speeches · April 6, 1987
Speech
Paul A. Volcker · Chair
For release on delivery
10*00 A.M E D»T.
Testimony by
Paul A. Volcker
Chairman Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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before the
Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
April 7, 1987
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I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today
to review some aspects of the world economic situation. In
particular you asked me to concentrate on exchange market
developments and international debt. These issues are in turn
related to the overall functioning of the world economy. Indeed,
I would argue that the problems of economic growth, balance of
payments adjustment, protectionism, and international debt are
so intertwined today that a failure to deal constructively
with any one of them would risk failure across the board.
Instability in Exchange Rates
So far in this decade we have experienced tremendous
swings in the value of the dollar. Measured in terms of a
multilateral-trade-weighted average against the currencies
of the other G-10 countries, the dollar's value rose about
80 percent from 1980 to the first quarter of 1985. It has
since retraced most of that rise and is now at a level only
about 10 percent above its average in 1980 when our current
account was close to balance.
Large swings in exchange rates among industrialized
countries over periods of several years were also characteristic
of most of the 1970s. However, if anything, the fluctuations
have appeared to become greater, rather than less, as the
period of floating rates has been extended.
In themselves, such wide swings in exchange rates are
troublesome. When exchange rates among nations fluctuate much
more widely than relative changes in domestic prices, productivity
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and other basic economic variables, economic units producing
internationally tradeable goods receive misleading price
"signals" over time. Investment decisions may be distorted, and
individual firms and workers can be whipsawed by fluctuations
in price competitiveness internationally. For the economy
generally, deflationary or inflationary impulses may complicate
the task of economic management and affect the stability of
financial markets.
However, it does little good merely to rail against
excessive fluctuations in exchange rates without being prepared
to do something about them. And that "something," in the
end, involves appropriate national economic policies and
reasonable consistency and complementarity among the policies
and performance of major nations. In fact, national policies
during much of the 1980s have, in important respects, diverged
in ways that put pressure on exchange rates and distorted
trade positions, even though inflation rates have tended to
converge at much lower levels.
For one thing, the U.S. federal budget deficit was
high and rising as budget deficits in other countries were
being reduced. For several years, growth in the United States
was substantially stronger than elsewhere and our interest rates
were relatively high. Although U.S. growth overall has since
slackened, expanded consumption has depressed further our chronically
low personal savings rate.
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As a result, there have been strong incentives for a flow
of capital from abroad into the United States. For a time,
that flow pushed up the dollar, and that strength was probably
amplified by more speculative forces. The result of the
strong dollar and our relatively rapid growth in domestic
demand was a sharp deterioration in our international competitive
position and in our trade and current accounts.
The rising trade deficit, lower interest rates, and
slower growth have all worked in the direction of reducing
dollar exchange rates over the past two years. Relative to
the Japanese yen and the German mark, the dollar is at, or
close to, all time lows.
No doubt a sizable realignment of currency values has
been a necessary part of the process of restoring better
balance to our trade and current accounts. Moreover, I believe
sustained economic growth and financial stability in the United
States over the next few years is importantly dependent on
improvements in our trade balance. But I do not believe we can
be successful in that effort if we fail to recognize the
importance of factors other than exchange rates in redressing
our trade balance. There are clear dangers in relying too
much on exchange rates alone.
The hard fact is that we have been spending more at
home than we have been producing — about 3-1/2 per cent more
last year. The decline in the dollar has provided incentives
for more exports and for less imports. But if we are to
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improve our trade balance, and do so with a minimum of
inflationary pressures, we will also have to slow the growth
of spending at home, particularly for consumption. We want to
maintain investment. However, we will have to achieve a better
balance between that investment and domestic savings if we are
to be in a position to dispense with foreign capital. In terms of
laying the groundwork for future growth, progress in making these
adjustments seems to me more important than achieving a
particular rate of growth overall this year.
The constructive way to work in the needed direction
would be to reduce our budget deficit, year by year, paving
the way for improvements in our trade accounts. In contrast,
looking toward depreciation of the dollar alone to improve
our trade balance would clearly pose substantial risks of
renewed inflationary momentum and undermine confidence in
future financial stability — developments that could jeopardize
prospects for sustained economic expansion. You are well aware
that some warning signs of just such developments have appeared
in recent weeks.
I know of no reliable way of judging now whether several
years ahead the dollar vis-a-vis other currencies will ultimately
need to be higher or lower, consistent with restoration of a
sustainable trade position. Too much depends upon other
important factors and policies affecting relative growth and
competitive performance here and abroad. What we do know
is that a substantial exchange rate adjustment has already
been made. That adjustment should be large enough, in a
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context of a growing world economy and fiscal restraint in
the United States, to support the widespread expectations of a
narrowing in the real trade deficit in the period ahead. There
are indications that the volume of our exports is now growing
substantially, and some slowdown in the growth, or even a
decline, in the volume of imports seems possible this year.
In real terms, the deficit in our trade narrowed in the fourth
quarter of last year.
Whether and how soon improvement in the real trade
balance this year will be accompanied by a reduced trade
deficit in dollar terms — the data published each month —
is more problematical. The trouble is higher dollar prices
of imports as the dollar depreciates — the well-known J-curve
effect — might offset improvement in the volume of net exports
for some time. That phenomenon itself points to one of the dangers
of looking to depreciation of the dollar alone to deal with the
trade problem: it generates inflationary pressures and could
actually prolong "J-curve" effects, perhaps, raising more doubts
about our ability to finance our current account deficit.
Prospects for achieving solid and steady improvement in
our external trade — and doing so in a context of sustained
world growth — is critically dependent upon the strength of
markets abroad, and on whether they are open to us. Unfortunately,
the evidence on that score is not entirely favorable.
Specifically, growth of real GNP in foreign G-10 countries
on average slowed to about 2-1/4 percent last year (fourth quarter
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to fourth quarter), almost 1/2 percent less than in 1985. To be
sure, much of that slowdown reflected reduced export growth rather
than reduced domestic demand. But clearly, domestic expansion in
those countries was not enough to offset the effects of the trade
adjustment. And the clear danger now in most other industrialized
countries is that growth may be slowing further.
In that kind of situation, further sizable depreciation
of the dollar could well be counterproductive. It will take
time and other policy changes both here and abroad to achieve
the shift in resources necessary to achieve better international
balance. Excessive volatility in exchange rates could jeopardize
instead of speed the process by further impairing prospects for
investment and growth in the surplus countries.
That I believe is the sense of the understandings
reached among the leading industrial countries in Paris in
February looking toward greater stability of exchange rates
around current levels. Those understandings have been reflected
in active intervention in the exchange markets in recent weeks.
But intervention, taken alone, is of course a limited tool.
Confidence in the current exchange rate levels will
in the end depend upon perceptions that more fundamental
policies than intervention will in fact be brought to bear.
I have emphasized the need for complementary changes in
fiscal policies in the United States, Germany, and Japan.
The conduct of monetary policy, here and abroad, will be
relevant as well. The performance of the dollar in the
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exchange market might become a factor bearing on our provision
of reserves; I should think our central banking colleagues
abroad may wish to take account of such circumstances as well.
In sum, we plainly do want and need improvement in
our trade balance. There are some encouraging signs in
that respect. But there are also practical limits as to
how fast the necessary massive shift in resources can be
accomplished if the momentum of world expansion is to be
maintained. Undercutting investment and growth abroad at
a time when growth prospects are already relatively weak is
neither in their interest nor ours. Undercutting our own
prospects for price and financial stability by a weak dollar
is equally unattractive.
What we need now, instead of more depreciation, is
action here and abroad to carry through on those other measures
needed to support growth and adjustment — specifically action
to reduce the budget deficit here, and to provide stimulus
abroad. We need time for those actions, and the earlier
depreciation, to work their effects. And we need the patience
to see it through, without embarking on self-destructive
protectionist policies.
The World Debt Situation — Progress and Problems
Patience is difficult enough for rich countries like
the United States; for the heavily indebted countries of the
developing world, the plea wears thin without supportable
prospects for greater economic growth and stability. In that
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connection, I do not share the sense of some that radical new
approaches to the debt problem are necessary or practicable —
indeed writing down and forgiving debts that can reasonably
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be serviced would risk undermining growth and stability in
the borrowing countries. But I also believe that we would be
blind to fail to recognize shortcomings in implementing
present approaches.
Specifically there is clearly a danger that adequate
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financing arrangements are not being negotiated and put in
place in a timely way. Borrowing countries that have demonstrated
their intent and ability to carry out effective economic programs
need to be able to proceed with confidence that necessary funds
will in fact be available to support those programs.
More broadly sluggish growth in the industrialized
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world has affected the export markets of the heavily indebted
countries, slowing their return to full economic and financial
health. For awhile, in 1983 and 1984, as the United States
led world recovery, markets of the borrowing countries expanded
at a rapid pace. Then the growth rate for industrialized
countries dropped to 3 percent in 1985 and to less than 2-1/2
percent last year. As things stand, prospects are no better —
and perhaps worse — in 1987. Taking the whole period since
1982, Europe and Japan have increased their imports very
little from Latin America. Plainly, it is in our collective
interest, as well as that of the indebted countries, to do better.
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Meanwhile my sense is that there has been too little
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appreciation of how much progress the heavily indebted countries
themselves have made toward laying the groundwork for renewed
and more sustainable growth. To take one key measure of adjust-
ment the combined current account deficit of the so-called
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Baker-15 countries declined from the $50 billion range in 1981-82
to essentially zero in 1984-85. The aggregate deficit
widened again by about $10 billion in 1896 but that almost
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entirely reflected the decline in oil and other commodity
prices. Even under those circumstances, the deficits have
collectively been within the amounts envisaged when Secretary
Baker outlined the "Program for Sustained Growth11 in Korea in
1985. At the same time, capital flight in most borrowing
countries has tended to slow? it has even reversed in some.
Reflecting those factors, growth in the external debt
of the most heavily indebted countries has slowed sharply,
averaging less than 3-1/2 percent a year in dollar terms
since 1982. With reasonable rates of economic expansion
both in the borrowing countries and in the world at large,
that rate of increase in external debt should be manageable
and consistent both with declining debt burdens for borrowers
relative to GDP or exports and with reduced exposures of lenders
relative to their capital and assets.
I realize neither world growth nor growth by borrowing
countries has recovered to "pre-crisis11 levels. Nonetheless,
along with the progress in external adjustment, many of the major
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borrowing countries have also experienced significant recovery
in economic activity* A few — Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and
Morocco — have achieved a substantial pickup in economic
growth, averaging more than 4 percent per year during the
past three years. For the 15 heavily indebted countries as a
group, real GNP has grown by some 8.8 percent since 1983.
Measured against the performance of the 1970s, when
foreign finance was so freely available, or against prospective
needs, the improvement in economic activity, employment, and
living standards has not been satisfactory. But a full measure
of success by those criteria was hardly possible in so short a
period of time. Plainly, the earlier amounts of lending from
abroad are simply not available today. Instead, some fundamental
economic adjustments have been required to build a more solid
foundation for sustained growth.
Naturally, the degree of success in making those
adjustments has varied from country to country. In difficult
economic and political circumstances, punctuated by natural
disasters and external shocks, some setbacks have been
inevitable. But what is so striking overall is the amount of
progress that has been achieved.
In country after country, fiscal deficits are under
better control than at the beginning of the decade.
Chronically overvalued exchange rates have been brought
into more realistic competitive alignments, enabling their
industries to compete more effectively in world markets.
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At the same time, the exchange rate and fiscal changes have
helped create conditions in which the borrowing countries
could be more open to international competition --
quantitative import restrictions, licensing requirements, and
tariffs have, on balance, been reduced. Other efforts are
underway to limit the role of the state in the economic
system by cutting back on subsidies, credit allocation, and
in some instances public ownership of industry.
One area that has been squeezed that reflects adversely
on future prospects is investment. That points up the need
for some margin of fresh funds from abroad to support growth.
The provision of such funds from both public and private sources
has been, of course, one of the basic elements of the "Baker Plan."
Both the IMF and the World Bank have played important
roles in that respect. In particular, the World Bank over the
past year, complementing the efforts of the Fund, has embarked
on an ambitious program to define and to support financially
structural changes that would provide a basis for debtor
countries to resume more vigorous economic growth. This has
entailed an intensive process of consultation with each of the
largest indebted countries to develop policy approaches that
are both strategically important for improving economic
efficiency and politically feasible.
During the past two years, the most significant structural
changes adopted by the major indebted countries have been in the
area of trade policy. Nigeria, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and
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Ecuador have each taken steps to liberalize their import
restrictions — and at the same time have been able to achieve
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impressive growth rates for their non-traditional exports. In
other instances, huge credit subsidies to agriculture or other
sectors have been reduced while other measures have been taken
to enhance the efficiency of those sectors.
Overall, disbursements by the World Bank and the
regional development banks to the "Baker 15" increased to
$7-1/2 billion in 1986, almost 40 percent above the rate of
1983-85. Disbursements should increase further this year to
the levels envisaged by the "Baker Plan." These institutions
will certainly provide a substantially larger proportion of
new funds flowing to Mexico and other heavily indebted countries
than in earlier years.
Both governmental and private lenders have restructured
outstanding debts of the borrowers, and interest rates on many
bank credits have been negotiated downward. More importantly,
world interest rates have declined in both nominal and real
terms. As a result, the burden of external interest payments
has been falling despite some increases in debt.
From the perspective of the commercial bank lenders,
progress has been more striking. Exposure to the heavily
indebted countries relative to their capital bases has declined
sharply. For all U.S. banks, the ratios of such loans to capital
have by now declined by close to 50 percent. Relative exposure
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of foreign banks has probably declined even more since 1982,
as a result of the depreciation of the dollar.
That progress is welcome in terms of the implications
of reduced financial pressure on lenders and borrowers alike.
However, there is another side to the coin. The heavily
indebted countries need to be able to count on receiving in a
timely way those funds reasonably necessary to support well-
conceived economic programs — and in particular necessary
levels of domestic investment. Available data suggest net
new commercial bank lending virtually ceased in 1985 and 1986
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and certainly was below amounts assumed in the approach outlined
by Secretary Baker.
Part of the difficulty has been the length of time
required to negotiate and syndicate the large new Mexican loan —
the gestation period is now approaching nine months. Underlying
the delay in that instance and others has been evident differences
in viewpoint and emphasis among banks — those with large exposures
as against those with limited exposures, those in one country as
against those in others, those with continuing interests in
international lending and those who want to withdraw.
While differences in approach and priority are natural,
and have been present from the start, what is disturbing to
many bankers and borrowers alike is the increasing difficulty
in arriving at a consensus, and once reached, implementing
that consensus effectively and speedily. What has been lacking
is the sense of urgency and willingness to cooperate in the
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larger general interest that was so evident in 1982 and 1983,
The irony is that it is precisely a failure to arrive more
expeditiously at mutually satisfactory financing agreements
that may be the greatest threat to the success of the overall
effort. In some instances, doubts about financing undermine
the resolve to carry out needed economic reforms* And an
environment of successive financing crises can hardly be in
the interests of the banking community itself.
Fortunately, a sense of renewed effort and commitment seems
to be emerging. Restructuring agreements were recently completed
with Venezuela and the Philippines and financing arrangements
with Chile modified, in each case, after months of discussions.
Initiatives are underway among U.S. regional banks, looking
toward the development of innovative approaches to broaden
the choices of banks in structuring their participation in new
financing programs. Discussions among banks at an international
level should help deal with points of friction.
In all these discussions, the issue of "free riders"
will need to be dealt with effectively; the cohesion of the
entire effort will be undermined to the extent some creditors
"opt out" of participation in new credits or restructurings
while continuing to receive interest and principal payments.
The success of all this renewed effort is being tested
in important negotiations with Argentina. That country is among
those making substantial progress in recent years toward greater
domestic stability and restoring growth, despite its heavy
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dependence on severely depressed world grain markets* Argentina
has been working closely with the IMF for several years, and the
World Bank is prepared to provide additional financing to
support sectoral reforms. But it is also clear that restructuring
of outstanding loans and some margin of new credit will be
necessary to support growth and to maintain continuity in
debt service. Early agreement on those matters seems to me
obviously in the interests of Argentina and lenders alike,
providing a base for greater confidence that their objectives
— some common and some different — can be reached.
The largest developing country debtor — Brazil — is
obviously in a difficult position today. After a period of
strong domestic growth and large trade surpluses, strong
inflationary forces again developed, the external position
deteriorated, and the momentum of expansion has been interrupted.
In the circumstances, with international reserves rapidly falling,
the government suspended servicing medium and longer-term bank
debt.
Given its enormous human and material resources, Brazil
clearly has the potential for becoming one of the world's leading
economic powers; its competitive strength, vitality, and adaptability
have been demonstrated again and again in recent years. At the
same time, as for any country, realization of that potential over
an extended period will clearly be dependent upon both consistent
and effective economic policies at home and strong and harmonious
trade and financial relationships with other countries.
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As a practical matter, the necessary regularization of
external payments by Brazil will take concerted effort. The
key prerequisite is clearly in the hands of Brazilian
authorities — shaping an economic program that commands the
support and confidence of Brazilians themselves and the world
community. Given that base, both Brazil and its creditors,
official and private, seem to me to have the strongest kind
of incentive to work together to develop external financing
arrangements consistent with strong and sustained growth.
Conclusion
In more general terms, that is of course the challenge
for all the heavily indebted countries and their creditors.
It seems to me a challenge that will continue best to be approached
case-by-case, taking account of the different circumstances and
problems of each country. But there are, of course, common needs
that run through all the particulars.
First, a successful approach needs to be premised on
the requirements for growth. That is not simply a matter of
providing external financing, critical as that may be at the
margin. It is first of all a matter of the intelligent design
of effective domestic programs.
Second, sustained economic growth, and the growing
imports and exports that are an indispensable part of that
process, is importantly dependent on access to world financial
markets. Continuity in debt service and negotiated settlements
are critically important in maintaining those relationships.
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Finally, success in the common effort will depend upon
growing and open markets in the industrialized world. That
responsibility plainly lies mainly with the United States and
its principal trading partners.
It is an effort that in my judgment needs to be
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reinforced by appropriate fiscal and other policies here
and abroad. It is an effort that would be placed at risk
by excessive instability in exchange rates. And it is an
effort that would be undermined entirely by a retreat into
protectionism.
I trust that we will have the collective will and
wisdom to take those steps that are necessary and to reject
those that could only be counterproductive. Too much is at
stake to do otherwise.
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Cite this document
APA
Paul A. Volcker (1987, April 6). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19870407_volcker
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19870407_volcker,
author = {Paul A. Volcker},
title = {Speech},
year = {1987},
month = {Apr},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19870407_volcker},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}