speeches · January 25, 1982
Speech
Paul A. Volcker · Chair
For release on delivery
10:00 A.M. , E.S.T.
Statement by
Paul A. Volcker
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Joint Economic Committee
January 26, 1982
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I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today
at the start of a new Congressional session. We will be facing
critical decisions on economic policy in the weeks and months
ahead. Toward the middle of next month I will be reporting to
the appropriate committees on monetary policy in more detail,
and this morning will confine my statement to more general
considerations.
Over the past two years, we have faced up squarely to
the necessity of reining in the inflation that had come to
grip the economy over a long period of time. There are now
clear signs of tangible and potentially sustainable progress
toward that objective. But the economy is also caught up in
recession, following several years of unsatisfactory performance.
In a real sense, the nation is paying the costs of the distortions
and imbalances in our economy created in large part by the years
of inflationary experience.
In approaching these problems, and in considering monetary,
fiscal, and other policies, it seems crucially important that we
keep firmly in mind the lesson of the 1970f s — s u stain able_ growth
cannot be built on inflationary policies. More positively stated,
the progress we are clearly beginning to see on the inflation
front, carried forward, will help lay the base for recovery and
much better economic performance over a long period of time.
As you know, the economy, after a burst of growth early
in 1981, levelled off, and in recent months strong recessionary
forces took hold. Real consumption expenditures have declined,
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in part reflecting an increased savings rate. A sustained
higher rate of sayings would ^ of course, be healthy in a
longer term perspective, and a nuiiiber of policy measures have
been adopted to strengthen savings incentives. But in tjie short
run, declines in consumption have led to unwanted inventories,
sharp reductions in production, and postponement of some capital
spending,
These are elements of <a classic recession pattern, and
at this point, the decline in economic activity has been of
proportions comparable to other post-World War II downturns.
What is different and so distressing is that the recession has
been superimposed on a pattern of sluggishness extending over
some years; unemployment was high to begin with, and now, at
8.9 percent, stands very close to its postwar peak. Moreover,
we have been left with a legacy of extraordinarily high interest
rates and financial pressures, conditions fundamentally associated
with the years of inflationary behavior and expectations.
The upward trend in unemployment in recent years and the
early onset of a new recession reflect both the difficulty of
living with inflation — and of bringing it to an end. Unsatisfactory
economic performance, well below our reasonable potential, has
extended over a number of years. The origins can be traced back
at least as far as the mid^lQeO's, when, as a nation, we failed
to accept the budgetary consequences of spending for a war and
vastly expanded social programs at the same time. Once fairly
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started, the inflationary process assumed a momentum of its own,
with only short interruptions in earlier recessions• At intervals,
the massive oil shocks, and to a lesser extent worldwide crop
shortages, ratcheted up the inflation rate, affected the real
income of most workers, and led to the need for large adjustments
in our industrial structure, depressing some traditional industries
while spurring others.
Through this period, one aspect of our economic problem
became increasingly obvious. Inflation came to be viewed as
a permanent part of the economic landscape, and workers and
businessmen, savers and investors, borrowers and lenders
built expectations of continued inflation into their daily
economic decisions. There have been profound effects on
financial markets and interest rates, inhibiting growth and
investment. Higher effective tax rates became a drag on the
economy, and the interaction of inflation with the tax system
tended to reduce business profitability and divert both business
and personal planning away from productive effort and innovation
into more speculative or purely financial areas. It*s worth
recalling the culmination of the process in late 1979 and early
1980 when concern about the inflation and budgetary outlook
brought interest rates to sharply higher levels and incited a
speculative outbreak in commodity and precious metals prices,
even as prices of long-term securities fell sharply. There
was broad recognition that inflation was eroding the foundations
of our economy, and that strong action had to be taken to restore
stability.
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In the circumstances existing, that job fell largely
to the Federal Reserve and monetary policy. As you know, we
have been pursuing a policy of reducing the pace of monetary
expansion over a period of time to rates consistent with price
stability. But monetary restraint, however necessary, can be
a blunt instrument. That is particularly true when prolonged
experience with inflation builds in expectations that it will
continue, when inflationary momentum is built into cost and
pricing behavior, and when productivity improvements are low.
For all its difficulty, monetary restraint must be an
essential part of any successful effort to damp inflation.
Strong upward price pressures may arise from a variety of
sources not directly related to monetary conditions — the
oil price shocks are a leading example. But those impulses
will persist and spread only if they are accommodated by growth
in money. And, as we have learned, we cannot really "accommodate"
to inflation without damaging economic growth and productivity.
Now, we can see highly encouraging signs that the
inflationary tide is turning --we see it in the data, and
less tangibly, in expectations. The improvement, to be sure,
has been associated with highly unsatisfactory business conditions
Prices of commodities, in particular, are sensitive to depressed
demand, there are incentives to reduce inventories, and the
weakened financial position of many companies has led to extra-
ordinary efforts to restrain wages and costs generally.
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No successful program to restore price stability can
rest on persistent high unemployment and depressed profitability,
any more than we can build prosperity on inflation. The obvious
challenge is to shape our policies in a way that can permit and
encourage recovery to proceed while maintaining the progress we
are seeing toward greater price stability. Some of the ground-
work has already been laid, or is in process. Price expectations
have calmed, and there is some evidence that the underlying trend
of costs is slowing.
Our current inflation did not originate as a "wage-push"
phenomenon. But in an economy like ours, with wages and salaries
accounting for two-thirds of all costs, sustaining that progress
will need to be reflected in moderation in the growth in nominal
wages. The general indices of worker compensation still show
relatively little improvement, and prices of many services with
a high labor content continue to show high rates of increase.
But we are all aware of recent negotiations completed or in progress
that seem to point toward significant moderation.
In many of these instances, to be sure, the changes reflect
the most intense competitive pressures, and the potential benefits
in terms of retaining jobs is clear. Major tests of the changing
climate still lie ahead? 1982 is a particularly important bargaining
year. It seems to me crucially important, not least for the
workers directly involved and for those now unemployed, that this
emerging pattern of greater moderation be extended. The end
result of moderating nominal wages should be higher real wages for
workers generally, for it can speed and sustain the process of recove
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The prospect for greater price stability, at least in
the near term, is reinforced by the outlook for stability in
petroleum prices and ample crops. And looking further ahead,
partly as a result of the more favorable tax climate, we
should be able to achieve renewed and sustained growth in
productivity as the economy grows.
Obviously, it is far too soon to claim victory in the
fight on inflation. To make that prospect a reality, properly
restrained and cautious monetary policy will continue to be
required. And at the same time, we need to combine that anti-
inflation effort with policies that will encourage and sustain
the recovery process. The linkage lies in considerable part in
encouraging favorable developments in financial markets and
interest rates, and there are critical implications for the mix
of governmental policies. An inadequate balance in policies
can add to financial stress, with severe consequences for vulnerable
credit-dependent sectors of the economy — consequences most
dramatically reflected in homebuilding and the problems of many
small businessmen and farmers. Moreover, our need to improve
and modernize our plant and equipment is evident* That need lay
behind many of the tax changes enacted last year; but over-
burdening monetary policy in dealing with inflation, with con-
sequences for financial pressures in the marketplace, can work
against that very objective.
This year we will have a very large Federal deficit. To
the extent that deficit is a passive reflection of recession --
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which in turn reduces other credit demands -- even that deficit
may be manageable without, in itself, standing in the way of a
more favorable financing climate. The large Federal contribution
to the income stream — including the second stage of the tax cut
at mid-year — should help buoy economic activity. But during
a period of recovery, deficits approaching the current magnitude
would have quite another implication; in an environment of limited
monetary expansion and rising private demands for credit, they
would threaten prolonged strain and congestion in financial
markets, with strongly adverse consequences for other borrowers.
And those consequences are not merely a hypothetical possibility
for the future. It is that concern that preoccupies the thinking
of many potential investors in the market today, making them
reluctant to commit funds for any long period of time, fearful
that interest rates may not decline or could even rise.
You and I may think those concerns overdone, particularly
in the light of the extraordinarily high level of rates today
in relation to the prospects for inflation. But the lesson for
policy seems to me unambiguous. Fiscal action needs to be
directed toward the progressive and substantial reduction of
the deficit as recovery proceeds.
We know there is a deep-seated public instinct associating
large deficits with inflation, and a great deal of history pointing
in that direction. We could also engage in abstract debate about
whether budgetary deficits are necessarily inherently inflationary,
and the point would be advanced that, given sufficiently severe
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monetary policy, they might not be. But that would
imply far higher interest rates, lower investment, and
poorer economic performance generally. Paradoxical as it
may seem, action by the Administration and the Congress to
bring spending and our revenue potential into closer balance —-
and ultimately into balance and surplus -— as the economy expands
can be a major element, through its implications for credit
markets, in promoting recovery and nurturing it. Credibility
in the budget, through its effects on expectations and behavior,
could only work toward lower interest rates and speeding the
disinflationary process.
In essence, the burden of my comments is that the need
for disciplined financial policies to carry through the anti-
inflation effort is not lessened by the current recession. It's not
just a matter of the longer-run — to back away from the commit-
ment to deal with inflation would be a disturbing matter for
financial markets today, complicating the prospects for early
recovery.
Interest rates fell appreciably last fall, and most
have remained substantially below earlier peaks. But in both
real and nominal terms, they remain extraordinarily high. The
fact is markets remain sensitive, disturbed, and uncertain despite
the encouraging trend toward less inflation. We cannot wish
these doubts and skepticism about the future away; we can act
to dispel them by our
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That, of course, has important implications for
monetary policy. As I indicated at the outset, I will deal
more specifically with our intentions with respect to monetary
growth after the Federal Open Market Committee, in the normal
course, meets next week to adopt guidelines for the coming
year. The basic thrust of policy will remain one of encouraging
continued progress on the inflation front. With such progress,
there should be adequate financial resources to support renewed
economic growth.
Present economic conditions are those of pain and hard-
ship for many. In working to relieve them, let us not forget
the basic circumstances that brought on the difficulty. Let
us take heart from the signs of progress in turning the corner
toward greater price stability. We can build on that progress,
and, in doing so, restore the confidence and financial conditions
so critical to recovery.
it -k
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Cite this document
APA
Paul A. Volcker (1982, January 25). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19820126_volcker
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19820126_volcker,
author = {Paul A. Volcker},
title = {Speech},
year = {1982},
month = {Jan},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19820126_volcker},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}