speeches · October 5, 1969
Speech
William McChesney Martin, Jr. · Chair
For release on delivery
Statement by
William McChesney Martin, Jr.
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
before the
Committee on Banking and Currency
House of Representatives
Concerning H. R. 13939
October 6, 1969
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I appreciate the opportunity to present to this Committee
the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on
H.R. 13939, a bill to extend for one year the authority to limit
rates of interest or dividends payable on time and savings accounts,
and for other purposes.
The first section of the bill would extend through
September 22, 1970, the discretionary authority to regulate rates
of interest on time and savings deposits initially granted to the
Federal agencies in 1966. In the establishment of ceiling rates,
that authority permitted a distinction between time certificates of
deposit sold in large denominations and other types of time and
savings accounts; it also extended to insured nonbank savings
institutions the type of rate regulations applicable to insured
commercial banks. The flexible authority provided by the present
law has proved to be useful during the past several years. However,
it would be desirable to grant this authority to the Federal
agencies permanently, rather than merely extending it for a year.
Permanent extension of the present authority—under which
ceiling rates on time and savings accounts may be suspended,
whenever economic and financial conditions warrant — would permit the
Federal regulatory agencies to formulate and implement plans for
moving toward the long-range objective of freer competition among
depositary institutions for the savings of the public. Over the
long run, the prospects for using our financial resources more
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efficiently, and for rewarding both small and large savers more fully
for their contribution to financing investment, would be enhanced by
a market-determined allocation of the flows of savings among financial
institutions and between such institutions and the securities market.
The second section of the bill would broaden the authority
of the Federal Reserve to acquire securities which are direct obligations
of Federal agencies, or are fully guaranteed as to principal and
interest by any agency of the United States, so as to permit direct
purchases from these agencies as well as purchases in the open market.
The bill would also express the sense of Congress that this authority
be utilized to further the objectives of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968.
General authority for Federal Reserve purchases of Federal
agency securities in the open market was initially granted by the
Congress in 1966. Very shortly thereafter, the Federal Open Market
Committee amended its continuing authority directive to the Manager
of the Open Market Account so as to permit transactions in such
securities under repurchase agreements. This authority has been
utilized regularly since then. When the Open Market Account has
made repurchase agreements with dealers, the practice has been to use
either direct Treasury obligations or Federal agency issues, at the
option of the dealer. The Federal Open Market Committee has kept
under review and study the question of outright transactions in
such securities, but as yet no outright purchases have been made.
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Whether outright operations in agency issues by the System
would contribute meaningfully to improvement in the functioning of
the market for these issues is, of course, a matter of judgment.
Among the factors that one has to consider are the difficulties
of outright transactions in a market characterized by relatively
small and frequent issues offered by a large number of different
agencies. In such a market, the System would inevitably be faced
with problems of avoiding dominance of any one issue or of a series
of issues of any particular agency. Thus, in view of the limited
scope for System operations, the basic question is whether they would
contribute more to market improvement than they would to market
uncertainties about the nature, timing, and objectives of possible
System transactions.
As I interpret section 2 of this bill, however, it is
designed to achieve objectives considerably more fundamental than
improvements in the functioning of markets for agency issues. It
would provide direct access to Federal Reserve credit to these
agencies without limitations as to amount — an unlimited line of
credit at the central bank that our laws have denied even the U.S.
Treasury, and I think wisely so. Furthermore, it would require that
Federal Reserve authority to acquire these securities be utilized to
support a specific industry, rather than for the general purposes
of monetary policy.
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In assessing the merits of such a proposal, we all recognize
that the housing market should not be made to shoulder an undue share
of the burden of restraint during periods of inflationary pressures,
as it often has in the past. Housing is especially susceptible to
policies of monetary and credit restraint, both because home buyers
depend heavily on credit as a source of financing, and because
unusually large swings occur in mortgage credit availability.
It is appropriate, therefore, that special Federal programs
should be available to moderate these swings in the supply of mortgage
money, and thereby to avoid undue strains in the housing market during
periods when monetary restraint must be used to combat inflationary
pressures. The Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal
Home Loan Bank System have made a significant contribution to this
objective. This year, for example, increased commitments by FNMA
have been an important factor in preventing the flow of private
funds into new home mortgages from declining further. Also, increases
in loans by the Federal Home Loan Banks to member savings and loan
associations over the first eight months of 1969 were about twice
as large as in 1966. This source of funds has enabled the savings
and loan associations to continue committing funds to the mortgage
market in amounts exceeding those that would have been permitted by
new inflows of savings, repayments on existing mortgages, and
reductions in liquidity. Funds put into the mortgage market by these
agencies have, of course, reduced the supply of credit available to
other classes of borrowers in other markets.
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However, an attempt to ensure that the housing market would
be sheltered from the effects of monetary restraint during periods of
inflation by providing the Federal housing agencies with direct access
to Federal Reserve credit would, in the Board's view, have potentially
serious consequences. The amounts of funds that would have to be
provided to offset the effects of monetary restraint on the housing
industry could be extremely large. An impression of the potential
scale of such operations is conveyed by the pace of FNMA commitments
to the mortgage market this year. Recently, these commitments have
been at an annual rate of $9 to $10 billion.
It would be clearly inappropriate to add large amounts to
bank reserves in an effort to solve the problems of housing at a
time when inflation is so serious a threat to economic stability.
Consequently, the Federal Reserve could not acquire Federal agency
issues in volume without, at the same time, engaging in simultaneous
sales of direct Treasury obligations, or raising reserve requirements.
Unless such compensatory actions were taken, the resulting expansion
of bank credit and the money supply would be extremely inflationary.
Indeed, it would be tantamount to abandoning the use of monetary
instruments as tools of economic stabilization. And once the
principle was established that the credit-creating powers of the
central bank could be utilized to subsidize programs benefitting
the housing industry, it would not be long before others would
present their claims for similar support. Surely, a practical
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solution to the problems of the housing market—problems that
have typically emerged in periods of inflation—lies in other
measures than those that would make inflationary pressures vastly
worse.
If, on the other hand, we were to offset the effects on
commercial bank reserves of purchasing agency issues by selling
Treasury securities or by raising reserve requirements, the most
immediate result would be to exert general upward pressure on
market rates of interest. This would, of course, increase the cost
of borrowing to the Treasury and to other borrowers. More importantly,
however, it would worsen considerably the kinds of difficulties that
nonbank thrift institutions that specialize in mortgage lending are
already facing. More of their depositors would be induced to
transfer funds out of savings accounts and into market securities,
as they have been doing this year, and the institutions would then
have still fewer private financial resources to commit to housing.
The result of this process would thus be to substitute Federal
sources of funds for private sources in the mortgage market, with
little real gain in the overall flow of funds to housing.
For these reasons, the provisions of section 2 of this bill
do not seem to the Board a practical or appropriate solution to
achieving our national housing goals. A more constructive approach
would be to move as quickly as we can towards additional structural
reforms that would break down further the institutional barriers that
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interrupt the flow of credit to the housing market during periods of
credit restraint. We have already made progress in this area during
the past few years, but there is clearly more to be done. Greater
flexibility in the asset and liability management of the nonbank
thrift institutions seems especially important, if these institutions
are to have more freedom to compete with banks, and with market
securities, for consumer savings. The Board believes that a number
of the suggestions contained in the recent report of the Commission on
Mortgage Interest Rates would also be helpful. These include the need
for a review of State usury laws which may impede the flow of funds
to housing; the permanent abolition of statutory ceilings on FHA
and VA mortgage loans; amendments of the Federal Reserve Act to
permit loans to member banks on the security of any sound asset—
including mortgages—and to enable national banks to participate
more actively in the mortgage market. In the Board's view, these are
the kinds of measures that would be of substantial long-run value to
the housing market.
In conclusion, we must recognize that home buying and
therefore home construction, will probably always be quite sensitive
to overall changes in credit market conditions, irrespective of all
our efforts to provide buffers for the housing market. The postponable
nature of housing outlays, the large percentage of total cost that
consists of interest payments, and the dependence of the home buyer
on borrowed funds, all tend to make investments in housing vary markedly
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in response to inflationary pressures and monetary policy. These
are inherent characteristics of housing that we must live with.
But if we are more successful in using our fiscal and monetary
tools to keep inflationary pressures under control than we have
been in recent years, the housing market will be able to look
forward to considerably fewer, and less pronounced, interruptions
in its long-run expansion.
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Cite this document
APA
William McChesney Martin, Jr. (1969, October 5). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19691006_jr.
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19691006_jr.,
author = {William McChesney Martin, Jr.},
title = {Speech},
year = {1969},
month = {Oct},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19691006_jr.},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}