speeches · January 19, 1998
Regional President Speech
E. Gerald Corrigan · President
The Expansion Going Forward | Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis https://minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/the-expa...
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Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to have this opportunity to
Independent Reviews
discuss the economic outlook in broad terms and to address Banking in the Ninth
several public policy issues which bear on it. Of course, an
appreciation of the economy's prospects requires an
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understanding of both recent performance and current conditions,
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so I will begin with a brief recap of our experience over the past Minneapolis Fed on Facebook
several years. Next, I will peer into the future and hazard a view RSS Feeds
on the course of the economy through 1998. Finally, I want to
raise three policy issues which may affect our performance and
prosperity in both the near and longer term. These issues are the
relation between wages and prices, the implications of
developments in Asia for our domestic economy, and the origins
of Asia's banking problems.
Let me begin with the economy. As is now well recognized, the
U.S. economy has turned in a remarkably positive performance
over the past seven years, following the end of the 1990-91
recession. Gains in employment and output have been
substantial, productivity improvement has accelerated in recent
years, inflation has diminished, and financial markets have been
strong. Moreover, virtually all sectors of the economy and all
regions of the country have participated in a meaningful way in
the expansion. Our record over this period looks particularly
favorable in comparison with that of many of the other major
industrial economies and that, in itself, is noteworthy because it
was not very long ago that many were predicting that Japan or
Western Europe or whoever would soon surpass us economically.
In any event, we clearly have had an extended period of
well-balanced, reasonably rapid growth, and one issue to confront
in considering the outlook is whether this momentum and these
favorable trends will continue. The general answer to this
question, in my view, is yes, in that I think that the economy will
continue to expand in 1998, although probably not at a pace
comparable to last year. Let me review the analytics and the
arithmetic underpinning this judgment.
On the supply side of the economy—its capacity to produce
goods and services—growth is determined in the short run by
expansion in employment and the productivity of employees. (I'll
take up the demand side shortly.) In the current environment, with
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the economy operating at essentially full employment,
employment growth will necessarily be limited eventually by the
expansion of the labor force, which in turn depends largely on
demographic factors; such factors suggest labor force growth of
about one percent per year.
This arithmetic deserves some further explanation. When
operating at high rates of employment, as our economy
undeniably is, future increases in employment are necessarily
limited largely by the expansion of the labor force, that is, the net
increase in the number of people available to work. Absent a
change in immigration policy, this number in turn is largely
determined by demographic factors—the difference between
those who become old enough to enter the labor force and those
who choose to leave it. To be sure, there is some short-term
flexibility, in that people may choose to work longer hours, take
second or third jobs, enter the labor force earlier or stay longer,
but ultimately these options are exhausted and the demographics
prevail.
Productivity, the second determinant of growth of aggregate
supply, is more difficult to get a handle on. It is challenging to
measure productivity accurately and, recently, it has not been
conforming to previous cyclical patterns. But a reasonable
expectation for 1998 would be productivity improvement of one to
two percent for the year. While I am comfortable with this range, it
is probably optimistic relative to the expectations of the majority of
the forecasting community. In any event, taken together—that is,
employment gains plus productivity—supply side considerations
suggest overall economic expansion of two to three percent in
real terms this year.
But, what of the demand side? If growth of demand surpasses
that of supply, pressure on capacity could mount, resulting in
inflationary pressures. Alternatively, if demand falls short, excess
capacity could start to emerge. Within a reasonable range of
tolerance, I suspect that growth of supply and demand are likely
to be in balance this year, implying aggregate real expansion in
the two to three percent range and little appreciable change in
capacity pressures. As the economy is about to enter its eighth
year of expansion, this performance, if realized, would seem fully
satisfactory.
At this point, some might object that even if I am right about the
general trends in economic activity, labor markets are already so
tight—both regionally and nationally—that accumulating wage and
price pressures are inevitable this year. I readily agree that wage
increases, and compensation more generally, is likely to
accelerate in response to labor market conditions, but such gains
need not necessarily translate into inflation. There are more
"degrees of freedom" in the wage-price relation than frequently
appreciated, which may explain why the relation does not appear
to be an especially robust one empirically. For example, the
inflationary consequences of compensation increases can in
theory be offset by productivity gains, reductions in nonlabor
costs, narrowing profit margins, or some combination of these
developments. The point is that one should not jump uncritically
from a forecast of wages to a conclusion about prices.
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Are there other factors which could derail this favorable outlook?
Until fairly recently, concern seemed to focus on the possibility
that growth in demand would outpace that of supply this year,
raising the spectre of an acceleration of inflation. Many who
anticipated this scenario expected the Federal Reserve to
respond with a more restrictive monetary policy and attendant
upward pressure on interest rates. Such a response, it was
expected, would restrain the interest rate sensitive components of
aggregate demand and, if calibrated appropriately, keep the
dimensions of the expansion of demand commensurate with that
of aggregate supply. Of course, it was never certain that the
calibration would be precisely correct or that the economy would
respond as anticipated, nor could the reaction in financial markets
be foretold with complete confidence. Certainly, something could
go wrong.
Developments in Asia appear to have changed this calculus,
however. Now, it is anticipated that US exports and domestic
industries facing significant competition from imports will be
restrained by weakness in Asian economies and currencies,
relieving, at least to some extent, concerns about demand
pressures. In these circumstances, many believe it more likely
that expansion of supply and demand will attain a rough balance,
and therefore that it is less likely than formerly that monetary
policy will become overtly more restrictive.
Admittedly, the ramifications of the Asian situation are difficult to
assess. It is not yet known how far the damage might spread or
how severe it may be. Indeed, the extent of the difficulties in
Japan is still coming to light, years after they first appeared. But
even if we knew the extent and severity of the Asian problem,
accurately estimating the implications for the US economy would
be a formidable challenge. This may sound like a cop-out, but I
think it is, rather, an honest admission of the limitations of our
knowledge about such issues, for which there is, in fact, little
historical precedent.
Some have gone further than considering Asia's impact on US
economic performance and have begun to worry that Asia's
troubles could precipitate worldwide deflation in the price of
currently produced goods and services, particularly if the global
spillover effects are greater than currently expected. To be sure,
one can imagine demand or supply shocks of sufficient magnitude
to produce a temporary decline in prices. But sustained deflation
—continuously falling prices of goods and services—requires the
acquiescence or encouragement of monetary policy, for deflation,
just like inflation, is ultimately a monetary phenomenon. That is to
say, sustained deflation is unlikely unless monetary policy officials
here and abroad permit it, and there is no reason to think that they
are willing to do so.
My principal concern about Asia at this juncture takes another
form. The current financial crisis in several Asian economies
demonstrates once again the consequences of inadequate market
discipline in financial affairs. I am referring, explicitly, to the moral
hazard problem which results when bank creditors have
insufficient incentive to price risk taking, thus permitting banks to
take on excessive risks. Unfortunately, we have seen this before
in Asia (and elsewhere), and this latest episode reminds us
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forcefully of the urgency of addressing the issue. I should add that
insufficient market discipline is not, of course, the only factor
contributing to financial difficulties in some Asian economies.
I am not today going to review proposals designed to correct
moral hazard. Instead, I want to convince you that the issue is
significant in its own right and that it may have serious
implications for economic performance. To be sure, government
deposit insurance has stabilized the banking system and, at least
in the US, widespread banking panics are unknown since the
1930s. But stabilization comes with a cost, especially if it is
perceived that there is a too-big-to-fail policy protecting all
depositors and other creditors of large institutions. In these
circumstances, depositors do not require an adequate risk
premium and banks, therefore, have an incentive to invest in risky
projects. Banks may also be insufficiently sensitive to exchange
rate and interest rate risk in these circumstances. In short, deposit
insurance encourages the misallocation of resources by
contributing to excessive risk taking by financial institutions.
These are not just theoretical concerns; occasionally these
chickens come home to roost. For example, the Presidential
commission established to investigate the origins and causes of
the savings and loan disaster in the US in the 1980s noted that
the moral hazard of deposit insurance was "the 'necessary
condition' for the debacle" and the "fundamental condition
necessary for collapse." Examination of the banking crises of the
1980s and earlier in the 1990s in Asia and other parts of the world
by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the
Bank for International Settlements, among others, singled out the
moral hazard of government depositor protection as a major
culprit. And in 1991, in its recommendations for bank reform
legislation, the US Treasury pointed to the "over expansion of
deposit insurance" as a fundamental cause for the exposure of
taxpayers to "unacceptable losses" as a consequence of bank
failures.
Thus, respected international organizations, a Presidential
commission, and the US Treasury all emphasize the costly
consequences of depositor protection carried to excess. Clearly,
moral hazard results in resource misallocation and, in some
cases, substantial burdens on taxpayers. But the issue is even
more important, for a recent study (Ross Levine, "Financial
Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda," Journal
of Economic Literature, 35 (2), 1997) persuasively makes the
case that inadequate or incapacitated financial markets and
institutions inhibit economic growth. Based on evidence from a
large number of countries, the study states that "... the functioning
of the financial system is vitally linked to economic growth.
Specifically, countries with larger banks and more active stock
markets grow faster over subsequent decades even after
controlling for many other factors underlying economic growth.
Industries and firms that rely heavily on external financing grow
disproportionately faster in countries with well-developed banks
and securities markets than in countries with poorly developed
financial systems." Damage to a country's banks, and to its
financial infrastructure more generally, may well damage its
growth prospects. It is imperative, therefore, to introduce
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incentives to contain moral hazard and to deal with banking
problems, once they arise, as expeditiously as possible.
This policy recommendation is as relevant to the US as
elsewhere. Despite the reforms of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, I am concerned
that the moral hazard problem as it pertains to large banks has
not yet been effectively addressed in our country. Until it is, our
banking system remains subject unnecessarily to this incentive
problem.
In concluding, let me briefly summarize the points I have tried to
emphasize. First, as recent data demonstrate, the domestic
economy begins the new year in excellent condition, and it seems
likely that many of the favorable trends of the past seven years
will continue. Thus, overall I expect further real growth
accompanied by modest inflation. There are, to be sure, risks to
this outlook, risks that have their origins in unusually tight
domestic labor markets on the one hand and in the disarray in
Asian financial institutions, markets, and economies on the other.
Because in some ways unprecedented, these risks are difficult to
assess; but, in view of the sheer size and diversity of our
economy, it may well weather these squalls with only minor
turbulence.
It is important, though, that we understand both the nature and the
consequences of the financial problem engulfing parts of Asia. As
we have seen before, both here and abroad, moral hazard distorts
incentives, resulting in excessive risk taking and, ultimately, in a
significant if not severe financial correction. And history
demonstrates that growth is adversely affected when the financial
system is disrupted and contracts. While moral hazard is certainly
not solely responsible for the current, or former, financial turmoil, it
is an issue that can and should be addressed if we are serious
about attaining over time maximum sustainable economic growth
here and abroad.
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Cite this document
APA
E. Gerald Corrigan (1998, January 19). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19980120_e_gerald_corrigan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19980120_e_gerald_corrigan,
author = {E. Gerald Corrigan},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1998},
month = {Jan},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19980120_e_gerald_corrigan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}