speeches · October 24, 1946
Speech
Marriner S. Eccles · Chair
FOR RELEASE IN AFTERNOON
NEWSPAPERS OF FRIDAY,
OCTOBER 25, 1946. October 24, 1946
ADDRESS BEFORE THE
SIXTEENTH NEW ENGLAND
BANK MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
OF THE
NEW ENGLAND COUNCIL
IN BOSTON, OCTOBER 25, 1946.
MARRINER S. ECCLES
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
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It is ten years since I had the privilege of meeting with you
at a bank management conference of the New England Council. The Axis
cloud was then just beginning to blacken the skies over Europe and the
Orient. Few were aware of its ominous portent. We were still struggling
up from the deepest depression in our economic history. A decade ago
most bankers and businessmen were worried about the Federal debt, the
unbalanced budget and the danger of inflation. The gross national debt
had reached nearly 34 billion dollars.
No one then could have foreseen the events of the next decade.
After the most devastating of all wars, we find ourselves today with a
gross national debt of 265 billion dollars, or nearly eight times as much
as it was ten years ago. Today, we no longer have a great slack of un
employment. We do have accumulated wants and needs beyond all past
experience. The backlog of savings, available to individuals and busi
ness in the form of currency, bank deposits and Government securities,
is from three to four times as great as in 1936, and current income
payments are running at a rate of about 170 billion dollars a year, or
more than double the highest prewar peaks of 1929 and 1940. The infla
tionary potential thus continues to be great — and war-time controls
intended to keep the flood of money in check until production could
catch up with demand have been largely abandoned.
If we are to avoid going through a painful period of readjust
ment of distortions in the wage-price structure, we must now rely pri
marily upon self-imposed restraint on the part of powerful conflicting
groups in management and business, in labor and in agriculture. Respon
sibility for maintaining orderly economic progress, which will prevent a
further Inflationary development that would inevitably bo followed by a
decline has now largely, shifted from Government to labor and management.
The unity of purpose, which enabled us to achieve a miracle
of production for war and thus to hasten the victory, is gone, and with
it public support of the direct controls over materials, wages, profits
and prices that prudent policy in the national interest seemed to re
quire while inflationary forces were still dominant. Fiscal policy and
scattered credit controls are about all that remain to the Government
as protective measures but these, too, are beset by increasing contro
versy and are likewise dependent upon majority will.
Popular revulsion against direct controls and other restraints,
of course, is natural in the aftermath of war. Certainly freedom of ex
pression and the interplay of the point of view of manifold social and
economic groups is the life blood of a progressive democracy. But this
democratic freedom should not be a license for special interest groups
to seek their own ends without regard for the public good. This spirit
of unenlightened self-interest has increasingly pervaded our national
life since the end of the war. If we are to make our economic and
political system function successfully we must find means of settling
conflicts of interest by lawful and peaceful democratic processes, with
out disrupting economic stability and progress.
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We see examples of conflicting interests on all sides. For
instance, most, cattlemen object to control of livestock prices, but
want the Government to stop a railroad or coal strike if it threatens
to interfere with distribution of their products; most farmers oppose
ceilings on the prices of their products, but want price floors; in
general, labor unions object to wage controls, but want the Government
to control prices; most businessmen favor curbs on wages but not on
profits; bankers want the Government to balance the budget, but many
also advocate higher interest rates on the public debt ostensibly to
combat inflation. And so it goes.
We must recognize the fact more than ever in this highly
industrialized, interdependent age that one sector of the economy can
not gain in the long run at the expense of another. Prosperous economic
conditions which will benefit all groups can be secured only if the re
quirements of the economy as a whole are considered. Past experience has
demonstrated that the maintenance of stable and prosperous conditions
can not be assured by exclusive reliance upon the free play of market
forces. The Government, as the collective agent of all of us, must be,
in effect, the umpire between contending pressure groups, deciding im
portant issues on the basis of what is in the interest of the country
as a whole. It is a question of the degree of Governmental action and
intervention. For my part, I want as little as possible — but I want
enough to minimize destructive economic conflict, and protect our na
tional interests.
We have only to look at the world about us today to realize
that there are, broadly speaking, three general types of economic
order — communism, socialism which, in greater or lesser degree,
prevails in England and throughout western Europe, and the democratic
capitalism which we want to preserve in this country. The challenge
to our system can and must be met by providing a sustained high level
of production and employment. Otherwise, we shall inevitably drift
towards more and more Government intervention and controls until our
system has been replaced by something akin to the other two — not
because our people deliberately choose it but because they would be
likely to consider it the only alternative to widespread economic
distress and social disorder under our own system.
With most other inflation curbs gone, attention — and
criticism — will no doubt be centered more and more on fiscal and
credit matters which affect about the only area left where some, re
straint may be exercised by the Government, Criticism has been aimed
particularly at three points: 1. At the Reserve System’s support of
the 7/8 ths rate on Treasury certificates; 2, At the Board’s fixing
of margin requirements at 100 per cent; and, 3, At continuation of
the Executive Order under which the Board has regulated consumer credit.
Let me discuss these three subjects briefly.
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1. Government Financing
Various bankers, dealers, insurance companies and others
have recommended an increase in short-term interest rates as a means
of combating inflation. As the Board pointed out in its Annual Re
port for 1945, there is no reason to suppose that even if the short
term rate were increased to as high as 1-1/4th per cent, it(would be
of value in combating inflationary dangers which have arisen from two
primary causes, neither of which would be corrected by higher rates,
One cause is the volume of money already created, which cannot be
rapidly reduced — and in fact can only be continuously reduced by
having a budgetary cash surplus sufficient to continue the program
of debt retirement. This can come either from taxes or from the
sale on balance of nonmarketable bonds to the public, using the
proceeds to pay off bank-held debt. The other, and by far the most
important basic cause, is the insufficiency of production as yet in
relation to the existing money supply.
Since most of the short-term debt, outside of the Reserve
System, is held by the banks, an increase in the short-term rate would
add to bank earnings, which are still at very high levels due to Gov
ernment bond holdings. It would add to the cost of carrying the public
debt, It would not reduce the existing money supply. It would add
nothing to production — the basic need of the, hour — nor would it
reduce consumption. It would have no real bearing as an anti-
inflationary factor. We have been witnessing a rapid rise in business,
consumer and mortgage credit. It is hardly reasonable to suppose
that short-term rates on Government securities could be increased
sufficiently to deter this private borrowing.
As for increasing the short-term rate with the idea of dis
couraging further monetization of the debt by the banks, it should be
emphasized that the Treasury’s debt retirement program has been an ef
fective means of accomplishing this desirable objective, and postpon
ing need for more direct measures such as the Board outlined in its
report as possible alternatives for Congress to consider.
It has been argued that a flexible policy permitting some
increase in short-term rates would introduce uncertainties into the
market, which would discourage banks from shifting into longer-term
issues. The fact is that there could be very little uncertainty as
to short-term rates in view of the large volume of securities that
mature monthly. If a policy were adopted permitting short-term rates
to rise without setting an upper limit, the Treasury would have dif
ficulty in refunding its maturities, since banks and other investors
would be likely to withhold funds awaiting even higher rates. The
question then is not whether the short-term rate should be pegged at
7/8 per cent or permitted to fluctuate up and down, but whether it
should be pegged at 1 per cent, 1-1/4 per cent or 1-1/2 per cent, or
some other level. There is no natural level. If short-term rates
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were permitted to rise sharply there would also be pressure to drive
long-term rates up. This would jeopardize the savings bond sales
program and cause wholesale redemptions.
There has been much discussion about the issuance of long
term, 2-1/2 per cent marketable securities not eligible for banks.
It has been said that such an issue would be anti-inflationary be
cause it would absorb savings which could be used to retire bank
debt. Some of the arguments that might be made against putting out
such an issue at this time are that it would increase bank credit
and insurance companies and savings banks would not only use accu
mulated funds for such investment but in addition would sell bank-
eligible issues to banks in order to raise funds with which to sub
scribe, or would borrow from banks. Such issues would not serve to
increase savings of individuals who are the most important group from
the inflation standpoint. Series E, F, and G Savings Bonds already
offer attractive investment outlets to this group.
If it should appear desirable in the future to provide an
additional investment outlet for funds of insurance companies and
savings banks it would be preferable to do this through the offer
ing of long-term nonmarketable securities, the yield on which would
be 2-1/2 per cent if held to maturity. This would avoid the danger
of future additions to long-term holdings of banks and it would pro
tect the Treasury against investors who buy long-term securities for
short-term holding, thus getting 2-1/2 per cent, plus the premium as
maturity is reached, on what in effect is demand money so long as the
2-1/2 per cent rate is maintained. In my opinion this long-term rate
should not be permitted to go up, and, if need be, the market must be
supported by the Federal Reserve. Otherwise the cost of carrying the
public debt would be increased, many outstanding savings bonds yield
ing lower rates would be cashed in and the funds invested in the
higher-yield market issues, and heavy losses would be incurred by
holders of outstanding market bonds. Confidence in the stability of
the Government bond market would vanish. If long-term nonmarketable
issues were offered, it might be necessary to limit subscriptions
under some formula which would provide only for the investment of ac
cumulated funds and prevent switching from present holdings, parti
cularly the bank eligibles.
It has also been argued that the Treasury should refund
short-term securities into longer-term debt to ease the refunding
problem and avoid the demand liability on the Treasury. Compared to
refunding in short-term issues, this would result in an increased
interest cost and in less flexibility to the Treasury in managing
the debt. Commercial bank holdings of longer-term securities and
commercial bank earnings, would be relatively higher. As a matter
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of fact, to the extent that private investors continue to expand their
holdings of E, F and G bonds, and the proceeds are applied to retiring
maturing bank-held debt, the result is a refunding of short into long
term holdings. This accomplishes the desirable objective of shifting
the debt out of the banks and into the hands of the general public.
Also to the extent that the Treasury has a cash surplus — and it may
possibly be $4 to $6 billions in the first half of 1947 — it can
likewise be used largely to reduce short-term bank-held debt.
With commercial banks holding 75 billion dollars of Govern
ment securities out of a total marketable debt of 182 billion, a
large amount of the debt should be in short-term issues. Monthly re
fundings create no problem. The argument that the Treasury is now
faced with a large volume of demand obligations is not persuasive.
Under present conditions, the entire debt is in effect a
demand obligation since the Federal Reserve assures the Treasury at
all times of a ready market for its offerings on a basis of 7/8’ths
per cent on the certificates and 2-1/2 per cent on the longest bonds.
With the public debt as large as it is today — twice the entire
private debt of the country — a free market is out of the question
if that is taken to mean an unmanaged, unsupported market. The pub
lic interest requires a stable market for Government securities, and
this is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve.
The Federal Reserve has worked and will continue to work
in close cooperation with the Treasury. The public interest requires
the closest teamwork. The Federal Reserve is in complete agreement
with the Treasury’s debt management program, as well as the general
fiscal policy, as outlined on several occasions by Secretary Snyder.
Beginning in March, as you know, it became possible not
only to meet the greatly reduced deficit without further borrowing,
but to enter upon a program of debt retirement by drawing upon cash
accumulated balances. Since then, and including the projected retire
ment of 2 billion dollars for November 1, the Treasury redeemed for
cash close to 20 billions of securities. This debt retirement pro-
gram has been of considerable help in checking inflationary pres
sures on the monetary side.
As a result of the retirement program the enormous monetary
expansion which had been in process throughout the war years and which
raised the money supply from 39 billion dollars in 1940 to 102 bil
lions in February of this year has been halted and reversed.
By imposing a drain on bank reserves, the retirement pro
gram has also exerted some brake upon further expansion of bank
credit. While commercial loans and consumer credit have recently
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increased rapidly, security loans have declined, and, as I have in
dicated, the retirement program has at least temporarily discouraged
further shifting by banks from short to medium and long-term Government
securities.
While I would not like to see an increase in interest rates
at this time, neither would I like to see a further rate reduction.
The decline in the price of longer-term issues since spring and the
resulting increase in yield has been altogether satisfactory as has
been the general stability of security prices.
There is no need for the issuance of additional long-term
marketable securities at this time, as the Government does not need
new money and, as I have indicated, expects to have a cash surplus.
If insurance companies, savings banks and other institutions have
surplus funds there is plenty of opportunity to invest in the exist
ing long-term issues at present favorable prices and yields. Also
there is or will be an increasing opportunity to invest in mortgages
and other long-term investments, including World Bank securities.
2, Margin Requirements
The credit policy of the Federal Reserve System, in all its
aspects, should be adjusted to the general credit situation of the
country. We are not justified, for example, in fixing margin require
ments exclusively by reference to the movement of stock prices, as some
people have suggested. The general credit situation must be the main
criterion, and this in turn is an integral part of the general busi
ness situation. When margin requirements were fixed at 100 per cent,
the general credit situation was highly inflationary because of the
immense volume of purchasing power in the hands of investors and the
general public. Indeed, there is plenty of cash today to drive
stocks up very high, entirely without credit, if investors, let us
say, had more confidence in the prospect for profits in business
and industry and less uncertainty over the possibilities of further
wage-price maladjustments. It can hardly be contended, with reason,
that the credit gates should.be opened now in the market in order to
finance new productive enterprise and private employment. There was
a very large volume of undigested offerings in the stock market,
only a part of which was for new financing. But in any case this is
not a time for encouraging new issues even for productive purposes be
cause with the scarcity of materials and labor, it would only add to
the inflationary pressure.
This is not a one-way street. When the situation changes,
and there is need to stimulate the use of credit for purchasing se
curities, it will be time to consider lowering margin requirements.
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This would be a time, as it seems to me, when there will be sufficient
supplies of materials and labor to justify the encouragement of new
issues of corporate securities, provided there is at the same time a
prospect of declining production and declining employment. The time
to lower the margin requirements will be one at which, in contrast
to the present time, the effect will not be to add to inflationary
forces which are already strong but to combat deflationary forces
in the general economy.
The stock market, after a four-year rise which increased
values by 150 per cent, has now experienced a decline, bringing
prices down to the level at the end of the war, or about 20 per
cent below their high point of last spring, I do not consider this
an alarming symptom. On the contrary, to the extent that this re
adjustment reflects a more sober appraisal of prospects and a les
sening of the inflationary psychology, to the extent that it will
tend to slow down the timing of not absolutely urgent capital ex
penditures and inventory accumulations, it will contribute to a
balance in the economy.
One of the fortunate aspects, of the situation has been the
low level of stock market credit. Such credit now outstanding is in
the general neighborhood of 1 billion dollars, as compared with some
thing like 3 billions at the prewar peak of stock prices in 1937 and
more than 12 billions at the peak in 1929. Without the existence of
stringent credit regulations the speculative upward movement of
prices would undoubtedly have gone much further and the subsequent
price decline with a concurrent forced liquidation of credit would
also have gone much further, thus making for greater instability.
Over the last 40 or 50 years, the upswings and downswings
of the stock market have been a decidedly unstabilizing influence in
the national economy. It was in order to reduce this unstabilizing
influence, particularly as it is connected with the use of credit,
that Congress in 1934 vested in the Reserve Board responsibility
for fixing margin requirements on listed securities but not on un
listed securities. In the late 1920's, when there were no Federal
margin requirements, the upward movement in stock prices caused
them to increase by more than 200 per cent and the sharp decline in
1929 was more than twice as rapid as that which took place during
recent months. The recent gyrations in the cotton market, which ad
vanced very rapidly last summer and then slumped by nearly 20 per
cent in a few days are an indication of what can bo expected in
speculative markets which are not subject to any effective control
over the use of credit.
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One of the interesting consequences of the Board’s margin
requirements has been an almost uninterrupted reduction since the
middle of last year in the amount of stock market credit in use,
including the reduction during the period when the market was ad
vancing -- which had never happened before. There were, to be sure,
some inequities and imperfections in margin requirements as a regu
latory instrument; including the failure of the law to cover non
listed securities. Congress considered the question of whether un
listed securities should also be covered by the law but concluded
that it was not practical. Moreover, it is evident that control
of listed securities greatly influences the use of credit and the
market for unlisted securities. On the whole, the use of margin
requirements can be viewed with satisfaction. Neither the long up
swing that: culminated last May, nor the subsequent downswing
have gone to the lengths to which they would have gone if there had
been no Federal margin requirements.
The general public strongly approves of this regulation.
It is not to be expected that some of those in the brokerage or
security business who feel that their business is adversely affected
by regulation would agree with this viewpoint.
Consumer Credit
As for consumer credit regulation, it was, as you may re
call, the seventh point in the Government's war-time program for
economic stabilization. The Reserve Board did not seek the task
of administering this regulation. The question of whether there
should be some permanent legislation covering this important segment
of credit in our economy is one for Congress to determine. The
Board, having had experience with the war-time regulation aimed
specifically at the inflation target, would be remiss, I think, if
it failed to call the attention of Congress to the need for making
a decision, one way or the other. I, for one, while I certainly
do not crave taking on this additional load, feel as the Board’s
annual report stated that serious consideration should be given by
Congress to the desirability of placing authority in some Govern
mental body to deal with the problem — for undoubtedly the expan
sion and contraction of this type of credit have greatly accentuated
economic upswings and downturns in the past. There is a very strong
case to be made for moderating these excesses, so far as possible,
in the consumer credit field.
It could be accomplished, in my opinion, by focusing regu
lation primarily on the major durable goods customarily sold on the
installment plan. They compose the great dollar bulk of consumer
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credit, It has been felt for some time by the Reserve Board that the
present regulation could be greatly improved administratively by
focusing it on the major durables, eliminating the major part of
single payment loans and charge accounts from its scope, together
with the soft goods and less important durables that were included
when the regulation was originally drawn as an anti-inflationary
device in war-time.
The Board for some time has been studying the advisabil
ity of thus revising the existing regulation with a view to making
it administratively more workable. It is felt that this can be done
without. a material weakening of its effectiveness as a restrain
ing influence at this time. When inflationary pressures have passed,
it would need to be revised further, assuming that Congress decides
to retain it as a permanent instrument of credit regulation.
It is important, of course, to bear in mind that these
selective controls, relating to listed stocks and consumer credit,
can at best play only a relatively minor role in assuring stabil
ity in our economic life. Likewise, monetary policy is even more
limited in its influence under present day conditions than over be
fore. Overshadowing all of these aspects of Governmental policy
are national, fiscal and budgetary measures, together with other
broad policies relating to business, labor and agriculture. Not
even the most ardent advocate of laissez-faire would propose that
we abandon all Government regulations. It is, let me say again,
a question of degree — of doing through, the medium of Government
what needs to he done to contribute to economic stability and
progress — and doing no more than that.
Since this is a banking group, I have sought to cover
three specific questions in which you have a particular interest.
In conclusion, I would like to turn for a moment to the general
economic situation as I see it as this time. Speaking recently
at the National Outlook Conference of the Department of Agriculture,
I undertook to assess in a general way the good and bad aspects
of our current situation. Without recounting that appraisal of
favorable and unfavorable factors, I will merely quote the con
clusions that I think should be drawn from them:
"The situation calls for a budgetary surplus and contin
ued debt retirement. Continued efforts should be made to reduce
public expenditures. Taxes should not be further reduced under
present conditions. It is desirable to increase tax revenues,
without increasing tax rates, by increasing the national income
as a result of greater productivity. Such an increase in the
national income, together with decreased Federal expenditures,
will bring about a budgetary surplus which will make possible tax
reductions later on.
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"Speaking of the general credit situation, there is no reason
under present conditions for reducing margin requirements on stock
market trading or for relaxing consumer credit restraints on durable
consumer goods in short supply. Credit should be provided for pro
ductive purposes, but not for speculation. Nor is there justification
for increasing interest rates which would greatly complicate the Gov
ernment’s problem of managing the public debt and increase the cost
of carrying it, without the offsetting advantage of preventing infla
tion.
"At best, Government price or credit controls can only be
a stopgap, and fiscal policy can deal only with the money side of the
inflation problem. The overwhelmingly vital need now is for more work
and more goods — for increased productivity. "Whether we are to have
a stable economic progress depends fundamentally now on the industrial
front, on labor and management, on increasing output by increasing ef-
ficiency, eliminating bottlenecks and restrictive rulers and practices,
including those in the construction industry, and by avoiding strikes
and shutdowns. We all know that in our interdependent economy a strike
in one key industry paralyzes others — strikes even by a comparatively
few workers in plants that supply others can throw many thousands out
of work.
"More work and more goods are the basic cures for inflation.
That is the only way in which labor can keep the gains from the pay in
creases it has received. It is the only way to safeguard the purchas
ing power of all wages and savings. Further wage increases for the
same amount of work and output would serve only to intensify the upward
pressure on prices. Increased wages that result in increased prices are
self-defeating. It will be far bettor to hold prices down and increase
productivity — to increase real wages — than to have further wage
and price increases that would finally result in public resistance.
For this, in turn, would upset business calculations, and all long
term commitments, thereby precipitating a recession, the severity of
which would depend mainly on how long it would take to correct the
distortions and maladjustments. Only by keeping prices down and
maintaining the buying power of wages and savings can we have a
higher standard of living.
"We have all the tangible elements of sustained prosperity —
manpower, raw materials, money supply, coupled with a vast backlog of
needs and wants. The intangibles, still needed, include self-restraint,
enlightened self-interest, the will and wisdom to translate the tan
gibles into a lasting, higher standard of living."
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Cite this document
APA
Marriner S. Eccles (1946, October 24). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19461025_eccles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19461025_eccles,
author = {Marriner S. Eccles},
title = {Speech},
year = {1946},
month = {Oct},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19461025_eccles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}