens
paceoftechnologicalchangeitself,andtherate themystery.Productivitygrowthseemstohave
ofgrowthofthelaborforce,arenotcompletely beenrisingatthesametimerealinterestrates
smoothprocesses.Theusefulnessofthebalanced havebeenfalling.Overtheeightquartersending
growthpathconceptisthatwhenimportantdis- withthesecondquarterofthisyear,productivity
turbancesoccur,wehavesomeideaaboutthe
growthfortheU.S.businesssectorhasaveraged
statetowhichweexpecttheeconomytoreturn.
4.8percentperyear.Theaverageoverthelast12
Ithinkitisclearthatmanyobserversofthe
quartersis3.6percent.Therateofproductivity
world’sindustrializedcountrieshavesometype
growthaveragedabout2½percentperyearin
oftheorylikethisinmindwhenthinkingabout
thesecondhalfofthe1990s.Onthiscalculation,
interestratesandtheirrelationtofundamental
thelong-termrealrateofinterestshouldhave
factorsintheeconomy.Inparticular,itisnotsur-
increasedbyabout1percentagepointafter1999,
prisingthattheUnitedStates,withpositivepop-
insteadoffallingbyabout2percentagepoints.
ulationgrowthandrobustproductivitygrowth,
BeforeItrytoaddressthisapparentanomaly,
hasahigherrealrateofinterestthanacountry
let’sgobackinhistoryafewdecades.Theperiod
suchasJapan,whichfacestheprospectofalong-
fromthelate1940stothelate1960swasagolden
termdeclineinpopulationandhaslowerpro-
eraforU.S.productivitygrowth.Whileactual
ductivitygrowththanintheUnitedStates.Nor
measurementsarevolatile,theaveragepaceof
itissurprisingthatcapitalisflowingfromJapan,
productivityimprovementwasclearlyhighduring
wherereturnsandcapitalrequirementsarerela-
thisperiod—perhapsintheneighborhoodof3
tivelylow,totheUnitedStateswherereturnsand
percentperyear.Butsometimeinthelate1960s
requirementsarerelativelyhigh.
orearly1970s,productivitygrowthratesslowed
Whataretheimplicationsforpolicymakers?
substantially,awidelystudiedbutpoorlyunder-
Clearly,wemustkeepasharpeyeonproductiv-
stoodeventthatbecameknownastheproductivity
ityimprovementswhenthinkingabouttheappro-
priatelevelofnominalinterestrates,becausethe slowdown.Productivitygrowthratesfellbyhalf.
realcomponentofthenominalrateisdrivenby Thisdeclineinproductivitygrowthhadadra-
productivityinanimportantway.Someofthe maticimpactontheU.S.economy,asitmeant
increasesinproductivityregisteredinthequar- thatrealincomefortheaveragehouseholdwould
terlystatisticsrecentlyhavebeenquiteextraor- improvemuchlessrapidlythanearlier.Witha
dinaryindeed.Theprospectsforcontinued productivitygrowthrateof3percent,realhouse-
productivityimprovementalsoappeartobegood. holdincomedoublesevery25years;withpro-
Eventually,butnooneknowswhen,itseems ductivitygrowthat1.5percent,realhousehold
likelythatmarketinterestrateswillrisetoreflect incomedoublesevery48years.
4
EconomicGrowthandtheRealRateofInterest
Thedeclineinproductivitygrowthshould increasesinproductivitygrowthmighthave
havehadadirectimpactontherisk-freerealrate effectsoninflationandmonetarypolicyopposite
ofinterest,causingittofallinthe1970sbyan tothosecreatedbythesurpriseshortfallinpro-
amountaboutequaltothedeclineinproductivity ductivitygrowthinthe1970s.
growth.Butnominalinterestratesroseduring Duringtheearly1990s,U.S.inflationrates
the1970s,becauseinflationincreased.The werehigherthantheyaretoday,andtheeconomy
increasesininflationweretoolargeandvolatile wasinthemidstofarecoveryfromthe1990-91
toallowustoseethedeclineinrealinterestrates recession.Atsomepointintherecoveryprocess,
associatedwiththeproductivityslowdown. usuallydated1995,thetrendproductivitygrowth
Isitacoincidencethatinflationroseaspro- rateincreased.Again,becausethedatacontaina
ductivitygrowthslowedstartingintheearly lotofnoiseandbecausemeasurementissuesare
1970s?Therearecertainlyreasonstobelievethat quitedifficult,itwasfarfromclearuntilseveral
partoftheinflationrun-upwasinfactduetothe yearsaftertheeventthatthetrendpaceofpro-
slowdowninproductivitygrowth.Declining ductivityimprovementhadincreasedtoabout
productivitygrowthnotonlyputsdirectupward 2½percent.Realhouseholdincomewoulddou-
pressureongoodspricesbutalso,byslowingtrend bleevery30yearsatthispaceofproductivity
outputgrowth,makesitalltooeasyforpolicy- improvement.
makerstomisreadthestateoftheeconomy.Mone- Duringthelasttwoyears,nonfarmbusiness
tarypolicywastooexpansionaryinthe1970s, sectorproductivitygrowthhasaveragedabout
inpartbecausepolicymakersoverestimatedthe 4¾percentatanannualrate.Atthisrate,real
economy’scapacitytogrow.Becauseproductivity householdincomewoulddouble,astonishingly,
isnotoriouslydifficulttomeasure,andavailable every16years.
statisticalmeasuresarenoisy,therealizationthat Twoyearsistooshortofatimetoreachfirm
productivitygrowthwassloweronasustained conclusionsaboutpersistentchangesinthetrend
basis,andnotjustasashort-runaberration,did paceofproductivitygrowth.Andcertainly,some
notoccurforsomeyearsaftertheslowdown oftheproductivitygainsseemtobeconnected
began.Inthemeantime,expansionarymonetary withanunwillingnessoffirmstohireadditional
policybuiltaninflationproblemintotheeconomy. laboroverthelasttwoyearswhiletheywaitfor
Failuretorecognizetheproductivitygrowthslow- economicconditionstoimprove.Totheextent
downiscertainlynotthewholestoryofmonetary thisistrue,productivitygainsmaybelowerwhen
policymistakesinthe1970s,butprobablypart employmentstartstogrowatasustainedhealthy
ofthestory. pace.
Inanyevent,giventheeconomicinstability Still,theearlierlessonswithtrendproductiv-
createdbyinflationinthe1970sanddisinflation itychangesandtheimpactthosechangeshave
intheearly1980s,wecertainlycannotcharacter- onrealinterestratesandonthelevelofoutput
izetheU.S.economyduringthisperiodasgrow- consistentwithbalancedgrowthsuggestcaution.
ingalongabalancedgrowthpath.Realratesof Thereisadistinctpossibilitythattheunderlying
interestwerelowerinthe1970sandhigherin paceofproductivitygrowthhasincreasedagain.
the1980s,butthesechangesseemtohavehad Ifso,andiftheFOMCdoesnotmakeappropriate
moretodowithinflation-forecastingerrorsand policyadjustments,inflationcoulddriftaway
cyclicalprocessessetupbyinflationthanwith fromcurrentlowlevels.Theshort-runimpactof
changesinlong-runproductivitygrowth. higherproductivitygrowthmightbetolowerthe
The1990sbroughtapleasantandunexpected inflationrate,asrisingoutputplacesdownward
surprise:Thetrendrateofproductivitygrowth pressureonprices.However,overthelongerrun,
rosesignificantly.And,asI’veemphasizedalready, higherproductivitygrowthwillprobablyrequire
productivitygrowthhasbeenevenstronger higherinterestrates.Ifmonetarypolicyadjust-
overthelastthreeyears.Unexpected,persistent mentsdonotkeepupwitharisingequilibrium
5
ECONOMICGROWTH
realrateofinterest,thentheinflationratemay anunsustainableinvestmentboom,whichwas
ultimatelyrise.However,mybestguessisthat particularlymarkedinthetelecomanddot-com
thecurrentstanceofpolicymakesadequate industries.Overthelastseveralyears,realrates
allowance,offsettingtheriskthatthecurrent havebeenlowastheinvestmentslumphasgradu-
lowinflationwillturnintoaperiodofdeflation, allyworkedoffexcesscapitalstockandasaseries
andFedvigilanceoverthelongerrunwill,I ofshocks—9/11terroristattacks,majorbankrupt-
believe,keepinflationundercontrol. cies,andcorporategovernancescandals—created
apervasiveairofcaution.Theseareoscillations
aroundtheeconomy’slong-rungrowthpath.
SHORT-TERM REAL INTEREST Short-runadjustmentsinmonetarypolicyhave
beenofenormoushelpindampingtheoscilla-
RATES
tions,butitisbeyondtheFOMC’spoweratthe
I’veconcentratedontherealrateofinterest
currentstateofknowledgetoeliminatetheoscil-
onlonger-termbondsandonphysicalcapital.
lationsaltogether.
Nevertheless,itishardtoignorethefactthatata
Asimportantasshort-runpolicyadjustments
one-yearmaturity,therealrateofinterestisabout
are,iftheFOMCfocusesonlyontransitorydis-
zerotoday.Thatrate,Ibelieve,shouldbeviewed
turbancesandfailstounderstandthelonger-run
asatransitorysituationduringtheprocessof
forces,itrunstheriskoffallingbehindasthe
economicadjustmentreflectingfundamental
economyconvergestowarditsbalanced-growth
longer-termforces.Amongthesefundamental
path.Thatispartofthestorybehindpolicymis-
forces,therateofproductivitygrowthiscertainly
takesinthe1970s.Idonotknowwhatthetrend
atthetopofmylist.
rateofproductivitygrowthwillturnouttobe,
Policymakersdonothavetheluxuryofcal-
butifisintheneighborhoodof3percent,thena
culatinganinterestratetheoreticallyconsistent
reasonableguessontheequilibriumrealrateof
withabalancedgrowthpath,asIdidearlier,and
interestisabout4percent—3percentfrompro-
thensimplyprovidingthatinterestratetothe
ductivitygrowthplus1percentfrompopulation
market.Itisusefultounderstandtheeconomics
growth.Inthemeantime,theFed’staskistopro-
behindthelong-runbalancedgrowthpath,but
moteasrapidareturntothelong-rungrowth
thoseconsiderationsprovidelittlepracticalguid-
pathasisconsistentwithmaintainingarateof
anceforshort-runmonetarypolicy.Becauseof
inflationthatislowandsteady.
short-andmedium-termshocks,theeconomy
I’veofferedyoumytakeonwherethestance
canwanderawayfromitssteady-stategrowth
ofmonetarypolicyistodayandonhowtheappro-
pathandinterestratescandepartfromtheirlong-
priatepolicystanceislikelytoevolveinthe
runequilibriumvalues.TheFedwouldhinder
futureaseventsunfold.I’veemphasizedthat
ratherthansupportareturntotheequilibrium
fundamentalrealforcesaffectingtherealrateof
pathwereittodetermineitsinterestratestance
interestarelikelytobecriticaltothelong-run
onlyonthebasisofthelong-runequilibrium.
pathofinterestrates,butthatthetimingofinter-
Fouryearsago,realinterestrateswerehigh
estratechangesishighlyuncertain.NowI’dbe
becauseoftheincreaseinproductivitygrowthin
pleasedtotakeyourquestions.
themid1990s,andalsobecauseexcessiveopti-
mism—excessiveinretrospect,anyway—ledto
6
Cite this document
APA
William Poole (2003, October 13). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20031014_poole
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_20031014_poole,
author = {William Poole},
title = {Speech},
year = {2003},
month = {Oct},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20031014_poole},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}