speeches · February 8, 1999
Regional President Speech
Cathy E. Minehan · President
Global Issues in Central Banking
Cathy E. Minehan
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
The World Affairs Council
February 9, 1999
Good evening. When Marshall Goldman asked me to speak to
you, he gave me free rein in terms of topic, adding that you could be
relied upon to raise any issues I hadn't covered in the question period.
So I decided to talk about a subject of major importance to the U.S.
economy, and one which I've spent the last 30 years or so studying
first hand -- the challenges of central banking. I would argue that while
this subject has always held some fascination, in recent years it has
assumed global importance both for countries individually, and for the
economic health of the world as a whole.
Economic outcomes here and around the world are being driven,
to an unprecedented extent, by the policies and perspectives of central
banks. Once, central banks received little scrutiny; now, their goals are
the subject of public debate; their successes and failures are the focus
of the attention of both financial markets and the popular media; and
their independence is often considered the first measure of a transitional
or developing country's emergence into the modern world. Central
banks have become the primary macroeconomic game in town for many
countries, and the only game in others. Tonight, I want to share some
thoughts on why this is so, and give you my perspective on three issues
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of key importance to every central bank around the world: achieving
price stability in an environment of sustainable growth; keeping banking
systems healthy; and developing resilient payment systems.
To start, let's consider why central banks exist, and some of their
essential characteristics. Then let me suggest two reasons why global
economic trends have in essence required central banks to become so
prominent.
First and foremost, central banks are banks. They are wholesale
financial intermediaries -- banks for banks -- which act as control valves
on the amount of money and credit in an economy. Their primary task
is to ensure a country's monetary and financial stability, its ongoing
resiliency in the face of economic cycles and periodic financial
disturbances or crises. This is a complex job and not every central bank
uses the same tools to accomplish it. Central banks in one way or
another all focus on controlling inflation; many central banks, especially
in small open economies, try to manage exchange rates at least for a
time; most central banks have some insight or authority over banking
system regulation, and many, if not most, now have a hand in payment
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systems, both from a policy perspective and increasingly on the
operational side.
But successful central banks have another, common characteristic
-- a large degree of political and operational autonomy. Ensuring
monetary and financial stability often requires that tough decisions be
made in a timely way; decisions that must be made in an environment
that is as free as possible from short-term political influence.
Legislatures can and often do set long-term goals for central banks. But
the way those goals are met, and the short-run tradeoffs inherent in
achieving them, in a world of cyclical economic flows and powerful
external destabilizing forces, is generally left to the discretion of the
central bank itself, subject, of course, to norms of accountability that
apply.
I would argue that this aspect of central banks -- their autonomy -
has made them the natural focus of economic policy-making in nearly
every country. Two trends account for this heightened focus: First, the
emergence of markets as the driving force in economic behavior. And
second, the related recognition that in many countries, in part because
of the burden of existing infrastructure, fiscal policy no longer can play
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the role of a counter-cyclical policy instrument that Lord Keynes and his
followers anticipated.
For at least the past two decades, there has been an increasing
recognition worldwide that closed and government-dominated -- much
less planned -- economies do not work. Market-oriented economies
that allocate resources to their most productive use, while far from
perfect, are the best answer to the problem of ensuring a country's
growth and rising standard of living. But market-oriented economies are
prone to cycles of excess and overshooting that can be damaging to
economic growth. Central banks exist to provide at least a first line of
defense here. They are the only instrumentality of public policy that
operates in, and is a part of, markets on a daily basis. In the United
States, this involves buying and selling securities--supplying or
contracting liquidity--in the open market. In other countries, developed
and developing, the specific mechanisms can vary. For example, buying
short-term central bank deposits can provide a mechanism for affecting
liquidity and interest rates in the absence of capital markets. The
market presence and flexibility of central banks is key here. Market-
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oriented economies, and central banks, must work together effectively
to promote economic growth.
But central banks and monetary policy, while necessary, are not
sufficient for growth and stability. As recent crises in Asia, Russia and
Brazil have shown, events can overtake monetary policies--even those
policies that ex ante seemed defensible. Clearly, central banks cannot
solve every economic or financial problem.
They can create an environment conducive to economic growth if
they are successful in keeping inflationary growth low, but they cannot
on their own guarantee that result. Nor can central banks outmuscle
bad fiscal, structural, or other policies without huge costs to society.
Conversely, putting flexible monetary policy on hold--through a currency
board, for example--is not the answer to market turmoil either, at least
in my view. Currency boards may be helpful at certain times to certain
countries, but the automatic response required by their operation can be
extremely costly indeed. If market economies are the best way to
ensure world-wide growth, and I certainly believe they are, then there is
no substitute for strong, autonomous central banks, and flexible
monetary policy.
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Over the period in which market-based economies have emerged,
there has been a related diminution in the efficiency of fiscal policy that
has contributed to the influence of central banks. In the developed
world, the large social safety nets built during the 1930s, and then
expanded first after the Second World War and then during the '60s
and '70s, created an overhang in terms of both current deficits and
future liabilities, that increasingly leaves governments with less
flexibility with which to affect cyclical economic trends. Moreover,
market-based economies value savings, which are the fuel for
investment and growth. To the extent that a government is a
significant source of dissaving, markets will drive interest rates higher
and create disincentives to growth in that economy. Developed and
developing countries alike are in the process of absorbing this lesson.
Deficits are coming down, and mechanisms for channeling private
savings are the focus of attention almost everywhere.
The size of government on a world-wide basis seems on the verge
of becoming smaller in relation to global GDP, and choices are being
made everywhere to keep it smaller going forward. Some have argued,
in fact, that a basic cause of the turmoil in apparently market-driven
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Southeast Asia, Korea, and Japan, involves too much government
control over the economy, which must change if markets are to work
efficiently. This may not be to everyone's liking from a social point of
view, but it is a logical outgrowth in an increasingly market-driven and
competitive world economic climate.
Thus, central banks have become the focus of most countries'
efforts to achieve short-run economic control, and they have had a
modicum of success. But there is an inherent tension in this trend. As
economies evolve toward a market base, most are turning to more
democratic governments, with all that implies about popular
referendums and policy accountability. Central banks must be
accountable, but they cannot do this by being subject directly to
political will, for that would destroy the very independence that makes
them effective. So the issue becomes how to balance the need for
central bank autonomy with the very real obligation to be responsible
and responsive to the public. In the end, of course, the public has the
upper hand through representative governments. True failures to be
accountable can result in legal changes to limit or remove a central
bank's autonomy.
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In this country, the balance between autonomy and accountability
is achieved by frequent testimony to Congress, other forms of
legislative oversight and an increasing level of transparency about what
the Federal Reserve does. Other countries have chosen similar paths,
but whether this is sufficient at any point in time is open to question.
The fact is that the price central banks must pay for their increasingly
central role is thorough and continuing scrutiny.
Some forms of scrutiny have always existed. I can imagine that
William McChesney Martin felt "scrutinized" as he rode in LBJ's car
around the Texas ranch shortly after the Fed raised interest rates in
1965. But somehow the current level of scrutiny seems different in
both its scope and intensity. All of a sudden--or so it seems at times-
every aspect of how central banks operate is open to debate. These
debates nearly always involve some fundamental aspect of a central
bank's activities. They center most often on the three areas I
mentioned earlier--the movement toward price stability, banking system
regulation, and payment system development. Let me discuss each of
these briefly.
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Many would argue that the only goal of a central bank should be
price stability. Clearly, low rates of inflation are vital to a stable
economy. Inflation distorts economic decision-making, and accelerating
rates of inflation impede growth by creating incentives for speculative
short-term activity rather than investments aimed at long-term progress.
But the pursuit of price stability is fraught with questions. How
accurate are our measurements of inflation? How low can it realistically
go? These are issues that have prompted a lot of debate not just here
in the United States, but also around the world. And this debate is
intensified by the realization that, at least in the short term, the central
bank's policy of inflation control will affect economic growth. Clearly,
governments must be partners in answering the questions related to
achieving lower rates of inflation, but how to do so without sacrificing
central bank autonomy is a primary issue. The trend increasingly is to
favor legislatively-set targets for very low inflation rates, as measured
by indices of consumer prices, and to hold central banks accountable
for achieving that rate virtually to the exclusion of all other objectives.
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In my view, much of this emphasis on reducing rates of
inflationary growth is right on the mark. Just look at the current rosy
U.S. domestic economic scenario as proof--a 28-year low in
unemployment, millions of new jobs created, GDP growing at a pace
faster than most any forecasters predicted and few signs of inflation.
The central bank must be vigilant here--temporary factors may be a key
reason why inflation remains so low--but I think in part we may also be
reaping the rewards of more than 1 5 years of bringing inflation down
steadily through each economic cycle over that period. Businesses and
consumers alike now expect costs and prices to be relatively stable and
move to change things when that is not the case. We compete
domestically and globally more effectively now than we have since the
'60s, and this is, in part, due to the success we've had in controlling
inflation. Should the central bank keep inflation at its current very low
levels? That's an interesting question right now since given the current
state of resource utilization keeping inflation low may exact some short
term costs. For now, a good deal of monetary policy vigilance is in
order to continue the current track record.
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Now, the relative success in the United States in bringing down
inflation in an environment of relatively stable growth has by no means
exempted the Federal Reserve from scrutiny and debate. Over the past
several Congressional sessions, bills to alter the structure of the System
have been submitted; the Reserve Banks and Board remain subject to
almost constant audit and oversight by Congressional Committees, the
GAO, and both outside and internal auditors; there are demands for
increased transparency, and for adherence to strict inflationary targets
on one side, and for increased accommodation to higher levels of short
term growth on the other. There have even been suggestions that the
Open Market Committee meetings be televised on C-Span.
Certainly, the Federal Reserve System should be accountable for
its actions and should be as open about its policies and perspectives as
is consistent with a responsible discharge of its duties. However, it is
not always easy to discern how to achieve that degree of openness.
Let me raise just a few questions that arise from this debate.
Should the Fed System be much more transparent in providing
information -- or will this make already volatile markets even more so?
Should the System set a particular target for inflation, or should such a
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target be set by Congress, or will setting a target in itself create
greater rigidity in monetary policy than is desirable? And how broad
based should the central bank's activities be -- strictly limited to
monetary policy, or, as was envisioned by the original architects of the
Federal Reserve System, more broadly focused on economic stability as
well?
That brings me to the second area of world-wide debate involving
the role of central banks: how to keep banking systems healthy. I
noted before that central banks use different combinations of tools to
achieve their tasks. There are some who do not believe that it is a
central bank's job to regulate or supervise the banking system. And in
the majority of countries where bank regulation is a central bank task, it
is shared in one way or another with the Ministry of Finance or its
equivalent, providing a system of checks and balances that is often
useful.
To some extent, the "religion" of price stability among central
bankers and others has encouraged the view that any other concern -
such as bank regulation -- will cause central banks to veer off the
straight and narrow path. However, it is clearer than ever that healthy
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banking systems are a prerequisite to economic growth. We should
have learned that lesson in the late '80s and early '90s in this country.
Similarly, consider the situations of the Mexican banking system after
the peso crisis; the Argentine banking system under the combined
impact of the "tequila" effect and the rigidity imposed by a currency
board; and the banking problems in Japan and throughout much of Asia,
and the relationship of the health of a banking system to the economy's
ability to bounce back after adversity strikes becomes clear.
Banking system fragility can both raise the cost of monetary
restraint and limit the effectiveness of monetary stimulus. Healthy
banks must be a central bank concern, particularly when those banks
are of such a size and geographic reach that they could threaten
financial and economic stability. Central banks are the natural regulator
for those institutions, no matter how the overall regulatory process
might be shared. Moreover, a central bank's role in the larger economy
makes it a desirable participant in the regulatory process -- impartial,
independent, and with a breadth of perspective that a single-purpose
regulator may not have.
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Beyond the question of whether central banks should have a role
in bank supervision and regulation, how should that process occur in a
market-based economy? Clearly the trend is toward less regulation.
Regulation can create a level of bureaucratic overhead that stifles the
competitive position of a country's banking system. Moreover, as we
have seen in this country, it is difficult to keep a formalized regulatory
process in harmony with rapidly changing technology and the
emergence of many new nonbank competitors. However, strong
banking institutions are more than ever necessary; market forces can
cause some failures -- indeed here in New England we lost fully a
quarter of our banking institutions in the early '90s -- but they cannot
be allowed to undermine public confidence in the banking system. So
we try to ensure safety and soundness in the banking system.without
distorting market discipline, and without imposing undue burdens.
This process has been made more difficult by the advent of
sophisticated new financial instruments, the global geographical
presence of domestic financial institutions, and the advent of new
technology that has made possible instantaneous movement of vast
sums of money worldwide. Bank regulators used to rely at least in part
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on a review of bank records and balance sheets. They would come
away with an evaluation of liquidity, capital, asset quality, earnings and
management that were a reasonably accurate picture of the
organization for the period until the next examination, assuming that
was done within the following year or so. But now, balance sheets
change instantaneously; some of the largest exposures are off-balance
sheet, and it is less clear what level of capital or liquidity provides an
appropriate backstop. What is clear is that the process an institution
uses to manage and control risk exposure at a point in time has to be
the focus of both senior management attention, and supervisory
oversight.
Risk-focused supervision thus has become the mantra of
regulators worldwide. That must include an in-depth look at the way
risks are managed by an institution, which involves sophisticated
mathematical tools to measure value at risk and the probabilities of loss
given certain market conditions. These tools provide insights as to the
level of capital, reserves, and liquidity that are needed, but such insights
are far from precise. For that reason, I believe that supervisors must
not abandon their focus on the simple, old-fashioned controls related to
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separation of duties, frequent audits, and even required vacations for
key trading and back-office personnel. The spectacular instances of
financial difficulty -- Barings, Kidder-Peabody, Orange County, Daiwa,
just to name a few -- were all the result, not of highly complex financial
products, but of the failure of simple, common-sense controls.
Banking systems connect to the wider economy through the
payment system, the third critical function of central banks. Indeed,
payment systems have been likened to the "plumbing" of an economy,
and, like plumbing, are usually only noticed when they break down. An
example from the early '90s may help here. When Drexel Burnham
failed, it held a large trading portfolio of GNMA securities, which at that
time were traded in paper form. To complete a trade, the holder of the
security had it physically delivered to the trading partner, and took a
receipt for the security. Then, later in the day, funds would be
transferred to cover the trade. In the Drexel case, trading partners lost
confidence that funds would be forthcoming, and refused to deliver
securities. Drexel, in turn, could not deliver out what it didn't have and
gridlock occurred -- gridlock that over a short period grew to represent
about a $2 billion overhang on the market. And it wasn't just Wall
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Street that was affected -- school districts, trust funds, and small
communities all had GNMAs in their portfolios, or were awaiting funds
from selling them, and the gridlock caused by Drexel affected many of
these investors.
The solution to this crisis was to implement a system that
increased the confidence of Drexel trading partners that either money or
securities would reliably be there if trades were completed. The Federal
Reserve Bank of New York developed a temporary "Rube Goldberg"
process to provide that assurance, but ultimately a private-sector
purchaser acquired the portfolio and gradually the gridlock eased. But
this was a clear instance in which payment systems were less than
resilient in a time of financial crisis. And this was also a case, I would
argue, that central bank hands-on expertise in the payments system
was invaluable, both in recognizing the problem and in working to
resolve it.
The particular problem related to GNMA securities couldn't happen
again, because they are no longer traded in paper form, and the delivery
of the security electronically is tightly coupled with the movement of
money. However, there are countless potential issues facing the
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payment system, and central banks must be deeply involved in them.
Traditionally, the Federal Reserve has had more of an operational, as
well as a policy making role in the payment system than have most
other central banks. But this is rapidly changing, especially in the
electronic, wholesale systems that transfer funds from one financial
institution to another. These so-called real-time, gross settlement
systems typically rely on intraday central bank credit, collateralized or
uncollaterialized, and provide for instantaneous central-bank-guaranteed
finality -- the best measure of security for both the sender and receiver
of the payment. The development of these new systems is underway
everywhere -- in Britain, Australia, in the European Monetary Union, and
in almost every developing and transitional country. And they are
clearly the province of central banks.
As you may expect by now, this development is not without
debate. Large financial institutions, particularly global institutions, have
long made sizeable profits from the transactions and credit involved in
payment systems. Moreover, these institutions have benefited from the
large net settlement systems -- such as CHIPS here and CHAPS in
London -- which they helped develop and operate. Net settlement
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systems can be highly efficient, particularly for large-volume players,
but they are also less transparent and more subject to problems if there
is a loss of confidence in a particular institution. Through concerted
international effort by both central banks and the financial institutions
themselves, netting systems have been made more resilient, and they
undoubtedly will continue to play a large role even as the central-bank
sponsored, real-time systems become more prevalent. But the tension
between the two will undoubtedly remain.
In the United States, a second form of tension between the
private and public sector also exists. Reserve Banks play a role not only
in wholesale payments, but in retail as well, collecting checks and
providing cash. They do so as providers of services, as the catalysts
for change, and as regulators. Is there any central bank purpose in
doing so, a purpose sufficient for the regional Fed Banks to be willing to
defend this activity in the constant barrage about the power and
influence of the central bank? I think so, and I also believe that without
Reserve Bank involvement, this country's retail payment system would
not be as effective as it is today, nor will the challenges inherent in
improving it in the future be as easily met.
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Such challenges are not inconsequential: Over 64 billion checks
are written and collected each year in this country, a vast tide of paper
that should be converted to electronics. How can incentives be created
so that this occurs? What are the risks and opportunities presented by
electronic cash, and how should its provision be regulated, if at all?
What about virtual banks -- are there safety and soundness issues if
reliance for payments is placed on non-bank service providers in a
process that literally runs on credit? The Federal Reserve must play a
role in addressing these and other questions and its ongoing operational
presence in the payments system will help it in doing so. But I confess
to some bias here.
In closing, let me return to my original point: Central banks have
become the primary intermediate-term macroeconomic policy makers, in
the U.S. and most everywhere else. Central banks, whether by design
or default, have more influence. It follows, therefore, that they must
also be subject to higher standards of accountability. Accountability is
one thing, however; political control is quite another. The goals of
achieving price and financial stability, which are shared by all central
banks, can only be achieved by those banks having a fair degree of
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autonomy. But this independence must be earned by central banks
through the effectiveness and integrity with which they discharge their
responsibilities.
Cite this document
APA
Cathy E. Minehan (1999, February 8). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19990209_cathy_e_minehan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19990209_cathy_e_minehan,
author = {Cathy E. Minehan},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1999},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19990209_cathy_e_minehan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}