speeches · February 5, 1996
Regional President Speech
Cathy E. Minehan · President
THE NET, CYBER-MONEY AND THE RISKS
Cathy E. Minehan, President
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
The World Bank Group
Washington, D.C.
February 6, 1996
NOT FOR REPRODUCTION
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Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. It is indeed a pleasure for
me to be here today and to participate in this symposium. I cannot
envision a more timely--or more important--theme than risk reduction in
the payments system. And my particular topic--the impact of changing
technology on central bank concerns about risk--occupies no small
amount of my time as I consider some of the strategic challenges
facing the Federal Reserve System.
From our perspective the pace of change--particularly
technological change--has never been greater. Smart cards, electronic
checks and various electronic money alternatives, combined with the
emergence of extensive, broadly accessible, communications facilities
such as the Internet are rapidly expanding the choices available for low
value, or "retail" payments. Similarly, in the "wholesale" payments
arena, new and enhanced communications, trading, clearing, and
settlement systems are forging linkages among growing numbers of
institutions. And these institutions participate in diverse markets in
both developed and developing countries, creating a truly global
marketplace for financial services.
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New technology, or more precisely, the application of new
technology to the business of payments, is giving rise to a wide range
of new and interesting payment alternatives. We all recognize our
increasing use of technology in the payments business but we may not
have recognized as well our increasing reliance on technology. There is
at least a chance that the technology genie, once released from its
bottle, may become the master rather than the servant, without some
care on our part.
In that regard, it's tempting to look at the proliferation of
technology and service providers in the retail arena with an attitude
quite unlike that with which we have addressed wholesale systems
over the past two decades. There are, after all, relatively small values
involved, the potential for great efficiency is sizeable, and the risks to
the casual observer seem low. However, I think such an approach
would be foolhardy if not dangerous. In my remarks today, I will
consider a few of the new retail alternatives against the experiences of
the last 20 years and suggest five lessons that should guide us in
payment system development, whether retail or wholesale, as we
capitalize on the advances provided by technological change.
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There is no doubt that applications of technology to the business
of payments can be a double-edged sword, bringing efficiency and
increased service levels but also holding the potential for unanticipated
results and increased risk, particularly in times of stress in the financial
markets. Developers rush new technology to the marketplace in an
attempt to "be there first" to attract new business. Users are quick to
adopt the new technology for fear of relinquishing competitive
advantage. Systems proliferate with inherent levels of complexity that
can exceed our ability to manage or even understand them. This rapid
introduction and adoption of new technology, and particularly the speed
at which it is occurring, often precludes analysis of the potential
impacts, intended or unintended, of the new technology. And while
technology may increase efficiency, it does not necessarily eliminate-
and in fact sometimes increases--the risks inherent in the payments
system. A brief examination of the evolution of large value transfer
systems should illustrate this point.
In the 70s and early 80s, technology was applied to payment and
clearing systems with a vengeance. Automated payments processing
and communications systems, such as Fedwire and CHIPS in the U.S.
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experienced phenomenal growth in the numbers of on-line participants
and in the volume and value of transactions processed. Bigger
computers were linked using faster networks to carry increasing
numbers of payments to more and more participants at ever increasing
speed.
Throughout this period it seemed that "bigger" and "faster"
meant "better." And, in many ways, this was true. However, our
ability to deliver payment instructions and securities transactions
outpaced our ability to achieve final settlement for these transactions.
Payment instruction delivery was essentially real-time for on-line
institutions, but final settlement--the actual posting of entries to
participants' settlement accounts--was typically an end-of-day (or next
day) processing activity. Even in systems that settle with each
transaction--so called real time gross settlement systems like Fedwire-
payment transfers were completed without regard for balances on
hand. As a result, the amount of intra-day credit--or what is called
daylight overdrafts--incurred by payments system participants grew at
a staggering rate. The technology genie was not only out of the bottle,
it was also out of control.
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Similar applications of technology to the securities and foreign
exchange markets increased both the volume and the velocity of
turnover in these markets. The time lag between the initiation and
ultimate settlement of securities and foreign exchange transactions
often was even greater than the time lags in settlement of most pure
payment transactions. As a result, the temporal risk incurred by market
participants was greater as well.
As the 70s gave way to the 80s, countries around the world
began to take note of the growing risk inherent in their payments
systems. Isolated payment system problems during the 70s and the
losses that resulted served to focus the attention of commercial banks
and central banks on the problems of risk. Payment system risk was
not created by technological change, but such change did increase the
levels of risk and make risk control more difficult.
By the mid-80s, however, technology was being applied to
improve risk control in domestic payments systems. Sophisticated
software systems were developed to measure risk as a first step
toward controlling it. With some prompting from regulatory authorities,
risk management software began to be integrated with and operated as
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part of the payment system applications. Real-time balance monitoring,
net debit caps and bi-lateral limits are all examples of automated risk
management controls made possible by creative application of
technology in wholesale payments systems. But it has taken us some
twenty years to start to regain control of the technology genie in our
wholesale payments business. It is possible we could be poised to
repeat this process in the retail payments arena.
We are seeing a migration of sophisticated technology to the retail
payments sector, and the possibility of the integration of the two
aspects of the payment system--retail and wholesale--in ways never
possible before. In the automated clearing house or ACH area,
movement to an increased number of daily cycles, and ultimately to
processing batches on a flow or "on-demand" basis creates a real
technological alternative for the smaller, less time-sensitive payments
now made on Fedwire. The retail payments sector has also broadened
out of bank-owned networks into much wider areas that are openly
accessible to consumer initiators of payments. These new electronic
access options are generally of two types: those that use a debit card
and those that depend upon "smart" card technology to store value.
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Debit cards have made considerable progress using traditional
networks developed by VISA and Mastercard as well as proprietary
bank systems like NYCE or MAC, but they have the potential for even
broader use, independent of these systems and networks, when
combined with use of the Internet for electronic authorization. Similarly
"smart" card technology is now being used to store electronic "notes"
authorized by the card-holder's bank that can be used to transfer value
between banks, consumers, and merchants. These electronic "notes"
flow over the Internet and provide authorization for funds to be
withdrawn from a bank account and paid to another party
electronically. Other systems take this concept a little further by
allowing the card holder to transfer value to other cards or to a system
operated by the seller to receive those payments. This can come close
to being a new form of currency in that the potential exists for the
value on the card to remain in circulation, transferring from card to
card, and one endpoint to another, without necessarily being converted
to a more traditional form of money.
More traditional banking services are being offered electronically
as well. "Virtual banks" are being formed using the Internet in place of
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traditional brick and mortar infrastructure, accessing services provided
not only by multiple banking organizations, but also from a wide variety
of financial and nonfinancial institutions. An interesting, and perhaps
troubling, aspect of this development is the emergence of non-banks as
major providers of banking and payment services. In the U.S., major
software providers such as Intuit, Microsoft, and Netscape are battling
for market share in the potentially lucrative market of online banking
services. Some banks are forming alliances with these new players;
others are developing their own proprietary systems. Who will emerge
as the dominant player(s) remains to be seen. Just as uncertain is
what the principal network will be.
The Internet has many advocates, and just as many detractors
when it comes to its suitability for payments. The Internet is free; no
one owns it; no one oversees, controls or secures it. The very aspects
that make the Internet so flexible and foster its incredible growth,
however, make it less than ideal for payments. For every "expert" who
claims that achieving adequate security on the Internet is simply a
matter of applying the appropriate technological solution there is one
who states the Net will never be secure enough for payments. In my
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view, it's sensible to remain agnostic about this at least for the present.
In 1994, purchases over the Internet amounted to a mere $20
million. However, in 1995, this figure was expected to reach $200
million, according to the Financial Services Technology Consortium,
and continued explosive growth is expected over the next several
years. Buslness-to-business payments are beginning to cross the
Internet. Online banking and brokerage services are being established.
Payment values, volumes and the degree of cross-border activity are
growing rapidly--so much so that Internet-based transactions could
soon comprise a not insignificant portion of payment system activity.
Moreover, with the proliferation of competing electronic systems,
whether Internet based or not, the landscape is beginning to be
reminiscent of the mid-1800s in the U.S. when commercial banks
issued their own currencies and an integrated nationwide payment
system was a dream, not a reality.
Are there reasons to be concerned about these new retail
payment initiatives? The central answer to this question lies in the
possibility that the trends I have been discussing may entail new
elements of risk we don't yet fully understand.
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o Is the proliferation of payment and payment information
systems working to increase rather than decrease the time
between the exchange of payment transactions and their
ultimate finality?
o Will the ease of access and low cost of these new systems
attract payments of increasing size in ways that enhance
short-term efficiency but increase long-term risk?
o Does the disintermediation of payments away from the
banking system work to make payment systems more or
less accident prone?
o Are the new linkages among systems--national and
international--more or less likely to induce a chain reaction
should one system encounter a major disruption, whether
mechanical or credit in nature?
o Are the risks of unauthorized entry and large scale fraud
greater? And even if security is adequate, who will
guarantee access to electronic cash is unimpeded by
technological failure?
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o And finally, at the extreme, is there a danger that these
trends can produce distortions in the measures of the money
supply thereby further complicating the conduct of monetary
policy?
I don't know the answers to these questions, but they strike me
as critical to consider as we move forward. And, at least for now, I
don't think the answer to them lies in new legislation or regulation
since that could stifle the forces of innovation and creativity. However,
I do believe that in addressing these questions we need to view these
new applications of technology from the vantage of all the hard-won
experience we've had in working to tame wholesale systems over the
past 20 years. Let me suggest five lessons that may help to guide us.
First, we must recognize that neither technology nor payments
systems are ends in and of themselves. They are the means to the
larger ends of the efficient allocation of economic resources within our
society. They are important, if not vital, to economic growth, but it is
that growth itself that is our end game.
In that regard, it would be both fruitless, and ultimately counter
productive, to believe we can or should hinder the infusion of new
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technologies into the payment system. Particularly in the United States
where 60 billion paper checks are still processed and collected each
year, a major shift to electronics holds the potential for reducing the
cost of payments operations and increasing returns to banks, bank
customers and society in general in a significant way. But we must be
careful how we do this. If we learned nothing else during the 80s, we
learned that the impossible can, and sometimes does happen.
Computers fail just as payments overdrafts are mounting; liquidity
problems can complicate creditworthiness; markets can drop
precipitously; interest rates don't move in the same direction
indefinitely--and on and on. Payments systems can be developed in
ways that strengthen and underpin the financial system, allowing it to
weather turmoil, or they can contribute to systemic fragility. And
systemic fragility can damage economic growth just as surely, and
perhaps more violently, than if new technologies were never
introduced.
Second, it is impossible to separate credit and payment systems.
While time intervals are short, there is probably more credit extended
through payment systems than through any other single modality of
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credit extension. This is why depository institutions with their inherent
expertise in assessing credit risk have specialized in payments
operations, and also why central banks take payment systems so
seriously.
It is true that information services can make value transfer more
efficient, and it is also true that central banks that are active as
payment system service providers like the Federal Reserve System may
not have taken the information component of payments as seriously as
they should have. However, I worry about providers of information
technology that offer systems to support retail payments transfer that
attempt to remove credit expertise from the heart of the system. When
the impossible happens, and liquidity is needed to make some new
payment system that has become all-pervasive function, the further
banks and central banks are from the action, the more difficult will be
the solution.
Third, if we reflect on the importance of payments systems to
economic growth, and on their use of credit, we realize that effective
payments systems, whether wholesale or retail, must have certain
crucial characteristics--accuracy, security, reliability, timeliness and
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certainty of value. The means of achieving these characteristics may
vary with the system, but they must be present.
The presence of these attributes, in turn, is determined by the
integration of the system's technology, its structure and participants,
and a legal and regulatory framework that clearly defines the roles,
rights, obligations and liabilities of those who use it. Thus, while it
may come as a surprise to some high-tech vendors, it is not technology
alone, or even primarily technology, that creates a payment system.
Technology interacts with the needs and responsibilities of participants
and with the legal and regulatory realities to define a payment system.
To assess whether new technology is appropriate, we must force
ourselves beyond the relatively narrow concerns of cost, capacity, and
technical feasibility. We must ask if existing control systems,
particularly ways of achieving electronic security, are robust enough for
the new technology, and if the payment system rules and regulations
are compatible and supportive.
Fourth, we've also learned that payment systems function best
when they have a degree of both transparency and effective internal
oversight. In the wholesale payments world, considerable attention has
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been focused on making the ultimate transfer of value as transparent
as to timing as possible. This has been done by emphasizing finality-
that is, irrevocable funds availability at a predictable time. Increasingly,
central banks and other payment system participants have seen the
advantage of systems that grant finality transfer by transfer--so called
real-time gross settlement systems; and in the area of securities
transfer and foreign exchange, systems that achieve simultaneity in the
delivery of security and the cash (so-called DVP) or the two legs of the
FX settlement (so-called PVP). Again--total transparency as to both
timing and irrevocable value.
But wholesale systems did not all start out like this. Many began
as the new retail systems are--as net settlements, largely because the
netting process is so highly efficient. Large value net settlement
systems have been strengthened over the years and continue to be
valuable payment service providers. However, when we look at the
new retail systems, we see that the use of technology could have the
potential to take netting to new heights, with transactions passed
between the ultimate settling banks only on a net, net, net basis. And
if one adds to this mixture the clear technical ability to add larger and
I
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larger value payments to the mix, one wonders whether some of the
surprises we found in large value payments systems won't come back
to haunt us in the new retail systems.
This gets us to the issue of system oversight. As I noted earlier,
legislation and regulation of new payments system alternatives could be
unwise right now, but that does not mean that participants in such
systems should not oversee them or that central banks should not be
concerned. In many clearing houses it is the members who are the
severest regulators of each other, as they realize their ability to be
funded at the end of clearing cycle depends on the strength of the
weakest participant in the clearing. The new broad retail electronic
networks do not invite the same kind of participant control as has been
the case with clearing houses, and I fear the addition of participants is
more a matter of marketing than system control. Banks and other
payments system providers need to ask themselves whether they know
in detail what will happen if a participant fails to make payment, or
computers malfunction, or a power outage stops normal operations.
And, as these systems become more pervasive, enlightened oversight
by central banks will be necessary to ensure that payment system
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rules, controls, and participation all work in the direction of enhancing
financial stability.
In this regard, it is especially intriguing to consider how the
"virtual" bank might be regulated. Some maintain that virtual banking
is "just a new form of bank" to which all the usual rules and
regulations apply. Is it that, or an entirely new financial vehicle that
cuts across existing rules and regulations in ways that render them
meaningless? What happens when a system opens an electronic
account for a customer, and then transfers funds to merchants? Isn't
this a demand deposit account in all but name only? Should this
banking relationship be regulated like any other even though it may
never show up as a bank account? If the point behind bank regulation
is to ensure the depositor of safety and soundness, and limit panic
during times of financial instability, how does that happen when the
package of banking services--even the medium of cash itself--
is provided by any number of service vendors, all or none of whom
might be regulated? Frankly, the regulatory community has just begun
to consider these issues, and much work needs to be done before we
even know all the questions to ask, let alone the answers.
I --
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Finally, drawing on this last point, central banks must continue to
play a large role in strategic payment system development. I
mentioned earlier that the proliferation of different systems and
technologies reminds me of the old days of competing commercial bank
currencies and non-par banking. It would be a shame if in the move to
more electronic retail and wholesale systems, consideration was not
given to how payments initiated in one system can be transferred and
settled in another. One of the reasons the Federal Reserve system
came into being was to create a nationally integrated payment transfer
process; we succeeded beyond our wildest dreams, no doubt
contributing to the lingering popularity of the paper check. Now we are
on the cusp, I hope, in the U.S. of great inroads being made to
decrease paper-based payment volumes, but we cannot lose the fabric
of a nation-wide retail payment system in the process. Similarly,
in the wholesale arena, we have for some time talked about the need to
reduce Herstatt risk. I noted the drive toward PVP systems earlier and
this will certainly be facilitated when Fedwire extends its hours in
1997. We at the Federal Reserve and central banks in general, must
work to develop and guide the payments systems within our nations in
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a strategic and cooperative way to ensure they work together
nationally and internationally.
In closing, let me say that the infusion of new technologies
promises much for payment system development. We need to be
sensitive to the risks, sensitive to the power of new technology and
how it can drive a process to an importance that is unforeseeable at the
outset. We also need to capitalize on the advantages, the increase in
efficiency and the minimization of risk that can come with new
technology. But most of all, we need to ensure the lessons of the past
indeed are there to guide us. Technologically superior payment
systems are only the means to the end, not an end in themselves; they
must be developed in ways that are sensitive to the inherent credit risk
involved in their operation; they must be characterized by accuracy,
security, reliability, timeliness and certainty of value; they must address
issues of finality and participant oversight, and they need central bank
involvement and strategic direction. Technology is a powerful genie,
but it must remain a dutiful servant to the important realities of the
payment system.
Cite this document
APA
Cathy E. Minehan (1996, February 5). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19960206_cathy_e_minehan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19960206_cathy_e_minehan,
author = {Cathy E. Minehan},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1996},
month = {Feb},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19960206_cathy_e_minehan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}