speeches · March 26, 1981
Speech
Paul A. Volcker · Chair
For release on delivery
9:30 A.M., E.S.T.
Statement by
Paul A. Volcker
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Committee on the Budget
House of Representatives
March 27, 1981
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I am pleased to be here today to discuss our shared
concerns about the interrelationships of budgetary and
monetary policy. I have the distinct impression that
there is a broad consensus about the appropriate goals for
economic policy, including the priority need for a marked
reduction in inflation as a prerequisite for sustained
growth in employment, productivity, and real income. The
difficult task we have before us is to translate that general
consensus into effective action. The Administration has
provided a firm lead in its program for economic recovery.
I hope that our dialogue today will further contribute to
this process by enhancing mutual understanding of our needs
and policies.
In principle, it is broadly accepted that the objective
of monetary policy must be to restrain growth in money and
credit as part of the process of turning back inflationary
forces. Indeed, the effort to control inflation has, until
now, often seemed to rely almost exclusively on monetary
policy. The consequence has been higher interest rates and
greater strains on our financial fabric,and on industries
particularly dependent on credit markets,than would other-
wise be necessary.
There is also understanding that no escape from those
financial pressures can be found in expansive monetary policies.
In the end, such an approach would only aggravate the very
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inflationary forces that underly so much of the difficulties
in the economy and in financial markets. What is necessary
is that other policies — including most specifically the
fiscal decisions that are the province of this Committee —
be in harmony with the need to deal forcefully with inflation.
In particular, I cannot stress too strongly the need to change
the strong upward trend in Federal spending that has character-
ized recent years.
As you are painfully aware, inflation is not
yet receding. We did avoid a further ratcheting up in the
general rate of inflation last year, despite another quantum
jump in oil prices and strong wage pressures. But that
"holding action" has been accompanied by little growth, on
balance, in economic activity since 1979, and unemployment
is high in important sectors of the economy.
Moreover, inflationary expectations are now deeply
embedded in public attitudes, as reflected in the practices
and policies of individuals and economic institutions. After
years of false starts in the effort against inflation, there
is widespread skepticism about the prospects for success. Over-
coming this legacy of doubt is a critical challenge that must
be met in shaping — and in carrying out — all our policies.
Changing both expectations and actual price performance
will be difficult. But it is essential if our economic future
is to be secure.
Monetary policy inevitably has a crucial role in this
effort. It must be — and must be seen to be — consistently
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directed towards curbing excessive growth in money
and credit. Such restraint is inherent in the Federal
Reserve's commitment to reduce the growth of money and credit
over time until inflationary pressures subside.
Our specific objectives for monetary and credit growth
in 1981 were presented to the House and Senate Banking
Committees last month. Without going into detail here,
these targets point toward further reductions in the growth
of money and credit as compared with the rates of increase
in other recent years. In the context of strong inflationary
pressures, the targets are intended to be restrictive, as
they necessarily must be if there is to be a winding down
of the inflationary process.
The need for that basic discipline is common to virtually
all schools of economic thought and is, as you know, recognized
in the Administration's program for economic recovery. The
only issue for debate is how vigorously to proceed.
I might also note that our efforts to keep money growth
within acceptable bounds will at times be associated with
substantial variations in short-term interest rates in
response to shifting credit demands, changes in economic
activity, or other factors. Increases or declines in short-
term rates — such as have occurred recently — are sometimes
cited as an indication that Federal Reserve "policy" is changing,
But those interpretations are misleading. Those interest
rate fluctuations typically reflect shifts in credit
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demands and expectations about inflation and economic
activity, which can be volatile, and should not call into
question our intent to maintain firm control on monetary
growth over time. At times, with inflation strong and
the economy expanding, restraint of money and credit
expansion may well be associated with high interest rates.
But those high interest rates are fundamentally a reflection
of the strength of inflation and excessive credit demands;
they are not in themselves a policy objective. indeed, over
time restraint on money creation should lead to lower, not
higher interest rates, as inflation subsides.
It is clear that the process of reducing inflation through
monetary restraint can be painful. It implies less money and
credit than is needed to support both the current rate of
inflation and sustained growth of real activity. Obviously,
the faster that inflation subsides, the greater will be the
scope for real gains in economic activity. Monetary policy
is, of course, designed to encourage and speed this disinflationary
process. But if strong cost pressures from wage settlements,
energy prices, or other factors persist or accelerate, strains
in financial markets will be greater than otherwise, and real
activity is likely to remain constrained. All of that points
up the importance of other aspects of economic policy and, in
particular, the stance of fiscal policy, the principal concern
of this Committee.
The Congress and the Administration are now in the process
of making a fundamental reappraisal of the conduct of economic
pol'icy. The focus of this effort is the Administration's far-
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regulatory reforms. The design and success of the program
that emerges is critical to the effort to reduce inflation
and increase productivity. I personally am encouraged by
the initial Congressional reactions to the new direction
proposed by the Administration. There appears to be broad
recognition of the nature and urgency of our problems and
a willingness to bring to bear a new discipline on spending.
This Committee and others will be debating, as you must,
the Administration's proposals. In my view, it would be
inappropriate for me or the Federal Reserve to inject ourselves
into consideration of the precise form of the budget and tax
cuts. Rather, I will confine myself to some general comments
about the overall thrust of the budget, and how it inter-
relates with the problems and purposes of monetary policy.
In that connection, I want to emphasize that my judgments
about appropriate budgetary decisions are not heavily dependent
upon a particular forecast about economic activity over the
next year or two. Of course, the actual budget results for
any fiscal year are in fact sensitive to what is happening
with respect to prices, unemployment, real income, and interest
rates. But our ability to forecast these variables with precision
is demonstrably limited. The range of uncertainty is probably
increased at a time of major new policy initiatives and possible
"external" shocks because past relationships may be a less
reliable guide to the future.
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I know you unavoidably will need, in the end, to make
precise numerical assumptions in presenting the budget. But
rather than suggesting precisely which assumptions are most
plausible for fiscal 1982, I believe it more important to
emphasize certain basic and longer-run considerations that
seem to me valid whether or not growth or inflation turns
out moderately better or worse next year than a particular
forecast might suggest. I emphasize the point because the
problems with which we are dealing are fundamental; they have
arisen over a long period of years; and the solutions must be
geared to the fundamentals rather than to cyclical concerns,
that to a considerable degree are unpredictable in any event.
Put another way, I believe we have a clear idea of where the
major economic and financial risks lie, and now the task is
to minimize them.
Among the fundamental considerations is the desirability,
from the standpoint of economic performance over time, of tax
reduction. I have little doubt that the growing level of
taxes — relative to GNP approaching the highest level in
our history, even during war — is a factor both in slowing
growth, adding to inflationary cost pressures, and distorting
savings and investment decisions.
There is no dispute among economists that the particular
structure of taxes can have important effects on incentives
to work, to save, to invest, and to bear risk. Consequently,
to the extent taxes can prudently be reduced, it is important
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that the reductions be designed in a manner to maximize
the beneficial effects on incentives. That is why, as I
understand it, the Administration has urged that tax proposals
involving other considerations be deferred.
What limits our ability to reduce taxes is, of course,
the potential budgetary deficits — deficits that are already
likely to be large in the period immediately ahead. Given
restrained growth in money and credit, the sale of Treasury
securities to finance a deficit curtails the availability of
funds to private borrowers, potentially reducing needed pro-
ductive investment. As the deficits are larger, the threat
of extraordinary pressures and strains on interest rates and
financial markets increases, and the more difficult it is to
control the money supply and inflation. The risks are increased
to the extent deficits are incurred when the economy is expanding,
That is why I emphasized at the start the critical
importance of cutting back as sharply as possible the
inexorable rise in Federal spending. In my judgment, that
must be the keystone in the arch of any new approach to
economic policy — a policy that can offer a real prospect
of success in dealing with inflation and in laying the ground-
work for lower interest rates and more vigorous growth.
In approaching that job, we should bear in mind the
seemingly chronic tendency for actual Federal spending to
exceed official estimates for future fiscal years. Recent
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experience in that regard has been particularly disturbing.
We have usually been overly optimistic in our assumptions
about economic circumstances, overestimating growth in the
economy or underestimating inflation. To be sure, there will
always be errors in estimates, and in some circumstances —
an unexpected recession, for example — a temporary automatic
response of expenditures to deteriorating economic conditions
may be appropriate. But not all the unanticipated expenditure
increases reflect new economic circumstances; the tendency
has been to add or enlarge programs and to underestimate their
expenditure requirements. If history is any guide, spending
tends to exceed intentions as we move from initial budgetary
planning to actual results, and I would suggest you appraise
the risks in that light.
I would also be cautious, in assessing budgetary pro-
spects, of the view that increased business and personal
savings should be looked to as a means of financing a deficit.
Savings are exceptionally low today. I share the hope and
expectation that new economic policies and declining inflation
will restore a more adequate level of savings. But those
savings, as and when they materialize, are urgently needed
to finance productive investment and housing — they should
not be dissipated in financing prolonged huge budgetary deficits,
For all those reasons, considerations of general
economic policy suggest all the risks lie on the side of
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cutting expenditures too little. I am acutely aware of
the difficulties and constraints that you face — the need
to increase defense spending, to protect the truly needy,
to pay interest on the national debt, and to maintain
strength and continuity in other essential programs. In
the broadest sense, those security, social, and other require-
ments ultimately limit what can be done to reduce spending.
But looked at from the standpoint of the need to reduce
inflation and encourage economic growth, you cannot, in my
judgment, cut too much. Every added dollar of spending cuts
will provide more assurance that needed tax reduction can be
accomplished within a prudent budgetary framework. Every
step toward a reduced budgetary deficit can only help head
off tension in financial markets and make room for private
investment.
You know how difficult it has been in practice to
achieve a reasonable balance between Federal outlays and
receipts. The record is clear; there has been only one
surplus in the Federal budget in the past 20 years. We
will not reach that objective in fiscal 1982. But we
must not continue to rationalize decisions that can only
have the effect of sustaining huge deficits indefinitely.
In setting the 1982 budget, we can meet two crucial
criteria that seem to me implicit in the Administration's
thinking. First, we can cut back the upward trend in
spending and significantly reduce the ratio of spending.to
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the GNP. Second, we can put the budget on a path that
realistically will produce balance and move into surplus
as the economy returns to levels of unemployment and
capacity utilization characteristic of most recent years.
You are well aware there are no easy choices before
you. But the wrong choice, it seems to me, would be to
let this opportunity pass to change the direction of
Federal spending. Then, the risk of prolonging inflation
and unsatisfactory economic performance and of great strains
in financial markets would be aggravated. Surely, there
is room for cutting if there is the will, and the Adminis-
tration's proposals for specific cuts over a broad array
of programs point the way.
The Federal Reserve has an indispensable role to play
in dealing with inflation. To be effective, we must demon-
strate that our own commitment is strong, visible, and
sustained. That is our intention. But the effectiveness
of our effort depends on complementary fiscal, regulatory,
and other government policies. I feel sure that we are in
fundamental agreement about those concepts. What remains
is to confront unflinchingly the hard decisons that this
effort will require.
* * * * **
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Cite this document
APA
Paul A. Volcker (1981, March 26). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19810327_volcker
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19810327_volcker,
author = {Paul A. Volcker},
title = {Speech},
year = {1981},
month = {Mar},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19810327_volcker},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}