speeches · May 27, 2008
Regional President Speech
Richard W. Fisher · President
Storms on the Horizon
Remarks before the Commonwealth Club of California
Richard W. Fisher
President and CEO
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
San Francisco, California
May 28, 2008
The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System.
Storms on the Horizon
Richard W. Fisher
Thank you, Bruce [Ericson]. I am honored to be here this evening and am grateful for the
invitation to speak to the Commonwealth Club of California.
Alan Greenspan and Paul Volcker, two of Ben Bernanke’s linear ancestors as chairmen of the
Federal Reserve, have been in the news quite a bit lately. Yet, we rarely hear about William
McChesney Martin, a magnificent public servant who was Fed chairman during five presidencies
and to this day holds the record for the longest tenure: 19 years.
Chairman Martin had a way with words. And he had a twinkle in his eye. It was Bill Martin who
wisely and succinctly defined the Federal Reserve as having the unenviable task “to take away
the punchbowl just as the party gets going.” He did himself one up when he received the Alfalfa
Club’s nomination for the presidency of the United States. I suspect many here tonight have been
to the annual Alfalfa dinner. It is one of the great institutions in Washington, D.C. Once a year, it
holds a dinner devoted solely to poking fun at the political pretensions of the day. Tongue firmly
in cheek, the club nominates a candidate to run for the presidency on the Alfalfa Party ticket. Of
course, none of them ever win. Nominees are thenceforth known for evermore as members of the
Stassen Society, named for Harold Stassen, who ran for president nine times and lost every time,
then ran a tenth time on the Alfalfa ticket and lost again. The motto of the group is Veni, Vidi,
Defici—“I came, I saw, I lost.”
Bill Martin was nominated to run and lose on the Alfalfa Party ticket in 1966, while serving as
Fed chairman during Lyndon Johnson’s term. In his acceptance speech,1 he announced that,
given his proclivities as a central banker, he would take his cues from the German philosopher
Goethe, “who said that people could endure anything except continual prosperity.” Therefore,
Martin declared, he would adopt a platform proclaiming that as a president he planned to “make
life endurable again by stamping out prosperity.”
“I shall conduct the administration of the country,” he said, “exactly as I have so successfully
conducted the affairs of the Federal Reserve. To that end, I shall assemble the best brains that
can be found…ask their advice on all matters…and completely confound them by following all
their conflicting counsel.”
It is true, Bruce, that as you said in your introduction, I am one of the 17 people who participate
in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) deliberations and provide Ben Bernanke with
“conflicting counsel” as the committee cobbles together a monetary policy that seeks to promote
America’s economic prosperity, Goethe to the contrary. But tonight I speak for neither the
committee, nor the chairman, nor any of the other good people that serve the Federal Reserve
System. I speak solely in my own capacity. I want to speak to you tonight about an economic
problem that we must soon confront or else risk losing our primacy as the world’s most powerful
and dynamic economy.
1
William McChesney Martin, “Alfalfa Club Dinner Script,” delivered at the Alfalfa Club Dinner, Washington, D.C., Jan. 22, 1966, Box 163,
William McChesney Martin Collection, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.
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Forty-three years ago this Sunday, Bill Martin delivered a commencement address to Columbia
University that was far more sober than his Alfalfa Club speech. The opening lines of that
Columbia address2 were as follows: “When economic prospects are at their brightest, the
dangers of complacency and recklessness are greatest. As our prosperity proceeds on its record-
breaking path, it behooves every one of us to scan the horizon of our national and international
economy for danger signals so as to be ready for any storm.”
Today, our fellow citizens and financial markets are paying the price for falling victim to the
complacency and recklessness Martin warned against. Few scanned the horizon for trouble
brewing as we proceeded along a path of unparalleled prosperity fueled by an unsustainable
housing bubble and unbridled credit markets. Armchair or Monday morning quarterbacks will
long debate whether the Fed could have/should have/would have taken away the punchbowl that
lubricated that blowout party. I have given my opinion on that matter elsewhere and won’t go
near that subject tonight. What counts now is what we have done more recently and where we go
from here. Whatever the sins of omission or commission committed by our predecessors, the
Bernanke FOMC’s objective is to use a new set of tools to calm the tempest in the credit markets
to get them back to functioning in a more orderly fashion. We trust that the various term credit
facilities we have recently introduced are helping restore confidence while the credit markets
undertake self-corrective initiatives and lawmakers consider new regulatory schemes.
I am also not going to engage in a discussion of present monetary policy tonight, except to say
that if inflationary developments and, more important, inflation expectations, continue to worsen,
I would expect a change of course in monetary policy to occur sooner rather than later, even in
the face of an anemic economic scenario. Inflation is the most insidious enemy of capitalism. No
central banker can countenance it, not least the men and women of the Federal Reserve.
Tonight, I want to talk about a different matter. In keeping with Bill Martin’s advice, I have been
scanning the horizon for danger signals even as we continue working to recover from the recent
turmoil. In the distance, I see a frightful storm brewing in the form of untethered government
debt. I choose the words—“frightful storm”—deliberately to avoid hyperbole. Unless we take
steps to deal with it, the long-term fiscal situation of the federal government will be
unimaginably more devastating to our economic prosperity than the subprime debacle and the
recent debauching of credit markets that we are now working so hard to correct.
You might wonder why a central banker would be concerned with fiscal matters. Fiscal policy is,
after all, the responsibility of the Congress, not the Federal Reserve. Congress, and Congress
alone, has the power to tax and spend. From this monetary policymaker’s point of view, though,
deficits matter for what we do at the Fed. There are many reasons why. Economists have found
that structural deficits raise long-run interest rates, complicating the Fed’s dual mandate to
develop a monetary policy that promotes sustainable, noninflationary growth. The even more
disturbing dark and dirty secret about deficits—especially when they careen out of control—is
that they create political pressure on central bankers to adopt looser monetary policy down the
2
“Does Monetary History Repeat Itself?” Commencement Day Luncheon of the Alumni Federation of Columbia University, June 1, 1965, New
York City.
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road. I will return to that shortly. First, let me give you the unvarnished facts of our nation’s
fiscal predicament.
Eight years ago, our federal budget, crafted by a Democratic president and enacted by a
Republican Congress, produced a fiscal surplus of $236 billion, the first surplus in almost 40
years and the highest nominal-dollar surplus in American history. While the Fed is scrupulously
nonpartisan and nonpolitical, I mention this to emphasize that the deficit/debt issue knows no
party and can be solved only by both parties working together. For a brief time, with surpluses
projected into the future as far as the eye could see, economists and policymakers alike began to
contemplate a bucolic future in which interest payments would form an ever-declining share of
federal outlays, a future where Treasury bonds and debt-ceiling legislation would become dusty
relics of a long-forgotten past. The Fed even had concerns about how open market operations
would be conducted in a marketplace short of Treasury debt.
That utopian scenario did not last for long. Over the next seven years, federal spending grew at a
6.2 percent nominal annual rate while receipts grew at only 3.5 percent. Of course, certain areas
of government, like national defense, had to spend more in the wake of 9/11. But nondefense
discretionary spending actually rose 6.4 percent annually during this timeframe, outpacing the
growth in total expenditures. Deficits soon returned, reaching an expected $410 billion for
2008—a $600 billion swing from where we were just eight years ago. This $410 billion estimate,
by the way, was made before the recently passed farm bill and supplemental defense
appropriation and without considering a proposed patch for the Alternative Minimum Tax—all
measures that will lead to a further ballooning of government deficits.
In keeping with the tradition of rosy scenarios, official budget projections suggest this deficit
will be relatively short-lived. They almost always do. According to the official calculus,
following a second $400-billion-plus deficit in 2009, the red ink should fall to $160 billion in
2010 and $95 billion in 2011, and then the budget swings to a $48 billion surplus in 2012.
If you do the math, however, you might be forgiven for sensing that these felicitous projections
look a tad dodgy. To reach the projected 2012 surplus, outlays are assumed to rise at a 2.4
percent nominal annual rate over the next four years—less than half as fast as they rose the
previous seven years. Revenue is assumed to rise at a 6.7 percent nominal annual rate over the
next four years—almost double the rate of the past seven years. Using spending and revenue
growth rates that have actually prevailed in recent years, the 2012 surplus quickly evaporates and
becomes a deficit, potentially of several hundred billion dollars.
Doing deficit math is always a sobering exercise. It becomes an outright painful one when you
apply your calculator to the long-run fiscal challenge posed by entitlement programs. Were I not
a taciturn central banker, I would say the mathematics of the long-term outlook for entitlements,
left unchanged, is nothing short of catastrophic.
Typically, critics ranging from the Concord Coalition to Ross Perot begin by wringing their
collective hands over the unfunded liabilities of Social Security. A little history gives you a view
as to why. Franklin Roosevelt originally conceived a social security system in which individuals
would fund their own retirements through payroll-tax contributions. But Congress quickly
realized that such a system could not put much money into the pockets of indigent elderly
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citizens ravaged by the Great Depression. Instead, a pay-as-you-go funding system was
embraced, making each generation’s retirement the responsibility of its children.
Now, fast forward 70 or so years and ask this question: What is the mathematical predicament of
Social Security today? Answer: The amount of money the Social Security system would need
today to cover all unfunded liabilities from now on—what fiscal economists call the “infinite
horizon discounted value” of what has already been promised recipients but has no funding
mechanism currently in place—is $13.6 trillion, an amount slightly less than the annual gross
domestic product of the United States.
Demographics explain why this is so. Birthrates have fallen dramatically, reducing the worker–
retiree ratio and leaving today’s workers pulling a bigger load than the system designers ever
envisioned. Life spans have lengthened without a corresponding increase in the retirement age,
leaving retirees in a position to receive benefits far longer than the system designers envisioned.
Formulae for benefits and cost-of-living adjustments have also contributed to the growth in
unfunded liabilities.
The good news is this Social Security shortfall might be manageable. While the issues regarding
Social Security reform are complex, it is at least possible to imagine how Congress might find,
within a $14 trillion economy, ways to wrestle with a $13 trillion unfunded liability. The bad
news is that Social Security is the lesser of our entitlement worries. It is but the tip of the
unfunded liability iceberg. The much bigger concern is Medicare, a program established in 1965,
the same prosperous year that Bill Martin cautioned his Columbia University audience to be
wary of complacency and storms on the horizon.
Medicare was a pay-as-you-go program from the very beginning, despite warnings from some
congressional leaders—Wilbur Mills was the most credible of them before he succumbed to the
pay-as-you-go wiles of Fanne Foxe, the Argentine Firecracker—who foresaw some of the long-
term fiscal issues such a financing system could pose. Unfortunately, they were right.
Please sit tight while I walk you through the math of Medicare. As you may know, the program
comes in three parts: Medicare Part A, which covers hospital stays; Medicare B, which covers
doctor visits; and Medicare D, the drug benefit that went into effect just 29 months ago. The
infinite-horizon present discounted value of the unfunded liability for Medicare A is $34.4
trillion. The unfunded liability of Medicare B is an additional $34 trillion. The shortfall for
Medicare D adds another $17.2 trillion. The total? If you wanted to cover the unfunded liability
of all three programs today, you would be stuck with an $85.6 trillion bill. That is more than six
times as large as the bill for Social Security. It is more than six times the annual output of the
entire U.S. economy.
Why is the Medicare figure so large? There is a mix of reasons, really. In part, it is due to the
same birthrate and life-expectancy issues that affect Social Security. In part, it is due to ever-
costlier advances in medical technology and the willingness of Medicare to pay for them. And in
part, it is due to expanded benefits—the new drug benefit program’s unfunded liability is by
itself one-third greater than all of Social Security’s.
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Add together the unfunded liabilities from Medicare and Social Security, and it comes to $99.2
trillion over the infinite horizon. Traditional Medicare composes about 69 percent, the new drug
benefit roughly 17 percent and Social Security the remaining 14 percent.
I want to remind you that I am only talking about the unfunded portions of Social Security and
Medicare. It is what the current payment scheme of Social Security payroll taxes, Medicare
payroll taxes, membership fees for Medicare B, copays, deductibles and all other revenue
currently channeled to our entitlement system will not cover under current rules. These existing
revenue streams must remain in place in perpetuity to handle the “funded” entitlement liabilities.
Reduce or eliminate this income and the unfunded liability grows. Increase benefits and the
liability grows as well.
Let’s say you and I and Bruce Ericson and every U.S. citizen who is alive today decided to fully
address this unfunded liability through lump-sum payments from our own pocketbooks, so that
all of us and all future generations could be secure in the knowledge that we and they would
receive promised benefits in perpetuity. How much would we have to pay if we split the tab?
Again, the math is painful. With a total population of 304 million, from infants to the elderly, the
per-person payment to the federal treasury would come to $330,000. This comes to $1.3 million
per family of four—over 25 times the average household’s income.
Clearly, once-and-for-all contributions would be an unbearable burden. Alternatively, we could
address the entitlement shortfall through policy changes that would affect ourselves and future
generations. For example, a permanent 68 percent increase in federal income tax revenue—from
individual and corporate taxpayers—would suffice to fully fund our entitlement programs. Or we
could instead divert 68 percent of current income-tax revenues from their intended uses to the
entitlement system, which would accomplish the same thing.
Suppose we decided to tackle the issue solely on the spending side. It turns out that total
discretionary spending in the federal budget, if maintained at its current share of GDP in
perpetuity, is 3 percent larger than the entitlement shortfall. So all we would have to do to fully
fund our nation’s entitlement programs would be to cut discretionary spending by 97 percent.
But hold on. That discretionary spending includes defense and national security, education, the
environment and many other areas, not just those controversial earmarks that make the evening
news. All of them would have to be cut—almost eliminated, really—to tackle this problem
through discretionary spending.
I hope that gives you some idea of just how large the problem is. And just to drive an important
point home, these spending cuts or tax increases would need to be made immediately and
maintained in perpetuity to solve the entitlement deficit problem. Discretionary spending would
have to be reduced by 97 percent not only for our generation, but for our children and their
children and every generation of children to come. And similarly on the taxation side, income tax
revenue would have to rise 68 percent and remain that high forever. Remember, though, I said
tax revenue, not tax rates. Who knows how much individual and corporate tax rates would have
to change to increase revenue by 68 percent?
If these possible solutions to the unfunded-liability problem seem draconian, it’s because they
are draconian. But they do serve to give you a sense of the severity of the problem. To be sure,
there are ways to lessen the reliance on any single policy and the burden borne by any particular
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set of citizens. Most proposals to address long-term entitlement debt, for example, rely on a
combination of tax increases, benefit reductions and eligibility changes to find the trillions
necessary to safeguard the system over the long term.
No combination of tax hikes and spending cuts, though, will change the total burden borne by
current and future generations. For the existing unfunded liabilities to be covered in the end,
someone must pay $99.2 trillion more or receive $99.2 trillion less than they have been currently
promised. This is a cold, hard fact. The decision we must make is whether to shoulder a
substantial portion of that burden today or compel future generations to bear its full weight.
Now that you are all thoroughly depressed, let me come back to monetary policy and the Fed.
It is only natural to cast about for a solution—any solution—to avoid the fiscal pain we know is
necessary because we succumbed to complacency and put off dealing with this looming fiscal
disaster. Throughout history, many nations, when confronted by sizable debts they were unable
or unwilling to repay, have seized upon an apparently painless solution to this dilemma:
monetization. Just have the monetary authority run cash off the printing presses until the debt is
repaid, the story goes, then promise to be responsible from that point on and hope your sins will
be forgiven by God and Milton Friedman and everyone else.
We know from centuries of evidence in countless economies, from ancient Rome to today’s
Zimbabwe, that running the printing press to pay off today’s bills leads to much worse problems
later on. The inflation that results from the flood of money into the economy turns out to be far
worse than the fiscal pain those countries hoped to avoid.
Earlier I mentioned the Fed’s dual mandate to manage growth and inflation. In the long run,
growth cannot be sustained if markets are undermined by inflation. Stable prices go hand in hand
with achieving sustainable economic growth. I have said many, many times that inflation is a
sinister beast that, if uncaged, devours savings, erodes consumers’ purchasing power, decimates
returns on capital, undermines the reliability of financial accounting, distracts the attention of
corporate management, undercuts employment growth and real wages, and debases the currency.
Purging rampant inflation and a debased currency requires administering a harsh medicine. We
have been there, and we know the cure that was wrought by the FOMC under Paul Volcker.
Even the perception that the Fed is pursuing a cheap-money strategy to accommodate fiscal
burdens, should it take root, is a paramount risk to the long-term welfare of the U.S. economy.
The Federal Reserve will never let this happen. It is not an option. Ever. Period.
The way we resolve these liabilities—and resolve them we must—will affect our own well-being
as well as the prospects of future generations and the global economy. Failing to face up to our
responsibility will produce the mother of all financial storms. The warning signals have been
flashing for years, but we find it easier to ignore them than to take action. Will we take the
painful fiscal steps necessary to prevent the storm by reducing and eventually eliminating our
fiscal imbalances? That depends on you.
I mean “you” literally. This situation is of your own creation. When you berate your
representatives or senators or presidents for the mess we are in, you are really berating yourself.
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You elect them. You are the ones who let them get away with burdening your children and
grandchildren rather than yourselves with the bill for your entitlement programs.
This issue transcends political affiliation. When George Shultz, one of San Francisco’s greatest
Republican public servants, was director of President Nixon’s Office of Management and
Budget, he became worried about the amount of money Congress was proposing to spend. After
some nights of tossing and turning, he called legendary staffer Sam Cohen into his office. Cohen
had a long memory of budget matters and knew every zig and zag of budget history. “Sam,”
Shultz asked, “tell me something just between you and me. Is there any difference between
Republicans and Democrats when it comes to spending money?” Cohen looked at him, furrowed
his brow and, after thinking about it, replied, “Mr. Shultz, there is only one difference:
Democrats enjoy it more.”
Yet no one, Democrat or Republican, enjoys placing our children and grandchildren and their
children and grandchildren in harm’s way. No one wants to see the frightful storm of unfunded
long-term liabilities destroy our economy or threaten the independence and authority of our
central bank or tear our currency asunder.
Of late, we have heard many complaints about the weakness of the dollar against the euro and
other currencies. It was recently argued in the op-ed pages of the Financial Times3 that one
reason for the demise of the British pound was the need to liquidate England’s international
reserves to pay off the costs of the Great Wars. In the end, the pound, it was essentially argued,
was sunk by the kaiser’s army and Hitler’s bombs. Right now, we—you and I—are launching
fiscal bombs against ourselves. You have it in your power as the electors of our fiscal authorities
to prevent this destruction. Please do so.
3
“The Euro’s Success Could Also Be Its Downfall,” by Harold James, Financial Times, May 18, 2008.
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Cite this document
APA
Richard W. Fisher (2008, May 27). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20080528_richard_w_fisher
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_20080528_richard_w_fisher,
author = {Richard W. Fisher},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {2008},
month = {May},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20080528_richard_w_fisher},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}