speeches · February 8, 1972
Speech
Arthur F. Burns · Chair
TFor release on delivery
Statement by
Arthur F» Burns
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Joint Economic Committee
February 9, 1972
I am glad to appear before thi£ Committee once again to
report the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System on the state of our national economy,
The early months of the past year presented an extraordinary
challenge to our national policies* Although a recovery had
commenced in economic activity, it proceeded at a rather sluggish
pace. Although the number of men and women at work was again
rising, the advance was no faster than that of the labor force; hence
unemployment continued at a 6 per cent rate. Although gains in
productivity were resuming, they had yet to display the vigorous
improvement characteristic of earlier cyclical recoveries.. And,
despite much idleness of men and equipment, wages and prices
continued to rise at a virtually undiminished pace.
Moreover, the competitive position of the United States in
international trade was deteriorating further, confidence in the
exchange value of the dollar was weakening, and a massive shift
out of dollars and into foreign currencies was getting under way.
In mid-August of last year, the President took bold and
comprehensive steps to deal with these accumulated economic
ills; for it had become reasonably clear by then that the perfor-
mance of the economy was eluding our national goals.
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The new economic policy had four major objectives: first,
to slow sharply and at once the rate of inflation and thereby break
the inflationary psychology gripping the nation; second, to set in
motion forces that would stimulate more rapid expansion in aggregate
demand and a decline in unemployment; third, to promote increased
efficiency in our factories, mines, and other workshops; fourth, to
set the stage for a reinvigoration of export trade, restoration of
confidence in the exchange value of the dollar, and progress toward
a sustainable equilibrium in the balance of payments.
The major new initiatives announced by the President
included a 90-day freeze on virtually all prices and wages, to be
followed by a more flexible price and wage policy; some selective
reductions in taxes, including restoration of the investment tax
credit; a temporary surcharge of 10 per cent on imports; and
suspension of convertibility of dollars into gold or other reserve
assets* The Congress in its turn moved with exemplary speed to
enact the basic tax measures recommended by the President, and
to strengthen the legislative basis for the new wage-price policy.
The nation responded with a sense of exhilaration to the
new economic policy; for it meant that we as a people could and
would deal energetically with our major economic problems--
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inflation, unemployment, inadequate growth in output and productivity,
and imbalance in international payments, A new confidence in our
nation1 s economic future was felt all around.
But, as so often happens in h\iman affairs, the first blush of
enthusiasm gave way to a more cautious appraisal of the problems
yet confronting the economy. Doubts gradually began to be expressed
about the effectiveness of the control program that supplanted the
freeze, about the strength of the economic recovery, or about the
durability of the Smithsonian currency agreement negotiated last
December.
These are understandable concerns and it would be fool-
hardy to dismiss them. Surely, we must recognize that uncertainty
is inherent in all economic life, that the deep-seated economic
problems we have been struggling with have not yet been solved,
that more--perhaps much more--remains to be done to restore the
conditions for lasting prosperity. Indeed, we must try to see to it
that the momentum generated by the new economic policy of last
August is sustained in the months to come,
But if all this is worth keeping in mind, it is all the more
important to recognize the solid evidence of improvement that has
occurred since last August in the economic and financial scene.
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The brief freeze on wages and prices turned out to be an outstanding
success. True, deferred increases went into effect when the freeze
ended, causing an upsurge in average wage rates and to a lesser
extent in prices, Nevertheless, both wages and prices have
advanced at markedly lower rates since August 1971 than they did
earlier in 1971. Moreover, demands for very large increases in
wages seem less pervasive now than at any time in recent years,
due in large part to the controls now in existence.
Financial markets have reacted constructively to this
slackening pace of inflation. Interest rates have declined, as
the inflation premium in the cost of credit has been whittled away.
Yields on high-grade corporate and State and local government bonds
have fallen about 75 basis points since last summer despite continued
heavy demands on the capital markets. The rate of interest charged
by some banks on prime business loans has dropped to the level
prevailing in the early 1960Ts. Interest rates on mortgages have
been moving down. And stock prices have risen significantly since
August, reflecting the greater confidence with which individuals
and businesses view the future.
This increased confidence has been evident also in markets
for goods and for labor. Consumers stepped up their buying of new
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cars and other durable goods last fall, and they were willing to go
into debt to do so, This was a major factor in the quickening pace
of economic activity in the fourth quarter. The demand for capital
equipment, which had been conspicuously weak, is now appreciably
stronger than last summer. And of late business firms have been
adding substantially to their work forces; by the fourth quarter of
1971, civilian employment had risen more than a million from its
level six months earlier, and a further significant increase occurred
this January.
Gains have also been made in restoring confidence inter-
nationally. The readjustment of currency values negotiated in
December by the Group of Ten countries was an event of far-
reaching significance. While concern about international trade
and finances has by no means ended, the uncertainties that had
been troubling businessmen and the exchange markets have been
greatly reduced. Confidence in continuing growth of the world
economy and of international trade is now much stronger than it
was last fall.
All these signs indicate that our people can look to the
future with more confident expectations. The state of confidence,
however, is always apt to be delicately poised in the early stages
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of economic recovery. It is therefore vitally important, now that
the Federal Government has become such a large factor in our
nation's economy, that its operations and policies be conducted in
ways that sustain the more confident public mood released by the
new economic policy. If that is accomplished, the prospects will
be very favorable for a quickening tempo of economic expansion in
the year and years ahead.
Several major areas of private demand offer promise of
additional stimulus to economic activity during 1972, Business
inventory policies have been conservative throughout 1970 and
1971. As sales pick up, there will be a need to keep larger
inventories on hand. Fixed capital expenditures by business firms
should also move up. Over the past two years these outlays declined
in real terms, so that a backlog of postponed projects has in all
probability accumulated. Recent surveys already indicate a sub-
stantial rise in planned capital expenditures during 1972--an
anticipation supported by a marked rise in manufacturers1 new
capital appropriations and the recent strengthening in new orders
for capital equipment and in construction contract awards,
A more rapid pace of consumer spending may well be an
additional source of stimulus in 1972. The rate of personal saving
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has been abnormally high for an extended period, and consumers
have accumulated large amounts of liquid assets that could be
drawn down. The tax reductions resulting from recent legislation
will provide additional support to consumer buying power this year.
As buying of goods or services goes up in one sector, its
strength will be transmitted to other sectors, and the economic
expansion will gather momentum, This is a familiar process in
business cycle history, and it seems likely that we are even now
experiencing such a development.
The Federal budget for fiscal 197 2 that has just been presented
to the Congress seems broadly consistent with the objective of more
rapid economic expansion, for it embodies a good deal of further
stimulation through both higher expenditures and tax reductions.
I recognize that the budget deficit reflects preponderantly the short-
fall in the performance of the economy. Yet, as I contemplate the
future, the sheer size of the projected fiscal 1972 deficit--close to
$40 billion--gives me some pause.
To maintain the public confidence that is so vital to the
achievement of faster economic expansion, I consider it crucial
to make tangible progress toward a more balanced fiscal position
in the 1973 budget and beyond. Whether or not the projected
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revenues are realized will depend principally on the strength of
economic recovery. On the other hand, the projections of further
increases in expenditures are largely within the control of the
Congress* I would urge, in keeping with the President's
recommendation, that the Congress impose a rigid ceiling on
fiscal 1973 expenditures--a ceiling to be treated as inviolate except
in the event of a grave national emergency, This necessary disci-
pline, which I have urged on other occasions, would go far to
reassure the public that the Federal budgetary process is not out
of control.
Let me turn now to ths role that monetary policy needs
to play in furthering national objectives this year. Clearly, our
monetary affairs--no less than our fiscal affairs—must be kept
in order, so that public confidence in our monetary management
is maintained. An unduly expansive monetary policy would be
most unfortunate, particularly in view of the large Federal
budgetary deficits now projected. We need always to be mindful
of the fact that increases in money and credit achieved today will
still be with us tomorrow, when economic conditions may no
longer be the same-as they are today.
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At this stage of the business cycle it is essential to pursue
a monetary policy that will facilitate good economic recovery.
Supplies of money and credit must be sufficient to finance the
growth in consumer spending and in investment plans that now
appears in process. Let me assure this Committee that the
Federal Reserve does not intend to let the present recovery falter
for want of money or credit. And let me add, just as firmly, that
the Federal Reserve will not release the forces of a renewed
inflationary spiral*
We are now in a favorable position to provide the monetary
support needed for a quickening pace of production and employment.
While expansion in the supply of money and credit was relatively
brisk during 1971, we successfully avoided an unduly rapid growth
of liquidity.
No single measure of money or credit represents adequately
the impact of monetary policy on the economy. Let me nevertheless
cite a few salient facts. Growth of the narrowly defined money
supply--that is, currency and private demand deposits--amounted
to 6. 2 per cent during 1971, compared with 5. 4 per cent in 1970.
If the money supply is defined more broadly, so as to include also
consumer-type time and savings deposits at commercial banks, the
rate of growth was 11. 1 per cent during 1971, compared with 8. 1
per cent in the previous year.
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These 1971 growth rates of money balances are at the upper
end of the range witnessed over the postwar period. That is what
should happen at a time of sluggish economic growth, as this
Committee has pointed out.
The substantial increase of the money supply, as variously
measured, was accompanied by abundant and readily available
supplies of credit. Inflows of deposits at the nonbank thrift
institutions were unusually large, and they permitted a record
increase in the volume of mortgage borrowing. Residential
construction was greatly stimulated, and new housing starts rose
to unprecedented levels by the fourth quarter. Business firms
were able to fund short-term debt and to rebuild their liquidity
position. State and local governments too, finding a ready market
for their securities, were able to expand fairly rapidly their
outlays on public goods and services.
Interest rates fluctuated over a fairly wide range last year
as financial markets were buffeted by international as well as
domestic disturbances. In the spring and early summer, inflationary
expectations worsened, and interest rates moved up despite the ready
availability of funds. But they declined again after the announcement
of the new economic policy in August. By the end of 1971, interest
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rates on virtually all types of debt instruments had fallen below
the levels prevailing at the beginning of the year.
Looking at 1971 as a whole, the growth in money and credit
was, I believe, consistent with the needs of an expanding economy.
There were, nonetheless, sizable variations in monetary growth
rates--particularly in the narrowly defined money stock, which
rose rapidly in the first half of the year and slowly thereafter.
These variations reflected the public1 s changing demand
for cash balances, which is related not only to the need to finance
current expenditures but also to the desire to hold money for pre-
cautionary reasons. Given the changing state of confidence during
1971, there is reason to believe that precautionary demands for
cash intensified during the spring and then subsided following the
August announcement of the new economic policy.
To some degree, however, the variations in monetary
growth resulted from shifts of emphasis in monetary policy.
Early in 1971, the Federal Reserve sought to promote a rate
of monetary growth sufficient to make up for the shortfall in late
1970. With precautionary demands for funds burgeoning unexpectedly
at that time, key monetary aggregates expanded at a faster pace than
expected or than would have been desirable for any length of time.
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Monetary policy, therefore, moved gradually during the spring and
summer to restrain excessive monetary growth. Once again, the
change sought was magnified during August by outflows of dollars
to foreign money centers, and later--over a longer stretch--by
an unforeseen upsurge of domestic confidence and consequently
smaller precautionary demands for ready cash*
In recent months, the Federal Reserve has sought to
encourage a faster rate of .monetary expansion than occurred in
the late summer and fall of last year. Open market operations
have been conducted with more emphasis on increasing the reserve
base of the banking system. In the five months from September
through January, total bank reserves rose at an annual rate of over
8 per cent. Thus far, much of this increase has supported an
accelerated growth in time deposits. But, in due course, the
narrowly defined money stock, on which so much emphasis is
nowadays placed by some single-minded observers, will also
respond; preliminary calculations indicate that this aggregate rose
more rapidly in January than in the immediately preceding months.
The additions to bank reserves have helped to move interest
rates down in recent months, especially short-term rates. With the
passage of time, this effect should become diffused as the additional
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funds—the reserves and the deposits they support--are employed
to finance consumer loans, or mortgage loans, or for other purposes.
It would not be surprising, therefore, to see short-term interest rates
rise somewhat as economic expansion carries the economy to higher
levels of resource utilization.
On past occasions, a rise in short-term interest rates has
more frequently than not induced a similar increase in long-term
rates. At the present time, however, the differential between short-
term and long-term rates is unusually wide. If further progress is
made in dampening inflationary expectations, there need not be any
rise in the cost of long-term funds. In fact, my hope is that further
downward adjustments in long-term interest rates will occur in the
months ahead, and that credit will remain in abundant supply for
housing, for State and local construction, and for our nation1 s
business firms.
Before closing, let me turn briefly to other financial and
economic issues. I have already referred to the significance of
the Smithsonian agreement of December 18. I have little patience
with the view that this agreement will prove to be fragile. The
nations participating in the negotiations last fall realized that much
was at stake. They still do* All of us are compelled by our own
economic interests to continue in the same spirit of cooperation
that led to the agreement.
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There is, however, much unfinished business at hand*
Legislation is needed to permit a change in the official dollar price
of gold, as called for by the Smithsonian agreement. This legislation
will soon be considered by the Congress, and I strongly recommend
swift approval.
Over the longer run, we and our trading partners must
fashion a new and stronger international economic order• The
issues are many and complex* A searching re-evaluation will
be needed of the roles played by gold, reserve currencies, and
special drawing rights in settling international accounts. Sufficient
flexibility in exchange rates will be essential to prevent large and
persistent balance-of-payments problems. The circumstances
under which the dollar may again be convertible into international
reserve assets will have to be reviewed carefully* And determined
new efforts will be required to reduce impediments to the inter-
national flow of goods, services, and capital.
Progress in these areas will not be rapid. But it is essential
to the health of every national economy, including ours, that we get
on with the job.
In the domestic sphere, the most urgent need is to realize
the promise of our present wage and price policy. The return to
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a free-market economy will be speeded if the Pay Board and the
Price Commission find ways to deal more successfully with outsized
requests for wage and price increases. It is of great importance that
the Pay Board resist pressures to reach compromises in specific
cases that threaten to undermine its overall objective. The Price
Commission is less subject to this hazard, since its decisions do not
involve direct conflict between labor and management. Its efforts to
hold down prices must be pursued with the utmost vigor, and yet leave
sufficient scope for confident and constructive business behavior.
For more rapid economic expansion is no less important at this
juncture of our nationrs history than bringing the rate of inflation
down to 2-1/2 per cent by the end of this year.
The jobs of both of these bodies will be lightened if improvements
in productivity accelerate. Our performance in this critical area has
deteriorated in recent years relative to that of other industrial
countries and of our own past. Resumption of rapid productivity
growth is fundamental to our longer-term prospects. With higher
productivity gains, we could have significant wage increases
}
larger profit margins,and numerous individual price declines within
a framework of a stable level of average prices; our ability to compete
with foreign producers would be greatly enhanced; and our national
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aspirations for cleaner air and water, for halting the process of
urban decay, for better housing, and a host of other things would
be more readily achieved.
Elevating the growth rate of productivity will require a
many-sided effort, with full participation by the public and private
sectors. A larger commitment of resources to technical research
and to new and improved capital equipment will be needed. Labor
and management will also need to get together in joint ventures to
increase productivity within the individual firm and plant. This can
best be done by assuring workers that they will individually share in
the benefits of improvements in output per manhour. Productivity
councils at the community and plant level could help to achieve this
objective, and—thanks to the initiative of the Congress—the National
Commission on Productivity will shortly be initiating a program to
establish such councils.
A serious national effort to increase economic efficiency
should also include the most careful consideration of the steps
needed to reduce abuses of private economic power, whether of
business or labor. That, I think, is an objective toward which the
great majority of the American people quietly aspire. Once our
labor and product markets become more competitive, there will
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be little or no need in the future for direct wage and price controls
such as we have recently instituted. This, too, would strengthen
the foundation of confidence on which our economy rests.
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Cite this document
APA
Arthur F. Burns (1972, February 8). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19720209_burns
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19720209_burns,
author = {Arthur F. Burns},
title = {Speech},
year = {1972},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19720209_burns},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}