speeches · October 13, 1980
Speech
Paul A. Volcker · Chair
For release on delivery
11 A.M. CDT (Noon EST)
The Burden of Banking Regulation
Remarks
by
Paul A. Volcker
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the
Annual Convention
of the
American Bankers Association
Chicago, Illinois
October 14, 1980
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There are times in the life of our Nation when it is probably
the better part of wisdom for Federal Reserve Chairmen to be neither
seen nor heard, and this may be one of them. In the light of that,
you may wonder why I welcomed the invitation to speak to you today!
I did so for a variety of reasons.
Implementation of the reserve requirements imposed by the
Monetary Control Act is now only a few weeks off. As a result,
the Federal Reserve will be thrust into a closer relationship
with many of your institutions than ever before. Under the
combined pressure of volatile markets, strong competition and
insistent legislative initiatives to achieve social purposes,
issues of both regulation and deregulation swirl about us as
perhaps never before. Broad questions of the future banking
structure of the country are being raised more actively than in
the memory of almost all of us. Some of those questions arise
from the rapid growth of international banking in general, and
the continued penetration of foreign banks in the United States
in particular. Others reflect technological change in banking and
communication within the country, the pressures on thrift institutions
to diversify, and competition from non-depository institutions.
Substantial legislative and regulatory action has resulted — the
International Banking Act, expanded powers for thrifts, and liberali-
zation of interest rate ceilings to name some of the most important.
These changes, in turn, have helped expose for debate other, long
quiescent issues revolving around the McFadden Act and the Douglas
Amendment governing interstate banking.
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I know and sympathize with the feeling of many bankers
caught up in this situation that the capacity of their institution
for change is "overloaded" — that they hardly have time to adjust
to new circumstances in one area before further requirements are
thrust upon them. Certainly, to deal with these questions at all
comprehensively would "overload" this speech, so I will confine
my remarks to only a few of the issues.
The greatest threat to the cohesion and stability of financial
institutions over time comes from instability in the economy itself
and the value of money. We can be gratified that the "free fall"
in economic activity that many sensed for a few months this spring
rapidly dissipated, and that we can now point to many signs of
recovery. The peak inflation rate of last winter has subsided.
But it is also evident that the more fundamental problems that
have developed over more than a decade remain. Productivity and
savings remain abysmally low. Investment activity is hesitant.
The lull in the upward sweep of oil prices — following the doubling
and more in 1979 and early 1980 — cannot disguise our continuing
vulnerability to foreign supplies and potential scarcity despite
the gains in conservation that we are now making. And most important,
we are face-to-face with the challenge of achieving economic recovery
while turning down the underlying rate of inflation — a process
that, I believe, is essential to lasting growth and prosperity.
The volatile performance of interest rates and financial
markets over the past year broadly reflects shifting concerns and
judgments about whether those challenges can and will be met, and
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particularly whether inflation can be brought to bay. A year ago,
I emphasized in my remarks to you the essential role and responsibility
of monetary policy in dealing with inflation and inflationary
expectations. That, of course, remains equally true today. It
also remains true that our economic performance and financial
markets — and the effectiveness of monetary policy itself — are
impacted by other important public and private policies and actions.
The banking community can make no greater contribution, in its
own interest, to economic and financial stability than by intelligent
debate about, and support for, policies dealing with inflation,
energy, and productivity. Your constructive interest in the
structural reforms embodied in the Depository Institutions De-
regulation and Monetary Control Act seems to me an apt case in
point, directly assisting the conduct of monetary policy. More
broadly, your strategic position in the economy provides an ideal
vantage point for encouraging the sense of urgency, combined with
understanding and patience, required to deal with problems that have
concerned us over so long a period of time. As C.C. Hope has rightly
emphasized, in connection with your inflation Task Force, "you can
make a difference."
I doubt that many illusions remain among those in the banking
world or elsewhere that the road to stability and growth will be
unambiguously smooth or the journey painless. What is critical is
that we face up to the problems — as I believe we have begun to do —
and accept that progress toward our goals will entail changes in the
way we go about our work.
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In that process I believe you can legitimately ask whether
those of us in Washington who regulate appreciate as fully as we
might that same need to change our regulatory approaches. Do we
avoid unnecessary burdens? In trying to protect what needs to be
protected for a relative few, do we reduce the availability or
increase the costs of financial services for the many?
I would be the first to confess that the pattern is mixed.
I squirm
— when a small bank writes, in response to our mailing
of a new regulation, that "no one within 80 miles
around here understands it;11
when we take 92 printed pages of regulation and some
1,506 interpretative letters and Court decisions to
administer "Truth in Lending" (adding up to a pile of
papers nearly two feet high);
- when the Board of Governors alone approved 82 regulatory
actions last year totaling over 1,000 typewritten pages,
and the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC have
their own comparable flows;
when the Board is engaged in such esoterics as whether
the location of a branch bank or terminal must be identified
on a customer receipt by state as well as street and city
address;
and when, much more importantly, we almost constantly find
ourselves closing unintended loopholes in regulations that
cut across the natural workings of the market place —
regulations that over time could better be abandoned.
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The point has been made to me that the spewing out of complex
regulations, applicable to all institutions big and small, may be
a larger threat to the economic viability of our smallest banks
than any branching statute because only the larger institutions can
possibly have the expertise and specialization to know the regulations.
Nor can it make sense to burden our regulated institutions to the
point that their competitors can grow more rapidly.
That litany of evils is familiar stuff. The operative question
is how to deal with it. I sense the climate of opinion, in the
Congress and elsewhere, is becoming more sensitive to the problem.
But we have a long distance to go in identifying the most productive
lines of reform — after a number of years in and out of Washington,
I have a certain skepticism that simply mandating more levels of
bureaucratic review of what we bureaucrats do is likely to be a
productive approach. In many cases, substantive changes in legis-
lation, mandating regulation in great detail, will be necessary.
And most difficult of all, we will have to resist the temptation
that Federal regulation is an appropriate answer to every problem
or abuse that can be identified.
Those interested in lightening the regulatory load will, in
my judgment, be more effective if they take as a point of departure
that nearly all regulations today have their roots in a perceived
and legitimate public interest that needs to be served. For
instance, the special role of banking in our economy is reflected
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in deposit insurance, in a rather elaborate network of facilities
to support or cushion weak and failing institutions, and in
protection from competitive excesses. The logical counterpart
to this government support for your business is regulation to
protect the public interest in the safety and soundness of the
banks. Another area of regulation that will persist — a type
of regulation increased in coverage by the Monetary Control Act —
flows directly from the needs of monetary policy.
Much more controversial are the series of regulations —
typified by Regulation Q and restrictions on branching, mergers,
and holding companies — designed to protect or enhance a particular
market structure, or to shield institutions from competition.
In this area, regulators may often be more enthusiastic about
deregulation than many of those regulated. But even the strongest
proponents of deregulation are forced to recognize that too sudden
change could undermine the stability of many financial institutions,
and be disruptive to the economy as a whole.
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Finally, and most important in terms of sheer volume in
.recent years, is the spreading legislation aimed at social
purposes and a fair distribution of credit. In this area of
Truth-in~Lending, Equal Credit Opportunity, the Community Re-
investment Act and Electronic Funds Transfer there has been
massive proliferation of rules and regulations governing some
of the terms and conditions of literally millions of credit and
deposit transactions. Concepts of what is "right" or "wrong,"
"fair" or "unfair" are hard to judge at the margin. Those
concepts sometimes cut across and conflict with commercial
judgments. As a result, we have a fertile breeding ground for
complexity, laborious dispute resolution procedures, new costs,
and mutual aggravation. Yet, it seems idle to think that the
basic objective will be, or should be, foregone.
If, in the face of these needs and circumstances, a vision
of no regulation is impracticable, how best to proceed? Let me
suggest at least four approaches.
First, we can, I believe, legitimately draw distinctions in
some areas of regulation between larger and smaller institutions.
I know that involves arbitrary judgments about size, and cuts
directly across our traditions of treating everyone just alike.
But treating everyone alike in principle can, in practice, lead to
differences in burden.
I do not mean that small banks should in general be wholly
exempt, but rather that there can be opportunities for greatly
simplified regulatory and enforcement procedures. We are cautiously
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(perhaps too cautiously) experimenting in this area in the ap-
plication of the Monetary Control Act, where reporting and
reserve maintenance calculations will be much less frequent for
the smallest financial institution. The new Small Business
Regulatory Flexibility Act points in the same direction, and
we intend to move forward as quickly as we can to reexamine all
our regulations in the light of that statute. The need and
opportunity seems to me particularly great in the area of "social"
regulation, where smaller institutions typically do not have the
capacity to analyze and implement all the complications of the
regulations — but neither are their operations so complex as to
require pages of regulatory instructions.
Somewhat along the same lines, I would suggest that we could
achieve the basic objectives of our "social" regulations with much
less cost —-I would like to think 90 percent of the purpose with
10 percent of the regulatory language and institutional effort —
if the basic legislation refrained from demanding precisely the
same disclosures and treatment for all transactions, however
infrequent they might be. The main purpose — say understandable
receipts or intelligible interest rate computations — must be
clear, and it is usually helpful to spell out the requirement
explicitly for the common types of transaction. But, if the goal
is clear and penalties not disproportionate, surveillance by in-
formal counseling or through the normal examination processes
should be able to substitute for detailed regulation of the more
unusual transactions.
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Perhaps most importantly, legislators, regulators, and
the regulated need to be aware that the burdens and inequities
of regulation multiply when they run counter to strong market
incentives. In some areas — say, capital requirements — there
may be strong public purposes dictating the regulatory intervention;
indeed the strong competitive pressures among institutions pushing
toward more leverage of capital may justify enforcement of more
arbitrary "rules of thumb" for the industry as a whole than would
seem reasonable for the best managed institutions. But our
experience with regulating interest rates on deposits is more
typical; as the difference between the rates institutions are
willing to pay, and what they are permitted to pay, widen, two
consequences are inevitable. The regulated institutions will
grow less rapidly, and they will constantly innovate to test the
bounds of the regulation, generating new regulatory efforts to
protect the old.
In particular situations, that regulatory effort may be
justified for a time. Under present conditions, for instance,
a large number of institutions and the markets they serve, for
historical reasons, would be severely dislocated by an abrupt
termination of all deposit rate ceilings. So long as that situation
can be demonstrated, the regulators have no real choice other than
to maintain the effectiveness of the regulation, dealing with
loopholes as they appear. But it is equally evident that the
regulations should be progressively relaxed just as soon as con-
ditions permit -- and, .as I understand it, that is precisely the
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intent of the Congress in delegating authority over those
ceilings to the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee.
I might point out that the objective of deregulation of interest
rate ceilings would be greatly facilitated by progress against
inflation — progress that would naturally bring in its wake
a declining trend of interest rates.
Finally, I am convinced there is a great deal more we
can do, as regulators, in getting the essential message of our
regulations across in simple, readable English, better tailored
to the particular needs of the recipient. To take one egregious
recent example, no credit unions, and very few banks, need to
know how to deal with Euro-dollars when computing their reserve
requirements, yet those subtelities now take up pages of regulation
routinely sent to all institutions.
While many of the results may not yet be visible to you,
we have undertaken a substantial effort to review and simplify
our own regulations wherever possible. A small group of
professionals has been working full time on that effort in
Washington, and we have enlisted the help of the Federal Reserve
Banks which are closer to your operating problems. More stringent
internal controls have been established for new and old statistical
reports, and, believe it or not, I can demonstrate tangible progress
in reducing the data received from member banks.
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We have tried in the limited time available to apply some
of those lessons to the implementation of the Monetary Control
Act. But I sense we are still only scratching the surface.
As we reach for further improvement/ we would welcome your
cooperation in working with us. We may not always agree on
what is essential and what is not — and it is not unknown, I
would remind you, for bankers to press us for new regulations
or for information we do not collect!
Indeed, your own actions indirectly can inadvertently have
a great deal to do with the regulatory process. The Congress
tends to respond to perceived abuses. A relative handful of
legitimate consumer complaints, a clear pattern of discrimination
by a few institutions, incidents of conflict of interest or self-
dealing by a few bank managements — like it or not — make news
and generate pressure to "do something" about it. And if the
broad intent of remedial legislation seems to be skirted by
exploiting areas of legal fuzziness or loopholes, the response is
likely to be still more legislation or regulation.
I know no industry as large and varied as banking can, however
vigilant, anticipate and correct every possible complaint or abusive
practice. Yet, in this day of open Government and close corporate
surveillance, I cannot emphasize too strongly how important it is,
working through your trade associations and otherwise, to demonstrate
that the industry generally is voluntarily dedicated to maintaining
high banking standards.
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One current example of significance for perhaps no more than
two dozen banks, is the practice that has developed over a number
of years to manipulate certain Euro-dollar transactions to reduce
reserve requirements artificially. While no law or regulation
has prohibited the practice, it does distort the international
payments sytem and competitive relationships. The practice seems
to be spreading, and we have asked the few banks engaging in the
practice to cease. I feel certain they will cooperate, and we
will not be impelled to develop complex new regulations to deal
with the situation. You are aware, I am sure, of the concern
over remote disbursement and delayed availability of funds —
areas where I believe we can also find solutions without being
driven into heavy-handed regulation.
I would also note that, to the extent an industry calls
upon governmental assistance, the more it opens itself to govern-
ment regulation. You may not associate banking with exceptional
requests for government aid — and neither do I. But I would
remind you troubled banks do as a matter of course expect assistance,
and every failure or near-failure involving such assistance to some
degree strengthens the hand of the would-be regulator. I, as you,
have opposed sweeping extension of deposit insurance coverage
partly because I believe that, over time, the result would be
more intrusion by government into your internal management.
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I am very conscious of the fact that I can offer no blinding
vision of deregulation en masse this morning. But I am convinced
we can turn the tide that has been so strong. In my judgment,
it's not a job that we, or the financial industry, can do
effectively alone. But with mutual understanding, we can identify
more clearly the central needs, cull out what is essential from
what is not, meet the essential needs more efficiently, and rely
to the maximum extent on competitive processes and market disciplines,
It is in that spirit that I particularly welcome the formation of
your Deregulation Task Force. Regulations take up even more
of our time than yours, and we both have an enormous stake in
doing it rightl
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Cite this document
APA
Paul A. Volcker (1980, October 13). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19801014_volcker
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19801014_volcker,
author = {Paul A. Volcker},
title = {Speech},
year = {1980},
month = {Oct},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19801014_volcker},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}