speeches · July 11, 2017
Regional President Speech
Esther L. George · President
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Fed Balance Sheet 1011
Remarks by
Esther L. George
President and Chief Executive Officer
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
July 12, 2017
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Forum
Denver, Colo.
The views expressed by the author are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal
Reserve System, its governors, officers or representatives.
1 A. Lee Smith and Timothy Todd assisted in preparing these remarks.
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I want to thank you for the opportunity to join you today. The Denver Branch of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City was created to serve as the central bank’s connection to
portions of the Mountain West that are within the Tenth Federal Reserve District – Colorado,
Wyoming and northern New Mexico. To help us fulfill that responsibility, we rely heavily on our
contacts from within this community, including many joining us here today, as well as others
across the region to provide us with insight on emerging financial and economic conditions. The
contributions by these individuals are extremely important to me in my responsibilities
representing this region in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) deliberations, and I want to
express my thanks to those who provide this valuable input.
Today, I would like to talk about a topic that has been receiving much attention — the
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet – and what it means when policymakers talk about its
normalization and ceasing reinvestments. Large scale asset purchases (LSAPs), better known as
quantitative easing, or QE, have transformed the Fed’s balance sheet and sparked active debate,
both within and outside the FOMC, about the costs and benefits of this unconventional monetary
policy that was deployed during and after the financial crisis. Given the juncture we are at in the
process of normalizing monetary policy, now is a useful time to revisit these issues based on
what we know — and what we have yet to learn — about using the Federal Reserve’s balance
sheet in this way.
Because the majority of my regional contacts are neither central bankers nor economists,
I have focused my remarks today on providing a basic foundation for understanding this headline
issue. I’ll begin my comments with a primer on the nature of the Federal Reserve’s assets and
liabilities. Then, I will describe how the Fed’s balance sheet changed starting in 2008 based on
FOMC decisions to make credit easier and provide more accommodation to the economy.
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Finally, I’ll discuss some of the key issues policymakers are considering today and what I see as
possible implications.
Inside the Numbers
Understanding the Fed’s balance sheet requires some understanding of the Federal
Reserve System structure designed by Congress in 1913. The Fed consists of a government
agency in Washington, D.C. known as The Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and 12
separately-incorporated, nationally-chartered Reserve Banks. When we talk about the Federal
Reserve’s balance sheet today, we are actually referring to the combined balance sheets of the 12
individual regional Federal Reserve Banks.
This combined balance sheet is audited annually by an independent audit firm, currently
KPMG, and is made available to the public on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System’s website: www.federalreserve.gov. Also on this website are unaudited quarterly
financial reports that include the combined balance sheet. And each week, generally late on
Thursday afternoon, changes to the Fed’s balance sheet are published on the website in the H.4.1
statistical release, known as “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances.”
The current $4.5 trillion balance sheet certainly stands out. The Fed’s assets primarily
include a securities portfolio of System Open Market Account (SOMA) holdings. The Fed’s
liabilities primarily consist of Federal Reserve notes in circulation and depository institution
deposits.2
2 Additional details on the composition of assets and liabilities in the Fed’s combined balance sheet at March 31,
2017 can be found in the unaudited quarterly financial report, which is available online at:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/quarterly-report-20170331.pdf
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What is unique about the Fed’s balance sheet is its ability to expand and shrink as needed
to facilitate the conduct of monetary policy in response to economic conditions. Conventional
monetary policy involves the buying and selling of securities. At the conclusion of each FOMC
policy meeting, a directive is communicated to the Federal Reserve’s open market desk, which is
based at the New York Fed. This directive also is communicated publicly in the FOMC’s post
meeting statement, which is heavily covered by the financial press.
In the case of a conventional policy tightening, the Fed’s open market desk will sell
securities. The funds received from those sales will then be removed from circulation, reducing
the overall amount of available reserves in the banking system. The resulting smaller pool of
reserves from which to lend increases the cost of borrowing – or to put it more clearly, interest
rates move higher. If the FOMC decides to ease monetary policy, this process would work in
reverse, with the Fed buying securities.
The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has grown considerably over the past decade. At
nearly $4.5 trillion, it represents almost 25 percent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) compared to just 6 percent of GDP in 2007. Liabilities of the Fed at that time were
comprised almost entirely of currency in circulation with reserves averaging about $10 billion.
Today, reserves total more than $2 trillion. These reserves were created by the Fed to finance the
purchase of long-term Treasury and agency debt during multiple rounds of large scale asset
purchases, also known as LSAPs. Although the Fed stopped its program of expansionary bond
purchases in October 2014, it has continued to reinvest the returns it receives from the maturing
securities. As a result, the current size and composition of the balance sheet has remained
unchanged for more than 2 ½ years.
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The Shift to Unconventional Policy
In the pre-crisis monetary policy framework, the Fed adjusted its holdings of Treasury
securities to affect the amount of reserves in the banking system through the process I explained
earlier. Due to the low level of excess reserves banks held at that time, modest adjustments in the
size of the Fed’s balance sheet influenced the federal funds rate, which is the rate that banks lend
their reserves to each other overnight. When this was the key mechanism to influence monetary
policy, open market operations required a relatively small balance sheet with assets comprised
primarily of short-term Treasuries. However, this pre-crisis framework was challenged during
the global financial crisis.
In December 2008, the economic outlook deteriorated to the point that the FOMC voted
to target a federal funds rate of zero to 25 basis points. Despite these extraordinarily low short-
term interest rates, longer-term rates for consumers and firms remained well above zero. The
combination of weakening economic conditions and effectively constrained short-term policy
rates led the Federal Reserve to pursue a strategy of LSAPs to further ease monetary conditions.
By the nature of the fed funds rate, traditional monetary policy has a more substantial
influence on the short-term securities market, providing a base from which yields extend across
the curve. LSAPs were designed explicitly to depress yields on longer-term securities through
the purchase of large quantities of assets. The initial round of purchases, which commenced in
December of 2008, primarily targeted mortgage-related securities in an effort to put downward
pressure on mortgage rates and to help stabilize housing and financial markets. However,
subsequent rounds of asset purchases included longer-term Treasury securities in a bid to ease
broader financial conditions and foster overall economic activity. In these latter rounds of
purchases, LSAPs evolved from a crisis response mechanism to a more general policy tool used
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to promote the Federal Reserve’s mandate to foster maximum sustainable employment and stable
prices.
Judging the Benefits and Costs of LSAPs
The use of the balance sheet as an instrument of monetary policy in this manner marked
an important shift. With no experience on which to rely, the FOMC’s decision to undertake
balance sheet policy was not taken lightly. Arguments in favor of expanding the balance sheet
focused on the notion that by depressing longer-term yields and easing credit conditions, the
FOMC could provide some stimulus to support the economic recovery. On the other hand, it was
recognized that there could be nontrivial costs associated with providing this experimental
stimulus. These costs stemmed from the unintended consequences LSAPs could have on the
economy and financial markets, and the complexities associated with employing and exiting
from such unconventional policy. Ultimately, the FOMC deemed the benefits would outweigh
the costs.
While it is likely premature to fully judge the extent of the benefits versus the costs of
LSAPs, a consensus of research does suggest that the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance
sheet has depressed longer-term interest rates. This has eased financial conditions,3 although
some of this effect assumes that the Federal Reserve will hold the assets it purchased for a
prolonged period of time independent of economic conditions.
Research by my staff suggests that the Fed’s asset holdings continue to place downward
pressure on longer-term rates today – as they were intended to do.4 This effect, however, has the
3 See, for example, Taeyoung Doh, “The Efficacy of Large-Scale Asset Purchases at the Zero Lower Bound,”
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Q2 2010. Also, the Macro Bulletin cited below.
4 See, for example, Troy Davig and A. Lee Smith, “Forecasting the Stance of Monetary Policy under Balance Sheet
Adjustments,” Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, May 10, 2017.
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potential to introduce new threats to economic stability going forward. Holding long-term rates
below the level that they might otherwise move to naturally, amidst improving economic
fundamentals, risks creating financial imbalances. History reminds us that it may be difficult to
detect such imbalances in real time and that they can only become apparent well after they
manifest. Looking across a spectrum of asset classes today, from real estate to equities to
corporate bonds, there is reason to remain vigilant despite the apparent tranquility in financial
markets.
In addition to the potential costs associated with using LSAPs, some costs have become
increasingly visible as the FOMC begins to normalize monetary policy. For example, a large
balance sheet has made monetary policy more complex today than it was a decade ago. From an
operational standpoint, the Federal Reserve has had to rethink its traditional approach to
targeting the federal funds rate in an environment of abundant reserves. In the process, the
Federal Reserve has engaged an expanded set of counterparties and thereby expanded its
footprint in certain financial markets.
From a communications perspective, the existence of multiple policy instruments has
made explaining the FOMC’s monetary policy strategy to the public more complicated. With the
introduction of LSAPs, the FOMC’s post-meeting statements became lengthier.5 These
statements now include not only the traditional policy directive and relevant details regarding
economic conditions and the outlook, but also address securities holdings acquired under the
LSAPs.
5 The first post-meeting public statement, issued in 1994, was a total of about 100 words. The length of policy
statements in recent years has increased to average more than 600 words.
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The Process of Normalizing the Balance Sheet
At its June 2017 meeting, the FOMC outlined its planned approach for reducing its
Treasury and agency portfolio. Once initiated, the Committee intends to limit the pace at which
the FOMC’s portfolio is unwound by gradually decreasing its reinvestment of the principal
payments received from maturing securities. Specifically, such payments will be reinvested only
to the extent that they exceed preset rising caps, allowing the balance sheet to shrink in a slow
and largely predictable manner.
While the “how” of balance sheet normalization has been largely established, the “when”
and the “how much” remain to be determined. In terms of “when,” the FOMC has indicated it
expects to begin implementing a balance sheet normalization program this year, provided the
economy evolves broadly as anticipated. One reason I favor shrinking the balance sheet sooner
rather than later is the observed disconnect between short-term rates and long-term rates. Despite
four 25-basis-point increases in the target funds rate since December of 2015, longer-term yields
remain little changed.
According to the FOMC’s Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), the median forecast
in the so-called “dot plot” anticipates another 25-basis-point increase in the funds rate this year
and three more increases next year. If further increases in the target funds rate fail to transmit to
longer-term yields, the yield curve could flatten further. Such a rate environment can distort
investment decisions. To the extent that reducing our asset holdings will apply some modest
upward pressure to longer-term interest rates, balance sheet normalization could promote the
more typical transmission of short-term interest rate changes throughout the yield curve and
ensure that all components of policy accommodation are removed in a gradual manner.
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The question of “how much” the Fed’s balance sheet will shrink also is an important
aspect of policy normalization, but has yet to be determined. The FOMC has said that it
anticipates reducing the amount of reserves, over time, to a level appreciably below that seen in
recent years but larger than before the financial crisis. The ultimate size of the Fed’s balance
sheet will be influenced by a number of factors, including the public’s demand for currency in
circulation, decisions the FOMC makes about its securities portfolio and its long-run operating
framework, and the economy. To improve the public’s understanding of balance sheet
developments, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s public website was recently updated
with projections for the long-run size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet.6
Gauging the Implications of Balance Sheet Normalization
I support the FOMC’s approach to balance sheet normalization and favor initiating the
process in the near future, although I would have preferred to be starting the process with a
smaller balance sheet than exists today. As a voting member of the FOMC in 2013, I voted
against the continuation of the asset purchase program known popularly as QE III. By then,
financial markets were stable and the economy was growing. My concerns about the expansion
of the Fed’s balance sheet under those conditions centered on many of the issues I’ve discussed
today. In my view, the possible unintended side effects of the ongoing asset purchases posed
risks to economic and financial stability and served to unnecessarily further complicate future
monetary policy. I remain reluctant to advocate for the use of LSAPs in the future outside
extraordinary circumstances.
6 http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2017/07/just-released-updated-soma-portfolio-and-income-
projections.html
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It could prove to be the case that my concerns were misplaced. Certainly today’s
financial markets are calm and labor markets remain robust. Recent “stress tests” suggest that the
largest U.S. banks are healthy for the most part. I hope such conditions point to a path of
continued, stable economic growth.
Yet, my experience reminds me that imbalances can develop in sectors outside the lens of
regulators and, as we witnessed a decade ago, can unwind with little warning. The current
combination of asset valuations —influenced in part by LSAPs — together with low levels of
implied volatility in equity and bond markets, could be signaling broader complacency in
financial markets. For example, the failure of longer-term rates to move up with short-term rates
during this normalization cycle illustrates the risk for a disruptive repricing of assets as markets
adjust to a more normal policy stance. The potential for such disruption highlights the essential
nature of ensuring that our largest banks are indeed well capitalized and able to withstand the
repercussions of a financial shock. Although often noted as higher than a decade ago, equity
capital levels in these banks remain well below levels held by the nation’s community banks.7
Assuring strong capital is particularly critical in light of focused efforts to ease various
regulatory mechanisms that are designed to offset the systemic risk these large banks pose to the
nation’s economy.
At the same time, the FOMC faces the unprecedented task of normalizing multiple
dimensions of policy without impeding the economic expansion. Moving too fast could
excessively tighten financial conditions and slow the economy. Moving too slowly could cause a
relatively tight labor market to become further stretched beyond what is sustainable in the
longer-run. In either case, history shows that a policy mistake can invite a recession.
7 FDIC Global Capital Index: https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/hoenig/global.html
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Conclusion
Even as short-term interest rates rise, monetary policy remains accommodative. Making
adjustments to the Fed’s sizeable balance sheet is a necessary but unfamiliar part of the FOMC’s
policy process. As a result, the Committee has adopted a gradual approach to its policy
normalization approach. Removing accommodation in small doses, consistent with the pace of
improvement in the economy’s fundamentals, should allow Fed policy to evolve from fueling an
economic expansion to sustaining it.
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Cite this document
APA
Esther L. George (2017, July 11). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20170712_esther_l_george
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_20170712_esther_l_george,
author = {Esther L. George},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {2017},
month = {Jul},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20170712_esther_l_george},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}