speeches · February 18, 1986
Speech
Paul A. Volcker · Chair
> .1 /<;•/. £_''? <•:, -iJ N ^C
For release on delivery
February 19, 198 6
IQsOO AJ, , E.S.T,
^^ rIi "y) Statement by
Paul A. Volcker
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
House of Representatives
February 19, 1986
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I am pleased once again to appear before this
Committee to discuss the approach of Federal Reserve policy
within the larger economic setting at home and abroad•
As you know 1986 has begun with the economy continuing
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to move forward after more than three years of expansion. Today,
more people are employed relative to the working age population
than ever before recorded. Unemployment has continued to fall.
Happily, the continuing expansion has so far been achieved while
inflation remained at the lowest rate in more than a decade.
^ Looking ahead, there are some highly encouraging signs
OS
as well. The larger employment increases in recent months are
reflected in relatively confident attitudes by consumers.
Manufacturing output as a whole, which had been sluggish
during much of 1985, is again rising even though many areas
continue to face strong competition from abroad. Lower interest
rates and higher stock prices — buoyed in part by the action of
Congress in improving prospects for declining federal deficits in
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the years ahead — have made it less expensive to finance new
business investment and housing. With few exceptions, excessive
inventories, often in the past a harbinger of economic adjustments
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appear absent.
While productivity growth has been rather disappointing, wage
restraint in much of industry and lower commodity prices have kept costs
under control. The sharp break in oil prices should be an important
force cutting costs and prices in the period immediately ahead, in
the process releasing real purchasing power to U.S. consumers.
Moreover, changes in exchange rates and the welcome initiatives
taken by the Congress and the Administration toward budgetary
restraint offer the potential for dealing with two of the
major, and interrelated, imbalances in the economy that I
have spoken about with you so often — the enormous fiscal and
trade deficits.
Altogether, the opportunity clearly remains for combining
sustained expansion with greater price stability in the period
ahead, building on the progress of the past three years. In
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my judgment, the present expansion — already longer than the
postwar average for peacetime years — is not about to die from
old age or sheer exhaustion. We don't have the pressures on
capacity, the excess inventories, the accelerating costs and
prices, or the rising interest rates that have typically
presaged cyclical downturns in the past.
Yet, any claim that we live in an economy in which
every prospect pleases would be idle pretense. There are evident
points of economic pressure and financial strain, some of them
aggravated by the sharp decline in oil prices itself. While the
adverse trends are being changed, the deficits in our budget and
trade accounts will take years to correct. And, we have long since
passed the time when we could, with any validity, insulate ourselves
from the difficulties of neighbors and trading partners to which we
are bound by strong ties of finance and trade.
Most of these threats, in magnitude and in combination,
are unique, certainly in our postwar experience. They demand our
full attention if we are to deal with them successfully.
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Take, for instance, the trade problem. The dollar had
risen to extraordinarily high levels by early 1985, with the
effect of undercutting our trade position vis-a-vis major
industrial competitors. At the same time the relatively rapid
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growth in demand for goods and services in the United States, at
a time of sluggish growth abroad, attracted a large volume of
imports. The net result was to drive our trade deficit to a
rate of close to $150 billion by the end of last year and to
about $125 billion for the year as a whole.
No doubt, given the extreme values the dollar had
attained internationally in 1984 and early 1985, an adjustment
in exchange rates has been a necessary part of achieving a better
competitive equilibrium and of responding to destructive pro-
tectionist pressures. That was explicitly recognized in the
meeting of the Finance Ministers and Central Bankers of the five
leading industrialized countries in September. By now, a sub-
stantial adjustment in exchange rates has been made, placing our
producers in a stronger competitive position.
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But we also know, from hard experience here and abroad,
that changes in actual trade flows necessarily lag changes in
exchange rates by a period extending into years that currency
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adjustments can assume a momentum of their own, and that sharp
depreciation in the external value of a currency carries pervasive
inflationary threats.
No doubt, some depreciation in the dollar, after the rapid
run up, could be absorbed without a sharp or immediate impact on
domestic prices. But we cannot afford to be complacent. Inevitably,
prospects for balance in our internal capital markets — and therefore
prospects for interest rates — remain for the time being heavily
dependent on the willingness of foreigners to place huge amounts of
funds in dollars and on the incentives for Americans to employ their
money at home. In essence, the financing of both our current account
deficit and our internal capital needs — so long as the government
deficit remains so high — is dependent on an historically high net
capital inflow. Clearly, the orderly balancing of our demands for
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funds with supply in those circumstances requires continued
confidence in our currency.
I recognize and appreciate the importance of the efforts
that the Congress and the Administration have made to place the,
budget deficit on a declining trend* I know that effort will
continue to require the hardest kind of choices. But we can also
see some of the potential benefits in improved market sentiment.
The net result should be both to reduce risks of inflation and to
make us less dependent on foreign financing in the years ahead.
At the same time, oil imports apart, improvement in our
trade balance for the next year or longer is in large part dependent
not on depreciation of our currency but on greater growth by our
trading partners. More competitive pricing is of limited value
when foreign markets are not growing strongly, and when producers
abroad do not themselves have expanding, profitable markets at home.
Prospects in that respect remain quite mixed. There have
been signs of somewhat stronger growth in Germany and elsewhere
in continental Europe. However, it remains questionable whether
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that growth will in fact be strong enough to reduce appreciably
continued high levels of unemployment, now averaging more than
10 percent for the continent as a whole. In Japan, where unemploy-
ment is historically at much lower levels, growth by those same
historical standards is sluggish, with the appreciation of the
yen itself a restraining factor.
As appropriately emphasized at the September G-5 meeting,
a better world equilibrium, including more rapid improvement in
our trade balance, is clearly dependent on structural and other
measures to deal with the sources of the imbalances. The Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings legislation represents one important approach to
that end. Stronger growth patterns in other leading countries are
also directly relevant. The opportunities for policies to work
toward that result this year appear to be greatly enhanced by the
strongly beneficial effects of the declines in oil prices and the
appreciation of their currencies. Both developments reinforce the
already strong prospects for price stability in those countries.
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—.ft —
Should oil prices remain close to present levels, that
development will also be a powerful force offsetting, and in the
short-run probably more than offsetting, the direct and indirect
effects of the lower international value of the dollar on our
overall price performance. At the same time, the effect is to
release real purchasing power and cash flow to American consumers
and oil-consuming businesses. The potential addition to real
consumer income should work in the direction of offsetting the
effects on purchasing power that some have foreseen in the full
implementation of the deficit reduction program called for by the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation over the course of this year.
With similarly beneficial effects for other consuming
countries, that is part of the basis for a sense of growing
optimism about world economic prospects. But, of course, the
effects are sharply adverse for energy producers, affecting
important regions in the United States where energy production
and exploration loom so large, and therefore prospects for
investment as a whole. The added strains for certain already
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heavily indebted developing countries are even more acute.
Moreover, the pervasive pressures on much of the agricultural
sector in this country remain although recent legislation by
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the Congress addressed and should help stem further deterioration.
These sectoral strains and imbalances point up the crucial
importance of maintaining the essential safety and soundness of our
financial system, and in particular our depository institutions.
For a long time, that was something we in this country thought
we could take for granted. And it was partly that feeling,
combined with accelerating inflation and other factors, that
contributed to much more aggressive lending behavior over the
years — lending that has led to unanticipated problems in a
period of disinflation and greater competitive pressures. Today,
measures to protect the basic financial fabric necessarily
assume a high priority, and that effort will require appropriate
action by the Congress as well as the regulatory authorities.
Finally/ in surveying the economic setting for monetary
policy, I must call to your attention the disappointing record
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with respect to productivity over recent years viewed generally,
at least as recorded by the standard national statistics.
Developments in that respect during 1985, when productivity for
nonfarin businesses as a whole showed no growth, are hard to
explain. In manufacturing, where recorded performance is
substantially better than in other sectors, the slower pro-
ductivity growth may be a reflection of the levelling of output.
But other sectors were growing relatively fast, without reflection
in productivity improvement.
Perhaps part of the seeming problem lies in the inherent
difficulty in measuring the volume and quality of output in the
dominant service sector of the economy. But the results do
raise further questions about the growth potential of the
economy as recorded by the GNP statistics — how fast can we
expect the GNP to grow in a sustained way without excessive
pressures on human or physical capacity. Over the past six
months, for instance, the unemployment rate has dropped by a
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full 1/2 percentage point — desirable in itself but accompanied
by a recorded annual rate of output growth of only 2-3/4 percent.
In the end, it is largely productivity that governs
prospects for per capita income growth? together with growth in
the number of workers, it sets a limit on our total economic growth•
Fortunately, in developing monetary policies now, we do not
need to reach precise judgments about our long-term growth
potential? today, capacity utilization is still somewhat below,
and unemployment somewhat above, average levels for periods of
business prosperity. Recent productivity trends, nonetheless,
do introduce an unwelcome cautionary note about the longer-run.
Monetary Policy
Any description of the opportunities and risks in the
current economic situation points up the fact that the formulation
and implementation of monetary policy need to take account of a
variety of sometimes conflicting objectives and criteria. In the
current setting, other policy approaches — toward the budget,
toward international finance, toward trade, and toward other areas —
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are obviously critical to the success of the common effort,
just as the pervasive and indirect effects of monetary policy
can bear upon the success of other policies beyond the strictly
financial. Moreover, institutional and economic changes have
strongly affected the behavior of certain policy guideposts —
notably Ml and debt —- relative to other economic magnitudes.
Consequently, I do not believe that in current circumstances
there is any escape from the need for a substantial element of
judgment in the conduct of Federal Reserve policies.
That need was illustrated in 1985. Over the course of
the year, monetary policy remained in a generally accommodative
mode in the sense that pressures on bank reserve positions were
both limited and little changed. The discount rate was reduced
once in the spring, from 8 to 7-1/2 percent, and most market
interest rates declined by 1 to 2 percentage points, generally
reaching the lowest levels since mid-1979 or before.
As illustrated in Charts II and III attached, the
broader monetary aggregates, M2 and M3, remained generally within
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the ranges targeted at the start of the year. At the same time,
however, the narrowly defined measure of the "money supply,"
Ml, grew persistently above the range set both at the start
of the year and again after the range was reset in July (see
Chart I), That aggregate ended the year almost 12 percent
above the year earlier level, an historically high rate of
growth*
In technical terms, that large "overshoot11 was permitted
in the light of a persistent and sizable decline in Ml "velocity" —
that is the relationship between Ml and the nominal GNP. That
decline in velocity was apparent whether measured contemporaneously
or with a one or two quarter lag between money and GNP. In other
words, the exceptional growth in Ml seemed to be matched by an
equally exceptional decline in velocity, suggesting the high Ml
growtii in 19&5 does not imply the same inflationary potential, at
least for the near term, as in the past.
Less abstractly, the judgment of the Federal Open Market
Committee as the year developed was that the rather strong
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restrictive action that would have been necessary to maintain Ml
within its targeted range was not justified in the light of the
different signals conveyed by the much more restrained growth
in M2 and M3, the slower growth in overall economic activity/
the margins of capacity that remained, and the continuing
progress toward price stability. For much of the year, the
dollar remained high, and that fact was another strong signal
that monetary policy was not unduly liberal.
We were aware, of course, of some conflicting evidence.
During much of 1984 and 1985, domestic demand — the spending
of consumers, businesses, and governments — continued to expand
at a rate well beyond the rate of domestic output, measured by
the GNP. In fact, the rate of demand increase, if maintained,
would probably be beyond our long-term growth potential. In
that sense we continued to live beyond our means, at the expense
of a widening trade deficit.
Moreover, private as well as public debt continued to
accumulate at an historically rapid rate* running above the
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9-12 percent "monitoring range" set out at the start of the year,
The aggregate debt statistics, portrayed in relation to GNP
on Chart IV exaggerate the problem to some degree. There has
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been massive issuance of tax-exempt securities in anticipation
of tax law changes, for re-investment in Treasury securities in
pending subsequent refundings, and for financing home purchases
and industrial development. These activities lead to "double
counting" in the aggregate statistics because both the new
municipal debt and the debt acquired in employing the funds
borrowed are included in the total. At the same time, sub-
stitution of debt for equity by businesses continued unabated,
with about $100 billion of equity retired by a combination of
stock repurchase programs, so-called leveraged buyouts, and as
part of mergers and acquisitions.
The strongly rising stock market and lower interest
rates had the effect of greatly increasing consumer wealth,
measured by current market values, and lowering the cost of
capital to business. Nonetheless, the trend of debt creation,
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with its implications of greater leveraging and potential financial
fragility, remains disquieting, particularly in an environment of
progress toward greater price stability. Indeed, as I suggested
earlier, there is already ample evidence in the financial area
of the consequences for individual institutions of extended
financial positions and unduly loose credit standards. The
crises in the thrift industry in Maryland and Ohio, where
federal insurance and supervision were absent, illustrated in
an extreme form the consequences of essentially speculative
lending and lax market practices.
A more pointed question for the deliberations of the
FOMC has been the lasting significance of the sizable increase
in Ml. We are well aware, as I have often reported to this
Committee, of the long history and of the economic analysis
that relate excessive money growth to inflation over time. The
operational question remains as to what, in specific circumstances,
is in fact excessive in the light of recent velocity behavior.
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That question is greatly complicated both by the changed
composition of Ml, which now includes accounts that receive
interest close to market levels and clearly have a large
"savings" as well as a "transaction-oriented11 component.
The disinflationary process and the associated decline in
market interest rates also have implications for the willingness
to hold money.
Enough evidence has now accumulated since the peak
inflation years to suggest two conclusions:
(1) That the long upward trend in velocity of
3 percent or so characteristic of most of
the postwar period — when inflation and
interest rates were generally trending upward -•-
will probably not be typical of a world in which
inflation and interest rates are trending downward
and in which Ml has a growing savings component.
(2) That Ml may be more sensitive to short-term
fluctuations in interest rates.
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For 1985 specifically, our work strongly indicates
that much of the unexpected decline in Ml velocity was a
response to the sharp reduction in interest rates late in 1984,
continuing at a lesser pace over much of last year. In a
context of contained inflation, a generally strong dollar, and
more muted economic growth, the decline in interest rates did
not appear in itself to risk excessive economic stimulation,
with renewed inflationary potential* Moreover, neither of the
broader monetary aggregates, which remained within their target
ranges, confirmed excessive monetary expansion.
Looking ahead to 1986, the FOMC decided to take account
of the greater uncertainty associated with the relationship
between Ml and economic activity and prices by adopting a
relatively broad Ml target range of 3-8 percent. While wider,
that range is centered on the same mid-point, 5-1/2 percent, as
the tentative 4-7 percent range set put last July. In fixing
that range, the Committee anticipated that velocity would not
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drop at nearly the rate of 1985. Without some reversal of the
sharp drop in velocity last year, growth toward the upper end
of the range could well be appropriate. More broadly, the
Committee agreed that changes in Ml would be evaluated in the
light of the presence — or absence — of confirming evidence
of excessive growth in M2 and M3. For both those aggregates,
the tentative growth ranges of 6-9 percent set in July were
reaffirmed.*
As set out in Table II attached, in establishing these
target ranges, members of the Federal Reserve Board and Reserve
Bank Presidents anticipated the economy would grow somewhat more
rapidly than in 1985 and that the unemployment rate would continue
to decline gradually. Views on the outlook for prices were
rather mixed, with some anticipating measurable further progress
toward stability, particularly in the light of the oil price
*These new ranges, and the related monitoring range for debt,
in comparison with ranges for 1985 are shown in Table I.
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decline, while others expected that the consequences of the
lower exchange rate may, for a time, put stronger upward
pressure on prices. While the "central tendency" of the
projections for real growth is lower than that of the
Administration, so are most of the projections of prices by
participants in the FOMC. The differences are not so large as
to suggest, in themselves, inconsistency with the monetary growth
targets; indeed, several Board Members and Presidents anticipated
real growth in the 4 percent area. I might also note the somewhat
lower unemployment rate generally anticipated by the Committee
participants suggests more limited productivity growth than implied
by the Administration projections.
Monetary policy is implemented day-by-day and week-by-
week by determining the appropriate degree of pressure on bank
reserve positions in the light of monetary growth, judged in
the context of the flow of information about the economy, the
outlook for prices, and domestic and international financial
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' markets, including the value of the dollar in the foreign exchange
markets. In the latter connection, circumstances now are of course,
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very different than during most of 198 5. the potential inflationary
implications of further depreciation of the dollar, while likely to
be offset for some time by lower oil prices, need to be fully con-
sidered in the implementation of policy.
At present, with the various monetary aggregates at
reasonable levels relative to their new target ranges, and taking
account of the cross-currents in other factors bearing on policy
implementation, there has been no occasion for significant change
in the degree of pressure on bank reserve positions. As you know,
both intermediate and long-term interest rates have been declining
to the lowest levels seen in years and the stock market has been
ebullient. The justification, and the sustainability, of those
developments lies in a combination of prospects for budgetary
restraint, the favorable impact of lower oil prices, and improved
inflationary expectations and performance. The challenge for
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md.netary policy/ insofar as it can contribute, is to help assure
that those favorable prospects for maintaining progress toward
stability can be a reality in the context of a growing economy.
The implementation of policy will be conducted in the light of
that objective.
Related Approaches
I referred earlier to the pressures in some areas of the
credit markets growing in large part out of the backwash of overly
aggressive lending policies in the earlier climate of accelerating
inflation. Indeed, those concerns have been aggravated in more
recent years by a continued highly aggressive approach by some
institutions seeking high returns, with their own liabilities
effectively underwritten by federal insurance. These problems,
and appropriate responses to them, are too large a subject for
me to deal with in the time available today? we have discussed
them before on a number of occasions.
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I do want to report, however, that the Federal Reserve
has underway a number of initiatives to help deal with the
problems- more effectively. They include strengthening our force
of examiners and supervisory personnel so that they are equipped
to meet higher standards in the frequency and intensity of
examination of member banks and holding companies. Certain
regulatory steps have been undertaken as well. Specifically/
we have issued for public comment a proposal for a framework of
"adjusted capital/asset ratios" designed to supplement our present
capital standards. The proposed standards are designed to take
account of the different characteristics of bank assets and to
incorporate allowance for off-balance sheet risks that have been
proliferating rapidly at major banks here and abroad in recent
years. I know other regulatory agencies have comparable initiatives
underway in the supervisory and regulatory area.
By its -naturei this supervisory effort must be a continuing
process, although it has particular relevance in this turbulent period,
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Moreover, I can only emphasize to you again my long-
standing concern that you act, and act soon, to modernize our
basic laws governing the structure and nature of our depository
system. After decades of little change in the legal structure,
technological and market developments have together created a
new competitive environment. That change, without a coherent
legislative framework, has sown enormous confusion about the
proper and legitimate role of banks, bank holding companies,
thrift institutions, and their commercial and financial competitors,
Regulatory decisions attempting to apply current laws, sometimes
conflicting in themselves, are regularly challenged in the courts.
The results are capricious as both regulatory bodies and the courts
inevitably reach different conclusions in ambiguous circumstances.
The courts themselves in recent decisions have emphasized
the need for fresh Congressional guidance. I can only reiterate
my own view that, without such a review, the banking and thrift
industries are left adrift, driven to exploit perceived loopholes
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in present law on the one hand, while on the other hand their
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basic and regulated business is undercut by commercial organizations
and investment houses operating without the protections provided
by the federal "safety net," The result is a clear threat not
only to the coherence but also to the safety and soundness of the
whole. Time is growing short.
From another perspective, the decline in oil prices has
presented an enormous new challenge to a few countries that have
been heavily dependent on oil resources for the development of
their own economies. The problem is particularly acute with
respect to Mexico, with which we have close trade and financial
relationships, but it is certainly not limited to that country.
In the broadest terms, the initiatives outlined by Secretary
Baker some months ago for managing a "second stage" of the inter-
national debt crisis provide a constructive and needed overall
framework for dealing with problems. He emphasized the importance
of achieving a solution in the context of overall financial and
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economic policies conducive to sustained growth. That, in turn,
requires complementary actions by the borrowing countries, by
creditors, and by multilateral development institutions alike.
In essence, the borrowing countries themselves — "Baker
Plan" or not -— appear to have the strongest kind of incentives
to take those actions necessary to improve the efficiency and
competitiveness of their own economies, including the development
of their potentially vast non-oil resources. Those fundamental
measures will be more effective, with faster results, to the
degree those nations also have greater assurance of access to
growing external markets for their products. Resistance to
protectionism should, of course, be easier to achieve in a
context of an expanding world economy, the prospects for which
should be enhanced by the same decline in oil prices that makes
the pressures more acute for oil producing countries.
The restructuring process can be greatly assisted by
cooperation with such institutions as the World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank, which have funds available for substantially
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larger loan programs in support of fundamental economic adjust-
ments, and with the International Monetary Fund. On that basis,
I believe necessary margins of external private investment or
loans can continue prudently to be made available to meet essential
external needs. Indeed, without complementary policies by inter-
national institutions and creditors, the will to find constructive
outward-looking solutions to the problems by the borrowers themselves
will inevitably be undermined, and the adverse implications would
extend far beyond the economic arena.
For some heavily indebted countries that either import a
sizable portion of their energy requirements or are essentially
neutral in that respect, recent developments should ease the
task. But I do not in any way want to minimize the challenge
for others — for Mexico, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Venezuela. What
I do suggest is that the fundamental premises of the total effort
by borrowers and creditors alike in managing the debt situation
remain valid. I believe that, with will and wisdom, the basis
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remains for working through this inevitably difficult period
in a way that ultimately will reinforce prospects for longer-
term growth *
Conclusion
I conclude as I started.
With constructive policy responses, recent developments
carry the potential for enhancing prospects here and elsewhere for
a sustained period of growth in a context of price stability.
Those are the common goals of the Congress the Administration
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and the Federal Reserve.
But if those goals are to be actually achieved, we
also must clearly recognize, and collectively deal effectively
with, points of strain and danger, some of them stemming from
the very successes of the past.
- Economic history is replete with examples of
countries that, in attempting to correct over-
valuation of their currencies, failed to take
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advantage of their improved competitive positions.
Too often, they lapsed into a debilitating and self-
defeating cycle of external depreciation and internal
inflation/ at the expense of an eroding loss of confidence,
higher interest rates, and impaired growth.
It would be foolish to presume that the United States
is somehow immune from that threat — we had too much
adverse experience in the 1970s to indulge in wishful
thinking in that respect. Instead, in our monetary
and fiscal policies, we need to be realistic about the
danger and be fully sensitive to the need to maintain
confidence in our currency.
— Fortunately, the sharp decline in energy prices now
underway should, for months ahead, help assure satis-
factory price performance overall, making the job of
maintaining progress toward stability much easier.
But those lower prices are no unmitigated blessing.
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They create new uncertainties and stresses for some
regions of the economy, for some financial sectors,
and particularly for some important developing countries
and trading partners. Those stresses need to be contained
and dealt with in a constructive way, and we need to guard
against conditions that might lead to a repetition of past
energy shortages.
The sense of greater confidence about our fiscal prospects
still needs to be converted into reality. Whatever the
fortunes of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation in the
courts or the merits of that particular approach toward
the problem, the direction and broad spirit of the effort
is essential if we are to correct deep-seated imbalances
that, sooner or later, would only undercut our bright
prospects.
— The success of all our efforts is dependent in substantial
part on complementary policies by other countries — their
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-31-
success in enhancing their growth and stability, in
opening markets to others, and in helping to deal with
points of strain in the international financial fabric.
Most other industrialized countries have, as a matter
of priority, been deeply concerned with restoring price
stability and reducing fiscal deficits. Remarkable
strides have been made toward those goals. However,
their growth, at least until now, has been heavily
dependent upon rising trade and current account surpluses.
Today, there appears to be a prime opportunity for
encouraging "home grown" expansion, larger imports, and
better international balance.
For the longer run, I welcome the call by the President
to consider what steps might be desirable to achieve and
maintain greater exchange rate stability internationally.
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No one should think that task is a simple one. It
cannot in any way substitute for disciplined and
complementary domestic policies among the leading
nations. Indeed, meaningful progress would imply
even greater demands on those policies and on inter-
national cooperation. But surely we have had enough
experience/ here and elsewhere, with the distorting
effects of extreme exchange-rate volatility to make
that effort to reexamine the international system
worthwhile. In a fundamental sense, that is a corollary
of the simple observable fact that the economic fortunes
of all countries -- including the United States — are
inextricably interlocked.
We have come too far, and the stakes are too high, to fail
to rise to the evident new challenges.
We have to recognize that depreciation of our currency does
not in itself provide a fundamental solution, and is in fact a two-
edged sword.
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~3lr
The budgetary effort must be sustained*
If we expect to benefit from the break in energy prices,
we must collectively respond to the points of strain*
We need to be patient when patience is required* The trade
an4 budgetary and financial problems will be with us for some time;
at the same time, we need to be insistent in carrying through the
measures to deal with them constructively.
In much of this, I recognize the Federal Reserve and
monetary policy have a vital part to play. Given the cross-currents
in the economy and sometimes conflicting signals among the guide-
posts to policy in today's setting, there will be a high premium
on careful judgment. But through it all the basic objective does
not change. We are convinced that sustained growth in the United
States — and much more -- is dependent upon maintaining progress
toward price stability over time. And given our weight in the
world, that same stability must be one of the foundation stones
of a prosperous, integrated global economy.
*******
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Chart I
Ml Target Ranges and Actual
Billions of dollars
680
8%
*j"'
660
640
•S"
620
Actual M1
600
3%
580
560
I I I I 1 I I I I I I 1 I 1 I I I I I I I I 1 540
0 N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M AM J J A S O N D
1984 1985
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Chart II
M2 Target Ranges and Actual
Billions of dollars
2850
2750
2650
Actual M2
2550
6%
<>
2450
.-^ .*
2350
i i i i . i i i i i i i I i » i i - J i i i i i i 2250
O N DJ F M A MJ J AS O N D J FM A MJ J A S O NO
1984 1985 1986
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Chart IE
M3 Target Ranges and Actual
Billions of dollars
3550
9%
3450
••'*' ^** 6%
3350
S
•y
91/2%
y-s 3250
' ^
3150
****%6«%i
3050
2950
I I I j_ I I I II I II I I I I 2850
O N D J F M A M J J A S ON D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1984 1985 1986
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Table I
Ranges of Growth for Monetary and Credit Aggregates
(Percent change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter)
1986 1985
Ml 3 to 8 3 to 8*
M2 6 to 9 6 to 9
M3 6 to 9 6 to 9-1/2
Debt 8 to 11 9 to 12
*Applied to period from second to fourth quarter.
Table II
Economic Projections for 1986
FOMC Members and other FRB Presidents Admini-
Range Central Tendency stration CBO
Percent change,
fourth quarter to
fourth quarter:
Nominal GNP 5 to 8-1/2 6-1/2 to 7-1/4 8.0 7.6
Real GNP 2-3/4 to 4-1/4 3 to 3-1/2 4.0 3.6
Implicit
deflator
for GNP 2-1/2 to 4-1/2 3 to 4 3.8 3.9
Average level
in the fourth
quarter, percent
Unemployment rate 6-1/4 to 6-3/4 About 6-1/2 6.7 6.7*
*Civilian unemp1oyment rate.
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Cite this document
APA
Paul A. Volcker (1986, February 18). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19860219_volcker
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19860219_volcker,
author = {Paul A. Volcker},
title = {Speech},
year = {1986},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19860219_volcker},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}