speeches · August 13, 1996
Speech
Thomas C. Melzer · Governor
Monetary Policy Myths and Realities
Thomas C. Melzer
President
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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MYTH: Monetary policy is about
controlling interest rates.
Because the Fed currently implements monetary policy by
targeting the federal funds rate, many believe that monetary
policy is about controlling interest rates.
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The Fed exercises some influence
over the federal funds rate, but
much less over other interest rates.
The reality is, however, that long-term interest rates, which
are important for long-term planning and investment
decisions, are not directly controlled by the Fed.
To see this let's look at the behavior of the federal funds rate
and the 10-year Treasury bond yield.
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Federal Funds Rate and 10-Year
Treasury Bond Rate
Monthly averages of the federal fund and 10-year T-Bond rates.
Important Points:
The two rates have similar long-run trends, but they frequently differ from each
other considerably for periods of a year or more. Note the mid-1970s; more about
the recent experience later.
The common long-run behavior suggests that they are driven by similar forces.
A particularly important force for the behavior of longer-term interest rates is
inflation or, more precisely, inflation expectations.
To see this, let's consider the relationship between inflation and the 10-year T-
bond yield.
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Inflation and 10-Year Treasury
Bond Rate
This chart has the actual inflation rate and not an estimate of inflation
expectations. But we know that there is a tendency of inflation expectations to
respond to actual inflation experience with a lag.
Inflation during the early part of the 1960s was low, so it is not surprising that long-
term rate did not respond fully to the acceleration in inflation that began in the mid-
1960s.
Also, the market tended to ignore the rapid accelerations and decelerations in
inflation in the 1970s, but did trend up with the average inflation rate.
In the 1980s and 1990s, financial markets have remained cautious despite the
improved inflation experience.
Attempts to reduce short-term interest rates can result in higher inflation
expectations and higher long-term interest rates and vice versa. For example, let's
take a close look at the experience since 1994.
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Federal Funds Rate and 10-Year
(Treasury Bond Rate
Percent
c ^. > luJ a > c
CC (0 (0
luJ
<D o as
"D 2 2
luJ Q. > c
a> o CO
(/) z -D 0) -i
The funds rate target was raised in a number of steps starting
in 1994. At first the long-term rate moved up with the funds
rate. Later, when the market came to believe that the Fed
was serious about resisting inflation pressures, the long rate
moved down with further increases in the funds rate.
The most recent cut in the funds rate, however, engendered
concerns about the Fed's resolve to fight inflationary
pressures. As a result, the long-term rate rose on cuts in the
funds rate target.
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REALITY: Monetary policy is about
controlling the supply of money.
The problem is that monetary policy cannot directly control
the interest rates that are important to the economy.
Indeed, monetary policy isn't about controlling interest rates
at all. Rather it is about controlling the supply of money.
Let me explain how this works.
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The Fed implements monetary policy
through open market operations-
buying or selling government
securities.
While there are three tools of monetary policy: the discount
rate, reserve requirements and open market operations,
policy is implemented primarily through open market
operations-buying or selling of government securities.
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Purchases of government securities
increase reserves and the monetary
base.
Purchases of government securities increase reserves
and the monetary base.
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Sales of government securities
decrease reserves and the monetary
base.
Sales of government securities decrease reserves and
the monetary base.
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Changes in reserves or the monetary
base are ultimately reflected in
monetary aggregates.
Eventually changes in the monetary base are reflected in a
wide variety of monetary aggregates.
The behavior of the monetary base and other monetary
aggregates is important for inflation, which brings me to the
next myth I would like to discuss.
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MYTH: Inflation is caused by
sudden increases in energy prices,
wages or other raw material costs.
Some believe that inflation is caused by increases in energy prices, wages or
raw material cost, so-called "cost-push" inflation.
Sudden increases in the prices of important raw materials, such as petroleum,
can have real consequences for the level of prices. But they are not responsible
for sustained increases in the price level, that is, inflation.
Inflation is a monetary phenomena, caused by allowing money to expand more
rapidly than the real economy for an extended period of time.
Sustained increased in wages, raw material costs and the like are the result of
inflation, not the cause of inflation.
To illustrate the relationship between money growth and inflation, let's consider
the experience of 17 OECD countries, including the US.
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Money Growth and Inflation
7 9 11 13 15
Monetary Base Growth
Average growth rates of the monetary base and inflation for 17 countries,
including the US. The averages are of available data. The shortest period is
38 years; the longest is 46 years.
Main Point:
There is a strong positive relationship between monetary policy and inflation in
the long-run. This is true for all countries.
As further evidence that inflation is a monetary phenomena subject to control
by the central bank, we know that some very rapid inflations, including our own
experience in the late 1970s and early 1980s, are associated with rapid money
growth.
There is also evidence, however, that monetary policy can be used to reduce
what many would consider moderate inflation. To see this let's consider the
experience of three countries that have recently adopted explicit inflation
targets.
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Inflation Experience of Inflation
Targeting Countries
Canada Average Inflation Target Index
Pre-Target (1990-1992) 4.04
Target (1993-1995) 1.33
New Zealand Average Inflation Target Index
Pre-Target (1990 - 1992Q3) 3.84
Target (1992Q4-1995) 1.77
United Kingdom Average Inflation Target Index
Pre-Target (1990 -1992Q3) 6.84
Target (1992Q4 -1995) 2.94
UK and New Zealand began inflation targeting in second quarter 1992, Canada
began in 1993.
Each country targets a price index that is slightly different than the CPI.
In every case, the decision to make inflation the sole objective of monetary policy
and to set explicit inflation targets has reduced inflation from the pre-targeting
levels.
Some people would point out that world-wide inflation rates have declined over
that latter period relative to the former.
While this is true, the experience of these inflation targeting countries appears to
be somewhat better than average. For example the US inflation in the former
period, 4.1%, was nearly the same as Canada's and New Zealand's. Their
inflation experience since then is somewhat better than our 2.7%.
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REALITY: Inflation is caused by
rapid money growth and can be
cured by appropriate monetary
policy.
Both economic theory and the experience of US and the rest
of the world suggest that inflation is caused by rapid money
growth and can be cured by appropriate monetary policy.
If this is true, why doesn't monetary policy simply focus on
bringing inflation down?
One reason is the belief that if we reduce inflation, we
necessarily raise unemployment and reduce output.
This is the next myth I would like to discuss.
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MYTH: There is a reasonably
stable, short-run tradeoff between
unemployment and inflation.
This is the so-called Phillips curve tradeoff.
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Inflation/Unemployment Tradeoff:
Ithe 1960s
6 8 10
Inflation Rate
Annual inflation and unemployment rates in the US from 1960 through
1969.
The idea that there is a stable relationship between unemployment and inflation
stems from the experience of the US prior to the 1970s.
The view is that the Fed can only reduce inflation by increasing the
unemployment rate.
But this apparent relationship breaks down completely when the data for the
1970s 80s and 90s are considered.
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Inflation/Unemployment Tradeoff:
1960-1995
6 8 10 12 14
Inflation Rate
Rapid inflation can occur with any unemployment rate. For example, our current
inflation rate of about 3 percent is consistent with unemployment rates of less
than 4 to over 9 percent.
Monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation does not necessarily mean higher
unemployment.
These data show that this is clearly not the case in the short-run.
Moreover, economic theory and empirical evidence certainly suggest that this is
not the case in the long-run either.
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REALITY: There is no stable
tradeoff between unemployment
and inflation.
There is no stable relationship between inflation and employment.
Consequently, those of us who believe that monetary policy should be focused
on reducing inflation are not arguing for higher unemployment or slower
economic growth. Although, many analysts try to make it sound as if we are.
While many acknowledge that focusing attention on inflation does not imply
higher unemployment rates and slow growth in the long run, some argue that
focusing monetary policy solely on inflation is a mistake because monetary policy
can and should be used to stabilize output.
This is the next myth I would like to discuss.
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Consider a hypothetical economy that moves through cyclical ups and downs.
Trend GDP is the path that the economy would follow if there were no cyclical
swings in output.
That is, trend GDP is what would occur if monetary policy could eliminate the
business cycle completely.
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To illustrate how stabilization policy would work, assume that
we are at time t just after the cyclical peak in output. If
0
monetary policy does nothing the economy will move through
the contraction phase of the business cycle.
Assume that the objective of monetary policy is to stabilize
output. Hence at time t the monetary authority eases policy
0
to avoid, or at least mitigate, the cyclical contraction.
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There are lags in the effect of monetary policy on the economy. Consequently,
the economy does not respond immediately. Rather the economy begins to
respond at time t
v
Instead of continuing to fall along the solid red line the economy begins to
expand and moves along the solid yellow line instead.
The result: Monetary policy has succeeded in reducing cyclical fluctuations in
output.
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What would we need to know to
stabilize output?
While this example is plausible, many things that are required
to stabilize the economy have been taken for granted.
Let's now consider some of the things that the monetary
authority would have to know to successfully pursue
economic stabilization policy.
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1. We must know precisely
where we are in the business
cycle.
We need to know precisely where we are in the business
cycle.
If we believe that we are at the start of a contraction [as in
our little illustration], but in reality we are in a continuing
expansion, policy may move in the wrong direction.
In our illustration, for example, we would have eased when
we should have done nothing or tightened.
The 1990-91 recession had started well before policy makers
were aware of it.
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2. We must be able to forecast
economic activity one or two
years out.
We must not only know where the economy is, but where it is going.
Hence, the important question is how well does the Fed or anyone else forecast
real output?
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Actual and 4-Qtr Ahead Forecast
Real Output Growth
Percent
-8 H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r-
74Q1 77Q1 80Q1 83Q1 86Q1 89Q1 92Q1 95Q1
Actual GDP growth and Median forecast of what output growth was going to be
from a year [four quarters] earlier.
These are the forecasts of some private forecasters, but economists who have
looked into it say that the central bank or government forecasts are no better on
average than private ones.
It's clear that we don't forecast a year ahead very well. Note the early 1980s.
Our ability to forecast is even worse two years ahead, which is a more relevant
time frame if the ultimate concern is inflation.
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Actual and 8-Qtr Ahead Forecast
Real Output Growth
Percent
10
8
6
4i
2
0
-2 -j
-4 "I
-6
-8 n 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r
74Q1 77Q1 80Q1 83Q1 86Q1 89Q1 92Q1 95Q1
Actual GDP growth and the median [5 forecasters] forecast 2-years [8 quarters]
earlier.
There is a particularly interesting aspect of these forecasts:
Forecast errors are very large around turning points and, particularly,
recessions.
Turning points are precisely what the Fed needs to forecast well to conduct
counter cyclical monetary policy.
To stabilize output, however, we need to do more than simply forecast correctly.
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3. We need to know when and
by how much the economy
will respond to our actions.
If stabilization policy is to succeed, we also need to know
how and when the economy will respond to our actions. Any
gains will be temporary, however. In the long-run, real output
growth is determined by real factors, such as, labor force
growth, productivity growth and technology.
The problem is that the economy is affected by many things,
so that the economy's response to changes in monetary
policy can be very different at different times.
To see this, let's consider a couple of times when monetary
policy eased substantially.
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Real Output and Base Growth:
11981-82 Recession
Percent
12
10
8
6
Base (81-82)
4 Output (81-82)
2
0
-2
10 11 12
The first is during the 1981-82 recession. Solid line is year-over-year monetary
base growth. The zero line denotes the quarter when there was a significant
change in the growth rate of the monetary base. In this case it is the fourth
quarter of 1981. The dashed line is year-over-year growth rate of real GDP.
Monetary policy had been restrictive, as base growth was trending down.
After the peak in output growth, however, monetary policy reversed course and
monetary base growth accelerated rapidly.
In this case, output growth continued to fall for the next three quarters before
picking up, but the economy expanded rapidly [above a 4% rate] for the next two
years.
Now let's consider a similar experience in the 1990-91 recession.
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Real Output and Base Growth:
1981-82 and 1990-91 Recessions
Percent
12
Output (81-82)
Output (90-91)
-4 -i 1 r- -l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r-
- 4 - 3 - 2 - 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
The zero line for the 1990-91 experience comes at the fourth quarter of 1991.
The experience of monetary base growth during the 1990-91 experience is similar
to that of the early 1980s.
The behavior of output growth, however, was quite different. Output growth
began to pick up about 5 quarters after the change in monetary policy.
Moreover, three years after the policy change output growth remained well below
the rates achieved in the mid-1980s.
In order to conduct effective counter cyclical monetary policy, the timing and
extent of effects of our policy actions on the economy would have to be much
more predictable.
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REALITY: Conducting counter
cyclical monetary policy is difficult,
if not impossible.
Conducting counter cyclical monetary policy is difficult, if not
impossible.
Moreover, it is dangerous because mistakes lead to more,
not less, cyclical instability.
Let's see what can happen if the Fed makes a mistake.
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Consider the situation that we considered earlier, where we
are at time t . Assume this time, however, that we
0
mistakenly believe that if we do nothing output will expand
rather than contract. That is, we have incorrectly forecast the
cyclical turning point!
Our mistaken belief would cause us to pursue a more
restrictive monetary policy rather than a more expansionary
policy.
What would the result be?
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The result would be that output actually declines by more than it would have
had we done nothing.
Now some will argue that as new information about the economy comes in, it
will become increasingly clear that we have made a mistake. At some point,
we will reverse policy. But remember that GDP data for current quarter are
not available until half way through the next. Furthermore, the first-released
data are frequently revised substantially.
In any event, by the time we realized that we had made a mistake, the impact
of our policy on the economy would begin to appear.
Conclusion: Inappropriate counter cyclical monetary policy, even though
well intentioned, can exacerbate cyclical swings in economic activity.
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MYTH: Attempting to stabilize
employment and output is better
than doing nothing.
Despite these difficulties, some suggest that we should
attempt to stabilize output because doing something is better
than doing nothing.
What they fail to realize, however, is that...
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REALITY: Pursuing counter cyclical
monetary policy may increase the
average rate of inflation.
Counter cyclical monetary policy is likely to raise the average
rate of inflation over the business cycle from that which it
would otherwise be.
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The pressure to reduce
unemployment is stronger than
that to reduce inflation.
Part of the problem is that the political pressure to reduce
unemployment is stronger than that to reduce inflation.
Consequently, during periods of slow growth there is
pressure for the Fed to ease policy. During cyclical
expansions the pressure to pursue a more restrictive policy
will be less.
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Monetary policy aimed at avoiding
cyclical downturns will be
conducted asymmetrically.
The result is that monetary policy will be conducted
asymmetrically.
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Monetary base growth will accelerate
during downturns, but not slow
commensurately during economic
expansions.
Monetary base growth will tend to accelerate more during
downturns than it will decelerate during economic
expansions.
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Inflation will be higher over the
business cycle than it would
otherwise be.
The result is that inflation will be higher over the business
cycle than it would otherwise be.
Some might say that is OK, because ...
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MYTH: The Fed is too concerned
with inflation and not concerned
enough with employment and
economic growth.
The myth is that the Fed is too concerned with inflation and
not concerned enough with employment and economic
growth.
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REALITY: Being concerned about
inflation and being concerned about
output growth are the same thing.
The reality is, however, that being concerned about inflation
and being concerned about output growth and economic
welfare are the same thing.
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Chain-Weighted GDP and Price
Index Growth Rates
Percent
1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
These are 5-year moving averages of year-over-year inflation and output
growth rates.
This chart suggests that there is no positive relationship between inflation and
output growth for the US over the last 30 years. When inflation goes down,
output growth goes up and the unemployment rate goes down, not up!
While there is no definitive scientific evidence that moderate inflation reduces
the growth rate of output, economic theory suggests that this might well be
the case.
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Why does inflation reduce output
growth and economic welfare?
Why does inflation reduce output growth and economic
welfare?
There are many reasons, but here are three of the more
important ones.
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^ ^ • 1. Inflation redistributes income.
Inflation redistributes income.
While this happens in many arbitrary ways, inflation most
importantly redistributes income from creditors to debtors.
The result is that inflation tends to reduce capital formation
below that which would otherwise be the case.
A lower rate of capital formation can result in a lower rate of
economic growth.
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2. Inflation and inflation uncertainty
redistribute resources from
their most productive uses to
less productive uses.
Inflation and the associated inflation uncertainty also
redistributes resources to less productive uses.
We all saw what happened during the high inflation of the
1970s. Resources were redirected to predicting and hedging
against the effects of inflation.
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3. Inflation distorts the economy's
price signaling mechanism.
Perhaps the most significant effect of inflation comes through the effect of
inflation on the price signaling mechanism.
The price signaling mechanism is the economy's way of redirecting resources to
their most productive use. For example, an increase in the price of good A
relative to the price of good B signals that more resources should be devoted to
A and perhaps fewer to B.
In an inflation environment, however, it becomes difficult to distinguish price
changes that signal a need to reallocate resources from those that do not, that
is, price changes that occur solely because of inflation.
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The importance of more rapid
economic growth: Even a very
small, almost imperceptible, effect
of inflation on output growth can
have an immense impact on output
over time.
While there is no definitive scientific evidence that moderate
rates of inflation reduce output growth, economic theory
suggests that it could. Because of this, it is instructive to look
at what even a very small effect of inflation on output growth
implies.
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Example: Since 1959, Real GDP
has increased at an average rate
of 3.13%, while inflation has
averaged 4.7%.
Since 1959, Real GDP has increased at an average rate of
3.13%, while inflation has averaged 4.7%.
Let's now assume that things had been different.
Specifically,...
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•Better monetary policy
•Lower inflation
•Higher output growth, 3.14%
instead of 3.13%.
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Since 1959, $424.8 billion more real
output would have been produced.
This amounts to average annual output lost of about $12
billion a year.
The point is that because of compounding, a very small
growth rate effect can have very large consequences for
long-term economic welfare.
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MYTH: Inflation has no lasting
consequences once it is under
control.
Nevertheless, some argue that we should focus some attention on stabilizing
output, because if we make a mistake and create more inflation than we would like,
we can simply reduce inflation back to a more desirable level without any lasting
consequences.
This idea is naive. What is important for the actual inflation experience is
inflationary expectations. Inflationary expectations depend on the public's
perception of how committed the monetary authority is to stabilizing prices.
Among other things, this perception is related to what the public has observed the
monetary authority doing in the past.
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Inflation and 10-Year Treasury
Bond Rate
Percent
16"
14"
Inflation \ 10-Year Bond
12"
10'
8'
A,
ru
"
"
0"i1 i i i i i I i i i i i i
0 u r 1 > C (o M C LO D C cx O > l- r ^ «t h f - o 00 C 0 O 0 C C O O C O O ) C O M L O O
CO CO
-naJ c c c
CO CO CO
-3 -D ~D
-naJ -naJ -naJ c c c c
CO CO CO CO
"D "D "D "3
For example, look at what has happened to the long-term rate since the early
1980s. The inflation rate has come down and so have long-term interest rates.
But long-term real interest rates remain relatively high.
Part of the reason for relatively high long-term rates is the fact that the market is
not certain that the Fed is truly committed to achieving and maintaining a stable
price level.
Indeed, when we look at the experience across countries, we find that the US
experience is not unique. Specifically, countries with higher historical inflation
rates have higher long-term interest rates relative to the current inflation rates
than countries with historically better inflation performances.
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REALITY: A lack of inflation
credibility can cause inflation
expectations and long-term interest
rates to be high for a long time.
The need for credibility leads me to the last myth I would like
to discuss with you.
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MYTH: The Fed has too much
independence.
The myth is the Fed has too much independence.
The fact is the more independent the central bank, the better
is the inflation outcome and the higher is that rate of real
growth.
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Inflation and Central Bank Independence
| Average Inflation Rate, 1950-1995
9 " •
8 -
7 " • •
6 "
5 •
• ""^^^ United States
4 •
^*>>->^^ Switzenand
a
3 •
Germany
\ £. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 l 1 I 1 I 1 « 1 1
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Index of Central Bank Independence
This is the average inflation rate over the 35-year period from 1960 to
1995 for 16 countries, including the US and a index of central bank
independence. This index is by Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (May 1995).
Several indices of central bank independence have been constructed, and they
all give qualitatively similar results.
The indices are designed to reflect what economists and others believe are
essential features of central bank independence:
• the institutional relationship between the central bank and various branches of
government
• the procedures for nominating and dismissing the head of the central bank
• the role of government officials in the central bank
• the frequency of contact between the head of the central bank and
government officials.
Main Point:
These data suggest that the more independent the central bank [where 4 is the
most independent], the lower the long-run inflation experience.
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REALITY: The more independent a
central bank, the better is the long-
run inflation experience.
Those who believe that the Fed is too independent likely also
believe that the Fed should do more to stabilize output
growth and be less concerned about inflation.
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What are the essential monetary
policy realities?
Let me summarize what I believe the essential monetary
policy realities are.
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1. Monetary policy is about
controlling the supply of
money.
Monetary policy is about controlling the supply of
money, not about controlling short-term interest rates.
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2. Inflation is a monetary
phenomenon that is subject
to long-run control by the
central bank.
Inflation is a monetary phenomenon caused by too rapid
money growth.
Moreover, economic theory and experience suggest that the
long-run inflation rate can be controlled by appropriate
monetary policy.
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3. As a practical matter, monetary
policy cannot be used to stabilize
output and employment.
Attempting to stabilize output will result in a higher average
rate of inflation and likely produce less not more economic
instability.
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4. A monetary authority that is
independent of short-term
political pressures will produce
the lowest inflation over time.
The best way we can insure that monetary policy will achieve
price stability is to maintain the central bank's independence.
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5. A monetary policy that
achieves price stability fosters
the highest rate of economic
growth and the highest level of
economic welfare.
Finally, the key to achieving the highest rate of economic
growth that the economy is capable of is to stabilize the price
level.
This is also the most that monetary policy can or should do to
stabilize output as well.
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What can be done to help the Fed
achieve price stability?
What more can be done to help the Fed achieve price
stability.
I recommend that the following three steps be taken.
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1. Make achieving price stability
the Fed's sole monetary policy
objective.
First, achieving price stability should be the Fed's only goal.
Multiple objectives only serve to divert the Fed's attention
from the only thing it can achieve, stable prices. The result is
higher inflation than is either necessary or desirable and, very
likely, a slower rate of economic growth.
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2. Direct the Fed to quantify its
inflation objective so it can be
held accountable.
Second, the Fed's price level or inflation objective should be
explicit and quantifiable. This is the only way the public and
Congress can make the Fed accountable for its actions.
Without explicit objectives there is simply no way to evaluate
a central bank's performance.
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3. Maintain the Fed's institutional
independence.
Finally, attempts during the past few years to politicize the
Fed must be resisted. For example, in recent years there
have been proposals to have members of the administration
serve on the Federal Open Market Committee or to have
Reserve Bank Presidents appointed by the President. Such
recommendations are thinly veiled attempts to reduce the
Fed's independence, and must be resisted.
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Cite this document
APA
Thomas C. Melzer (1996, August 13). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19960814_melzer
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19960814_melzer,
author = {Thomas C. Melzer},
title = {Speech},
year = {1996},
month = {Aug},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19960814_melzer},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}