speeches · September 3, 1990
Regional President Speech
W. Lee Hoskins · President
federal
RESERVE
For release: Immediately
September 4,1990 o
Bank of
Cleveland
A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS:
OBSERVATIONS FROM ABROAD
W. Lee Hoskins, President
Federal Reserve Batik of Cleveland
Bayerischer Hof
Munich, Germany
September 4,1990
PO BOX 6387
C L E V E L A N
OH 4 4 10 1
A European System of Central Banks:
Observations From Abroad
The European Economic Community (EEC), hoping to strengthen the economic
benefits of the Single-Market Initiative, seems headed toward monetary union as
outlined in the Delors Commission's report. That route would eventually establish a
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) with powers to conduct a common
monetary policy and, presumably, to issue a single European currency.
Throughout history, nations have devised many institutions to carry out these
same tasks, often relying primarily on the private sector and market discipline, and
giving governments a minimal role. Today, central banks, functioning as extensions
of governments and issuing fiat currencies, attempt to ensure monetary stability.
Moreover, we have come to call upon central banks to perform many operations that
extend well beyond the traditional definition of providing monetary stability. The
record of central banks on monetary stability leaves much to be desired. The fact that
central banks have not provided a stable price level over prolonged periods of time
should be foremost in the minds of those charged with the formation of a European
monetary union.
Today, in the context of comments on the Delors Report, I will describe those
institutional attributes that, in theory, infuse central banks with their social worth. I
will make the case that price stability should be the primary objective of a central bank
and propose a structure to achieve that objective. I will also point out some pitfalls to
avoid should you establish a European System of Central Banks.
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Economic Benefits of a Monetary Union
Benefits of the economic unification of Europe will accrue primarily from the
removal of artificial restraints on the movement of goods, services, labor, and capital.
The gains from trade, as resources seek their most efficient use, will occur with or
without the establishment of a common monetary policy or the existence of a single
currency. In the last century, the various German states achieved substantial
economic gains from the Zollverein (customs union) before they achieved political
and monetary union. Nevertheless, with appropriate safeguards, a monetary union
can augment the benefits of a single market.
Discussions of monetary union often emphasize the gains that could result from
eliminating the exchange risks and currency-conversion costs associated with
intra-European trade. In reality, however, these costs are relatively small and
unimportant. Any benefits from European monetary union will result most directly
from the ability to strengthen money as a medium of exchange, as a temporary store of
value, and as a unit of account. Acting in these capacities, money reduces the
information and transaction costs associated with commerce, thereby allowing for
better decisions, longer-term contracts, and improved productivity.
As German business people know so well, the economic efficiencies of money
depend first and foremost on the stability of its purchasing power. Issuers of money
must forge a trust with those who hold that money or denominate their wealth in it.
When that trust is eroded, individuals and businesses devise elaborate and expensive
schemes to minimize their cash holdings and to protect their wealth. Such
unproductive uses of resources necessarily lessen the economic benefits afforded from
the use of money. Should the trust between issuers and holders of money collapse
completely, so too will the functions of money, and trade will revert to barter.
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The Primary Objective of a Central Bank: Price Stability
The primary role of a central bank is to provide an immutable guarantee of the
long-term stability of the purchasing power of money. In this way, a central bank
maximizes the efficiencies that money affords and creates an environment conducive
to sustained growth in the standard of living. Countries with relatively low, stable
rates of inflation seem to experience relatively faster rates of real economic growth J
Price stability not only eliminates the need to hedge against inflation, but it removes
an important source of uncertainty associated with making long-term contracts and
committing to long-term investments. Price stability also cements the social contract
whereby governments do not impose taxes on wealth without the consent of their
citizens.^ The uncertainty and hidden taxes that inflation generates reduce long-term
investments, which have proven vital to technological advances and sustained real
economic growth.
The prominence given to price stability in nearly all proposals for a European
central bank is heartening. The Delors report recommends that price stability be the
primary objective of the ESCB and encourages the central bank to support other
Community economic policies and exchange-rate stabilization only when price
stability is not compromised.
In recommending this approach, the Delors Commission is following the German
example of central banking. The Deutsche Bundesbank Act specifies that the primary
function of the Bundesbank is to "safeguard the currency." The Act also requires the
Bundesbank to support the economic policies of the Federal Government, but only
"without prejudicing" its primary function.^ Nevertheless, I am concerned that in
some subtle — yet important -- respects, the Bundesbank model is not strictly
appropriate for the ESCB.
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Terms such as "safeguarding the currency," "monetary stability," or "price
stability" are ambiguous. In common usage, for example, price stability has at least
three interpretations. To some individuals, it implies that prices can rise, but not to
such an extent that inflation affects private decisions. Others interpret price stability
as an expected zero-inflation rate, but see no need to offset actual jumps in the price
index. Accordingly, the price index can drift up or down. A third interpretation of
price stability requires the central bank to offset any deviations in the price level from
its baseline value.
The Bundesbank views its principal directive, "safeguarding the currency," as a
mandate for price stability in the sense of not allowing inflation to affect private
decisions. More important, the Bundesbank interprets this directive very narrowly in
its operations, exhibiting a general distaste for inflation exceeding 2 or 2.5 percent per
year. Consistent with its legal mandate, the Bundesbank does at times pursue other
policy objectives, notably exchange-rate stabilization. Yet, the Bundesbank has
maintained its credibility in pursuing price stability. Credibility is important because
it reduces the real economic costs of maintaining price stability in the face of random
economic shocks or policy errors that periodically buffet price indexes.
As the Delors Commission undoubtedly realizes, the Deutsche Bundesbank Act
provides the Bundesbank with a foundation for its credibility. But more important,
through years of steadfastly interpreting its primary directive narrowly, the
Bundesbank has built a strong reputation for consistently pursuing low inflation. This
reputation has strengthened a rather vaguely stated official objective. No other
central bank enjoys a similar level of credibility for price stability.
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The ESCB, initially, will lack such a reputation. Because reputations are slow to
build and quick to vanish, many economists recommend that central banks adopt
rules for price stability that are verifiable, unambiguous, and enforceable. I have long
advocated such a rule for the Federal Reserve System, and I would encourage the
European Community to adopt a similar price-stability directive.
I have suggested that the Federal Reserve System adopt a stable price level as the
sole target for monetary policy. When prices deviate from the baseline level, the
System must act to bring prices back in line.^ I also support Congressional legislation
to underscore the importance of price-level targeting. Such a system would be easy to
monitor and the legislature could easily hold the central bank accountable for
attaining the directive.
An Institutional Structure to Achieve the Price-Stability Objective
To secure a goal of price stability for the ESCB, the European Community must
craft an institutional structure to carry out that task. The structure must offer no
leeway for political maneuvering, which ultimately would undermine the central
bank's pledge of price stability.
A perennial issue in the debates about central banking -- one especially germane
to the establishment of the ESCB -- is how to balance central-bank independence from
political pressures, and central-bank accountability to the public. The Delors
Commission, wisely choosing the Bundesbank as a model, recommended that the
ESCB be independent of European fiscal authorities, but nevertheless noted the need
to make the central bank accountable to the "democratic process."
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Independence: Countries that afford their central banks a high degree of
independence typically have experienced lower rates of inflation.^ The basic
requirements to ensure central-bank independence are that the central bank have no
obligation to purchase the debt of any fiscal authority, and that the respective finance
ministers be excluded from voting on monetary policy. Nevertheless, concern
remains because most European central banks presently assist in financing their
governments' fiscal budgets. Many, for example, pre-finance their governments'
budgets, by buying and re-selling the debt. Even the Bundesbank can grant
temporary short-term credit to the government. The ESCB must remain free of all
hints of fiscal assistance if it hopes to establish credibility for price stability.
Although buying government debt is the most direct and obvious linkage
between central banks and fiscal authorities, indirect channels of influence also exist.
The structure of the Federal Reserve System attempts to minimize these indirect
connections between the power to create money and the ability to spend public
funds. For example, the Federal Reserve System is self-financing. The System
generates its own revenues, pays its own bills, and remits its profits to the U.S.
Treasury. The Federal Reserve System is not subject to the appropriations process of
the U.S. Congress, since this could prove to be a conduit for political pressures.
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The governance structure of a central bank can also affect its susceptibility to
political influence. Within the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) decides monetary policy by a majority vote of the seven
governors and the five voting District Bank presidents/ The President of the United
States, with Senate confirmation, appoints the seven governors of the Federal Reserve
Board. To minimize the potential for political influence, the Federal Reserve Act
stipulates that governors serve a single 14-year term/ Each District Bank's board of
directors, with the approval of the Board of Governors, appoints a president of that
regional Reserve Bank. The District-Bank directors represent banking and other
public interests in each district. Commercial banks elect most of the directors, and the
Board of Governors chooses the remainder. This dispersion of power among different
individuals who have come to the central bank through different paths, and with
different allegiances, helps to reduce the concentration of political interests and to
lessen the impact of external political influences on the central bank.
An analysis of the voting record by Federal Reserve Bank presidents and
governors highlights the importance of a decentralized structure for a central bank.
Over the past 25 years, as our price index rose nearly fourfold, presidents were twice
as likely as governors to dissent from the FOMC's majority in favor of a tighter
monetary policy, while governors were five times as likely as presidents to dissent
from the majority in favor of an easier monetary policy/
Although Germany has a central bank with a similar decentralized structure,
nearly all other European nations seem to favor a more centralized arrangement. As
the European Community considers the governance structure of the ESCB, it should
be careful not to adopt a structure that could compromise the price stability objective.
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Accountability: While supporting the independence of the ESCB, the Delors
report stresses a need to make the central bank accountable to the "democratic
process." Central banks are products of governments and as such are naturally
accountable to the governmental entities that create them. This accountability can
provide a useful support for central banks, or it can become a serious impediment to
their proper functioning. The outcome depends on how a nation or a group of nations
frames central-bank accountability.
When a nation does not assess central bank performance in terms of an
unambiguous, verifiable goal, such as price stability, accountability is a detriment to
the smooth functioning of a central bank and becomes an avenue for political
influence. The Federal Reserve System offers an example. The United States Congress
created the System and retains the power to alter its form and function. Congress
requires the System "...to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
price stability, and moderate long-term interest rates." However, Congress allows the
System discretion in how best to pursue these goals.
With multiple goals and no overall ranking of System objectives, the criterion for
success — the measure of accountability — is ambiguous and subject to change.
Priorities will shift as political and economic circumstances alter the implicit weights
that elected officials assign to specific objectives. Being ultimately responsible to
Congress, the Federal Reserve System has an incentive to alter the weights that it gives
to various goals. This provides monetary-policy decisions with a myopic focus.
Fashioned in this manner, accountability becomes the antithesis of independence.
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When, instead, legislatures measure accountability in terms of an operationally
unambiguous and technically achievable goal, accountability effectively complements
central-bank independence by giving the central bank a single, long-term focus.
Self-imposed monetary rules can lack force and credibility with the public because a
believable enforcement mechanism does not exist. Consider this issue for a moment.
Has a central-bank policy committee ever dismissed itself for generating inflation, or
for consistently missing a monetary target? When a superior legislative body, which
is responsive to the public, imposes the rules on a central bank, those rules are more
likely to be enforced and are more credible. For this reason, I, along with a number of
other Federal Reserve officials, have supported Congressional legislation in the United
States mandating price stability as the Federal Reserve's primary goal.
Although most legislatures acknowledge the importance of preventing inflation,
none specify price stability as the sole business of central banks and few even accord it
top priority. The Delors report envisions the ESCB undertaking other economic
functions, notably exchange-rate stability. I object to such contingency plans on two
counts: First, they create doubts about a central bank's willingness and ability to
pursue its primary objective. Second, these contingencies are often technically
infeasible and of dubious economic merit.
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Foreign-Exchange Intervention: The Delors report, for example, would instruct
the ESCB to smooth ECU (European Currency Unit) exchange-rate movements.
Research indicates that central banks cannot conduct intervention separate from
monetary policy. Focusing monetary policy on an exchange rate is, at times,
consistent with price stability, such as when a central bank acts to prevent an
inflation-induced depreciation of its currency. Just as easily, however, intervention
can be inconsistent with price stability. Then, intervention raises doubts about the
central bank's commitment to pursue a stable price level. If traders expect policy to
switch between price and exchange-rate objectives, they will continue to hedge
against inflation and exchange risk, creating uncertainty and costs. Intervention then
reduces the efficiency of money.
Inflation-Unemployment Trade-off: Similarly, many legislators on both sides of
the Atlantic believe that central banks should attempt to exploit possible short-term
trade-offs between inflation and unemployment in an attempt to stabilize the business
cycle. I disagree with such attempts. Besides jeopardizing credibility, such attempts
are not systematically feasible. Money stock changes can temporarily alter
employment and output only if these changes confuse individuals about the nature of
price movements or if market frictions prevent individuals from adjusting prices
quickly. In either case, there is no stable trade-off between real economic activity and
inflation. As markets anticipate the resulting inflation, more and more inflation is
built into the economy, quite independent of the phase of the business cycle. U.S.
inflation immediately after the last recession was roughly as high as it was at the
business-cycle peak in the late 1960s.
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Financing Debt: The ESCB could face a unique challenge to price stability
because of the ability of national governments in the European Community to issue
debt. Because many European nations are large relative to credit markets, with
monetary union the debt of some individual nations could raise interest rates
throughout the Community. Pressures on the central bank to avoid high interest rates
could result in the ESCB inadvertently financing the borrowing of individual member
countries. Some European countries have fiscal policies that seem unsustainable.
Other nations support various inefficient industries. With the power to create money
no longer vested at the national level, some countries could experience difficulties in
placing debt. This further highlights the need for a price-level target.
Financial Panic Questions also arise concerning the role of the ESCB should a
government or a state-run enterprise default on its obligations. Major defaults, stock
market crashes, and other shocks occasionally buffet the economy, producing financial
panics.^ A financial panic can slow money growth dramatically and place strong
downward pressure on prices. In such cases, an increase in the monetary base is
consistent with an objective of price stability.
Financial panics are especially precarious because, in confronting them, a central
bank must stabilize the price level without providing bailouts to specific institutions
or groups of institutions. Should it fail, the public will come to view the central bank
as a political institution and will question its commitment to price stability.
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To avoid the perception of political expedience, the central bank must approach
the task in a manner that emphasizes its macroeconomic aspects, rather than its
lender-of-last-resort character. The general objective is to provide a temporary
injection of liquidity without attempting to prop up insolvent firms or even giving
such a perception. Supplying liquidity exclusively through open-market operations
not only avoids loans to specific institutions, but is also more efficient. Offering loans
to individual banks, especially institutions that are approaching insolvency, creates a
moral hazard problem that, in the long run, can increase the frequency of financial
crises. Lending, and the associated moral hazard problems, requires the central bank
to spend substantial resources on the supervision and regulation of the financial
community.
Implicit in a macroeconomic approach to financial crisis is a willingness to allow
individual institutions, even large ones, to fail. Discount-window lending,
particularly at, or below, market rates, can easily become a subsidy to firms that do
not meet the market test. If the European Economic Community is unable to allow
certain firms to fail, it should remove the bailout function from the central bank and
vest that responsibility in an independent agency that is directly responsible to the
European Council and European Parliament. The European Parliament should fund
the bailouts through direct budgetary appropriations. Such an arrangement would
ensure direct political accountability for the bailouts, while preserving the monetary
integrity of the central bank.
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Conclusion: Monopoly or Competition?
The Delors Commission seeks to grant the ESCB a European monopoly for the
issuance of fiat money. I have suggested four general criteria to ensure that this
institution produces an efficient product: first, unambiguously establish price
stability as the sole objective of the central bank; second, make any
government-sponsored central bank completely independent from fiscal authorities;
third, hold the central bank accountable to a legislative body (i.e., the Parliament)
solely for attainment of a stable-price rule; and fourth, address any financial crisis that
threatens price stability only through open-market operations.
The Delors report, using the Deutsche Bundesbank as a model, endorses most of
these recommendations. However, beyond Germany, few European nations
appreciate the dangers of mingling the power to spend with the power to issue fiat
currency. I find it difficult to accept the argument that governments, which
individually resort to the inflation tax, will collectively choose to avoid that revenue
source, particularly in an arrangement that lessens the dominance of the Bundesbank.
Today, Germany's low-inflation monetary policy provides a price anchor to countries
participating in the Exchange-Rate Mechanism. An ESCB structure that dilutes
Germany's influence without establishing a clear, mandatory price-level target, will
almost certainly make Germany worse off.
If the EEC cannot adopt a legal commitment to price stability along the lines that I
have suggested here, Germany might not wish to grant the EEC a monopoly in this
area. Instead, Germany might foster a monetary-policy competition by strengthening
sanctions against countries that might attempt to reimpose barriers to the free
movement of capital and real resources.
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The resource movements associated with the Single-Market Initiative will confer
great benefits on the European Economic Community. They will create natural
competition for sound government policies, and the movements of resources across
borders will effectively register votes on policy. Governments that institute excessive
rates of taxation, through inflation or more explicit means, will see their tax bases
shrink. This competition will foster, indeed encourage, coordination of monetary and
fiscal policies even without the establislunent of a single European central bank. This
competition either will produce an evolutionary convergence of inflationary
preferences among the European states, thereby completing the groundwork for
monetary union, or it will graphically illustrate the impossibility of forcing monetary
union on countries with different inflation preferences.
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FOOTNOTES
1 See William T. Gavin, "In Defense of Zero Inflation," Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland Working Paper 9005 (June 1990), for discussion and references to
evidence.
2 See David Altig and Charles T. Carlstrom, "Inflation and the Personal Tax Code:
Assessing Indexation," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper 9006
(July 1990). —» - '
3 This English translation of the Deutsche Bundesbank Act is found in The
Deutsche Bundesbank, Its Monetary Policy Instruments and Functions, Deutsche
Bundesbank Special Series No.7 (October 1982).
4 A 2 percent band around the target level would be acceptable provided that the
target is an unchanging price level.
5 See "Central Bank Independence," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Annual
Report 1989 for a discussion and references to evidence.
6 All twelve district bank Presidents attend the FOMC and participate in its
deliberations, but only five of the twelve vote at any particular time.
7 Some appointments, however, fill out vacancies left in existing terms.
8 "Central Bank Independence," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Annual
Report 1989, footnote 3, page 18.
9 A price level target could eliminate a historic source of such shocks: abrupt shifts
in monetary policy.
Cite this document
APA
W. Lee Hoskins (1990, September 3). Regional President Speech. Speeches, Federal Reserve. https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19900904_w_lee_hoskins
BibTeX
@misc{wtfs_regional_speeche_19900904_w_lee_hoskins,
author = {W. Lee Hoskins},
title = {Regional President Speech},
year = {1990},
month = {Sep},
howpublished = {Speeches, Federal Reserve},
url = {https://whenthefedspeaks.com/doc/regional_speeche_19900904_w_lee_hoskins},
note = {Retrieved via When the Fed Speaks corpus}
}