speeches · September 10, 2006
Regional President Speech
Cathy E. Minehan · President
News & Events
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Remarks to the National Association of Business Economists
by Cathy E. Minehan, President & Chief Executive Officer
September 11, 2006
Good morning. Let me welcome you again to Boston. It’s a pleasure to have the National Association of Business
Economists here in our city. And it was certainly a pleasure to entertain you last night at the Bank. As we recognize the
fifth anniversary of 9/11 it seems to me to be important to assess both the state of the U.S. economy and the economic
health of the world. In that regard, I know this will be a fruitful and productive conference, as there is no dearth of
economic challenges on which to focus.
I want to start my comments this morning with a thumbnail sketch of my thoughts on the current state of the U.S.
economy. Following that, I want to spend most of my time on an important challenge facing us in the medium term --
the declining trend in U.S. savings, in particular the savings people need to provide for a financially secure retirement.
In discussing this issue, I will draw on work done by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College headed by
Alicia Munnell, who among her many past accomplishments has served as our Bank’s research director. I will also talk
about what the field of behavioral economics has to say about policies to increase personal savings. Behavioral
economics is a new focus of the Boston Fed -- we recently formed a new center to enhance our expertise in this
evolving area, and particularly to hone in on what this field has to say about macro policy formation. Finally, I want to
share with you some perspectives on financial literacy as that is key to the savings question. And, of course, any
thoughts I share with you are mine and not those of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee.
One of the more striking features of the current economic outlook, reflected in the forecast at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston as well as in other mainstream forecasts, is how relatively benign it is. Against the backdrop of the war in
Iraq, the uneasy ceasefire in the Middle East, the looming fiscal deficits driven by demographic change everywhere in
the developed world, and sizable international imbalances, the forecast for the next couple of years seems quite
optimistic.
Yet, as near as we in Boston can tell, the best baseline forecast is that U.S. growth will moderate from its average of
around 4 percent in the first half of 2006 to something slightly below its potential of a bit less than 3 percent over the
next year or so. At this pace, the growth of demand will roughly match that of aggregate supply, and lead to little
change in unemployment. Moderate growth in jobs and real income is expected to sustain consumer spending, even as
cooling housing markets and high energy prices take their toll.
Residential construction has already fallen, and may well slow further. But this seems likely to be offset, at least in part,
by increases in non-residential construction as businesses add needed capacity after years of sub-par spending. Solid
business profits and reserves of cash also augur well for a pick-up in business fixed investment, and recent data for
orders and shipments of capital equipment suggest such a pick-up is occurring. Productivity growth remains solid
providing some cushion for resource utilization. Financial conditions in both debt and equity markets remain fairly
accommodative, making borrowing relatively affordable and softening the impact of flattening house prices on
household wealth. Globally, growth is solid as well. U.S. exports have increased and trade is at least for now
marginally supportive of growth. Finally, the baseline forecast also sees inflation subsiding slowly, assuming no further
geopolitical or other shocks to oil prices. But more on that later. To summarize — I see growth for the next year or so
in the high 2’s, approximately full employment, and core inflation subsiding. Not a bad picture, particularly given the
challenges I mentioned a moment ago.
The next obvious question concerns risks — where are they and how likely are they to materialize? In my view, risks
have grown over the summer on both sides of this forecast. Growth could be slower or inflation could be higher and
more persistent -- or both. I take both of these risks seriously.
On the risks to growth, one obvious concern is the housing market. Trends in housing affordability and sales affect the
pace of residential construction, now over 6 percent of GDP and up from its historical average of closer to 4 percent.
The Bank’s baseline forecast assumes a continued moderate downturn in residential construction. I’m comfortable with
that baseline, but recent data on declines in starts and permits, gloomy assessments by builders, the potential for higher
mortgage rates, and increased inventories of unsold homes, remind me that this assessment could well be optimistic.
An even larger downside could result if nominal home prices actually decline, rather than flatten out as projected,
affecting household wealth and overall spending more than anticipated. Moreover, some have suggested that changes in
the ease and terms of mortgage financing spurred more than normal spending during the years of rapidly rising home
equity. By that logic, as financing costs rise and equity withdrawals decline, the resulting spending hit could be even
greater than that suggested by wealth trends.
These are serious concerns. However, I take a measure of reassurance from a number of factors. First, a fall in nominal
home prices nationwide would be quite an unusual event. We have never seen a sustained decline in nationwide home
prices in any of the more reliable price measures. Even now, as residential construction wanes, home prices, adjusted
for quality, continue to grow, albeit at a much slower pace. Second, the so-called “wealth effect” that links increases
and decreases in house prices with rises and falls in consumer spending may not be as strong as some analysts suggest.
In our estimation, the run-up in housing values over the past several years did not spur much of a bigger-than-expected
increase in consumer spending — if anything, the response was a bit on the low side compared to the historical average.
So we wonder about how large a spending effect one should expect to accompany a fall in housing prices, if that were to
occur. Clearly mortgage equity withdrawals have been sizable during the housing “boom,” but many of these
withdrawals were used to reduce other forms of consumer debt and to make one-time improvements in the housing
stock. Indeed, as a result, overall household balance sheets today continue to look fairly strong.
That is not to say, however, that rising mortgage interest rates are not negatively affecting borrowers. It also does not
mean that new types of mortgages won’t contain more than a few nasty surprises. Of particular concern are sub-prime
borrowers and perhaps some depository institutions specializing in subprime lending. Thus, there are clear risks to the
baseline housing outlook. Overall, however, I continue to think the best guess is that consumption will moderate, not
collapse, as the result of cooling housing markets, and that moderate employment growth, and moderately rising income
and non-housing financial wealth will buoy household spending.
Another concern is the recent and not very favorable trend in inflation at the headline and the core. Headline CPI and
PCE numbers (currently at 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent year over year, and 5.0 percent and 4.1 percent for the most
recent quarter) are high and rising over the near term, mostly as the result of energy prices. These energy price
increases reflect not only geopolitical shocks but also growing world demand for oil, particularly by the emerging
giants, India and China. The feed-through of higher oil prices is likely one reason why core inflation also has increased
markedly over the past months, though the breadth and persistence of that increase also suggest a role for pressures
related to overall resource utilization. The Bank’s baseline forecast assumes that if energy prices stabilize as indicated
in the futures market, core inflation will gradually subside. That is my best guess at this point and, based on inflation
expectations measured in a variety of ways, private-sector individuals, businesses, and financial markets appear to
agree. But, as others have said repeatedly, monetary policy is about risk management. A key risk is that inflation will
continue to rise or persist at high levels and embed itself in consumer and business plans. Managing that risk is clearly
important, and a matter about which central banks need to be quite vigilant – as I believe the FOMC has been and will
continue to be.
While the near term forecast seems benign, though certainly not without risks, the medium-term presents real
challenges. One of these involves the dearth of U.S. national savings, more particularly savings by households and the
federal government. Let me say a couple of words about the overall numbers, and then turn to the question of personal
savings and the retirement of today's workers. Given the demographics, the health and welfare of the consumers in this
cohort is a vital aspect of our nation's future.
As many of you no doubt know, U.S. national savings, now about 13 percent of national income, is down about five
percentage points since the late 1990s, and is lower in the U.S. than in any other major developed country. National
savings includes both private savings by households and firms, plus public savings or the net of government spending
and tax receipts. Let’s start with public saving, and the federal budget deficit — which reached $318 billion in 2005.
Relative to the overall size of GDP, the current budget situation doesn’t look all that dire; the deficit was about 2.6
percent of GDP in 2005, a decline from 2004 and relatively low when compared to the 1980s. Indeed, the fiscal deficit
as a share of GDP has declined through this year as well. But it would be a mistake, I think, to take a great measure of
confidence from this short-term trend.
One must recognize that the deficit would be much larger, 4.1 percent for fiscal 2005, if it were not for a sizable surplus
in Social Security — a surplus that is the direct result of payroll tax rates designed to prepare the Social Security system
for the surge in benefit payments that will result as baby boomers retire. By 2030, almost one in five U.S. residents will
be 65 years or older. Well before then, beginning in about 2018, Social Security will start to pay out more in benefits
than it receives from payroll taxes. Even before that, -- in the neighborhood of 2010 -- Social Security will start
exerting upward pressure on the unified federal budget deficit as its surplus diminishes, with a consequent reduction in
net public saving, absent changes in the program itself, increased taxes, or reduced spending on other government
programs.
The situation for Medicare is similar and, potentially even more serious. Payroll taxes to cover Medicare expenditures
are currently in surplus. Over time, however, Medicare spending is expected to increase more rapidly than related tax
revenues, creating a deficit problem that analysts see as potentially greater in size and more difficult to deal with than
that associated with Social Security. Thus, despite the relatively benign federal deficit we currently see, it is clear the
situation will worsen dramatically over the next decade. And, unlike the late '80s when deficits became a national
concern, there seems to be no political consensus on the nature of this problem or its resolution -- a fact that should be a
concern to all of us.
Along with the decline in public saving, the personal savings rate is now in negative territory. In the late 1980s and
early 1990s, personal saving in the U.S. was running at about 7 percent of personal income; in 1994, it dropped to 4.8
percent; by 2005 it was actually negative and remains so. A key question here is whether the U.S. consumer is saving
enough for retirement, particularly given the nature of the challenges facing Social Security and Medicare. Given the
country’s demographics, the retiring baby boomers, faced with inadequate retirement income, could impact overall
spending and place additional burdens on the government programs and tax rates. The issue is also of concern when
one considers the high stakes for low- and moderate-income consumers who face the most difficulty saving and have
the smallest margin for error. So for overall macro concerns, and distributional reasons, the question of the adequacy of
saving for retirement is key.
Now some have rightly pointed out that the National Income and Product Account’s measurement of savings on which
the personal savings rate calculation is based may not be well-suited to questions about the sufficiency of household
savings for retirement. Measured NIPA savings does not include capital gains, and thus may omit what households
consider an important component of their retirement resources.
On the other hand, there are also NIPA accounting rules that tend to overstate saving, such as the fact that interest
receipts and payments are included in nominal terms and that pension contributions to saving don’t net out the
associated future tax liability. In addition, NIPA investment excludes spending on education, which most households
surely undertake because they expect it to raise future income and add to retirement resources. So NIPA measures may
not tell the whole story about the adequacy of retirement resources, and they certainly do not address distributional
issues. But, one should not ignore the headline message -- personal savings need to grow.
Others take a different approach to measurement — one that focuses not on aggregate measures of saving but on the
retirement readiness of individual households. The Center for Retirement Research (CRR) has developed a National
Retirement Risk Index to measure the share of working-age households that are in danger of being financially
unprepared for retirement. Their findings are sobering. They report that almost 45 percent of all such households are
“at risk” of falling well short of the amount estimated to be necessary to maintain the household’s pre-retirement
standard of living. Younger households are particularly vulnerable, as are low-income households and those with
neither a defined benefit pension nor a 401(k) plan. Other studies perform similar exercises and come to similar
conclusions. A number of you may have been involved in such efforts in the course of your work.
What accounts for the gloomy retirement picture? Part of the explanation is simply that Social Security will replace a
smaller fraction of pre-retirement earnings as the normal retirement age rises from 65 to 67, assuming that people do not
delay retirement. Another important part is the shift away from defined benefit pensions to voluntary defined
contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans. Since most workers save little outside of employer-sponsored plans, they are
an increasingly important part of our nation’s retirement readiness. While 401(k)s and IRAs have the potential to work
well, they require some expertise and discipline from workers who typically must choose to enroll, decide how much to
save, and how their savings will be invested.
Although the projections are worrisome, there are a number of avenues for action. For younger households especially,
relatively small changes in savings behavior could substantially reduce the number of households at risk if they occur
early enough. Stress tests of the CRR model show that increases in the saving rate of only 3 percent among Generation
Xers could reduce the number of households “at risk” substantially. Good news, but this is a fix that is easy to prescribe
and much harder to accomplish. How do we encourage people to save more?
Good public policy can help. In that vein there may be some assistance from the Pension Reform Act of 2006 which
Congress passed in early August with broad bipartisan support. The bill is more than 900 pages long and contains some
very complex provisions, so it may be awhile before its implications are fully understood. Nonetheless, it has a number
of provisions that appear likely to increase the flow of savings into both defined benefit and defined contribution plans,
and to produce a modest increase in national saving. They include increasing the funding target for most defined benefit
pension plans from 90 to 100 percent. And they would allow 401(k) plans to automatically enroll workers; that is,
workers would have to “opt out” if they don’t want to participate.
This brings me to some encouraging developments from the emerging field of behavioral economics. Behavioral
economics attempts to incorporate insights from psychology and other social sciences into the study of economics, and
some of its insights have been particularly helpful in studying savings behavior. For example, behavioral economists
have focused on the insight that people don’t always behave in a consistent fashion over time. In other words, they
often have a hard time getting themselves to do in the short-run what they know is best for them in the long-run. This is
true when it comes to exercise and to diet — and it is also true for retirement saving. Not surprisingly, people tend to
give in to the immediate gratification of spending even though they know they would be better off in the long run if they
saved. Households end up saving less than they really intend or want.
Another psychological phenomena addressed by behavioral economists is that people sometimes become overwhelmed
when faced with a complicated decision that has many choices and options and they may respond in a counterproductive
way by procrastinating or making no decision at all. Retirement planning can be complicated and anxiety-provoking for
the person trying to figure out what to do. Some end up putting the decision off, maybe even indefinitely.
Of course many people are well aware of these difficulties and adopt strategies to help them save, such as saving by
automatic payroll deduction or using tax withholding to save over the course of a year. In essence, these are pre-
commitment devices that make it more likely that a person’s short-run impulses do not undermine their long-run goals.
Such insights from behavioral research are already helping design saving programs that deal with complexity and self
control issues. One example is adjusting the default option in a savings program — whether people have to “opt out”
versus “opt in.” People are more likely to join a 401(k) program if they are automatically enrolled and have to actively
drop out than if the default is non-enrollment and they have to decide to sign up. The new pension reform bill, by
explicitly allowing “automatic opt in” could really help companies in shaping their 401(k) programs.
Taking this a step further are programs that automatically increase 401(k) contributions with salary increases by having
staff commit to this in advance. Results from one such program showed a high proportion of those offered the plan
enroll, and the majority of those who enroll stay in at least through the fourth pay raise. Average savings rates among
participants almost quadrupled, from 3.5 percent to over 13 percent in the first 40 months of the program.
A number of researchers have suggested that simplified portfolio choices might help overcome procrastination and
encourage more people to enroll in 401(k) plans. In one study, allowing people to enroll using a preset contribution rate
and asset allocation tripled the number of new employees enrolling in the program and increased enrollment by current
employees by more than 10 percentage points. Now, these programs might also have downsides; some may feel that
they are too paternalistic or worry that they encourage people to be too conservative in their investment decisions.
But these studies are also promising, as they point the way to more research that will resolve some of the uncertainties
and help us devise even better programs in the future. Perhaps some of them will come out of the Boston Fed’s new
Center for Behavioral Economics and Decision-Making. The Center is an exciting innovation for us, as behavioral
research has potential applications to many aspects of monetary policy and bank supervision as well as savings
behavior. One new initiative from this Center is an effort by Boston Fed economist Stephan Meier to better understand
the credit problems of low-income individuals and specifically study how credit counseling can improve individual
credit outcomes. The Center also is co-sponsoring a conference with Boston University and the Research Foundation of
the Chartered Financial Analysts Society this fall on the development of new financial products and policy to address
consumer savings and investment issues.
This raises an area that is probably already apparent to all of you. That is the importance of financial literacy if workers
and households are going to be able to save effectively for retirement. Planning for retirement has always been a
complicated undertaking, requiring a fair amount of sophistication and financial skill. But a number of changes in the
economic landscape — particularly the introduction of new technology and advances in financial instruments and
institutions, along with the increased reliance on 401(k) saving — have really raised the bar on the level of
sophistication and financial literacy necessary for effective planning. More than ever, people need to be well informed
about the options they face and the potential outcomes that might arise from their decisions.
Unfortunately most assessments of financial literacy only serve to underscore how far we have to go. One 2004 survey
found that only a third of adults over 50 years of age surveyed could answer basic questions about interest
compounding, inflation, and risk diversification. Fewer than one third had ever tried to devise a retirement plan — and
of those who tried, many didn’t succeed. In another survey, more than a third of respondents could not even guess at the
amount they would need for retirement. Other studies have shown that financial literacy is a particular problem among
low-income individuals, people who are especially at risk because of limited resources.
Now again, there is some good news. We have reason to think that financial education works — that it improves
knowledge and is associated with better behavior and outcomes. For example, one study suggests that high school
curriculum mandates were effective at increasing students’ exposure to financial education and were also associated
with higher saving rates and net worth in adulthood. Others find that workplace education can increase participation in
401(k) plans and increase wealth, especially in families in the bottom of the distribution and with less education. One
study even suggests the possibility that workplace training may have social spillovers to other employees, raising
participation in savings programs even among coworkers who did not attend training.
Increasing the general level of financial literacy is also an area of special concern and involvement for the Boston Fed
and the Federal Reserve System in general. To this end, the Federal Reserve undertakes a variety of financial education
activities focused on increasing access to information about financial products and services, supporting and identifying
best practices, and collaborating with educational and community organizations to improve financial literacy. Some of
the initiatives focus on students, others on adults, and they cover a wide range of issues.
Many either directly or indirectly try to improve savings and retirement decisions. For example, at a System level, we
are active in America Saves, a campaign sponsored by nonprofit, corporate, and government groups targeted at helping
low- and moderate-income individuals and families save and build wealth. In Boston, as I mentioned, among our many
activities we are trying to better understand the credit problems of low-income people. We have also put a lot of effort
into on-line games that make learning the basic concepts of economics fun, and have developed our own "Economic
Adventure" at the Bank to teach the concepts behind rising standards of living in a hands-on way. We hope the over
12,000 students and others who visit the Adventure each year come away with an enhanced appreciation of the role their
own financial habits can play both in their personal future, and in the health of the overall economy.
U.S. national savings are a major concern. More attention needs to be directed at the potential medium term fiscal
deficit. As the economy slows over the near term, consumers could become more uncertain about the future and save
more. Indeed, most forecasts assume this will happen. But more is needed here as well. Individuals must focus more
on retirement savings, given the evolving picture of corporate benefits and the challenges facing both Social Security
and Medicare. We at the Boston Fed believe there is much that can be done to encourage more savings. Through
innovative ideas and research, we continue to learn more about how to devise savings programs in ways that encourage
people to participate and help them save more. New and better programs to more effectively reach out to improve
economic education and financial literacy can also help. We also encourage you, the country’s business economists, to
join us and look for ways to participate in this most important endeavor. In that way, we can all look forward to a better
economic future for ourselves and our country.
Related Links
Cite this document
APA
Cathy E. Minehan (2006, September 10). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20060911_cathy_e_minehan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_20060911_cathy_e_minehan,
author = {Cathy E. Minehan},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {2006},
month = {Sep},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_20060911_cathy_e_minehan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}