speeches · November 29, 2001
Speech
William Poole · President
Central Bank Transparency: Why and How?
“HowTransparentShouldaCentralBankBe?”
ThePhiladelphiaFedPolicyForum
FederalReserveBankofPhiladelphia
Philadelphia,Pennsylvania
November30,2001
Since arriving at the St. Louis Fed, I’ve officialsinapoliticalsetting.Everydemocratic
been asked a number of times what I societystrugglesinthepurgatorybetweenthe
foundtobemybiggestchallenge.Onthe idealofgovernmentresponsivetocitizenconcerns
monetary policy side of my responsibil- andthepracticeofamessyprocessresponsive
ities, I reply without hesitation that my biggest towell-financedadvocates.Weareinstinctively
challengehasbeentoexplainpolicytoanumber suspiciousofsecretdealsbecausewefearthat
of different audiences. Given that experience, I theywillcomeattaxpayerexpenseorwillbene-
believe that the transparency issue is not posed fitundeservingspecialinterests.Theexperience
properly by the title of this session, “How ofourdemocracy,andthatofotherdemocracies,
Transparent Should a Central Bank Be?”; the demonstratesbeyondanydoubtthatthefearof
issue for me is how in fact to be transparent and secretdealsisjustified.Webelievethatpolicy
what being transparent really means. decisionsinthepublicinterestratherthaninthe
I’lldividemyremarksintotwosections.First, privateinterestwillleadtoahealthierandfairer
I’lldiscusswhyIthinktransparencyisimportant.
society.
Second,I’llconsidertheproblemofdeciding
Ihastentoadd,however,thatasfarasIknow
whatactionsandstatementsmightimprove
specialinterestmotivationshavenothadan
transparencyandhowwemightmeasurethe
importantbearingonU.S.monetarypolicy.
successofstepstobecomemoretransparent.I
Becausemonetarypolicyisageneralizedpolicy
mustemphasize,however,thatIdonothaveset-
instrument,ithasinherentlylittlescopeforpro-
tledviewsonthissubjectandbelievethatthere
vidingspecialbenefitstonarroweconomicinter-
ismuchroomforconstructivedevelopmentin
ests.Idiscussedsomeoftheseissuesatgreater
thisarea.Thetopicisalmostunexploredatan
lengthseveralyearsagoinalectureentitled,“The
empiricallevel.
FederalReserveasaDemocraticInstitution.”
Beforeproceeding,Iwanttoemphasizethat
Transparencyinageneralsensesimplymeans
theviewsIexpressherearemineanddonot
providingthefullestexplanationpossibleof
necessarilyreflectofficialpositionsoftheFederal
policyactionsandtheconsiderationsunderlying
ReserveSystem.Ithankmycolleaguesatthe
them,inastimelyamanneraspossible.Anadvan-
FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis,especially
tageoftransparencyinthissense,familiarto
BobRasche,fortheircomments,butIretainfull
everyteacherandresearcher,isthatthebestway
responsibilityforerrors.
tobesureyouunderstandanissueistoexplain
ittoothersinaclass,ajournalarticle,alecture,
orinmeetingminutes.Transparencyisagreat
WHY TRANSPARENCY?
spurtodevelopingcoherentviews,andsurelyit
Mostdiscussionsabouttransparencyare isbeneficialtopolicymakerstobecoherentin
conditionedbynotionsofaccountabilityofpublic theirownthinking.
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MONETARYPOLICYANDINFLATION
Iremembermyconcerninyearspast,before marketconfidence.Thoseexpectationswillbe
assumingmycurrentposition,thatrefusalof moreaccurateandconfidencemorecomplete
publicofficialstoexplaintheiractionsoften themoreaccuratelythemarketunderstandswhat
reflectedtheirownsensethattheirviewswere theFedisdoing.
notverywellformed,ratherthananeedtohide Iknowofnofindinginthemacroeconomics
unsavorymotivations.Ipersonallybelievethat literaturethatprovidesatheoreticalcase,or
mycurrentsenseofobligationtoexplainmy empiricalsupport,fortheviewthatconfusionor
viewspubliclyisasmuch,ormore,abenefitto uncertaintyintheprivatesectoraboutthedirec-
meastomylistenersandreaders.Iregularlyuse tionofmonetarypolicyservestobetterachieve
myspeechesasanopportunitytodigintoaspe- policyobjectives.Indeed,intherationalexpec-
cificpolicyissueandtoforcemyselftodevelop tationsliterature,inaccurateexpectationsabout
anopiniononamatterIreallyoughttounderstand policyunambiguouslycreateinefficienciesinthe
thoroughly. economy.Itakethispointseriously,andbelieve
Mostdiscussionsoftransparencydonotseem thatitprovidesacompellingcaseforpolicymak-
togomuchbeyondafaiththat“governmentin erstoprovideasmuchinformationaboutpolicy
thesunshine”willyieldthedesiredresults.How- astheypossiblycan.ButIdowanttoreemphasize
ever,naiveconfidencein“sunshine”issurely thatanaiveapproachtodisclosurecandamage
inadequate.Oneissueisthatpolicymeetingsin thedeliberativeprocesswithoutprovidinginfor-
thesunshinearesimplydifferentmeetingsthan mationofgenuinevaluetothemarkets.
onesheldconfidentially.Adifferentmeetingin
thesunshineisnotnecessaryabettermeeting
fromtheperspectiveofservingthepublicinterest HOW TO ACHIEVE
well.
TRANSPARENCY?
Sunshineadvocatesexpectsunshinemeetings
todifferfromclosedmeetingsinthatpolicy- FromwhatI’vejustsaid,theanswerto“Why
makersareassumednottocutdealscontraryto transparency?”isthatwehopetoachievebetter
thepublicinterestwhentheymeetinthesun- policyresults.Buthowtoachievegreatertrans-
shine.Idonotknowofastudyofthesubject,but parency,orwhetheranyparticularstepwillbe
mycasualimpressionisthatthereisnoevidence constructive,isfarfromsimple.
thatthereislessspecialinterestlegislationnow ConsiderthepossibilityoftelevisingFOMC
thanthereusedtobebeforeenactmentofvarious meetings,soallcanobservetheproceedings.
piecesofsunshinelegislation,suchastheFreedom Oneissueisthemismatchbetweenthetechnical
ofInformationAct. levelofthemeetingandtheknowledgeofthe
Fromaneconomist’sperspective,theissue audience.IfIreallywanttoconveyinformation
of“Whytransparency?”seemsprettystraight- onaparticularsubjecteffectively,I’llgiveadiffer-
forward.Putsimply,policyactionsaffectthe entlecturetoafreshmaneconomicsclassthan
economythroughexpectationsinthefinancial toagraduateseminar.Monetarypolicyneedsto
marketsandintheeconomymoregenerally. beconductedatthehighestpossibletechnical
WhattheFOMCdoesmostdirectlyistosetatar- level;ageneralaudienceismorelikelytobecon-
getforthefederalfundsrate.Expectationsabout fusedthanenlightenedbywatchinganFOMC
thelevelofthattargetinthefuturedetermine meetinglive.Mostviewerswouldgetlittleoutof
interestratesallalongtheyieldcurve.Expecta- watchingadiscussionoftechnicaleconometric
tionsabouthowtheFedwillrespondtovarious issues—whichdoarisefromtimetotimein
possibleeventsdetermine,amongotherthings, FOMCmeetings—andmightwellmisinterpret
theexpectedinflationrate.Assumingthatthe suchdiscussion.Perhapsweshouldn’tworry
Fedhassoundpolicyobjectives,itssuccess toomuchaboutthisissue,astheaudienceforan
dependscriticallyonmarketexpectationsand FOMCmeetingwouldprobablybeprettysmall
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CentralBankTransparency:WhyandHow?
afterafewsuchepisodes.Idonotthinkwewould FOMCdeliberationsareextremelyopenandthat
competeverysuccessfullywithdaytimetelevision! issuesarethoroughlyexplored.Idonotthink
Ofcourse,atelevisedFOMCmeetingwould thatdisclosingthetranscriptwithafive-yearlag
notbethesamemeetingweholdtoday.Forone inhibitsmydiscussion,andbelievethattobethe
thing,thedeliberationscouldnotincludedis- caseformostothermembersaswell.Ialsobelieve
cussionofinformationobtainedunderpledgeof thatthetranscriptprovidesavaluablerecordfor
confidentiality.Informationfromindividualfirms scholarsandIstronglysupportthecurrentsystem
doesplayausefulroleinpolicymaking,andthe ofreleasinglightlyeditedtranscripts.
Fedcouldnotobtainsuchinformationwithout So,myanswertowhytransparencyisthat
maintainingitsconfidentiality.Moreover,there weexpectbetterpublicpolicyoutcomesfroma
isampleevidencethatpeopleintelevisedmeet- transparentprocess,butthemoreIconsiderhow
ingsbehavedifferentlythanthoseinclosedmeet- transparency,themoredifficulttheissueseems.
ings.Someparticipantsmighthaveatendency ThecurrentsystemofreleasingtheFOMCtran-
tograndstandfortheaudienceandtoavoiddis- scriptwithafive-yearlagworkswell.Idonot
cussingdifficultorcontroversialissues.Ina believethatmonetarypolicyactionsmotivated
completelyopenmeeting,itishardforsome byspecialinterestswereaprobleminthefirst
participantstotryoutideasandthenadmitthat place,andsothetranscriptshavenothadabear-
theargumentsofferedbyothersarebetter.Itis ingonthatissue.Butthetranscriptshaveserved
particularlydifficulttoanalyzeunpleasantpos- toenhanceknowledgeofthepolicydecision
sibilitiesinpublic,suchasthataparticularpolicy processandthathasbeenconstructive.
actionmighthavetheeffectofincreasingtherisk Probablymoreimportantthanthetranscripts
ofrecession. inrecentyearswasthedecisioninFebruary1994
Anyonewhohasheldapolicymakingposition toreleasethepolicydecisionpromptlyatthecon-
knowshowimportantconfidentialityissuesare. clusionofeachFOMCmeeting.Mycolleaguesin
TheFederalReservefacedasuddenandsevere theSt.LouisFedresearchdivisionandIhave
confrontationwiththisissueinOctober1993, conductedsomeresearchontheeffectsofthat
wheninformationconcerningthelong-standing step.Thebottomlinefromthisresearchisthat
practiceoftapingFOMCmeetingsbecamepublic. promptdisclosureofpolicyactionssignificantly
MostFOMCmemberswereunawarethatthe improvedtheaccuracyofmarketforecastsof
meetingswerebeingtaped;thepublishedtran- policyactions.
scriptoftheFOMCconferencecallofOctober15, TheFOMCbegandisclosingitsso-called
1993,demonstratesvividlytheanguishanduncer- “bias”in1999andlaterrevampedthelanguage
taintyabouthowtoproceed.Itisclearfromthat ofthatstatement.Moreover,disclosureofthe
transcriptthatthememberswereunanimousin policyactionisnowaccompaniedbyashort
believingthatquickreleaseofmeetingtranscripts statement.Ihavenotexaminedempiricallythe
wouldseverelyinhibitfreeexchangeofideas effectivenessofthesestepsandhaveanopen
andinformationanddamagethedeliberative mindastowhethertheyhaveinfactimproved
process.Manymemberswereconcernedthat publicunderstandingofpolicyactionsorthe
releaseoftranscriptsevenafteralagofthreeto accuracyofmarketforecastsoffuturepolicy
fiveyearswouldalsobeharmful. actions.Ithinkitimportanttomaintainanempiri-
I’mtold—buthavenofirsthandknowledge— calperspectiveontheseissues,forthereisno
thatafterthetapingofFOMCmeetingsbecame otherwaytodecidewhetheraparticularstepin
publiclyknown,themeetingschangedsignifi- thenameoftransparencyisinfacteffective.
cantlyforatime.Membersreadfromprepared Differencesincentralbankdisclosureprac-
statementsandgive-and-takediscussiondidnot ticesofferagreatopportunitytoconductresearch
occurasreadilyasithadpreviously.Duringthe onhowbesttopursueanefforttoincreasetrans-
timeI’vebeeninSt.Louis,myimpressionisthat parency.Manypoliciesandpracticesdifferamong
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MONETARYPOLICYANDINFLATION
theworld’scentralbanks.Ifwearetomakegen-
uineprogressondeterminingwhatworksand
whatdoesn’twithregardtodisclosure,weneed
todigintotheresearchopportunitypresentedby
thesedifferentdisclosurepractices.
I’llfinishbymentioningtwospecificideas
forimprovingFedtransparency.Oneisthatthe
Fedcouldannounceanexplicitinflationobjec-
tive,expressedeitherasapointtargetoratarget
range.Ihavelongbelievedthatsuchastepwould
beuseful,andIadvocatedanexplicitinflation
objectivenottoolongafterarrivinginSt.Louis.
Anumberofothercentralbankshaveexplicit
inflationobjectives;however,comparingU.S.
andforeigninflationexperiencedoesnotprovide
aconvincingcasethatanannouncedobjectiveis
necessarytomaintainalowrateofinflation.Thus,
althoughIdofavoranannouncedinflation
objective,itisclearthatanempiricalcaseisnot
adecisiveconsideration;transparencyissues
canneverberesolvedentirelythroughempirical
investigation.
AsecondspecificsuggestionisthattheFOMC
mightconsiderreducingitsend-of-meetingstate-
menttorelativelysimpleboilerplatelanguage.
Thissuggestionmayappeartobeastepbackward,
buttheissueisthatthecurrentstatementisopen
toavarietyofmarketinterpretations,andthe
uncertaintyaboutexactlywhatthestatement
meansmaynotbehelpfultothecauseofclear
communication.Boilerplatelanguagewitharela-
tivelyfewoptionsmighthave,orcometohave,a
settledmeaningthatwouldreducemarketuncer-
tainty.Thisexampleisalsointerestingbecause
itillustratesthegeneralpointI’memphasizing
thathowtransparencyisnotasimpleissue.
Insummary,thecaseforwhytransparency
isclear.Transparencypromotesaccountability,
improvesmarketefficiencyandprobably
improvestheclarityofpolicymakingitself.How
transparencyisjustplainhard.Itiseasytofind
communicationsgaps,butnotatalleasytofill
them.
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Cite this document
APA
William Poole (2001, November 29). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20011130_poole
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_20011130_poole,
author = {William Poole},
title = {Speech},
year = {2001},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20011130_poole},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}