speeches · December 13, 1937
Speech
Marriner S. Eccles · Chair
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
Statement for the Press
December 14, 1937.
Attached is a copy of the address delivered by Chairman Eccles be
fore the Annual Meeting of the American Farm Bureau Federation at Chicago,
Tuesday forenoon, December 14, 1937.
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION AFTER 12.00 NOON EASTERN STANDARD
TIME, DECEMBER 14, 1937.
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AN ADDRESS
BEFORE THE
ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE
AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION
AT CHICAGO
DECEMBER 14, 1937,
BY
MARRINER S. ECCLES,
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
It is particularly gratifying to me to have this opportunity today
to speak before the American Farm Bureau Federation. Your leaders and
members, to a much greater extent than some of the other organized groups
in this country, are approaching fundamental economic problems from a
broad public-interest standpoint. 1 feel, therefore, that I can discuss
here some of the problems as I see them at this time, knowing that you
are interested, as we who are charged with certain monetary responsibili
ties must be, in finding wherever possible the solutions which will be of
the greatest benefit to the nation as a, whole.
I do not need to tell you that your daily life and prosperity are
dependent on developments in industry and trade, and that the proper
functioning of the monetary mechanism is of great concern to you. Ac
cordingly, you will understand why I wish to confine my remarks largely
to an interpretation of the present situation in the industrial and mon
etary field, rather than to attempt to discuss the agricultural problem
which you know so much better than I do. I would rather listen to you
on that subject.
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During the past three years I have lived continuously with the
problem of how to achieve and maintain full and continuous employment
of the country’s human and material resources. I have been chiefly
concerned with the contribution the Federal Government in general and
the Federal Reserve System in particular could make to the solution of
the problem. As time has passed, I have become increasingly impressed
with the danger to our common goal resulting from conflicting policies
of different economic groups. Before we can achieve a larger measure
of stability we will have to find some way of ensuring that the policies
of private business and organizations, whether of farmers, of labor, or
of business men, are not in conflict with our common objectives.
From 1934 up to the last quarter of 1936, we had an orderly recovery
movement. The steady expansion in consumer incomes and buying power, in
considerable part attributable to what the Government spent in excess of
what it collected, led to a steady growth in production. The Index of
Industrial Production moved gradually upward from 86 in December, 1954,
to 110 in October, 1936, while the Index of Payrolls rose 39 percent in
the same period. Wholesale commodity prices remained practically un
changed, so that the expansion in the national income from 1934 to 1936
of some $14 billion represented not merely more motley received by our
people, but an increase in the amount of goods that they could purchase.
The orderly character of the recovery movement, under which such
steady progress had been made, underwent a drastic change in the final
quarter of 1936, and in the six months fallowing October of last year
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prices began to rise rapidly. It was in this six months’ period that
the groundwork of the present recession was laid.
Among the factors contributing to the upsurge in costs, prices
and inventory buying, were the bonus payments coming on top of already
heavy Government expenditures and giving a sharp additional impetus to
consumer buying. The organizing campaign of labor, together with the
drive for higher wages and shorter hours, added to expectations of
higher prices. The rearmament program in various countries contributed
to the general inflationary sentiment. A sellers’ market developed and
widespread advantage was taken of it to increase prices. Various import
ant sectors of industry which had not added to their productive capacity
in the preceding years found themselves unable to promise quick delivery,
leading to still further piling up of orders and higher prices. The
prices of various internationally-controlled raw materials skyrocketed,
while bond pricos declined.
The longer this condition persisted and the further wage costs and
prices advanced, the more severe the inevitable reaction was bound to be.
Therefore, before the movement acquired further momentum, the President,
on April 2, issued a warning statement. The previous announcement by the
Board of Governors of raised reserve requirements for member banks, which
I shall discuss in more detail later, tended to diminish the fear or ex
pectation of credit inflation. In any case, a damper was put on infla
tionary sentiment. Prices temporarily leveled out. Industrial production,
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though interrupted here and there by strikes, was broadly maintained,
but it was maintained on the basis largely of forward orders and part
of the output was piling up in the form of inventories rather than mov
ing forward to consumers.
The backlog of orders which had accumulated in the winter and spring
in anticipation of price advances kept business going until well along in
the summer. Balance sheets of industrial corporations and mercantile
establishments reveal that in the latter part of this summer inventories
were in excess of what thoy were lust year while at the same time sales
wer« declining. If sales to consumers had continued to increase, inven
tories could have been rapidly absorbed. As far as can be judged from
available figures, however, consumer buying did not increase after last
spring. The income of consumers apparently ceased to expand after May
and the volume of their purchases likewise failed to increase.
An important factor in the arrested growth of buying by consumers
was the failure of building activity to expand. There was every reason
to expect residential building of substantial proportions this year. The
national income was running considerably above 1936, rents were rising,
and the accumulated housing shortage was growing more acute. As has fre
quently been pointed out, we should be building an average of some 800,000
housing units a year for five years to make up for the shortages, to off
set demolition and to provide for the normal growth in the number of fam
ilies .
Yet, instead of increasing, residential building actually turned down
in May, and it is doubtful whether the number of units built this year
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will much exceed 280,000, the number constructed in 1936. The only ex
planation that can be offeree to account for this disappointing showing
is the sharp advance in construction costs last spring while rents did
not advance as rapidly, sc that it became less profitable to build.
Coupled with these developments, there was a decrease in Government
expenditures and an increase of tax collections, particularly on social
security account. In the first eleven months of this year, the excess
of cash expenditures by the Federal Government over cash receipts de
clined by three billion dollars as compared with the same period last
year. Owing to the failure of consumer incomes and buying to increase,
industry found that as forward orders were filled there were not enough
new orders coming along to keep up the volume of production and thus of
employment.
The various factors which I have enumerated were chiefly responsible,
in my judgment, for bringing about the current decline of business. Other
factors may have been contributory in some degree, but upon careful analy
sis they appear to be entirely insufficient to account for the recession.
The more I have considered other explanations, the more I have been led to
the conclusion that the cost and price advances of last winter and spring
were the principal causes of the subsequent downturn.
There are critics who contend that monetary policy has been primarily
responsible for the present recession. They think that sterilization of
incoming gold by the Treasury and the actions of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System in increasing the- reserve requirements of member
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banks caused a reversal of the upward movement. Upon careful searching
of the record, I cannot find convincing evidence to support this analy
sis. At the time these actions were taken member banks had a volume of
reserves that could have become the basis of an inflationary expansion
of credit which under the law it was the duty of the Federal Reserve
authorities to prevent. At the time final action on reserves was taken
the aggregate of bank deposits and of currency in circulation was larger
than it had been in 1929. If no action had been taken, excess reserves
would by now have been about $5 billion, sufficient to support an enor
mous ana inflationary increase in deposits.
Even after the excess reserves were reduced, member banks still had
enough left to meet all current demands for credit, and money- rates re
mained at exceptionally low levels. In effect, the actions of the Board
did not "put on the brakes", as some critics have said, but merely took
up a large part of the slack so that the Reserve System was placed in the
position it was intended to occupy in which, as was stated at the time,
it would be able to use the traditional and flexible instruments of open
market and rate policy either in the direction of further monetary ease or
in the opposite direction as changing conditions and the public interest
might require. As a matter of fact, last spring the Board eased conditions
through open-market operations and again this fall, in cooperation with the
Treasury, further steps were taken in the same direction by desterilization
of gold and by subsequent open-market operations. Similarly the Reserve
System put into effect last August the lowest discount rates in the history
of the System.
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If the actions taken last winter had a psychological effect in re
straining the inflationary developments which were clearly under way at
the time, then these actions were definitely in the public interest. If
this be so then my only regret is not that the actions were taken, but
that they were not taken earlier.
Another explanation of the recession that has been advanced ascribes
it primarily to the undistributed profits and capital gains taxes. Thore
are some who consider this explanation so obvious and so important that
they urge the immediate repeal of these taxes or a revision so drastic as
effectively to destroy them. I would be the last to contend that these
levies are perfectly drafted; but I would urge that changes in these taxes
be made only after careful consideration of such reforms and modifications
as would make them more equitable and improve the working of the mechanism
without prematurely abandoning the principles of these taxes.
It should be recalled that the undistributed profits tax was designed
to correct evils appearing in the economy of the twenties, as well as in more
recent years, such as the avoidance of individual surtaxes in the upper
bracket incomes through non-distribution of profits, the inequalities in the
taxation of incorporated and unincorporated businesses, the piling up of
corporate earnings which make for further combinations and consolidations
and the reduction of competition, the accumulation of large balances that
boosted security prices through being loaned to the call money market and
that, later on in the depression, were shunted around from place to place and
were an important indirect cause of numerous bank failures, we must remember
that a general liquidation of debts in the economy or a gradual accumulation of
idle reserve funds could well intensify deflationary forces at this time,whereas
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if ths tax were so modified as to exempt earnings which were used for
capital account, the effect would be to increase the use of funds and hence
business activity. It would be well to consider how this tax can be made
to function more equitably, particularly with respect to small business.
It would, however, be shortsighted to be stampeded into hasty abandonment
of a tax principle which is fundamentally sound and equitable.
Likewise, while 1 agree that the capital gains tax should be improved,
we should remember that this tax is designed simply to make effective the
progressive taxation of income in accordance with ability to pay—a course
on which I think the American people are soundly determined. There is little
convincing reason why the realized income from a rise in property values,
including speculative profits, should be dealt with more leniently than
the realized income, for instance, from personal earnings. There is little
in the history of security prices to indicate that they have fluctuated more
widely when this tax was higher than when it was lower. The stock market
has gone up and down when the capital gains tax was much smaller and less
restrictive, as in 1929, and when the capital gains tax was much larger as
in 1936-57. We should also remember that both the undistributed profits
tax and the capital gains tax were in force in 1936, when industrial plant
and equipment expenditures and general investment were expanding at a rate
quite as rapid as could reasonably have been expected. And during the first
nine months of this year the volume of industrial plant and equipment ex
penditures was maintained at a level approximating that of the pre-depression
year of 1928. The recession, therefore, cannot logically be ascribed to the
curtailment of expenditures because of this tax.
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The basic causes of the present situation are not to be found either
in the capital gains tax, the undistributed profits tax, or in monetary
policy, but, as 1 have indicated, in the rapid price and cost advances of
last winter and spring. The experience of this past year illustrates
again the limitations of monetary and fiscal policy. Fiscal policy, in
particular, cannot be quickly adjusted to sudden changes in business
activity because such policy depends largely upon prior legislative en
actments .
When the disruptive price factors became intensified last spring and
proposals were advanced in some quarters to correct the situation 'through
monetary action to tighten money rates, I issued a public statement for
the purpose of refuting the notion that monetary action should be invoked
to correct such conditions. 1 pointed to the fact that the price rises
were the result primarily of non-monetary factors including foreign arma
ment demands, strikes and monopolistic practices by certain groups both in
industry and organized labor and that these factors had led in turn to
speculative security and commodity buying which served to accelerate the
price advances. I suggested at the time that other means than a restrictive
money policy must be used under such conditions to control unwarranted price
advances which result in a rise in the cost of living for a majority of the
people without a commensurate increase in their income.
It is, of course, easier to raise problems then it is to solve them,
When we review the events leading up to the current recession, it becomes
apparent that a basic difficulty in achieving full and continuous utiliza
tion of cur human and natural resources lies in the conflict between im
mediate private interests and the general welfare Those groups that con
tributed . to the upsurge in costs and prices last winter end spring were not
acting either in the public interest or in their own ultimate interest.
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We must recognize the fact that competition has declined and monop
oly elements have increased over large sectors of our economy. For ex
ample, it could only have teen the absence of competition that permitted
building costs to soar on the low volume of building that took place last
spring. It is only the absence of competition that can explain the main
tenance of fixed prices and wage rates when the volume of activity declines
sharply. The gradual increase in the non-competitive elements in our econ
omy, so strikingly illustrated in the developments of the past year, raises
some highly important questions;
How are we to achieve and maintain full employment if private groups
and organisations raise prices and costs whenever increased demand appears,
although there is still an abundance of idle and unused man power, plant
facilities and raw materials? Does this necessitate steady increases in con
sumer buying power through deficit spending; How long can we pursue such a
course? Are we to attempt to return to a truly competitive laissez faire
economy? If not, are the alternatives facing organizations of capital and
labor either self-government in the public interest or increased regulation
in the public interest;
I earnestly hope they will choose the former alternative. So far as
a return to laissez faire is concerned, I doubt that this is possible. The
development of the industrial process itself has created larger units and
has brought into being various forms of organization of both capital and
labor. Rather than attempt to revert to earlier forms of organization,
it seems to me that our best hope lies in developing that form of organiza
tion for capital and labor which will best further the public interest.
Thought must also be given to the best form of organization that will in
sure an adequate representation of the public interest involved in price,
wage and production policies.
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The ultimate self-interest both of capital and of labor is identical
with the public interest. I am hopeful that individual business men in
strategic positions, and the various local, trade and national associa
tions of business men, will act upon a recognition of the fact that their
long-run interests are bound up with the largest possible volume of pro
duction at the lowest possible prices. For their own ultimate benefit,
as well as in the interests of a stable economy with a steadily rising
standard of living, they must resist the temptation to secure larger re
turns through the adoption of policies that restrict output.
Likewise, I am hopeful that labor policy will increasingly take into
account the fact that after a certain point the gains of labor are depend
ent upon increased productivity. Advances in wages which are in excess
of increasing productivity and result in increased prices react against
labor itself, as ’well as against the community at large. If they result
in advancing prices, they encourage speculative inventory buying, or shut
off demand, or both, as we have recently seen. If they reduce profits
below a point that encourages new investment, they lead to decreased
plant, equipment and other capital expenditures. Similarly, general short
ening of hours not offset by increases in efficiency is bound to result
in a lower standard of living for workers generally. Accordingly, it is
to the interest of labor leadership to take into consideration the effect
of its policies on the general price level, on the standard of living,
and on progress toward as full and. as continuous employment as possible of
the human and material productive resources of the nation.
We are prone to take for granted a steadily rising standard of liv
ing without inquiring too closely into the basis for this belief. Actually
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there is only one way in which the general standard of living can rise
and that is by an increase in the production and consumption of real goods
and services per head of the population. This stubborn fact, though in
controvertible, is too often ignored or forgotten. We are inclined to
think too much in terms of money incomes and not enough in terms of what
the incomes will buy.
In the final analysis, the national income is measured by the total
output of goods. If there is less to divide, all groups of the popula
tion, including capital, labor, and agriculture, will suffer; The national
standard of living will decline.
I have sought to state in the broadest and most fundamental terms
what I believe to be some of the major economic problems raised by our
recent experience. These long-range, fundamental problems cannot be solved
overnight or without hard and realistic thinking. They must be solved
eventually, however, if we are going to be able to realize our enormous
productive potentialities and maintain full and efficient employment of
all our resources. We are only doomed to disappointment if we place all
our faith in monetary management or fiscal policies and ignore the prob
lems raised by the decline in competition and the growth of restrictive
policies. The problems to which I refer are not all new and they are not
exclusively the problems of any political group. They are the basic
problems which must be successfully met if we are to preserve our capital
istic system, and they will confront whatever group may have the responsi
bility for government.
Although I have been thinking mainly of the basic problems raised by
the current recession, much of what I have been saying is applicable to
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the immediate problem of stopping the contraction and resuming the re
covery. Two of the principal causes of the recession -were excessive in
ventory accumulations and the failure of building construction, railroad
and utility expenditures to increase sufficiently to offset the decline
in the Government's contribution to community buying power. Considerable
progress has been made since September in rectifying the inventory situa
tion. Production has declined much more rapidly than consumption.
If consumer demand can be sustained, we may be hopeful that production
may soon begin to increase. Local, state and Federal provision for the
unemployed afford a support to consumer buying power that was lacking prior
to 1933.
At the same time, it is highly desirable for business men, both in
their own and in the public interest, to review carefully their present
and prospective inventory, plant and equipment requirements. Further cur
tailment of expenditures for these purposes at the present time will mean
that many lines of business will be physically unable to meet the orders
that will come to them when the recovery movement is resumed. In order to
expand their productive facilities, to meet the demand, they will find them
selves bidding against each other at advancing prices.
In addition to measures to sustain buying power and production, we
need an impetus that will bring about an actual increase. For this, we
must look primarily to the building industry. Building has demonstrated
in the past its ability to move against a general downward trend if the
relation of costs to rents is favorable for construction. In legisla
tion now pending, the Federal Government proposes to bring about more
favorable terms for financing housing both on a small and on a large
scale. It has, among other things, taken steps to place the opportunity
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for acquiring a new home within the reach of people who can afford only a
few hundred dollars down payment.
In order for this opportunity to be fully availed of, however, build
ing costs should be lowered to around the levels of 1936. Business and
labor organizations connected either directly or indirectly with the build
ing industry can serve their own raid the public interest by doing what they
can to reduce unit costs and in this way increase their aggregate returns.
Lower financing costs, and the mechanism proposed in the pending housing
bill, for large scale housing production will also contribute to this end.
Lower real estate taxes on new construction as well as lower land values
would likewise greatly aid the housing program. In the more competitive
parts of the building field, costs have already declined substantially.
Fundamental solution of the railroad problem is bound up with in
creasing traffic, with consolidations and elimination of duplicating
facilities and with decreased costs. I trust that the importance of a build
ing revival in this connection will not be lost sight of. I question whether
any steps to help the railroads that would have the effect of increasing
building Costs or reducing farm income would bo in the real interest of the
railroads or of the general public.
Broadly speaking, I fee1 that the resumption of an orderly recovery de-’
pends upon the adjustment downward of those monopolistic or controlled prices
and wage rates which still remain too high in relation to consumer pur
chasing power, and an adjustment upwards of such prices and wage rates as
may be too low in relation to the cost of living. The policies of Govern
ment, agriculture, business and labor to be successful must be directed
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toward the objective of restoring and maintaining a better balanced economy
that will make for a greater production and distribution of real wealth.
In conclusion, let me say that in my opinion the extent of the pre
sent recession will depend upon how rapidly the more serious maladjustments
between prices and buying power arc corrected and increased national income
is created by the activity of private business. An adequate treatment of
your particular problem of agricultural income must be a major part of a
successful program of recovery. I feel that the Government in its policy of
taxation and spending must adapt itself to changes in the national income
created by private enterprise and, finally, I feel that the monetary author
ities should exert their efforts to keep the availability, supply and cost of
money at such a level as to encourage continuous expansion of the real in
come of the nation in goods and services and to prevent or moderate an ex
pansion of monetary income in excess of the nation’s productive capacity.
I am confident that monetary authorities are prepared to contribute their
full share to the end that the nation's economic health may be regained and
preserved.
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Cite this document
APA
Marriner S. Eccles (1937, December 13). Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19371214_eccles
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_speech_19371214_eccles,
author = {Marriner S. Eccles},
title = {Speech},
year = {1937},
month = {Dec},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/speech_19371214_eccles},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}