Speech

Speech delivered before School of Banking.University of Wisconsin Madison, Wisconsin : < / « August 29. 1950 ' ' ' MONETARY POLICY IN A FREE ECONOMY Today I shall address my remarks to the basic issues of current Monetary policy. Any discussion of this subject.must take into account certain basic principles that underlie monetary policy at any time, whether it be a period of national emergency, the course of a business cycle, or a long-run peacetime poriod of economic growth. I would go so Jar as to say that thinking and rethinking of fundamentals are of maximum importance right now, for monetary policy, intelligently and flexibly administered, can and should play an important role "in.helping our econo- m y to meet our defense emergency. My remarks today, therefore, begin ^ith consideration of basic principles. Then I shall go on to consider ^neir ap<plication to the current situation. For purposes of oresent discussion, the basic problems of monetary Policy can be divided into two parts, (l) the long-range and (2) the short-range. The long-range problem can be "put-Very simply. It concerns having enough credit and money to keep pace with the ne:eds of economic growth arid a steadily rising standard of living for all the people. Thus the total money supply, mainly bank deposits, has incrc-ased substantially during the last fifty years largely to accommodate the increased need. jong-range Monetary Problem Economic growth and a steadily rising standard of living are basic features of our free-enterprise economy. No other society in the world's history has accomplished so much in so"brief a'span of years. One of the ftain reasons why this has been possible has been the inventiveness of our community in expanding its financial assets as its resources and pro- ductive power have'increased. In this development our private commercial banking mechanism has Played a vital role. This role has been—and continues to be: 1. 'to rfiobilize and safeguard the community's currency and bank deposit's; «*• . .. - ; 2. To provide its own -money in the form of checking accounts against deposits as the principal money form used in the country; 3. To assist private' enterprise and. individuals to find appropriate development opportunities; and A. To expand the community's bank deposits on the basis of borrow- ing to realize such opportunities. As Government has grown to provide essential police, health, edu- cational, and other public services, or to meet great national emergen- cies such as war, commercial banking has helped in financing governmental 20. • needs. Our private banking mechanism has been a propelling force in our country's dramatic economic growth. hUC Central banks are socially devised institutions, often quasi-pu in character, for reenforcing private commercial banking. They teve im- portant supplementary functions to perform. Their task is: ,1. To help safeguard the general linuidity and soundness of private commercial banks; 2. To facilitate exchange of the national currency into other national currencies; • 3. To provide elasticity to the currency and deposit mechanism; and • " U. To maintain supply conditions for. credit and money in ac- cordance with the over-all needs of the economy at high levels of activity. Efficient performance of these related functions means encouraging^ enough expansion of credit and money to farter full utilization of expand- cv ing physical resources, technical skill,s and manpower. "Enough" $, reSS re and monetary expansion means not so much as to foster inflationary P ght ri and not so little as to induce deflationary trends. Maintenance of trie amount of credit and money is the heart of the monetary problem. It is ^ what monetary policy, carried out through central banking operations, signed to accomplish. Central banks have grown up because of a need manifested by recurr- ing monetary and. banking problems. Our own Federal Reserve System was es- tablished in 1913 after a very extensive Congressional study of American ^ banking and monetary experience, as well as of that of other countries. ^ experience since the Reserve System's founding has brought shortcomings ^ light, the Congress has authorized some modifications in the System's au- thorities and organization. Short-range Monetary Problem From these remarks on the long-range monetary problem, I should to turn to what I think is the short-range monetary problem. By short- the range problem, I do not necessarily mean today's problem, but rather short-range problem at any given point of time, regardless of the orevai ing ov r-all economic and financial conditions. To express it in the fewest pos ible words, the short-run monetary problem is how to adjust credit and monetary conditions to current chang ^ in the economic situation. In part, this means adjusting credit end mon^ conditions in such a way that monetary policies do not in themselves con- tribute to economic instability, dore particularly, it means that creoi_ and monetary policy should seek to counteract or compensate for unstabU ing forces. An essential consideration in credit and monetary adjustment is the avoidance of any weakening of the financial structure which would 'P*™** undermine the soundness of the general credit situation. Avoidance of an unbalanced development of particular categories of credit is also crucial. How Monetary Policy Functions in General Timely and appropriate monetary policy can greatly assist in level- ing off booms and recessions. Thus it can help to keep the economy on a stable and smooth functioning basis. A case in point is the action of the monetary authorities in easing credit in early 1949, when down- ward trends in business'activity, employment, and prices appeared. Monetary action that is taken before isolated unsettling economic changes set in will often avert such developments. It does this by influencing the volume of spending. In part this influence is exerted by pressure on the volume of spend- ing which is financed through credit extension. For the most part, the available policy instruments do not directly influence credit spending; rather, their effect is general and indirect. Their immediate imoact is on the cost and availability of short-term credit. In other words, they make it easier and cheaper (or more difficult and more costly) to borrow for the short-term. Monetary influence is also exerted by'moderate upward or downward pressure on the value of marketable assets. Such pressure increases (or decreases) the amount that individuals, businesses, and financial institutions would receive for their assets; that is, it makes them -eel more (or less) disposed to soil assets in order to obtain cash. ese changes necessarily alter the willingness of those affected to spend. A third avenue of influence is through the regulation of terms on ^hich borrowers obtain .credit. This method of influence is, of course, limited to types of credit which are customarily extended on a standard- ized pattern, which, accordingly, can be sirgled out by statute for regulation, and are of sufficient current importance to the economy to ^arrant special regulative treatment. Loans on stock exchange collateral are an example that immediately comes to mind. Consumer credit and real estate credit also lend themselves well to special regulative treat- ment. A fourth avenue of influence on spending is through the effect of credit oolicy on the total volume of money end other liouid assets. In other words, as a result of credit policy changes, the economy as a whole has somewhat more or somewhat less than otherwise to spend. This effect is in addition to the one previously mentioned of supulying the original borrower with new buying power. It relates to the secondary and other Uses of money as it is spent and re-spent. This effect may continue for some time. Monetary oolicy, lastly, is a potent factor for affecting the fi- nancial climate of the economy. When the financial climate is favorable, that is, when, in the language of the market place, credit.and money are easy," the effect is to invite business, investor, and consumer Expenditures. Uhen the financial climate is unfavorable, that is, when credit and money are "tight," a degree of caution comes to certain mm sensitive business areas and then spreads to others. By having this kind 1 of an influence, monetary policy further helps bo buoy up ( or dampen down) the total level of spending. The Meaning of a Flexible Monetary Policy • Flexibility in monetary and credit policy means readiness to move cuickly in response to changes in economic conditions. The main ad- vantage of monetary policy over some other policies to influence economic conditions is. that it can be promptly enacted and can take effect cuickly- No other instrument approaches its capacity for prompt and timely action. As business begins to slacken off, action to ease credit is usually indicated. As the economy returns to higher levels of activity, measures that permit credit to tighten are usually in order. Monetary and credit medicine is something to be taken promptly as various symptoms develop— that is, taken in moderate, timely doses. As such, it can temper ir\r> flation and deflation. In an inflation, for example, it can help to re- strain price increases before they become embedded in cost structures and before they give rise to an inflationary spiral that inevitably leads to deflation and losses. Drastic monetary measures naturally catch public attention. Unfortu- nately, drastic measures applied in the past are what the public associ- ates with credit and monetary policy. But they are not the monetary measures that make the greatest contribution to the smooth functioning of a free enterprise economy. For normal conditions, monetary policy is best thought of as a snubbing operation, dragging somewhat against rapid upward movements in activity and cushioning rapid downward' movements. Over the years, the slight monetary and credit action taken from time to time to moderate excessively sharp movements of contraction or expansion in the economy makes major contributions to our well-being. An illus- tration of how it works with particular effectiveness, unnoticed by most people, is its role in relieving seasonal tensions in 'the money market. Before the Federal Reserve Syr.tem we had abrupt and disruptive seasonal changes in the supply conditions for credit, due in part to large geo- graphical shifts in finds. Today, we are scarcely aware of the existence of seasonal tautness or slackness of credit, so smoothly does our financial nechanism absorb these "road shocks." Another noteworthy feature of well implemented monetary policy is its auick reversibility. is susceptible to rapid changes in tempo. For example, early in- 1949 the monetary authorities eased credit as business slackened off. Later in the year, they shifted their policy from credit ease to restraint as inflationary forces strengthened again. In a free economy, flexible credit and monetary policy to prevent "booms and busts" is bound to be reflected in some change in interest rates, particularly short-term rates, which are the market's expression of the cost of credit. Thus, short-term rates have been firming since the last half of last year as the monetary authorities have attempted to restrain credit expansion. Expanding demand for credit will naturally result in higher interest rates unless additional supplies of funds are made available. Putting limitations on credit availability tends to be reflected in a firming of short-term interest rates; an easing of credit tends to soften short-term interest rates. Certainly it is true that if changes in interest levels are prevented rom occurring in response to changes in credit demands, monetary policy greeted towards greater economic stability is very difficult, if not ^possible, to manage. Hhat_.fr Flexible Monetary Policy C Do an In the 1930's it was apparent that monetary and credit ease was not ^equate to lift us out of a major depression. It was an easy step for ome to reach the conclusion that monetary measures had little or no niiuence at any time, either on expansion or contraction of credit. It SSQ ted and in m a ny uarters soLt l ' ° accepted as a fact, for example, that omehow borrowers would borrow just so much and only so much, virtually ^respective of whatever action might be taken either to ease or to eotrain the availability of credit. The level and the movement of short- en interest rates came to be rather widely regard as having little or economic significance. th p esent era w h en the w o r ld is so vrmi? f f ' divided between those who ould control every individual decision and tnose of us who would maxi- ±ze the ar a of individual choice and initiative, I believe it is appropriate to take another ;ook at the virtues of monetary policv. We nould ask ourselves what monetary action can do to help us keep our free nterprise economy functioning fully. In what specific ways can monetary ^lon serve to promote economic progress and stability? T thr W light n these son,° ° n ° questions, I should like to consider with you ome principal areas where monetary measures do influence individual nly indirectl in? ° y and without direct governmental control of -^uividual aecisions, Bef e d t his, it m ay be w o r th w h i le t0 fm °* I ° stress a point that is requently forgotten. It is that credit and monetary action primarily miuences decisions with respect to credit spending-and influences only ^relatively small margin of these decisions. It is just those marginal ecisions, however, that are taken quickly in times of economic change and a dls tonl y? P™P°rtionate effect on prices. It is not necessary to °uch all points m order to contribute to the maintenance of a stable conomy. It may well be sufficient for monetary measures to influence uy a fringe of 5 per cent, or 10 per cent, or 15 per cent of credit Pending decisions to be a very effective stabilizing factor, particularly L that influence is properly timed. One of the areas where monetary measures can have a marginal influence s m connection with decisions nob to spend but to save. It is true that rge a r 0f 0Ur S a v i ng today is m a de su^ £ h through contractual arrangements by the Jr Payment of premiums on life insurance, the regular repay- mm(ent of mo r4tgage and consumer instalment debt, and the "bond-a-month» Jings plans of banks and business enterprises. On this saving, monetary Policy has little effect. On other types of individual saving, tighter supply conditions for credit and higher rates of return may stimulate more vln S» On the other hand, easier credit conditions and lower rates of 2L. return may lead to -less saving. Business saving may also be significantly increased in total when monetary policy becomes restrictive, since some businesses may-tighten dividend and profit withdrawal policies. Companies that have begun an expansion program will tend to retain more"of their earnings.end to use these funds rather than credit, as money from the capital markets or irom --ill UiiVMV J. UiiVikJ i U VU^i UllUll VX m/UJ. U ^ IJ j-iWii*. v» t fc w XT v v- — , banks becomes harder to get and more costly. Stockholders and owners wi not have a chance to spend this money themselves; it will be-.saved ior t-nefl by their businesses. Thus, while the effect of ftonetary policy on the total volume of saving is admittedly not general, it should not be neg lected.entirely. Can monetary and credit action h*ve any significant effect on ing Do restrictive monetary policies, for example, influence•any signi cant number of persons or businesses to postpone or reduce the spending of borrowed.money? . It: probably can be agreed that the decisions of a bloc of borrowers-may be little affected. Consumers, for .example,_borro at retail and the retail credit market is not particularly to r e s p o n s i ve restrictive monetary polici.es. Ve found in the twenties that stock mar , speculation is likewise insensitive to moderate restraint exercised thro traditional, monetary measures. It is in such areas that instruments of selective credit control reS called for when over-all economic and financial conditions require r^ K on specific types of credit. The regulation of loan margins against sto market collateral, and of such credit terms as down-payment and maturity requirements in the case of consumer borrowing, has been found to be ver/ effective in regulating the voluine of credit extended. c o r But what about the businessman? His business expectations are ^ t ly affected by changes in monetary policy, if for no other reason than <; these changes, signal changes in the availability of credit. The fact t the money he ne ds is harder (or easier) to borrow, and perhaps ds&rer cheaper) is a concrete fact—a change in the business climate. He pro- ^^ ceeds more cautiously in his working capital commitments. From the mon standpoint he uses less credit and does less credit spending. f* * This is particularly true in the case of commerce, where the cost o carrying inventories is an important element in the total cost of^merch- dise", and in the public utility industry, where the cost of amortizing a huge plant and equipment is greatly influenced by the rate at which.money can be borrowed. ...•,.• Underwriters of new securities are particularly conscious of the issueS influence of credit and monetary policies on the market for new ' ' io(?n When credit policies are restrictive, for example, these middlemen betve borrowers and lenders encounter difficulties in distributing new issues. They become reluctant to commit themselves on proposed new offerings. They are likely to discourage inouiries about security flotations and cause some issues which may be ready for sale to be withdrawn pending-a more favorable market situation. These actions cause postponement of^oi capital expenditures by businesses and even local governments, which is exactly what is needed when existing demand for goods is pressing on our capacity to produce. - Finally, monetary action has an important.influence on lenders them- selves. Total lending power of Federal Reserve member banks can, of course, be very closely circumscribed if the Federal Reserve is disposed to take such action. Bankers are awnre of this end even moderate credit tightening action is carefully watched and has its impact on the amount of lending banks are willing to do. What happens is that if bankers see restraining monetary measures underway, they tend to cut back the credit lines available to their customers and they may even refuse some marginal credit applications altogether. All of the effects of restraining monetary action in particular fi- nancing areas that X have outlined here, taken together, can add up to important, dimensions. If onetary measures are vigorously and appropri- ately applied they can be positive stabilizing forces, operating to influence the volume of spending and saving and thus to moderate sharp changes in economic activity. To all who prize a high degree of freedom m economic and political life, it is most desirable that this be done without direct Government intervention in a single individual decision. Rosuits effected through credit and monetary policy come about through general influences on the market place, where millions of judgments can ^till be freely made and tested every day. Such results continue to be "the composite expression of the individual decisions and wishes of all of u s who buy and sell. fei^ionship betve n Monetary Policy and Fiscal and Debt Management Policy Monetary and credit policy has always been closely related to fiscal and. debt management policy, but this relationship has been much closer anymore important as a result of the huge expansion of the public debt during World War II. The Treasury has always had such monetary powers as the issuance of currency against silver, the minting of coin, and the ability to make changes in its cash balances with the Federal Reserve System. More recently, however, the magnitude of its public debt ooera- tions and the rate of interest paid on refundings have come to have a much ttore important effect than formerly upon Federal Reserve policies to influence the supply, cost, and availability of money to private as well as public borrowers. The greater influence of fiscal policy on monetary policy comes about as a result of the responsibility of the Federal Reserve System to main- tain orderly conditions in the market for Government securities. At times that responsibility involves some sacrifice of positive influence over the supply of bank credit. During much of the postwar period, for example, the Federal Reserve System purchased a. large volume of U. S. Government securities. This action operated to create bank reserves which in turn tended to ease the private credit market at a time when price inflation v as occurring. During some of this period, however, the Treasury.had the benefit of a budgetary surplus which was used to retire bank-held public tiebt and thus affect the inflationary impact of Federal Reserve open Market operations. It stands to reason, in the kind of financial situation we have had since World War II, that monetary policy and fiscal and debt management Policy must maintain a close liaison. Both monetary policy and fiscal and 26. ; •• • debt management policy have a primary responsibility to make a maximum ^ contribution to economic stability. Consistency with the objectives of the Employment Act of 1946 means that these respective policies should : be'"coordinated and tailored to the economic situation. For example, at high levels of employment and production, when 'inflationary dangers are greatest, fiscal policy should aim to produce a budgetary surplus so that monetary policy may operate freely, if neces- sary, to restrain excessive cr d.i.t and monetary expansion,. Debt manage- ment''policy, in these circumstances, needs to play either a neutral role or a' role of supporting monetary policy by emphasising borrowing, from n oh bank investors. •' , r >1 ,'Vhbn"'economic activity recedes from high levels, another arrange- ment of policy may be appropriate. Fiscal policy at such times may permit- a,Government deficit and debt management policy may need to stress fi- nancing through the banks. Monetary policy, while adapted to discouraging credit''contraction and encouraging the expansion of credit,, may at that time favor deficit financing through the banks. ; Monetary Policy in the Current,'Situation On the basis of this broad background of the role of monetary policy in a free economy, what can be said regarding the role such policy can and should play in helping to solve the. economic and financial problems that have arisen as a result of the invasion of South Korea? Prior to tha . invasion, inflationary pressures had already gained considerable momentum as a result largely .of heavy peacetime'consumer.and business buying. This buying was financed by a substantial expansion of credit and by an increase use of our very large supply of currency and bank deposits, as well as by a high levels of current income. Following the Government announcement of larger military program, the tempo of private spending accelerated greatly* credit''demands increased substantially, and commodity .prices rose sharply* From'the end of June to the middle of August, the prices of basic commodi- . ties rose 17 per cent and the 'loans and holdings of - corporate 'and municipa- n securities at member banks in leading cities alone expanded, by 1.7 billio dollars. Inflation- ry forces have become? so strong that the public has clamored for effective action to stop them. • >. , r , In recognition of the inflationary -situ tion into which the Korean developments have catapulted the country, President Truman on July IB directed the Federal agencies concerned'-'with.real estate credit operations to tighten the terms on which Federally aided credit is available.' A day later he reouested the Congress to authorize emergency- powers to limit the use of essehtial materials; to regulate consumer, real estate, and com- modity trading credit; and to assure adequate' financing for defense pro- duction and productive- facilities.' Still later in the month he presented 1 to the Congress a tax program to .increase Federal revenues by approxi- mately 5 billion dollars. When this lecture was being written, the Congress was considering in conference the Defense Production Act of 1950* This bill was intended to provide the President not only with the powers he"reouested, but in addition standby controls over price and wage stabi- lization and rationing. Legislation to raise taxes was also receiving active consideration by the appropriate Committees of the Congress at 27. that time. Indications are that the added revenue will come mainly irom higher levies on personal and corporate incomes. . The two principal means that were advocated for preventing indefi- # nite and cumulative price increases were (lj imposing a comprehensive harness of direct controls, including price and wage fixing ,nd ration- ing, and (2) undertaking a vigorous credit and fiscal program to limit total ® riband for goods. It is outside the scope of my talk today to embark upon a discussion of the problems involved in imoosing an in- clusive set of direct controls. It is relevant to note, however, that an adeouate mechanism for administering such a set of controls does not now exist. Even if the establishment of an adequate mechanism could be accomplished within a reasonable period f time, I do not believe direct controls are the 0 Present answer to our immediate inflation problem. They deal only with ex.f.ects and not with basic causes. The basic cause of our inflationary Problem is continuing rapid credit and monetary expansion, abetted by current Government deficits which threaten to grow larger and larger. Some people look upon direct controls as a practically painless way oi meeting the emergency financial problem. No more serious error could oe made. There is no painless way of controlling inflati onary pressures, either we meet them head on and overcome them or we wage a losing rear guard action against them. If the fuel of inflation is provided,, all d i r e ct ^ controls can do is to drive the inflationary pressures under- ground and to postpone some of their effect. Therefore, even if direct controls eventually become necessary, °road, basic monetary and fiscal measures will be essential to make them 1 tective. Price and wage fixing and rationing are much more difficult 0 Minister in a protracted period of partial mobilization than they J^re m a limited period, of all-out war effort. Civilian goods will still °e available in large amounts but the total demand for such goods will jar exceed their supply, . The job that direct .controls can do, which is ^ cushion the pressure of military demands on supplies of goods and services and distribute available civilian goods at eauitable, administer- ed prices, can only be accomplished if some of the civilian demand is a rained off by higher taxation and if new private credit creation is Prevented. xt is m y belief that the proper method, of dealing with our immediate inflationary situation is to adopt a coordinated program of monetary Policy, fiscal and debt management policies, and a system of selective Priorities and allocations of strategic materials. The cornerstone - of eur anti-inflation program must be bold fiscal measures including across- ihe-.boa.rd increases in personal and corporate income tax rates, selective excise taxes, and taxes on war profits and speculation. Financing the expanded military budget cannot be limited to the taxation of wealthy individuals and business enterprises if it is to be useful as an effective anti-inflationary measure. It must restrict spending, and most spending is done by the vast number of individuals and families with low and middle bracket incomes. In an emergency situation like the present, our tax changes must be designed primarily to meet the danger of inflation. 28. In addition to higher taxes, the Government should make every attempt in its debt management policies to tap as large a volume of available private investment funds as possible. Concerted efforts should be made to sell nonmarketable bonds and tax savings notes to individuals, businesses, and nonbank financial institutions, thus absorbing money that would other- wise be spent on current consumption or on new private investment. Such a program would not only absorb redundant funds but would also make it 1 possible to reduce the volume of Government financing through bdnksywftiw is highly inflationary. Monetary and credit controls to deal with our immediate inflationary situation can and should be broad in scope, restrictive in 'character, and vigorously administered. They involve, for one thing, the application of effective curbs on consumer and r al estate credit. There is no doubt the recent large increases in consumer and mortgage credit have added fuel 11 to the inflationary fires. Since the end of 1945,' consumer credit has be* 10 increasing by about 3 billion dollars a year. The increase in May and Jm of this year was about a billion dollars, the largest on record for those two months. Home mortgages made by all lenders in the first half of 195^ exceeded 6.5 billion dollars. By the end of June, total home mortgage debt outstanding exceeded 40 billion dollars, a new peak and more than double the volume outstanding at the end of' the war. In addition to effective consumer and real estate credit regulations general measures to curb the availability of credit to other types of borrowers are called for. On August 4a joint statement was made by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Home Loan Bank Board, and the National Association of Supervisors of State Banks urging that banks and all other institutions engaged in extending credit exercise special care in their lending and investment activities. Somewiiat earlier the American Bankers Asssociation had issued a similar statement, and more recently President Peterson of that Association has further urged bankers to cooperate in restricting nonessential credit. I should like to under- score the importance of your own support of these efforts to encourage voluntary restraint in bank and other lending. On August 18, the Federal Reserve Sy-tem took further restraining action in the area of monetary and credit policy. The Board of Governors then approved an increase in the discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bar.K of New York from 1-1/2 to 1-3/4 per cent, and within a few days approved a similar increase at other Reserve Banks. Also, on August 18, the Board the System's Open Market Committee issued a joint statement indicating tho* both bodies were prepared to use all the means at their command to •restrain further expansion of bank credit consistent with the policy of maintaining orderly conditions in the Government securities market. On the same day, the Treasury announced that it had temporarily increased the volume of Series "F" and "G" savings bonds available to nonbank financial insti- tutions. It is to be hoped that all these efforts may prove effective in curb- ing loans to businesses and individuals which might* be used for specu- lation or other purposes that would have adverse effects on our defense effort. If they are not, monetary policy will need to resort to even more restrictive use of one or more of the general instruments of credit contiol 29. at its disposal, namely, open market operations, changes in the dis- count rate, and changes in bonk reserve requirements. In case these measures prove inadequate, the Congress might very well need to consider the desirability of authorising additional powers over bank credit expansion in some form of supplementary reserve reouirements. Uch ° Powers might include a secondary or special reserve recuirement similar to that the Federal Reserve requested in 19-47, or some ceiling °r dual reserve plan about which I have spoken to this group on previous occasions. Suminary i My remarks today reflect a sincere belief that monetary and credit measures, taken together with appropriate fiscal measures, are invaluable capons in our economic and financial arsenal for use in the battle to maintain economic stability within the framework of a free enterprise system. This is true not only over the long run when we look forwaid normal peacetime activity again, but also in the snort run when Hitary and inflationary pressures seem almost overwhelming. Fiscal measures, particularly higher taxes, must be our main line of defense, ut monetary and credit action is also necessary to restrict private redit expansion and, moreover, can be applied more promptly to hold the • ±ne until fiscal measures take effect. Financial instruments therefore ust be among our major weapons against economic instability as long as w o value our freedom.

M.S. Szymczak (1950, August 28). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19500829_szymczak

@misc{wtfs_speech_19500829_szymczak,
  author = {M.S. Szymczak},
  title = {Speech},
  year = {1950},
  month = {Aug},
  howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
  url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19500829_szymczak},
  note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}