speeches · February 16, 1939
Speech
Chester C. Davis · Governor
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AGRICULTURE * INDUSTRY * LABOR
Subject of
Third Annual
NATIONAL FARM INSTITUTE
Des Moines, Iowa,
February 17*18, 1939.
AGRICULTURAL PRICES AND PRICE RELATIONSHIPS
Opening address by
Chester C. Davis,
Member, Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System,
Washington, B. C,
9:30 a.m,, Friday, February 17, 1939.
Release for afternoon papers of
Friday, February 17, 1939.
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AGRICULTURAL PRICES AND PPItL? RELATIONSHIPS
By Chester C. Davis
I find it impossible to fence in the topic assigned to me and
then work it neatly and independently, like a good fanner with a
forty-acre field. Each farmer is touched by what countless millions
of others are doing all over the earth. Ho is affected by happenings
in a labor union hell, or in the remote directors' room of some vast
impersonal corporation, or in a committee ha.ll in Congress. At this
moment plans may be forming in some dictator brain five thousand miles
away that will influence the immediate returns of an Iowa farmer far
more than will any decision he himself is likely to make.
This generation is feeling the impact of changes as swift and as
radical as those which named an>earlier period the Industrial Revolu
tion. We have crossed over the divide from the 19th century era of
expansion, of frontier development, into a no-man*s land which we do
not understand.
For all practical purposes the automatic price system has disap
peared from our economy, except in the field of agriculture, and even
there more or less effective attempts at control have been under way
since 1929. It still remains to be demonstrated whether political democ
racy can survive its disappearance.
Farm commodity price maladjustments are only one thread in our
economic tangle. The United States never before had as many of its
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citizens earnestly trying to find the; causes and suggest the cures
for our many economic ills.
The lack of agreement in diagnosis and prescription suggests
that perhaps, as fallible human beings, we are like the blind men who
described the elephant. One grasped him by the tail and said the ele
phant is like a rope. The one who felt his leg thought him like a tree.
Another who bumped into his side was confident that the elephant resem
bled nothing so much as a wall; while the last, who reached the trunk,
thought he had hold of a snake.
There is the risk that as we become wrapped up in the study of one
feature of our complicated structure we may lose sight of the great central
national problem — the elephant, if you please. So before stepping off
into the discussion of farm prices, it is important to open \±p the main
highway to which I shall return before the conclusion of my remarks.
The central economic and political problem confronting us is how to get
our men and our resources to work. All else is subordinate. Every pol
icy and act of government, of business, and of labor should be tested by
its contribution to that end.
Merely raising the price level, increasing the dollar total of na
tional income, is not very important unless it is accompanied by in
creased production of wealth. More shifts in distribution of the present
total of income produced will not answer our national problem unless it
increases consumption and production and employment.
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It is so with fanners. If we omit consideration of debt and
taxes as related to prices, then the real question becomes, not how
high prices are in dollars, but what the farmers' production can buy
in terras of other goods raid services. As for debt, it can be dealt
with directly, either through lowering of interest charges by mone
tary and credit action, or by .adjustment of principal. The price
level is important in relation to tax burden, but a fair division of
the load between real property, and other forms of wealth and income,
is probably of even greater importance to the farmer.
Aside from debt and taxes the real issue is one of exchange values,
of disparities. The present price ratios are not fair to farmers.
They are not conducive to expansion in consumption and production, or
to increase in employment. At the close of 1938, according to the
Dep; rtment of Agriculture, prices of the commodities farmers sell were
96 percent of their pre-war (1910-14) average. Prices paid by farmers
averaged 121 percent of pre-war. Industrial wages averaged 207 percent.
It is true that for the past five years government payments that
are not reflected in the farm price average have added to farmers’ in
come . But even so, farm prices are too low in relation to industrial
wages and the price of non-agriculturcl products. The farmer isn’t
the only one to suffer. City industries and city labor are unemployed
when falling buying power in the country makes a poor customer out of a
good one.
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To many sincere people the problem presented by unremunerative
and inequitable farm prices seems a v'ery simple one. Some believe it
can be solved by monetary action; others that adjustment in supply is
the cure. Prices fixed by government fiat is a popular prescription.
There are many other approaches than these.
Before we consider them, and what may be done to help establish
fairer price relationships in the interest of the farmers ana of the
nation, let us pause long enough to get some facts straight. I get
very tired of hearing the agricultural efforts criticized by the un
thinking as "programs of scarcity". Farmers constitute the one impor
tant group in our economy that has consistently kept up its volume of
production even though it has suffered severe price disadvantages as a
consequence. This wa.s true before 1933; it is true today with the
A.A.A. in operation.
This last year, while farmers were producing more than ever before
in the history of the country - more than they produced in 1919 or in
19«!9 or any other year - industrial production was reduced 35 percent
below the quantity produced in 1929. Incidentally, the index of agri
cultural prices fell off one-third in 1938 compared with 1929. The
prices of what farmers buy fell much less.
I repeat - the farmers kept ux> their volume of production, but
manuiacturing and mining industries cut their production down to the
extent of 35 percent. Factory payrolls dropped 30 percent from the
totals of 1929.
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Talce a specific instance that comes close home to the farmer.
The production of farm machinery fell from an index of 190 in Septem
ber, 1937, to 96 in September, 1938 — almost exactly in half. Pay
rolls in farm machinery factories fell, from 204 to 87 — more than
half. Price changes in standard lines were slight.
In other words, farmers keep on producing; factories shut down
when output cannot be sold for a price that covers costs and a margin
of profit, even though millions of vforkmen are plowed out into the
street o.s an unfortunate result.
I am not here today either as a defender or expounder of the ag
ricultural adjustment program. Many who for years have tried in every
way to hamper and break down its operations are now gloating over what
they term its failure. Again it is important to get our facts straight.
Cooperative acreage control was suspended when the Supreme Court
majority delivered its anachronistic decision in the Hoosac Mills case
on January 6, 1936. No mechanism for effective control existed from
that date until the enactment of the new Agricultural Adjustment Act
on February 16, 1938.
No control program was in effect when 80,000,000 acres were
planted to wheat for harvest in 1938, or when the cotton crop of
19,000,000 bales was planted and harvested in 1937.
The problem of farm price relationships can be attacked from, two
sides. Organized farm groups have concentrated on the direct approach
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which is to get higher dollar prices through control of supplies
marketed, control of supplies produced, government loans, monetary
action, or as a last resort, direct government price fixing.
The other, or indirect approach, is to increase the production
of non-agricultural goods by encouraging industry to seek profits
through volume rather than high unit price, and labor to seek higher
income through continuous employment and expanded production rather
than through the highest attainable hourly wage for the minimum of
output.
The first or direct line of attack on farm prices is employed
in the agricultural adjustment program. It inspires the many price-
fixing proposals. The one seeks to establish parity prices for farm
products; the other demands prices that equal cost of production in
cluding interest on capital and a profit. I have come to the conclu
sion that neither form of direct attack can fully attain its objective
unless a successful movement along the second line can be made to in
crease national income by freeing and expanding employment and produc
tion of non-agricultural goods.
Even with extraordinary government aid agriculture will probably
not be able to secure the degree of rigidity in the prices of farm
products that existing controls have attained in the prices and unit
wages of organized industry and labor. Nevertheless, radical changes
in world demand and technology make it imperative that far-reaching
agricultural adjustment programs be continued. There is time only to
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mention a few of these new conditions.
The cotton economy of the South is undermined by the swift en
croachment of synthetic competition on the one hand, and by expansion
of foreign sources on the other. The spreading use of artificial
substitutes is probably inevitable. The direct and indirect control
of foreign cotton-growing areas and policies by dictator states can
not be altered to suit the wishes of the American cotton grower. It
is unlikely that the United States can ever regain its formex' share
of the world market for cotton. In the meantime, millions of concen
trated farm population dependent on cotton face desperate adjustment
problems.
A little-realized revolution in farm mechanics is now under way
which promises to displace within a few years hundreds of thousands
of farm laborers and their families who are now attached to the land,
ana to turn millions of fertile acres from the production of feed for
horses and mules to other and competitive uses. I refer to the coming
of the flexible little rubber-tired tractor, selling in many cases at
about the price of a good team of horses, which does any kind of farm
or road work and does it quickly, comfortably and cheaply.
The wheat farmers have not adjusted their operations to the radi
cal world changes that have resulted from policies of national self-
sufficiency adopted by our former customers, aud from altered condi
tions of international exchange.
The problem of adjustment of feed supply and livestock numbers
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in tn.e interest of a stable corn-belt and range economy is with us,
and vri.ll remain with us quite apart from considerations of price that
are involved.
These are only a few of the conditions that demand a continued
adjustment program regardless of what political party may control our
government. Every right-thinking citizen will do his best to hasten
the day when the principles and operations of agricultural adjustment
are removed from the field of partisan prejudice and debate.
■t>ut agricultural adjustments alone; are not likely to result in
parity of farm prices with other costs and prices if the practices of
corporate industry and of organized labor continue without change.
Nuitner do I believe that any plan to have the government fix prices
at the cost-of-production point will work out as its advocates believe.
Most of these plans would apply fixed prices to the portion of a
crop that is consumed in the United States, depending on export outlets
at some price for all that is produced above domestic consumption. We
cannot, without radically changing our attitude towards increasing im
ports, go on expanding our exports at will. Even without the export
stimulus which such a plan would provide:, we were forced to accept
?1,500,000,000 in gold which we do not need to pay for the excess of
our exports over imports during the 15 months up to January 1, 1939.
Thera is another aspect of government price-fixing that is even
more disturbing to me. i’rice-fixing would require either a far-reaching
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system of government monopolies, or strict license and regulation of
all operations from consumer to final processor.
Europe is rich in experience along both lines. Three years ago
I had a close-up view of some of the operations on the other side of
the Atlantic. One man with whom I spent considerable time in Vienna,
Dr. Oskar Morgenstorn, recently described how price-fixing adventures
of this sort have culminated in Europe. He says:
"There emerges from many examples one principal
phenomenon. I am thinking of the fact that, once
price control has set in, new controls of far-
reaching scope and importance have to be piled up
one above the other. It does not really matter
whether the first step toward price-fixing was
undertaken by a public monopoly or by some other
governmental agency. ******** jn GVery case the fact
emerges that a trading monopoly pledged to maintain
prices, after a very short time, has no choice but
to increase its scope at the cost of further suppres
sion of private enterprise. This is precisely what
has happened in every instance."
Dr. Morgenstern illustrated his conclusions by specific cases.
One was the Milk Marketing Board of Austria, which in a comparatively
short time found itself actually selling butter and cheese in England
at one-sixth the price that prevailed at home, and the Austrianst par
ticularly the Viennese, were not getting the milk and dairy products
they needed, either.
Another illustration with which I had become familiar was the
Czechoslovak grain monopoly. It started out as simple price-fixing
back of high tariffs and import quotas. In 1932 a .ful.l-fledged monop-
%
oly took over all internal as well as export grain marketing. Let
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Dr. Ivlorgenstern tell the rest of the story:
monopoly had to regulate primarily
the trading of wheat, the production of which in
creased while the cultivation of barley, rye and oats,
where the price protection was much less, decreased.
*******Even the installat ion of meters at the mills,
registering the amount of wheat actually milled, could
not prevent the growth of a 'bootleg market*. There
fore, the decline in consumption shown by the statistics
to have amounted to some 30-40 per cent was not entirely
a real one. Meanwhile, the monopoly accumulated huge
stocks. particularly curious device con
sisted of forcing the peasants in 1936 to repurchase
some of the wheat formerly bought from them by the
monopoly."
I am sorry that time will not allow me to discuss proposals that
are made looking toward increasing price levels and correcting dis
parities by monetary action. I wish we had a supreme court of money,
credit and finance before whom these questions might be debated, and
from whom an objective and conclusive finding could be had. I can only
say that in my own study I have approached these proposals with un
diluted sympathy for their objectives, and yet I do not see how at this
time they promise any real help in meeting the nation's economic needs.
So much for direct approaches to the problem of farm price dis
parities. The second, or indirect approach is to concentrate our ef
forts on increasing the aggregate of our national production of wealth.
As I have said, the farmer is contributing his full share to production,
and will continue to do so. He will be unable to contribute his full
share toward consumption, as long as such great inequalities between
his selling price and his buying price prevail.
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If policies are developed in the United States that lead toward
full employment and larger volume of non-agricultural production,
the demand for farm products will expand, and the real purchasing
power, the exchange value, of farm commodities will rise.
This condition suggests to me that part of the farm problem,
and a large part at that, lies outside the farm field; that the poli
cies of non-agricultural industry, of organized Labor, and of the gov
ernment with respect to both, may have enormous influence in determine
ing whether the farmer prospers or suffers in the exchange of his goods.
If we examine each separate problem in our economy, I suspect we
will find that in every case part of the trouble lies off in some other
field. Labor suffers when farmers lack purchasing power to buy the
output of city industries. Railroads suffer when volume of business
lags. In other words, this isn’t a rope, or a tree, or a wall, or a
snake - it’s an elephant we’ve got on our hands’.
As I see the central problem, it is this:
We have millions of men unemployed; we have the greatest endowment
of natural and mechanical resources known to the world; and we have the
monetary basis for an expansion of productive activity far greater than
ever existed heretofore. Yet opposed to these in stark paradox we have
on almost unlimited gap of unfilled human wants and needs.
I submit that the challenge presented by that combination is, after
all, the nation's economic problem number one. Work it out, and many of
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the difficulties of the farmers will shrink and disappear.
I used that word - a challenge - because other nations seem tem
porarily at least to be making headway through forms of government and
at a price which we do not favor here. The price they pay is the com
plete subordination of the individual to the State.
The task ahead of us is to bring about such a rate of production
that all of our effective ruan-power may find useful employment. Most
of us favor accomplishing this expansion under private initiative and
direction to the fullest extent that is possible.
The needs of the people are great enough to absorb production in
the aggregate at a much higher rate then we have ever attained. Expan
sion to that point is safe as long as we produce what the people need
and at prices at which production will be absorbed.
All of us need to address our attention to this central problem.
I mean all of us — those who are temporarily in positions of Government
responsibility, the farmers, labor, industrialists, the press, the edu
cators, the carriers, all elements in our society. I do not offer to
solve the equation, but we do not have all eternity to work it out in.
I do not believe we are going to meet this challenge unless the
government, the employers of labor, and the leaders of organized labor
themselves, re-appraise their policies and true them up with the all-
important objective of getting the unemployed into useful work and
maintaining conditions tbit will give them work to do.
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I submit two questions for your consideration:
Would not manufacturers and other non-agricultural producers be
better off if they held to lower prices and larger continuous produc
tion when demand starts to revive, looking to volume production instead
of increased prices for their profits?
And would not labor get higher real wages if its leaders fixed
their eyes on the amount earned at the end of the year through steady
employment in producing things people need, rather than on the highest
attainable hourly wage for a minimum of production?
The principles suggested by these questions for industry and labor
are the principles agriculture has always followed. If they are put to
work, the farm problem will become far simpler tc- handle than it is.
Please do not misunderstand my references to the wage scales and
practices of labor. I am not trying to pin blame on anybody. This
is not necessarily a moral issue. I am pleading for a larger view of
our economy irrespective of political beliefs ana immediate interests
and sympathies. Farmers want labor to have higher incomes. They want
to see labor income raised, however, by more continuous employment in
the production of things this country needs and, with our resources,
should be able to afford - better houses and clothing and shoes; ade
quate and comfortable home furnishings, and the necessities and com
forts now denied so many of its people.
Neither do farmers, in my opinion, begrudge industrial capital
and management their adequate rewards, but they think it poor public
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policy to try to insure and protect those rewards by rigid prices and
high margins at the risk of falling production and unemployment.
Wo saw the wrong kind of price policies in building materials,
and the wrong kind of labor policies in the building trades, combine
to kill off a promising rise in residential construction in 1937.
The volume of contracts awarded increased 30 percent between mid-1936
and rnid-1937 — a recovery movement of the first magnitude. Meanwhile
the price of southern pine rose from $24 in the fall of 1336 to $3£.50
a thousand in the spring of 1237; lead pipe rose from $6.50 to $9.25 per
100 pounds, and window glass rose from $2.75 to $3.65 per 50 square
feet. And while accurate statistics are not available, there is good
reason to suppose that contractors' margins increased in about the
same proportion.
The average hourly wage of labor employed in the steel industry
advanced from 66 cents to 65 cents an hour between August 1936 and
July 1937; in the manufacture of agricultural implements, from 60 cents
to 7TJ cunts an hour; in automobiles, from 73 cents to 93 cents an
hour; in the building trades, from 80 to 90 cents an hour — in many
communities much higher.
It will be interesting to observe whether there is any general
recognition in 1939 of the set-back those earlier policies gave us.
Now in conclusion: Economists call the aggregate of income pro
duced by all the workers of the land, our national income. It is pos
sible to make that income steadily increase. If it does, troubles
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that seem so anormous today will give us decreasing concern — the
state of the government budget, the condition of the railroads,
ana the economic health of agriculture.
We should look upon agriculture as a part of the economic fabric
of the nation. The farmers’ welfare is linked to the economic welfare
of the people employed in the mills and factories of our great cities.
And the roots of their prosperity in turn are watered and fed by the
farmers cf the entire nation.
America will never be satisfied as lon^ as unemployment and
want are companions in our land. If ours can be an expanding economy;
if we can get all elements of the team to pull together, producing
year by year a larger national income, then farmers as well as others
can face the future with hope and confidence, so Jong as the whole
country keeps on the upgrade.
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Cite this document
APA
Chester C. Davis (1939, February 16). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19390217_davis
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19390217_davis,
author = {Chester C. Davis},
title = {Speech},
year = {1939},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19390217_davis},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}