speeches · June 11, 2012
Regional President Speech
Thomas M. Hoenig · President
Statement by
FDIC Director Thomas Hoenig
Basel Capital Notices
of
Proposed Rulemaking
June 12, 2012
I support moving these Notices of Proposed Rule Making into the public domain for
comment. I strongly encourage the industry and, just as importantly, other interested
parties to address the questions posed in these notices. I also would encourage any
additional comment the public might wish to make on the final rule regarding market risk
that is being voted on today.
The proposed risk-based capital and leverage (capital relative to unweighted assets)
ratios are improvements over Basel II. They are composed of stronger forms of capital
and have higher risk weights. The minimum capital requirements also are higher. The
individuals who developed the Basel capital standards and these proposed rules
worked tirelessly to improve the definitions of capital and measures of risk, and I very
much appreciate their efforts.
Despite these improvements, I remain concerned that as proposed, the minimum capital
ratios will not significantly enhance financial stability. The rules continue to focus on
risk-based capital ratios, which strike me as overly complex and opaque. Also,
experience suggests that the tangible common equity leverage ratio is what investors
focus on and is what ultimately determines whether capital is adequate. Because
leverage is one of the primary factors that determines financial outcomes, I also am
concerned that the minimum leveraged ratios in the proposals are too low to be of real
value in moderating future crises.
Currently, the primary focus of the U.S. implementation of the Basel approach is on
minimum risk-based capital ratios. These ratios depend critically on -- and are very
sensitive to -- the models used to estimate risk and determine risk weights. As the
financial system has become more complex, the models too have become more
complex, but not necessarily better. For example, in the booming economy leading up
to the financial crisis, while total capital ratios showed increases, tangible equity
leverage ratios declined systematically. This was particularly the case for the largest
banking organizations, despite the build up in risk that was exposed only ex post. In
addition, in a recent Barclays Capital international survey of 130 institutional investors,
most respondents indicated that they do not trust the internal models used by banks to
calculate risk-weighted assets and would prefer simplified risk weighting and less firm-
specific discretion.
As a result, I am very interested in hearing public comment on whether consideration
should be given to focusing less on risk-based capital and more on minimum leverage
ratios, which are independent of models and less subject to manipulation.
I am aware that a minimum leverage ratio in isolation may encourage institutions to
gravitate towards riskier assets because all assets must be funded with the same
percentage of equity. However, the Basel risk management approach includes three
pillars—capital, supervision, and market discipline. It is important not to view the capital
requirement in isolation, but instead as part of a system that makes use of all three
pillars. And, if managements, supervisors, and the markets' ability to assess risk are
undermined because the risk-based measure is overly complex and opaque, then the
measure will be ineffective -- or worse, counter productive.
Because of the importance of leverage ratios, I encourage comment regarding their use.
For example, should the proposed Tier 1 leverage ratios be higher? Would it be better
to use the newly proposed Common Equity Tier I capital to measure leverage? Would
higher minimum ratios address concerns about risk incentives associated with greater
reliance on a leverage ratio? Should the minimum supplemental leverage ratio for
advanced-approach institutions be higher to be considered well capitalized than
adequately capitalized? Currently 3 percent is the proposed minimum for both
categories. There is ample evidence that without government guarantees the market
would require significantly higher levels of capital.
A greater emphasis on leverage ratios would be stricter than what is agreed to in the
International Accord. However, there is precedent for stricter requirements. Leverage
ratios, at the urging principally of the FDIC, were adopted in the United States even
though they were not part of the Basel I or II Accords. More recently the Swiss have
implemented higher minimum capital ratios, and the United Kingdom's Vickers
Commission has recommended higher requirements than in the Basel III Accord.
While staff have developed detailed measures of risk, it is bankers and bank
supervisors, those serving on the boards of banks and those in the field, who must
understand them, implement them, and enforce them. Having read these drafts, I
suspect that will be no easy task. The measures imply more accuracy than can be
realized. Risks migrate from assigned levels, and formulas go stale. The more
complicated a rule the more likely it will be "gamed," with the most brazen winning out
over the most conscientious participants in the market. Also, the more complicated a
rule, the more costly it is to implement. Increasing costs against constant revenues
drives consolidation within an industry already heavily concentrated.
There are many issues that deserve attention as these proposals are placed in the
public domain for comment. I encourage the industry and the public at large to engage
in a vigorous discussion about what capital measures will serve financial stability best.
Last Updated 4/17/2013
Cite this document
APA
Thomas M. Hoenig (2012, June 11). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20120612_thomas_m_hoenig
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_20120612_thomas_m_hoenig,
author = {Thomas M. Hoenig},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {2012},
month = {Jun},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20120612_thomas_m_hoenig},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}