speeches · May 3, 2000
Speech
Alan Greenspan · Chair
For release on delivery
8 25 a m CDT (9 25 am EDT)
May 4, 2000
Remarks by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the
36th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition
of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
May 4, 2000
The final decades of the twentieth century witnessed remarkable advances in financial
engineering, financial innovation, and deregulation As recently as thirty-five years ago, the
universe of financial instruments was composed almost exclusively of deposits, short- and long-
term, plain vanilla debt, and equities Financial institutions, by and large, specialized in
relatively narrow portions of these markets In the intervening years, significant developments in
technology and in the pricing of assets have enabled innovations in financial instruments that
allow risks to be separated and reallocated to the parties most willing and able to bear them and
the degree of specialization by financial intermediaries changed dramatically In the case of debt
instruments, investors may now choose among structured notes, syndicated loans, coupon
STRIPs, and bonds secured by pools of other debt instruments But of all the changes we have
observed in the past three decades, two of the most dramatic have been the growing use of
financial denvatives and the increasing presence of banks in private equity markets Today I
should like to evaluate the scope of these latter progressions, the risks they entail, and some of
the challenges in managing those risks
It seems undeniable that in recent years the rate of financial innovation has quickened
Many in fact argue that the pace of innovation will increase yet further in the next few years as
financial markets increasingly intertwine and facilitate the integration of the new technologies
into the world economy As we stand at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the possible
configurations of products and services offered by financial institutions appear limitless There
can be little doubt that these evolving changes in the financial landscape are providing net
benefits for the large majority of the Amencan people The rising share of financial services in
the nation's national income in recent years is a measure of the contribution of the newer
financial innovations to America's accelerated economic growth Denvatives and private
equities have been in the forefront of the recent financial expansion, fostering the financing of a
wider range of activities more efficiently and with improved management and control of the
associated risks
Fear of Change
Nonetheless, some find these developments worrisome or even deeply troubling The
rapid growth and increasing importance of denvative instruments in the risk profile of many
large banks has been a particular concern Yet large losses on over-the-counter derivatives have
been few Derivatives possibly intensified the losses in underlying markets in the liquidity crisis
during the third quarter of 1998, but they were scarcely the major players Credit losses on
derivatives spiked but remained well below those experienced on banks' loan portfolios in that
episode
Derivatives credit exposures, as you all know, are quite small relative to credit exposures
in traditional assets, such as banks' loans In the fourth quarter of last year, for example, banks
charged off $141 million of credit losses from derivatives—including options, swaps, futures,
and forwards—or only 0 04 percent of their total credit exposure from denvatives This in part
reflects the fact that in some derivative contracts, most notably in interest rate swaps, there is no
pnncipal to be exchanged and thus no principal at risk In comparison, net charge-offs relative to
loans were 0 58 percent in that quarter—also small but, nonetheless, almost fifteen times as
much In the third quarter of 1998, at the height of the recent financial turmoil, the loan charge-
off rate at U S banks was 41/2 times that of denvatives
In a similar vein, concerns of highly leveraged positions caused by denvatives have led to
fears of "excessive leverage " But leverage, at least as traditionally measured, is not a
particularly useful concept for gauging risk from derivatives A firm might acquire an interest
rate cap, for example, to hedge future interest rate uncertainty and hence to reduce its risk profile
Yet if the cap is financed through debt, measured leverage increases Thus, although one may
harbor concerns about the overall capital adequacy of banks and other participants in derivatives
markets and their degree of leverage, the advent of derivatives appears to make measures of
leverage more difficult to interpret but not necessarily more risky To be sure, the unfamiliar
complexity of some new financial instruments and new activities, or the extent to which they
facilitate other kinds of risk-taking, cannot be readily dismissed even by those of us who view
the remarkable expansion of finance in recent years as a significant net benefit
What I suspect gives particular comfort to those of us most involved with the heightened
complexity of modern finance is the impressive role private market discipline plays in these
markets Importantly, derivatives dealers have found that they must maintain strong credit
ratings to participate in the market Participants are simply unwilling to accept counterparty
credit exposures to those with low ratings Besides requiring a strong capital base and high
credit ratings, counterparties in recent years have increasingly insisted both on netting of
exposures and on daily posting of collateral against credit exposures U S dealers, in particular,
have rapidly expanded their use of collateral to mitigate counterparty credit risks In these
programs, counterparties typically agree that, if exposures change over time and one party comes
to represent a credit risk to the other, the party posing the credit risk will post collateral to cover
some (or all) of the exposure These programs offer market participants a powerful tool for
helping control credit risk, although their use does, as we all know, pose significant legal and
operational issues
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Legitimate Concerns
Despite the commendable historical loss record and effective market discipline, there aie
undoubtedly legitimate concerns and avenues for significant improvement of risk management
practices Moreover, during the recent phenomenal growth of the derivatives market, no
significant downturn has occurred in the overall economy to test the resilience of derivatives
markets and participants' tools for managing risk The possibility that market participants are
developing a degree of complacency or a feeling that technology has inoculated them against
market turbulence is admittedly somewhat disquieting
Such complacency is not justified In estimating necessary levels of risk capital, the
primary concern should be to address those disturbances that occasionally do stress institutional
solvency—the negative tail of the loss distnbution that is so central to modern risk management
As such, the incorporation of stress scenanos into formal risk modeling would seem to be of
first-order importance However, the incipient art of stress testing has yet to find formalization
and uniformity across banks and securities dealers At present most banks pick a small number
of ad hoc scenanos as their stress tests And although the results of the stress tests may be given
to management, they are, to my knowledge, never entered into the formal risk modeling process
Additional concern derives from the fact that some forms of risk that we understand to be
important, such as liquidity and operational risk, cannot at present be precisely quantified, and
some participants do not quantify them at all, effectively assuming them to be zero Similarly,
the present practice of modeling market risk separately from credit risk, a simplification made for
expediency, is certainly questionable in times of extraordinary market stress Under extreme
conditions, discontinuous jumps in market valuations raise the specter of insolvency, and market
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risk becomes indistinct from credit risk
Of course, at root, effective risk management lies in evaluating the risk models upon
which capital allocations and economic decisions are made Regardless of the resources and
effort a bank puts into forecasting its risk profile, it ought not make crucial capital allocation
decisions based on those forecasts until their accuracy has been appraised Yet forecast
evaluation, or "backtesting," procedures to date have received surprisingly little attention in both
academic circles and private industry
Quite apart from complacency over risk-modeling systems, we must be careful not to
foster an expectation that policymakers will ultimately solve all serious potential problems and
disruptions Such a conviction could lull financial institutions into believing that all severe
episodes will be handled by their central bank and hence that their own risk-management systems
need not be relied upon Thus, over-reliance on public policy could lead to destabilizing
behavior by market participants that would not otherwise be observed—what economists call
moral hazard
There are many that hold the misperception that some American financial institutions are
too big to fail I can certainly envision that in times of crisis the financial implosion of a large
intermediary could exacerbate the situation Accordingly, the monetary and supervisory
authorities would doubtless endeavor to manage an orderly liquidation of the failed entity,
including the unwinding of its positions But shareholders would not be protected, and I would
anticipate appropriate discounts or "haircuts" for other than federally guaranteed liabilities
As we consider potential shortcomings in risk management against the backdrop of an
absence of significant credit losses in derivatives, one is compelled to ask Has the financial
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system become more stable, or has it simply not been tested?
Probability distributions estimated largely, or exclusively, over cycles that do not include
periods of financial stress will underestimate the likelihood of extreme pnce movements because
they fail to capture a secondary peak at the extreme negative tail that reflects the probability of
the occurrence of extreme losses Further, because the experience during cnses indicates
heightened correlations of pnce movements, joint distributions estimated over periods that do not
include severe turbulence would inaccurately estimate correlations between asset returns during
such episodes The benefits of diversification will accordingly be overestimated
Another aspect of the system that may not have been appropriately tested is the set of
credit risk modeling systems that have evolved alongside the growth in derivatives Such models
embody procedures for gauging potential future exposure Prevailing prices will doubtless
change in the future, so counterparties must assess whether those contracts with small or even
negative current values now have the potential to result in large positive market values and,
hence, a potential credit loss on default Do such calculations adequately account for the
possibility of prolonged disruptions or recessions9 Are assumptions relating exposures to default
probabilities sufficiently inclusive9 These and other support columns underlying estimation of
potential future exposure should continue to be examined under a critical light
Private Equity Activity
Derivatives, no doubt reflecting their growth, their extensive use in hedging that
facilitates additional risk-taking, and their gigantic notional values, continue to be the
quintessential image of financial engineering and innovation But another dramatic change in the
activities of banking organizations has received less attention merchant banking Indeed, the
most dramatic change in the financial landscape that the Gramm-Leach-Bhley Act may have
induced is not the combination of banking, securities underwriting, and insurance, but rather the
generalized merchant banking powers for financial holding companies And even this change is
really evolutionary for a handful of very large U S banking organizations
By merchant banking, I mean financial equity investment in nonfinancial firms, most
often, but not always, in nonpublic companies, with the investor providing both capital and
financial expertise to the portfolio company Such investments are usually held for three to five,
but often as long as ten or more, years for subsequent resale to other investors The recent
financial modernization legislation gives banking organizations broad authority to make
merchant banking investments but prohibits them from routinely managing the portfolio
companies in which they have invested except in extraordinary circumstances for limited
periods In addition, banks' credit extensions to the firms in which their parents or affiliates hold
equity are limited by the same section 23 A and B restnctions imposed on bank lending to their
affiliates
Prior to the recent legislation, banking organizations could make only limited types of
merchant banking investments, and these were made principally through three vehicles First,
since the late 1950s, banks and bank holding companies have been authonzed to operate small
business investment companies (SBICs) that can invest in up to half of the equity of an
individual small business, currently defined by regulation as one with less than about $20 million
of pre-investment capital The aggregate limit of such investments cannot exceed 5 percent of
the bank or BHC's capital Second, Edge corporations, which are primarily subsidiaries of banks
but can also be subsidiaries of holding companies, can acquire up to 20 percent of the voting
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equity and 40 percent of the total equity of nonfinancial companies outside the United States
Finally, BHCs more generally can acquire up to 5 percent of the voting shares and up to 25
percent of the total equity of any company without aggregate limit I have, of course, been
referring to equity investments of banking organizations for their own account BHCs section
20s—and any future investment banking affiliates—also hold equities in trading accounts as part
of their underwriting and trading activities These daily mark-to-market holdings are quite large
at a couple of banking organizations that have a significant equity underwriting business but are
rather modest for others
Through the three long-term holding vehicles, banking organizations have made direct
equity investments on their own and in partnership with others They have also made indirect
investments through private investment groups, sometimes acting as the manager of the group
for performance-based fees In the early 1960s, banking organizations were probably the
dominant source of venture capital in the United States, and still play an important role—perhaps
accounting currently for 10 to 15 percent of the domestic private equity market What has
changed with the recent legislation is the generalized grant of authority for bank holding
companies that qualify as financial holding companies to exercise merchant banking powers
There are now about 155 domestic and more than 10 foreign financial holding companies that
could—but not necessarily will—undertake merchant banking Two-thirds of the financial
holding companies have less than $500 million in assets, about one-third have less than $150
million
In evaluating that general grant of merchant banking authority, it is useful to consider the
experience of banking organizations that have been active participants in the private equity
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market in recent decades To date, there have been no significant problems To be sure, the
record on pnvate equity investment by banks is one of substantial year-to-year variation in
return, just as one might expect with any portfolio of risky assets Some of the deals have
resulted in total write-offs, but over all the rates of return, especially in recent years, have been
quite impressive—30 percent or so per year in the last five years In part, perhaps in large part,
this reflects the substantial nse in equity prices
Still another historical factor has been the quite conservative treatment of equity
portfolios by banking organizations Both banks and independent securities firms engaging in
merchant banking have tended to allocate substantial internal capital to support their pnvate
equity investment activity—between 50 and 100 percent—and to recognize unrealized capital
gains only on traded equities or when some tnggenng event supported the revaluation of
nontraded shares and then only subject to a discount In effect, banks have locked up significant
internal capital for their equity purchases and have been conservative in recognizing gains in
their earning flows and, consequently, in their capital
For a small number of large banking organizations, equity portfolios are a significant
share of their business already As of year-end 1999, for the five large banking organizations
with more than one billion dollars invested, at cost, in equities, these assets accounted for
between approximately 10 percent and 25 percent and more of tier-1 capital and between more
than 10 percent and 35 percent at carrying value Moreover, the pre-tax gains recognized last
year—either at sale or because of revaluation—accounted for between 5 and 30 percent of pre-
tax reported earnings in 1999 at these five banking organizations In the first quarter of this year,
such gains accounted for 16 percent to more than one-half of pre-tax income
It is likely that authorization of merchant banking powers will lead both to deeper
participation by the current large players and to wider merchant banking activity across banking
organizations To limit risks to the bank subsidiary of the financial holding companies and to the
insurance fund, the Federal Reserve interim regulations require that before this activity
commences, the organizations establish appropriate internal controls to manage the risks
associated with this activity It must be kept in mind, as I pointed out in other contexts, that most
bad commercial loans are made during prolonged periods of prospenty I suspect that the
experience of bank equity investment has been similar Current interim regulations—which
propose for comment a 50 percent capital charge on all nontrade account equities held by
banking organizations—should not be viewed separately from the current state of the economy
any more than commercial banking should be
In any event, at those entities with significant merchant banking portfolios, the above
average variance in stock pnces will doubtless add to the vanability of earnings of the overall
organization—and hence, one can conclude, to the organization's valuation in the marketplace
There is, indeed, general agreement that the pnce-eamings ratio of trading banks is lower than
that of other banks of the same size, although it has been difficult because of the dynamics of
other vanables to nail down empirically the appropnate orders of magnitude And, I suspect, that
if the data were readily available, we might be able to demonstrate the same pattern at
institutions significantly involved in the pnvate equity market and perhaps even in denvatives
trading Any earnings stream that shows vanability has been appropnately discounted That is
not to say that real economic value is not being created for banking organizations, their
shareholders, and the economy from what appears to be a greater—and perhaps expanding—flow
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of venture and other equity capital from banking organizations But despite the very good record
to date in both the derivatives and private equity activities of banking organizations, we all
would be remiss if we did not note that there are risks in these activities that, during some
periods in the future, will create reduced returns, if not significant overall losses, for individual
organizations However, the same might be said about portfolios of loans—the traditional
historical major asset of banks—and one that will continue to dominate the business of most
banks for the foreseeable future
Conclusion
I have noted many times over the years that the purpose of banks and banking
organizations is to take risk in order to contnbute to, and facilitate the growth, and other needs,
of an economy We must be cautious, however, that we understand the nature of the new risks
that have evolved with information innovation technologies and be certain that they are managed
in ways that do not undermine this economic role
Balancing these objectives is no easy task We need to ensure that strong risk-
management systems are in place and that the management of banking organizations use these
systems both to enhance their awareness and understanding of the risks knowingly taken and to
manage those risks accordingly But systems are never perfect, mistakes will be made, and tails
in loss distnbutions do represent a reality that sooner or later occurs
Individual foreign and domestic banking organizations in the past have, from time to
time, suffered large losses in the denvatives and private equity markets We will not be immune
from such events in the future But so long as we recognize the risks and insist on good risk-
management system, and so long as supervision moves—as it has—from balance sheet analysis
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to a review, evaluation, and cnticism of risk management systems, economic growth is, I
suggest, enhanced by the kinds of financial innovation that technology and deregulation are now
producing
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Cite this document
APA
Alan Greenspan (2000, May 3). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20000504_greenspan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_20000504_greenspan,
author = {Alan Greenspan},
title = {Speech},
year = {2000},
month = {May},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_20000504_greenspan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}