speeches · July 17, 1985
Speech
Paul A. Volcker · Chair
Statement by
Paul A. Volcker
Chairman. Beard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
U.S. Senate
July 18, 1985
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I welcome the opportunity to review with you monetary
policy in the context of recent and prospective economic and
financial developments. The economic setting and the decisions
cf the Federal Open Market Committee with respect to the target
ranges for the monetary and credit aggregates are set out in
the semi-annual "Humphrey-Hawkins11 Report* As usual, I would
like to amplify and develop some aspects of those decisions in
my testimony*
The Economic and Financial Environment
The pattern of slower, and more lopsided growth in domestic
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output that developed during the latter part of 1984 became even
more pronounced during the first half of 1985. Manufacturing
activity overall nas be-;: essentially flat following exceptionally
large gains earlier in the expansion period. The farming and
mining sectors have remained under strong economic and financial
pressure. But consumption — supported directly and indirectly
by large increases in personal and federal debt — has continued
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to rise fairly strongly. Construction activity has also
expanded, responding in part to lower interest rates. Despite
recent losses of manufacturing jobs employment growth in
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services and trade has been strong enough to keep the overall
unemployment rate essentially unchanged at about 7-1/4 percent.
The contrast between marked sluggishness in the goods-
producing sector of the economy and rising domestic consumption
and demand is reflected in continuing strong growth in merchandise
imports. Those imports in real terms are up by about 60 percent
in three years; in manufactured goods alone the increase has been
even more rapid. Overall, imports have now reached a level
equivalent to 21 percent of the value of domestic production
of goods. In contrast exports have stagnated/ and now account
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for only cbout 14 percent of goods output.
I can put the snm\e pc nt another way. Domestic final
sales — tc consumers, to businesses, and to governments —
appear tc have been expanding at a relatively brisk rate of
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more than 4 percent so far this year. Domestic output of goods
and services has not nearly kept pace, rising at a rate of
around 1-1/2 percent or perhaps less. That is partly because
inventory accumulation has slowed. But it is mostly because
ir.cre of the domestic demand is being satisfied by growing imports,
That was true earlier in the expansion period as well.
But we have felt it more as growth in demand has slowed to a more
sustainable rate. Another potentially disquieting development
has been the apparent failure of productivity to maintain the
strong gains achieved earlier in the expansion period. The
implication is that the underlying trend may not have increased
as much as hoped from the poor record of the 1970s.
Against those cross-currents in the economy this year the
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Federal Reserve, in conducting its open market operations, has
r-ot appreciably changed the degree of pressure en bank reserve
positions, which had already been substantially eased by the
enc: of 1984. In May, the discount rate was reduced from 8 to
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7-1/2 percent. That action was consistent with the general
tendency of market interest rates to decline further over the
period, extending the rather sharp reductions during the Autumn
and early last winter. Both the discount and short-term market
interest rates in May and June reached the lowest levels since 1978,
The relatively "accommodative" approach in the provision
of reserves has been designed to provide support for the sustained
growth of economic activity against a background of relatively
well contained inflationary and cost pressures. Indeed, sensitive
agricultural and industrial prices — including prices of crude
petroleum -- have been declining appreciably, and prices at the
wholesale level have been almost flat. It is somewhat reassuring
that the trend in wage an 5 salary increases has, overall,
remained at r.h.e sharply reduced pace established at the start
of: the recovery period, although the slowdown in productivity
has been reflected in higher unit labor costs and some pressures
on profit margins. Clearly, even if reduced, some momentum of
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inflation has persisted in the economy as a whole, and
expectations remain sensitive. But so far this year, price
increases have been concentrated largely in the service sectors,
Meanwhile, the broader measures of monetary growth —
M2 and M3 — have remained generally within the target ranges
established early in the year. However, currency and checkable
deposits, measured by Ml, have increased much more rapidly than
envisaged. (See the attached charts.)
Until May, growth in that aggregate remained in an area
reasonably close to the upper band of the target range. Given
that the more rapid growth during that period followed some
months of subdued expansion, the outcome through April was
reasonably in Line with FOMC intentions and expectations. More
recently, in Maj and June, a new surge in Ml carried that
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aggregate much further above the targeted range.
At the same time, total non-financial debt has continued
to expand substantially more rapidly than the GNP, propelled
particularly by the federal deficit and consumer credit. As
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much as 1 percent of that debt expansion can be traced
to a continuing -- and, from a structural point of view,
disquieting — substitution of debt for equity as a result of
mergers and other financial reorganization. More generally,
these developments also point up the apparent dependency of
economic growth, under circumstances existing this year, on a
relatively' high level of debt and money creation.
Unduly prolonged, those developments would not provide a
satisfactory financial underpinning for sustaining growth in a
context of: greater price and financial stability. For the time
being, however, taking account of current and likely economic
developments, the downward pressures on commodity prices, and
the high level of the dollar that has prevailed in the foreign
exchange markets? the growth in Ml and debt has not in itself
justified a mere restrictive approach toward the provision of
reserves tc the banking system.
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After increasing sharply from already high levels in the
early weeks of the year, the dollar more recently has fallen
back against the currencies of other leading industrial countries,
dropping abruptly over the past week or so to about the average
levels of last summer. At these exchange rates — still about
60 percent above the relatively depressed levels of 1979 and 1980 —
prospects for stemming the deterioration in our trade accounts,
much less achieving a turnabout, remain uncertain. Much depends
upon the rate of growth in other countries that provide the
principal markets for cur exports and are the source of our
import-;;. In any event, the potential effects of interest rates
and decisions with respect to monetary policy on exchange rates
and the external sector of the economy have necessarily been a
significant ingredient In FOMC deliberations.
The Outlock for the Economy
Members of the FOMC generally have projected a pickup in
economic activity over the second half of 1985 and sustained
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growth through 1986* In those circumstances, while employment
gains should remain substantial, unemployment would be expected
to drop only a little if at all. The overall rate of price
increase would be expected to remain close to the recent pattern,
assuming dollar exchange rates do not vary widely from recent
levels. (See Table I attached for the numerical projections.)
Obviously, neither the anticipated "stickiness" of the
unemployment rate nor the projected inflation rate is entirely
satisfactory, and a substantial range of uncertainty must be
associated with any economic projections at this time. As I
emphasized earlier, there are sharp differences in the performance
o£ different sectors of the "economy. Demand for and employment
in services, where most upward price pressures have been concentrated,
ccm inue to expand rather strongly. Most sectors more immediately
sensitive to interest rates and monetary conditions — including
construction and automobile sales — have also been performing
relatively well. Other sectors exposed to strong international
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competition are sluggish and agriculture remains under strong
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financial pressure*
The Broad Policy Challenge
The cross-currents, dislocations, and uncertainties
in the present situation point up one uncomfortable but
inescapable fact. We are dealing with a situation marked by
gross imbalances that can neither be sustained indefinitely nor
dealt with successfully by monetary policy alone, however
conducted.
We are borrowing, as a nation, far more than we
are willing to save internally.
We are buying abroad much more than we are able
to sell,
We reconcile borrowing more than we save and buying
more than *e sell by piling up debts abroad in amounts
unparalleled in our history.
Our key trading partners, directly or indirectly,
have been relying on cur markets to support their
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growth, and even so most of them remain mired in
historically high levels of unemployment.
Meanwhile, our high levels of consumption and
employment are not being matched by the expansion
in the industrial base we will need as we restore
external balance and service our growing external debt.
And/ after 2-1/2 years of economic expansion, too
•aany borrowers at home and abroad remain under strain
or over-extended.
At uheir core, these major imbalances and disequilibria may
lie outside the reach of monetary policy — or in some instances,
U.S. policy generally. But they necessarily condition the
environment in which the Federal Reserve acts, along with all
the current evidence about monetary growth, economic conditions,
and prices-*
In all our decisions* whether with respect to monetary or
regulatory policies, we would like to work in a direction
consistent with reducing the imbalances, or at the least to
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avoid aggravating them. That sounds obvious and straight-
forward. The difficulty is that, as things now stand, some
policy actions that might seem, on their face, to contribute
toward easing one problem could aggravate others. Nor can
we afford to apply a mere poultice at one point of strain in
the nope of temporary relief at the expense of undermining
basic objectives.
Our monetary policy actions need to be conducted with a
clear vision of the continuing longer-term goals — a financial
environment in which we as a nation can enhance prospects for
sustained growth in a framework of greater stability. To succeed
fully in that effort, monetary policy will need to be complemented
by action elsewhere.
Th-j 1985 and 1986 Target Ranges
As I indicated earlier, the recent surge in Ml in May
and June has carried that monetary aggregate well above the
target range set in February. M2 and M3, while also rising
rather sharply in June, have remained generally within, or
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clcse to, their targeted ranges. Against the background of a
high dollar, the sluggishness of manufacturing output/ and
relatively well contained price pressures, quick and strong
action to curtail the recent burst in Ml growth has not been
appropriate. The potential implications of the relatively
strong growth xn. Ml since late last year nonetheless had to
be considered carefully in developing our target ranges and
policy approach.
You may recall that somewhat similar high growth rates in
Ml developed during the second half of 1982 and during the first
half of 1983, At that time, important regulatory changes involving
new accounts and affecting the payment of interest on checking
accounts had tak*5*:, place. Pervasive uncertainty during the
lacter stages of the recession appeared to affect desires to
hold cash. Both circumstances made interpretation of the
monetary data particularly difficult, and Ml was deemphasized.
Those circumstances are not present today, at least not in
the same degree.
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However one common factor, and an important factor,
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was at work during both periods. The rapid growth in Ml
in 1982 and 1983 and this year followed sizable interest rate
declines, with a lagged response evident for some months.
Analysis strongly suggests that, as market interest rates decline,
individuals and businesses are inclined to build up cash balances
because they sacrifice less interest income in doing so. The
possibility today of earning interest on checking accounts —
and the fact that these interest rates change more sluggishly
than market or market-oriented rates — probably increases that
tendency ,
Moreover, as I have suggested in earlier testimony, the
payment of interest on checking accounts may over time encourage
more hole; ;gs of Ml relative to other assets, or relative to
economic accivity, than was the case earlier. Partly for that
reason, the upward trend in Ml "velocity" — the ratio of GNP
to Ml — characteristic of the earlier postwar period may be
changing.
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That trend was, of course, established during a period
when inflation and interest rates were trending upward. In
contrast, over the past three and one-half years, velocity has
moved irregularly lower, with the declines concentrated in
periods of declining interest rates.
Tft+3 earlier 1982-83 period of rapid growth in Ml was
correctly judged not to presage a resurgence of inflationary
pressures, contrary to some expectations. I would emphasize
in that connection, however, that Ml growth was moderated
substantially after mid-1983, and velocity rose during the
period of strong economic expansion, as anticipated.
We simply do not have enough experience with the new
institutional framework surrounding Ml (which will be further
changed next year under existing law) to specify with any
precision what ne* trend in velocity may be emerging or the
precise nature of the relationship between fluctuations in
interest rates and the money supply. Moreover, while the
surge in Ml, and the related drop in velocity, can be traced
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at least in substantial part to the interest rate declines of
the past year, the permanence of the change in velocity will be
dependent on inflationary expectations and interest rates
remaining subdued. For those reasons, the Committee has continued
to take the view that, in the implementation of policy, developments
witn respect to Ml be judged against the background of the
other aggregates and evidence about the behavior of the economy,
prices, and financial markets, domestic and international.
None of that analysis contradicts the basic thrust of a
proposition that we have emphasized many times — that excessive
growth of money* sustained over time, will foster inflation.
Certainly the burst in May and June cannot be explained by
trend or interest rate factors. But, it is also true that
morurhly data ara notoriously volatile, and sharp increases
unrelated to rocze fundamental factors are typically moderated
or \ i ::tly reversed in following months.
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In all these circumstances, the FOMC, in its meeting last
week decided to "rebase11 the Ml target at the second quarter
average and to widen the range for the rest of the year to 3
to 8 percent at an annual rate. That decision implies some
adjustment in the base of the Ml target range is appropriate to
take account both of some change in trend velocity and a return
of interest rates closer to levels historically normal.
We are, of course, conscious that, because of strong
June growth, Ml currently is high relative to the rebased
range^ and the Committee contemplates that Ml will return
within its range only gradually as the year progresses.
Consistent with the conviction that a marked slowing in the
rate of Ml growth is appropriate over time, the Committee
tentatively set the target range at 4-7 percent for next year —
a decision that will be reassessed on the basis of the further
evidence available at that time. Meanwhile, the lower part
of the range set for the remainder of this year reflects the
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willingness cf the FOMC, in appropriate surrounding circumstances
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to tolerate substantially slower Ml growth for a time should the
recent bulge in effect "wash out,"
No changes were made in the target ranges for M2 and M3
and the associated monitoring range for debt this year. As
was the case at the beginning of 1985, the Committee would
find growth in tha upper part of these ranges acceptable.
The changes tentatively agreed for 1986 are small, limited to a
1/2 percent reduction in the upper limit for M3 and a 1 percent
reduction in the monitoring range for debt.
These target ranges are felt to be fully consistent with
sustained growth in the economy so long as inflationary
pressures are contained. I. should note again, however, that
members cf the BOMC are concerned about the persistent debt
creation well in excess of the growth of the economy and
historical experience, and therefore look toward some moderation
in that growth next year, as reflected in the monitoring range
set cut. (The new ranges are set out in Table II attached.)
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The uncertainties surrounding Ml, and to a lesser extent
the other aggregates, in themselves imply the need for a
considerable degree of judgment rather than precise rules in
the current conduct of monetary policy — a need that, in my
thinking, is reinforced by the strong cross-currents and
imbalances in the economy and financial markets. That may
not be an ideal situation for either the central bank or
these exercising oversight — certainly the forces that give
ri.:se to it are act happy. But it is the world in which, for
the time being, we find ourselves.
Complementary Policies
The massive trade deficit that has rapidly developed over
the period of eccncmic expansion is the most obvious and concrete
reflection of underlying economic imbalances. The trade deficit,
in an immediate sense, has been primarily related both to the
strength of the dollar in the exchange markets and to relatively
slow growth elsewhere in the world. In effect, much of the
world has been dependent, directly or indirectly, on expanding
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demand in the United States to support its own growth* Put
another way, growth in domestic demand in Japan Canada and
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Europe has been less than the growth in their GNP, the converse
of our situation* And, even with surging exports to this
market output been increasing too slowly to cut into high
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rates of unemployment in Europe and elsewhere. As a consequence,
the demand of ethers for our products has been relatively weak.
The strong competition from abroad has, in an immediate
sense, had benefits as well as costs for this country. It
has been a powerful force restraining prices in the industrial
sector and in encouraging productivity improvement. The related
net capital inflow has eased pressures on our interest rates
and capital in&rk&ts* We have been able to readily satisfy the
higher levels of: consumption driven in part by the budget
deficit.
Bat those benefits cannot last. Sooner or later our
external accounts will have to come much closer toward balance.
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Indeed, as our debts increase/ we will have to earn even more
in our trade to help pay the interest.
In the meantime, the flood of imports, and the perceptions
of unfairness which accompany it, foster destructive protectionist
forces. The domestic investment we will ultimately need is
discouraged while our companies shift more of their planned
expansion overseas* And the larger the external deficits and
the longer they are prolonged, the more severe the subsequent
adjustments in the exchange rate and in cur economy are apt to
be. We will have paid dearly indeed for any short-term benefits.
These considerations have tempered the conduct of
monetary policy for some time. Specifically, our decisions
with respect to providing reserves and reducing the discount
rate have been influenced tc sci^e extent by a desire to curb
excessive and ultimately unsustainable strength in the foreign
exchange value of the dollar. But we have also had to recognize
the clear limitations and risks in such an approach.
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The possibility at some point that sentiment toward the
dollar could change adversely, with sharp repercussions in
the exchange rate in a downward direction, poses the greatest
potential threat to the progress we have made against inflation.
Those risks would be compounded by excessive monetary and
liquidity creation*
As I have said to this Committee before, there is little
dcubt that the dollar could be driven lower by "bad" monetary
policy — a pelicy that poses a clear inflationary threat of
its own and undermines confidence. But such a policy could hardly
be in our overall interest — it would in fact be destructive
of all that has been achieved.
The hard fact remains that so long as we run massive
budgetary deficits, we will remain dependent on unprecedented
capital inflows to help finance, directly or indirectly, that
deficit. The net capital inflows will be mirrored in a trade
deficit — they are Siamese twins.
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As things new stand, if cur trade deficit narrowed sharply,
both the budget deficit and investment needs would have to be
financed internally, with new pressures on interest rates and
a squeeze on other sectors of the economy — "some of which
are now doing relatively well, such as housing, and some,
such as farmers and thrift institutions, already under strong
financial pressure. The implications for our trading partners
and for the heavily indebted developing countries would be
severe as well,
There has tc oe a way out of the impasse — a way that
would maintain and even enhance confidence in our own economy
and prospects for stability/ a way that would not simply shift
the pressures i:rca me sector of the economy to another, and a
way consistent v/ir.h the economic growth of other countries.
But chat way canr.ot be found by U.S. monetary policy alone.
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What we can do is reduce cur dependence on foreign capital
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and the rising imports to meet our domestic demands, by curtailing
the budget deficits that importantly drive the process. In that
sense, the choice is before you — in the decisions you will make
in t;he budgetary deliberations that have been so prolonged.
The needed adjustments would be eased as Well if other
industrialized countries became less dependent on stimulus
from the United States for growth in their own economies.
I am a central banker. I can well appreciate and sympathize
with the priority that those countries have attached to budgetary
restraint and particularly to the need to restore a sense of
price stability in their own economies,, They have had a large
measure of success in those efforts in the face of depreciation
of their currencies vis-a-vis the dollar, which has made the
process more difficult. The pull of capital into the United
States, and the reduced outflow from the United States has also
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had effects on their own financial markets and interest rates,
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and thus on the possibilities for "home grown" expansion. But
as those adverse factors diminish in force, or even begin to be
reversed? opportunities surely exist for festering more expansion
at hope in their own interest as well as that of a better
;
balanced world economy.
All of the industrialized countries, working with the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and by other means,
need to continue to support the efforts of much of the
developing world to restore the financial and economic
foundations for growth in their countries. That process,
under the pressure of the "debt crisis," has been underway
for some years. By its nature, the fundamental adjustments
required pose ch-u...iengi.r-g questions of economic and political
management. The.ce is * certain irony in observing the enormous
difficulties in car own political process in achieving — so
far without success -- deficit reductions equivalent to one
to two percent of our GNP while much poorer countries with much
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greater demands upon them are cutting their deficits by much
larger relative amounts.
That effort — along with others — is justified only
by its necessity to their own economic health. It is hardly
surprising that progress has been uneven, that from time to
time setbacks are encountered and that impatience and
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frustration surface politically. But I know of no realistic
shortcuts or substitutes for the effort to place their own
economies on a sounder footing/ any more than we can ultimately
escape our own responsibilities to put cur budget in order.
What is so encouraging is that the strong effort that
has been made in most of the indebted countries is yielding
some tangible results. A measure of grcwth has been restored
in Latin .uuerica as a wlvM Wit:ft interest rates lower and
many debrr.s restructured, debt burdens are gradually but
measurably being reduced.
For the mcst part, the heavily indebted countries are
still a long way from regaining easy access to commercial
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credit markets. Extraordinary cooperative efforts by the
IMF the World Bank and commercial banks will continue to be
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required for a time to make sure external financing obligations
are structured in a way that matches ability to pay. As always,
the ultimate success of all those efforts — most of all those
by the borrowers themselves — ^ill depend upon orderly growth,
reasonable interest rates, and access to markets in the rest of
the world, which will be determined by our actions and those of our
trading partners*
Conclusion
We have had a relatively strong economic expansion in
the United States over the past 2-1/2 years as a whole. At
the sarcie- time, the rate of inflation has remained at the lowest
level in more than 15 years* That combination should be a
source cf great satisfaction. But 2-1/2 years is not, in
itself, terribly significant in the economic life of the nation.
What will count is whether we can build on that progress, and
extend it over a long time ahead.
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The inherent strength of our economy and the momentum of
sur expansion have carried us a long way. We have done a lot
:o lead the world to recovery. The longer-term opportunities
ire still there for the taking. But we also do not need to
Lock far to see signs o! strain, imbalance, and danger.
In these circumstances, monetary policy has accommodated
* sizable increase in monetary and credit growth, and interest
rates have dropped appreciably even though they are still
relatively high in real terms* In that way, economic growth
las been supported at a time when the dollar has been particularly
strong and inflationary pressures, at least in contrast to the
970s ano early 1980s, quiescent* But there are obvious limitations
-o the process of monetary expansion without threatening the
necessary progress toward stability upon which so much rests.
Plairly there are implications for other policies as well.
;
The widely shared sense that other nations should do more
o open markets, to deal with the structural rigidities in
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their economic systems, to encourage growth — to get their own
houses in order -- is certainly right. We can legitimately
cajole, and urge, and bargain to those ends.
But there can also be no doubt that it all will come much
easier as the United States does its part. Monetary policy
F ,st be part of that effort. But we also do need to come to grips
' ith the budget deficit. We do need to avoid a witch's brew of
protectionism.
The success of the world economy -— and of our fortunes
within it — is in large measure dependent on us. That is the
inescapable consequence of size and leadership.
ie ******
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Table I
Economic Projections for 1985 and 1986*
FOMC Members and other FRB Presidents
Range Central Tendency
-1985-
Percent change, tcurth quarter
to iearth quarter:
Nominal GNP 6-1/4 to 7-3/4 6-1/2 to 7
Real GNP 2-1/4 to 3-1/4 2-3/4 to 3
Implicit deflator for GNP 3-1/2 to 4-1/4 3-3/4 to 4
Average level in the fourth
quarter, percent:
Unemployment rate 6-3/4 to 7-1/4 7 to 7-1/4
Percent change, fourth quarter
to fourth quarter:
Nominal GNP 5-1/2 to 8-1/2 7 to 7-1/2
Peal GNP 2 to 4 2-1/2 to 3-1/4
Implicit deflator for GNP 3 to 5-1/2 3-3/4 to 4-3/4
Average level in the fourth
qua rte r, pe rcen t:
Unemployment rate 6-3/4 to 7-1/2 6-3/4 to 7-1/4
*The Administration has yet tc publish its mid-session budget
review document^ and consequently the customary comparison of
FOMC forecasts and Administration economic goals has not been
included in this report.
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Table II
Long-run Growth Ranges for the Aggregates
(Percent increase, QIV to QIV unless otherwise noted)
Adopted July 1985
Adopted in Tentative
February for 1985 1985 for 1986
1/
Ml 4 to 7 3 to 8 4 to 7
H2 6 to 9 6 to 9 6 to 9
M2 6 to 9-1/2 6 to 9-1/2 6 to 9
Domestic Non-
financial debt 9 to 12 9 to 12 8 to 11
1/ Annual rate of increase over the period from QII 1985 to
QIV 1985.
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Chart 1
M1 Growth Ranges and Actual
Billions of dollars
620
610
600
590
580
ACTUAL M1 570
560
550
J L J I L J L I I I I 540
O N D F M A M J J A S O N D
1984 1985
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Chart 2
M2 Growth Range and Actual
Billions of dollars
2650
— 2600
— 2550
2500
— 2450
— 2400
— 2350
— 2300
2250
O N D
1984
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Chart 3
M3 Growth Range and Actual
Billions of dollars
r
3300
9V%
2
3200
AGTUAl. M3 3100
3000
2900
I I I I I I I I I I 2800
O N D M M J J O N D
1984 1985
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Chart 4
Debt Growth Range and Actual
Billions of dollars
r 6800
12%
6600
6400
ACTUAL DEBT
6200
6000
5800
J I I I L I I I I L 5600
O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1984 1985
Digitized for FRASER
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Cite this document
APA
Paul A. Volcker (1985, July 17). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19850718_volcker
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19850718_volcker,
author = {Paul A. Volcker},
title = {Speech},
year = {1985},
month = {Jul},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19850718_volcker},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}