speeches · April 28, 1997
Speech
Alan Greenspan · Chair
For release on delivery
1 30 p m EDT
April 29, 1997
Remarks by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the
Spring Meeting
of the
Institute of International Finance
Washington, D C
April 29, 1997
It is a pleasure to be here today
I will take this occasion to offer some thoughts related to the upcoming G-7 economic
summit meeting, which will be held in Denver in less than two months One theme in recent
summit meetings -- starting in Halifax in 1995 and continuing in Lyon last year — has been
the promotion of stability in international financial markets My purpose today is not to
describe all the efforts that have been made in that regard, which relate primarily to
supervision and regulation Rather, I would like to step back a bit and offer a framework for
thinking about those efforts
To begin with, we should not lose sight of the fact that government regulation, if not
carefully designed, can undermine the effectiveness of private market regulation and can itself
be ineffective in protecting the public interest No market is ever truly unregulated in that the
self-interest of participants generates private market regulation Counterparties thoroughly
scrutinize each other, often requiring collateral and special legal protections, self-regulated
clearing houses and exchanges set margins and capital requirements to protect the interests of
the members Thus, the real question is not whether a market should be regulated Rather, it
is whether government intervention strengthens or weakens private regulation, and at what
cost At worst, the introduction of government rules may actually weaken the effectiveness of
regulation if government regulation is itself ineffective or, more importantly, undermines
incentives for private market regulation Regulation by government unavoidably involves
some element of perverse incentives, that is, moral hazard If private market participants
believe that government is protecting their interests, their own efforts to do so will diminish
2
At the same time, societies have judged that it is not sufficient to rely exclusively on
the private sector to ensure the adequacy of the management of risk in our financial systems
There is a perceived need for supervision and regulation by the public sector, as well As I
will point out shortly, this need arises largely to counter the potential moral hazard that arises
as a consequence of the development of large safety nets for our financial systems
Many of the benefits banks provide modern societies derive from their willingness to
take risks and from their use of a relatively high degree of financial leverage Through
leverage, in the form principally of taking deposits, banks perform a critical role in the
financial intermediation process, they provide savers with additional investment choices and
borrowers with a greater range of sources of credit, thereby facilitating a more efficient
allocation of resources and contributing importantly to greater economic growth Indeed, it
has been the evident value of intermediation and leverage that has shaped the development of
our financial systems from the earliest times -- certainly since Renaissance goldsmiths
discovered that lending out deposited gold was feasible and profitable
Central bank provision of mechanisms for converting highly illiquid portfolios into
liquid ones in extraordinary circumstances — a key element of our safety nets -- has led to a
greater degree of leverage in banking than market forces alone would support Traditionally
these mechanisms involve making discount or Lombard facilities available, so that individual
depositories could turn illiquid assets into liquid resources and not exacerbate unsettled
market conditions by the forced selling of such assets or the calling of loans More broadly,
open market operations, in situations like that which followed the crash of stock markets
3
around the world in 1987, satisfy increased needs for liquidity for the system as a whole that
otherwise could feed cumulative, self-reinforcing contractions across many financial markets
Of course, this same leverage and risk-taking also greatly increase the possibility of
bank failures Without leverage, losses from risk-taking would be absorbed by a bank's
owners, virtually eliminating the chance that the bank would be unable to meet its obligations
in the case of a "failure " Some failures can be of a bank's own making, resulting, for
example, from poor credit judgments For the most part, these failures are a normal and
important part of the market process and provide discipline and information to other
participants regarding the level of business risks However, because of the important roles
that banks and other financial intermediaries play in our financial systems, such failures could
have large ripple effects that spread throughout business and financial markets at great cost
The presence of the safety net, which inevitably imparts a subsidy to banks, has
created a disconnect between risk-taking by banks and banks' cost of capital It is this
disconnect that has made necessary a degree, of supervision and regulation that would not be
necessary without the existence of the safety net That is, regulators are compelled to act as a
surrogate for market discipline since the market signals that usually accompany excessive
risk-taking are substantially muted, and because the prices to banks of government deposit
guarantees, or of access to the safety net more generally, do not, and probably cannot, vary
sufficiently with risk to mimic market prices The problems that arise from the retarding of
the pressures of market discipline have led us increasingly to accept supervision and
regulation that endeavors to simulate the market responses that would occur if there were no
safety net, but without giving up its protections
4
To be sure, we should recognize that if we choose to have the advantages of a safety
net and a leveraged system of financial intermediaries, the burden of managing risk in the
financial system will not lie with the private sector alone With leveraging there will always
exist a remote possibility of a chain reaction, a cascading sequence of defaults that will
culminate in financial implosion if it proceeds unchecked Only a modern central bank, with
its unlimited power to create money, can with a high probability thwart such a process before
it becomes destructive Hence, central banks will of necessity be drawn into becoming
lenders of last resort But implicit in the existence of such a role is that there will be some
form of allocation between the public and private sectors of the burden of risk of extreme
outcomes Thus, central banks are led to provide what essentially amounts to catastrophic
financial insurance coverage Such a public subsidy should be reserved for only the rarest of
disasters If the owners or managers of private financial institutions were to anticipate being
propped up frequently by government support, it would only encourage reckless and
irresponsible practices
In theory, the allocation of responsibility for risk-bearing between the private sector
and the central bank depends upon an evaluation of the private cost of capital In order to
attract, or at least retain, capital, a private financial institution must earn at minimum the
overall economy's rate of return, adjusted for risk In competitive financial markets, the
greater the leverage, the higher the rate of return, before adjustment for risk If private
financial institutions have to absorb all financial risk, then the degree to which they can
leverage will be limited, the financial sector smaller, and its contribution to the economy
more limited On the other hand, if central banks effectively insulate private institutions from
5
the largest potential losses, however incurred, increased laxity could threaten a major drain on
taxpayers or produce inflationary instability as a consequence of excess money creation
Thus, governments, including central banks, have been given certain responsibilities
related to their banking and financial systems that must be balanced We have the
responsibility to prevent major financial market disruptions through development and
enforcement of prudent regulatory standards and, if necessary in rare circumstances, through
direct intervention in market events But we also have the responsibility to ensure that
private sector institutions have the capacity to take prudent and appropriate risks
Our goal as supervisors should not be to prevent all bank failures, but to maintain
sufficient prudential standards so that banking problems that do occur do not become
widespread We try to achieve the proper balance through official regulations, as well as
through formal and informal supervisory policies and procedures
The revolution in information and data processing technology has transformed our
financial markets and the way our financial institutions conduct their operations In most
respects, these technological advances have enhanced the potential for reducing transactions
costs, to the benefit of consumers of financial services, and for managing risks But in some
respects they have increased the potential for more rapid and widespread disruption
The efficiency of global financial markets, engendered by the rapid proliferation of
financial products, has the capability of transmitting mistakes at a far faster pace throughout
the financial system in ways that were unknown a generation ago, and not even remotely
imagined in the 19th century Financial crises in the early 19th century, for example,
particularly those associated with the Napoleonic Wars, were often related to military and
6
other events in faraway places Communication was still comparatively primitive An
investor's speculative position could be wiped out by a military setback, and he might not
even know about it for days or even weeks, which, from the perspective of central banking
today, might be considered bliss
Similarly, the collapse of Barings Brothers in 1995 showed how much more rapidly
losses can be generated in the current environment relative to a century earlier when Barings
Brothers confronted a similar episode Current technology enables single individuals to
initiate massive transactions with very rapid execution Clearly, not only has the productivity
of global finance increased markedly, but so, obviously, has the ability to generate losses at a
previously inconceivable rate
These technological forces also have been central to the process of globalization, that
is, the growing integration of national economies — including national financial markets
They are, of course, not the only forces The gradual removal of barriers to trade,
deregulation and reform of financial systems, and simply the enormous creation of wealth
have all generated the demand and opportunities for the expansion of investment and business
horizons beyond national boundaries Technological changes have facilitated such an
expansion
The growing importance of emerging market economies in international financial
markets is one manifestation not just of the impressive growth of those economies but also of
increasing global integration Thus, it is not surprising that the need to promote financial
stability, and in particular to enhance prudential supervision, in emerging market economies
7
was identified at the Lyon summit as an important objective It is important for those
economies individually and for all of us collectively
One element of the follow-up to the Lyon summit that is especially fitting in the
context of my earlier remarks has been efforts to enhance market transparency, including
more -- and more meaningful -- public disclosure Meaningful public disclosures by firms
about the nature of their risk exposures and their procedures for managing those risks
contribute significantly to the constructive role of market discipline Not surprisingly, the
market itself is probably the most powerful source of pressure for improved disclosures
I might mention one specific accomplishment related to market transparency Central
banks have agreed to establish a system of regular reporting of derivatives activities by the
world's major dealers, beginning as of June 1998 The system has been designed to yield
aggregate data on global trading activities in a manner that avoids double counting and is
sensitive to reporting burden The aggregate data will be publicly released to enable firms to
assess their own activities in relation to the market as a whole
The globalization of international financial markets and of the operations of individual
firms clearly calls for international cooperation among supervisors Correspondingly,
supervisory cooperation is an important element of the G-7 summit agenda on financial
stability Much of the recent work has related to the desirability of a more systematic
exchange of information among national supervisors, including consideration of what kinds of
information need to be exchanged and under what circumstances The possible need for and
8
possible roles of an "information coordinator" have been central issues in the Joint Forum
discussions
The objective of a more systematic exchange of information is easy to support in
principle However, when it comes to implementation, there are questions that need to be
addressed Even more questions arise when one thinks of going beyond the exchange of
information to other forms of supervisory coordination, involving a "lead regulator" of some
kind that is intended to fill so-called supervisory gaps
What are the supervisory gaps that need to be filled? Each of us could probably point
to episodes where problems could have been avoided, or the degree of disruption could have
been reduced, if better information had been available sooner to supervisory authorities
Perhaps Barings is one example It is more difficult to point to episodes when the absence of
formal arrangements for coordination of supervisory actions inhibited a response to a
problem Conversely, might arrangements that are too formal, too rigid, or too cumbersome
themselves inhibit appropnate responses in emergency situations, each of which is likely-to be
unique"?
Another question is whether supervisory authorities have the expertise and resources to
provide meaningful oversight and develop accurate assessments of the risk-taking activities of
large, diversified, globally active financial institutions If the answer is no, as might well be
the case, should we nevertheless convey to market participants the sense that we are in fact
adequately supervising such activities? Wouldn't that reduce the incentives for market
participants themselves to provide discipline?
9
Would a statement that all major financial firms, even the most diversified ones, are
subject to coordinated supervision suggest a degree of support that effectively extends, to an
unwarranted extent, the subsidy associated with national safety nets? Would it generate a
degree of moral hazard that could itself be the source of systemic risk?
The answers to these questions are not straightforward However, while many firms
should reassess and upgrade their risk management procedures, and supervisors should
improve their procedures as well, I do not believe that the need for a radical change in our
framework for the supervision of internationally active financial firms has been demonstrated
The paradigm of supervision itself is, of necessity, continuously adjusted to the rapidly
changing, technologically driven, financial system In recent years, firms and supervisors
alike have sought to harness technological advances to enhance risk management procedures
Much thought has been given to how to make public disclosure more meaningful and to
reinforce market discipline Supervisors around the world, not just in the major industrial
countries, have gotten to know each, other better and to understand better each others'
problems and policies The legal and institutional infrastructure of financial markets has been
significantly improved Along with good macroeconomic policy -- a topic for another day --
a continuation of this ongoing process of careful and measured progress represents the most
constructive strategy for ensuring financial stability
Cite this document
APA
Alan Greenspan (1997, April 28). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19970429_greenspan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19970429_greenspan,
author = {Alan Greenspan},
title = {Speech},
year = {1997},
month = {Apr},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19970429_greenspan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}