speeches · August 11, 2020
Regional President Speech
Eric Rosengren · President
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“The COVID-19 Pandemic,
the Economic Outlook, and the
Main Street Lending Program”
Eric S. Rosengren
President & Chief Executive Officer
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Remarks to the South Shore Chamber of Commerce
August 12, 2020
The views expressed today are my own, not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors or the Federal Open Market Committee.
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Good morning. Thank you for inviting me to address the South Shore Chamber of
Commerce. While it is unfortunate that we cannot be together for this event, I am grateful that
technology allows us to gather virtually.
Public Health and Economic Effects
This continues to be a challenging time, with the high rate of positive COVID-19 cases
and resulting deaths across the country highlighting the unfolding human tragedy of the
pandemic. In addition to a tragic loss of life, the pandemic has resulted in an unprecedented
shock to the U.S. economy.
The inability, thus far, to control the virus in the United States is resulting in renewed
restrictions on individuals and businesses in many parts of the country. While vital and
necessary for the good of the economy in the longer run, the ongoing social distancing in
response to the virus’s spread will continue to complicate policymakers’ task of supporting the
economy in the short run with fiscal and monetary policy. As the Federal Reserve’s July Federal
Open Market Committee statement highlighted, “The path of the economy will depend
significantly on the course of the virus.” 1
Even as official restrictions relax, many people may prefer to continue avoiding activities
that require social interaction in order to protect their own health. With such a pattern of
behavior taking hold, momentum in the economy toward returning quickly to full employment
would likely fade. Being cautious during a pandemic is absolutely the right thing to do, and all
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of this highlights that we must get the virus under control in order for a sustainable economic
recovery to take hold.
The New England region currently has COVID-19 infection rates below those prevailing
in many parts of the country, including the South and the West. Recently, however, New
England infection numbers have been gradually increasing. Certainly, common sense
precautions – such as wearing masks when around other people, maintaining safe social distance,
and avoiding crowded indoor settings – are much less costly than having to shut down whole
sectors of the economy again. It is, therefore, important that everyone continue to take steps to
protect public health in order to avoid more tragic outcomes along with further economic pain.
This is especially true at a time when some colleges and universities are resuming in-person
classes, and some K-12 school districts are planning to bring students back together this fall –
when there will be less ability to congregate outdoors.
Today I would like to begin my remarks by reviewing the current state of the U.S.
economy, and I will then discuss some of the steps that the Fed is taking to address the crisis and
mitigate its impacts on both financial markets and the real economic activity of American
households and businesses.
In this crisis, which finds little precedent in our lifetimes, both monetary and fiscal
policymakers have moved aggressively to offset some of the economic impact of the pandemic.
Policy actions this year have been large and timely, reflecting the urgency of the risks that the
continuing public health crisis poses. Specifically, the federal government has expanded its
usual programs to help individuals during a downturn, such as making unemployment benefits
more widely available and increasing the payouts, as well as providing direct payments to lower2
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income individuals. Keeping this segment of the economy afloat, by providing a financial bridge
until economic conditions normalize, will play an important role in the recovery.2
In addition, one of the segments of the economy heavily impacted by the pandemic has
been small and medium-sized businesses, which together employ a very sizable share of the
workforce. Many small and medium-sized businesses had to close down operations when
quarantine restrictions were put in place in the spring and simply cannot fully recover until the
pandemic has abated.
As one measure to address this concern, in early July the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, on behalf of the Federal Reserve System, opened the Main Street Lending Program, or
MSLP, which aims to help facilitate credit flows that can provide a bridge for small and
medium-sized businesses until better economic times arrive. Because activity in the facility will
depend, to a significant degree, on the path of the economy and the virus, I expect utilization to
increase as we get into the fall. I will say more about this later in my remarks.
Despite the sizeable interventions by monetary and fiscal policymakers, high-frequency
economic data indicate that the recovery may be losing steam, as activities in many states are
once again restricted (officially or voluntarily) to slow the virus’s spread. Particularly in some
parts of the South and the West, where some hospitals are reaching their ICU capacity, changes
in behavior are showing up in high frequency data on individuals’ mobility and spending.
Clearly, continued stimulative monetary and fiscal policy are critical, and most importantly
slowing down the COVID-19 infection rate.
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The Outlook for the Economy
A notable feature of this recession is how aggressively policymakers have responded.
Figure 1 shows the path of real disposable personal income since January 2000. Generally, the
data fall on a relatively consistent line, and you see relatively small changes around the periods
of recession shading. However, in this recession, there has been a substantial increase in real
disposable income. This reflects the extraordinary amount of fiscal action taken to offset the
impact of the virus. Fiscal policy has provided many individuals with substantial financial
support, as befits an unprecedented crisis.
The extraordinary fiscal relief provided to households, however, has translated only
modestly into spending. Figure 2 shows a striking rise in the personal saving rate – a far bigger
jump than we have seen at any time since World War II. Several factors account for this surge in
saving. First, with both required and voluntary social distancing, and less willingness or ability
of many people to pursue certain activities – such as travelling, attending entertainment events
with crowds, or eating indoors at restaurants – spending will likely be lower relative to the past,
until activities involving social interaction entail substantially less public health risks. Second,
saving may have risen for some because of the concern about the prospects for worse economic
circumstances and less fiscal support going forward. In all, the increase in saving is a reminder
of the importance of containing the pandemic in order to achieve a more robust recovery.
Along with fiscal policy, monetary policy reacted quickly and decisively. Short-term
interest rates were quickly dropped to close to zero in March and, as Figure 3 shows, the 10-year
Treasury yield is well below the level reached during the financial crisis of 2008-9 and Great
Recession. In addition, the Fed has deployed a variety of emergency credit facilities designed to
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maintain the availability of credit to firms and individuals. Based on many decades of research
and policymaking, I can attest that credit interruptions prolong recessions and ultimately harm
individuals and firms on “main streets” across America.3 So these credit facilities implemented
by the central bank are very important, and welcome.
With such substantial deployment of fiscal and monetary policies, one might expect a
robust recovery. Unfortunately, as long as the virus poses significant threats to public health, a
full economic recovery will be very difficult as individuals, often voluntarily, avoid activities
that place their health at risk. The increased saving rate, reflecting a falloff in consumption
despite substantial fiscal transfers to individuals, illustrates the challenges the recovery faces.
Indeed, the trajectory of the economic recovery will be determined more by the path of the virus
than by the path of policymaking, although monetary and fiscal policy can mitigate, and have
mitigated, some of the most significant adverse impacts to the economy.
Recent Data, and the Pandemic’s Effect on the Economy
Figure 4 illustrates one of the challenges in achieving a full, and timely, economic
recovery by comparing new COVID-19 cases per million in the European Union with those in
the United States. While both the EU, which I’ll refer to here as Europe, and the United States
had significant increases in infection rates during the spring, Europe enacted more stringent
economic shutdowns and limits on individuals’ mobility that were maintained over a longer
period. As a result, their infection rates fell faster and further, and have remained relatively low.
In contrast, in the United States, infection rates remain elevated, as states lifted protective
measures too soon and in a manner not calibrated for the true risks posed by the virus. For the
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country as a whole, the infection rate is much higher than in the spring, and stands in sharp
contrast to the level of infections in Europe.
Figure 5 compares new COVID-19 death rates in the United States and the European
Union. The chart shows that deaths per million in population have been rising and are
considerably higher in the U.S. than in Europe. The U.S. death rate from the virus remains
below its peak in the spring – in part, many suspect, because younger patients have accounted for
more of the infections, and also because hospital treatments have improved. Nonetheless, the
rising death rate could become more severe if infections that start with younger people spread to
more vulnerable individuals over time.
Figure 6 shows cumulative deaths per million people from the virus in Europe and the
United States. While Europe had more cumulative deaths than the U.S. through March and
April, cumulative deaths in the United States have now far surpassed those in Europe. The
reason, I would argue, is highlighted in Figure 7, which shows the change in visits to retail and
recreational locations in the U.S. and select countries in Europe. The pattern of the visits
illustrates how Europe shut down more forcefully, maintained restrictions longer, and did not reopen until the virus had reached low levels. As a result of this more successful virus
containment policy, visits by Europeans to retail and recreation locations have now experienced
a more robust recovery compared with American visits to such locations and are close to their
pre-pandemic levels.
Additional evidence of the costs of early re-opening of the U.S. economy – in economic
and public health terms – can be seen in data on infections, mobility and consumer spending
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across states, as highlighted in my next four charts. They demonstrate various facets of the
interactions between the virus and the economy.
Figure 8 plots the states based on two factors – first, the level of mobility within each
state (as measured by cellphones coming in close proximity to one another) at the end of May
and beginning of June, relative to February (pre-pandemic); and second by the change in the
types of spending that are sensitive to social distancing, in May versus April. Spending that is
sensitive to social distancing involves sectors such as travel, hotels, restaurants, and certain
personal care services like beauty salons and barber shops. What we see is evidence of the initial
economic benefit in states that became less restrictive earlier. The regression line shows the
correlation – spending in May was stronger, relative to pre-pandemic levels, in those states that
had more mobility (contacts) and less restrictions on economic activity.
But, unfortunately, that benefit was short-lived.
Figure 9 compares the same mobility measure for each state to the percentage change in
infections in July. The regression line highlights the overall relationship – more mobility in a
state through June is generally correlated with larger recent increases in infection rates in July.
In particular, states in the Northeast typically experienced much less mobility through June, but
also much lower growth in infections in July than many states in the South and West.
The lower recent growth in infections in some states is in turn associated with greater
recent mobility. Figure 10 compares the percent change in COVID-19 infections in July with
the change in mobility (contacts) in the same period. The Northeastern states now have smaller
increases in infections and higher mobility, as lower infection rates support more mobility. In
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contrast, Southern and Western states now have more infections and less mobility, as people
reduce contacts both voluntarily and because of increased restrictions on economic activity.
Finally, Figure 11 shows that the monthly growth rate in July spending was ultimately
much better in the previously more restrictive and slower to reopen states in the Northeast
relative to many Southern and Western states. Specifically, the figure plots the change in
COVID-19 cases in July versus the change in social-distancing-sensitive spending in July.
Taken together, these data show that states that re-opened early and quickly lifted
restrictions saw a short-term increase in activity, but it was at a cost – rising rates of infections,
which resulted in less spending more recently. In short, lifting restrictions too early and too
quickly hurt both the economy and public health down the road. In the Northeast, where
restrictions were more substantial and lasted longer, states are now experiencing both better
public health outcomes and more spending in sectors of the economy that are sensitive to social
distancing. These results are somewhat parallel to the differences in outcomes between Europe
and the U.S.
Despite some states achieving a recent reprieve from COVID-19 infections, it is of course
important to remain vigilant, given the ease of spread of the virus due to the ease of travel across
state borders. Recent slight upticks in states like Massachusetts and countries like Germany –
which have taken the pandemic seriously – bear watching. Going forward, states should be
carefully calibrating their actions to data, especially as we reach the fall with schools opening
and more activities moving inside as the seasons change. Failure to take quick actions to
suppress the virus could result in more severe economic outcomes as well as the unnecessary
loss of life.
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An Update on the Main Street Lending Program
As I noted earlier, the path of the economy depends heavily on the path of the virus. No
economic policy action can fully offset the public health crisis, but it can help limit its impact on
the economy.
An important economic policy action designed to mitigate current and potential economic
effects of the pandemic is the Main Street Lending Program, which seeks to facilitate the
continued flow of credit to small and medium-sized businesses that were in sound financial
condition prior to the pandemic, but have been adversely impacted by it. The program is
attractively structured for many businesses facing cash-flow interruptions due to the pandemic by
facilitating 5-year loans with no payment of interest in the first year and no payment of principal
until the third year. It is attractive for lenders because they can meet the credit needs of creditworthy companies and nonprofit organizations in their markets while retaining only 5 percent of
the loan on their books, with the Federal Reserve taking a 95 percent participation interest in the
loan.
With the program, the Fed is aiming to help creditworthy businesses and nonprofits that
have suffered temporary cash-flow problems due to the pandemic, and, given the uncertain
outlook, might otherwise have difficulty in obtaining credit from a lender that would have to
hold 100 percent of the loan. The Main Street program can provide essential financing to help
these entities avoid shutting their doors and permanently laying off their employees.
Figure 12 shows that there are currently 522 lenders registered in the program. Banks of
all sizes have enrolled, with the greatest number of banks in the $1-10 billion range, although
smaller community banks and larger universal banks have also signed up.
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One concern raised by potential borrowers about the program was that their bank might
not be participating in the program and, if that were the case, how could they find a bank willing
to take on a new customer and work with them on a Main Street loan. In response, we have
made available an interactive map on our website, www.bostonfed.org/mslp, which provides a
list of all participating banks in each state that are currently accepting loan applications from new
customers and that have agreed to be announced to the public. There are currently 160 banks on
this list; Figure 13 provides a view of the banks in Massachusetts that are part of this subset of
registered lenders.
By the way, while participation on any level in the MSLP is voluntary – registering,
working with existing customers, or taking on new customers – I strongly encourage additional
banks to consider joining those already registered and those on our list accepting new customers.
We have seen tremendous interest from potential borrowers experiencing a pandemic-related,
temporary disruption of their businesses. Financial institutions have a vested interest in the
continued viability of local businesses and organizations, and the vibrancy of their local
economy. The Fed is eager to work with lenders and help them as they provide credit to their
borrowers. Given the unprecedented crisis brought on by the pandemic, it is important that the
Federal Reserve take extraordinary measures to help “main street” businesses.
Importantly, additional debt may not be right for every business and organization at this
challenging time, but I would encourage businesses that have been disrupted by the pandemic
and are in need of financing to explore the program. On the Boston Fed’s website, at
www.bostonfed.org/mslp, you can learn more about the terms and conditions of the program,
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inquire with banks in your network to see if they are participating, and if not consult the
interactive map for lenders in your state accepting applications for new customers.
For many, the program can serve as a vital bridge to address cash flow interruption
ushered in by the pandemic. Of course, bank loans are contracts between borrowers and banks,
and the negotiations for loans can take some time and effort. As a result, when the program was
launched in early July, there were relatively few Main Street program loans submitted for
participation purchase. As borrowers and banks have become more familiar with the program,
we have seen a steady increase in banks submitting loans to our portal.
Figure 14 shows that there are currently more than $856 million in loans active in the
portal, with more than $250 million in loans committed or settled. Much of the increase has
occurred recently, and I expect we will continue to see more activity as more firms are impacted
by the pandemic. Unfortunately, should the fall bring a resurgence of the virus as many
epidemiological models predict, this program may become even more essential.
Some seem eager to suggest that the Main Street program’s modest initial activity is
evidence of failure. I completely disagree, and allow me to explain why.
The Program differs from other programs for businesses made possible by the CARES
Act, reflecting the parameters of what the Federal Reserve is authorized by Congress to do.
Unlike the Paycheck Protection Program, where many loans could turn into grants funded by the
CARES Act, the Main Street program involves loans that must be repaid. These loans are
negotiated between the borrower and lender, designed to meet the special needs or circumstances
of a particular borrower, and must be underwritten by the lender. A grant program, or a lending
program with even more generous terms, would of course have faster uptake. But MSLP’s
design, as determined by the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, in conjunction with the
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Treasury, can indeed support the flow of vital credit to many firms and nonprofit organizations.
The Federal Reserve and Treasury have sought to design a program that is well managed with
respect to risks, efficiency, and resilience, while being responsive to the needs of borrowers
experiencing difficult times.
Indeed, designing and operationalizing a program of this breadth and nuance, delivered
through secure technology, is a significant achievement in a few months’ time. Everyone
involved is focused on the public service goal of helping to provide important credit support to
businesses and nonprofits at this critical and challenging period. Quickly scaling up a program
that purchases a large portion of existing loans – from a very diverse group of borrowers in a
decentralized market that lacks standardization – is inherently difficult. There are also tradeoffs
between limiting credit risk, ensuring that operations are safe and secure, reaching scale, and
achieving operational efficiency.
As a reminder, the program opened for loan purchases on July 6. The numbers to date
seem to me consistent with what I would characterize as a gradual pace of initial activity that is
more recently expanding as participants become familiar with the program’s parameters.
It is important that the Federal Reserve stands ready at this time of distress, in the public
interest and in pursuit of our Congressional mandates, to facilitate lending to for-profit
businesses and nonprofit organizations of many sizes at reasonable rates. As I mentioned at the
outset, credit interruptions prolong recessions and ultimately harm individuals and businesses on
main streets across America. The Boston Fed and the Federal Reserve as a whole see the Main
Street Lending Program as one way to do all we can to support the businesses, nonprofits, and
individuals that make up our nation’s economy.
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Concluding Observations
Unfortunately, the economic outlook is being driven by the course of the pandemic, and
much depends on how successfully it can be contained, either through public health or medical
innovations. The forecast for the U.S. economy this fall is quite uncertain, but my view is that
the recent slowdown in economic activity that we have seen in high frequency data is likely to
continue. Currently, we have an unemployment rate above 10 percent, and because of the
continued community spread of the virus, I am concerned that the pandemic will limit the ability
of the economy to recover quickly. As a result, an increasing number of those who are currently
temporarily unemployed may ultimately have to face permanent layoffs and the difficult task of
finding a new job in a changed economic environment.
At the Fed, we are focused on doing all in our power and purview to support the
economy, including through efforts we are very proud of, like the Main Street program that again
I recommend lenders, businesses, and nonprofits explore participating in.
While the fiscal and monetary stimulus has been significant, it cannot fully offset the
economic drain caused by the public health crisis. Limited or inconsistent efforts by states to
control the virus based on public health guidance are not only placing citizens at unnecessary
risk of severe illness and possible death – but are also likely to prolong the economic downturn.
Thank you for having me today. I wish you all continued good health during these
challenging times.
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1
See July 29, 2020 statement of the Federal Open Market Committee:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200729a.htm.
2
For more discussion, see: https://www.bostonfed.org/news-and-events/speeches/2020/an-update-on-theeconomy-and-the-main-street-lending-program.aspx
3
For additional research on this topic, see https://www.bostonfed.org/people/bank/ericrosengren.aspx#biography, especially the following work:
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•
•
"Credit Supply Disruptions: From Credit Crunches to Financial Crisis" Current Policy Perspectives
No. 15-5 with Joe Peek; also in the Annual Review of Financial Economics. vol 8, (2016): 81 - 95.
"The Impact of Liquidity, Securitization, and Banks on the Real Economy." Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking. vol. 42 (September 2010): 221-228.
“Identifying the Macroeconomic Effect of Loan Supply Shocks,” with Joe Peek and Geoffrey M.B.
Tootell. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. vol. 35, no. 6, part 1 (December 2003): 931-946.
“Troubled Banks, Impaired Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Relative Access to Credit,” with
Michael Klein and Joe Peek. The American Economic Review. vol. 92, no. 3 (June 2002): 664-682.
“The Capital Crunch: Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be,” with Joe Peek. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking. vol. 27, no. 3 (August 1995): 625-638.
“Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch,” with Joe Peek. Journal of Banking and Finance. vol. 19,
no. 1 (June 1995): 679-692.
“Bank Real Estate Lending and the New England Credit Crunch,” with Joe Peek. Journal of the
American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 33-58.
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Cite this document
APA
Eric Rosengren (2020, August 11). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20200812_eric_rosengren
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_20200812_eric_rosengren,
author = {Eric Rosengren},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {2020},
month = {Aug},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20200812_eric_rosengren},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}