speeches · November 12, 1967
Speech
Darryl R. Francis · President
Farm Credit - Supply and Demand For
Funds and Efficiency of Credit Institutions
Speech by Darryl L. Francis, President
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Before the National Agricultural Credit Conference
November 13, 1967
It is good to have this opportunity to discuss some current
farm, credit problems with you who represent the nation's major
sources of farm credit. The fact that we meet for this discussion
indicates our great interest in the agricultural sector of our economy,-
Jn terms of employment, the farm sector of the economy is
declining. If attendance at this conference had remained proportionate
to the number of farmers, only about 50 per cent as many would be
attending today as attended twenty years ago, However, rather than
followirjg the decline in number of farmers, participants in these
conferences have increased. The farm credit industry is typical in
this respect to other agribusiness industries. Both the farm supply
and the processing and marketing sectors have trended constantly
upward. Agribusiness output in 1965 totaled about $130 billion.
Such products accounted for 30 per cent of the nation's economic
activity. The agribusiness group of industries grows about 4.0 per
cent per year in dollar volume, despite the decline in workers at
the farm sector.
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From a national welfare viewpoint, we are indeed fortunate
to live in a nation and an age when the production of food and fiber
requires such a small portion of the nation's labor. Only 6 per cent
of our labor force in the United States was employed on farms in 1965,
and the per cent employed in this sector has declined almost every
year during the past three decades. Indicative of the gains in farm
technology, one worker in 1966 produced sufficient food and fiber for
himself and 39 other people. This was almost six times the number
of people sustained by one farm worker at the turn of the century.
Of the 12 major industrial nations of the world for which
data are provided by the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooper
ation and Development), the United States in recent years has had the
lowest per cent of workers employed directly in agriculture. Employ
ment on farms in the 1960s ranged from 6 per cent of the labor force in
the United States to 49 per cent in Greece. In Western Europe, one
of the most highly-developed areas of the world outside the United
States, about 20 per cent of the labor force was engaged in agriculture
and still failed to produce sufficient food and fiber for the population.
The area imported a sizable portion of its farm product needs.
In nonindustrial nations such as the African states, India, and
Latin America, which contain about three-fourths of the world's popu
lation, more than half of the work force is usually engaged in producing
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food. In other words, while we are lining in a land of abundance,
most of the world has been subjected to the harsh laws of scarcity
as outlined by Malthus 150 years ago. The level of population in
most countries may have actually been determined by the food supply,
and starvation is the norm rather than the exception.
How have we in the United States achieved this efficiency in
the production of farm products? I might begin by commenting that
we have made wise use of our productive resources (labor, land
and capital). Our labor has generally been well trained and our other
resources have been efficiently allocated, not dictatorially nor by
committee, but by the desire of each person to achieve greater profits
via increased sales and/or reduced costs. This incentive to maximize
has provided a market for productive farm resources. The more
efficient operators have found it profitable to expand by purchasing
resources from others. Individual farm expansion has taken several
forms, including more acres per farm and an increase in both fixed
and operating capital. The less efficient operators and many of the
farm youth not already established in farming have moved to other
occupations where labor returns are greater.
Efficiency of farm production has been greatly enhanced by-
technological developments. Science has attacked farm production
problems on a wide front and with amazing success, mechanization
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technology" has made possible our large multi-row cultivating and
harvesting equipment, as well as numerous other labor-saving
machines. Plant and animal breeding have changed the characteristics
of plants and livestock. Chemicals, including insecticides, fungicides,
weed control agents, and fertilizers, have been developed which
enable producers to greatly increase output per acre and lower direct
labor requirements per unit of output, Each success provided incentive
for additional investment in research as markets for productive
inputs developed.
In this development most government programs, especially
those concerned with education and research, served as a catalyst,
aiding the market to achieve maximum efficiency. Agriculturally-
trained specialists hired by the government encouraged farmers to
adopt new devices and use new products. Credit markets for farmers
were improved through the organization of the Farm Credit Banks.
Research supported by government has made major contributions to
new farm production and marketing techniques. Government price
stabilization programs have tended to reduce risk and possibly
thereby increase marginal innovations. On the other hand, price
supports have tended to reduce the rate of adjustment in the farm
labor force and farm organization for maximum efficiency in some
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areas. The Acreage Control Programs, a companion to price
stabilization, may also have contributed to inefficiency in farm
organization and output, but possibly hastened the exit of labor
from agriculture. Despite the inefficiencies inherent in price and
acreage controls, most other government programs have, on balance,
tended to aid the market forces in moving toward greater efficiency
in the industry-
Most moves toward greater farming efficiency have involved
larger quantities of credit for longer terms. High returns to scale
have hastened farm enlargement and greatly enhanced demand for
farm real estate credit. Such credit rose at the annual rate of 9 per
cent during the past decade and at an annual rate of 7 per cent in the
prior ten years. Demand for credit per farm, i. e. , size of loan,
rose at a faster rate than total credit demand. Total credit per farm
rose at.the annual rate of 13 per cent during the decade ending in
1966, with almost equal rates of increase in real estate and non-
real estate credit. Each increase in purchased inputs from farm
supply industries has resulted in a corresponding increase in credit
demand. Costs of many farm supply items such as machinery,
breeding livestock, and specialized buildings can only be recovered
after many years of use. Demand for longer-terra credit for non-
real estate purposes thus increased.
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Despite government price stabilization programs, farm
credit risks have probably increased. Major fluctuations in farm
income could formerly be absorbed by the farm family, since family
labor and other nonpurchased materials constituted the major
portion of farm production expense. Now, however, purchased
inputs total more than four-fifths the value of all farm inputs and
three-fourths the value of all farm product sales. The farmer has
thus moved into the category of a businessman. His margin from
operations has declined. His capital and credit demands are high
in relation to net returns. He can now go bankrupt.
With this brief background of developments in the farming
industry, it seems appropriate to ask ourselves the questions: How
well have farm credit demands been met? How well has the com
mercial banking system performed its job of supplying farm credit,
and what are the prospects for bank credit to agriculture during the
next few decades?
We have several yardsticks for measuring the efficiency of
credit flows into agriculture. First, we have a general measure,
which is over-ail productive efficiency of the industry. If agriculture
is credit starved, it would necessarily be inefficient. This is not,
however, true relative to other nations. Compared with the rest of
the world we are quite efficient. We have a very small per cent of
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our labor force in agriculture. Yet it is able to produce an excess of
farm commodities for domestic use at current prices. Thus, on the
basis of over-all efficiency of farm production, it appears that farm
credit demands have been adequately met.
Another measure of the farm credit market is the rate of
return on farm productive assets. If agriculture is starved for
credit or capital, one would expect the returns to capital to be
relatively high. In other words, if farm credit is scarce, farm
assets are likely to be moderately priced. The rate of return on
such assets would be high. Returns on assets in agriculture, how
ever, are actually relatively low. Since 1959 the rate of return on
productive assets in agriculture has averaged only about 5 per cent.
This is less tha.n the average rate of return on book value in any of
the 6l major industries listed in Standard and Poor's Indvistry Surveys.
Despite the differences in measuring the value of farm and nonfarm
assets, these data indicate that credit to farmers has been sufficient
to bid up farm assets to relatively high levels.
A third measure of farm credit availability is the interest
rates paid by farmers on borrowed funds. Rates charged farmers
are generally higher than rates on other business loans. It is
difficult, however, to compare interest rates in absolute terms,
since size of loan and risk involved greatly influence the rate charged.
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During the past twenty years the rates paid by farmers have
increased less than rates paid by almost any other group. Average
rates on commercial bank non-real estate loans to farmers rose from
6. 3 to 7. 1 per cent. This was an increase of only 13 per cent, or
less than one percentage point, in the rate paid, whereas the prime
commercial loan rate more than tripled and the average rate on all
short-term business loans doubled. Agriculture would thus appear
to be in a more favorable position on the basis of interest rates paid
than it was twenty years ago.
These data on the farm credit situation are evidence that
agriculture is being adequately financed and that farmers are able
to borrow money at competitive rates.
If, as indicated, agriculture is being financed at reasonable
rates, do we have a farm credit problem, or is it limited to com
mercial bank problems of financing agriculture? The data seem to
suggest the latter. The volume of non-real estate farm credit by
commercial banks has already declined to a secondary position in
some states. In contrast, prior to the Great Depression of the 1930s
banks were the only institutional lenders of importance in this field.
In the late 1930's the Production Credit Associations and the Farmers'
Home Administration (Farm Security Administration) had begun to
supply substantial quantities of short-term credit to farmers. The
commercial banks1 share of all short-term farm credit by institutional
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lenders had declined to 57 per cent of the total in 1939. The
remaining 43 per cent included holdings of 30 per cent by the PCA's
and 13 per cent by the Farmers' Home Administration. Following
World War II commercial banks were in a highly liquid condition and
eager to acquire additional loans. As a result of this liquid condition
plus a rapid increase in farm credit demand, their holdings of short-
term farm loans rose rapidly. By 1952 the banks1 share had increased
to 76. 8 per cent of the $4, 1 billion outstanding to reporting lenders.
The share of short-term farm loans held by banks turned
down, however, in 1952 and the relative decline continued through
1967. Nationally the banks1 share of the total declined from 76. 8
per cent in 1952 to 69 per cent in early 1967. The PCA proportion
had increased from 13. 8 per cent to 24 per cent during the period.
Little change occurred in the shares held by Federal Intermediate
Credit Banks, while the share held by the Farmers1 Home Adminis
tration declined.
By early 1967 banks had been replaced as the leading
institutional lender of short-term farm credit in seven states. In
contrast, banks were the leading institutional suppliers of such
credit in all states only ten years earlier.
Looking at rates of growth during the past ten years, banks
have more than doubled their short-term farm credit outstanding,
while the growth of such credit held by the PCA's has more than
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tripled. In dollar amount, however, such holdings by banks
continued to increase faster, rising $4.4 billion compared with a
gain of $1. 9 billion for PCA's, These data all point to the fact
that PCA's are rapidly becoming a major competitor to banks in
supplying non-real estate credit to farmers.
Commercial banks have historically held only a small
portion of the farm real estate debt. At the beginning of 1967 all
operating banks held only 14 per cent of all farm mortgage credit,
a slightly smaller per cent than ten years earlier. Thus banks can
look back on a small relative decline in farm real estate credit and
a greater relative decline in non-real estate farm credit.
The facts with reference to farm credit so far indicate that
farmers are not only being supplied with credit at reasonable rates,
but that the competition for farm credit is so great that banks are
losing in the struggle to maintain their relative position of recent years.
I do not believe that the relative decline of commercial bank
credit to farmers can be traced to a shortage of funds in the banking
system as a whole. For example, a large portion of the farm credit
supplied by the PCA's and the Federal Land Banks has come from the
commercial banks. At the close of last year banks held about $6. 5
billion of non-insured government agency issues, a large part of
which were FICB debentures and F LB bonds. This is not a complaint
against cooperative farm credit. On the contrary, I would suggest
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that the evidence points to the possibility that these agencies have
done a more efficient lending job by purchasing funds from banks
at wholesale rates and retailing them out to farmers than has the
banking system through direct loans.
In looking at commercial banks to determine why they are
not gaining farm credit relative to other agencies, three problem
areas are apparent. I would classify them as follows: (1) problems
arising at the individual bank level, (2) bank structural problems,
and (3) legal restrictions.
First let's take a look at some individual bank problems. It
is quite obvious from the data that a number of banks are about "loaned
up," given the set of conditions under which they are currently operating.
A Federal Reserve System survey of bank credit to agriculture in mid-
1966 indicated that 30 per cent of all farm banks in the nation had loan-
to-deposit ratios in excess of 60 per cent and 10 per cent of such banks
had loan-to-deposit ratios exceeding 70 per cent. Given the legal
requirements for guaranteeing certain public accounts and the need
for day-to-day liquidity, it is apparent that a substantial number of
farm banks, especially those with 70 per cent loan-to-deposit ratios,
are short of liquid assets.
Further confirming the "loaned up" thesis is the fact that
one-sixth of all farm banks in the nation reported difficulty in
meeting farm financing requests from their own resources. About
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one-eighth of all banks in the Eighth Federal Reserve District
similarly reported difficulty in meeting farm credit requests.
Prior to rushing out with major programs for the solution
of this problem, however, we should take another look at the
situation. Surely one important factor in meeting credit requests
is the price charged on loans -- interest rates. If the rates charged
are below the going rate for similar loans, one would expect an
excess of requests and obviously all requests could not be handled,
i.e., rationing becomes necessary.
On the other hand, if the price paid for loanable funds such
as time and savings deposits is below the going rate, it is reason
able to expect a shortage of incoming money. One way of looking at
the supply side of the credit market is to imagine yourself a wholesale
merchant. If his offering price for apples is somewhat below the
going rate but his asking price is the current market price, he will
find his opportunities for selling to be about normal, but his ware
houses will soon be empty because his purchases will decline.
The da.ta indicate that many commercial banks are trying
to operate in a manner similar to that of the wholesale apple merchant.
Of the 175 banks in the Eighth Federal Reserve District which reported
difficulty in meeting farm credit requests, 119, or two-thirds of the
total, were paying well below the maximum permissible rates on
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savings in mid- 1966. It seems apparent that funds will be lost
to other agencies and other geographic areas if the local
offering price is not at generally competitive rates. I might
mention that the.PCA's, the banks1 leading competitor in supplying
short-term farm credit, were paying well above 5 per cent for
their funds last year.
Part of the individual bank problem in the farm credit
field is probably associated with motivation and quality of personnel.
When I observe bank statements which show low loan-to-deposit
ratios and note the high rate of growth of non-bank loans to farmers
in their communities, I can only assume that the banker doesn!t
care for the additional business. Perhaps more competition among
financial agencies is desirable in such communities. In other
instances the quality of personnel in the competing agencies appears
to be the deciding factor. Most of the non-bank farm credit agencies
are staffed by well-trained farm credit specialists. Banks in rural
communities may also find it advantageous to obtain specialists in
farm credit, just as banks in non-farm areas have credit specialists.
This would be a major step in equalizing bank opportunities in the
farm credit field.
Second to individual bank problems in meeting farm credit
competition I would place bank structural problems. Some banks
grow at rapid rates while others grow at slower rates. The
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capitalization and credit needs of most farms are increasing at
a very high rate. As a result, many farms are becoming increas
ingly difficult for the local banks to finance because of size alone.
Some banks are located in low savings and high credit demand areas.
Since loanable funds of banks are generally obtained locally, these
banks may not be able to obtain sufficient funds at competitive rates
to meet their farm credit requests at going rates. A banking system
which moved funds freely throughout the nation from high savings to
high demand areas would apparently be more efficient in meeting all
credit demands.
In the absence of a nationwide banking system we attempt
to ta,ke care of these local fund shortage and overline problems
through correspondent banking. Individual overline requests have
probably been handled through the banking system with greater
efficiency than local demands which ha/ve resulted from over-all
liquidity shortages. About one bank in seven reported to the Federal
Reserve System of having received overline requests during the 12
months ending in June 1966. Of the smaller banks (those with
capital and surplus of less than $300, 000) more than a fourth received
overline requests during the year.
I believe that most large correspondent banks are eager to
participate with their customers in handling overline demands of
farmers. On the other hand, I know of instances where smaller banks
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preferred not to be bothered with such credit, and the loans were
eventually made by non-bank agencies. How much of the farm
credit business banks have lost because of problems of this
type I do not know. If we were farmers, I wonder how long we
would give the banker to reply to credit requests when we knew that
someone else who had the means to meet all our credit demands
was ready to give us a favorable hearing. With farms increasing in
size and capitalization at such a fast rate, it is inevitable that
participation requests will rise. I believe that the banking system
will rise to the occasion and meet a considerable portion of such
requests. On the other hand, unless many banks make preparations
to avoid unnecessary delays in meeting overline requests, the banking
system will probably continue to lose many overline customers.
The other part of the bank structural problem, namely,
areas which are short on loanable funds at going rates, may require
solutions outside the commercial banking system in some instances.
Loanable funds and debt instruments do not move through the banking
system as freely as we would like. Federal funds, certificates of
deposit, and other instruments move quite freely among the larger
banks and provide an opportunity for liquidity adjustments. Federal
funds also move quite readily from the smaller to the larger banks.
However, it is the smaller banks in the areas which are chronically
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short on credit that may have difficulty in financing farm credit
demands. Also, the certificates of deposit of smaller banks are
not as marketable as those of larger banks. Unfortunately, the
correspondent banking system does not work as well as we would
like in these situations. Different credit standards among banks
prevent the free movement of customers1 notes from bank to
bank. We do not have insurance policies available for most types
of loans in case of default. Since banks in credit-deficit farm
areas are likely to be loaned up, they have few asset instruments
other than notes for exchanging, and exchanging notes from small
to large banks has been less than satisfactory in providing a
uniform national farm credit market. Nevertheless, I believe
that more cooperation within the banking system toward the solution
of this problem would be profitable.
It has been suggested that a system of farm credit discount
banks be organized for discounting the paper of commercial banks.
These discount banks would apparently obtain funds by selling debt
instruments in the money market similar to Federal Intermediate
Credit Bank operations.
I am not sure, however, that we have exhausted the
facilities that are in existence for distributing funds to rural areas.
The Federal Intermediate Credit Banks were originally designed for
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this purpose. Most bankers have looked upon the FICBs as the
exclusive discount agency for the PCAs. The officials at the local
Intermediate Credit Bank, however, informed me that they are dis
counting farm notes for commercial banks. I believe that they are
willing to expand such discounting. They report that the terms are
generally the same for commercial banks as for the Production
Credit Associations. If the facilities of the Intermediate Banks are
capable and willing to do the job, and I believe they are, then I think
that they should be used by those commercial banks that are willing
to pay money market rates for loanable funds.
Only if we try the FICB's and find them unable to do the
job do I suggest new agencies for channeling funds from money
markets to rural banks. Ultimately all loanable funds must come
from savings and the small increments created through the banking
system by monetary operations. Thus, an agency already in
existence for channeling such savings would appear to be stronger
and more efficient than a new agency, if its policies are sufficiently
flexible.
The third category of bank problems in meeting farm
credit demands involves legal restrictions. In some respects legal
restrictions are similar to bank structural problems, since both
retard flows of loanable funds through the national market.
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The type of restrictions to which I refer are those which
limit the rates that banks may pay and charge for funds. When
market rates are below the legal limits, the legal restrictions are
not effective. On the other hand, when market rates rise above the
legal limits, legal restrictions can be damaging, both to the banks
involved and to some sectors of the economy.
When commercial banks are unable to pay rates comparable
v/ith other financial intermediaries on time and savings deposits, banks
tend to lose deposits to these institutions. As a result, potential
borrowers from banks are the ultimate losers. When limits are placed
on rates paid by all financial agencies, savings tend to move directly
from, savers to users, thus bypassing our efficient lending agencies
and thereby creating major inefficiencies in the loan markets.
Maximum limits on loans create problems similar to the
limits on savings. For example, there is a legal limit of 6 per cent
on single payment loans in one state of the Eighth Federal Reserve
District and a limit of 7 per cent in another state. When such limits
are set below the market rate, as determined by supply and demand
conditions for loanable funds, either credit rationing or a tendency
to bypass the regulations occurs. Banks may purchase loans made
in other areas which yield higher returns, or they may divert money
from single payment farm loans to installment loans at higher rates
of return.
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If credit rationing occurs, the banks will be likely to
supply funds to the very low-risk applicants until all loanable
funds are depleted. All higher-risk borrowers will thus be unable
to obtain credit. In either the case of credit rationing or of by
passing the restrictions, the poorer and higher-risk farmers who
the restrictions were designed to protect are damaged most, for
credit is unavailable to them.
So long as the basic supply and demand situation with
respect to loan and investment funds produces high general interest
rates, 'it is necessary for the commercial banks to go along with
these trends. Banks must both pay high rates and charge high rates
if they are to perform their function in the economy. In many ways
the high and increasing general level of interest rates is disruptive
and undesirable. But if the general level of rates needs to be kept
down, total demand for loanable funds must be reduced. Public
policy can accomplish this only by influencing the supply and demand
situation with respect to the total product of the economy. The only
way we know to accomplish this is by a more restrictive Federal
budget and a somewhat less rapid monetary expansion.
In conclusion, we have a very efficient agricultural industry
in the United States. Apparently, farmers are receiving credit at
competitive rates. Commercial banks, however, have declined some
what from their earlier position as the predominant supplier of farm
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credit. Several factors may have restrained the rate of bank
credit growth to farmers. Such factors may include lack of
proper personnel, bank structural problems, and legal restrictions
on banks. I believe, however, that we should fully utilize existing
institutions and attempt to reraove some legal restrictions both on
rates charged and rates paid before proposing additional agencies.
I don't believe that we have exhausted these opportunities at the
present time.
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TABLE I
Per Cent of Population Employed in
Agriculture in Selected Nations
Per Cent
Japan (1966) 24.2
Norway (1966) 18.6
Switzerland (I960) 10. 1
Iceland (1964) 14.0
United States (1965) 6.1
Italy (1966) 24. 7
Portugal (I960) 42.3
Denmark (I960) 17. 5
Canada (Oct. 1966) ?,. 5
Ireland (Apr. 1965) 32. 2
Greece (196l) 49.0
Germany (1965) 10. 9
Source: Economic Surveys, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, Paris, 1967.
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TABLE II
Interest Rates on Selected Loans and Securities
Rat. 2S Increase
1945 1965 1945-65
Farm loans
Nonreal estate
PCA 5. 40 % 6.60 % 22 %
Commercial banks 6.30 7. 10 13
Real estate - Federal Land Banks 4.00 5.60 40
Other loans
Bank business loans
Prime commercial 1.50 4. 50 200
All short-term 2.20 5. 00 127
FHA new home mortgages 4.50 5.47 22
Securities
3-month Treasury bills 0.375 3.954 954
3- to 5-year U. S. Government bonds 1. 18 4.22 258
Corporate Aaa bonds 2.62 4.49 71
High-grade municipal bonds 11..6677 ,, 3.27 96
Federal Land Bank bonds 11..3366--ii// 4.32 218
Intermediate Credit Bank debentures 0.88 4.47 408
1/ 1946.
Sources: Rates on farm credit from USDA; FHA new honie mortgage yields
from 1964 Supplement to Economic Indicators and Federal Reserve
Bulletin; all other data from Economic Report of the President,
January 1966.
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Cite this document
APA
Darryl R. Francis (1967, November 12). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19671113_francis
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19671113_francis,
author = {Darryl R. Francis},
title = {Speech},
year = {1967},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19671113_francis},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}