speeches · January 29, 1997
Speech
Alan Greenspan · Chair
For release on delivery
10:15 a.m. E.S.T.
Thursday, January 30, 1997
Statement by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
January 30, 1997
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today. The Committee is faced
with a number of complex policy issues that will have an
important bearing on the fiscal health of the nation and the
welfare of our people well into the next century. I will be
happy to respond to questions relating to any of those issues,
but in my formal comments this morning I intend to focus on the
accuracy of the consumer price index.
I would like to begin by commending this Committee for
having done so much to bring the issue of possible bias in the
CPI to the attention of the Congress and of the nation in
general. The hearings conducted by this Committee in 1995, as
well as the report produced by the advisory commission that was
sponsored by this Committee, have advanced the discussion
considerably. These efforts, along with the continuing
contributions of the Bureau of Labor Statistics1 research staff,
have added importantly to our understanding of the sources of
measurement error in the CPI.
Any index that endeavors to measure the cost of living
should aim to be unbiased. That is, a serious examination of all
available evidence should yield the conclusion that there is just
as great a chance that the index understates the rate of growth
of the target concept as there is that it overstates the truth.
The present-day consumer price index does not meet this standard.
In fact, the best available evidence suggests that there is
-2-
virtually no chance that the CPI as currently published
understates the rate of growth of the appropriate concept. In
other words, there is almost a 100 percent probability that we
are overcompensating the average social security recipient for
increases in the cost of living, and almost a 100 percent
probability that we are causing the inflation-adjusted burden of
the income tax system to decline more rapidly than I presume the
Congress intends.
A major reason for this is that consumers respond to changes
in relative prices by changing the composition of their actual
marketbasket. At present, however, the marketbasket used in
constructing the CPI changes only once every decade or so.
Moreover, new goods and services deliver value to consumers even
at the relatively elevated prices that often prevail early in
their life cycles; currently, that value is not reflected in the
CPI.
For that and other reasons outlined in the Boskin Commission
report and other studies, we know with near certainty that the
current CPI is off. We do not know precisely by how much,
however. There is, nonetheless, a very high probability that the
upward bias ranges between 1/2 percentage point per year and 1-1/2
percentage points per year. Although this range happens to
coincide with the one I gave two years ago, it does reflect both
the improvements in the index that the BLS has implemented since
then and the emergence of evidence suggesting that the initial
problem was of a slightly greater dimension than had previously
-3-
been estimated. This estimate is consistent with a number of
microstatistical studies as well as an independently derived
macroevaluation by staff at the Federal Reserve Board, which I
will discuss shortly.
In judging these evaluations, it is incumbent upon us to
resist the evident strong inclination to believe that precision
is the equivalent of accuracy in price bias estimation. If we
cannot find a precise estimate for a certain bias, we should not
implicitly choose zero as though that was a more scientifically
supportable estimate.
There is no sharp dividing line between a pristine estimate
of a price and one that is not. All of the estimates in the CPI
are approximations, in some cases very rough approximations.
Further, even very rough approximations can give us a far better
judgment of the cost of living, than holding to a false precision
of accuracy. We would be far better served following the wise
admonition of John Maynard Keynes that "it is better to be
roughly right than precisely wrong."
Estimates of the magnitude of the bias in our price measures
are available from a number of sources. Most have been developed
from detailed examinations of the microstatistical evidence.
However, recent work by staff economists at the Federal Reserve
Board has added strong corroborating evidence of price
mismeasurement using a macroeconomic approach that is essentially
independent of the exercises performed by other researchers,
including those on the Boskin Commission. In particular,
-4-
employing the statistical system from which the Commerce
Department estimates the national income and product accounts,
the research finds that measured real output and productivity in
the service sector are implausibly weak, given that the return to
owners of businesses in that sector apparently has been well-
maintained. Taken at face value, the published data indicate
that the level of output per hour in a number of service-
producing industries has been falling for more than two decades.
In other words, the data imply that firms in these industries
have been becoming less and less efficient for more than twenty
years.
These circumstances simply are not credible. On the
reasonable assumption that nominal output and hours worked and
paid of the various industries are accurately measured, faulty
price statistics are almost surely the likely cause of the
implausible productivity trends. The source of a very large
segment of these prices is the CPI.
For this exercise, the study used the GDP chain-weight price
measures. Although these price measures are based on many of the
same individual price indexes included in the CPI, they do not
suffer from upper-level substitution bias. Hence, the price
mismeasurement revealed by this data system largely reflects
shortcomings in quality adjustment and in the treatment of new
goods and services. If, instead of declining, productivity in
these selected service industries was flat, to up a modest one
percentage point per year, the implicit aggregate price bias
-5-
associated with these service industries alone would be on the
order of 1/2 percentage point or so per annum in recent years—very
similar in magnitude to the Boskin Commission estimate of total
quality adjustment and new products bias.
To be sure, it is theoretically possible that some of the
measured productivity declines in these service industries merely
reflect mispricing of intermediate transfers among various
industries. Such an occurrence would cause an understatement of
productivity in some sectors, but a corresponding overstatement
in others. But the available evidence suggests that for these
particular service industries this theoretical possibility is not
of a sufficiently large empirical magnitude to overturn the basic
conclusion that there are serious measurement problems in our
price statistics. Moreover, the study did not attempt to
evaluate possible quality and new products bias in other
industries.
Some observers who are skeptical that the bias in the CPI
could be very large have noted that the evidence on the magnitude
of unmeasured quality change and the importance of new items bias
is incomplete and inconclusive. Without a doubt, quality change
and new items are among the most difficult of the problems
currently confronting the BLS. But since I raised this issue two
years ago in my testimony before this committee, a number of
studies have documented significant new examples of cases in
which the current treatment in the CPI results in an
overstatement of the rate of growth of the cost of living.
-6-
There doubtless are certain components of the CPI that are
biased downward because quality change is handled
inappropriately. One instance in which there may well be a
problem in this regard pertains to new vehicles, where it may be
more appropriate to treat pollution control and mandatory safety
equipment, at least in part, as raising price to a consumer
rather than improving quality, as is the present practice. But
the potential downward bias introduced by current methodology for
such equipment can only be slight. We should be prepared to
embrace credible new research on quality adjustment, regardless
of whether that research points to additional sources of upward
bias or previously undetected instances of downward bias.
Nonetheless, currently available evidence very strongly supports
the view that, on balance, the bias is decidedly toward failing
to appropriately capture quality improvements in our price
indexes. There is little reason to believe that this conclusion
will change unless we alter our procedures.
A more difficult quality related issue is whether to reflect
changes in broad environmental and social conditions in price
measures that are used for indexing various components of federal
outlays and receipts. That is, should the CPI reflect the
influence of factors such as the level of crime, air and water
quality, and the emergence of new diseases, which are not
specifically related to products that consumers purchase? There
is little in the record to suggest that, when it enacted the
indexation of social security benefits in 1972, the Congress
-7-
intended for the beneficiaries of that program to be compensated
for changes in such environmental and social factors. Nor do
these issues appear to have been raised when Congress debated the
indexation of various tax parameters during the 1980s. Taking
account of such conditions, particularly those that lie outside
of the markets for goods and services, would be an interesting
exercise in its own right, but would appear to extend well beyond
the original intent of the Congress.
A considerable professional consensus already exists for at
least two actions that would almost surely bring the CPI into
closer alignment with a true cost-of-living index. First, we
should move away from the concept of a fixed marketbasket at the
upper level of aggregation, and move toward an aggregation
formula that takes into account the tendency of consumers to
alter the composition of their purchases in response to changes
in relative prices. The BLS already calculates such an index on
an experimental basis with a lag of about a year. If the Bureau
adopts the Boskin Commission's recommendation that it publish a
"best practice" version of the CPI with a lag of a year, it
should, without question, build that index on the foundation of a
variable marketbasket.
There is a somewhat more difficult issue as to whether the
concept of a variable marketbasket can be applied in "real time,"
that is, with the same degree of timeliness that characterizes
the current CPI. It is not possible to implement the textbook
versions of any of the so-called "superlative" index formulas in
-8-
real time, because those formulas require contemporaneous data on
expenditures, and those data are not presently available until
about a year after the fact. However, this hardly forecloses the
possibility of implementing an approximation to a superlative
formula, and work should continue on the development of such an
approximation.
A second area that will require attention is the aggregation
of prices at the most detailed level of the index. This is a
highly technical area, and an important example of how research
by the staff at the BLS has advanced our knowledge. Without
going into the details of the matter, it is sufficient to say
that a selective move away from the current aggregation formula
is warranted, and would probably make a modest further
contribution to bringing the index more in line with the concept
of a cost-of-living index.
Beyond these rather limited steps, most of the needed
developments will require time, effort, and quite possibly
additional resources. It is important that the Congress provide
the Bureau with sufficient resources to pursue the agenda
vigorously. These are difficult problems, and cannot be solved
tomorrow or next week. But with adequate support and diligent
effort, the pace of improvement should quicken. Moreover, an
accelerated pace of BLS activity, and heightened congressional
interest should galvanize analysts outside the government to
contribute to the research effort.
-9-
Where will this longer-term effort be required? One of the
key areas, by all accounts, is quality adjustment. As the Bureau
has rightly noted, they do indeed already employ a variety of
methods to control for quality change, but available evidence
suggests that these are not sufficient to the task.
Unfortunately, making improvements on this front will be
difficult: Each item will have to be considered on its own, and
there may well be limited transfer of knowledge from one item to
the next.
Another key area on the longer-term agenda will be the
estimation of the value of new products to consumers.
Significant innovations, such as the personal computer, the
cellular telephone, and the heart bypass operation create value
for consumers, even at their typically high initial prices;
moreover, this value is even greater at the much lower prices
that often prevail when new products are, in fact, introduced
into the CPI. A true cost-of-living index would reflect this
value and its implication for the true rate of growth of the cost
of living. The CPI does not reflect it, and accordingly fails to
capture a significant offset to price rises in other products.
Deriving an estimate of this value and building it into the CPI
will not be an easy undertaking. But conceptually, it is
unquestionably the right direction to be heading, and some recent
research suggests that it could measurably affect the index.
Over time, we will need to investigate alternative sources
of data. Already, there is interesting work being done to
-10-
develop techniques for processing data collected from bar-code
scanners at the check-out counter. Scanner data will allow the
BLS to track not just a small sample of products, but virtually
the entire universe of products in selected lines of business
and, perhaps most importantly, virtually the universe of
transactions, regardless of whether those transactions happen on
a weekday, at night, or on a holiday.
We should also move to improve our understanding of the
value that consumers place on their own time. Absent such
knowledge, it will be impossible for the BLS to estimate the
value of many goods and services that mainly serve to enhance
convenience and save time.
Finally, we will have to attempt to build an understanding
of why consumers shop at the places they do: What
characteristics of an outlet are important, and how much so?
Location, hours of operation, inventory, and quality of service
all are likely influences on the value that consumers place on
their shopping experience, and all will be important in helping
the BLS to develop a more sophisticated statistical method for
dealing with the appearance of new consumer outlets, including
those that operate over the Internet.
Even if the BLS moves aggressively, some upward bias will
almost surely remain in the CPI, at least for the next several
years. Two years ago, in testimony before this committee, I
suggested that a workable structure for dealing with this
situation might involve a two-track approach. That suggestion
-11-
still seems to me to make sense. The first track would involve
action by the BLS to address those aspects of the bias that can
be dealt with in relatively short order, say within the next
year. The second track would involve the establishment of an
independent national commission to set annual cost-of-living
adjustment factors for federal receipt and outlay programs. The
Commission would examine available evidence on a periodic basis,
and estimate the bias in the CPI taking into account both the
latest research on the sources and magnitudes of the bias, and
any corrective actions that had been taken by the BLS. This type
of approach would have the benefit of being objective,
nonpartisan, and sufficiently flexible to take full account of
the latest information. Moreover, there is no reason why the two
tracks could not proceed in parallel.
Without the second track, we are implicitly assuming,
contrary to overwhelming evidence, that the most accurate
estimate of the bias is zero. There has been considerable
objection that such a second track procedure would be a political
fix. To the contrary, assuming zero for the remaining bias is
the political fix. On this issue, we should let evidence, not
politics, drive policy.
We have an overarching national interest in building a
better measure of consumer prices and in implementing more
rational indexation procedures. Through these efforts, we are
most likely to ensure that the original intent of the relevant
pieces of legislation will be fulfilled in insulating taxpayers
-12-
and benefit recipients from the effects of ongoing changes in the
cost of living. At present this objective is not being met.
Cite this document
APA
Alan Greenspan (1997, January 29). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19970130_greenspan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19970130_greenspan,
author = {Alan Greenspan},
title = {Speech},
year = {1997},
month = {Jan},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19970130_greenspan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}