speeches · November 14, 2002

Speech

William Poole · President

From Professor to Policymaker: Emerging from the Shadow WashingtonUniversityinSt.Louis OlinSchoolofBusiness St.Louis,Missouri November15,2002 Iappreciate comments provided by my col- TheFederalReserveisanunusualorganiza- leagues, especially Robert Rasche, Director tioninanumberofrespects.Onepeculiarityis of Research, at the Federal Reserve Bank thatIcantakepositionsthatarenot100percent of St. Louis. I take full responsibility for alignedwiththoseoftheFedChairman.During errors. The views expressed are mine and do thelate1960sandearly1970s,St.LouisFed not necessarily reflect official positions of the PresidentDarrylFranciswasinprettyopenrebel- Federal Reserve System. lion,activelyandpubliclyopposingpolicyposi- SincecomingtotheSt.LouisFedfouranda tionstakenbythetwoFedChairmanwhoserved halfyearsago,anumberofpeoplehaveasked whileFranciswaspresident.Moregenerally, meabouthowthatmovehappenedandhowmy membersoftheFederalOpenMarketCommittee newcareerdirectionhasworkedout.Inthinking can,andonoccasiondo,publiclydissentfromthe aboutaspeechtopicfortoday,itstruckmethat majorityposition,whichhasalwaysbeendefined reflectingonmytransitionfromprofessorto bythepositionoftheFedChairman.Ihastento policymakermightfitespeciallywellinthecon- addthatIfeelveryfortunatethatIamserving textoftheExecutiveMBAprogramoftheOlin underaFedChairmanIhaveknownandrespected School.I’mcertainlynottheonlyonetohave sincetheearly1970s,andwithwhomanydiffer- madearight-anglechangeincareerdirection, encesarethetypicalprofessionaldisagreements andsomeofyoumayalreadyhavehadasimilar overdetailsandnotoverfundamentals. experience. Still,canyouimagineanofficerofaprivate- AlthoughI’llnothavemuchtosayinmy sectorcompanypubliclydissentingfromadeci- preparedremarksaboutcurrentmonetarypolicy, siontakenbytheChairmanoftheboard?Standard Iwouldnotbesurprisedifyouaskmeaboutthis practiceistoargueyourcaseinternally,butdefi- subjectwhenIfinishspeaking.So,Iwilloffer nitelynotexternally,andthentofallinlinewith thestandardFederalReservedisclaimer,thatI’m whateverdecisiontheCEOmakes.Infact,the speakingformyselfandthatmyviewsdonot FederalReserveisnotfundamentallydifferentin necessarilyrepresentofficialFederalReserve thisrespect.Attheendoftheday,therecanbe positions. WhatIwanttodoistalkabitabouthowI onlyonemonetarypolicy;althoughImaydissent gottoSt.Louis,howmyyearsasauniversity publicly,andbelieveIhaveanobligationtodis- professorarerelevanttowhatIdonow,andthe sentifIfeelstronglyenough,Ialsohavethe intellectualconnectionsbetweenmylifeaspro- responsibilitytosupportthemonetarypolicy fessorandmylifeaspolicymaker.Iparticularly decisionsoftheFOMC. wanttodiscussonespecificaspectofpolicymak- OnelessonIdrawfromtheseobservationsis ing:theimportantroleofclearcommunication thatIhavebeenabletomakethiscareertransition withthemarketsandgeneralpublic. successfully—atleastfrommyperspective— 1 MISCELLANEOUS becauseIknewtheFederalReservequitewell I’vealsotakenagrowingroleinSystem-wide beforeassumingmycurrentposition.Thatknowl- activitiesaffectingalltheReserveBanks.These edgestemmedfrommyemploymentonthestaff totallynewareasformehavebeenchallenging oftheBoardofGovernorsforfouryearsinthe andveryrewardingpersonallyasI’velearned early1970s;ayearonthestaffof,andseveral theropesandhavebeenabletomakesomecon- yearsconsultingfor,theBostonFed;andmy tributionsbeyondthesubjectmatterIknewpretty researchonmonetarypolicyissuesasauniver- wellwhenIarrived. sityprofessor.Moreover,andthisiswherethe WhenmypredecessorinformedtheSt.Louis “shadow”referenceinmytitlecomesfrom,Iwas boardofdirectorsofhisintentiontoresign,the amemberoftheShadowOpenMarketCommittee boardbeganthesearchprocessforanewpresi- from1985tothetimeIcametoSt.Louisin1998. dent.Oneconsiderationwasthattheboard TheSOMCisagroupofacademicandbusiness wanted,ifpossible,tofindamonetarypolicy economiststhatmeetstwiceayeartodiscuss expertwhoseviewswereconsistentwiththe macroeconomicpolicyissuesandtopresenttheir policytraditionoftheSt.LouisFed.Thattradition conclusionstothepress.Consequently,through beganinthe1950s,whenHomerJonesbecame myyearsofresearch,teaching,andmyinvolve- researchdirector.JonesbroughttheUniversity mentwiththeSOMCandanumberofotherpro- ofChicagoschoolofmonetaryeconomicstothe fessionalactivities,Iwasquitefamiliarwith Bank,andthoseviewslaterbecamethefocusof monetarypolicyissuesandtheirhistory.Ifyou intensepolicydebate.WithintheFederalReserve, aregoingtomakeacareerchange,youarewell DarrylFrancisledtheChicagoschoolsideofthe advisedtoknowalotabouttheorganizationyou argument. areabouttojoinandabouttheissuesyouare abouttoface. Evenso,IhadnoexperienceastheCEOofan MY PROFESSORIAL LIFE organizationaslargeastheSt.LouisFed,which hasabout1,300employees.Twobriefstintsas Myprofessionaltrainingineconomicswas economicsdepartmentchairmanatBrown attheUniversityofChicagointheearly1960s. Universitydidlittletopreparemetoleadthe Atthattime,afterroughly30yearsofneglect,the Bank.So,IhadalottolearnwhenIarrivedhere. subjectareasofmonetaryeconomicsandmone- AnotherpeculiarityofaFederalReserve tarypolicybecamehighlycontroversial.Thedom- Bankisthatthereisnorealunderstudyposition inantprofessionalparadigmthatemergedfrom toprepareacandidatetobeBankpresident.As theGreatDepressionofthe1930swasbasedon youknow,thereare12ReserveBanks;someof theworkofJohnMaynardKeynesinhisGeneral thepresidentshaveextensivemanagerialexperi- Theoryandtheworkofeconomistswhofollowed ence,eitherintheFederalReserveSystemorthe Keynesandfurtherdevelopedhisideas. privatesector,andothershaveanextensivemone- Oneofthoseideaswasthatthefederalgovern- tarypolicybackground,asIdid.Butnoonecomes mentcould,andshould,stabilizeshort-runfluc- intothejobwiththefullrangeofexperience tuationsineconomicactivitythroughtheactive acrossallthedifferentresponsibilitiesofaReserve applicationoffiscalpolicy—timelychangesin Bankpresident.Iwasfortunatetoinheritastrong governmentspendingandtaxes.Governmentwas seniorstafftoruntheoperatingsideoftheBank expectedtomoderate,andifyouwereanoptimist, andthathaspermittedmetoconcentrateonmy eliminatethebusinesscycle.IntheUnitedStates, comparativeadvantage,whichismonetarypolicy. thefederalgovernmentbecamecommittedto Nevertheless,duringmyyearsinSt.Louis,I’ve suchapolicyobjectivebytheEmploymentAct learnedalotaboutallthevariousresponsibili- of1946. tiesoftheBankandhavebecomeincreasingly AsecondcentralKeynesianideawasthat involvedinallaspectsoftheBank’soperations. monetarypolicywasirrelevantornearlyso. 2 FromProfessortoPolicymaker:EmergingfromtheShadow Indeed,from1942untiltheFederalReserve– thatschool.PathbreakingworkatChicagowas TreasuryAccordin1951,theFedwascommitted notconfinedtotheeconomicsdepartment.There toapolicyofpeggingnominalinterestratesat wasexcitingresearchproceedingatthebusiness lowlevelstominimizetheinterestcostsofthe schoolaswell—whatlatercametobecalledthe largeFederaldebtaccumulatedduringWorld efficientmarketstheoryoffinancialmarkets.This WarII.Inthisregime,theFedwasnothingmore workfitinnaturallywiththebroaderChicago thanapricecontroller.After1951,theFedwas schooltraditionofrespectforcompetitivemarkets relievedofitsnarrowmandate,buttheprincipal anddistrustofgovernmentintervention.Such objectiveofmonetarypolicy—tokeepnominal interventionwasbasedontheincorrectviewthat interestrateslowandstable—remained.TheFed’s marketsareoften,oreventypically,inefficientand rolein,orresponsibilityfor,inflationwasnoton irrational.Agrowingbodyofempiricalresearch, theradarscreeninmostpolicydiscussionsof muchofitfromChicago,demonstratedthatmar- thelate1950sandearly1960s. ketswerenottheirrationalcasinosthatsomany So,IcametograduatestudyatChicagoata thoughttheywere.Oneofmythesisadvisors timewhenChicagoeconomists,especiallyMilton wasMertonMiller,whowontheNobelPrizein Friedman,wereconductingafrontalassaulton Economicsin1990forhisworkinfinance. whatwasthenmainstreammacroeconomics— Thesethemesfrommygraduateschooldays, thereceivedKeynesianwisdom.Friedmanwas oftheimportanceofmonetarypolicyandrespect involvedinanumberofresearchprojects,but fortheefficiencyofmarkets,motivatedmuchof perhapsthemostimportantwashiswork,with myresearchandteachingduringmyyearsin co-authorAnnaJ.Schwartz,onAMonetary academia. HistoryoftheUnitedStates1867-1960.1This monumentalstudywaspublishedin1963.The bookcoveredalotofground,butperhapsthe MY POLICYMAKER LIFE singlemostimportanttopicconcernedthepropo- sitionthatmonetarypolicymistakesturnedwhat BythetimeIarrivedattheSt.LouisFedin mighthavebeenaminorrecessionintotheGreat 1998,thepolicyenvironmentwasremarkably Depression.GiventheprevailingKeynesianwis- differentfromwhatithadbeeninthe1960sand dom,thosewereindeedfightingwords. 1970s.AtleastthewayIseeit,mostoftheissues Asagraduatestudent,Istudiedpapersjust monetaryeconomistsfoughtoverinthe1960s publishedandpapersinprepublicationform hadbeenresolvedinfavorofpositionsespoused presentedinresearchworkshops,especially byMiltonFriedmanandotherswholedthedevel- Friedman’sMoneyWorkshop.Alongwithother opmentoftheChicagoapproachtomonetary Chicagograduatestudents,Iwasaninside economics. observerofthefrontiersofthemonetaryeconom- Asacademicviewschanged,soalsodidthe icsdebate.In1976,Friedmanwasawardedthe viewsofcentralbanks.Iknowofnocentralbanker NobelPrizeinEconomics,inpartforhisworkin todaywhodoesnotsubscribetoFriedman’sdic- monetaryhistoryandtheory.Itisexcitingtome tumthat“sustainedinflationiseverywhereand eventodaytolookbackonmyChicagoyearsand alwaysamonetaryphenomenon.”Centralbanks realizethatIwasthereatsuchanimportant todayemphasizetheirresponsibilityforcontrol- time. linginflation,andsomehavemadethatcommit- AlthoughItooklotsofeconomicscourses mentclearbyadoptinganexplicitinflationtarget. andwasamemberoftheMoneyWorkshop,my TheReserveBankofNewZealandprovedtobe homebaseatChicagowasactuallythegraduate thepacesetterwhen,in1991inconcertwitha schoolofbusinessandIreceivedmyPh.D.from Laborgovernment,itacceptedasinglepolicy 1 MiltonFriedmanandAnnaJ.Schwartz,AMonetaryHistoryoftheUnitedStates1867-1960,(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1963). 3 MISCELLANEOUS responsibility,namely,tohitaprespecifiedquan- theequationdescribingmonetarypolicyand titativeinflationtarget.Sincethen,“inflation assumethatthemarketsknewwhatthatequation targeting”hasbeenspecifiedasthepolicyobjec- was. tiveforalargenumberofcentralbanks,including BeforecomingtoSt.Louis,Iknew,asdidother theBankofCanada,theBankofEngland,the academics,thatnosuchmonetaryequation,or SwedishRiksBank,andtheCentralBanksofChile monetaryrule,existed.ButIdidnotunderstand andBrazilandtheBankofKorea,tonameafew. thefullimportofthisobservation.WhenIgot Thereisanotheraspectofchangingcentral toSt.Louis,Iimmediatelybegantostruggleto bankpracticethatismuchlesscompleteand explainmonetarypolicytoaudiencesthathad muchlessunderstood—thegrowthofcentral invitedmetospeak.Ihadtofieldquestionsfrom banktransparency.Aroundtheworld,central thepress.Moreover,Ibecameincreasinglyinter- bankershavebeenabandoningtheirtraditional estedinthefactthatthefederalfundsfutures preoccupationwithsecrecyinfavorofapolicy marketseemedtobeabletopredictFOMCpolicy environmentwithtransparentobjectivesand decisionswithgreataccuracy.Thoseobservations substantialdisclosureoftherationaleforpolicy encouragedmetothinkmoresystematicallyabout actions.However,therearemanyunresolved communicationsissuesandtobegintoconduct issuesinthisarea,andI’llnowtakeupsomeof researchinthisarea.Withanexcellentresearch theseissues. staffattheBank,andfindingsomeinterestamong oureconomistsinwhatIwasthinkingabout,we begantouncoversomefascinatingevidenceon TRANSPARENCY AND howtheprocessworks.WedevotedtheBank’s annualresearchconferencetothissubjectin2001. COMMUNICATION Thetitleoftheconferencewas,“Gettingthe Duringthe1970s,akeydevelopmentwas MarketsInSynchwithMonetaryPolicy”;the theconstructionofrationalexpectationsmacro- Bankhaspublishedtheconferenceproceedings, economicmodels.Researchonefficientmarkets whichareavailableinhardcopyandontheSt. atChicagoandelsewhereandtheoreticalinsights LouisFedwebsite. fromeconomistssuchasRobertLucas,whowon Letmegobeyondmysimpleanalogyofthe theNobelPrizein1995forthiswork,madeclear brokenplayinfootballtodiscussjusthowimpor- thatitwasimpossibletomodelthebehaviorof tantthistopicis.TheFOMC,ateachmeeting,sets theprivatesectorwithoutincorporatingmarket atargetforthefederalfundsrate,whichisthe expectationsaboutallrelevantinformation, overnightratebetweenbanksthatborroworlend includingthecourseofmonetarypolicy.That fundsonatemporarybasis.Allotherinterest meantthatasatisfactoryoutcomefortheeconomy ratesarelinkedtothefederalfundsratethrough dependednotonlyonthecentralbankfollowing marketexpectations.Therateona1-month asoundpolicybutalsoonthecentralbankmak- Treasurybilldependsonthemarket’sexpecta- ingclearwhatthepolicywas.Otherwise,the tionsofthefederalfundsrateoverthenextmonth; economymightsuffertheequivalentofabroken thelong-termmortgageratesimilarlydependson playinfootball,wherethelinebelievesthequar- marketexpectationsoftheaverageone-dayrate terbackiscallingoneplaywhenthebackfieldis overthelifeofthemortgage.Theseexpectations runningadifferentplay.Ifmarketsbelievethe dependontheinteractionofmonetarypolicyand centralbankispursuingadifferentpolicythan theeconomy—alltheinfluencesthatcombineto itintends,boththemarketsandthecentralbank determineratesofinterest.Forjustoneexample willprobablysuffernastysurprises. ofwhythismatterisimportant,considerthe Academicmodelbuilderssolvedthisproblem mortgagerate,whichiscriticallyimportantforthe byassumption.Tosolvearationalexpectations strengthofthehousingindustry.Thatratedoes model,allthatwasnecessarywastowritedown dependinpartonexpectationsoffuturemonetary 4 FromProfessortoPolicymaker:EmergingfromtheShadow policy.Thoseexpectationsdonotcomeoutofthin thatreal-timeTVdidnotchangethedebateIdo air,butaredependentonhowtheFedconducts notthinkthatsuchdetailedknowledgewould monetarypolicyandcommunicatesitsstrategy. helpmarketstopricesecuritiesmoreefficiently. HowcantheFederalReservemosteffectively Theissue,Ithink,ishowtheFOMCcanbest andaccuratelyconveytothemarketitsmonetary explainitspolicydecisions.Theexplanationis policyexpectationsandplans?Thisisnotaneasy importantatanytime,butevenmoreimportant question,formanyreasons.Policyinteractswith istheregularityofdecisionsovertime.Thatreg- whatisgoingonintheeconomy,andwemust ularitydefinesapredictablepolicy.Creatingthat talkaboutprobabilitiesratherthatcertainties. regularityandthemarket’sunderstandingofitis Inputstoourthinkingincludehighlyabstract acrucialaspectoftheexplanationofeachindi- economictheory,statisticaltheory,gutfeelings vidualpolicydecision.Policyregularityinturnis aboutwhatisgoingon,andviewsabouthowbest whatpermitsthemarkettopredictdecisionsin toreacttocontingenciesthatmayarise.Howdo advance,basedonthefundamentalsthatdrive weconveythisknowledge,andourrecognition thedecisions.Infact,RobertRasche,research ofitsincompleteness,tothemarketsandthe directorattheBank,andIexploredthisissue generalpublic? fairlysystematicallyinapaperwepublishedin Mythinkingontheseissuesisstillevolving. 2000.2 Tomymind,improvingourunderstandingofhow Considerthepolicystatementreleasedby besttocommunicatewiththemarketsisapress- theFOMCattheconclusionofeachmeeting. ingmonetarypolicyproblem,becauseincreasing Meetingminutes,speeches,andtestimonycon- thestabilityoftheeconomyprobablydepends tainthesameprincipalelements,butobviously onmakingprogressonthisfront.Letmeoffera atmuchgreaterlength.Thepolicystatementcon- fewthoughts,withtheunderstandingthatthese tainsthepolicydecisionandseveralotherele- arereflectionssubjecttodevelopmentandcer- ments.OneelementisinformationontheFed’s tainlyreflectionsthatshouldnotinanywaybe viewofthecurrentstateoftheeconomy,itslikely consideredofficialFederalReserveviews. futuredirectionandrisks.Obviously,thisinfor- Ithinkitisveryimportanttoconcentrate mationishighlyrelevanttothejustificationfor firstonclearcommunicationofpolicydecisions thepolicydecisiondeterminingtheintended andtheirrationale,andnottoattempttoconvey federalfundsrate. thefullrangeofdebateinrealtime.Foronething, Asecondelementisinformationonthelikely internaldebatewillbestifledifpositionsand orpossiblefuturedirectionofpolicy.Howtodeal thenamesofpersonsholdingthosepositionsare withthiselementisadifficultissue.Ordinarily, releasedpromptlytothepressorpresentedlive itseemstome,iftheFOMCiscertainthatitwill onC-SPAN.TelevisingFOMCmeetingswillnot wanttoadjustthefundsrateatitsnextmeeting, disclosedebate,butchangeitandinterferewith thenitwouldbebetteradvisedtosimplymake thefreeexchangeofideas.Moreover,wouldit theentireadjustmentatthemeetinginquestion. reallyhelpmarketstobetterforecastpolicydirec- Itmakesnopracticaldifferencetotherateona tionifeveryoneknewallthedetailsofaminority 10-yearTreasurybondwhetherthefederalfunds positionheldbyonlyoneFOMCmember?Ifyou rateischangedby,say,25basispointsatapartic- areinterestedinthissubject,Iwouldurgeyouto ularmeetingoratthenextmeetinginsixweeks. readthepublishedtranscriptsofpastFOMCmeet- Usually,though,theintendedfederalfunds ings,whichtheFedreleaseswithafive-yearlag. ratesetataparticularmeetingreflectstheFOMC’s Thesetranscriptsserveanimportantfunctionin bestjudgmentastotheappropriaterategiven promotingaccountabilityandprovidingarecord theinformationavailableatthemeeting,and foreconomichistorians;however,evenassuming judgmentsaboutfuturechangesintherateare 2 “PerfectingtheMarket’sKnowledgeofMonetaryPolicy,”JournalofFinancialServicesResearch,18(December2000),pp.241-54. 5 MISCELLANEOUS probabilistic.Weknowthatinformationthat andbelievethattheFed’sefforts,andeffortsby changesthepicturemayarisebeforethenext severalnationaladministrations,todefuseinfla- meeting.HowcanIconveytothemarketthatI tionarypsychologywerenotonlyunsuccessful thinkthattheprobabilityofachangeatthenext butalsoharmfultothegovernment’scredibility. meetingis0.5,or0.2,orwhatever?CantheFOMC Wecannotfixaneconomicproblembytalking asacommittee,withmembersholdingdifferent peopleoutofit;wemustinsteadworktogetthe assessmentsoftheprobabilities,cometoacom- fundamentalsright.Insomecases,thereisnoth- monviewandconveyacommitteedecisionon ingthegovernment,ortheFed,candoabouta thisissue?Clearly,Iamskepticalthatthisisa problemintheshortrunexceptwaitpatientlyfor productiveavenueofcommunication.Frankly, theproblemtoberesolvedbymarketprocesses. whenIfirstcametotheFedin1998andtheFOMC Ifthepolicyfundamentalsarerightandwe wasusingthepolicy“bias”or“tilt”languagein arerightinourlonger-runassessmentsofhow itspolicystatement,Ithoughtthatthelanguage theeconomywillperform,theninduetimethe couldserveausefulpurpose.ThemoreIhave datawillsupportusandpublicviewswillchange. reflectedontheproblemofclearcommunication Itcanbepainfultogomonthaftermonthwith ofpolicyintention,themoreskepticalIhave publicpsychologyseeminglyatoddswitheco- becomethatsuchcommunicationcanbehelpful. nomicreality,andasIreflectonlivingthrough WhatIthinkisquiteclear,andmoreimpor- severalsuchperiodsIknowthattheapparent tanttoexplainingthepolicyprocesstothemar- disconnectbetweenfundamentalsandpsychology kets,isthatwhatevermaybeourassessmentof makesmequestionmyownassessments.My probabilitiesoffutureaction,newinformation strategyinsuchsituationsistokeepsearchingto maydriveachangeinthatassessment.Themar- seehowpiecesofevidencefittogether,and ketsshouldnotbelievethatwewillfailtoacton whethertheycontinuetoconfirmmybeliefsor newinformationjustbecausepreviousinforma- leadmetochangemybeliefs.IdothebestIcan tionhadledusinadifferentdirection. toexplainmybeliefs,buttrynottochangepublic Theproblemistoexplainwhatsortofnew psychologytobemoreoptimisticthanImyself informationdrivessuchreassessments.IwishI feel.ThatisthepointI’memphasizing—that couldsaymorethan“IknowitwhenIseeit.” effortstochangepsychologytomanufacturea Thatisnotasatisfactoryresponse,buttodateI happyoutcomeare,Ithink,rarelysuccessful. donotknowhowtoformalizethisprocess.If Onefinalpoint.Analystsreadbetweenthe someonedid,wecouldwritedownapolicyrule linesofwhatIwrite.Iwriteknowingthatanalysts linkingpolicyactionstoobservabledata.But readbetweenthelines.AnalystsknowthatIknow thatisexactlywhatwecannotdoatpresent. theyarereadingbetweenthelinesandwrite Athirdelementinthepolicystatementmay accordingly.Giventhisinfiniteregress,Iactually involve—andIemphasize“may”—aneffortto trytowriteasplainlyandsimplyanddirectlyas shapepublicperceptionsofthestateoftheecon- Iknowhow.Itrynottowriteusingcodewords, omy,toencourageasenseofgreateroptimism, orwordssubjecttomisinterpretationbecausethe orsuggestaneedforgreatercaution. usageofawordineconomicsdiscoursediffers Iemphasize“may”withregardtoaneffortto fromordinaryEnglishusage.Ithinkthecauseof shapepublicpsychologybecausemyviewisthat clearcommunicationisservedbycarefulwriting effortsinthisdirectionthatdonotaccordwiththe andbyaccumulationoftrustovertimebetween Fed’sownviewaboutthesituationareunlikely writersandreaders.I’vecometoknowahandful tobesuccessful.Ifapolicystatementexudes ofjournalistswhofollowmyspeeches;frommy optimism,andnewdataarrivingoversubsequent perspective,Ibelievethatmycommunication weeksthensuggestthattheoptimismwasunwar- throughthemiseffectiveinthesensethatthey ranted,anypsychologicaleffectwillbeshort- accuratelyreportwhatIsayandconveythe lived.Ifollowedeventsprettycloselyinthe1970s, intentofwhatIamsayinginreportsthatare 6 FromProfessortoPolicymaker:EmergingfromtheShadow necessarilymuchshorterthanmyspeeches. Ihavenodoubtthatmyyearsofteaching andwritinghavehelpedmetocommunicate effectivelyinthissense.Thus,althoughIsaidat theoutsetofmyremarkstodaythatmycareer hastakenaright-angleturn,infact,thereisfar morecontinuityinwhatIdonowwithmypro- fessoryearsthanmightappearatfirstglance. I’llfinishbysayingthatIfindmyjobnonstop fascinating,challenging,andneverboringor tiresome.I’vebeensuccessfulinfollowingthe adviceIalwaysgavetomystudents—findajob wheresomeonewillpayyoutodosomething youreallylove. 7

Cite this document

APA

William Poole (2002, November 14). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20021115_poole

BibTeX

@misc{wtfs_speech_20021115_poole,
  author = {William Poole},
  title = {Speech},
  year = {2002},
  month = {Nov},
  howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20021115_poole},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}