speeches · February 15, 1950
Speech
Thomas B. McCabe · Chair
STATEMENT OF CHAIRI'.1AM I'CCABE
ON BEHALF OF THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
ON
S. 22l|6
BEFORE THE
SENATE COI3IITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY
9$0
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1
FOR RELEASE
UPON DELIVERY
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In response to a formal request made by the Chairman of your
Committee, I am presenting this statement on behalf of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System v:ith respect to the effect which
various sections of S. 22i|6 might have on the national economy. This is
a complex bill. A thorough appraisal by housing, as well as monetary,
specialists would be required to assess all of its provisions from a
general economic standpoint. Our comments, accordingly, vdll be directed
to those phases with which the Board is concerned because of its responsi
bilities in the monetary and credit field.
At the outset, I should like to express the strong sympathy which
the Board has for the objective of this Committee in helping to solve the
nation* s housing problem. Vie realize that your task is extremely diffi
cult because of the many facets of the problem — social and political
as well as economic and financial. Socially, an adequate supply of hous
ing of reasonable quality and comfort and at bearable cost is essential
to a decent standard of living* Economically, housing construction is
one of our strategic areas of industrial activity, and stability of
housing construction is of vital importance to the maintenance, of over-all
economic stability. Financially, housing is a principal outlet for the
direct placement of individual savings as well as a principal asset in
the financial statement of a large proportion of American families, and
housing mortgages are a principal medium of investment for our savings
institutions and a source of indebtedness for American families#
The Board of Governors is confining its comments on the proposed
bill to its economic and financial implications. We recognize, however,
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that the President and the Congress must take full account of all aspects
of this legislation and that such opinions as we nay offer on the economic
or financial phases will be judiciously balanced against other relevant
considerations.
Cur first concern with this housing legislation, as with most
legislation, is to assess its potential effects on the total volume of
debt or credit and therefore on the problem of maintaining high level
economic stability, i«e., of avoiding the twin perils of inflation and de
flation, The traditional powers entrusted to the Federal Reserve System
are concerned primarily with influencing the total volume of debt and credit
in the interest of monetary and economic stability. From the end of the
war through 19i}9 the total debt in the economy, i.e., public debt (exclud
ing trust funds) plus private debt, increased about 37 billion dollars.
Private debt increased 6? billion dollars, to 208 billion dollars, while
public debt declined 30 billion, to 237 billion* The decline in public
debt wc.s due mainly to a repayment of outstanding Federal obligations,
held by the banking system, through the drawing doi.r. of Treasury cash bal
ances accumulated as a resu?_t of the Victory Loan and budget surpluses*
The greatest relative increase in private debt was in consumer and mortgage
boi'ro'vang, Conruiaer credit increased from 7 billion dollars to nearly 19
billion and residential mortgage credit on 1-ij. family structures doubled
and rose phenomenally from 19*2 billion dollars to 37.5 billion in.the
four year period.
It should be pointed out that there is such a thing as a credit
inflation as well as price inflation. There is some limit to the volume
of debt an economy can carry and service. It is desirable to retain as
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much of our national borrowing power as possible for periods of recession
when the availability of funds for cash purchases by consumers and business
enterprise is relatively low. We must always bear in mind the possibility
of periods of recession. The carrying over of huge debts into such periods
will restrict consumer buying power and accentuate the dovmward cycle.
As you will recall, from the end of the war through 19U8 our
economy was characterized by heavy and persistent demands for all types of
goods and services by consumers, business enterprises, all levels of Gov
ernment, and for export to the rest of the world. During this period the
supply of goods and services available to satisfy the large over-all demand
was growing, but still limited. As a result, prices rose sharply and dur
ing I9I4.8 we were in a dangerously inflationary situation. During this
early postwar period, personal and business incomes were high, accumulated
holdings of liquid assets were large, and bank and other credit was readily
available at low cost.
It was in this environment that the Federal Reserve System undertook,
through its monetary and credit powers, to exercise some anti-inflationary
restraint. Voluntary commercial bank efforts to avoid excessive or specu
lative lending activity were encouraged; stringent curbs on stock market
credit were maintained; wartime consumer credit regulation was extended to
19k7
late and reimposed in the early fall of 191+8; and higher reserve re
quirements were imposed on member banks. It was mainly in the mortgage
lending and agricultural areas that no restraint was directly applied* Yet
the impact of the Government’s support programs in both these areas, by
contributing to the volume of spending power and the demand for materials
and labor in short supply, accentuated the inflationary trends that per
vaded the economy during those years*
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In making this statement, I wish to say that I am aware that the
acute shortage in the existing housing supply was an important factor in
the inflationary situation, I also appreciate fully the contribution which
the Housing authorities made in their strenuous efforts to channel new
construction activity into the building of low-cost units, thus adding the
largest number of units to the housing supply with available labor and
materials. During these years, however, the Federal Reserve System was
subjected to sharp criticism because the sacrifices which were imposed on
those sectors of the economy subject to its restraints were being offset
by inflationary developments in other sectors, such as mortgage finance.
Your Subcommittee has included in the bill Mr, Foley’s suggestion
which would give the President authority to adapt the terms and scale of
operations of any Federal program involving loans for housing to the state
of the construction industry and to the state of the economy generally.
It is a soiu’ce of satisfaction to the Board that the importance of gearing
the scale and character of Federal housing programs to the general economic
situation has been recognised.
Our second main concern with housing legislation in general is the
effect it may have on the total volume of public debt with which the Open
Market Committee of the Federal Reserve System has to cope. The complex
problems presented to the Treasury and the Federal Reserve by the huge
volume of publicly held securities now outstanding has been thoroughly
explored and reviewed by the Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on the
Economic Report of which Senator Douglas is Chairman, Certainly the ef
forts of the Federal Reserve to restrain the postwar inflation in the years
1 9
from to 19l;8 would have been considerably more successful if the System
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had not felt obliged by the then existing circumstances to purchase huge
quantities of marketable securities. Right here I would like to repeat the
statement I made to this Committee in reviewing that situation in May of
last year.
. From September 1 (191+8) to November 1 (19U8) bonds in
the amount of 3-1/h billion dollars were purchased to carry out
this policy of stability,
"In retrospect, I am certain that our action in support of
the Government securities market was the right one. That pro-'
gram was a gigantic operation. In the two years 191*7 and 191+8,
the System's total transactions in Government securities amounted
to almost 80 billion dollars. Despite this huge volume of activ
ity, the net change in our total portfolio was relatively small,
I am convinced that we could not have abandoned our support posi
tion during this period without damaging repercussions on our
entire financial mechanism as well as seriously adverse effects
on the economy generally,"
In the legislation now before you we have noted the section of the
bill which would provide for building up separate reserves back of the securi
ties to be issued by the proposed National Mortgage Corporation for Housing
Cooperatives. These reserves are designed to insulate the Treasury against
any losses that might be incurred from the Corporation's operations. Never
theless, the guaranteed securities issued by this public corporation would
generally be considered United States Government securities# They would be
purchased by banks and others on this basis. Indeed, it is this fact of
market standing which would permit them to be sold at the low rates contem
plated. This very same fact would mean that these guaranteed issues would
represent additions to the volume of publicly held debt with which the Federal
Reserve is particularly concerned.
In this connection, I would like to call to the attention of the
Committee the fact that we have had some experience with publicly floated
guaranteed securities of Government corporations. Several issues of this
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kind were brought out during the early part of the recovery program in the
1930's# This device was used, for example, to finance the operations of
the Home Owners Loan Corporation. These experiments were later discontinued
as a matter of public policy,,
Inflationary problems have not been acute since the end of 19u8
but it would be an illusion to premise major public policies on the assump
tion that all inflationary dangers have passed. During the first half of
h9>
19 inflationary pressures generally abated, prices declined moderately,
and the rate of growth of private debt tapered off, The response in the
field of housing was particularly noteworthy. Larger supplies were avail
able and there was a relaxation of the high pressure demand that had
characterized preceding years reflecting in part the reluctance of lenders
to finance low interest mortgages. In response, costs of new housing re
versed their previous upward trend and fell moderately. Subsequently, in
fact from near the middle of 191$, housing demand expanded and a year that
opened with marked consumer resistance to high building costs, closed with
a record for the largest number of houses ever started in this country.
The expansion in the operations of the Federal National Mortgage Association
played its part in financing this renewed activity. During this recent
period, construction costs and values of improved real estate were not
far below postwar peaks of about double prewar levels.
During the first half of 19^9, the Federal Reserve was prompt to
recognize the change in current trends, and showed great flexibility in
relaxing its special anti-inflationary restraints. It also inaugurated a
more flexible money market policy. These actions had some effect in
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checking recession tendencies of that period and in encouraging revival, but
the contribution of credit relaxation to these developments should not be
overestimated. To an important extent, the sustained high level of economic
activity has reflected continuing large consumer spending out of high current
incomes and the continuing use of previously accumulated liquid savings.
Since about the middle of 19lt9 > both public and private debt have
shovm increases as well as tendencies toward accelerating growth* In re
cent weeks, prices have strengthened in selected areas, notably those re
lating to the building trades where as I have said, activity is at record-
breaking levels for this time of the year. Personal holdings of liquid
assets — totaling 177 billion dollars — are still large in relation to
current production. In view of the Government deficit and consequent bor
rowing, which is increasing outstanding liquid assets, it is important to
scrutinize closely all legislation such as this that will further add to
their volume.
This brings us to our third point of concern with housing legisla
tion — namely, the extent to which it vdll contribute to the deficit* All
of us, I am sure, look with anxiety on the present fiscal situation where
we are running a deficit at a high level of activity. Both the Administra
tion and Congress are exploring every channel of taxation and expenditure to
see how the deficit can be minimized and how the economy can be protected
from the inflationary implications of an unbalanced budget, I mention this
third area of concern to remind us that close to one billion dollars, or
one-fifth of the current cash deficit is attributable to the special support
given housing by the operation of the Federal National Mortgage Association,
The proposed bill would broaden the operations of the Federal National
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L'ortgage Association. If some way could be found to make the mortgages now
purchased by the Federal National Mortgage Association more attractive to
private lenders, it would contribute to monetary and fiscal stability. It
would also seem well worthwhile to consider restoring the authorization that
was previously in the law for organising private National Mortgage Associa
tions.
YJe have a fourth area of concern of a somewhat different order
with respect to housing legislation, namely, that programs to stimulate
housing should not be pushed at any one time to the point where problems
of instability are created for the future# Today, ’.re are all a.vare of the
inflationary impetus that can be given to the spiral of wages, prices, and
costs throughout the economy when the supply of housing is aci.tely short
relative to effective demand. Conversely, as we all know, the opposite
situation can prevail and when it does the effects are deflationary on
widely ranging aspects of the economy. This result comes about, for one
reason, because the housing industry, directly or indirectly, is perhaps
our largest area of employment, and for another, because it is a major
form of investment and saving for the mass of the people. I mention this
point, not because we think it is raised acutely by the proposed bill but
because it is implicit in all legislation that promotes housing construction.
The areas I have outlined summarize the concern which we in the
Federal Reserve have for the varying aspects of all housing legislation.
Concentrated as we are on watching the economy to detect trends that may
foster instability, inflation or deflation, we must ask ourselves of each
piece of proposed housing legislation: (l) urill it overly—stimulate the
total volume of credit? (2) Yiill it still further expand the now huge
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volume of marketable public debt which greatly complicates the conduct of
Federal Reserve open market operations? (3) '-ill it add to a cash deficit
when the economic situation calls for a Government surplus? And (li) is
there serious risk that it will over-stimulate construction activity and
eventually contribute to deflation in the housing industry?
During recent years many pieces of housing legislation have given
us concern on one or more of these grounds. At the same time, we have
recognized that the housing situation was abnormal and that emergency
measures were required. We are aware that, although the housing situation
is steadily improving, and shortages and exorbitant rentals are abating,
there may still be areas where special action may be justified.
Yfe believe that the time is close at hand when it will be desir
able to begin adjusting housing legislation toward a pattern better adapted
to normal peacetime conditions. These adaptations should be based on the
principle that credit for residential building should be private credit,
subject to the market tests governing other private credit, to be influenced
in its volume by Federal Reserve monetary and credit policies. Such adapta
tions should not proceed on the assumption that residential mortgage credit
should be public credit, relatively immune to market restraints and to re
straints arising from Federal Reserve operations but at the same time re
quiring Federal Reserve support. If it were to be the latter, the sheer
volume of credit that would be transferred from the private to the public
field would greatly complicate the monetary problems writh. which we in the
Federal Reserve have to deal.
We are fully aware that the adjustment to normal peacetime condi
tions cannot be made all at once or by any one session of the Congress.
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As I mentioned earlier, recognition of the fact that Federally sponsored
housing activities should be varied in accordance with changing economic
conditions is an important forward step. It is another step in the right
direction that Section 608 of the National Housing Act would finally be
terminated,
VJe suggest that your Committee will make a fundamental contribu
tion to greater economic stability if in considering legislative adaptations
in this field it keeps in mind four major principles:
(1) Interest rates in the mortgage market should be flexible.
If Congress promotes programs premised on an interest
ceiling, the Federal Reserve will not be able to operate
as recommended in the Douglas Subcommittee report,
(2) As long as the Federal debt is so huge, the contribution
of mortgage financing to the outstanding volume of mar
ketable public debt in terms of which the Federal Reserve
is obliged to operate should be held to a minimum,
(3) The imoact of housing assistance on a Federal budget al
ready running a deficit at a time of high level employ
ment should also be held to a minimum,
(4) Housing programs should be judged not only by the con
tribution they make to the current availability of
housing and current levels of employment, but also by
their effects on the long-term stability of the market
for residential construction and on the mortgage market,
I would like to say a few words directed specifically to the program
for middle-income housing provided for in Title III, possibly the most contro
versial portion of the bill. The primary objective of this Title, as we
understand it, is to provide lower rentals for the middle-income families
in certain areas where current rents on uncontrolled dwellings are ab
normally high in relation to the current incomes of these groups, w'e
have studied this Title carefully in the Board and I think I summarize our
observations correctly when I state:
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1. Yfe recognize that the cooperative principle has shown great
merit in other areas and that its encouragement in the field of housing may
prove helpful in improving middle-income housing,
2.
Yfe believe that important benefits can flow from those sections
setting up technical services and making them available to potential coopera
tives,
3. VJe believe that use of the cooperative principle is justified
to the extent that it achieves its economies on a competitive financial ba
sis, Our fundamental concern is with the financial terms, Yfe know of no
mortgage credit currently available in this country on amortization terms
of $0 to 60 years or at interest rates siich as are contemplated here. It
seems to us also that securities floated publicly in the market on the
credit and guarantee of the Government, though not through the budget, might
create difficulties, especially if the operation should ever attain sizable
volume.
It. Ife believe that it would be appropriate f or the ideas embodied
in this bill to be given a full and fair trial on an experimental basis,
with the financing on the FHA principle, rather than through the establish
ment of a new Government lending institution on a permanent basis, Yfe
understand that cooperative projects have encountered some difficulty in
obtaining construction loans because of the lack of familiarity of lenders
with this type of operation. Perhaps some special provision should be
devised to remedy this particular difficulty,
American industry has grown great through research and experimenta
tion, This is an occasion which the Congress might well utilize, to adopt
the experimental method and develop a record of experience that could be
extremely valuable in another period of recession. Then there would be
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real economic need for accelerated effort in the construction industry. Today-
on the other hand, the industry is already operating at a very high level.
This brings me to a point on which I would like to place great
stress. So far as the mass of our people is concerned,, the monthly cost
of housing depends on two major elements, (l) the monthly cost of financing,
including both interest costs and amortisation, and (2) the capital cost
of land acquisition and construction. The monthly cost of housing can be
lowered either by providing for more lenient financial terms or by promoting
greater efficiency in the construction industry. Conversely, the advantages
of more lenient financial terms can be nullified by rising construction costs*
Something of this sort seems to have been happening in recent years of infla
tionary conditions and abnormal demand.
Although the Congress has recently made desirable provision for
technical and economic research in the field of housing most of the efforts
of Congress to improve the housing conditions of our people have been di
rected toward the lowering of interest rates on home mortgages and toward
the relaxation of repayment terms. The reforms inaugurated under Title II
of the National Housing Act in 193U> for example, had far reaching effects in
this direction. Looking backward over the period since 193U as a whole, I
think we can fairly say that those reforms actually contributed materially
to lowering the monthly costs of housing for people who bought their homes
up to, say, the outbreak of the war. Since that time, it is much more dif
ficult to assess their effects or the effects of other comparable measures
which Congress has taken in the same direction.
The great contributions of American industry to our standard of
living have come about as the result of lowered real costs, of continued
increases in the efficiency of production. It is to this factor that we
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must chiefly look for the emergence of higher standards of housing. Any
contribution that can be made to increase the efficiency of construction,
and thus to lower building costs, will produce manifold returns to the
welfare of the American people.
In conclusion may I again say that our presentation here today
has been confined to the economic and financial aspects of this legislation,
I want to emphasize, for myself personally and on behalf of the Board of
Governors, that we will willingly accept and wholeheartedly help to carry
out any program which the Congress evolves. As I said in the forepart
of this statement, we fully appreciate that there are many other aspects
to this proposed legislation which, in the judgment of the Congress, may
override the financial and economic considerations that I have presented,
important as these are, from our point of view.
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Cite this document
APA
Thomas B. McCabe (1950, February 15). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19500216_mccabe
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19500216_mccabe,
author = {Thomas B. McCabe},
title = {Speech},
year = {1950},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19500216_mccabe},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}