speeches · April 14, 1941
Speech
Chester C. Davis · Governor
THE MIDWEST AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
Address by Chester C. Davis, Member of the Advisory Com
mission to the Council of National Defense, before the
Annual Meeting of the St. Paul Association of Commerce,
St. Paul, Minnesota, Tuesday evening, April 15, 1941-
In acknowledging your welcome let me express my sense of a
kinship that has been peculiarly close not only with this community
but with this organization. I believe the St. Paul Association was
the first civic organization in a large American city to take up the
farmers' fight for equality for agriculture and make it its own.
When ny part in that struggle first took me out of Montana 18 years
ago I came to St. Paul. Your association backed the farmers not
only with your moral support but you gave them substantial aid.
I was here five years ago on a visit to the University when
word came of my appointment to the Federal Reserve Board. It isn't
altogether coincidence that finds me spending with you tonight the
last hours of my service as a member of that Board. It is pleasant
to be with old friends of the Ninth Federal Reserve District on the
last evening before I take up nry new duties in the Eighth.
A great deal has happened to the world in those five years.
The rate of change during the past year has become breath-taking.
The rise of force above decency throughout the world has had profound
effects in the United States.
The first anniversary of the American defense program is
almost here. It was a year ago the end of next month that President
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Roosevelt called together a group of civilians from diverse fields
to advise with him and with the leaders of the armed forces on
America's first peacetime mobilization of her industry. A year ago
our armed services, our industry and our ideas were all on a peace
time footing. The Array existed primarily as a nucleus for the ex
pansion which would be required in case of a serious threat of war.
Our Navy was on an operating basis as a Wavs,'- must be. But it was
planned and built for the protection of one ocean only.
More important perhaps, a year ago we were thinking mostly
of peacetime problems. We knew that another war was going on in
Europe just as we knew that an old war still continued its desolate
course in Asia. Both of them seemed a long way away. To most of us
prices, mortgages, jobs, and making a living were still the all-
important problems of the day.
A year ago or a little less we had projected a defense ex
penditure of some two and one-half billions - a sum to be sure which
looked over-large to many Americans after two decades of thought
about universal peace. Some of the changes in our thinking during
the year can best be seen by tracing out the history of this two and
one-half billions. When France fell last summer and we began to rec
ognize the full threat of the new world terror, our Government doubled
the sums which previously had been appropriated. In September this
five billions was tripled to fifteen billions. There were further,
although smaller, increases after that.
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Then as the year wore on the larger strategy cf American
defense began to take shape. England last summer and autumn showed
magnificent powers of survival ana we formally and 'by democratic de
cision declared our stake in her survival. So our defense program
has been extended to encompass assistance to Great Britain and other
nations. To the sums which Congress has made available for our own
defense establishments it has added seven billions of dollars for
aid to Britain* Greece and China. Still further appropriations for
our own defense establishments are under way. Before this year is
out our appropriated and authorized defense expenditures will reach
a grand aggregate of some forty-four billions of dollars. This in
brief is the financial history of the defense effort during the past
year.
Tonight5 recalling that I am speaking before a group which
concerns itself with the problems of industry and commerce* 1 should
like to tell you of some of the lessons we have learned as this pro
gram has developed - some lessons in what might be called defense
economics. And I should like to apply some of these lessons to the
problems and responsibilities of the Middle-West in connection with
the defense program.
In one respect the United States began its defense program
with an. enormous inventory of advantages. We are an industrial coun
try with nearly all of the basic materials for modern armament. We
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have a well-organized motor_ industry, a large and efficient steel in-
'hs
dustry, a progressive chemical industry, and rich and efficiently
utilized agricultural resources. All of these were developed, it is
true, for peace, but the raw materials of peace are the same as the
raw materials of modern warfare.
But we also know that a strong industry in itself is not
enough. While we had the raw materials for defense production - with
out which our position would be hopeless - we did not last summer
have the industries which turn these raw materials into armaments.
The main task when we began to rearm ourselves eleven months ago was
to build such an armaments industry. It was necessary for us within
the span of a few months to build ourselves the equivalent of the
arms factories of the Old World. We had to duplicate under secure
Government ownership the vast shops which in peace and war have turned
out engines of destruction for European governments and which in their
search for private profit may have added their own mischievous con
tribution to the making of war itself.
The requirements of modern war are diverse in character and
enormous in quantity. When armies abandoned pikes and swords for mus
kets and cannon, they became totally dependent upon an industry to manu
facture gunpowder. This is still true today. A supply of powder for
rifle, machine gun, anti-aircraft and artillery ammunition is still a
vital requirement. A year ago we did not produce enough smokeless
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powder to last a modern army more than a few weeks. It was necessary
to build completely new plants for the manufacture of powder. Two of
these, I might say - one in southern Indiana and one in the hills of
western Virginia - are now coming into production. Similarly we had
no industry for producing other explosives in the vast quantity re
quired in modern war. he neeaed an industry to produce tanks and an
other uo manulacture smaxl. arms ammunition. These also are under way.
Above all, we needed an industry to produce military air
craft. A year ago our airplane industry was on a peacetime basis. We
produced only a few pursuit planes, some of them at least of unproven
quality. American transport planes were used in commercial airlines
all over the world and the transport plane is closely related to the
oomber. But even this part of the industry was a small-scale, hand-
tooled affair. We needed a full dress American-scale aircraft indus
try. Europeans have long been in the habit of looking with wonder at
our automobile industry and at the number and efficiency of the cars
which it turned out. vvhat we have needed most of all during the past
year is an airplane industry which would create the same impression.
oo the ouilding of a now armament industry has been the num
ber one proolem in defense economics during the past year. One of the
problems which has interested me deeply in connection with this program
has been the location of these new plants. What principles should be
followed in deciding where this industry should be established?
tcnen the National Defense Advisory Commission was organized
lasu summer, I expressed the view that new industries required under
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ll he defense program should not be located in areas where existing in
dustries essential to defense are no?.' concentrated when there was any
possibility of placing them elsewhere without undue sacrifice of speed
and efficiency. It v/as clear that this was the only way in which new
reservoirs of unemployed labor and resources would be tapped witnout
uprooting families and shifting them thousands of miles into comrauni-
ties where ebbing of the armament effort would leave them stranded.
The plans for war production which had been made prior to
the emergency were not based on such a principle. In carrying out trie
program up to date some progress toward decentralization has been made,
but I am afraid that on the whole we have followed trie same pattern of
regional concentration that was followed in 1917 and 19-1.8. Then we
handicapped our effort by shortages of labor and transport and left an
aftermath of over-concentrated industry. I am afraid, that we will
again reap some of the same harvest of economic and social conse
quences .
New facilities and new production are now being authorized
for the United States and .for aid to England. I am hopeful that the
armed services and the defense authorities will do a better job with
those than has been done heretofore. I do not mean that the plants
and facilities that have already been located will not produce effi
ciently the materials and the implements they arc designed to turn out.
By a "better job" I mean that the additional units yet to come will be
located where they can tap resources of materials, facilities and men
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heretofore untouched. The importance of such an effort to the Midwest
area will be apparent to all of you. It is of equal importance, I be
lieve, to the agricultural regions of the South and Southwest. In
these areas are the great reserves of manpower and materials which are
not now being tapped for the defense program and which we must bring
into use.
On the human side and to minimise the aftermath, it is im
portant that we avoid so far as possible drawing men from the mountains
and the prairie, from farms and interior cities and towns to crowd them
into industrial centers hundreds of miles away. It is far better to
leave as many as possible on farms and in the villages but give those
with low incomes opportunities for employment in industry. This would
lessen the immediate need for housing and provide a measure of security
when the emergency has passed.
So much for the new industries. The number two problem in
defense planning during the last year has been the readjustments in our
existing industry required by a defense economy. I have reference here
to the changes in the production of our present farms, mills, and fac
tories to supply the changed and expanded demands of the defense pro
gram or to offset the loss of foreign sources of supply.
I think many would agree that this has been the most awkward
and difficult phase of the defense effort. It is much easier sometimes
to create a new industry than it is to expand an old one. Up to the
present time we have been going through the easy part of this adjustment
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process. We have been picking up the slack in industries which in the
past had been operating below capacity, Now this stage is oast. The
point has been reached where expansion in the great basic industries
is imperative. We do not produce the tools, steel, power, non-ferrous
metals or chemicals which our newly assumed role- as the arsenal of
democracy will require. For many of these commodities it may be nec
essary that we have priorities and rationing while new plants are being
built to supply our full needs. But so long as it is physically pos
sible to increase output by increasing our plant and machinery, ration
ing is only an expedient. We can build a fifteen or twenty billion
dollar defense program out of the men and materials which in the nast
have been unused, if we have the mills in which to employ them.
f'or a aecaae the American economy has been operating in low
gear. Our industrial capacity ha« become adjusted to a low level of
output. Our problem now is to face up to the full productive output
of the country and provide the mills and the machines which will en
able us to use our total manpower. Some have feared no doubt that the
new factories and mills would fall idle some day - that they would be
added to the excess capacity which many industries have struggled with
m past years. This, in my judgment, is an idle worry. If we know
how to use our plant and equipment to produce the implements of war,
we ought to be able to learn how to use them in th* production of things
of peace.
The next problem is closely related. It is to learn how to
use the small business man and the small shop in the defense effort.
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It is to learn how to use the machine tools and machine skills which
are available in every industrial city of the United States - equipment
and skills which are not a monopoly of the large mass production cen
ters of the nation. On one or two occasions I have drawn attention to
tne fact that the great proportion of the prime contracts for war ma
terials awarded so far has gone to a relatively small number of com
panies. Of those let between June 13 of last year and February 15
of this year 30 per cent had gone to 62 companies or financially inter
related groups of companies. These are the companies or families of
companies that were best equipped with experience and management to at
tempt the different phases of the colossal job we have on hand. But
the defense authorities clearly recognize that if the manpower and the
facilities of the country are to be brought fully to Dear on the job
of production,, the corporations and firms holding these prime contracts
must spread the task of production through subcontracts as widely as
possible over the land.
As most of you know, an organization is being perfected un
der the direction of the Office of Production Management through which
the Arm:/- and. the Navy and the other defense authorities are going to
try to do an effective job of spreading the work covered by these con
tracts. If this is successful it means a larger use of the industrial
facilities in this area. The three States of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and
Iowa in 1939 together contributed five per cent of the total to the val
ue added by the nation*s manufactures. For the period from July 1 of
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last year to February 23 of this year these three States were awarded
but 1.5 per cent of the prime contracts for defense operations* This
is the situation which we must seek to offset by a larger use of sub
contracting* together* of course* with a constant effort to achieve
the best possible distribution of new prime contracts and new facto-
i w S •
This will require a lot of attention and a lot of work from
all of us. In one way or another the end must be accomplished.
I should have liked* had time permitted* to talk more about
the effects of war abroad and the arras program at home on different
branches of our agriculture. Our problems in this area have in some
ways been much simpler than those I have just mentioned. Agriculture*
as you know* produces at a high level of output in both good times and
bad. The farmer made his adjustment to depressed market conditions
during the depression by taking lower* or ices rather than by cutting
down on his output. This meant that we entered the defense period with
a farm plant that was producing at a high level and wi th surplus stocks
of many of the great basic commodities. To these have been added fur
ther supplies that we formerly sent abroad. Sometimes I wonder if very
many people have stopped to consider how much weaker our position as a
nation would be if we had to worry about whether our stocks of wheat
were sufficient to maintain the supply of bread next year. Few of us*
I am sure* appreciate the security with which the farmers of the United
States have provided us.
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Some agricultural supplies will be needed in greater quanti
ties in the months ahead. Meats, dairy products, poultry products,
and some vegetables are in increasing domestic demand and it is these
commodities which Britain will require in the main. Farmers, I believe,
will be ready to meet these requirements - in fact, I expect we shall
see the farmers give another exemplary lesson to industry and to labor
in the form of a prompt and willing response. For my part I have every
confidence and farmers have every right to expect, that the Government
will back them up with assurance of secure markets at fair prices for
this increased output.
Nearly two decades have passed since the long fight for
equality for agriculture began. I recall vividly the early leadership
and sponsorship which this organisation and the people of this city and
the Northwest provided. We sought to establish the principle that the
farmer's income was determined by the relation between his costs and
his prices and that he was entitled to get and keep a fair relation be
tween the two. That principle has been accepted as the law of the
United States.
It has not been easy or possible to apply that principle with
uniform success in the market place. But current tendencies to regard
it as outmoded and obsolete disturb' me. The formulae may need revision
technological changes may need to be taken into account, but the policy
that accepts and seeks to attain I'or agriculture a fair standard of re
lationship with industrial wages -and industrial prices should not be
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cast, aside and need not be apologized for. I see altogether too pro
nounced a tendency to do both in the present agricultural picture.
There is no equity and but little foresight in a philosophy that ac
cepts and justifies every wage increase organized labor can wring out
of this present crisis, and exonerates increasing industrial prices as
"necessary" because of rising costs, while denying the same Kind of
accounting to the American farmer.
We have many and difficult adjustments ahead of us. The de
fense program means that we shall have unequal pressures on different
markets. Some farm supplies may be difficult to obtain. Costs may
rise and many farm prices will continue to reflect the loss of foreign
markets. The principle of a fair parity in farm income and farm outgo
must be maintained - if for no other reason than because the farm plant
must remain healthy and solvent for national defense itself.
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Cite this document
APA
Chester C. Davis (1941, April 14). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19410415_davis
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19410415_davis,
author = {Chester C. Davis},
title = {Speech},
year = {1941},
month = {Apr},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19410415_davis},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}