speeches · April 22, 1986
Speech
Paul A. Volcker · Chair
£•'•>'*
For release on delivery
10:00 A.M., E.S.T.
1986
Fed^al Reserve Bank!
of St. i ^s
Statement by
Paul A. Volcker
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection and Finance
of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
April 23, 1986
#*8
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I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the rapid growth
of debt in the United States and its possible implications for
our financial markets and economy. As you know, this is a subject
about which I have expressed some concern from time to time over
the past few years, and I welcome an exploration of the many
difficult and complex issues it raises. Given those difficulties
and complexities, no single hearing can do more than identify
tendencies, raise questions, and point to areas for further
study. In that sense, this testimony is more descriptive than
prescriptive, but I think it does suggest the importance of the
subject.
The increase in indebtedness since the early 1980s certainly
has been extraordinary.* The debt of domestic nonfinancial
sectors — the measure of credit monitored by the Federal Open
Market Committee — has increased at rates ranging from around
11 to 14 percent in each of the three years of the current
economic expansion. This growth has been much faster than the
nominal increase in GNP and income, breaking a pattern that had
persisted through most of the postwar period.
*The attached charts and tables illustrate various aspects
of recent debt growth.
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Until the early 1980s debt and income expanded at roughly
comparable rates over time, and the ratio of debt to income
fluctuated at or just below 140 percent. Since then, however,
as debt expansion far outpaced the growth of income, this ratio
has risen sharply to almost 170 percent at the end of 1985.
Historically, changes of that magnitude, up or down, are
unusual except in highly disturbed economic circumstances —
V? depressions, wars, or major inflations — not just in the U.S.
*"' but also, so far as comparable statistics are readily available,
^ in other major countries. That itself raises questions as to
'; what is different now.
r
In that connection, I should emphasize that there is
nothing particularly significant or alarming, in itself, about
one or another ratio of debt to income. Even if the statistics
were fully comparable and accurate through time, there are a
number of reasons why the ratios might change over time or
between countries. One major influence, for instance^, is the
amount of financial intermediation characteristic of an economy.
The data I just cited nets out debt of defined financial
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intermediaries — banks, thrifts, finance companies and other
"financial" firms. But "non-financial" firms and governments
both lend and borrow, more today than before, and, from one
point of view, the related debt is double counted in the data.
Stated another way, offsetting borrowings and loans on balance
sheets of firms may not suggest the same risks and "leveraging"
as borrowings not matched by comparable financial assets.
However, even after allowing for identified areas of
double counting or greater intermediation — for instance,
the spate of advance refundings late last year by state and
local governments — the overall data do strongly suggest
greater "leveraging" among borrowers; that is a larger burden
of interest and principal payments relative to net worth and
income streams. In the corporate sector, the same conclusion
is implicit in the massive net retirement of equity recently,
amounting to some $150 billion over the last two years, even
though retained earnings have been rising.
The willingness to take on large volumes of additional
dabt certainly has not impeded the economic expansion. f#
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some degree, the high levels of borrowing have helped support
the spending needed to keep the economy growing. However, at
some point a rising debt load is not sustainable. Debt cannot
rise without limit relative to the income needed to service it,
and increased leveraging implies smaller safety margins to deal
with economic adversity. Consequently, continuing rapid growth
of debt has disturbing implications for the fragility of the
financial system over time, and the question is especially
apropos at a time when certain important groups of borrowers
are already under severe financial stress. The vulnerability
of the economy to unanticipated increases in interest rates
or a shortfall in income appears to be increasing, rather than
the reverse. Surely we must be concerned about achieving a
better balance in the sources of our economic expansion if
we wish it to be sustained.
Sources of Credit Growth
The very structure of the growth of debt in the last
few years reflects underlying imbalances in our national
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economy. To a considerable extent, the unusually rapid
growth of debt in recent years directly reflects the borrowing
by the Federal Government to finance an unprecedented string
of budget deficits* Usually, budget deficits and federal
borrowing decline as the economy recovers from recession,
boosting tax receipts* In the last three years, by contrast,
the budget deficit has remained extraordinarily high during
the expansion, and federal debt held by the public has grown
by more than 15 percent each year.
The Federal Government is our strongest borrower, and
an increase in the federal debt ordinarily would not connote
greater weakness in our credit structure. Even then, however,
the need to service that debt requires higher taxation than
would otherwise be necessary — with consequences for economic
efficiency — and pressures of government debt service have
historically sometimes led to excess money creation and inflation,
Viewed from an economy-wide perspective, large borrowings
by the Federal Government have typically been accompanied by
small increases in private debt* In the current setting,
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however, borrowing by non-federal sectors also has been
unusually strong, with household, business, and state and
local government indebtedness all rising relative to GNP.
In that sense, it's hard to see direct evidence of
"crowding out" of private borrowing. In substantial part,
the simultaneous rapid expansion of both federal and private
debt has been a reflection of the relative ease with which
this country has attracted savings and capital from other
countries in recent years.
In effect, there has been a massive imbalance between
the generation of loanable funds at home and the amount of
borrowings. The resulting pressures on interest rates have
been moderated by the capital inflow from abroad. But that
inflow exacts a price. The net transfer of financial resources
has been accompanied by a similar transfer of real resources
to the U.S. — or to put it in more comprehensible language,
record trade deficits. And we have, in the space of a few
years, reversed our position as the largest world creditor (net)
and are in the process of becoming the largest world debtor.
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We donft want those developments to continue indefinitely —
ultimately they are both politically and economically unsustainable,
The willingness of foreigners to advance credit to the U.S. is
not inexhaustible, and the capital inflow and related trade
deficit has been maintained at the expense of our own manufacturing
industry.
Moreover, for a country as well as an individual or
business, rising debt levels imply greater obligations to make
interest payments out of future income. This would be less of
a concern if the foreign savings could be seen as being used
to build up our domestic productive capacity, improving our
prospects for growth and giving us a stronger base from which
to make interest or dividend payments abroad. But with domestic
investment spending relatively modest in recent quarters, it
seems evident that in large measure the foreign lending is
going, directly or indirectly, to fill the deficiency in
domestic saving created by federal deficits. In a real sense,
the rapid growth of federal debt and imbalance in foreign
transactions has placed a mortgage on our future.
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Perhaps the most striking evidence of greater willingness
to incur debt can be found in the substitution of debt for
equity associated with the wave of mergers, leveraged buyouts,
and stock repurchase programs over the last few years. These
activities resulted in the gross retirement of around $100
billion in outstanding equity of nonfinancial corporations in
198 4 and again in 1985, funded in the initial stages primarily
by new debt issues/ amounts not nearly offset by new sales
of equity.
The unusual volume of equity retirements may have
accounted for roughly one percentage point of debt growth each
of the last two years. While some of this debt may subsequently
be paid down through sales of assets, or with equity obtained
by sales of stock or internally generated cash flow, it seems
clear that at least for some time a significant number of
businesses will be carrying more debt, and therefore greater
financial exposure, than if these corporate restructurings had
not occurred.
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These concerns are mitigated by the substantial profits
and cash flow of many businesses, so that equity and cash
cushions have been better maintained than debt data alone
might suggest. Moreover, the recent surge in stock prices
has greatly bolstered the market value of corporate equity —
ratios of market valuations of corporate debt to equity have
actually declined in the past year. Declining interest rates
also moderate the debt burden. Nonetheless, the trend in
debt creation, if extended, would imply some increase in
financial risk for the economic system.
In the household sector, savings rates have been unusually
low and both consumer and mortgage indebtedness has risen much
more rapidly than disposable income. Some part of the rise in
the ratio of debt to income for households — which stands at
a postwar high — undoubtedly reflects lengthening debt maturities,
shifting demographics, and greater convenience use of credit,
rather than an underlying increase in debt burdens. Even so,
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it appears that households, like businesses, have become more
willing to take on debt, at the expense of more vulnerable
financial positions*
Shifting Attitudes Toward Debt
The reasons for the apparent shift in attitudes are not
easily identified and quantifiable* It is evident that the
tax system favors debt over equity sources of funds for
businesses through its differential treatment of interest
and dividend payments. It also encourages household borrowing
by allowing unlimited deductions for interest expenses.
However, these provisions and their incentives have not
substantially changed in the 1980s, and lower marginal tax
rates tend to reduce the incentives*
The inflation experience of the 1970s probably had a
profound effect on attitudes toward debt. During much of
that period, inflation rates outstripped interest rates,
making leveraged buying a seemingly attractive economic
strategy. Some borrowers may have expected inflation to pick
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up again as the economy expanded after 1982, inducing them
to buy in advance of price increases and in anticipation of
repaying debts in dollars of lower real value. Perhaps they
looked to some degree to the borrowing patterns of the
Federal Government as justification of a view that debt
creation is benign.
This tactic might have seemed quite risky and unattractive
if borrowing had to be done at the high long-term rates prevailing
over this period. But the greater availability of short- and
floating-rate instruments reduced the risk considerably, since
if inflation did not rebound, short-term rates would be expected
to move lower.
The shift to floating rate instruments is but one example
of innovations in financial markets that have played a role in
supporting, if not encouraging, the growth of debt. The
proliferation of techniques such as interest rate swaps,
securitization of loan portfolios, and third-party guarantees
may have given borrowers access to sources of funds that might
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otherwise have been closed to them, and reduced perceptions of
risk. Many smaller or growing companies have long used low
or unrated bonds as an important financing technique, and those
securities clearly have a legitimate role in finance. But
recent innovations, relying on the use of such bonds to finance
large takeovers of well-established companies, seem to have
opened new channels from lenders to borrowers, increasing the
flow of credit for particular uses.
For intermediaries, the rapid development of secondary
markets at home and abroad for loans of various types has
enabled them to originate a far larger volume of credit than
would be consistent with their own command over resources. In
addition, concerns over exposure to interest rate fluctuations
probably do not constrain asset growth at banks or thrifts to
the degree they once did, given the greater opportunities to
structure both assets and liabilities to manage the degree of
interest rate risk.
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At the same time, elimination of most deposit rate
ceilings allows depository institutions to compete for funds
for lending under a variety of circumstances, even if interest
rates were to rise sharply. And the lifting of many usury
ceilings has meant that lenders would continue to be willing
to make credit available under such conditions. Thus,
deregulation has substantially diminished the threat of
constraints on credit availability as credit markets tighten,
though it may also imply a wider swing in interest rates over
the cycle.
From one perspective, these developments have increased
the efficiency of our credit markets and improved the distribution
of saving among competing uses. The greater variety of instruments
available enables borrowers to tailor the maturity and other
characteristics of debt to their specific needs or expectations.
And with deregulation, borrowers probably feel a greater sense
of assurance that funds will be available to roll over existing
debt, even if interest rates should rise* On the supply side of
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the credit market, the ability of intermediaries to reduce
interest rate risk to compete for funds without regulatory
f
constraint, and to replenish lendable funds through sales of
assets probably has encouraged a more aggressive pursuit of
lending opportunities and an eager embrace of innovative
techniques to appeal to borrowers.
Consequences and Concerns
On balance, the net effect of shifting attitudes and
financial innovation appears to have been to increase the
expansion of private debt. Many of the particular techniques
developed are designed to reduce risks for one or more of the
parties directly involved. The larger question remains as to
whether risks have, in fact, been reduced on balance for the
financial system and the economy as a whole. The increase
in total debt burdens, the longer and larger chain of trans-
actions between ultimate borrowers and lenders with a
diffusion and possible widening of credit judgment, the
greater internationalization of the system all raise questions,
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One thing seems reasonably clear. More of the risk
of unexpected movements in interest rates has been shifted
onto borrowers. Most recently, borrowers have benefitted
from this shift, as declining interest rates have reduced
their interest costs and enabled them to extend debt maturities
at considerably lower rates than if they had been using long-
term credit all along. But the strategy can, and does, carry
considerable risk that an unanticipated rise in interest rates
could sap the financial strength and creditworthiness of a
substantial number of borrowers.
My general concern relates primarily to the degree to
which the continuing buildup of debt may, as a by-product of
eroding financial positions, leave a substantial number of
borrowers so extended that they would have great difficulty
dealing with unanticipated financial setbacks. Of course,
borrowers ordinarily do not take on debt they expect, with
any high degree of probability, will cause them problems ahead
(although even that assumption may not be valid with respect to
a relatively few depository institutions in hard-pressed financial
circumstances that have been willing, in effect, to make high-
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stake gambles with insured depositors1 money). Nonetheless,
the larger the share of income devoted to debt servicing in
relatively prosperous times or the smaller the equity cushion —
and that has been the trend over rather a long period of time —
the more likely is it that an unexpected shortfall in income or
rise in interest rates will lead to problems in meeting obligations.
For individual borrowers, income could weaken owing to
factors beyond their control, reflecting conditions in a
particular region or industry as well as a general downturn in
the economy. A substantial rise in interest rates could prove
especially troublesome, given the still heavy reliance on short-
term or floating-rate debt. Many borrowers may minimize such
possibilities — and economic policy typically works to limit
the risk. But all of history suggests it would be short-sighted
to behave as if such possibilities did not exist.
The agricultural sector of our economy provides ample
evidence of the effect of unexpected developments on highly
leveraged borrowers. Those farmers who went deeply into debt
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— X 1)""
in the late 1970s in anticipation of maintenance of higher
land and crop prices are experiencing the most agonizing
difficulties as these expectations are not fulfilled. Their
problems in turn have severely weakened a number of agricultural
lenders.
Potential vulnerabilities are suggested not only by
elevated debt-to-income ratios throughout the economy, but
also by the deterioration or disappointing performance of
certain more direct indicators of financial distress at a time
of rising economic activity generally. Corporate bond down-
gradings , for example, have trended sharply higher over the
past two years, reflecting in part concerns about the effects
of additional leveraging on the financial strength of certain
corporations- In addition, problems in the household sector
are indicated by some upward tendency in delinquency rates on
consumer and mortgage loans or other measures of financial
distress during the expansion period.
In another vein, I addressed earlier some of the
implications of our growing dependence on capital and credit
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from abroad. That is hardly a dependable source of financing
for years to come, and indeed will shrink as our trade balance
improves, as we hope.
I do not suggest that these developments point to some
inexorable accumulation of debilitating financial difficulty.
Indeed, there are a number of developments currently working
in the opposite direction. Recent substantial declines in
interest rates and increases in stock prices have helped to
alleviate pressures on financial positions. The fall in rates
by itself will reduce debt servicing burdens, and both firms
and households have taken advantage of the considerable downward
movement in long-terra rates to lengthen the maturities of their
liabilities, locking in lower rates and reducing exposure to
an unanticipated rise in. short-term rates. The higher stock
prices are currently strengthening the financial positions of
many individuals and companies• New stock issues have picked
up. And recent regulatory and supervisory initiatives can help.
At the same time, enough has gone on, and continues to
go on, to raise clear warning signals, to justify further1
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analytic effort, and to support action in areas where such
action is plainly warranted•
Addressing the Concerns
We know enough to understand that disproportionate
increases in debt extended over years do not constitute a
solid, sustainable base for satisfactory economic growth and
stability indefinitely into the future. Ultimately, debt can
only be serviced from income. If that relationship is strained,
financial pressures will jeopardize further growth in income
itself, aggravating the difficulties• The time to act is
before the strains become oppressive, not after«
The most direct step that can be taken by the government
itself to address concerns about the growth of debt is to
decrease, and eventually eliminate, the federal budget deficit.
Such a course will reduce pressures on domestic credit markets,
freeing domestic savings to be channelled into domestic invest-
ment and encouraging further restructuring of balance sheets
through greater reliance on long-term debt and equity. By
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promoting better balance between spending and income
domestically, it will also work to reducing dependence on
foreign capital.
Some of these effects already were discernible as the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation moved toward passage late
last year; the improved outlook for budget balance appeared
to contribute materially to the decline in rates on bonds and
fixed-rate mortgages, in an environment in which the dollar
was also depreciating toward levels more consistent with
restoring the international competitive position of U* S.
products,, Concrete actions to implement the law will provide
a constructive background for financial markets over coming
years partly by its direct effects and partly by reducing
f
the chances of a resurgence in inflationary pressures.
Beyond that step I believe the time has come for Congress
#
to also address those elements of our tax code that so strongly
favor debt finance. While that "bias" has long existed, other
changes in the economic and financial environment seem to have
had the effect of making it more important in decision-making,,
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The original Treasury tax reform proposal had some
limited elements that moved in the right direction; they have
subsequently been dropped or sharply diluted• One lesson, I
suppose, is that no strong constituency has emerged for a
reform with such diffuse and seemingly indirect benefits.
But I also believe that other efforts to reduce excessive
reliance on debt in the private sector pale into relative
insignificance so long as that basic bias imbedded in the
tax system exists.
I noted that deregulation and innovation may encourage
growth of debt. Those changes respond to basic technological
and competitive forces that cannot be denied. We can, however,
respond in constructive ways, strengthening when necessary
oversight of key markets and intermediaries so that they do not
become the unwitting vehicles for the spread of problems through
the economy.
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To this end, the Federal Reserve, working in concert
with other regulators of depository institutions, has stepped
up its examination of banks and bank holding companies,
tightened capital standards, and proposed keying those
standards to the risk profile of the banks. We and the other
bank regulators are also acting to deal with present points
of strain, particularly in the agricultural and energy areas,
through a variety of techniques. We have also joined with the
other regulators in requesting that Congress extend and
liberalize legislative authorization for interstate acquisition
of troubled institutions.
These are essentially defensive measures, designed to
keep immediate problems from infecting the financial system
more generally by easing adjustments by individual institutions
and local areas. They are not, and cannot be, a substitute for
forward-looking structural change.
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In that connection, it seems to me imperative to clarify
and modernize the laws governing the structure of our depository
and financial systems. Too often in recent years, old legis-
lation has clashed with new market facts* Accommodation is
achieved more by the exploitation of perceived loopholes in
existing law than by a well-considered design of how we want
the financial system to evolve. Distinctions among banking,
other financial institutions, and commercial firms are fast
eroding with little considered debate — and less action —
to guide the process.
For a long time, as the result of the lessons of past
financial crises, the unique role of banking and the payments
system in our economy has, in concept, been recognized through
provision of a federal "safety net," backed up by special
oversight and supervision. Today, the distinctions underlying
that approach are rapidly eroding, raising new questions about
our ability to maintain the stability of the whole. The
situation cries out for review and for new laws, adapted to
the problems of today and tomorrow.
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Nor can we evade a review of the basic safeguards and
trading practices in other key sectors of financial markets,
given the complex interdependencies that exist. One specific
example came to your attention last year, and the Committee
responded by providing a legislative framework for limited
surveillance and regulation of the government securities
market. As you know, action has not yet been completed on
that matter.
Conclusion
In one sense, the extraordinary volume of credit flows
in recent years is a tribute to the efficiency and innovative
instincts of financial intermediaries, borrowers, and lenders
alike. There has been rapid and effective response to new
technological possibilities.
Those same developments also highlight the complex inter-
actions involved and the new interdependencies created. And,
in the end, credit creation is constructive only to the extent
the obligations are manageable in relation to income.
It is in those areas that questions arise.
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I must emphasize that the government can take a number
of basic steps to address concerns about the rapid growth of
debt. These include, most importantly, a balanced approach
to economic policy, including cutting excessive budget deficits
and a fresh look at some important provisions of the tax code.
Government must also provide a supervisory and regulatory
structure to promote a sound financial system.
Ultimately, and quite properly in our free market
economy, the strength of our financial system must also
ultimately rest on the prudent decisions of private parties.
Borrowers and lenders must recognize risks and act to manage
them. In such a context, the growth of debt would hold no
concerns for us, but rather would be seen as an integral part
of a healthy and active economy.
* * * * * **
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Growth of Domestic Nonflnaneial Debt, Nominal and Real
Four Quarter Growth Rates
P T P T P T P T PT P T Percent
16
1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
1 Nominal debt deflated by GNP deflator.
Domestic Nonfinanciai Debt
Relative to Nominal GNP
Ratio
P T P T P T PT P
—l 2.0
TOTAL DOMESTIC 1.6
NONFSNANCfAL
PRIVATE DOMESTIC 1.2
NONFINANCSAL -^S!> • -
k-
.8
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
.4
Jjiiuilo
1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
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Private Domestic Nonfinancial Debt by Sector
R©lat!v« to Nominal GNP
Ratio
P T P T P T P T P T P T .7
.6
.5
fPCr*- NONFINANCIAL BUSINESS
.2
STATE ANO LOCAL
._-#"
i i 11 i 11 i i i i i i i I ill i i w i i i i in Pi i i i
1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
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Household Debt and Principal Components
Relative to Disposable Personal Income
Ratio
P T P T P T P T 0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
i HOME MORTGAGES;
: y^^:
0.4
0.3
;:CONSUMER CREDIT;;
0.2
0.1
1961 .1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
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Changes in Ratings of Corporate Bonds
Changes
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
UPGRADINGS
I L 1 Ml I I I
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
As determined by Moody's Investors Service.
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Net Interest Coverage
Nonfinanclal Corporations
Ratio
P T P T P T P T P T
—f 25
20
15
10
CAPITAL INCOME 1 PLUS
ECONOMIC DEPRECIATION
TO NET INTEREST
i i i i i J L J _ u _ J L J il i i mi i i ii m i mm I i i
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
Capital income equals net interest plus before-tax profits plus capital consumption adjustment and inventory valuation adjustment.
Commerce Department data.
Short-Term Debt as a Percent of Total Debt Outstanding
Nonfinanclal Corporations
P T P T
45
40
35
30
a; i i l i i i l i im i i mi I I i i us i mm I i i
25
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
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Household Delinquency Rates1
Percent
—| 3.0
2.5
2.0
S v'
Mi
:<m-
1.5
MORTGAGE LOANS
If
m i wmm i 111»i»»»i«»,
1.0
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
1. Consumer loans delinquent 30 days or more (data from American Bankers Association).
2. Mortgage loans delinquent 60 days or more (data from Mortgage Bankers Association).
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Uses and Sources of Net Private Saving1
(a)
USES OF NET PRIVATE SAVING Percent
115
As a percent of Net National Product
— Net Private Saving
_ _ — (Met Private Investment
12
I I I f I f i I I I i I
1970 1975 1980 1985
(b)
SOURCES OF NET PRIVATE SAVING Percent
115
As a percent of Net National Product
««»"—•»» Net Private Saving
«*.«.«. Domestic Saving
SAVING FROM ABROAD
12
NET INVESTMENT ABROAD
I I j | I _]_ J L_L_J_i__L t I |
1970 * 1975 1980 1985
1 Includes net savings from abroad and by domestic households, businesses, and state and local governments . Commerce Department data-
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
ESTIMATES OF NET EQUITY ISSUES OF NONfINANC1AL CORPORATIONS
New Issues
(including direct sales) Retirements Net Change
-billions of dollars, annual rate
1981 21.5 33.0 -11.5
1982 28.9 17.5 11.4
1983 40.0 11.7 28.3
1984 18.0 92.5 -74.5
1985 24.9 106.5 -81.6
1985-Q1 19.7 104.0 -84.3
Q2 27.9 95.0 -67.1
Q3 25.0 100.0 -75.0
Q4 27.0 127.0 -100.0
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
DEBT-TO-EQUITY RATIOS
NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
1
Debt (par)1 Debt (market)2
End of period Equity (current) Equity (market)
|
-percent —
1962 38.4 42.4
1964 40.8 37.7
1966 45.1 43.4
1968 45.6 35.6
1970 46.5 48.0
1971 45.6 46.7
1972 45.4 45.4
1973 45.0 61.9
1974 40.7 91.1
1975 38.1 72.0
1976 37.4 72.9
1977 38.0 84.0
1978 37.0 87.5
1979 36.8 79.0
1980 35.2 60.4
1981 35.2 70.3
1982 36.3 71.5
1983 36.6 63.4
1984 41.8 75.0
1985 46.5. 72.8
1. Debt is valued at par, and equity is balance sheet net worth with
tangible assets valued at replacement cost,
2, The market value of debt is an estimate based on par value and ratios
of market to par values of NYSE bonds; equity value is based on market
prices of outstanding shares®
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Cite this document
APA
Paul A. Volcker (1986, April 22). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19860423_volcker
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19860423_volcker,
author = {Paul A. Volcker},
title = {Speech},
year = {1986},
month = {Apr},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19860423_volcker},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}