speeches · September 25, 2019
Regional President Speech
Tom Barkin · President
Risk Management in Monetary Policy
Thomas I. Barkin
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Risk Management Association 2019 Economic Update
Richmond, Virginia
September 26, 2019
Thank you very much for inviting me to speak with you this afternoon. I’d like to take a moment
to share some thoughts on monetary policy, specifically how risk management principles inform
our approach. Before I say more, I have to note that the views I express are my own and not
necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or in the
Federal Reserve System.1
I joined the Richmond Fed last January after a 30-year career in consulting at McKinsey,
where—in addition to consulting—I had multiple roles including serving as our chief risk
officer.
We had a lot of risks to manage—the media, unhappy clients, cybersecurity defense, individual
behavioral issues and even crises such as an Ebola outbreak. So you might imagine that retiring
and moving to public service has been a relief.
But the Fed has its own risks to contend with, and the stakes are high. We’re concerned about
cybersecurity. We face operational risks when it comes to processing payments and
implementing monetary policy. We oversee risk in the financial system. Any of these topics
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could be a speech in themselves, but today I’d like to talk in more detail about one I hope you’ll
find interesting: risk management in monetary policy.
Economic Update
Let’s start with a baseline look at the economy. Overall, if you look at the data, things are good.
GDP has been pretty solid, averaging 2.7 percent over the past two years. The labor market is
very strong, with unemployment at 50-year lows. Although the pace of job creation has slowed
some, we’re still averaging around 160,000 new jobs per month since the beginning of the year,
well above the pace necessary to accommodate growth in the workforce. Bolstered by the strong
labor market, consumers are confident and are spending.
We are facing several headwinds, however. There is a great deal of uncertainty around trade and
politics, which matters for business confidence. Confidence is critical for businesses to want to
invest and for markets to be willing to finance that investment. So I’m particularly concerned
about the roller coaster we’ve been on recently. Between Brexit, the ongoing negotiations with
China, tensions in the Middle East and the political headlines—to name just a few—it’s been
tough for businesses to feel like they’re on solid ground. That might be why business investment
shrank 0.6 percent in the second quarter. I watch that number closely because eventually lower
investment affects jobs.
The headwinds are having an impact overseas as well; GDP growth has slowed in China and
stalled in the eurozone. In the second quarter, growth was negative in Germany, Europe’s largest
economy. There’s a risk that weakness will affect us.
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At just 1.6 percent over the past 12 months, inflation has been running persistently below the
FOMC’s 2 percent target.2 We’re not that far away—if we just rounded, we’d be at target—but
it’s also possible that the uncertainty I’ve discussed is limiting firms’ ability and willingness to
raise prices.
And the bond market has sent some concerning signals recently. The yield on 10-year treasuries
has been very low given the overall strength of the economy and has actually been lower at times
than the yield on 2-year treasuries. As you probably know, such an inversion of the yield curve is
historically a good predictor of a recession. But is that what the yield curve is signaling now, or
are we just seeing a move toward higher-yielding safe assets at a time when international rates
are historically low?
Monetary Policy Response
Overall, I think it’s safe to say the economy is giving us conflicting signals. The strength of the
labor market might be saying “hold” or even “raise rates,” while inflation and the bond market
might be saying “lower rates.” How should policymakers think about it?
In 2018, the risk seemed to be the economy “overheating.” With interest rates well below
“normal” levels, strong GDP growth, fiscal stimulus and a tight labor market, we raised the
target rate four times, with many FOMC participants projecting additional rate increases the
following year.
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But in early 2019, political and global turmoil signaled more risk to the downside, so the
committee decided to pause and take a patient approach, with a much flatter projected rate path.
Then, over the last two meetings, with inflation muted, continued uncertainty and international
weakness, we took the target rate down 50 basis points. This doesn’t mean a recession is
imminent, nor that we are in a prolonged period of easing. As Chair Powell said after last week’s
meeting, the change was intended “to provide insurance against ongoing risks.” There is a lot of
uncertainty about the outlook, particularly with respect to global growth and the impact of trade,
so it seemed prudent to take out some insurance—which I’m sure a room full of risk managers
can appreciate.
The Risk Management Problem
We have a difficult risk management situation. We have a dual mandate, which means that right
now we are trying to close the gap on our inflation target while avoiding policy that’s too
accommodative, pushing inflation too high or causing financial instability. And we battle
constant uncertainty. The dynamics of the economy are complex and constantly evolving, and
the information we get about those dynamics comes with a lag and are often revised. Add the
fact that monetary policy can take a while to have an effect on the economy, and you see the
challenge.
Further complicating matters, we face risks in multiple directions.
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Easing isn’t risk free. It’s tricky to stimulate the economy to a precise level, and we run the risk
of overshooting our objective, as one could argue we did in the late 1960s.
Even if lowering interest rates doesn’t end up overstimulating inflation, it could affect other
areas of the economy.3 For example, it’s possible for low interest rates to distort markets by
shifting resources into the most interest-sensitive sectors or encouraging firms to over-substitute
capital for labor. Or low interest rates could fuel an asset price bubble, as some have suggested
happened last decade.
But there are risks to not easing. We undermine the credibility of our 2 percent inflation target,
which could lead to a decline in inflation expectations and thus to even lower inflation.4 In
addition, if economic activity does slow further, we could find ourselves behind the curve,
wishing we had moved more and sooner. This is especially relevant given how close we are to
the effective lower bound.5
In addition to the risk of missing on the upside or downside, we also have a trade-off between
short and longer term. Any rate move can be seen as facilitating a choice between consuming or
investing today or tomorrow. At lower rates, you might accelerate a car or house purchase; at
higher rates, you might defer.
So we also face the question, should we move quickly in order to have more impact? Or does
that waste vital ammunition we might need for the next downturn? Economist William Brainard
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famously said that when uncertainty is high, proceed with caution—but sometimes caution is a
risk in and of itself.
Managing the Risks
How do we manage these risks? Five themes: First, we try hard to specify a clear risk strategy.
We release each January a “Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy.”
This statement articulates a balanced approach to our dual mandate and gives the public a sense
of our risk appetite. We also communicate our reaction function through speeches, press
conferences and other media so that markets understand what we’re doing and work alongside
us.
Second, our governance and culture help us. We operate by committee, which gives voice to a
range of views, and the presence of regional Reserve Banks, with regional perspectives, helps us
avoid “group think.”
We are data-focused and invest in having the best analysis possible so we can make decisions
with confidence. There are around 350 economists on staff at the Board of Governors, and each
regional Bank has a team of economists as well. To test and supplement the data, each Bank also
maintains very strong external networks, so we are constantly out talking to businesses to gauge
their sentiment and gain a real-time perspective on the economy. We also have a number of
surveys to develop a richer understanding of trends in our District.
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Third, we have a deep commitment to risk modeling. Every Tealbook, which FOMC participants
receive before each meeting, details a range of scenarios for how the economy could evolve and
fully tests the potential upsides and downsides of possible policy changes. We also conduct a
similar risk assessment of our financial system on a quarterly basis; key elements of which we’ve
recently started publishing twice a year as a Financial Stability Report.
Fourth, we constantly review and revise what we do in order to evolve along with the economy.
That is helped by the constant attention we get from the entire macroeconomics profession, the
media and the markets. We get a lot of help! That said, we listen and we change. For example, in
an effort to tame inflation in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Fed began targeting monetary
aggregates (the quantity of money). When financial innovations made monetary aggregates a less
useful gauge of the state of the economy, the Fed shifted its attention away from them and now
targets the federal funds rate (the price of money). More recently, we have been using the interest
rate paid on excess reserves to influence the federal funds rate rather than the traditional tool of
open market operations. In the last downturn, we introduced more specific forward guidance, an
explicit inflation target and quantitative easing.
Finally, we push outside our borders to enable an environment less susceptible to risk. When we
anchor inflation expectations, we reduce the chance that a few volatile inflation readings will
have an adverse effect. When we properly supervise the banking system, we reduce the risk of
financial market distress. And there’s some history of Fed chairs (like Alan Greenspan) calling
out deficits or “irrational exuberance.” I do worry now about the impact of today’s large federal
budget deficits on our resiliency in the next downturn.
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All that said, we’ve made mistakes. Modern scholars generally attribute the severity of the Great
Depression to errors in monetary policy, and we accept much of the blame for the Great Inflation
of the late 1960s and 1970s as well. But I hope you believe we’ve learned from those mistakes.
The lessons of the Great Depression guided the Fed’s response to the financial crisis. The Great
Inflation taught us the importance of maintaining the credibility of the Fed’s commitment to
price stability.
Currently, in the spirit of continuous improvement, the Fed is reviewing its monetary policy
strategy, tools and communication practices to ensure that we can continue to achieve our dual
mandate given low inflation and the risk of returning to the effective lower bound. As part of that
review, we’ve been holding a series of “Fed Listens” events to get input from business leaders,
community members, academics and other stakeholders. We’re talking about a range of
approaches, and the insights we’ve gained from these discussions have been invaluable. Now, in
the spirit of continuous learning, I’m looking forward to learning from you.
1 Thank you to Jessie Romero for assistance preparing these remarks.
2 Based on core PCE inflation.
3 For example, see Esther George, “Is Low Inflation a Problem for the United States?” Speech at the Economic Club
of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., May 14, 2019.
4 For example, see James Bullard, “President Bullard Explains His Recent FOMC Dissent,” June 21, 2019.
5 For example, see John Williams, “Living Life Near the ZLB,” Speech at the 2019 Annual Meeting of the Central
Bank Research Association, New York City, July 18, 2019.
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Cite this document
APA
Tom Barkin (2019, September 25). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20190926_tom_barkin
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_20190926_tom_barkin,
author = {Tom Barkin},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {2019},
month = {Sep},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20190926_tom_barkin},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}