speeches · February 25, 1999
Regional President Speech
E. Gerald Corrigan · President
From Command and Control to Market Discipline: How Regulation Shou... https://minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/from-...
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The rapid evolution of the banking industry should concern
policymakers and regulators. To be sure, the source of the Connect
concern is not the evolution itself. That the banking industry has MinneapolisFed on Twitter
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become more consolidated, more complex and more competitive
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may well be an appropriate and efficient response to changing
market conditions and technological innovations. The trouble
arises from the interaction of these developments with our policies
to safeguard the banking system and bank depositors.
Specifically, I am concerned that the fundamental changes taking
place in the banking industry exacerbate the tendency of
government safeguards to encourage banks to take on too much
risk—the so-called moral hazard problem. This excessive risk
taking arises when the government agrees, through means such
as deposit insurance, to bear losses that firms and their creditors
normally bear. Earlier this year, an official of the Bundesbank put it
well. He said, “... the special role of banks must not be interpreted
to mean that bank boards can count on government support in
emergencies. If they could, the risk of a precarious situation in the
banking sector would increase even more. This would create a
moral hazard, which would result in banks taking excessive risk in
order to obtain higher returns, in the confidence that they could
rely on government support in the event of a failure.” Indeed,
many have argued persuasively that this distortion to the
risk/reward tradeoff was an important factor behind the savings
and loan and banking crises of the 1980s and perhaps the recent
financial turmoil in Asia as well.
Given this experience, there is a compelling need to adopt
policies that dampen the incentive to take on too much risk. In
fact, the need for regulatory reform is no longer controversial, but
deciding which reform to choose and implement is. Proposals that
rely on unfettered markets or that rely exclusively on supervision
and regulation are either not credible or are unlikely to effectively
address the underlying moral hazard problem. Nevertheless, all is
not lost. The many years spent analyzing moral hazard have also
yielded promising reform proposals that make use of market
signals. Moreover, regulators have made progress in shifting
supervisory resources to areas of banking believed to pose the
most serious threats to the deposit insurance fund. Drawing on
these plans and reforms, I propose combining market signals of
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risk with the best aspects of current regulation to discipline
effectively bank behavior.
I. Developments in the Banking Industry Will Increase
Excessive Risk Taking.
Several trends characterize the banking industry over the last two
decades, including heightened competition, increasing asset
concentration and a growing degree of complexity in bank
operations. All three trends make it more likely than formerly that
banks will respond to the existing safety net by taking on
excessive risk. Such a response raises the specter of future
economic losses, and gives policymakers and regulators impetus
to reform the safety net.
Increasing Competition and Increasing Risk
Increased competition among banks and between banks and
other providers of financial services over the last two decades has
stemmed from at least two sources. First, legal reforms such as
approval of inter- and intra-state banking and the phase-out of
interest rate restrictions on deposits reduced banks' market
power. Second, technological advances have allowed nonbank
financial intermediaries to offer products that either match or
improve upon the previously unique features of bank liabilities and
assets. Examples of these trends on the liability side of the
balance sheet are well known and include the shift in household
assets away from insured deposits toward money market mutual
funds and many other instruments. Other innovations, such as
extensive use of commercial paper funding and securitization,
have increased competition for banks on the asset side of the
balance sheet. In total, these shifts unmistakably suggest a
reduction in the value the market places on the unique aspects of
bank products and attributes, including federal deposit insurance,
and this development brings with it increased risk taking by banks.
Some point to the new technology not as an incentive for
increased bank risk taking but rather as evidence that banks are
innovating. Banks are themselves in the mutual fund business,
securitize loans and carry out valued risk management techniques
through new, off-balance sheet tools. But replacement of
traditional lending and funding sources with products and services
offered by a wide variety of financial firms does not alter the
conclusion about the decline in the economic advantages of being
a bank. In fact, when the “special features” of banks no longer
merit that designation, the value of being a bank falls. And when
the benefit of being a bank falls, managers have less to lose and
more incentive to take on risk.
Increasing Asset Concentration and Increasing Risk
Banking assets are increasingly controlled by the largest firms. In
1980, there were more than 12,000 banks in the country, with
institutions with assets greater than $10 billion controlling 37
percent of total bank assets. These figures had barely changed by
1990 but, by 1998, there were far fewer banks (8,910), with the 64
over $10 billion in assets controlling a large share of total banks
assets (63 percent). The accepted wisdom, buttressed by
econometric models, forecasts a continuation of this trend toward
consolidation.
This rising concentration has almost certainly led to more Too-Big-
To-Fail (TBTF) institutions. This matters, because policymakers
and regulators have long made clear that they will rescue the
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liability holders of the largest banks because of their fear of
contagion and systemic instability. Because of the TBTF
guarantee, liability holders do not have adequate incentive to
charge large banks higher rates when they take on more risk, and
thus TBTF banks face significantly less than optimal market
discipline; in other words, they have the incentive to take on too
much risk.
Increasing Complexity and Increasing Risk
Bank operations are also more complex, and therefore banks are
both more difficult to manage effectively and to supervise
effectively. There are several reasons for this, including:
Increased bank size and geographic reach.
Increased scope of product offerings (e.g., insurance sales,
underwriting of securities, etc.)
Increased skills needed to offer some new products (e.g.,
derivative structuring) and implement new risk management
systems that may differ radically from previous practices.
Bank supervisors have expressed concern about their ability to
effectively monitor and respond to the risk taking of the largest
and most complex banks. The calls to redraft the Basle Capital
Accord exemplify the issue. The current accord fixes a capital
charge on bank loans based on the general purpose of the loan
(e.g. mortgage loans vs. commercial and industrial loans). But the
capital charge does not vary with the probability that the specific
loan will default.
Regulators believe, however, that large banks using economic
capital models have begun to arbitrage between the amount of
capital they should hold given the financial risk of their credit
positions and the fixed regulatory capital requirements. In
practice, banks engaging in this arbitrage sell off credit positions
where regulatory capital requirements exceed economic capital
and retain positions where regulatory capital requirements are
less than the quantity of economic capital they should hold based
on risk. As a result, the banks are in full compliance with
regulatory capital standards even though the expected losses of
their portfolio exceed the capital that regulations require they hold.
Several Federal Reserve policymakers and senior staff have
argued that a capital regime based on a bank's internal models or
loan ratings is necessary to end this kind of arbitrage. Implicitly
then, they argue that examiners cannot quickly and adequately
identify capital arbitrage and end it. In other words, regulators face
a difficult time in responding to the new techniques by which large
banks assume risk.
II. Conventional Reforms Fall Short of the Mark
Analysts have devised a variety of responses to the trends just
described and their implications for moral hazard and excessive
risk taking. Some well-known reform proposals take a laissez faire
approach and advocate privatizing deposit insurance or moving to
a system of so-called “narrow banks.” Another approach focuses
attention on regulatory and supervisory initiatives. In my
judgment, these responses will not adequately address the moral
hazard problem because they are either not sufficiently credible or
not sufficiently effective.
Why Laissez Faire Responses to Moral Hazard Fall
Short
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Several reform proposals look to unfettered markets to manage
the risk-taking incentives created by the safety net. One option,
privatization, would simply eliminate the federal safety net and
with it the need for regulators to monitor banks. Instead, private
insurers would assume that role. Several large commercial banks
are the proponents of these schemes, which vary from plan to
plan but which often call for stripping deposit insurance of its
federal features, such as the full faith guarantee of the U.S.
government.
Narrow banking plans, whose features are well known, essentially
take a similar approach. The uninsured, unregulated “wide banks”
under the scheme are the same as banks under a privatized
system and have the same economic justification for their
creation. The difference is that the narrow bank would meet the
residual demand for insured deposits. The safe, transparent
assets of the narrow bank eliminate the need for existing safety
and soundness examinations and, presumably, for federal
insurance, although it could be retained if desired.
A third alternative would also rely on market forces alone to
reduce exposure under the safety net by further diminishing the
value of being a bank; this proposal might be viewed as
“accepting (or accelerating) the inevitable.” To achieve this
outcome, policymakers could, for example, provide nonbank
financial intermediaries access to services previously reserved for
banks. For example, the government could grant mutual fund
organizations direct access to the small dollar retail payment
system. In a more extreme case, the government could auction
deposit insurance coverage to nonbank intermediaries.
Competitors presumably would use new powers to increase
market share and profitability vis a vis banks and further reduce
the distinction between bank and nonbank financial
intermediation. In response, banks could give up their charters or
more likely move assets to nonbanking firms they control.
Excessive risk taking in the banking sector would become
relatively inconsequential as the portion of the banking industry
under the safety net shrinks.
A serious problem with these laissez faire approaches is that they
do not credibly address the potential for instability in the banking
system nor the related TBTF problem. The complete absence of a
federal safety net creates the potential for banking panics which
could have substantial financial and real costs, but one need not
hold this view to conclude that laissez faire reforms will fail to
reduce risk taking incentives. This is because policymakers and
regulators have long made clear that they will rescue liability
holders of the largest banks, and perhaps even smaller
institutions, because of their fear of contagion and systemic
instability. These policies raise doubts about the credibility of the
"no government support" pledge central to privatization and
narrow banking plans. As such, narrow banking and privatization
are not likely to reduce materially market expectations of bailouts
and hence the accompanying under pricing of risk. And as the
discussion suggests, the problem is particularly acute for large
institutions.
The suggestion to encourage further decline in the value of the
banking charter also lacks credibility, as it could easily produce
the very outcome it purports to eliminate. As noted above, the
decline in the value of being a bank leads, other things equal, to
more risk taking. Hence, excessive risk taking may well occur as
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further diminution in the value of the bank charter takes place. At
the same time, the proposal may magnify the exposure of the
taxpayer by potentially extending the safety net to nonbank
intermediaries.
Why Regulatory and Supervisory Approaches to Moral
Hazard Fall Short
The primary response to the pernicious incentives created by the
safety net is to regulate bank risk taking. Policymakers and bank
supervisors have both taken, and proposed, several legal,
regulatory and supervisory responses to the new trends in
banking. In total, these reforms have focused resources on banks
in poor financial condition. For example, banks in relatively poor
financial shape pay a higher deposit insurance premium.
Likewise, banks in weak financial condition face restrictions on
their activities and more frequent examinations than financially
sound institutions. And for all banks, supervisors have
implemented examination procedures which shift staff resources
to review of higher risk activities and of the banks' policies for
controlling their risk exposure. Finally, regulators have hired more
“rocket scientists,” staff with the specialized human capital
necessary to evaluate new forms of bank risk taking and
management.
All of these steps appear beneficial. But even with them, we
cannot rely solely on regulatory and supervisory reforms to
adequately contain moral hazard incentives. There are several
reasons for this conclusion, including:
Moral hazard results when economic agents do not bear the
marginal costs of their actions. Regulatory reforms would not
directly alter marginal costs.
The strength of legal and bureaucratic norms, along with the
ability of banks to alter their risk profiles quickly, makes
restricting bank activities in a timely fashion difficult.
Moreover, regulatory forbearance has occurred at times when
rapid bank closure would have been the appropriate policy.
Unfortunately, current rules meant to close banks while they
are still solvent may be incapable of achieving that outcome.
Regulators have access to “inside information” that helps
them judge the riskiness of bank activities. But government
agents do not have a sound basis for determining how much
risk taking in the banking industry is “too much” or “too little.”
Banking supervision and regulation, in other words, should
not be expected to lead to something like an efficient amount
of risk taking.
The asymmetry of information between banks and regulators
limits the effective use of internal bank practices to supervise
banks. For example, regulators cannot reasonably verify the
accuracy of bank capital models and comfortably use those
results in the regulatory process with precision.
It is unlikely that society will allocate enough resources to
regulators so that they can hire and retain quantitative staff on
a par with the firms the regulators must examine.
These observations do not argue against any of the changes to
regulation that have been made or that have been proposed.
Indeed, it is a positive step that policymakers and supervisors
have moved from a traditional command and control regime to a
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system where supervisory intensity and rules depend on the
financial condition and management of the bank. However,
regulatory steps alone are unlikely to adequately address
distortions created by the safety net. Rather, and let me
emphasize this, market signals, in conjunction with regulation and
supervision, constitute the “required discipline” that will lead to
improved management of the moral hazard problem. Note, also,
that application of internal bank capital models in supervision, an
adoption of a market practice, is not a step toward market
discipline. Market discipline requires market pricing of bank
liabilities under circumstances where participants know they bear
at least some risk of loss.
III. Incorporating Market Signals in the Regulatory
Process.
Increased market discipline is then an essential step in
addressing moral hazard. However, incorporating market signals
from creditors put-at-risk into the regulatory process requires a
credible policy framework, one which accounts for TBTF and
potential systemic instability, and which supervisors and
legislators will embrace. Further, market discipline alone has
limitations, and therefore it should be incorporated with existing
regulation. The idea, then, is to require, by law, that depositors
and other creditors at all banks, even those considered TBTF,
bear some risk of loss in the event of the failure of the institution,
and to incorporate the market signals that this policy generates
into the current regulatory regime.
What Market Signals Offer
A wide body of empirical research suggests that bank creditors,
credibly put at risk, do assess and act upon the risk taking of
banks. That is, these investors alter their pricing to reflect
changes in the riskiness of the bank. The incorporation of new
information by creditors means that market prices for bank
funding will directly affect the bank's marginal cost of taking risks.
In particular, this means that greater reliance on market signals is
potentially capable of reducing the mispricing of risk taking which
occurs today. Moreover, market participants have proven reliable
in analyzing and incorporating new means of production in their
assessment of risk, so further financial innovation can be
expected to be accommodated within this approach.
A Policy Framework With Market Signals and
Regulation
Development of a policy framework for the use of market signals
requires two steps. First, policymakers must credibly put creditors
and others capable of providing market discipline at risk of loss,
so that market signals are generated. To accomplish this
successfully, the reform must address TBTF and instability.
Second, bank regulators must explicitly and systematically
incorporate market signals into the supervisory process.
Creating Credible Market Signals Analysts have suggested
several credible methods for developing market signals. The
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis has called for amending
FDICIA so that uninsured depositors and other creditors at TBTF
institutions would lose a modest but meaningful percentage (e.g.
20 percent) of funds if their bank fails. This plan takes advantage
of the vast experience of private insurers who have long used
coinsurance to address moral hazard. In the banking context,
such coinsurance is credible because the limitation on loss size
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should preclude substantial financial spillovers, and thus the issue
of contagion should not arise. As a result, Congress and bank
supervisors would have less incentive to bailout TBTF institutions
or worry excessively about the threat of panics.
Once at risk, these uninsured creditors would demand additional
information about their banks to the degree that current
disclosures do not allow for a clear assessment of risk taking, and
so we recommend mandating additional disclosure requirements
only after assessing the data provided voluntarily under this new
regime. With increased incentive for large depositors to monitor
the quality of banks, the risk premia found in the rates charged by
such depositors and other creditors put at risk should provide
good evidence of bank risk.
A similar type of plan would, alternatively, require large banks to
issue subordinated debt equal to some small percent of the bank's
assets. Subordinated debt holders come only before equity
holders in making a claim on failed bank assets. Thus, they could
lose a significant investment if their bank becomes insolvent. This
gives subordinated debt holders incentives that regulators should
desire. The debt holders want banks to take enough risk to
generate profits, but they should demand bank closure before the
institution becomes more than minimally insolvent. The Federal
Reserve Banks of Chicago and Atlanta have been leaders in
developing these plans and, more recently, Federal Reserve
Board Governor Meyer has actively reintroduced such a proposal.
Although subordinated debt plans vary by author, their general
structure has generated more support than proposals that rely on
depositor discipline. In particular, holders of subordinated debt
cannot demand immediate repayment as can some depositors,
and therefore such plans are seen as potentially less
destabilizing. Moreover, the subordination of debt could reduce
the likelihood that holders would receive coverage during a bank
bailout.
However, there are no free lunches; the market
discipline/instability tradeoff is inescapable. The secondary market
for subordinated debt has the potential to be illiquid, in part due to
mandating the issuance of such securities in greater amounts
than currently demanded or supplied. Moreover, some
subordinated debt plans require relatively infrequent issuance of
the debt. These two traits could limit the usefulness of the market
signals provided by subordinated debt. In addition, some
subordinated debt plans are vague as to how they would address
TBTF.
Private insurance offers a third source for generating market
signals. Congress could require large banks or the FDIC to
purchase a small amount of private deposit insurance, covering 5
percent of deposits, for example. In fact, in 1991 Congress
mandated that the FDIC study the establishment of a private
reinsurance system. Financial engineers could also design
instruments to allow private investors to bear the cost of covering
insured depositors. Such instruments already exist for natural
disasters.
Either of these proposals would require market participants to
price the likelihood of a bank's failure. The effect of these
arrangements on stability depends on the confidence of the
insured creditors. If they do not believe private insurance capable
of honoring their claims, insured creditors will run banks, although
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the limited amount of risk they would bear should limit that
problem. Moreover, these insurance arrangements do not address
TBTF per se. But they could be structured such that the bailout by
the government of the liability holders of a large bank with private
insurance does not eliminate the insurer's requirement to make a
payout. As such, pricing should still reflect the risk of a claim
against the private insurer.
All of these proposals to put bank creditors at risk have the virtue
of gradual implementation, if needed. The coinsurance rate, for
example, need not rise to 20 percent at once (or ever), nor does
the required amount of subordinated debt have to meet its
maximum level at once. This should reduce concerns about
instability.
Incorporation of Market Signals Putting bank creditors at risk,
however, is not a replacement for supervision. Some portion of
large bank assets, for example, will remain opaque, leading to
incomplete information for market participants and, presumably, to
imperfect market signals. The supervisory process can generate
and act on valuable information for such assets and therefore may
contribute to restriction of bank risk taking.
More generally, the market discipline provided by creditors may
not be enough on its own to address excessive bank risk taking. If
creditors bear only a small amount of loss when banks take on
extreme levels of risk—perhaps because they are well diversified
and receive high compensating interest rates—then the perverse
incentives of the safety net would to some extent remain. More
practically, policymakers and regulators do not appear willing at
this time to create bank supervisory regimes dominated by the
market signals creditors create.
Thus, the supervisory process will continue to play an important
role going forward. In this environment, to rein in moral hazard
effectively, the signals created by the market must be incorporated
in two general areas of regulation: deposit insurance assessments
and the supervisory process.
Assessments: Under any credible reform to the safety net, the
government will continue to provide a base level of deposit
insurance. To limit moral hazard, then, the government must
charge deposit insurance assessments that vary with the riskiness
of the bank (as signaled by the market). The means of
incorporating market signals into the assessment depends on the
source. Private insurance premiums would offer the most
straightforward source for incorporation, but other market signals
would work as well. The risk premia evident from the prices
charged by depositors or other creditors put at risk of loss
suggests a way to differentiate deposit insurance pricing. In order
to reduce administrative costs, the deposit insurer would most
likely group institutions with fairly similar risk premia into
assessment categories. And the insurer would surely use market
premia as only one factor in the assessment setting process,
along with supervisory and other information that add predictive
value.
Supervisory Process: The existing regulatory system relies in part
on “triggers” which require risky institutions, as evaluated by bank
supervisors, to face more supervisory scrutiny, higher insurance
costs and more restrictions on activities than do sound
institutions. Under Prompt Correction Action (PCA), for example,
banks with declining capital ratios face increasing restrictions on
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activities until the point that regulators close them. The frequency
of bank examinations is also linked to capital ratios and
supervisory ratings of management (for smaller banks).
Incorporating market signals into these supervisory triggers would
enhance the ability of supervisors to address moral hazard. In a
fairly simple approach, supervisors could make use of the new,
risk-based deposit insurance premium groupings to sort banks
into various trigger categories. Alternatively, supervisors could put
banks into regulatory categories based on their funding costs
relative to some benchmark rate (e.g. the average rate on a
particular quality bond or the average for bank debt).
IV. Thoughts on the Future
The reforms suggested here are modest in many ways. They
maintain deposit insurance, the existing supervisory structure, and
phase in change gradually. At the same time, the reforms create
the infrastructure for future efforts. They do so by starting to
address directly the fundamental problems of moral hazard and
banking instability and by taking the first steps toward explicit
incorporation of market signals into the regulatory process. They
also give regulators and policymakers time to learn and gain
experience, thereby likely enhancing the quality of additional,
future reforms.
Why bring up future reforms on the heels of this proposal? One
answer is that the justification for regulation and the safety net
declines, and could eventually disappear, if banks continue to
become more like other financial services firms. These reforms
provide a framework for transitioning from existing regulation, to
regulation and market signals, to a system even more reliant on
the market.
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Cite this document
APA
E. Gerald Corrigan (1999, February 25). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19990226_e_gerald_corrigan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19990226_e_gerald_corrigan,
author = {E. Gerald Corrigan},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1999},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19990226_e_gerald_corrigan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}