speeches · February 21, 1996
Regional President Speech
Jack Guynn · President
Speeches
Reevaluating Approaches to Regulation
Remarks by Jack Guynn
President and Chief Executive Officer
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Financial Markets Conference
Coral Gables, Florida
February 22, 1996
Good evening! I'm really pleased to welcome each of you to this conference on financial markets. As the new president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, I
couldn't be happier than to be presiding over this important convocation that brings together practitioners, regulators, and academics to discuss financial markets and
related public policy issues. During the past five years, we have attracted more and more of the best minds in finance to this conference--thanks in large part to the
efforts of former Atlanta Fed officers Sheila Tschinkel and Curt Hunter, both of whom are with us tonight. I'd like to thank them for their past efforts and also to thank
those current officers and staff members of the Atlanta Fed who are continuing the hard work to keep this conference on the cutting edge.
Tonight, I'd like to discuss the regulatory aspect of financial markets. While doing so, I'll evaluate both some old approaches to regulation and some new ones.
Although I recognize that the old paradigm of regulation worked well in a stable world, it's no longer completely suitable in today's dynamic world. As financial markets
have become marked by rapid change and uncertainty, we can't just update parts of our regulatory approach that are essentially fixed or static--and even
capital-based procedures fall into this category. The important point I would like to make is that we--and the "we" here refers not only to bank regulators or to financial
regulators more broadly, but to firms in the industry as well--we must open our minds to new ways of achieving our ongoing goal. Together, we must find the best
public policy approaches for today's financial markets--approaches that will promote efficiency, flexibility, and innovation while still keeping the overall financial system
safe and sound.
It might help to think of regulatory approaches as an evolutionary process on two tracks: one track going from static to dynamic and the other from piecemeal to
holistic. At one end of that continuum are the bank supervision practices of several decades ago. That was a time when examiners focused on verifying assets and
measuring credit losses at the time of an exam. This snapshot approach worked satisfactorily in a static environment that was marked by a fair degree of certainty.
The past 10 years represent the middle range of the continuum. This has been a time when a new set of circumstances has demanded a new way of thinking. We
have learned that static measures of risk and capital can't capture the whole panoramic picture in the new era of dynamic financial markets. Therefore, we've moved
toward analyzing the risk management process at banks. As we evolve, we're moving fastest toward a more dynamic and goals-oriented approach for those parts of
banks that deal in tradable securities. Looking forward and trying to guess where our evolution might take us, I would think that we might learn how to apply this goals-
oriented approach to all other bank operations as well. Naturally, I recognize that we don't yet have the capability to apply such an approach to a bank as a whole. But
I don't believe that this current limitation should stop us from being open to new ideas in regulation.
BANKS AS A MODEL FOR REGULATION OF RISK
In my remarks tonight, I'll cover three areas: How we used to regulate, how we do it now, and how we might do it in the future. As a prelude to
discussing possibilities for the future, let me set the context by recalling the time before the 1970s--a time when banks played a larger part in credit
markets than they do today.
In those days, legislation restricted permissible activities to a narrow field and set clear limits on the fees and rates that banks could charge and pay.
Legislators, however, didn't go so far toward regulating the regulators. As a result, bank examiners could exercise a certain amount of discretion when
reviewing banks' activities. Change in positions and risks was relatively slow. Credit risk predominated. Interest rate risk and market risk were
considered to be of secondary importance. Examiners spent their time testing mainly for credit quality and the capital adequacy of the lender. They
didn't expect institutions to change quickly. Deposit insurance and Fed policy limited catastrophic losses, at least for banks and their depositors. In short,
regulators monitored and exercised their judgment. And if a bank didn't meet regulatory standards, regulators might examine the bank more frequently
or make good use of other forms of "supervisory attention" and its associated costs to discipline the bank.
Then came more than a decade of profound and interrelated changes. These included high inflation followed by significant disinflation, some
deregulation of depository institutions, increased competition between bank and nonbank financial intermediaries, rapid intellectual and technological
innovation, and the increasing internationalization of financial markets. The financial services industry was battered by these changes. The savings and
loan crisis, as well as the sharp increase in bank failures and portfolio problems, reflected this battering. All these developments combined to move
Congress to put in place more stringent regulations for the financial services industry. Legislation, like parts of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), encouraged a substantially more intense level of supervision and regulation.
HOW REGULATION IS EVOLVING -- THE 1990s AND BEYOND
Banks have evolved in response to market pressures nonetheless. For instance, as this conference highlights, they've dramatically expanded their
portfolio of tradable claims. Interest rate risk and credit risk that previously couldn't be unbundled are now routinely unbundled. Even traditionally
nontradable assets, such as credit card receivables, are being securitized.
So here we are in the middle of the 1990s with a good deal of overhang from what I regard as overly detailed legislation and regulation. At the same
time, we've come to realize that regulators are always going to have a difficult time keeping up with technology and market innovations. One major
reason for the inevitability of this lag is that there are so many more resources--and much greater upside gains--available to practitioners as compared
with regulators. Fortunately, regulation is already evolving, and it will continue to evolve in response to changes in financial markets. For example, at the
Fed, we're increasing the focus on banks' internal risk management.
More generally, the risk-based capital proposal for assessing market risk in trading accounts exemplifies the regulatory evolution. The current internal
models approach was adopted late last year for implementation over the next several years. Banks with active trading accounts already have risk
management models that calculate value at risk, or VaR. This internal models approach seeks to take advantage of banks' models to determine
appropriate capital set-asides. It does so by using a multiple of VaR to determine the level of capital that has been set aside in order to protect against
trading losses.
One of the appeals of this method is that it addresses criticisms of regulatory micromanagement. Clearly, relying on banks' own internal models is a
giant step--a giant step away from inflexibility, rigidity, and a one-size-fits-all premise. The internal models method is a solid indication of the evolution in
regulatory thinking. Where is this evolution headed? Toward more flexible oversight, toward significant self-determination for banks. Yet, at the same
time, there will continue to be an important role for supervisors. Examiners will continue to review the effectiveness of banks' risk management on an
ongoing basis.
STRATEGIC DIRECTION
Needless to say, the internal models approach has been a big shift for the Fed (and other regulatory authorities abroad). Nonetheless, I hope we can
progress beyond that point. There are a few ideas that have already been talked about that might prove to be useful in the future. One such idea that's
been proposed is the precommitment approach. This concept, in some senses, parallels the idea behind the procedures used by the Fed in daylight
overdrafts. The Fed's system for handling daylight overdraft risks gives institutions a major say in determining their own debit limits on Fedwire. It also
penalizes them for exceeding these limits. The daylight overdraft system has been phased in since the late 1980s, and it seems to be working
reasonably well. The precommitment approach attempts to bring this same kind of thinking to market risk in banks' trading accounts.
The precommitment approach is a proposal that would allow banks to specify the maximum expected loss over a given period and to set aside an
amount of capital based on this level. Trading losses exceeding this amount would subject the bank to a penalty regime. Regulators wouldn't dictate the
modeling methodologies that underlie the precommitment levels. Supervisors would, however, review the models.
This method has a number of potential advantages. The main one is that, properly designed, it would align a bank's incentives with regulatory goals. It
would also reduce the importance of regulators' reviewing the accuracy of internal models and VaR calculations. Examiners could shift their focus
instead to observing a breach of the precommitment levels. Information about such a breach might be made known to the public in the interests of
generating additional market pressure. Of course, the integrity of the bank's underlying risk management model could be periodically scrutinized as part
of the examination process. In addition, this precommitment approach would avoid the incentive for banks to engage in so-called gaming of the model,
for example, by using models they know tend to underestimate their exposure to risk.
Naturally, there are potential problems as well. It would be necessary to create a penalty that would be strong enough. It would have to be a credible
deterrent to keep a bank from under-reporting its risk exposures through the precommitment level. Setting the right penalty isn't a trivial challenge.
Penalties would need to be structured to avoid compounding problems for individual banks that are experiencing unexpected losses. In a closely related
vein, penalties would also have to be structured to avoid leading, in extreme circumstances, to systemic problems. The feasibility of doing so deserves
more research. This topic is currently being studied and discussed in the Federal Reserve System and elsewhere.
THE CHALLENGE AHEAD
So where do we go from here? First, I think we'll need to keep a range of regulatory approaches. Traditional approaches may be suited to situations
when risks need to be limited in advance. This is true even though these traditional approaches may impose costs on many financial activities that are
important to banks in the 1990s. The Barings case immediately comes to mind as an example of a situation when effective regulatory encouragement of
stronger internal controls might have made a difference.
Second, I'm the first to acknowledge that incentives-based approaches have their limits as well. Markets differ in liquidity. Consequently, they also differ
in their capabilities to provide independent checks on prices and to allow for trading out of risk exposures. Where reasonably accurate valuation is
possible, it seems that regulations could focus on performance measures. Sometimes, though, performance or valuation information is likely to be
tenuous. In those cases, procedural regulation might continue to be more appropriate.
On the whole, however, I believe that regulation based on incentives applied in appropriate situations warrants further study and debate. I hold to this
belief, in part, because such an approach may help us to transcend the vicious cycle in which we find ourselves. We all know what this cycle is:
legislators and regulators write elaborate rules to circumscribe banks' activities. This body of statutes and regulations, in turn, prompts banks to find
convoluted and inefficient ways to conduct their business. These legal maneuverings are deemed necessary in order to compete and survive. If
regulators can find effective ways to focus on the results of banks' decisions, then banks should have substantially less incentive to find ways around
regulations.
Overall, though, as I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, these incentives-based approaches can now be applied only in a piecemeal fashion to
certain parts of financial institutions. But a bank's total risk is not merely the sum of its parts. The next logical evolutionary step of regulation would be
toward looking at the financial institution as a whole rather than piece by piece. Along these lines, I hope for a time when perhaps we can move away
from an accounting measure of capital ratios to a test of viability based on the riskiness of future earnings. A change like this in our way of thinking
would move us from a static point of view to one that is dynamic.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I'm challenged to evolve in my thinking as a regulator rather than to remain static. At the same time, though, I challenge each of you to
help to formulate approaches to regulation that will keep our financial markets vibrant yet safe, innovative yet sound. Only by sharing the creativity we all
have and by advancing the debate can we develop a new paradigm of risk management that will serve our shared purposes. Thank you for being with
us for this conference. I look forward to learning a lot, to being stretched into new ways of thinking, and to coming away with some solid ideas about
where we need to go next. I hope you, too, find the information you take away from here to be both useful and provocative.
CONTACTS
Jean Tate
404-498-8035
Cite this document
APA
Jack Guynn (1996, February 21). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19960222_jack_guynn
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19960222_jack_guynn,
author = {Jack Guynn},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1996},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19960222_jack_guynn},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}