speeches · June 1, 1995
Regional President Speech
Cathy E. Minehan · President
Reflections of a Freshman CEO
Remarks by Cathy E. Minehan,
President and Chief Executive Officer,
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
UMASS Pre-Commencement Dinner
Friday, June 2, 1995
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Reflections of a Freshman CEO
Remarks by Cathy E. Minehan
UMASS Pre-Commencement Dinner
Friday, June 2, 1995
It has now been over a year since I moved from being chief
operating officer to chief executive officer at the Boston Fed. While
there is only one word different in the two titles, the difference
between "operating" and "executive" has been quite dramatic. Today,
I would like to share with you some of my reflections on that
transition, reflections both on the professional aspects of the change
and on the personal. After all, this is the time of year for transitions,
and tomorrow is a very important transition in the lives of the UMASS
Boston graduates who will be honored.
A central part of the shift from COO to CEO at the Fed means
becoming a member of the Federal Open Market Committee--the group
that meets every six weeks to set interest rate policy. In March of last
year, I attended my first FOMC meeting. While I had certainly worked
in the Reserve System for a long time, I had never attended a
Committee meeting. My predecessor Dick Syron never had the good
grace to be away at the time of a meeting, and I never was a "back
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bencher", so it was all new territory. Prior to the meeting I read two
years worth of minutes (honestly, I did) and then sought help-- both
from old friends in New York and from my new staff. Where do I sit?
What really happens? How do I know when to talk? What do I talk
about? And mostly, I thought about two questions: First, how could I,
with a background largely in making things in the Federal Reserve
System work rather than in monetary policy formation, contribute to
this most fundamental task of the central bank? And, second,
especially after I became President, what particular role does the
President of a regional Reserve Bank play in monetary policy making?
I'd like to focus the first part of this talk on the answers to these two
questions.
As most of you know, my formative years at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York were spent largely in the area of payment systems,
and related supporting activities like doing budgets, running computers,
accounting and the like. In the seventies, these areas were a good
definition of the backwaters of a Reserve Bank, but by the eighties,
given changes in technology, the volumes and values of payments
being transferred, and the periodic crises involving payment system
risk, knowing how things actually work, and being able to make them
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work in a problem situation became a powerful adjunct to policy-
making. Thus, it was a great time to be in those areas. We in
operations became the close allies of policy makers in a crisis, and
important players on the team when it came time to figure out how to
handle things better the next time. This was an extraordinary time to
learn, and I've found the lessons of this period very powerful in
establishing the framework within which I make my decisions regarding
monetary policy. What are those lessons?
o That in addition to price stability the country's, if not the
world's, financial stability is the overriding responsibility of
the U.S. central bank;
o That a central bank's credibility is essential to its ability to
step into a crisis as a trusted intermediary and promote
stability; and
o That credibility comes in large measure from the expertise it
develops over the years and, most importantly, the control
the central bank exerts on inflation, since low and stable
rates of inflation produce incentives throughout the
economy that work in the direction of encouraging
productive growth rather than excessive speculation.
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So, to cut to the question reporters like to ask: does this make
me a hawk or a dove? Neither, I think, since I believe the essence of
monetary policy formation is much more subtle than the simplistic
hawk/dove dichotomy. However, the lessons of the 80' s have made
me a staunch defender of the course monetary policy has been
following. I believe the focus on containing inflation begun in the early
part of that decade has resulted in longer periods of cyclical economic
growth, lower interest rates at cycle peaks, and, at the same time,
lower unemployment rates, at cycle troughs. It hasn't been perfect,
but it has laid the groundwork for the United States regaining its
position as one of, if not the, most productive and competitive world
economies. That, I think, is the very definition of success for a central
bank.
With this perspective, I have approached this first year at FOMC
meetings, and now as a voting member, with the old physician's oath
in mind "Do no harm." In 1994, the strength of the economy kept
exceeding most forecasts while inflation remained well controlled; in
anticipation of price problems given tight labor markets and high use of
productive resources in general we at the Fed raised short-term interest
rates seven times. Now in 1995 things are getting especially
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challenging as most indicators suggest the slowdown we were aiming
for seems well underway.
But will it be enough? Is what we're seeing now that long
sought-after "soft landing"--or what might be better characterized as a
levelling-off while still in flight--accompanied by a short cyclical blip in
inflation? Is it the beginning of a downturn and higher inflation, a
recurrence of the dreaded period of "stagflation" of the late 70's, albeit
in single-digit rather than double-digit inflation? Or is it a mere pause in
spending both by consumers and businesses that, given lower long
term interest rates and a better competitive picture in international
markets, will be over by the end of the year with a substantial pick-up
in growth and in inflationary pressures? I think you could find support
for any of these arguments right now, making this an especially
difficult and interesting time for monetary policy makers.
Now on paper, the monetary policy decision process looks
unwieldy--some might even say messy. Nineteen participants--some
appointed with Congressional approval, others selected by private
Boards of Directors with agreement by Washington. Of these
nineteen, twelve members who vote at any point in time, ei~ht on a
permanent basis and the others with votes rotating based on an
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arcane system that at times seems inspired by astrologers. Some
members are based in Washington, others in cities across the country,
the location of which reflect the population and political centers of the
early 1900's. It's hard to believe that such an arrangement would
work well, let alone produce a coherent monetary policy. Nonetheless,
external appearances notwithstanding, I would argue that this
arrangement, this awkward-appearing system of checks and balances,
this blend of public and private inputs, has worked well for many years
and, as I noted earlier, has worked particularly well recently.
Undoubtedly, much of our success has to do with the good
fortune we have had in the men who have served as Chairman. Both
Alan Greenspan and Paul Volcker deserve much of the credit for our
success. But as great as their contributions have been, some of the
credit also goes to this seemingly ungainly federal committee system in
which not all of the input to decisions comes from Washington, D.C.
(or even the combination of Washington, D.C. and New York City) but
some portions come from provincial outposts like St. Louis, Richmond,
and yes, even Boston. Specifically, I believe that the contribution from
outside the Beltway has been a major factor in making the Federal
Open Market Committee an effective institution.
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Economics, as some of you are probably already aware, is NOT
an exact science. This applies fully, if not doubly, to monetary policy,
which, as you know, works only with a lag. Like it or not, forecasts
and reasoned, experienced judgements about future economic
prospects, and about the variety of financial market reactions are an
integral part of monetary policy because of this lag in its impact. Such
judgements and forecasts form a place to start but they necessarily are
surrounded by a cloud of uncertainty.
Recognizing this, it is important to have a wide-ranging, active
debate about the assumptions that underlie the starting point. Where
are the risks to this "best guess?" Are these risks evenly balanced,
or asymmetric to one side or the other? And what the prospects are
for whatever policy is ultimately adopted? This debate means that
more than one perspective, more than one school of thought, more
than one econometric model can make a valuable contribution. And I
also think it means that there's a lot of room for the contributions of
those of us with less mathematical, but more experienced-based
senses of both the tenor of economic growth and the feel of the
markets. Ultimately, monetary policy formation ends up being a
process of exercising judgement, with very few clear-cut rights or
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wrongs. The Committee has to make a call, and to do so we all have
to learn from each other, even from those with whom we ultimately
may disagree.
One of the contributions the "salt water" economists in Boston
have made over the years is to focus FOMC attention squarely on the
fact that while controlling inflation is the key objective of monetary
policy, inflation works through the product and factor markets of the
economy. If you want to understand and predict what inflation will be,
you have to look beyond just money growth or just interest rates or
even Wall Street, to the nonfinancial parts of economic activity. The
1987 stock market crash was a dramatic event, but it hardly put a
dent in the pace of economic activity and ultimately in the upward
creep of inflation. After several false signals from gold and commodity
prices, it has ultimately been the increased pressure of the "real
economy" on our productive capacity that has provided me with the
justification for the Federal Reserve's tighter policy since February
1994. And it will be signals from that real economy first, as well as
reflections on all the other market factors, that will provide the
justification for easier policy when that is needed.
In addition to providing a forum for different schools of economic
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thought to flourish and interact, the decentralized system also provides
insight into economic conditions in each region. A region's economic
experience can differ quite markedly from the national average and
these differences can provide an "early warning" of developments that
could affect the nation as a whole. A case in point is the New England
experience during the 80's. I am told that Frank Morris, then President
of the Boston Fed, was a voice in the wilderness regarding the
problems inherent in the excess of real estate lending in the mid-80's.
This fueled a sizeable economic boom in New England, but the
recession that followed was much deeper than the national downturn.
The combination of a declining economy and a collapsing real estate
market led to severe problems at the region's banks. As banks
struggled to survive, they cut back their lending, which further
exacerbated the regional recession.
New England's problems were later echoed elsewhere; but
because of New England's earlier experience, the FOMC was already
sensitized to the contractionary effect of disruptions to the availability
of bank credit. This was one of the headwinds to which Chairman
Greenspan referred frequently during the early stages of the national
recovery and served as impetus to the monetary policy actions taken
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to counter those headwinds. This experience is testimony, I think, to
the value of the federal committee system, and to the importance of
the regional Reserve Banks in setting national policy. Representing this
District, in some senses representing all of you in this room, is a part of
this job I take very seriously.
Now let· me turn the remainder of my thoughts for you this
evening to some more personal considerations. I noted earlier that two
questions had preoccupied my thoughts as I took over the Boston Fed
CEO position, and became an Open Market Committee member. There
was a third. How important was it that I was the first woman to be
president of the Bank, and the only female peer of eleven other white
male Reserve Bank Presidents? I think after nearly a year I am inclined
to answer that question quite differently than I would have early on.
In progressing through many levels at two Reserve Banks, I had
largely focused on doing the best possible job I could at whatever job I
had. I never considered my gender as either a plus or a minus. Even
when tempted to reflect on a minor setback as perhaps indicative of
sexism, I was always convinced that what I was feeling was some
doubt on the part of others that I was ready for a new challenge,
rather than concern about my ability to meet it simply because I was a
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woman. Reaction to my getting the Boston presidency, however, has
made me rethink and reshape my perspectives in this area, and reflect
a bit on the importance of diversity in the corporate environment, and
in society as a whole.
I must say that the overwhelmingly positive reaction by women
both in banking and in other professions to both the prospect and the
reality of my getting this job has been a pleasant surprise. When Dick
left for the American Stock Exchange, I found myself the focus of a
network of well-placed women around town who saw my getting the
job as an objective of some value. They counseled me, took me to
task when necessary, and generally provided the support that's
necessary when one is enduring months of a public, nationwide search
while also trying to do two jobs--that of the COO and the acting CEO.
Those women were incredibly helpful, because they saw, as perhaps I
didn't at that point, that my getting this position would have powerful
meaning to many other women. And so it has. Women tell me all the
time how remarkable it is to see a woman at my level, and how it
makes their own progress seem more achievable. They see the
diversity that I bring to top levels of the Boston and national financial
scene as an important breakthrough that may be the harbinger of a
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better gender balance at the top in the future.
This is clearly a benefit of increasing diversity within business--an
opening up of new vistas which cannot help but increase the
contribution of our increasingly diverse staff. Moreover, just as our
employees are more diverse, so too is the marketplace in which we all
deal, both here in the U.S. and internationally. To compete in the
global arena , increasingly we must have teams that reflect those who
will buy our products and services. But diversity in the corporate
world and certainly for the larger society itself is far more important
than simply a means to compete. Diversity challenges us as individuals
to define ourselves and what our personal values are, in the midst of a
galaxy of competing cultural and intellectual frameworks. It forces us
to recognize who we are and what we are about in a way that a more
homogenous world never could. This is not an easy challenge--for
many it is incredibly difficult.
For some diversity increases choice. For others it increases
competition. For a few, however, it is a scapegoat that can be blamed
for one's inability to deal well in the larger society. I think we've seen
the uglier side of the threat that our increasingly diverse society can
pose in recent months, in a very minor way in the questions raised
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about affirmative action goals and in divisive rhetoric both locally and
nationally, and in an exponentially more important way in what we've
begun to learn about the extremists who have so forcefully
commanded the front pages of our newspapers. Diversity demands
tolerance, but we as educated people cannot be tolerant of extremes
of thought and action brought on by ignorance, frustration or racial
hatred. We must work against extremism, and uphold those standards
of human discourse that define a just society. We must make it
possible to celebrate the next woman who becomes a CEO, the next
African-American who becomes a leader, the next gay person who
assumes responsibility as a sign of hope for both those minorities
amongst us and for all the rest of us as well. And I must say that
institutions like UMASS-Boston, with its commitment to both diversity
and the best standards of education, stand as shining beacons as we
try to find our way to that just society we treasure.
In closing let me say that the past year has been an extraordinary
time for me. I've learned a lot about what it takes to be effective in
the area of monetary policy formation, and how to go about
representing this region. I've also developed a new perspective about
the benefits of diversity, and some of the challenges it presents. But
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most of all I've been struck by the enormity of the responsibility this
job brings with it. After attending FOMC meetings for about nine
months, my rotation as a voting member came around this past
January. Blithely I thought that the change would make little
difference since each FOMC member, voting or not, contributes equally
to the discussion. Imagine my shock then when I found myself almost
shaking when my name was called for my first vote. Exercise of that
responsibility cannot be a rote or mechanical function; the very real
human impact is too important. To me this position is the pinnacle of
a career spent in public service and the intellectual challenge of it, as
well as the ability to make a real impact on the country's economic
welfare, make it an incredible opportunity as well.
I appreciate your allowing me to share these thoughts with you
tonight. I've enjoyed the chance to reflect and I hope you have as
well. Thank you.
Cite this document
APA
Cathy E. Minehan (1995, June 1). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19950602_cathy_e_minehan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19950602_cathy_e_minehan,
author = {Cathy E. Minehan},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1995},
month = {Jun},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19950602_cathy_e_minehan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}