speeches · November 15, 1995
Speech
Alan Greenspan · Chair
For release on delivery
1 p.m E.S.T
November 16, 1995
Remarks by
Alan Greenspan
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at a
Research Conference
on
Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk
Washington, D C.
November 16, 1995
I am pleased to be able to address this international audience drawn from the staffs of G-10
central banks and other government organizations, from firms involved in trading and risk
management, and from several of the world's most prestigious universities I am particularly gratified
that the Federal Reserve Board is the site of this conference The topics of risk measurement and
systemic risk are part of a newly evolving area of research in finance and economics - an area that is
more than just an intellectual exercise In the next few years, the fruits of these research efforts will
no doubt help to determine the way business is done, both in central banks and in the private sector
Yet it is not entirely clear, at this stage, which lines of inquiry are the most promising and useful
Currently, there are several points of view from which one could frame the relevant questions, as well
as multiple strategies for approaching the issues once they have been defined Thus, it is imperative
that the work be fostered by free and open communication among researchers in financial firms,
academe, and government agencies, and across international borders To that end, I hope that this
conference will make a constructive contribution
The related problems of risk measurement and systemic risk are of crucial importance to
central bankers We know that there is more to central banking than monetary policy, narrowly
defined One aspect of our mandate is to act as a "lender of last resort," providing needed liquidity to
the financial system when it is appropriate
The possibility of panics or market disruption motivated the formulation of a principle for
lender-of-last-resort policy, known as Bagehot's Rule, after the prominent 19th century British
economist The rule dictates that the central bank "lend freely at a high rate," as long as the bank is
solvent and can post collateral that would be unquestionably sufficient during normal periods
Bagehot also was a century ahead of his time in advocating that the central bank should voice a
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pre-announced commitment to such a policy Of course, following this rule will require the central
bank to make difficult judgments In practice, one cannot risklessly serve as a lender of last resort
In Bagehot's world, as was the case until fairly recently, bank balance sheets were simple in
structure — deposits, capital, loans, and reserves -- and the predominant event in which Bagehot's Rule
might be applied was that of a fear-induced run on a bank by depositors However, the largest banks
are now gradually moving away from their traditional role as originators and holders of relatively
simple debt instruments, financed by deposits, to using a more diverse set of instruments in ways that
constitute new forms of financial intermediation Banks increasingly serve as a medium through
which risks -- both market risks and credit risks -- can be allocated so as to be borne by whoever is
most willing or able to bear the exposure Banks today are providing customized contingent payoffs
for their clientele, rather than just an extension of credit or a fixed-yield investment opportunity
Instead of a low-risk asset, bank customers now have access to contracts that can actually lower their
overall risk Liquid international markets and rapid price discovery, brought on in part by innovations
in information technology, permit banks to pursue complicated dynamic trading strategies and to
revalue their portfolios almost instantaneously in light of new information Accordingly, a larger
proportion of banks' portfolios consists of assets that are actively traded and are marked-to-market on
accounting statements The historical threat of deposit runs has faded as a concern, to be replaced by
more complex threats to the financial system, increasingly driven by ever more sophisticated financial
products The definition of a bank run surely needs to be updated, as deposits represent a declining
share of the contractual obligations of the largest banks
Modem information and accounting systems may help impose market discipline upon banks
and reduce the risk of creditor flight, provided traders and risk managers are able to react quickly The
effective acceleration of financial events also complicates the task of central banks Judgments
concerning the sufficiency of bank capital are a principal element in supervisory actions but are
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important, as I shall point out shortly, to the lender-of-last-resort function, as well Such judgments
involve comparing the level of capital to the risk of the activity that it supports Given that capital is
measured as the residual of assets less liabilities, capital adequacy can be an elusive concept for
portfolios that are turning over rapidly Measurement of capital may be muddied by a dependence on
complex judgments in valuing, for example, over-the-counter derivative contracts and structured notes
Moreover, it is unlikely that an occasional snapshot of a portfolio's composition can serve as a basis
for evaluating the riskiness of a dynamic strategy With instruments trading that represent highly
leveraged exposures, a large chunk of capital can disappear, and then reappear, all within the trading
day Supervisors may have to resort to basing their analyses chiefly on assessments of managerial
capabilities rather than of the portfolio held at a given instant.
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing central banks is the question of how their role as the
lender of last resort must be transformed so that it can be earned into the financial environment of the
twenty-first century With the increasingly global nature of their activities, the national identity of
many of the largest banks is fading away With a monetary authority for each country in which a
bank operates, or at least one for each currency, which one is the lender of last resort? The only
tenable answer is that it is all of the central banks, collectively As long as there is a need for this
function to be performed it is crucial that central banks be able to cooperate -- both on a one-to-one
basis and through the multilateral organizations In the past year or so, there has been more than one
episode that either underscored the advantages of sharing crucial information among financial
authorities in different countries, or illustrated the perils of failing to do so
A natural consequence of the existence of a lender of last resort is that there will be some sort
of allocation of the burden of risk of extreme outcomes Thus, central banks are led to provide what
essentially amounts to catastrophic financial insurance coverage Such a public subsidy should be
reserved for only the rarest of disasters, triggered, at most, a handful of times per century If banks
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were to anticipate being propped up frequently by government support, it would only encourage
reckless and irresponsible management practices In theory, the allocation of responsibility for
risk-beanng between the private sector and the central bank depends upon an evaluation of the private
cost of capital In order to attract, or at least retain, capital, a private financial institution must earn at
least the overall economy's rate of return, adjusted for risk In competitive financial markets, the
greater the leverage, the higher the rate of return, before adjustment for risk If private financial
institutions have to absorb all financial risk, then the degree to which they can leverage, of necessity,
will be limited, the financial sector small, and its contribution to economic growth, minimal On the
other hand, if central banks effectively insulate private institutions from the largest potential losses,
however incurred, increased laxity could threaten a large drain on taxpayers or produce inflationary
instability as a consequence of excess money creation In practice, the policy choice of how much, if
any, of the extreme market risk that central banks should absorb is fraught with many complexities
Yet we central bankers make this decision every day, either explicitly or by default It does seem
clear, however, that under the currently structured international financial system, if we do not choose
to absorb the most extreme risks, there is a danger that private financial institutions will be overly
daunted by the specter of unlikely, but enormous and unhedgable losses The result might be that
banks would adopt an attitude of excessive caution that stifles the health of the overall economy
Nonetheless, it is essential, of course, that with these limited and extreme exceptions, all risk remain
within the private financial system
One might ask why, if there is a need for catastrophic financial insurance, private markets
could not provide it upon their own initiative Voluntary risk-pooling arrangements among banks,
with mutual monitoring to deter free riders, arose in more than one country in the nineteenth century
Regrettably, they did not always prove to be stable in the face of imperfect monitoring
At root, we must recognize that if we are to operate a leveraged financial system, it will not be
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without cost There will always exist a remote possibility of a chain reaction, a cascading sequence of
defaults that will culminate in financial implosion, if it is allowed to proceed unchecked Only a
central bank, with unlimited power to create money, can guarantee that such a process will be thwarted
before it becomes destructive. If the vicious cycle can encompass more than one currency, more than
one central bank may be necessary In decades past, the stacking of currency in the window of a bank
generally stopped a bank run In today's complex financial system, the stack of currency may never
be large enough, and thus, there appears to be little alternative to central banks acting as lenders of last
resort
With central banks taking on the risks of serving as lenders of last resort, research on financial
risk that is done by central banks properly places disproportionate focus on the most extreme
outcomes Conversely, financial risk analysis in the private sector rationally concentrates on outcomes
other than the most extreme
The concerns of central banks and the private financial community generally intersect in a
preoccupation with the analysis of risk in general and in an interest in the development of risk
management models The session later this afternoon on "Internal Models" will serve as a progress
report on the models and the Value-at-Risk (VaR) measures that they generate It is worth keeping in
mind that the task of risk management has some pitfalls and fundamental limitations A long list of
simplifying mathematical assumptions are necessary to keep risk management models tractable As a
representative example when pricing OTC options and measuring the risk of positions in them, the
valuation is typically based on a dynamic trading strategy formulated under an assumption of a
continuous price path and sufficient liquidity all along that path Such an assumption may be quite
reasonable in most instances However, it is in times of market stress, when banks are relying most
heavily on their risk management capabilities, that it is most likely that there will be large discrete
jumps in asset prices and that markets will be thin This explains the recent tendency for risk
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managers to conduct so-called "stress tests," in which the impact of larger-than-usual price changes on
profits and risk exposure is appraised
But even stress tests are necessarily limited by the implicit conjecture that relationships among
asset prices that are observed over some past period will continue to hold in the future Typically, risk
management models use estimated variances and correlations computed over a recent historical sample
If the underlying environment is static, the most precise estimates of these statistics would be obtained
by using all of the available historical data However, the financial world is surely changing Thus,
risk management practices might be improved by explicitly modeling the evolution of the riskiness of
assets Given the multitude of models of conditional variance that econometncians have developed
over the past decade, such innovations are clearly technically feasible In fact, several of the
presentations this morning offered possible strategies for modeling changes in risk
Another dimension in which there is room for improvement in risk measurement is in the
statistical distributions that asset returns are presumed to follow Most VaR calculations are based on
multivanate normal distributions, despite compelling evidence that many of the data are drawn from
distributions functions with heavier tails From the point of view of the risk manager, inappropriate
use of the normal distribution can lead to an understatement of risk, which must be balanced against
the significant advantage of simplification From the central bank's corner, the consequences are even
more serious because we often need to concentrate on the left tail of the distribution in formulating
lender-of-last-resort policies Improving the characterization of the distribution of extreme values is of
paramount concern
Although a large portion of the process of risk management is highly quantitative, the most
effective approach to risk management surely involves a blend of qualitative and quantitative insights
Successful risk managers will find a way to reconcile high-tech, but possibly naive, mathematical
modeling with low-tech market experience In such an approach, market experience must temper key
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model assumptions, or the consequences can be dire
Some of the more difficult research questions we are facing pertain to systemic risk It would
be useful to central banks to be able to measure systemic risk accurately, but its very definition is still
somewhat unsettled It is generally agreed that systemic risk represents a propensity for some sort of
significant financial system disruption Nevertheless, after the fact, one observer might use the term
"market failure" to describe what another would deem to have been a market outcome that was natural
and healthy, even if it was harsh Even with agreement on what constituted a realization of a systemic
crisis in financial markets, descriptions of the symptoms of systemic risk cannot be disentangled from
theories of how financial crises come to pass Until we have a common theoretical paradigm for the
causes of systemic stress, any consensus on how to measure systemic risk will be difficult to achieve
Nevertheless, there are other avenues that can be explored that may help us grapple with
systemic risk One key empirical question is whether the structure of bilateral credit exposures is
conducive to a chain reaction of defaults Work that characterizes the statistical distribution of
extreme events would be useful, as well It would also be useful to see future research that considers
how structural or policy changes might reduce the exposure of the financial system to systemic risk,
and at what cost Just as knowledge of the finer points of risk measurement at the individual bank
level can make us better supervisors, a clearer understanding of systemic risk will allow central banks
to be more effective in their role as guarantors of the integrity of the financial system -- the lenders of
last resort
Cite this document
APA
Alan Greenspan (1995, November 15). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19951116_greenspan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19951116_greenspan,
author = {Alan Greenspan},
title = {Speech},
year = {1995},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19951116_greenspan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}