speeches · November 9, 2022
Regional President Speech
Mary C. Daly · President
Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco
ABOUT US OUR PEOPLE JOIN US
What We Study Our District Research & Insights
News & Media
/ NEWS & MEDIA / EVENTS
In Conversation: Mary C.
Daly with the European
Economics & Financial
Centre
DATE
Thursday, Nov 10, 2022
TIME
8:00 am PST
LOCATION
Virtual
TOPICS
Global Economy Inflation International Trade Monetary Policy
President Daly’s Fireside Chat with the
European Economics & Financial Centre
IInn CCoonnvveerrssaattiioonn:: MMaarryy CC.. DDaallyy wwiitthh tthhee EEuurrooppeeaann EEccoonnoommiiccss && FFiinnaanncciiaall CC……
Mary C. Daly’s Fireside Chat with the European Economics & Financial Centre.
Transcript
Hannah Scobie:
For us. We are greatly honored that you accepted our invitation. As you
may know, our center has had a very longstanding relations with San
Francisco Fed back to the days where Dr. Janet Yellen was in the
Federal Reserve and San Francisco Fed. And in a way, we’re very sorry
that you couldn’t come today to London in person, but we totally
understand, and are very grateful to you that it’s made possible to have
a discussion with you. So given that we have lots of questions and a
short time, I would like to start the first question and go straight to the
news that came today, about which you must be pleased that the
headline inflation came out as 7.7% down from 8.2% and core inflation
down to 6.3% from 6.7. So while this is one or two readings that show the
decline, at the same time, if we look closely at the data, part of the
decline in our view was to do with the decline in oil prices, which came
down from a high of $120 in June to low of 76.7, this is WTI. And now the
price of oil since then has been rising and it’s quite possible that
headline inflation could go up again. So in a sense, making the job of
policy makers more difficult. In a way, what is very important for us is to
learn your views on basically at the moment the risks. And how do you
actually see the five-year, five-year forward? Other than five-year, five-
year forward, other indicators of inflation expectation that you would
regard as inflation is more persistent. So over to you.
Mary Daly:
Okay. Okay, thank you. And let me start off by saying thank you so much
for shifting to a virtual event when I couldn’t make the trip. I really do
appreciate it, and it’s an honor to be a part of your series. And I’m just
looking forward to the conversation. Now that question you asked had
multiple parts, and I’m gonna unpack it a little bit because I think it’s
useful to treat each of those parts as as individual items. So let’s talk
about the numbers that came out today. It was indeed good news that
inflation moderated its grip a bit. And the focus I’ll draw really is on core
inflation, which as you said was 6.3% over the year coming down from
6.6, I think was the rate last time. So, I’m sorry I didn’t look at my note, but
you said-
Hannah Scobie:
Six.
Mary Daly:
Six? Right. So it’s come down a little bit. Most of that drop was
attributable to the decline in core goods prices which we’ve been
expecting to ease a bit as people… Two things happen, supply change
recovers, production change recover, and also people rotate to
services, back to services consumption and away from such a focus on
goods consumption. So that just helps bring demand and supply back in
balance. That’s a welcome piece of news. And so we see that starting to
happen, but one month of data is not a victory make and I think it’s
really important to be thoughtful that this is just one piece of positive
information, but we’re looking at a whole set of information. On the
other side, core services continues to rise and that really can be
attributed to a variety of things, but one of the things that’s really
important to focus on is housing. Shelter costs continue to be high in the
United states, rising the inflation tends to be high. That’s a lagging
variable. Once you get that in there, it takes a while to… Once house
prices start to moderate or house price growth starts to moderate, it
takes a while to come through all of the rental agreements and really
ease the consumer pocket book on these things. And so that’s gonna
stick with us for a while. But again, it’s good news that the goods price
inflation is starting to moderate. We’ll have to see if that continues. It’s
good news that consumers are getting a little relief, but in that part of
the topic with one piece of information we’re about to come up on our
Thanksgiving holiday here in the United States, which is a big holiday for
family and festivities and importantly food. And if you’re at the grocery
store right now, you see it. In any grocery store you go to, people are
making trade offs. How many people can they invite? What are they
gonna serve? Are they gonna trade down? Are we having a different
kind of meal? Are we not having as many options? Because it’s just very
expensive. 7.7 is very limited relief. I mean, it’s just better than over eight,
but it’s not close enough to two in any way for me to be comfortable.
And so it’s far from a victory. Now in terms of inflation expectations,
which is the other thing that you asked about, we absolutely focus on,
they’ve been remarkably well anchored despite the high realized
inflation we’ve now had for 18 months. And so short-term expectations
of course have risen because they move almost in lockstep with food
and energy prices really. And food and energy prices have been rising
at a rapid clip as you mentioned. And energy prices are quite volatile. So
we could have some easing one month then turn around and get some
higher readings the next month. And whereas winter rolls in and
especially with the ongoing war in the Ukraine and energy supplies
being so constrained, there’s just some real risk that energy prices come
back. So that is an important thing to keep our eye on. But I think that
what we see is that consumers and businesses and the five-year, five-
year forward market participants, everyone really is smoothing through
those pieces, putting ’em in short-term inflation expectations, but they’re
not really bleeding into medium and longer run inflation expectations.
And that is comforting, but we can’t be complacent. And one of the
reasons you’ll hear Fed officials repeatedly say we’re resolute in
bringing inflation down, is we’re not hanging our hands on, well, inflation
expectations in the longer end haven’t moved very much. So look at us,
we can just be easy. We have to be resolute to bring inflation down to
2% on average. That’s our goal, that’s what Americans depend on and
that’s what we’re committed to doing. So we’re gonna continue to adjust
policy until that job is fully done.
Hannah Scobie:
That’s very interesting. And we share your views. Now, basically, I mean
from the recent press conferences and speeches you’ve given, you seem
to be an advocate of moderation of the upcoming interest rates hikes,
and keeping monetary policy tight for longer. So given Friday’s job
report, I was just wondering, do you still maintain this view and how do
you read the data that came out last Friday?
Mary Daly:
Sure, so I think in a starting point, let me say, when we look at the data, I
was taught early on in my PhD program that data’s a plural word, is a lot
of things not one data point. And I think the same applies to policy
making. We’re not data-point dependent, we’re data dependent. And
the data as you already mentioned, is both the inflation, it’s also the
employment. We have a labor market dashboard of indicators. We’re
looking at all of them. We’re looking at housing, the real side of the
economy in general, and what’s going on in financial markets in terms of
tight needs. You put all those data together, and what we’re asking is,
what does it look like the economy’s doing? Is it slowing its pace of
growth so that demand and supply can come back into balance? And
what I saw in the labor market report is signs of easing of conditions
from these really rapid paces of growth in the job market to something
more moderate, but not at all close to what we actually need if we’re
going to keep things steady. Right now we’re adding over 200,000 jobs,
over 250,000 jobs per month on average, the last three months. And
that’s far, far, far above the 100,000 jobs we need each month to just
keep pace with the new labor force entry. So in other words, every time
a new month of employment numbers come out, we need more workers
to fuel those things that are actually coming into the labor market. So
this is causing the data to be stronger than we need it to be in the
longer run on employment, but it is good sign that it’s slowing. It’s much
like the inflation data. It’s good in terms of the direction, but the level still
out of balance. Now in terms of policy, I think it’s useful to talk about how
I think about pace versus level versus length. So I’m gonna use these
three words, pace, level, length. So the pace of interest rate adjustments
is really about the speed at which we adjust the Fed funds rate at each
meeting. The level is about, where do we think we’re going to be
sufficiently restrictive? The level of the interest rate that would be
sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation effectively down to 2%. And then
the length is the length of time we hold it in that restrictive stance to
ensure that we’ve sustainably got inflation at 2%. And that it’s really
coming down to that 2% goal and staying there. And so right now we’re
moving away and I as you mentioned, I was an advocate of thinking
about this because the pace piece is really about trying to get from
zero, the zero lower bound that we started at last March, to something
that’s modestly restrictive. And since we knew with clarity and certainty
that the economy didn’t need any more support, it’s already running out
of balance with inflation too high, then it’s clear to everyone that we
don’t need to support the economy through accommodative policy. So
we can march expeditiously, was the term we used, but quickly and
clearly up to that modestly restrictive pace without fear of over
tightening. And that’s what we did. We moved at 70 basis point
increments. We tightened policy historically fast. And we got ourselves
from zero, which is highly accommodative, to modestly restrictive, which
is the stance we have now, 3.75 to 4. We got that done in just the period
of time from March to now. So that’s a very good outcome and that’s
why the pace was effective because we needed to go, we could go
quickly ’cause we knew the destination. So now we’re shifting to what I
think of as a second phase of policy making, policy tightening. We are
shifting to a phase where we’re already modestly restrictive and we’re
asking the question, how much more restrictive do we need to be to hit
that sufficiently restrictive definition that we talked about in the FMC
statement? And when we think about that, several things come into
play. First of all, we have to watch the evolution of the data. And there’s
considerable uncertainty right now. There’s uncertainty about how long
inflation will persist. There’s uncertainty about how quickly our
monetary policy transmits through there, the long and variable lags.
There’s uncertainty about how much tightening is already in the system
and pent up and ready to kind of unleash itself on the economy. And so
that combines with the lags. And then there’s uncertainty about the
global economy. Right now, I spend a lot of time worrying about Europe
and the UK and thinking about a winter that could be harsh. And if
there’s a harsh weather, winter, that makes the difficulties of energy
supplies even more challenging. So that would push the headwind
against global growth for sure, not to mention the hardship that so
many people would face. So all of those things matter and it’s why we
need to think about getting there carefully. So my own view is that we
want, stepping down is an appropriate thing to think about. It seems like
that’s the time is now to do that. But it is not to be confused… and this is
where I’ll close this answer. It is not to be confused with adjusting the
terminal rate. By terminal, I don’t mean the end rate we’ll ever have. I
mean the rate at which we would raise to hold. That rate is very
dependent. That’s the level piece. That rate is very dependent on the
evolution of the economy, and all those pieces of information that I laid
out. And I think the main thing that people need to know now from my
vantage point is there’s a lot of uncertainty about what that rate will be.
What will be the sufficiently restrictive rate is not known today. And to
sort of say we know that with certainty and then march towards it, then
my judgment would be imprudent. And that’s why I don’t support that
type of running to it. I support a more gradual approach of getting to it
so we can be discovering the right rate as we go.
Hannah Scobie:
That’s very interesting. Thank you. I was going to refer to your staff
released the paper this week suggesting that monetary policy is much
tighter than the Fed fund rate on par with Fed funds at 5 1/4% by your
September meeting. And the discount meeting minutes of the Federal
Reserve Board from September also showed that the San Francisco Fed
Board supported a 50 basis hike instead of a 75 basis point hike last
month. So I was just wondering how you are putting these together.
What do you need to see to support a pause in a rate hike?
Mary Daly:
So, if I may, I’m going to throw out the word pause and not use it
because pause means a lot of things to people, and pause often means
that we stop. Maybe that’s how you meant it. But that’s not even a
discussion item in my judgment. Pausing is not the discussion. Discussion
is stepping down. So again, go back to we’ve reached this modestly
restrictive pace and so now it’s about stepping down off the pace and
making the conversation less about pace. That’s what the chair
mentioned. And I totally support this. Let’s not have the conversation
about pace so much because the real conversation should be about
the level at which we would hold the interest rate. And that’s not right
now. Right now we’re trying to think about what the level of restriction
would be that would be sufficiently restrictive. And there’s some likely
more rate hikes in our future. That’s what I see in the data right now. I just
have to return us to the conversation about inflation we had a moment
ago. 7.7 is not price stability, that’s not our goal. Our goal is average of
2% and we need to see that it’s moving down towards that average of
2% over time. And I just don’t have that in the forecast just now. Right
now my own forecast is that inflation is higher than our target at the end
of 2023, and that’s with more restrictive policy than we currently have.
So again, I think let’s shift from the pace and to the level. And in terms of
the work you highlighted that Andrew Forrester on the San Francisco
team with did, I think this work is incredibly important and really I’m glad
you highlighted it. The importance of it is that it has an insight that we
really need to be thoughtful of as policy makers. The insight is that the
Federal funds rate, the policy rate as we call it, that used to be a
sufficient statistic for where the tightness of policy was because it was
our only tool. But for a while now we’ve had two other tools, forward
guidance and balance sheet. And both of those also affect the financial
conditions, the tightness of policy. And what he and his colleagues have
done is they’ve indicated that if we put current financial conditions in
the typical funds rate space, the funds rate would actually be about
two percentage points higher than it currently is printing. And so now
they’re hot off the presses, he did the estimates right when we took the
75 basis point increase at the last meeting and now the proxy rate is
over 6%, so about two percentage points higher than the rate that we
have currently in place. This is just an indication that we have to be
mindful when we say cumulative tightening of financial conditions as
we did in our FOMC statement. The cumulative tightening is not only
what’s in the pipeline of the things we’ve done, but what’s the impact?
Because of our forward guidance, our balance sheet policy and our
funds rate increases, what’s the impact on tighter financial conditions?
And not being mindful of those things will really put us in a position
where we could risk over tightening. So that’s why I think this work is so
important because there’s two things I have at the base of… It’s like the
foundation of how I’m thinking about policy right now. One is resolute, I
have to be resolute, and the other is mindful. Resolute to bring inflation
down and mindful that a variety of things are shaping up in the
economy right now that we have to be keenly focused on if we’re really
going to balance the risks of under and over tightening and put the
economy in the best chance of making a smooth transition to a more
sustainable place.
Hannah Scobie:
Thank you very much. I was wondering in the light of the data that has
come today on inflation, are you likely to revise your forecasting for the
SEP coming up for the December meeting?
Mary Daly:
Well, wouldn’t be in light of these data particularly. I guess I’ll reiterate
that I don’t find that I’m data-point dependent. I’m looking more at a
confluence of data that come in and then what does that mean for the
outlook for the economy? So in September, let’s use the SEP instead of
my particular SEP estimate, but let’s use the SEP. We came in at about 4.6
as the ending rate, if I remember correctly. And just let’s call it four and a
half for the sake of the example. But now I think my own view is that we
probably will have to tighten a little bit more than that to be sufficiently
restrictive. I guess I can share I was a little bit on the more higher
terminal rate side than the SEP itself. I was one rate hike above the
median. And the reason for that is that I looked at the persistence of
inflation. I mean, inflation’s just really, when it gets into core services, that
is harder historically to bring down and it takes more effort on the Fed’s
part to do so. We also have had just a persistence of… I mean, the goods
inflation coming down now is very welcome, but it has been higher than
we had forecast for a while. And I personally find myself in this position
as a policy maker. I would rather move a little bit higher and have to
come back than to move a little bit less high and have to then tell
people we’re gonna go higher. Because at some point it does seep into
inflation expectations. And Chair Powell said in his press conference,
and I think it’s worth highlighting, that we have the tools to… We can cut
interest rates if we need to. And I don’t wanna be over tightening to the
point where we throw the economy into a sharp recession, but if we’re
talking about a rate hike on either side, I want to fully get inflation
sustainably down to 2% on average. And the motivation I have is really
twofold. Americans are suffering, struggling, and particularly those who
are at least able to bear and it’s just eroding their purchasing power, it’s
eroding their real wages, it’s just eating away their lives and livelihoods.
And the second thing is that it’s the commitment we’ve made. What we
do know from the 1970s and ’80s that painful local inflation that we
took, that one of the mistakes that was made is in the ’70s is that the Fed
said, “Well, okay, we’ve got it coming down, so now we’ll stop raising
rates, we’ll stop trying to fight it back.” And then it sort of reared its ugly
head again and got solidified in psychology. I am not prepared to make
that mistake. We wanna make sure this doesn’t seep into psychology,
embed itself in inflation expectations and then find ourselves in that
very painful situation. So I’m looking to not make unforced errors on
either side, neither by over correcting and then have a painful recession
that was unwarranted, or under tightening and find ourselves with
inflation higher than we want for longer than we want. And we have to
put the economy through more discomfort and pain to bring it down.
And that’s why policy making takes this prudence, it takes mindfulness
because the only chance we have of doing that well is to be very
thoughtful about how we’re doing it.
Hannah Scobie:
Well, at least compared to UK you can be comforted that families here
who have mortgages are hurting very much. I mean, immediately a lot
of people have had to refinance, and when they had a choice, maybe
some to go to a five-year fixed when interest rate was very low and
now they find themselves with a two-year fixed. They have to basically
remortgage. And their monthly mortgages have rocketed. I mean
literally, rocketed. And hasn’t tightened yet completely. I mean it’s just
only 175 basis points and a little bit before when we have 11% inflation.
So it’s a very precarious situation that we have. Your kind of mortgage
situation is much better in terms of people have the option of having 30
year and nothing like that could be ever offered here. So on the other
side, I wanted to ask you about the impact of the dollar on the actual
inflation. Obviously, US economy is not that exposed to imports and
exports as some of the European countries, but nevertheless, I mean, the
strong dollar must have some impact on lowering the inflation. So for us
it’s a really amazing number of… I mean, surprise, I changed money
when I was going to the IMF recently at 107, it’s unheard of. This
happened back in October. So I was interested in your views to see how
you see the impact of the dollar on the inflation.
Mary Daly:
Sure, absolutely. If I may, I’m gonna go back and just say one thing about
mortgage rates. So in the United States too, because I think it’s useful. It’s
very interesting how the mortgage systems in different countries play
out as rate adjustments are made. But in the United States, one of the
things that has happened is we started talking about raising interest
rates back in November, raising them earlier than back in November of
2021, raising them earlier than we had anticipated. And immediately you
started to see mortgage rates start to creep up and then by the time we
got to February, they had risen quite considerably. And what all of that
forward guidance did is it really accelerated some of the refinancing for
people to restructure their debt obligations. So if you were in a variable
rate mortgage or you were an adjustable path, you were moving into
15-30 fixed pretty quickly. And then once the rates went up, refinancing
activities sort of stalled altogether and then it started felt filtering into
new originations and ultimately into housing prices themselves. So that
transmission mechanism in the United States still works fairly well from
monetary policy to the housing market. We’ve seen it actually work
fairly quickly this time around, but it is something that people can
prepare for a little bit more in terms of the general population because
we’re not in that, everyone has the refinance the three to five year
frequency. So that is a really interesting difference in terms of the impact
of rate increases on the budgets of citizens basically. So now in terms of
the dollar. So the thing that is important to say is that we don’t make
dollar policy. We’re adjusting the interest rate to achieve our two goals,
full employment, price stability, those are the ones that Congress gave
us. But as we adjust the interest rate, and for a variety of other reasons,
the dollar does fluctuate in value relative to other currencies. And so
right now the dollar is strong and what you see is the normal situation
that occurs. It’s hard on our exporting sectors because our goods just
got more expensive in those sectors. You see employment slowing in
those sectors, you see growth slowing in those sectors. And then of
course it has the opposite effect on our imports, imports are cheaper,
and so it tempers the inflation coming from imported goods, which has
an overall tempering effect on mostly goods price inflation. So those
two things are happening. When you net them out, economists study
this constantly to see, what is the offsets of those? What’s the pass-
through of import prices to broader prices, et cetera? And I think there
will be a little bit of import price inflation that tempers our overall
inflation numbers, especially in the goods sector, but it’s not the primary
thing that matters for the inflation numbers we’re seeing. As I mentioned
earlier, a lot of the things going on for us in the United States, which is a
little different than Europe and in the UK. We’re about 50% of our excess
inflation comes from demand, and about 50% comes from supply. So we
still have this demand strength, domestic demand strength that’s simply
outstripping the supply of goods and services available. And so is about
bringing that demand back in balance and getting particularly for
services inflation back at the levels that we’re accustomed to. And so
that we can get to that 2% goal. So I definitely look at the strength of the
dollar, but through the effects on imports. Of course, import prices, the
effect on export sectors, just the real output there. And I think another
piece that it definitely see is worth noting is about the effect on global
growth. As you mentioned, some countries are negatively affected by
the strengthening dollar and so global growth is. It’s a headwind to
global growth, which means it’s a headwind to domestic growth. In the
US, we think of these, the global economy as tailwinds, neutral or
headwinds. That’s how I think of it. And definitely global growth is a
headwind right now because we have variety of things going on. We
have COVID still in parts of Asia and then the COVID lockdowns that
China has to undertake or does undertake. We have the war Ukraine
disruptive to so many things, people’s lives and livelihoods, but also
energy and food and other commodities. So all of these things matter
for how the US will fare going forward. And it’s another one of those
things… If you put the list of things I wanna be mindful about, another
one of those things is the global economy. And part of that is the fact
that so many central banks to fight high inflation are raising interest
rates. And so that’s synchronized but uncoordinated tightening we’re all
doing, actually is another factor we have to think about because our
proxy rate probably reflects of the Fed funds rate, that proxy funds rate
probably reflects some of that, but there’s a amplification mechanism
that goes on when all central banks tighten simultaneously even when
we’re not coordinating our policy tightening paths.
Hannah Scobie:
Absolutely, and the last question is basically, you seem to disagree with
market pricing in rate cuts next year. And we share that view, let me say
that. We don’t believe that there’s gonna be any rate cuts. I don’t know
how they get that idea into their head. So is there an inflation scenario
which in your view will justify a rate cut next year? And basically various
surveys say they are 4.2% sort of, it could be 4.2% year-on-year inflation
with a wide range of sort of broad spectrum going from 2.4 to 7.5%
year-on-year. And some think this inflation could go down to 3.2% by
September, 2023. So, I mean-
Mary Daly:
I guess I would just… Yeah, let me just start with this. I mean, I think it’s
very challenging to think in hypotheticals of what could happen in
certain conditions so I will simply say that… In terms of on that front, I’ll
simply say that the Federal Reserve policy making, all of us have
historically maintained the idea, and this is not just me and the time I’ve
served, but just historically that you respond to the economy you have.
So if economic conditions change in a way that we don’t project and
we don’t have in our even our risk assessments, then of course we would
move policy to accommodate and work with those conditions. But I
tend to think in the most likely scenarios and even in the risks around
those most likely scenarios. And here’s what I see. You mentioned that
some people have inflation coming down to 3.2%. I’ll just remind
everyone on the call that’s not 2%. 2% average inflation is our goal. And
we need to see positive traction on getting to that number. And so that’s
why I have focused on the raise and hold strategy. So you raise the
interest rate to a level that you think is sufficiently restrictive so that if
held over time, you can reliably and sustainably move inflation to 2%
over time. And that is still the policy path. And if you looked at the SEP in
September, you saw that policy path. You saw that the dots go up, they
reach a level even though there’s a disagreement about what the exact
level is, there was amazing amount of continuity among the dots,
because there’s amazing amount of continuity among the FOMC
participants as you hear when you talk about, when you listen to them.
We have to be resolute to bring inflation down. We’re united in that
commitment. So then how do we think we do that? Well, it’s raising the
rate and then holding it for a length of time that is sufficient to bring
inflation reliably back to 2%. And so, I don’t see anything in the incoming
information that has changed the look of that path, the dynamics of
that path since the September SEP. So the material thing that could
change is where we think that point is where we just start holding. And
that could change. And the chair said that in his press conference. It’s an
all likelihood that will go up a little bit in the December SEP, but we’ve
got a lot of information coming in between this meeting and the
December SEP in the December meeting. And so we’ll have to continue
to watch that. And we’ll adjust as the economy shows how persistent
inflation is and how much momentum still exists that we will have to
bridle back to bring… Why would we bridal things back? I mean, I get
asked this a lot. Why would you bridal the economy? Isn’t it good to
have growth? It is good to have growth, but we all know and I know
that you all you believe this is that we need to have demand and supply
imbalance because if we don’t have, if demand consistently on strip
supply, then we know what the outcome of that is and we’re living
through that right now, high inflation.
Hannah Scobie:
Well, thank you very much. I’m going to open it up to the audience.
Anybody who has a question, please raise your hand and we can see it
on the side of the Zoom. So the first question goes to Johnson Ratcliffe. If
you unmute yourself and ask your a question.
Johnson Ratcliffe:
Hi Professor Scobie, thank you. Now we submitted our questions to you
via email as you know, and you’ve asked three out of four of them. So I’m
very happy to save my time to my client, Vandit Shah. Vandit, if you want
to unmute and ask your question, I’m very happy for you to take my time.
Vandit Shah:
Hey, thanks a lot, John, I appreciate that. Mary, thank you for taking the
time. One of the things that you mentioned was that you wanted to kind
of continue adjusting the rate until you thought that the job was fully
done. If I could just break that into two parts. When you think about the
job being fully done is that there’s a risk that we kind of get to 4%, 5%
fairly quickly, but then there’s a view that the next move lower from 5% to
2.5% is stickier. So would you think that just staying at a sufficiently
restrictive level is adequate to get that down from five to two and a
half? Or do you think you need to keep raising rates up to a point where
that number really does start going into the two, three kind of region?
Thank you very much.
Mary Daly:
I’m really glad… Yeah, thank you so much for the question. It’s really
helpful. So there is a little bit of confusion I think and it’s a good time to
clarify this. And the chair said this is press conference, so I’ll also refer
you to his remarks. I think they pulled this quote in Financial Time’s story
this morning on US inflation numbers. And think it’s really a good point to
make, is that certainly we want to continue to be in our restrictive stance
until we know the job is well and fully done. But that doesn’t mean the
test has never been, we’ll keep raising at 75 or we’ll just keep raising
rates until we see 2% or we see big declines towards 2%. That that’s why
it’s so, you have to be very mindful. It is really about what is your
expected path of inflation? And is it coming reliably? Are you confident?
Are we confident it’s coming reliably and sustainably down to 2%? So
from my own view, we get to the point, just as we said in the FMC
statement, we get to the point where policy is sufficiently restrictive and
we hold it over a period of time, which we’ll be evaluating as we hold it
until we see that inflation’s really well on its way to getting to 2%. But
because of the lags in monetary policy and importantly if you look
historically at what data lagged the most, inflation is one of the most
lagging variables, right? You see it adjusted in the interest-sensitive
sectors of the real economy, then it takes hold and eventually adjusts
the labor market, and then finally you see it feed through to inflation. So
if you waited until inflation literally hit 2% before you made any
determination about where policy should be, you would likely over
tighten. So that’s why we have to be so thoughtful about how the lags
play in. But of course we don’t know with a capital T truth what the lags
really are. We’re gonna have to estimate those and look for those. And
we’re gonna have to look at the data, the backward looking data,
which is the published data, we’re gonna have to look at talk to people,
think about what we’re hearing from our business leaders, our workers
about what they’re expecting their wage increases will be. And forecast
out and then check our forecast constantly against the incoming
information. So I think, please, I want you to be as you walk away from
this meeting is my own view is this, that sufficiently restrictive is a level of
the interest rates that if we hold it there for a period of time, we are
confident inflation can come down. And we will continue to evaluate
that. I don’t want you to leave with the impression, we would never
change that, but I do absolutely. That’s how I’m thinking about where we
land before we hold. And we’re not there yet. Of course, we have more
work to do. We will do that in coming meetings. But then the whole big
part is important, and I wanna add one other thing to the whole piece.
As inflation goes down… So say we get to a level of interest rate and we
hold it. As inflation comes down, policy becomes more restrictive. So
that is something to keep in mind, right? We move the interest rate up
and we hold it, but as inflation comes down, the real interest rate is
going up, right? So then policy is becoming more restrictive. So we have
to think about that as well. As you can see, there’s a lot of things going
into this calculation that make it not as easy to just say this number, that
number, this month, that month. Which is why we are so data
dependent. And I’m hearing a lot of talking on the background, but I
don’t know where that’s coming from. But I’ll point that out to you,
Professor Scobie.
Hannah Scobie:
Thank you very much. The next question goes to Marcus Petersen, if you
could on yourself.
Marcus Petersen:
Yeah, hi, thanks very much for doing this, President Daly, we appreciate
it. So I wanted to switch gears for a moment and spend some time on
the balance sheet. And then specifically the composition of Fed
liabilities, which I know it can be a technical subject, but I think it’s been
a little bit interesting that we’ve seen the ON RRP stay relatively
elevated and reserves come down relatively quickly. I wonder what
you’re thinking is on the path of the composition of the Fed’s balance
sheet into year end and around potential dead ceiling dynamics, and
whether or not there’s some concern around the pace of reserves or
there’s still this expectation that we’ve seen in the minutes. And in some
of the staff notes that have repeated the sentiment that eventually the
ON RRP should decline and maybe that happens before reserves
decline to an uncomfortably low level. Thank you.
Mary Daly:
Sure, so every time we are in a situation where we’re reducing the
balance sheet and markets are moving for a variety of reasons, we’re
not the only reason that these, the firms and businesses and market
participants are moving things around. Then there’s this question of how
much of what we’re seeing, in this case ON RRP, is technical
adjustments? Technical features that we expect to resolve versus
something needs to be changed in the pace of our adjustments. And we
rely heavily on the New York Fed’s Markets staff to really think of hard
about those issues and we deliberate those issues. But right now I’m just
going to be in agreement with the Fed staff that you know right now we
continue to think that our balance sheet policy is on track. It’s continuing
to be… Markets continuing to be well-functioning. We continue to think
that this is appropriate. We will at some point have to talk about the
pace of our rolling it off, but that time is not today, that time is is later.
And I think it’s a good opportunity that highlighted different issue really,
but it’s related, it gets related in conversations for people, is that there’s a
real distinction between what we do as monetary policy makers and
our path of policy and what we think about on market functioning. And
I know you all in the UK just came through a period of that. These are
very different things. And because the balance sheet’s involved
oftentimes in both, there’s a bit of conflating of those two things. But
what we do with the balance sheet roll off, that is separate than the
market functioning. In this case, your particular question, they’re very
related of course, but I continue to think what the Fed staff thinks, the
Fed’s Market staff in particular, that it is resolving itself over time. And I’m
not especially concerned about the ON RRP right now, but watching,
constantly watching to see if we need to make adjustments. And we’re
prepared to make adjustments, should we, but right now I see the path
of our balance sheet roll off and the path of our policy be well absorbed
by the marketplace.
Hannah Scobie:
That’s very interesting. Maybe I should mention the discussions we had
with Bank of Japan. And they were always very wary of the idea of
actually selling bonds into the market that the central bank holds,
whereas balance sheet runoff is much more viable and much more
credible policy. And I think you’re doing absolutely the right thing on that
side. The next question goes to Michael Michaelides.
Michael Michaelides:
Hi, good afternoon, President Daly. Thank you very much for the call. If I
could just ask a little bit about this. So I think we will understand your
policy of slowing down but not stopping on the Fed funds rate. And I
guess a couple of the reasons, at least as I understand them is that, one,
of course you mentioned that how much tightening is already in the
system and the lags there, but then also presumably as a central bank
you’re a little bit concerned about if there’s any kind of real wage
resistance or if inflation settlements in wages stay higher, don’t come
down to the inflation sort of consistent level, and that’s what you’re
waiting to find out. How would you kind of characterize the mix of the
different things you’re looking at? I mean, there’s many reasons to slow,
but I guess some maybe more important than others. So some insight on
your thinking there would be great.
Mary Daly:
Sure, so let me think about the wage issue for a minute. So we don’t have
any evidence of a wage price spiral dynamic forming. We certainly,
that’s theoretically possible and you would wanna… We look for
evidence all the time to see if that’s happening, but we don’t see that.
One of the things we see in wages, there’s two things I’d like to mention
here. The first thing is that in the United States real wages are falling and
quite dramatically on average. Oh, 9% over the last two years. Real
wages, average real wages are falling. So that’s really hard on
American families and workers who depend on their real incomes, not
their just nominal incomes. So we have this piece where nominal wages
are rising at a brisk pace outta balance with long run productivity
growth and 2% inflation. But real wages are falling. And so that’s the
price of high inflation. The second thing that’s interesting in terms of this
wage price dynamic is that short-term inflation expectations. Another
piece of research that San Francisco Fed researchers have done that I
really will point you to is that they found that if you look at inflation
expectations and wage demands, wage demands really get based off
short-term inflation expectations, not medium or longer-term inflation
expectations. So people can hold a view that the Fed will eventually get
inflation down, but they’ll ask for wage increases to offset their real
burdens. And you can see why that would be the case if real wages are
falling, right? You’re making a good nominal wage, but you realize by
the time you pay for gas, food and housing you’re falling behind. Then
you that wage negotiation. Now the good news in the US on this front is
that last year, I do a lot of… I have the 12, I’m sorry. I’m in the 12th District, I
have the nine… It’s early here, just gimme a little grace on that. But I have
the nine western states. And so we talk to businesses, worker groups,
community leaders and I spend a lot of my time out in the field talking to
people to get forward looking information. And here’s something that
I’ve learned in the last couple of months. Last year my contacts, and this
was true if they were unions or if they were firms, they were saying that
wage increases of 4.5 to 5% was what they were asking for. And now
they’re thinking of three and a half to four. And because the economy
has changed and one, food and energy prices have come down, which
is little relief, but also people see the economy slowing and they don’t
want to move into these higher wage increases. And firms are, I mean,
workers are less willing, are less likely to ask for such high wage
increases, cause they see the economy slowing, they see bright spots of
inflation coming down. So from that vantage point, I think there’s less
evidence that there’s a wage price spiral and more evidence that the
policy efforts we’ve made so far are starting to work their way through
the economy. And we’ll find ourselves next year hopefully in a much
better situation than we sit in today. But there’s more work to do and
we’ll keep at it until the job is well and fully done. And I’m glad I
explained what well and fully done means earlier, but does that answer
your question?
Michael Michaelides:
Yes, so I guess a little bit of backward induction, it seems that your
slowing policy is not so much to look at if there’s a real wage resistance,
it’s a lot more about just seeing when and how big the impact of the
lagged hikes is.
Mary Daly:
Yes, yeah, so, I mean I will go back, I don’t mean to keep repeating it, but
I think it is really important. For me the slowing is all based on this. It’s
based on the fact that you go really fast when you know where you’re
headed. So we knew for sure we needed to take the accommodation
out of the economy. So it was quite easy to go at 75 basis point
increments, ’cause we knew where we were going. But now if you take
the SEP and you even say we move up to give… Say that the SEP goes up
a little bit in December. Say that it goes up to an interest rate of 5% as
the rate will hold at. That’s only a 100 basis points higher than we have
now. Right now we’re at 3.75 to 4. So we have to a 100 basis points to get
to five. Well, that means we’re in a stone’s throw of that. And the pace of
adjustments doesn’t need to be as rapid. And it gives you the
opportunity to really pay attention to the critical aspects of the
cumulative tightening of policy, including how tight are financial
conditions relative to the Fed funds rate. That research we’ve talked
about already. And also the lags and monetary policy, which of course,
they take time to work their way through. So we’re seeing it in the
housing market, but right now we’re only seeing the starting points in the
other parts of the real side of the economy, and we haven’t yet really
seen it in inflation. I mean, we’ve seen a little bright spot of the data
today, but again, I can’t iterate enough that one month of data, positive
data on inflation does not a victory make. And 7.7 is not price stability.
Hannah Scobie:
Thank you very much, President Daly. There’s a lot of information in what
you gave and we are very grateful to you for that really good
explanation. The next question goes to Nikhil Shama. If you could
unmute yourself.
Nikhil Shama:
Yeah, thank you, Present Daly, for the insightful comments. Just following
up on a point that you made. CPI is obviously a lag indicator and
probably so is NFP. So I was very curious, what are some of your favorite
forward looking indicators for inflation? And timing wise, where do you
think you face that choice between shifting focus from fast forward
inflation if growth starts to slow down?
Mary Daly:
Sure, great question. So they’re all been really good questions. I
appreciate them. So in terms of forward looking, so one of the things…
Let’s talk about inflation first. One of the things that I mentioned already
is really pushing up core services inflation as shelter prices. So those are
not just home prices, they’re not just owners’ equivalent rent prices, but
they’re also rental prices themselves. And so one of the areas where I
really look to see if we’re getting the step down in inflationary pressures
in shelter is in new leases. So if you look at rental price inflation, those
are old leases and new leases all mixed together. But if you pull out new
leases, you are seeing actual declines in those lease prices relative to
the level of rents out there right now. If you took average rents, new
rents, new leases and rents associated with that are lower. So that to me
is an indication this is working its way through the economy, but it’ll take
a while for all of those, for everybody to turn their lease over. And so you
just see that in the average rental prices. And so when you do the year-
over-year owner-occupied rental equivalent, and you do the rental
prices, the averages are still high even though the new leases are
coming down. So that’s a leading indicator. Another leading indicator
that I look at, and now let’s go to the labor market is what are the wage
offers to new workers? So we get a new group of workers coming in all
the time, and especially when students graduate from college, and we
look at, what are new workers getting relative to existing workers? And
for a while we were seeing every new worker just getting more and
more than the existing average. But when the economy starts to slow, a
leading indicator is that starts to stabilize. You can look at also job
switchers. It’s another aspect of the new worker. So what are job
switchers getting? Are people who switch jobs getting higher wages
than the firm they go into or are they getting about the same as the
average? So those are all leading indicators in the labor market along
with quits. We’ve seen quits moderate a bit. When quits start to
moderate, people are not as confident in the labor market. So you put
those things together. There are other ones I start… There’s a traffic
indicator. You can look at actual traffic of driving, but I mean a retail
traffic. You can look at these real-time retail traffic indicators and then
you can look at sales per customer, the average return you get for every
person who walk through your store. And so I watch those kind of
carefully too because if I see traffic falling off and sales values falling
off, then I see, okay, the customers are pulling back. The final piece of
the leading indicator information that I will talk about, and I know you
probably have heard this before from other regional Fed presidents, but
one of the great aspects of having the regional Feds and the Federal
Reserve System, and I guess the people who put this together back in
1913, the Fed Reserve System thought of this, is that you have 12 reserve
bank presidents out there spending a good portion of their time
collecting information from being in conversation with people. What are
you going to do? What are your hiring plans look like? What is your
projected revenue stream? So we were able to, here in the 12th District,
talk about the tech layoffs that you see materializing now, six, eight
months ago because we were having conversations with people about,
where the layoffs were likely coming, why were they there? Why were
they coming in the first place? And what would be the impact on overall
tech sector growth? And so that really comes from talking with people.
And so I spend my time talking to workers, union groups, small
businesses, medium businesses, large businesses, community leaders,
and that augments and gives us like insight into how people are
thinking about the economy and what they’re putting their real money
towards, which helps us be looking forward when we’re faced with
published data that often is just backward looking.
Nikhil Shama:
Thanks, that’s great. Thank you.
Hannah Scobie:
Thank you very much, President Daly. Is Jasper Livington on the call? He
sent his question. Well, maybe I can just read it to you. Oh, are you here?
Okay. His question is why is the huge increase in the corporate sector’s
profit margins rarely, if ever, mentioned in the board’s remarks on
sources of inflation?
Mary Daly:
So the profit margins fluctuate for a variety of reasons and economists
study those and find that they fluctuate for a variety of reasons. So
when we think about inflation, we look not just at the fluctuations over
time, but what’s generally true. So something I spend a lot of time
thinking about is, what’s the labor share of income in the United States?
And for a while that was just plummeting for a decade, and now you
started to see it stabilize a little bit. And so when I think about those
things and whether those dynamics have changed, and when I look at
the sources of inflation that are really apparent, the ones that matter
most to policy making is that calculation I shared with you earlier. So
there’s a lot of things that are causing inflation to be high, but I have a
tool as a policy maker, we have tools that only treat one part of this.
And that is the excess demand inflation. The other aspects of inflation
that are there, we do not have the tools to treat. And so then people say,
“Well, maybe you can’t treat this at all.” And let me dispel that idea as
well. So in Europe and the UK you actually are facing a different
situation than we are. A lot of the inflation, at least if you do a standard
decomposition, a larger share of the excess inflation is energy related.
But in the United States about half of the inflation is supply, supply
chains, energy disruptions, all of those things. And about half of it is
demand, excess demand that is out of step with supply. And so the Fed
is specifically able to treat that piece of inflation, and that’s what we
spend our time talking about. When Chair Powell does a press
conference or when we’re out talking about it, we talk about the part of
inflation that we have a tool for, and then we leave the other parts of
inflation where we have no tools to the fiscal side of our house. And the
way an independent central bank works effectively and it has been an
effective thing for the United States and other countries for a long, long
time is we don’t comment on things we don’t have decisional rights or
tools for, because that would be inappropriate. Our job is narrow one
and we try to do that well.
Hannah Scobie:
Thank you very much. The last question goes to Mr. Martin Husheck. Are
you on the call? If you could unmute yourself. Hello? Okay, I’ll read it.
Says, in a recent Bloomberg interview, you expressed your reservation
about hump-shaped yield curve saying that interest rates should stay
higher for longer. Is there an inflation scenario or a broad
macroeconomic scenario which in your view should justify a rate cut in
second half of 2023? I think you answered it.
Mary Daly:
I think I answered that question earlier, but I’ll just say again, it’s really
hard to think in hypotheticals, but the Fed has historically been
prepared and this Fed is no different, I can say that with great
confidence that we’ll respond to the conditions we face, but right now
where we’re focused is inflation is too high, it’s been too high for too
long, and our job is to restore price stability.
Hannah Scobie:
Well, thank you so much, President Daly. This is really wonderful. We
really appreciate the calls that were so clear, so elaborate and so
insightful. We very much hope to invite you again and as I mentioned,
our doors are always open. If you come to London, we hope you do
make the trip to Senate House where we are based. So all the best. And
I would also like to thank all your colleagues who work so hard on this
particular event. They were all marvelous and we appreciate it, but
most of all-
Mary Daly:
Well, thank you.
Hannah Scobie:
Thank you so much for your time. It was fun.
Mary Daly:
Thank you. It was my pleasure. And thank you again for being so flexible
to accommodate my change of plans. Just a reminder, the pandemic
remains with us a little bit. It’s just loosening its grip. So, but thank you
again for this. It’s been a terrific conversation and I look forward to
seeing you sometimes soon.
Hannah Scobie:
Sure, thank you very much.
Mary Daly:
All the best. Thank you.
Summary
President Daly will join Professor Hannah Scobie, Chair of the European
Economics & Financial Centre, for a discussion on inflation, monetary policy,
and global macroeconomic conditions.
Stay in the know and sign up for notifications on Mary C. Daly’s speeches,
remarks, and fireside chats.
About the Speaker
Cite this document
APA
Mary C. Daly (2022, November 9). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20221110_mary_c_daly
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_20221110_mary_c_daly,
author = {Mary C. Daly},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {2022},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20221110_mary_c_daly},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}