speeches · November 15, 1982
Speech
Paul A. Volcker · Chair
?<$r release on delivery
|:00 PM, EST
November 16, 1982
Sustainable Recovery: Setting the Stage
Remarks by
Paul A. Volcker
Chairman Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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before the
Fifty-eighth Annual Meeting of the
New England Council
Boston , Massachusetts
November 16, 1982
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I am delighted to be with you tonight for several
reasons.
First, I can take special pleasure in joining you to
honor Dick Hill. For many years, he has stood in the first
rank of bankers, not just in Boston and New England, but in
the nation and the world. But with Dick banking responsibilities
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have been combined with a clear sense of the public interest.
It is that quality that over many years has brought Dick into
close contact ~ as Director of the Boston Fed, as a member and
President of our Federal Advisory Council, and in less formal
contacts — with me and my colleagues and predecessors in the
Federal Reserve. He has been as unstinting in his wise counsel
to us as I know he has to many of you.
Second, I welcome the chance to share thoughts about our
economic problems with members and friends of the New England
Council. Your organization has had a mission —- to analyze dis-
passionately the problems of a once relatively depressed region,
to propose constructive approaches and develop a needed consensus
for action, and to "stick with it" year in and year out. The
relative strength and progress of the New England economy in
recent years stands in part as a tribute to your faith and efforts.
Of course, New England, like every other region of the
country, has not been exempt from the effects of national problems.
I need not linger over the human and statistical evidence of
economic trouble — the postwar record unemployment rate, the
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unutilized industrial capacity, the signs of stress in financial
markets, and the rest. You know all that* and we also know the
sense of uncertainty and even frustration that these developments
breed.
But this period can also be one of great opportunity —
an opportunity, with reasonable good sense and good management,
to set the economy on a course of sustainable growth for many
years ahead. Indeed, I believe substantial progress has been
made in laying the foundation for that growth. Of course, there
are some big potential stumbling blocks ahead — and I will be
touching on them tonight. But, first, let's summarize where
we are.
For long months we have, quite obviously, been in
recession. Our situation has many of the characteristics of
earlier, recurrent postwar recessions. But to consider recent
developments as "just another recession" would, to me, miss the
essential point.
For more than a decade, roughly encompassing the 1970fs,
our economic performance had been deteriorating in fundamental
ways. We had come earlier to take growth of 4 percent or more
a year for granted. But the rise in productivity necessary to
support that kind of growth simply dwindled away; by the end of
the 1970's it had practically disappeared. At the same time,
inflation got out of hand. We found ourselves with the most
persistent and largest increase in price level since the
ODntinental dollar; after a while, we had come to expect it —
to anticipate it in our business decisions, in our financial
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planning, and in our shopping. As we did so, we tended to
leverage our capital, to reduce our liquidity, to divert our
energies into more speculative and unproductive activities —
to take risks in ways that could not be sustained. And in the
end, the growth we took for granted was undermined.
By the late 1970fs, the country began responding —
responding most particularly by attaching hitjh priority to the
effort to deal with inflation. The Federal Reserve, by
necessity, has been at the leading edge of that effort,
recognizing no inflation can be stopped without appropriate
restraint on the growth of money and credit. And that effort
was made more difficult because complementary approaches were
weak or lacking.
We should never have anticipated that dealing with a
deeply entrenched inflation would be fast and easy; it has
not been. Strong pressures on credit markets, with interest
rates affected by continuing inflationary expectations, have
burdened capital intensive industries in general, and housing
in particular. Plans undertaken and financed in the expectation
of rapidly rising prices have had disappointing results, in
some cases leading to unanticipated financial strains and even
bankruptcy. Profits have been hard hit as prices have stabilized
faster than costs and volume has declined.
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We are still some distance from price stability.
But I do believe we can now fairly claim the insidious
upward momentum of inflation has been broken. I judge
that not simply by the fact that the common indices of
inflation this year have been running at a third to a half
of their earlier peak levels. I believe we also see signs
that the hardened skepticism of financial markets and the
public at large about our ability to deal with inflation
a skepticism bred over years of disappointment and false
starts — is beginning to yield. One reflection is the
rapid decline in long-term interest rates in recent months —
although they are still very high historically. And there
are hard analytic reasons to believe that progress toward
stability can be maintained during a period of business
recovery.
Part of my optimism in that respect is rooted in a
sense that the stage is being set for restoration of productivity
growth. Typically, productivity does poorly in a recession;
it's hard to increase output per worker when total output is
falling, as it has been. But business after business reports
more intense efforts to boost efficiency, and in many instances
there are signs of a new sense of cooperation between manage-
ment and labor. Recent data suggest some tentative signs of
more favorable results. But the real payoff should come in
a period of expansion.
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At the same time, the upward trend of wage and
salary costs has slowed• The pattern is uneven among
industries and companies, partly because of contracts
extending over several years. But it is unmistakable.
With inflation slowing, that restraint on nominal
income has been fully consistent with higher real income
for those working. The demonstrated progress against
inflation ~ combined of course with the currently excessive
levels of unemployment — should be reflected in further
restraint on the growth of nominal wages. Together with
rising productivity, the result should be slower growth in
unit wage costs, paving the way for further progress toward
price stability and the higher real incomes we want as the
economy expands. To be sure, movements in food, energy,
and commodity prices may not be so favorable to the consumer
they have all been affected by the recession. But neither
is it likely we will face the kind of agricultural or energy
price shocks we had in the 1970's.
I do not equate that progress against inflation with
victory — far from it. Concern about inflation is not some-
thing we can afford to turn on or off — not if we want to
see that progress continue and price stability restored.
That concern will, in turn, require continued vigilance in
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keeping appropriate restraint on the growth of money and
credit — a matter upon which I will say a few words in a
moment•
That restraint, I should emphasize, is not the
equivalent of a high interest rate policy -- quite the
contrary. Lending for any period of time is in essence
an act of faith -- faith, among other things, that interest
paid in the years ahead will yield a real return and not
lag behind rising prices.
The rapid declines in interest rates over recent
months, particularly in the longer-term markets, have, I
believe, partly reflected a basic reappraisal of the outlook
for inflation. Those declines in turn appear to be con-
tributing to some revival in housebuilding and supporting
other sectors of the economy. I am well aware interest rates
are still historically high, and that it is not yet clear
that a broad-based recovery is underway. Obviously, in the
circumstances, further reductions in interest rates would
be welcome. But we also wa.nt to be sure that lower rates
can continue so that the recovery will last. Therein lies
the challenge for economic policy — and for monetary policy
specifically: we need to combine recovery with further
progress toward stability or we would risk losing both.
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As you know, most of the monetary and credit aggregates
that the markets watch so closely are running somewhat above
the targets we set for ourselves at the start of the year.
So far as Ml is concerned, the data have plainly come to be
distorted by institutional change — particularly in October
by a flow of funds into checking accounts as a large amount
of All-Savers certificates have matured, Prospectively, the
introduction of new forms of transaction or quasi-transaction
accounts are likely to distort the figures further, although
the direction of impact is less evident. In the circumstances,
we have had little alternative to attaching much less weight to
that aggregate in guiding the provision of reserves until the
institutional changes settle down.
More generally, current developments with respect to
the growth of money and credit have had to be interpreted in
the light of all the evidence we can gather with respect to
the economy, price developments, interest rates, and financial
pressures. Taken together, the evidence is strong that the
desire for liquidity has strengthened appreciably this year,
as sometimes happens in periods of exceptional economic un-
certainty. The turnover or "velocity" of "Ml money" has,
for instance, declined appreciably this year, instead of
trending upwards as has been the pattern thoughout the post-
war period. M2 velocity — generally stable in most recent
years — has declined even more sharply.
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In all these circumstances, the Federal Open Market
Committee has remained willing for a time — as we indicated at
midyear — to tolerate^monetary expansion at a somewhat higher
than the targeted annual rate. That approach, in the light of
the evidence of exceptionally strong liquidity demands should
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in no way be interpreted as lack of continuing concern about
inflation — and happily I do not believe it has been so
interpreted by the markets. The fact is that, with velocity
patterns obviously shifting at least for a time, rigid pursuit
of targets would have had the practical effect of a more
restrictive policy than intended when these targets were set
out. It is not without relevance, in that connection, to
note that growth in bank credit, or private credit generally,
has been relatively limited this year, tending to confirm that
the greater liquidity provided has not spilled over into
inflationary private credit expansion.
What recent developments do emphasize is that, in a
time of rapid institutional and economic change, we must be
wary of highly simplified rules in the conduct of policy.
That is why we have always looked to a variety of monetary
and credit "targets," and retained elements of flexibility
and judgment in pursuing those targets.
What we do not have the flexibility to do is to abandon
broad guidelines for monetary and credit growth as a means of
judging policy over a period of time. The danger of creating
excess liquidity is not so much immediate, when there is so
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much Surplus capacity and unemployment, but rather when the
economy begins to regain forward momentum. That is why we
must continuously balance the need to meet liquidity needs
today against the risks of building in fresh impetus to
inflation tomorrow. And, that is also one reason why the
prospective position of the Federal budget remains of so much
concern•
In the fiscal year just ended, the Federal deficit was
$111 billion, and it could well be 50 percent higher in the
current fiscal year. That current deficit, approaching 5 per-
cent of the GNP, overstates the "structural" budgetary problems.
High unemployment cuts revenues and increases spending, tem-
porarily enlarging the deficit. Indeed, the current deficit,
while hardly welcome in so large a size, does provide support
and impetus to the economy at a time of cyclical weakness.
But the hard fact is that, as things now stand,
the deficit will remain close to current levels even as the
recession passes. Left unattended, the budget situation poses
a strong potential for a clash between the need to finance the
deficit and the rising financial requirements for housing and
for the business investment needed to support lasting growth
in productivity. Simply pumping out more money and liquidity,
year after year, to meet the needs of the government would
risk renewed inflation and drive investors away from the long-
term markets once again. The alternative of the government
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bidding away a limited supply of credit from the homebuyer
or businessman is hardly more inviting — and would also be
reflected in high real interest rates. Understandable con-
cern about one or the other of those "scenarios11 feeds back
into today's markets, tending to keep interest rates higher
than they would otherwise be.
There was meaningful progress on this front in the
passage of tax and spending legislation last summer; it was
particularly encouraging that the Congress and the Administration
acted in the face of an election with the economy in recession.
Further progress will not come easily. But I am encouraged
by the degree of consensus on the need to continue in the
direction of fiscal moderation and by the fact that so much
of the debate centers on "how" rather than "whether." It
is the budgets for 1984 and beyond that seem to me especially
critical, for the private economy would then be expanding more
rapidly. But we should clearly understand that failure to
act with all deliberate speed would, quite simply, be a major
block to recovery and its sustainability.
The remaining problem area that I would like to touch
upon more fully is international economic and financial con-
ditions. More than ever before in the postwar world, prospects
for sustainable expansion are closely tied to what happens
abroad. And other countries are, of course, partly dependent
on ,our own policies and approaches.
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Not just the United States but the entire industrialized
world is in recession. In greater or lesser degree, the econ-
omic and financial circumstances of other countries parallel
our own -— and for similar reasons* Unemployment is at record
levels, prospects for near-term growth today seem limited, and
the financial ties that bind us to the developing world have
become strained. Should we fail to understand the full extent
of these difficulties or respond inappropriately, no country
will escape the consequences.
The problems of the rest of the industrialized world
and their policy approaches are so similar to ours that I
need not linger over the analysis. Suffice it to say that
our recovery can assist theirs — and vice versa -- just as
the heartening progress on the inflation front has been speeded
by the interactions among us. What is a threat to us all is
the evident pressure toward greater protectionism* There
are those who in our present situation would draw parallels
to the 1930's ~ usually with little foundation. One major
difference has been that we have not, by and large, yielded
to the temptation to retreat behind national barriers to trade,
with the inevitable result of cutting off each other's markets,
impairing growth in trade, and dulling competitive pressure
on prices. But there are too many exceptions to that generality
to permit us to rest easy.
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Another threat — essentially without precedent
in the postwar world — is an outgrowth of the financial
difficulties of much of the developing world. Those developing
countries, for all their problems/ have been a growing, dynamic
feature of the world economy. Even during the 1970 's, in the
face of enormously increased energy prices and slower growth
in the industrialized world, they maintained strong forward
momentum. That growth was marred, however, by increasingly
large external payments problems. The current account deficits
of all non-OPEC developing countries soared to $75 billion or
so after the second oil crisis and continued at that rate
into this year.
For a time, those deficits were supported by a vast
expansion in international credit. Some of that credit was
official — relatively inexpensive and long-term. But an
increasingly large chunk was from commercial banks around the
world. According to available data, which may well be in-
complete, outstanding bank credit to the non-OPEC developing
countries doubled from 1975 to 1978 — from about $60 billion
to about $125 billion — and then nearly doubled again to about
$230 billion by the end of 1981.
The process of rapid debt accumulation could not be
sustained indefinitely. The potential problem was brought to a
head at this time by a combination of circumstances. Sharply
higher- interest rates increased debt service requirements rapidly
relative to the capacity to service debt. The widespread recession
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in the industrialized countries and the declining level of
real world trade restricted markets for the exports of the
developing countries. Declining commodity prices put further
pressure on many developing countries^ still dependent on
commodity exports for a large portion of their foreign exchange
earnings•
The result is that, in the pa$t year or so, we have
seen several important borrowing countries — first in Eastern
Europe and then in Latin America -- reaching the limits of
their ability to keep up the servicing of their foreign debt*
As these countries experienced; strain,, the flow of bank credit
to some others -- freely available only a few months before --
was curtailed, threatening further problems.
In this situation, the need for closing the gap in
external payments -- sometiirtes at the expense of stopping
internail growth for a time -- is ^napbiguous; when the supply
of new credit is reduced, there is simply no alternative. The
key question is how orderly this adjustment process will be.
The more orderly and effective the adjustment, the more rapidly
growth in the developing world can be restored and sustained,
the more our own export markets and those of other industrialized
countries will expand, and the more promptly any questions
about the possible impact on the earnings of international
banks can be put to rest. It is precisely for these reasons
that there exists the strongest kind of community of
interest among borrowers and lenders, among governments
and private businesses, and 'among the developing and
industrialized countries, in working together to find
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effective answers to the evident problems. Each of the
parties has a critical role to play — sometimes together, and
sometimes separately. What is especially important is that
all these participants achieve a high degree of common under-
standing, recognizing the potentialities and limitations of
each for action. On the basis of that understanding, we can
then deal forcefully and effectively with the problems at hand.
In the first instance, the borrowing country itself
has the heaviest responsibility, for it must initiate and
carry out the needed adjustments in its own economic policies.
I do not underestimate the difficulties of such adjustments
for relatively poor countries, often with rapidly growing
populations and beset by political problems. But, we are
also fortunate that the principal countries involved have
important economic strengths, demonstrated growth potential,
and able economic officials who understand the needs and re-
quirements of the situation. Current liquidity problems need
not be — and for the major borrowers they are not — symptomatic
of inherent economic weakness.
Several countries — important in themselves and
important as examples — have taken the significant step of
entering into negotiations with the International Monetary
Fund, seeking the kind of international endorsement of strong
adjustment programs that IMF imprimatur carries. Just last
week, essential agreement on so-called "letters of intent"
was reached with Mexico and Argentina, and negotiations are
underway or about to begin with other major borrowers.
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Agreement with the IMF brings with it the availability
of certain amounts of medium-term financing, usually over a
three-year period. To assure the adequacy of IMF resources
in current and prospective circumstances, the ongoing nego-
tiations to enlarge the funds available to it should, and
can, be brought to an early conclusion. Both a sizable
increase in basic quotas and a reliable standby borrowing
arrangement — along the general lines proposed by the U.S.
Treasury some months ago — can be readily justified.
Agreement on both, now, seems to me doable. And such
agreement would convincingly demonstrate the capacity of
countries to act together to meet extraordinary needs.
I realize some time will be required to obtain necessary
legislative approval in each country involved. But early
international agreement will provide the tangible assurance
necessary to permit full commitment of presently available
funds if needed, and those funds could be temporarily sup-
plemented by IMF borrowing from the market or directly from
member countries.
The importance of IMF participation in adjustment
programs is not limited to the amount that institution can
itself lend. The Fund is in a unique position for evaluating,
dispassionately and impartially, the policies of its member
countries. Approval of adjustment programs proposed by the
member will reinforce the confidence of other lenders, paving
the way for needed extensions of official and private credit.
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In certain circumstances, national monetary authorities,
acting separately or jointly under the auspices of the Bank
for International Settlements, have been called upon to provide
some short-term "bridging" credit to help maintain continuity
of international payments and ease financial shocks. Mexico
and Hungary have been cases in point. But cases of that sort
can be justified only by a clear threat to the international
banking system as a whole; monetary authorities have neither
the capacity nor the authority to substitute short-term central
bank credit for needed medium or longer-term financing.
To some extent, more conventional means of official
financing support, such as official export credit agencies,
can play a role. But, in the end, some borrowing countries
will find it necessary to arrange some restructuring of their
outstanding debts and, for a time, to seek fresh credits from
the commercial banks that have been large sources of funds in
the past.
I fully realize that the extraordinarily rapid growth
in bank lending to some countries in the recent past cannot
reasonably continue indefinitely. But it is also an obvious
fact that some of the largest borrowers are not in a position
to repay debts suddenly, and an orderly adjustment program —
a program fundamentally in the interest of borrower and lender
alike — will frequently require at least transitional financing
beyond amounts appropriate to, or feasible for, the IMF and
official lenders.
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It is equally a fact that, given strong and necessary
adjustment programs, borrowing countries will not require bank
financing in amounts nearly as large as the sums provided by
banks over recent years. Indeed, lending banks, working effec-
tively together to meet a clearly justified transitional need,
should be able to provide the necessary margin of finance while
reducing ratios of outstanding loans relative to their capital
or assets. In a number of instances, outstanding loans need
not rise much if at all next year, although negotiations to
extend or rollover current maturities may be necessary.
From the standpoint of the banks themselves, such
restructuring and the provision of some additional credit,
alongside and dependent upon agreed IMF programs, will in some
instances be the most effective and prudent means available to
enhance the creditworthiness of borrowing countries and thus
protect their own interests. In such cases, where new loans
facilitate the adjustment process and enable a country to
strengthen its economy and service its international debt in
an orderly manner, new credits should not be subject to super-
visory criticism.
As we look ahead, both private institutions and the
relevant authorities and international institutions should
develop more effective means of heading off crisis. Some
banks have already undertaken promising initiatives to bolster
their information sources and lending judgments. The IMF, with
resources appropriately enlarged, is likely to have an even
larger role to play in maintaining essential discipline. The
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World Bank may wish to work more flexibly in coordinating
some of its lending with the Fund. Banking supervisors will
need to review in the light of experience their own criteria,
sources of information, and approaches toward the surveillance
of international lending.
But that is for the future. The main requirements for
dealing with the present situation are clear enough. The
corrective process in some countries is fairly under way.
The necessary further actions can be taken in the space of
coming weeks and months, so long as we have the wit and the
will to do so.
The theme of my remarks tonight can be summarized
in a few sentences. We have all come to recognize that lasting
prosperity must be built on a sound currency. We cannot deal
with our economic problems in isolation from other countries.
It's a complicated, difficult world, and the obstacles to
progress are not going to yield to one-dimensional approaches.
At the same time, we must not permit any sense of
frustration and impatience to blind us to how far we've come in
setting the stage for renewed prosperity. We can continue
the progress against inflation. We can deal with the budget
problem. We can manage the threats to the fabric of the
international financial system. We have strong and resilient
financial institutions, and an effective apparatus of govern-
mental institutions to contain and diffuse strains.
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Those are some of the major reasons that I am
convinced we can make the 1980's the reverse of the 1970fs —
a decade of renewed stability and progress -- a decade in which
the doubts and uncertainties of today will give way to renewed
confidence and vigor.
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Cite this document
APA
Paul A. Volcker (1982, November 15). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19821116_volcker
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19821116_volcker,
author = {Paul A. Volcker},
title = {Speech},
year = {1982},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19821116_volcker},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}