speeches · November 30, 1994
Regional President Speech
E. Gerald Corrigan · President
3/20/2018 A nation's commercial banks and central bank are reflections of each other | Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
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Published December 1, 1994 | December 1994 issue
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The issue of the relation between commercial banks and the
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central bank is a broad, general one which, if I adhere to it, risks a
lack of focus in my remarks this morning. Nevertheless, I intend to
adhere to it because, as I reflected upon this subject, it became
clear that the relation is an important and far-reaching one, with
potentially significant implications for a country's economic
performance.
My "theme" this morning, in fact, is that a nation's commercial
banks and central bank are reflections of each other. They are
likely to succeed or fail together. While this theme may have some
intuitive appeal in the arena of bank supervision and regulation—
where there are clearly overlapping if not common interests—it
may be less obvious in other areas of central bank responsibility
and of commercial bank activity. It is, however, my firm conviction
that the conduct of monetary policy (macroeconomic stabilization
responsibilities) and payment system responsibilities are also
critical components of central bank-commercial bank relations.
In market economies, the banking system plays a critical role in
gathering funds from the public—mobilizing savings—and in
channeling these credit resources to their most effective uses.
Economies with minimal or underdeveloped banking systems will
typically find capital formation, productivity and growth inhibited.
An effective banking system can contribute over time to economic
growth.
Payments processing
The banking system is also a major processor of payments—
frequently the backbone of the payments system of a country. The
role of an efficient, reliable, smoothly functioning payments
system, as a contributor to economic prosperity, often is
overlooked or at least underestimated because it is taken for
granted in many industrial countries. We assume, when
depositing funds with currency or check, that appropriate credit
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will occur, and the counterparty's account correctly debited. And
we assume the same scenario with the electronic movement of
funds. In countries geographically vast, for example the United
States and Russia, timely movement of balances and account
information is no small accomplishment. Yet the effective conduct
of commerce, at a high and sustainable level, depends on it.
Businesses and consumers need to be confident that funds are
transferred timely and accurately; if not, the economy has to rely
too heavily on cash and/or barter, inherently less efficient means
of payment.
Integral to a smoothly functioning payments system, are
intangibles which, as experience demonstrates, are critical in
virtually all aspects of banking. These intangibles are concepts
such as confidence, trust, integrity and stability. In the United
States, consumers and businesses worry little if at all about the
mechanics of payments. They that know with confidence that the
system can and will move funds and information routinely, within
specific deadlines, and rarely give it a thought. This is what I
meant about underestimating the importance of a payments
system.
Similarly, there is a good deal of confidence—trust, if you will—
that the financial institutions doing business today will be there
tomorrow. It has not always been so, but today's system is
reasonably stable.
The Federal Reserve System, through the 12 district Reserve
banks, is a major provider of payments services. The Fed is active
in check clearing, electronic funds transfer, securities transfer,
currency provision and destruction, and the accounting of
commercial bank reserve balances that coincide with payments.
Commercial banks, of course, are also major providers of
payments services, and in general deal with a much broader
range of customers than the central bank. In the United States,
the Fed provides payments services directly only to insured
depository institutions.
The Federal Reserve is also a regulator of payments system
practices and provides a safety net under the U.S. payments
system, explicitly with regard to movement of large dollar funds by
wire and implicitly under other payments in times of instability and
disruption. It should be emphasized that large dollar payments
systems, where banks exchange claims on each other, are
vulnerable to major disruption should a participant fail. Such
systems handle a large volume of payments for goods, services
and financial transactions, and failure of a participant could be
highly disruptive to the financial system and, potentially, to the
economy. Because of the magnitude of these consequences, the
central bank has a role to play in assuring the integrity of the
system.
To be sure, there is tension from time to time between commercial
banks and the central bank over payments issues, due to the
Federal Reserve's dual role as regulator of, and participant in, the
payments system. We in the Federal Reserve System have dealt
with this tension by establishing a barrier between our regulatory
responsibilities on the one hand, and our participatory activities on
the other. Nevertheless, some tension remains.
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I believe most would agree that, both through regulation and
provision of the safety net, the Federal Reserve has contributed to
the reliability of the payments system and has helped to provide
and to strengthen those intangibles—trust, confidence, stability—
which I earlier emphasized. Our direct participation in the
provision of payments services has contributed as well,
particularly in times of stress in the banking system when direct,
hands-on experience is of particular value in resolving problems.
Supervision
As these comments imply, an effective banking system requires a
high degree of trust and confidence. It is here that a central bank's
supervisory and regulatory responsibilities are particularly
valuable because, if carried out thoroughly and well, they can
provide assurance that banking institutions are conducting their
affairs in a safe and sound manner, and in a manner consistent
with international banking standards. This helps to give
customers, domestic and foreign, confidence that they can count
on the performance of the institutions in question. I am convinced
that effective supervision and regulation is in the interest of
commercial bankers. It helps to make their institution credible,
internationally and domestically, so that they can participate fully
in global markets and with a diverse base of customers.
Supervision alone will not accomplish such participation, however.
A comprehensive financial infrastructure, encompassing the
foundations of law, accounting and regulation, is needed for the
success of a market-based banking system. More specifically, a
legal framework that protects private property rights and that
supports debt recovery, liquidation and bankruptcy is essential.
Adoption of accounting and auditing standards comparable to
those accepted internationally, which will measure the conditions
of banks consistently and accurately, is also critical.
It is instructive to note that over its history the United States has
experimented with both banking structures and approaches to
banking supervision. For example, during the Free Banking Era,
roughly a 25-year experiment in the middle of the 19th century,
US banks were restricted by law and regulation much less than
ever before (or since). Allowing such freedom in banking did not
work well: Many free banks closed, and many of the notes they
issued lost value. Thus, customers of the free banks were losers.
One explanation for this performance is that little government
oversight encouraged dishonest bankers to form so-called
"wildcat banks" whose purpose was to defraud the public.
A more careful reading of the evidence on this period suggests a
different explanation, however. Bank problems, rather than
attributable primarily to fraud, resulted from declines in the prices
of bank assets, leading to impairment of bank capital and to runs
on banks and in some cases to insolvency and/or closure. Many
of the banks opened in the free banking states, although initially
reasonably well capitalized, had asset portfolios that were
insufficiently diversified and insufficiently liquid to weather the
economic shocks of the period. Whatever the cause, it is
undeniable that free banking did not work well.
The Federal Reserve System was established in 1913 after a
series of financial problems and panics which had characterized
the second half of the 19th century and the early years of the
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20th. There were several problems with which banking systems of
the time seemed unable to cope:
Money and credit did not, at times, grow commensurately with
the needs of the economy. Economic expansion thus was
constrained by financial shortages.
There were sharp seasonal fluctuations in the cost and
availability of credit, which were disruptive to sectors of the
economy.
There were impediments to the flow of credit to its most
effective uses, thus interfering with the efficient allocation of
resources.
Not only were financial institutions and their immediate customers
affected by these problems, but also such disruptions frequently
spilled over to adversely affect the level of employment and output
in the economy more generally. Part of the problem, as during the
free banking era, was that bank asset portfolios were insufficiently
diversified, in terms of both type of credit and geographic location
of the borrower, so that, once a "shock" depressed values, the
effects on particular institutions could be very large.
In response to these problems, the new central bank was to
prevent or at least contain banking panics, to provide for growth in
money and credit in line with the needs of the economy, and to
smooth out seasonal fluctuations in credit availability. These
objectives are still with us today, 80 plus years after formation of
the Federal Reserve.
As demonstrated particularly by the Depression of the 1930s,
achievement of the original objectives of the Federal Reserve Act
did not come easily and, indeed, central banking in our country is
still evolving. The difficult experience of the 1930s led to changes
in the Federal Reserve's structure which remain in place today.
Significantly, legislation of the 1930s also expanded the safety net
underpinning banking, with the establishment of deposit
insurance. Deposit insurance changed the financial landscape
profoundly by making the banking system far more stable and
less subject to runs by nervous depositors. It also altered
incentives for bankers, leading to a tendency to excessive risk
taking in their portfolios and practices, although it took some time
for this tendency to appear.
Deposit insurance creates a "moral hazard" problem. When
insured, depositors have little if any incentive to care about the
calibre of the institutions with which they do business. Hence, risk
taking is priced too low, and as a consequence too much risk is
assumed. Some remedies that have been suggested are to limit
or eliminate insurance; to raise bank capital requirements, so
owners have more at stake; and to regulate and supervise bank
activities so as to avoid excessive risk taking.
The rationale for the supervision and regulation of banks by the
Federal Reserve and other regulatory organizations is to offset
the tendency for excessive risk taking as a consequence of
deposit insurance and other elements of the safety net. Deposit
insurance is a valuable subsidy to banks, but the cost is that the
institutions are subject to regulation and supervision of activities,
essentially a quid pro quo.
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Thus, despite commitment in the United States to market
determined outcomes, the banking system has been deemed
"special," sufficiently special so that at least some of its creditors
(depositors) are protected by a safety net of deposit insurance. In
addition, banks have access to the Federal Reserve discount
window to meet short-term and seasonal needs for liquidity. All
such borrowing from the Federal Reserve is fully collateralized.
The United States has made the public policy choice to enhance
the stability of the banking system with the safety net; many other
countries have made the same decision. Once such a decision is
made, supervision and regulation of banking logically follow.
The focus of supervision is to assure banks are well managed,
with strong earnings and capital positions, ample liquidity to
satisfy increases in loan demand or deposit withdrawals, and
high-quality assets well diversified by borrower, economic sector
and geography. Banks that fail to display these characteristics are
subject to supervisory actions to strengthen their position.
As would be expected, tension can arise from time to time
between commercial banks and the central bank in the
supervision and regulation area. From one perspective, this is as
it should be, for the regulator's responsibility is not that of
advocate of, or spokesperson for, the industry. Rather, the
regulator must keep public policy objectives at the forefront,
objectives which will benefit the economy as a whole rather than
banking or any other specific industry.
Nevertheless, many bankers no doubt see considerable value in
supervision. It acts as an objective outside check on their policies
and practices, "certifying" their soundness and integrity. Further, it
adds to banks' credibility, assuring customers, domestic and
foreign, that the institution meets solid prudential standards. This
assists the bank, and the system as a whole, in attracting and
retaining resources, to the long-range benefit of the economy.
Increasingly, regulations, and in particular requirements for bank
capital, have become standardized internationally under the
auspices of the Bank for International Settlements. The
advantages of such an approach are clear. When banks adhere to
such standards, they and their customers can be reasonably
confident of the quality of the institutions with which they are
dealing. Uncertainty is reduced. Moreover, the playing field for
banks competing in the international arena is leveled.
Stabilization policy
The third major area of responsibility of the US central bank is
monetary policy. While this function may at first seem far removed
from the banking issues and concerns I have previously
discussed, it is in fact integrated with these other matters. It is
very difficult to have an effective, smoothly functioning, sound
banking system in an unstable macroeconomic environment.
An unstable economy may have several unfavorable
consequences. The health of particular sectors of the economy
will ebb and flow, in the process imposing losses on creditors
(banks) and possibly on their depositors as well. I've commented
previously on the need for diversification of a bank's asset
portfolio, but even extensive diversification may be insufficient if
the economy swings sharply between boom and recession. There
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is no doubt that bank balance sheets are healthier in a sound
economy. Conversely, there is no practical way for banks to avoid
all the effects of dislocations in their domestic economy.
Instability marked by rapid inflation undermines the value of the
currency and can contribute to a flight from deposits in the home
currency. Rapid inflation also can make it difficult for bankers to
judge the creditworthiness of various business enterprises, thus
interfering with sound credit extension practices. Inflation may
also spur a return to barter, a highly inefficient transactions
mechanism.
Inflation adversely affects economic performance—resource
allocation, growth, productivity—because price signals are
distorted. Decision-makers have difficulty distinguishing between
a general rise in the price level and a change in relative prices.
The latter should shift resources to the activity where prices have
risen, while the former has no such implications for resource
allocation.
A good deal of evidence has now been accumulated which
demonstrates that countries with low inflation generally
outperform economies with high inflation. Similarly, evidence
demonstrates that, over time, the economy of a given country
performs better, in terms of employment, growth, and so on, in
periods of low inflation. There is even a school of thought that
says the severity of the Depression of the 1930s in the United
States was in part a consequence of flight from the dollar—
because of fear that it would depreciate in value relative to other
currencies—rather than a run on US banks, because of fear of
their failure.
It is widely acknowledged that an overly expansive monetary
policy is the root cause of persistent inflation. The central bank
may simply permit money and credit to grow too rapidly. On the
other hand, the central bank may be responding to a variety of
pressures: pressure to finance large fiscal deficits, pressure to
achieve unrealistically low unemployment targets, pressure to
provide short-term support for faltering business enterprises, to
name a few.
At least in the United States, and I suspect in many other
countries, banks are central to the transmission of monetary
policy to the economy at large. It is the banking sector that is
among the first to feel the effects of changes in monetary policy,
as reserve conditions are directly and promptly affected by
Federal Reserve actions.
Banks, in turn, transmit policy changes to at least some of their
customers. Borrowers with floating rate obligations may be
affected almost immediately, and other customers may well find
conditions changed when they come to roll over loans or to obtain
new credit.
While large, international businesses frequently have direct
access to domestic and foreign financial markets at competitive
terms, medium and small-sized businesses tend to rely much
more heavily on banks, and other intermediaries, for financing. It
is such businesses, as well as consumers, that typically are most
significantly affected by policy changes. For even if all borrowers
face the same general change in interest rates, customers of
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banks and other intermediaries may experience a change in
creditor attitudes which can magnify the effect of the change in
rates, for better or for worse.
Summary
Let me conclude by summarizing the points I have attempted to
make this morning. It is my view that commercial banks and the
central bank of a country are reflections of each other. A healthy,
efficient banking system goes hand-in-hand with a dependable,
independent central bank. The activities of both are inextricably
intertwined, and the institutions undeniably share a commonality
of interests.
Central bank supervision of commercial banks, helping to assure
maintenance of standards and sound banking practices,
contributes to the health of the industry and to the trust and
confidence upon which banking depends. The safety net
contributes to this objective as well.
Similarly, effective central bank stabilization policy provides an
environment in which banks can thrive; one in which they can go
about the business of meeting the legitimate needs of their
customers without undue concern for capricious fluctuations in
economic conditions or asset values.
Further, as I have noted, a reliable and efficient payments system
in which both commercial banks and the central bank participate
enhances economic activity, encouraging smooth exchange of
goods and services and of financial claims, and efficient allocation
of resources.
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Cite this document
APA
E. Gerald Corrigan (1994, November 30). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19941201_e_gerald_corrigan
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19941201_e_gerald_corrigan,
author = {E. Gerald Corrigan},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1994},
month = {Nov},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19941201_e_gerald_corrigan},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}