speeches · November 23, 1947
Speech
Rudolph M. Evans · Governor
BOARD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
Statement of Governor R. M. Evans
Before Senate Bankins and Currency Committee on
REGULATION OF CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT
For immediate release
November 24, 1947
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has recommended to
the Chairmen of the Senate and House Banking and Currency Committees a bill which
would authorize the Board to regulate consumer instalment credit.
If legislation is to be passed, we believe that consumer credit regula
tion should be directed to the volatile sector of consumer credit, that is, instal
ment credit. This is the part which has been subject to the greatest fluctuations
in the past, thus contributing to instability and unemployment. It is also the
'part that is now increasing most rapidly and doing most to keep prices on the up
grade.
Regulation under the proposed legislation would be in much the same form
as it was under the Board's Regulation V/ when that regulation was still in force.
Allowing for appropriate exceptions to provide administrative flexibility, the
regulation would prescribe maximum maturities for all types of instalment credit
and in addition would prescribe minimum down payments for instalment credit to
finance the purchase of important categories of consumers' durable goods. The
regulation would accordingly cover not only instalment credit for consumers' dur
able goods but also instalment credit for other consumer purposes, both of which
contribute to the accentuation of business upswings and downswings and neither
of which can be sharply disassociated from the other. At the consumer.level, both
instalment selling and instalment lending are among the inflationary forces ,sat
are at the present time causing so much apprehension to the public, and to the Con
gress.
. Generally speaking, the instalment terms finally prescribed by Regula
tion W called for maturities of hot more than 1.5 months and called for down pay
ments of at least one-third in most cases and for 20 per cent in,some, cases. Under
the proposed legislation, terms would, of course, be varied from time to time de
pending upon changing economic conditions but with a view to restraining the de
velopment of unsound credit terms and with a view to preventing.or reducing ex
cessive expansion or contraction of consumer instalment credit. These would be
the declared statutory objectives.
Under existing conditions when the articles commonly financed with in
stalment credit are for the most part in short supply relative to demand, it is
apparent that the restraints which could be imposed would help to dampen the de
mand and thus reduce the upward pressure on prices. Even when goods become avail
able in larger quantities, however, reasonable restraints on consumer instalment
credit would serve a useful public purpose, because they would tend to induce
sellers to reach more customers by reducing prices and improving quality instead
DSRARYi
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of by resorting to & competitive "relaxation*' of - instalment credit terms while still
maintaining high prices. Under prevailing conditions of maximum peacetime employ
ment and national income, it' would be economically -unsound to encourage people to
go deeper and deeper into debt bn increasingly- easy -terms.
Notwithstanding continued shortages of goods, particularly durable- goods,
and notwithstanding the regulation of consumer credit that has been applied, in
stalment credit has expanded during the past 12 months by more than 2 billies dol
lars. The economic effect of adding borrowed dollars to currant income, together
with the unprecedentedly large volume of savings in the hands of the public gen
erally, can only be to prolong the period of inflated prices. At toe present time
this is the really crucial point. Easy credit.terms would make no more goods
available. They -would only help to hold prices high Tn the marketplace. Were
goods available in larger volume and were many consumers aole t) finance th&ir
purchases on easier credit terms, there is little question but that the volume of
consumer instalment credit would increase even more rapidly than it has increased
during the past year.
The need for regulation is acute at the present time but the need is not
merely a temporary one. Experience has shown that the excessive expansion and sub
sequent contraction of consumer instalment credit contributes substantially to
economic instability. Its role in instability is increasing as the years go by,
with the growing importance pf consumers' durable goods in the economy. It is
recognized that the development of this type of credit has gone hand in hand with
the unparalleled industrial development of the nation. Yet, it is equally sig
nificant that when competition takes the form of relaxing credit terms and is car
ried to extremes, it is a symptom and cause of economic unsoundness. Millions of
people are encouraged to .overpledge future income.. This inevitably entails in
stability because the excessive credit extended during a business boom accentuates
the boom and then has to be liquidated out of current income on the downswing,
which accentuates depression. The fact that current income has to be used to pay
off excessive instalment debt created during the business boom necessarily diverts
that income from the channels of consumer expenditures in the depression, espe
cially in the important sector of consumers' durable goods.
Voluntary efforts have been made from time to time by foresighted re
tailers, sales finance companies, banks, and other lenders to prevent down payments
from becoming excessively small and repayment periods from' becoming over-extended
in times of credit expansion. These efforts, however, have always been ineffec
tive because of the aggressive competition of tnese who will not voluntarily co
operate in this objective. Since the end of Regulation W, only three weeks ago,
for example, and notwithstanding efforts by many to "hold the line," instalment
credit terms have been growing more and more liberal in many fields. Credit terms,
in fact, have already become too easy for these boom times.
The present trend of expansion In consumer instalment debt needs to be
carefully watched and restrained so that the country shall not repeat the pattern
of inducing American families to go heavily into debt on too easy terms, particu
larly for high-priced goods many of which are not.only high-priced cut of in
ferior quality. The decline that would be bound to follow would be felt not only
in the durable goods Industries but throughout the economy. The. proposed restraint
would help to prevent a repetition of such an unsound sequence of event's.
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The Board feels that this type of regulation, which is of a selective
character, serves a useful purpose which cannot be reached by the exercise of any
powers over bank credit in general. The regulation is needed, therefore., as a
supplement to, and not a substitute for, general-credit control powers. Each In
st raiment has its proper place in a well-rounded anti-inflation program.
In connection with any Congressional action on the subject, there are
some legislative alternatives that seem to us to deserve the careful consideration
of the Congress. Executive Order No. 8843? under which Regulation W was issued,
served its purpose reasonably well. Six years of experience, however, have shown
that it would be preferable for legislation on the subject, to convey independent
authority for the necessary regulation rather than merely to revive the Executive
Order.
For one thing a statute enacted at this time could provide clearer md
more appropriate standards or guides to be followed in prescribing regulations.
In addition, it could place clearer and more precise limits on the Board's author
ity as, for example, by limiting it to only that portion of consumer credit that
takes the form of instalment credit. A bill conferring such independent author
ity could still be relatively short, and it would be distinctly more satisfactory
than a mere continuation of the Executive Order. This would be true not only from
the standpoint of sound administration but also from that of greater convenience
for those subject to the legislation.
The matter of appropriate enforcement provisions also deserves the con
sideration of the Congress. Such provisions could be incorporated more conven
iently in an independent bill such as we have suggested, but in any event the
problem is one which the Congress would not wish to overlook. It has been our
experience that the penalties applicable under the Executive Order and the under
lying authority in the Trading with the Enemy Act are so drastic that it is diffi
cult to apply them in actual practice. To provide enforcement that is both equi
table and efiective, it is essential that there be specific provision for courts
of equity to aid enforcement through their power to enforce subpoenas and enjoin
violations. That is a sound type of enforcement machinery that the Congress has
adopted in connection with other similar matters. If necessary, this authority
could be given in a single-sentence provision through the incorporation by cross
reference of provisions on this subject in statutes already applicable to' other-
agencies.
The case for permanent legislation seems to the Board to be very strong.
It is important in any event that any legislation on the subject should have a
long enough life really to achieve the objectives of the Congress. We believe the
Congress would largely defeat its purposes if it attempted tc confine the opera
tion of the legislation to an unduly short period. It would be rash tc assume
that inflationary pressures will substantially subside in the near future. Fur
thermore, any temporary statute tends to lose much of its effectiveness as it
approaches its termination date, and this can become serious long before that date
is reached. Accordingly, if the Congress is not disposed at tais time to enact
permanent legislation, the Board would recommend that the measure authorize ap
plication of the necessary restraint for a period as long as three years. At any
time within this period the' Board would be in position to modify whatever restric
tions may be prescribed, or even to remove them altogether, in the event that such
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acti on should be warranted by a change in economic conditions at any time during
the period. It should be taken for granted that the administration, of consumer
credit regulation must be, and would be, altogether flexible.
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Cite this document
APA
Rudolph M. Evans (1947, November 23). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19471124_evans
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19471124_evans,
author = {Rudolph M. Evans},
title = {Speech},
year = {1947},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19471124_evans},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}